mirza zulfiqur rahman- mphil synopsis

8/4/2019 Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman- MPhil Synopsis

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Indias Foreign Policy and Look East Diplomacy: An Analysis of Indias strategic

interests in Myanmar vis--vis China and developmental vision for Northeast India

MPhil Research Synopsis

Submitted to

Professor Pushpesh Pant

Submitted by

Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman

MPhil Candidate, Diplomacy and Disarmament Division

Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament

School of International Studies

Jawaharlal Nehru University

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Background:

Myanmars strategic location at the crossroad of Southeast Asia and South Asia provides

it an opportunity to play a significant role in the regional geopolitics. Huge availability of

energy resources in Myanmar adds an economic dimension in its strategic significance.

Myanmars position, as a zone of convergence between Indias Look East and Chinas

Look South Policy, makes it a key factor in the regional foreign policy agendas of both

the Asian giants of India and China. Therefore, engagement with Myanmar becomes

inevitable for both India and China. However, the nature of the engagement of India and

China vis--vis Myanmar depends on their domestic political scenario and their

respective foreign policy objectives in Myanmar.

Indias Engagement in Myanmar

Historically, relations between India and Myanmar have seen many ups and downs. After

independence Burmese leadership adopted the policy of close and harmonious relations

with India. Nehru and U. Nu had shared understandings over various regional and global

issues. However, Myanmar in 1962 after the military coup came under military rule and

due to General Ne Wins policy of A Burmese way to Socialism and Myanmars

unfriendly stand on the Sino-Indian conflict 1962, India-Myanmar relationship became

strained. However Myanmar never completely sidelined India and avoided being

identified too closely with China. Therefore, during the regime of Ne Win the nature of

India-Myanmar relationship was stagnant but cordial on the whole. Ne Win also visited

India in 1980. However, during Indira Gandhis tenure, India was neutral and

disinterested in Myanmar, because a commitment to democratic values was prioritized

ahead of security concerns in Indian foreign policy agenda towards Myanmar. This

policy of idealism was also continued by the Rajiv Gandhi regime. When the SLORC

(State Law and order Restoration Council) assumed power in 1988, India strongly

criticize Myanmars new military regime. New Delhi also offered refuge to anti SLORC

dissidents and openly sided with pro-democracy activists during the 1990s decade.

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Having taken an insight of the strategic imperatives of the engagement of both India and

China vis--vis Myanmar it can be argued that due to its critical geographical location,

Myanmar becomes an important component of the regional foreign policy agendas of

both India and China. Thus, both the countries are bound to engage with Myanmar

irrespective of its domestic political scenario. While given the trust-deficit between India

and China interests of both the countries clash in Myanmar, it also offer the opportunity

for both India and China to cooperate in a sub regional framework including their

peripheral regions. Therefore, the proposed study aims to make a comparative

examination of the nature of engagement of both India and China vis--vis Myanmar

with elaborating the both conflicting and cooperative dimensions the country offers to

India and China and examine if their interests coincide or collide. It is also important to

examine if Myanmar has any strategic motive to play one power against the other power.

A speech by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Dispur, Assam on 21 November 2004,

at the opening of the new secretariat in Dispur, reflected the much awaited inclusion of

the Northeastern region in Indias overall Look East Policy. This seemed to be a turning

point in the attitude of the central government towards the Northeastern states of India,

which had long been ignored in the LEP paradigm. This turn in attitude can be attributed

to a variety of reasons. The genuine intent of developing the Northeastern region by the

central government can be one likely reason, emanating from the inclusion of the

Northeast development concern as an important component of the LEP in the late

1990s. On the other hand, the more likely reason for this shift could be more strategic

than for mere developmental purposes. This can be attributed to the China factor, as

India sees China as a principal source of insecurity and a potential threat to its strategic

interests in its proximate region. Therefore, closer economic ties with East and Southeast

Asia through Northeast India are considered viable means to limit Chinas influence and

balance its expanding power in the region.

The genesis of Indias LEP can be traced back to the early 1990s when this term gained

coinage under Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. The question however remains as to

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how the Northeastern states fit into the LEP. We must, at the outset, make a clear

distinction between the ordinary developmental policies for the Northeast and the

emergence of the LEP as a way of initiating developmental policies in the Northeast. The

ordinary developmental policies for the Northeast over the years have been conceived as

a component of centre-state relations with 10 per cent of all central ministry funds

being earmarked for Northeastern region with carryover provisions in every budget ever

since 1996. The initiatives by the central government from 2004 onwards can be dubbed

as a continuation of the Northeast policy with a new development mantra or paradigm. At

the centre of this new paradigm of development is Indias LEP.

The 1990s saw a gradual increase in central governments aid towards the Northeast

amidst the growing secessionist movements in the region. While the Mizoram insurgent

movement was successfully resolved with the formation of the Mizo National Front

government in 1987, insurgencies in Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya and Tripura

continued to rage on. The central government continued its policy of grants-in-aid to the

Northeastern states which was in reality a policy of control by appeasement, thereby

pumping huge amounts of money into the states. This pumping in of money was not

backed by adequate policies of infrastructure development or capacity building, but rather

consisted of grants and internal security infrastructure building. As a result, these

mindless grants gave rise to a lot of corruption in the Northeast. Mizoram, which

emerged as the model state of an insurgency to peace transition, could not benefit from

this huge resource inflow, particularly due to the lack of developmental policies and

initiatives.

Because of the absence of such policies, a lot of money meant for development was

unused and returned to the Central Government until a carry over provision was

introduced in 1996, also stating that 10 per cent of all central ministry funds should be

allocated to the Northeast. This carryover clause allows unused funds to be transferred to

the next budget and was needed because of the slow usage of funds which made the

process of development of infrastructure and capacity building dreadfully slow and in

some cases, non-existent.

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The trend of grants-in-aid to the Northeastern states after 2004 saw a change as the

Northeast was included in the overall Look East Policy. In recent years, many discussions

and seminars on the Look East Policy have taken place with a focus on the Northeastern

region both in New Delhi and in the Northeast. This aims to bring Indias Foreign Policy

closer to the people of the Northeast, and enunciate strategies that would be pragmatic

and directed towards the development of the region as a whole, given its geographical

proximity to Southeast Asian countries. In fact capital cities such as Guwahati, Imphal

and Shillong have become the hub of such events and discussions based on the LEP in

the region. The investment fairs conducted by the government and business lobbies have

huge prospects, as they can boost trade and development. Promotion of the Northeast as a

safe recipient for investment also took place outside of the region, in events such as the

North-East India Trade and Investment Opportunities Week held in Bangkok in October

2007.

In addition, there were a slew of announcements of developmental projects in many states

such as Manipur, Assam, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh. These projects were aimed

at developing infrastructure and connectivity in the Northeastern region with to the aim

of ultimately linking it with Southeast Asian countries. The 2004 India-Asean car rally

at the inauguration of which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made the above-quoted

speech is seen by many commentators as the turning point when the Indian government

made it clear that the Northeastern states would be an important component in its LEP.

The car rally had started from Guwahati in Assam and passed through the states of

Nagaland and Manipur. It was received by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Vientiane

in Laos during the Asean Summit before the rally culminated in Singapore. This was seen

as a great success and a boost to the idea of connectivity from Indias Northeast to

Southeast Asia. An expressway linking Thailand with the Northeast was mooted

immediately but little progress has been seen since then. Border road connectivity was

accorded high priority in states such as Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. The Assam

Government has listed as one of its achievements in the year 2007 the opening of the

Stilwell Road on the Indian side. The Special Accelerated Road Development Project for

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the Northeast, in which the Border Roads Organization (BRO) has been engaged over the

past few years, is an indicator of the central governments policies in improving

connectivity in the Northeastern region. This project which enjoys high priority

reflects the security angle to Indias concerns in the face of Chinas growing

infrastructure and connectivity north of the Line of Actual Control separating Arunachal

Pradesh and Tibet. Hence, BRO was recently withdrawn from other projects in the

country and dedicated to this specific projects fast and effective implementation.

Over the years, the Northeastern region has evolved from a component of Centre-State

relations to an important part of the Look East Policy. This transition from insensitivity

and neglect to conscious incorporation of the Northeast in the LEP has happened over

many nuances in policy making.

Literature Review:

A comparative study of the engagement of India and China in Myanmar requires a

thorough review of the existing literature on foreign policies of both countries towards

Myanmar and various factors involved in it. For this purpose, the review of literature has

broadly discussed the available literature on evolution of the bilateral relations between

India-Myanmar and China-Myanmar, changing dynamics of relationships and various

strategic imperatives that led both India and China to follow a policy of engagement vis-

-vis Myanmar. Moreover, the review of literature aims to examine the role of Myanmar

with both the aspects of conflict and cooperation that it tenders to both India and China.

In order to have a sound understanding about the engagement of India and China in

Myanmar, it is essential to understand the difference in the nature of the engagement

policies, if any, of both the countries vis--vis Myanmar. Here it will be better to start

with separate assessment of the genesis of a paradigm shifts in the policies of both India

and China which paved the way for their respective engagement policies towards

Myanmar in the years when the relations among them had numerous facets and turns.

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In case of China, elucidating the shifts, Baladas Ghoshal (1994) in his article Trends in

China-Burma Relations states that the shifts in the Chinese Burma Policy from 1978

onwards and the Burmese reciprocal cordiality prepared the ground for the gradual

rapprochement between the two countries. He further argues that a final and more

fundamental shift in Chinas Burma Policy was witnessed in the 1988 when China

withdrew its policy of providing material support to Communist Party of Burma (CPB)

which was involved in a direct struggle with the government of Myanmar. Although, this

article is very significant to understand the implications of the Sino-Burmese entente for

the regional security and strategic scenario in South and Southeast Asia, it gives a

sketchy analysis of the push and pull factors behind the various shifts in Chinas policy

vis--vis Burma and therefore not seen as a very comprehensive study on the issue. His

later writings on the various issues of Myanmar and its engagement with India and China

have also bee examined, but in a nutshell, this contentious aspect remains unanswered.

John W. Graver (2000) in his book Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the

Twentieth Century dedicated a full detailed chapter named Burma: the Backdoor to

China to analyze the factors which laid the foundation of Chinas policy of strategic

engagement with Myanmar. The chapter starts with an elaboration of the Chinas

supporting act to the Communist Party of Burma during Maos period and later on it

points out the shift in the Chinas strategic vision towards Myanmar after the arrival of

Deng Xiaoping. The chapter emphasizes that Mao followed a dual track approach in its

relations with Myanmar, first track was the development of normal state-to-state relations

with the government of Burma and second track was focused on encouraging fraternal

relations between Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ruling China and Communist Party of

Burma (CPB). The Wa tribe in the Myanmar-China border was the communist link.

The author identifies that this particular balance between these two tracks at any point in

time was a major characteristics of Chinese policy towards Burma. To answer the

question of why Mao followed this dual track policy, he argues that the first track of

developing state-to state relations with Burma was focused to keep Burma away from the

sphere of influence of any hostile power, particularly the presence of KMT forces and

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CIA covert operations against China from the Shan state of Myanmar. On the other hand,

second track of providing support to the CPB insurgency, he linked it with Maos

decision to support CPB in the context of intensifying struggle between Chinese and

Soviet communist parties over the direction of the world communist movements. In his

book Graver also takes into accounts the factors which led China to withdraw its support

from the CPB and opt for a policy of strategic engagement between the two countries at

governmental level; such as the development of the economic relations between Yunnan

and Myanmar and seek access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar. However, to make

a better understanding of his analysis and to place it in an overall context, other sources

substantiated with the factual details are needed and must be studied further.

Donald M Seekins (1997) in his article Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire

extensively discussed the implications of Chinas strategic economic foray into Myanmar

after 1990. To explain the consequences of increasing Chinese influence in Myanmar he

cites the examples of Sinicization of Upper Myanmar and development of Mandalay as a

high priced China town with an influx of immigrant Chinese population from the

Yunnan and other provinces of China. He further mentioned that how bilateral trade

between China and Burma increased manifold in the late years of 1990s but finally he

characterizes the economic relations between China and Burma as equivalent to the

relations between a European metropolis and an Asian colony during the early 20th

century, which was characterized by a general context of colonialism and imperialism.

In a special issue of Adelphi Paper named Myanmar Foreign Policy: Domestic

Influences and International Implications Jurgen Haacke (2006) elaborates the

converging political views of China and Myanmar after the incidents of suppression of

pro-democracy activists in 1988 in Myanmar and in 1989 in Tiananmen Square of China

respectively. In his analysis he emphasizes on the fact that China emerged as a most

trusted friend of Myanmar after 1988 and contributed greatly to the regime and growing

stability in the early years of the SLORCs rule. China has even protected Myanmars

interests in the United Nations Security Council several times by exercising veto against

the resolutions proposed by the US and the West to impose sanctions on Myanmars

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military junta.

However, Stephanie Kleine-Ablbrandt and Andrew Small (2008) in their article Chinas

New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs points out a slight shift in

Chinas Burma policy which is coupled with Chinas changing approach to deal with the

pariah states like Burma, North Korea and Sudan. Although China is not going to relegate

its economic and strategic interests in its policy in dealing with the pariah states but it is

trying to evolve more sophisticated means to assist the process of positive political

development concerning these states so that they could gain a level of legitimacy such as

the six party talks with North Korea. In case of Myanmar too, despite rejecting the

proposals of sanctions against Myanmar, China supported a statement from the UNSC

deploring the juntas use of violence against peaceful demonstrators. Moreover, China

pushed the Myanmarese government to receive the UN special envoy and grant him

access to the Aung San Suu kyi. However, the author duo admits that it is not possible for

China to go very far to exert pressure over the junta in Myanmar, given the opposition of

the hardliners in Chinese leadership to such policies of intervention abroad.

As far as understanding of the fundamentals of the Indias engagement with Myanmar is

concerned, study of the French researcher Renaud Egreteaus (2003) book, Wooing the

Generals Indias New Burma Policy, is a must read. The book contains a

comprehensive and well researched literature on the evolution of the relationship between

India and Myanmar from its very beginning to the Indias new policy of Constructive

Engagement vis--vis Myanmar. The focus of the book is more on changing strategic

equations in the South and Southeast Asia and how the China factor forced India to be

constructively engaged with Myanmar. However, the recent bilateral imperatives, such as

energy cooperation and border trade, do not occupy an important place in his analysis.

Sudhir Devare (2006) in his book India and South East Asia: Towards Security

Convergence provides a chapter on strategic importance of Myanmar for India. In this

chapter he considers Myanmar as a challenging frontier for Indian foreign policy from all

the perspectives of security whether traditional or non traditional. The author identifies

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Myanmar as a link between India and the Association of South-East Asian Nations

(ASEAN) and suggested that political stability in Myanmar is in the interest of India.

However some broad questions, Which type of government in Myanmar would serve

Indias interests better, democratically elected or military? remain unanswered in it.

To develop an understanding about the Indian and Chinese engagement in Myanmar it is

also necessary to analyze the Myanmars response to the respective engagement policies

of India and China. An article by Helen James (2004), Myanmar International Relations

Strategy: The Search for Security gives a broad understanding of the various determining

factors of Myanmar foreign policy agenda and its domestic political and economic

implications. This article attempts to elaborate on the fact that due to the continuing

sanctions by western powers, Myanmar is left with no option but to pursue its foreign

policy objectives in Asia and balance profitably and strategically between China and

India. This has helped create the sense of an imminent Sino-Indian rivalry in Myanmar.

Definition, Rationale and Scope of the Study:

Having reviewed the literature on the evolution of the Indian and Chinese engagement in

Myanmar, in order to elaborate the wide strategic compulsions of the respective

engagement policies of India and China in Myanmar, the proposed study focuses on the

Geopolitics of Indian and Chinese Engagement in Myanmar. The review of the existing

literature reveals that extensive literature is available on the engagement policies of both

India and China vis--vis Myanmar but separately. Therefore, there is a need to make a

comparative review of the respective engagement policies of India and China vis--vis

Myanmar so that the results regarding the role of Myanmar in the regional strategic

dynamics between India and China and its impact on the political developments in

Myanmar can be obtained. In order to delineate the engagement of India and China in

Myanmar, the study would take into account the period from where a significant policy

shift towards Myanmar can be seen in the Indian and Chinese foreign policy discourse.

In case of Chinese engagement in Myanmar, the evolution of engagement phase

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seemingly, starts ever since China adopted a policy of Good Neighborliness under the

leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Likewise, to define the Indian engagement in Myanmar,

the study would mainly focus on the period since India opted for the diplomatic pattern of

constructive engagement in its foreign policy design vis--vis Myanmar.

Furthermore, available literature on the Indian and Chinese engagement in Myanmar

seems inadequate on some accounts and some deeper questions remain unanswered in

accordance with the emerging trends and changing realities. These questions are related

to the comparative assessment of the nature of Indian and Chinese engagement in

Myanmar, continuation of military rule in Myanmar and its implications for India and

China; pivotal role of Myanmar as a bridge for evolving the structures of economic

cooperation between the sub regions of India and China. Thus, it is needed to review all

the aspects of Indian and Chinese engagement in Myanmar with a comparative

perspective. The proposed study will try to bridge the existing gaps, bringing about a

critical understanding of the dynamics of China and Indias engagement in Myanmar.

The study will bring out the dynamics of Indias Look East Policy and the question of the

development of Northeast India and the accumulated failures of New Delhi to give a

genuine and workable vision for development of Northeast India through the Look East

Policy paradigm. This requires a grand connected vision of Indias external dealings with

Myanmar and its internal policies related to Northeast India.

Research Problem/Question and Hypothesis:

Research Problem/Question:

Why do Indian foreign policy objectives and the Look East Diplomacy seem to face

enormous hurdles in Myanmar and compete and collide with Chinese strategic interests,

and not cooperate and compliment each other; and why has the Look East Policy and

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overall vision not been able to bridge the development deficit seen in Northeast India?

Hypotheses:

The scramble for resources in resource rich Myanmar has got intense, and as the growing

energy needs of India compound amidst the current global energy crunch, India see

intense competition to their strategic and economic interests in Myanmar.

Both China and India see each others presence in Myanmar as a counter to their

respective strategic and economic interests in the country and the larger region, because

each country feels that Myanmar constitutes their natural sphere of influence, and each is

trying to impede on the other by their respective processes of engagement with Myanmar.

India has envisioned the Look East Policy towards acting as a means to bridge the

development deficit seen in Northeast India, but has failed to address the underlying

problems which have affected the Northeastern states of India for decades on end.

Research Methods:

The study would both be analytical and descriptive in nature, and in order to

meaningfully explain the knowledge gained, the study is required to be dealt with

theoretical application and methodological rigour. To successfully identify the answers of

the research problem/question related to the topic, the study would be relied upon both

primary and the secondary sources and rely on reviewing extensive existing literature.

The study would begin with an understanding of the research theme evolved from the

help of secondary sources such as books, articles and news reports. However, given the

contemporary and dynamic nature of the topic, the information gathered by the secondary

sources needs to be substantiated with the help of the primary sources to make the study

more authentic. For this purpose, primary sources mainly the interviews of the

government officials particularly diplomats who have served in Myanmar and

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academicians and researchers having knowledge regarding Myanmar would be used in

the study. Sino-Indian relations will also be assessed through interview of various

diplomats and academicians following the trajectory of bilateral relations closely.

The reports of concerned ministries in countries, press releases, joint statements

published by the government of respective countries shall also be cited as primary

sources. Moreover, given the empirical nature of some parts of the study like current

status of various projects, problems in border-trade, comparative assessment of the

linkages between the border areas of India-Myanmar and Myanmar-China demands a

sound understanding of the existing realities. Thus field trips of concerned areas seem

essential to complete the study and these need to be conducted primarily in Myanmar,

assessing the nature of interaction of Myanmar with Chinese and Indian diplomats and

officials, and trying to decipher the thought-process and the orientations of the ruling

class and government officials of Myanmar in its interaction with China and India

respectively. The various dimensions including political, economic and strategic of China

and India in Myanmar would be assessed from all three points of view, and domestic and

cultural roots would be examined, especially assessing people-to-people interactions.

Tentative Chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction

The first chapter will outline a background to set the stage for analyzing the politico-

strategic imperatives of the respective engagement policies of India and China with

Myanmar, and analyze the military juntas policy of engagement with these nations. This

will outline the Look East Diplomacy of India and highlight the vision for the

development of Northeast India within the Look East Policy.

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Chapter 2: Indias Look East Diplomacy: Myanmars Domestic predicaments and

Indias perception

It will be discussed in this chapter in detail that how India perceive the domestic politics

of Myanmar. The second chapter will scrutinize the Indian over the issue of democratic

transition in Myanmars domestic polity.

Chapter 3: Role of Look East Policy in the development of Northeast India

This chapter will take into account the overall vision and role of the Look East Policy

towards bridging the development deficit seen in Northeast India.

Chapter4: A Comparison of the Economic and Security Engagement of India with

Myanmar

Elaborating the status and objectives of Indian economic engagement in Myanmar this

chapter will make an attempt to present a holistic outlook of Indias economic

engagement and interests in Myanmar including energy stakes and overall gains. This

chapter will also analyze Indias security cooperation with Myanmar with regard to

insurgency in Northeast India and huge flows of arms and narcotics smuggling.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The concluding chapter would try to answer the research question and bring forward the

debates on conflict and cooperation between China and India in Myanmar, and further

analyze the road ahead for a prospective constructive policy for the vision to be

successful for the genuine development of Northeast India. It will analyze the Look East

Diplomacy in its overall strategic and developmental dividends over the years.

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