misperception and miscalculation during the sino
TRANSCRIPT
Misperception and Miscalculation during the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962:
An Analysis of the Indian Decision Making Process
Deep Jyoti Barman
PhD Candidate
CIPOD/SIS
Jawaharlal Nehru University
2011
India and Peoples Republic of China (PRC) fought a bitter war in the high Himalayan wastes
in the winter of 1962. The genesis of this war lies in an unresolved border dispute between
the two Asian neighbours. The aim of this dissertation is to explain the research puzzle: why
did India, a relatively weaker power, pursue a provocative military strategy and an
unyielding diplomatic stand against the more powerful PRC. This question is not a novel one
as there have been many studies to understand wars among asymmetric powers. (Paul, 1994;
Arreguín-Toft, 2005; Sullivan, 2007) But most of the existing literature is geared towards
understanding puzzle: why do strong states lose war against weaker states? This corpus of
literature has its origin in understand American involvement and subsequent defeat (in some
cases) in Vietnam, Korea, Iraq, or Soviet Union’s defeat in the hands of the mujahedeen’s in
the Russo-Afghan war. This dissertation on the other hand is an attempt to understand the
reason as to why a weaker state would enter into a military conflict with a stronger state. Sun
Tsu’s “Art of war” a military classic had long ago stated that one should only enter into a war
when it is sure about its victory. Did the Indian leadership fighting the Chinese in 1962 think
that they would defeat the Chinese? A cursory reading of the memoirs of Palit (1992), Dalvi
(1969), Mullik (1971), or secondary literature on the war by Maxwell (1970), and Hoffman
(1990) would show that the Indian leaders were very pessimistic about the likely outcome of
any military conflict with China. Why would a democratic country like India which was
trying to become a normative power in the early years after its independence agree to fight
with China?
The core of this chapter is a detailed statement of the causal argument advanced in the
dissertation. The theory proposed in this dissertation is: when a state (particularly a weaker
one), is engaged in a crisis situation with another state, it bases its security not on the basis of
its military capability and resolve but rather on the reaction of the international order to the
war which would deter the more powerful adversary. In other words, the weaker state
believes that because of its unique situation in the international order, other states would have
a stake in its survival. An underlying assumption of the weak state is that, the adversary has a
world view consistent with its own, because of which it would be deterred from escalating the
conflict to war. Bolstered by this belief, the weaker state is more likely to undertake certain
policies which are non-reflective of its relative power, thereby impeding diplomacy, which is
gravitates both states towards war. There are two stages to this causal argument, each
expressed as a hypothesis below: the first portion links the belief about security to
misperception; the second extends that to miscommunication and crisis outcome. The logic of
each will be sketched out in turn, and then predictions are derived to allow for testing in the
dissertations empirical work. The chapter also includes an attempt to place the research
within the existing literature, and an explanation of the methodology of inquiry pursued in the
remainder of the dissertation.
The literature on misperception and miscalculation states that wars are the result of different
expectations held by the belligerents about the outcome of a militarized conflict. (Blainey,
1988; Jervis, 1976; Johnson, 2004) According to them, war is the ultimate reality in which
misperceptions about military superiority ends and a shared knowledge about the existing
balance of power evolves, which brings the adversaries to the negotiating table to divide the
issue of conflict according to the prevailing power differentials. This explanation is
satisfactory for states with marginal power difference. But does this misperception and
miscalculation about relative power exist between states with a wide gap in their power
ratios? This question gets even more perplexing when we factor in the fact that the India and
China were not natural rivals. There is a lack of ancient hatred and past wars to support
explanations of war such as hyper-nationalism, etc. Moreover, India and China since their
independence in late 1940’s have been on very cordial relations. The Panchsheel Agreement
signed in 1954 has been the cornerstone of Sino-Indian relations which talks about the five
principles of peaceful co-existence. Moreover, the Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru supported PRC’s inclusion in the United Nations Security Council, and India did not
react provocatively to the Chinese takeover of Tibet. These two policy examples bolster the
view that India and China had a very cordial relation until the final months before the war.
There is a strand of literature which points at a possible domestic politics angle originating
from the failed “the great leap forward” movement of General Mao which made the Chinese
leadership to fight a war with India. (Garver, 2009) But this dissertation does not concern
itself with the Chinese causes for the war but rather on India’s decision to enter into a
military contest with the powerful PRC. In presenting the benign relationship between India
and PRC we should not lose sight of certain irritants in their relationship such as India giving
asylum to Dalai Lama who fled from Tibet after the Chinese occupation, the training and
support of the Khampa revolutionaries by Indian intelligence agencies, etc. But these factors
would impact the Chinese decision making process; a factor that does not concern this
dissertation.
Literature Review:
The literature on misperception and miscalculation is exhaustive. For a systematic of this
literature, it can be divided into two categories: the analytic-revisionists and the cognitive-
perceptual categories.
In most of their basic premises, the analytic-revisionists studies comprise an extension of the
logic of the rational theory of decision making. These theorists are convinced that actions
taken by the actors reflect purpose or intention, and are chosen as a calculated solution to the
strategic problem. (Allison, 1971: 13) The proponents of this approach assume that statesmen
accurately perceive external threats and opportunities, and select policies on the basis of cost-
benefit calculations in order to advance national interest. (Levy, 1983:76) This branch is
committed to the notion of rationality and implies consistent value-maximizing choices, and
generally ignores the possibility of chance, lack of coordination, unintended consequences
and coincidences. Instead, it suspects that “well laid out plans give events a coherence they
would otherwise lack,” and that hidden manipulations and conspiracies, rather than confusion
and chaos, are the factors responsible for the failure of national actors to meet the challenge
of an impending onslaught. (Jervis, 1976: 321) In short, the analytic-revisionists argue that
wars are not accidental but an act of deliberation by both parties involved. This category
refutes the concept of strategic surprise. Ben Zvi (1979) argues in his essay “The study of
strategic surprise” argues that the analytic revisionists believe that when a country attacks
another country, the initiator’s reaction is never a surprise to the national leadership of the
victim state, since the attacker merely reacts to a deliberate posture on the part of the victim,
who provoked the confrontation as a carefully thought-out means of maximizing a broad
cluster of desired goals, whose importance far outweighs the losses anticipated in the course
of the confrontation. According to him, these theorists perceive the outbreak of war as the
culmination of an elaborate scheme, intended to provoke the enemy into firing the first shot.
(Ben Zvi, 1979: 130)
The analytical revisionist category of research have been criticised for being predisposed to
downgrade and obfuscate any conceptual, cultural, or communication impediments to a
timely and accurate analysis of signals. They believe that states have a shared and
homogeneous understanding of the world view, each other’s military capability and resolve.
Moreover, they seem to have absolutely no problem with the concept of war which the
rationalists such as Fearon, et al have categorised as ex post inefficient. James D. Fearon in
his seminal work, “The Rationalist Explanations of war” (1995) argues that wars are
accidental and the result of bargaining failure. According to him, states being rational actors’
should have an interest in resolving their disputes peacefully rather than through military
contest since wars are ex post inefficient. He mentions three main causes of war: private
information, commitment problem, and the problem of issue indivisibility. Private
information simply refers to privileged information available to national leaders. The
information could be secret military alliances with other nations, new technological or
organizational innovation, motivational level of the troops, etc. In short, private information
can be understood as any information that is exclusively available to national leaders that
influences the probability of winning a military conflict. Fearon, in his essay, argues that
private information can skew the accurate calculation of the military balance of power,
thereby fostering misperceptions, which may lead to war. The “commitment problem” is
another cause of war. Since the international order is anarchic, there is no guarantee that once
the power transition happens, the adversary will not renege previous agreement. Therefore,
states would rather fight a war when they have a greater probability of winning it, than
consent to a negotiated solution which the adversary would renege once it is able to improve
it position of power. Indivisibility of certain issues of conflict (such as sacred territory, etc.) is
another cause of wars.
The second category of literature falls under the cognitive-perceptual umbrella, which relies
largely on cognitive premises as the basic analytical tool. These theorists are skeptical about
the prospects for fully overcoming the problem of confusion, ambiguity and deception. The
cognitive-perceptual school seeks an explanation of war in terms of the perceptual
mechanisms and predispositions which obscure the ability of states to accurately perceive the
existing balance of power. These theorists (Jervis, 1976; Vertzberger 1990) argue that states
look at themselves and others through perceptual lenses which are rigid and exclusive,
thereby skewing reality and producing unique understandings about the world order, relative
military capability, resolve, etc. which makes signalling difficult. Jervis adds that there is an
innate propensity among states to see ambiguous information as confirming pre-existing
images and beliefs “about how the world works and what patters it is likely to present us
with”. (Jervis, 1985: 18) According to this category, policymakers are bound to distort or
dismiss information as unreliable and unfounded which is incompatible with their initial
beliefs, particularly those which comprise the core of their belief systems (Jervis, 1976: 187-
190).
Thus, whereas analytic-revisionist studies overestimate human capability to control the
operational environment, most cognitive-perceptual works underestimate the ability of
decision-making units to overcome the obfuscating screen of ambiguity, noise and deception,
and thus to act objectively to the unfolding situation rather than react from the premises of
certain fixed premises. In short, the analytic-revisionist category reduces the complexity of
human behaviour in crisis situation to a hyper-calculating monistic unity, where the leaders
are followed unquestionably and orders are interpreted accurately and immediately to the last
man. On the other hand, the cognitive-perceptual category believes that the decision makers
are controlled by their immediate environment to such an extent that objectivity is severely
compromised and incoherence and incoordination is rampant.
This research makes an attempt to steer clear of falling in the extremes of either of the above
mentioned categories while unravelling Indian’s decision to enter into a war with China in
1962. This dissertation while attempting to systematically reconstruct the perceptual and
behavioural patterns by which Indian political and military leadership decided to engage into
a war with PRC, it is essential to carefully scrutinize not only the two major determinants
about future adversarial behaviour that pertain to opponent’s intentions and capabilities but
also the behaviour of external powers, especially United States and Soviet Union.
Blainey (1988) argues that wars are a result of disagreements between states regarding the
ultimate outcome of war. He purports that if states could accurately measure the military
capability and resolve of themselves and their adversaries, then they would all have a shared
understanding about the ultimate outcome of any militarized contest between them. Under
such shared understanding, the states would eagerly resolve their disagreements in a peaceful
way depending on the prevailing power differentials, thereby avoiding the unnecessary cost
of war. But in the Sino-Indian context, the power difference was so vast that India could not
possibly think of emerging as a victor. In the absence of a clear sight of victory, why would a
democratic state engage in warfare with a powerful PRC?
Van Evera (1999) on the contrary argues that wars are results of deliberate move by certain
states to exploit the “window of opportunity”. According to him, misperceptions and
miscalculations about the structure of power is the prime cause of war. The causes of these
misperceptions are militarism and nationalism which introduces perceptual biases in
misperceiving both capability and resolve, thereby leading one or both states to believe that
offense is a better option than defence. Van Evera claims that offense dominance, or the
perception thereof, will encourage both expansionary states to expand and status quo states to
become more aggressive due to greater security fears. Offense dominance also heightens
first-move advantages, leads to greater power shifts, encourages secrecy and dangerous
diplomacy and discourages agreements. His measures of the offense-defence balance include
military technology, strategy, geography and diplomacy. In addition, perception seems to
play an even larger role than the actual balance of power. Although Van Evera’s work
provides a more acceptable explanation about inter-state warfare, it fails to address the
question: why doesn’t the weaker power simply submit to the demands of the more powerful
adversary and save itself the cost of costly war? Moreover, the literature on Sino-Indian war
(Maxwell, 1970; Dalvi, 1969) suggests that it was India which acted provocatively rather
than PRC. But in the absence of the expectation of victory, why would a weaker state escalate
the conflict?
This dissertation while greatly benefitting from the existing theoretical literature on the
causes of war finds a lacuna in it and makes a modest attempt to fill the vacuum. It is obvious
from the very onset that this dissertation falls under the cognitive-perceptual research
category as it centres on the bounded rationality assumption based on false optimism. Here
false optimism is not operationalized in the traditional way whereby states overestimate their
military capability, resolve, military strategy, etc. but rather about its unique position in the
international order and the favourable reaction of other states towards its crisis situation.
Theoretical Framework:
After situating the project in the existing literature, this chapter now turns to the specific
causal chain proposed by the theory. It begins with a summary of the existing work that
explains the bargaining model of war and the causes for its failure before moving to the next
stage where the causal chain proposed by the dissertation will be presented in a two stage
hypothesis: first, false optimism should lead to underestimation of adversary’s resolve; and
second, such an underestimation should lead to sending of strong signals (both tying hands
and sinking costs) which leads to unnecessary conflict.
What stops two states engaged in a dispute from effectively communicating their strength and
resolve to their opponents so that they can reach a negotiated solution without fighting a war?
Even if they are talking, and they often do, they still fail to agree on a solution that is
peaceful. Fearon’s three causes have been introduced earlier as the main causes forwarded by
the bargaining theory. If we peel the “private information” cause then we see that states have
an incentive to withhold information as that might have an edge during actual combat such as
information about new technologies, morale of the troops, secret military alliances, etc.
Secondly, even if states communicate their true intentions and capability, the adversary might
disregard the information as an attempt to bluff in order to secure a better bargaining position.
Misperception and miscalculation theorists (Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, 1985) argue that
sometimes due to perceptual lens such as those of culture, ancient hatred, past wars, and even
different military doctrines (Twomey, 2009) can skew the signals to such an extent that the
recipient state might misperceive a strong signal as weak or vice versa, completely miss the
signal as noise, or misinterpret the signal as re-affirming pre-existing biases. Hence a large
part of the literature on misperception and miscalculation is dedicated to the problem of
signalling resolve.
Theorists such as Mesquita (1983), Slantchev (2011), Powell (1999) have argued in their
works that to credibly signal resolve, states have to send signals that are costly. The existing
literature distinguishes between two types of costly signals that state leaders employ in trying
to credibly communicate their foreign policy interests to other states, whether in the realm of
grand strategy or crisis diplomacy. Leaders might either tie hands by creating audience costs
that will suffer ex post if they do not follow through on their threat or commitment (i.e. costs
arising from the action of domestic political audience); or shrinking costs by taking actions
such a military mobilization, etc. that are financially costly ex ante (Fearon, 1997). Both these
actions create credibility of threats because they alter the cost of making a threat in the short
term. Proponents of the audience cost mechanism argue that leaders can make more credible
threats when their constituency is more likely to hold them accountable for backing out from
their word. This creates an incentive for leaders not to bluff and not to make threats when
they are not certain that if the target state does not comply they will be able to carry out the
threat.
The appeal for costly signalling strategies rest on the intuitive link between credible threats
and averting war- if the enemy ultimately wants to avoid war, a threat convincing enough,
threatening enough, to make him or her count on war is also likely to make him or her yield.
(Wszolek, 2007) But this linkage between costly signalling and war aversion is too simplistic
and has been criticized by many scholars. The psychological approach suggests that every bit
of new information does not necessarily convey the true intention of the rival state because
information available between states is inherently noisy. The noise generated by overlapping
and often contradictory information generated from different segments of the government,
domestic politics, etc. can greatly impede the communicative ability of the signals. Moreover,
commitment problem, trade-offs between military efficacy and diplomatic initiatives, and the
salience of the future have all been hypothesized to cause misperception of signals and cause
a crisis to end in war, even without uncertainty. (Lai, 2004) to this effect Sagan and Suri
(2003) argues that, contrary to most assumptions about crisis bargaining, the October 1969
alert, demonstrates that a major increase in military readiness, even a global nuclear alert, did
not necessarily create a kind of costly commitment that can enhance the credibility of a threat
by placing the reputation of a leader at stake. Sagan and Suri in their research demonstrates
that although the October 1969 nuclear alert was a loud signal it failed to deliver the intended
message to the receiving Soviet Union, thereby suggesting that despite popular understanding
even military signals can be cheap, indicative of a bluff rather than resolve.
This proves that signals do not have an inherently costly or cheap value but rather their true
value depends on the perceiver’s interpretation. This dissertation building on the above
arguments about the ambiguity of signals argues that – during crisis, a state which due to a
sense of false optimism believes in its immunity from its more powerful adversary- is
predisposed to either dis-regard even costly signals as indicative of bluff or re-interpret it to
fit the existing perceptual biases. This complicates further, the already convoluted problem of
making honest threats in a crisis situation when the environment is fraught with suspicion and
full of noisy and contradictory information.
Hypothesis: 1
When a state believes that there are other states which have an interest in its security due to
its unique position in the international order; it is more likely to misperceive the adversary’s
signals as weak, and this misperception, ceteris paribus, will lead to the underestimation of
the adversary’s resolve.
This hypothesis has two components. The first focuses on opacity as a result of misreading of
the world order due to a unique understanding about its own identity. The second part focuses
on how this opacity manifests itself: underestimation of the adversary’s resolve.
The first part of the hypothesis suggests that, national leaders have private information about
the unique position their country occupies in the current international order because of which
other nations would have an active interest in maintaining its pivoted position. Bolstered by
this understanding, the national leadership is more susceptible to misperceive the adversary’s
signals as weak, since the ‘belief about one’s position’ operationalizes in the form of a biased
calculation about the balance of power. Here the misperception is not so much about military
capability as in about relative resolve of the states. The logic of this causal argument is: since
the state believes that other states would react in a favourable or predicted manner to any
escalation between itself and the adversary, the adversary will be deterred by the prospect of
disturbing the overall balance of power. In other words, the cost of war calculations for the
adversary will substantially increase not vis-à-vis its opponent but with the prospect of losing
control over the escalation of the war due to involvement of other states. In short, third party
intervention due to systemic factors (pivoted position of the state) makes any military
engagement highly uncertain and risky. The second part of the hypothesis follows from
existing literature on overconfidence and war. Johnson (2004) has argued in his book that the
primary way misperception works out is underestimation of the adversary’s will. This claim
will be tested in the dissertation.
Hypothesis: 2
When a state underestimates the adversary’s will-that comes from Hypothesis 1- it is more
likely to undertake policies which are non-reflective of its relative power, thereby impeding
diplomacy and leading to unnecessary escalation of conflict and possibly war.
Jervis (2002:302) notes that since interpretation of indices depends on theories, perceivers are
likely to go astray when these are incorrect. He farther adds that, this can lead the
underestimating nation to think that it is stronger than it really is…(Jervis, 2002: 302) As a
result the nation may pursue a tough bargaining stand and more aggressive policies to farther
improve its position in the negotiating table. (Blainey, 1988; Stoessinger, 2001) This claim
will also be tested empirically in the dissertation.
Summary of the Theoretical framework:
For the bargaining process to work efficiently, both sides must have a homogeneous view
about the distribution of power among them. The shared understanding helps them to
understand eachother’s signals and thereby helps them to locate a negotiated settlement
below the threshold of violence which is ex post inefficient. But, as proposed by this
dissertation, states do not necessarily hold similar view about the international order. This
disjuncture leads to miscalculation of the balance of power, followed by underestimation of
adversary’s resolve and subsequently hardening of unrealistic bargaining positions, which
increases the probability of war.
The third chapter will examine the instances and reasons for India’s miscalculation of PRC’s
cost of war. The chapter will demonstrate how a skewed understanding about the
international order and one’s pivoted position in it leads to overestimation of the net cost of
war. This miscalculation of the cost of war due to misperception about one’s importance in
the international order manifests into unrealistic and aggressive postures to improve one’s
bargaining position. Once a state, particularly a weak one, is under the above mentioned
misperception, it disregards even strong signals sent by the adversary, even worse
misperceives them to corroborate their preconceived biases. This leaves the adversary,
particularly the stronger one, with very little option other than carrying out the threat, either
to evade negative effects of audience cost or retain its reputation in the international system.
Research Methodology:
These two hypotheses will be evaluated through the study of Sino-Indian war of 1962. This
section contains a detailed statement about the methodology used in the course of this
dissertation along with the merits of this case study, including specific empirical predictions
of the general theoretical hypotheses, and merits of the chosen case study.
Predictions:
The two hypotheses lead to six predictions that should be apparent in the empirical record.
These are essentially of the validity of the theory and can be used to test it. These are grouped
into several categories. First, predictions about the nature of the existing world order and
one’s pivoted position should exhibit a growing sense of security due to miscalculation about
the cost of war. Secondly, predictions about underestimation of adversary’s resolve should
exhibit proliferation of aggressive policies and hardening of the bargaining stand. Thirdly,
actors should be surprised once reality contradicts their predictions. Specific predictions as
each of these categories are listed below.
I) Special understanding about the existing world order and its pivoted position in it
i) Special view about the existing world order and its pivoted position in it
should make the national leadership discard the possibility of war.
ii) Because the national leadership does not believe that the crisis would end
in war, the political leaders should have a more important role in dealing
with various aspects of the crisis, often infringing into territories that have
traditionally been the domain of the military. In other words, the political
leaders should downplay any advice by the military that does not coincide
with its existing belief system. A lot of inter-governmental, and especially
civil-military tension, should be apparent during the crisis.
II) False optimism about the unlikelihood of war should result in underestimation of the
enemy’s resolve:
iii) Despite strong signalling from the adversary, the national leadership
should continue to downplay the likelihood of war and declare the
adversary’s signals as attempts to bluff.
iv) The two states should have very different momentum for war. The state
under the influence of false optimism should lag behind significantly in its
war preparations. There should be a clear disjoint between the tough
bargaining stand taken by the state and its actual war fighting preparations.
III) Perception meets reality: surprise!
v) When war actually happens the political leadership should express shock.
Leaders often have incentives to conceal their surprise, so it may manifest
itself as hastily reinforcing or last minute changes in strategy, a new
willingness to join some security community or plead other nations to
intervene on its behalf.
vi) The war should be very short and the adversary should be able to secure its
objectives with minimum cost.
Investigation of the empirical record in the case study is cantered on these predictions as well
as hypotheses more generally. These predictions focus on relatively operationalized factors
stemming from the hypotheses, and thus ease the task of assessing theory’s validity. To the
extent the cases align with the predictions, the dissertation’s hypotheses are supported.
Case Procedure:
Predictions derived from the hypotheses allow for detailed process tracing to assess the
causal force of the theory in the case material. Assessing the various ancillary predictions of
the theory generally requires examination of leaders’ statements, policies implemented, and
reaction of the adversary’s behaviour. Process tracing provides relatively robust grounds to
assess the validity of a theory as it characterizes not only macro-level outcomes but also
micro-level processes by which outcomes occur and judges whether these corresponds with
the theory’s predictions. (George and Bennett, 2004) Thus the data requirement for this
methodology, are, thus substantial.
Merits of case study selection:
Sino-Indian war is an excellent case to investigate using the dissertations theoretical
framework for two primary reasons. First, both these states lack qualities such as ancient
hatred, previous wars, etc. which might make the states suspicious of latent factors other than
the issue of conflict. This helps us to look at the particular dispute as an isolated case.
Second, the wide gulf between the military capabilities of both these states makes mutual
optimism about winning the war redundant.
Conclusion:
Clearly, the proposed theory does not have a monopoly on possible explanations of all wars
between asymmetric powers. This dissertation is only a modest attempt to understand the
causes of war between asymmetric powers under very specific conditions.
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