mission analysis brief 20 august 2002

Mission Analysis Mission Analysis BriefBrief

20 August 200220 August 2002

BLUE SINGABLUE SINGA

PurposePurpose

The purpose is to brief the commander on the results of the staff’s mission analysis, propose a restated mission and commanders intent.

AgendaAgenda

•CTF Area of Operations (AO)CTF Area of Operations (AO)

•Threat SituationThreat Situation

•Facts / Assumptions / LimitationsFacts / Assumptions / Limitations

•Strategic/Operational Centers of GravityStrategic/Operational Centers of Gravity

•Tasks (Specified, Implied, Essential)Tasks (Specified, Implied, Essential)

•Force Structure AnalysisForce Structure Analysis

•Risk AssessmentRisk Assessment

•End states (Operational/Strategic)End states (Operational/Strategic)

•Proposed CCTF Restated Mission and Intent StatementsProposed CCTF Restated Mission and Intent Statements

•Proposed CCIRProposed CCIR

•CCTF Feedback / GuidanceCCTF Feedback / Guidance

CTF OPERATIONAL AREA CTF OPERATIONAL AREA

TINDORO

AUSTRALIA

SAMAGALAND

•Land mass of Tindoro, including its territorial waters•Area of interest will include the sea and air lines of communication to Samagaland

CTF AREA OF OPERATIONSCTF AREA OF OPERATIONS

THREAT SITUATIONTHREAT SITUATION

Threats– Terrorism

Operating from Displaced persons (DP) camps in Queenstown and the Fingal enclave.

– Poor law & order (Banditry) Direct impact on relief operations

– Aggression from opposing military forces Still deployed along border

– Poor humanitarian conditions May be exploited by terrorists & bandits Cause low morale

– Economy affected by war

C2 EstimateC2 Estimate

Key considerations– Geography – mountainous & wet

Good terrain for bandits & terrorists– Low morale - difficult to gain support

Economy – unemployment & poverty– Well established terrorist cells

Existing terrorists’ infrastructures– Disposition & readiness of North & South

Tindoro forces

C2 EstimateC2 Estimate

AO– Mountainous– Network of lakes & rivers– Coastline generally rugged– Heavy rainfall– Coastal areas exposed to strong winds– Jan-Feb: warmest mths (18-21C)– Jun-Jul: coldest mths (average: 10C)

HIGHER’S MISSIONHIGHER’S MISSION

Coalition Task Force GOODWILL will Coalition Task Force GOODWILL will commence deployment of a multinational commence deployment of a multinational force no earlier than 28 August 02, to force no earlier than 28 August 02, to conduct peacekeeping operations in North conduct peacekeeping operations in North and South Tindoro, in accordance with and South Tindoro, in accordance with UNSCR 147, in order to create conditions UNSCR 147, in order to create conditions necessary for a secure and stable necessary for a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro.environment in North and South Tindoro.

HIGHER CDR’S INTENTHIGHER CDR’S INTENT

I intend for CTF GOODWILL to conduct I intend for CTF GOODWILL to conduct peacekeeping operations in support of UNSCR peacekeeping operations in support of UNSCR 147, by providing a secure and stable 147, by providing a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro, so environment in North and South Tindoro, so that the inhabitants can rebuild their lives, that the inhabitants can rebuild their lives, economies, and social institutions in peace. economies, and social institutions in peace.

HIGHER’S CONCEPT OF HIGHER’S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONSOPERATIONS

Singapore, as lead nation, will form CTF GOODWILL, utilizing the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Ninth Division Headquarters as the core CTF HQ, augmented by military planners from the various troop contributing countries. The CTF HQ will exercise OPCON over CTF multinational forces. CTF GOODWILL will provide a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro by maintaining separation of hostile factions and facilitating humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons. Coordination of efforts with UN Special Representative of the Secretary General is imperative to mission Success

Army–Division HQ–1 x Bde HQ with 3

x Inf Bns–1 x Medical Team

Air Force–2 x C-130 –2 x CH-47D–2 x SPs

SINGAPORE

Navy– 1 x LSL – 1 x LST

FORCES AVAILABLE FOR FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNINGPLANNING

Army–1 x Air Evacuation

Platoon–1 x Civil Affairs Bde

HQ Air Force

–4 X C-130J–1 X KC 135R–2 X C-5B–2 X C-17–1 X Air Mobility

Support Sqn

UNITED STATES

Joint– 1 X Psyop Ops Coy– 1 x JPOTF HQ– 1 X JPOTF PDC– 1 X TPD 980 HQ– 1 X Special Ops Det– 1 X Special Force

Group– 1 x Joint Spec Ops HQ– 1 X MSQ 126 ( for 60

days)


UNITED STATES

Navy– 1 x LHD-2– 1 x LPD-10– 2 x LSD– 1 x LST

US Marine Corp (for 60 days)– 1 x Marine Air Group– 1 x Marine Inf Bn

US Marine Corp (for 60 days)– 1 x Bn Landing Team

Inf Bn LAV Plt AAV Plt Arty Bty

– 1 x Medium Helicopter Sqn (Reinforced) 12 x CH-46E 4 x CH-53E 3 x UH-1N 4 x AH-1W 6 x AV-8B

– 1 x MEU Service Support Group

1 x STINGER Sect


Army– 1 x Infantry Bn– 1 x Engr Coy– 1 x Field Log Spt Staff– 1 x Medical Team– 1 x ROWPU Unit

Navy– 1 x LSH– 1 x LPA

AUSTRALIA


Bangladesh– 1 x MP Coy– 1 x Medical Team– 1 x ROWPU unit

Brunei– 1 x Provost Coy

Canada– 1 x Army Logistic Coy– 2 x C-130E

• Fiji -- 1 x MP Coy

• FranceFrance

–1 x Army Surgical Unit

– 3 x C-130H

• India

–2 x IL-76MD

• Indonesia

–1 x Infantry Bn


Japan– 1 x Surgical Team– 1 x Engineer Bn– 1 x ROWPU Unit– 2 x C-130H

Korea– 1 x Engineer Coy

Madagascar– 1 x Civil Police Unit

• Malaysia

– 1 x Infantry Bn

– 4 x C-130H

– 2 x LST

• Mauritius

- 1 x Engr Plt

• Nepal

–1 x Infantry Coy


New Zealand– 1 x MP Coy

Philippines– 1 x Infantry Bn– 1 x Medical Team

Russia– 1 x Infantry Coy

• Thailand

– 1 x Infantry Bn

– 1 x Special Forces Detachment

– 1 x Army Support Grp

• Sri Lanka- 1 x MP Coy

• Tonga

- 1 x Infantry Coy


2 x C-130J

2 x C-17

4 x HC3 Helo

1 x FFG

UNITED KINGDOM


FACTSFACTS

• CTF is working with two sovereign states who have agreed to UN mandate

•North and South Tindoro have Offensive Capabilities

•40,000 DP’s in 10 camps

•UN NGO/IO already working in AO

•The CTF will require re-supply within 5 days.

• Engineer support is sufficient for road repair and maintenance of the force.

• Host nation support is limited in South Tindoro

•Security problems are hindering HA efforts

FACTS (con’t)FACTS (con’t)

• The CTF will require re-supply within 5 days.

• Engineer support is sufficient for road repair and maintenance of the force.

•No effective law enforcement in North/South Tindoro

FACTSFACTS(Maritime)(Maritime)

Northern Tindoro Port– Launceston; harbor is 100%– Bicheno– Bridport– Davonport (road conditions 40%

flooded)– Marrrawah– Smithton– Stanley (road conditions 75%

flooded)– Ulverstone– Wynard

Northern Tindoro Port– Launceston; harbor is 100%– Bicheno– Bridport– Davonport (road conditions 40%

flooded)– Marrrawah– Smithton– Stanley (road conditions 75%

flooded)– Ulverstone– Wynard

–Southern Tindoro PortHobart; harbor is 100%

Dover

Dunalley

Macquarie Harbour

Port Arthur

St. Helens

Strahan

FACTSFACTS(Medical)(Medical)

• South Tindoro health system is near collapse • Large and growing displaced population with urgent humanitarian needs:

- Cholera outbreaks in 4 camps • Presence of medical NGOs/IOs in the AO (main offices in Hobart)

FACTS FACTS (Special Operations) ((Special Operations) (CSOTF)CSOTF)

• Known Facts • Terrorist activities Fengal and Queenstown• Suspected operating base – displaced person

camps• Denouncement of terror activities by both

governments

• Assumptions• Disruption of restoration efforts by terrorist

• Commanders intent• Anti terror, force protection• Security plan

• Limitations – “CTF will not Conduct Counter Terrorist Actions”

ASSUMPTIONSASSUMPTIONS

•The government of both countries will continue to support the peace process and accept the UN Sanctioned MNF

•All Sea Port Of Debarkation/Aerial Port Of Debarkation (SPOD/APOD) will be available throughout the operation

•MNF will be able to move freely within AO Existing IO and NGO can continue to provide assistance

LIMITATIONSLIMITATIONS

• CONSTRAINTS• Execute handoff with UNMOG• Forces must be able to be self-sustained for 6

months• Forces must be able to self deploy/redeploy• Must deal with two sovereign governments

• RESTRAINTS

• TCC cannot deploy before 28 Aug• NZ cannot be used as Intermediate Staging Base

(ISB)• USMC must re-deploy by sea after 60 days• Cannot conduct any direct counter-terrorism• Host Nation support in South Tindoro is limited

STRATEGICSTRATEGICCENTERS OF GRAVITYCENTERS OF GRAVITY

• CRISIS• Belligerents/host nation belief that MNF/CTF is

impartial in the application of the mandate• Belligerents capability/willingness to use

violence to achieve means

• FRIENDLY• Credibility of the MNF/CTF• APOD/SPOD Access• Public Consent

OPERATIONALOPERATIONALCENTERS OF GRAVITYCENTERS OF GRAVITY

• Phase I (Pre-Crisis Response)• CRISIS

• Consent of all parties to the mandate• Well-being of displaced persons

• FRIENDLY• Legitimacy and credibility of the CTF• Sea and air lines of communications

• Phase II (Lodgment)• CRISIS

• Acceptance of the general population• FRIENDLY

• Deployment flow/ Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD)/Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD)

OPERATIONALOPERATIONALCENTERS OF GRAVITY, con’tCENTERS OF GRAVITY, con’t

• Phase III (Mandate Enforcement)• CRISIS

• Host nation forces• FRIENDLY

• Integration and liaison with all parties• CTF credibility

• Phase IV (Stabilization)• CRISIS

• Local population acceptance of the settlement• FRIENDLY

• Sustainment of mandate• Capability of NGO/IO to provide humanitarian assistance

OPERATIONALOPERATIONALCENTERS OF GRAVITY, con’tCENTERS OF GRAVITY, con’t

• Phase V (Post Crisis)• CRISIS

• Host nation ability to provide secure environment

• FRIENDLY• Complete transition to host nation

SPECIFIED TASKSSPECIFIED TASKS

• Facilitate reintegration of DPs to respective communities• Facilitate transition of HA to host nations• Execute mission handoff from UNMOG to MNF• Separate hostile factions• Facilitate humanitarian assistance• Conduct Information Operations• Execute handoff to host nations• Develop media campaign plan• Create conditions for a secure and stable environment on

Tindoro• Coordinate with UN SRSG• Establish border regime• Conduct peacekeeping operations

IMPLIED TASKSIMPLIED TASKS

•Provide security/presence at Displaced Persons (DP) camps associated with militia and terrorist activity

•Establish buffer vicinity disputed border areas

•Establish/monitor cantonment areas

•Provide support to Host Nation Police forces

•Establish/monitor border regime and checkpoint control

•Integrate with Host Nation Police/Mil coordination mechanisms

•Integrate with NGO/IO/PVOs coordination mechanisms

IMPLIED TASKSIMPLIED TASKS

• Emergency infrastructure development• Secure and establish storage facilities for distribution of HA

supplies• Establish SPODs and APODs• Facilitate external news media coverage• Conduct air-mobility operations• Develop Main Supply Routes (MSR) and their security• Assist in the development of DP routes and their security• Assist in the transport DPs as necessary• Establish Command and control (C2) arrangement within

the CTF• Provide communications to supporting forces as required

ESSENTIAL TASKSESSENTIAL TASKS

• Create conditions for a secure and stable environment• Conduct Information Operations• Facilitate reintegration of DPs to respective communities• Execute handoff to host nations• Execute mission handoff from UNMOG to MNF• Separate hostile factions• Facilitate humanitarian assistance• Conduct peacekeeping operations• Coordination and liaison with NGOs/IOs/UN SRSG

INITIAL FORCE STRUCTUREINITIAL FORCE STRUCTUREANALYSISANALYSIS

Sealift – sufficient Airlift – sufficient

Communications – shortfall of communications equipment and inter-operability

RISK ASSESSMENTRISK ASSESSMENT

Risk is minimal

OPERATIONAL END STATEOPERATIONAL END STATE

CTF successfully hands over security and HA support responsibilities to Host Nations’ Armed Forces and Civil Authorities, when; hostile forces are separated, border regime is in place, displaced persons are reintegrated, HA missions are transitioned to civil authorities.

STRATEGIC END STATESTRATEGIC END STATE

A secure and stable environment in North and A secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro. South Tindoro.

PROPOSED CTF RESTATED PROPOSED CTF RESTATED MISSIONMISSION

Coalition Task Force GOODWILL will deploy a multinational force no earlier than 28 August 02 (C-Day), to conduct peacekeeping operations in North and South Tindoro, in accordance with UNSCR 147, to create the conditions necessary for the governments of North and South Tindoro to maintain a secure and stable environment.

Intent is to form a multinational force to help Intent is to form a multinational force to help create conditions necessary to establish a create conditions necessary to establish a secure and stable environment in North and secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro. All of our actions in keeping South Tindoro. All of our actions in keeping hostile forces apart, assisting with HA and hostile forces apart, assisting with HA and return of DPs, must be focused towards this return of DPs, must be focused towards this end.end.

PROPOSED COMMANDER’S PROPOSED COMMANDER’S INTENTINTENT

PROPOSED INITIAL CCIRPROPOSED INITIAL CCIR

•Do the Militia and terrorists receive tacit support from host governments

•The CCTF requires notification of impending terrorist/militia activity

•Does the host nation have the ability/intent to perform Counter Terrorism in support of CTF operations and defense.

COMMANDER’S GUIDANCECOMMANDER’S GUIDANCE

CPG-1 GuidanceCPG-1 Guidance

Minimum Military Footprint

Heavy SOF, CMO, and involvement of smaller regional nations

Heavy HA, IO, PA, media campaign

Establish functional composite subordinate Task Forces (TF) -

(TF med, TF LOG, TF Security, etc.)

Strong border regime or Military Exclusion Zone (MEZ) - CPG make recommendation

Critical infrastructure repair & CA projects on Tindoro

Full integration of Multinational Forces


Heavy Military Footprint

Establish MEZ along TEMASEK Agreement border

Demilitarization

Heavy mil-police security

Full integration of MNF

Establish CCMOTF to conduct HA & NGO support, Civil Military Operations (CMO) and support to SRSG


Sector Establishment

Sector assignment of participating forces

Plan for smooth coordination of NGO / HA support

Security patrols / demilitarization

Coordinate reintegration of DPs across sectors and borders

Strong border regime or MEZ - CPG make recommendation

Minimize inefficiencies created by force structure

Determine optimum logistic support

mission analysis brief 20 august 2002

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staffs mission analysis

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