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FBI WMD Directorate

Mitigating the Chemical ThreatAt Your FacilityAt Your Facility

Bill DelBagnoS i S i l A tSupervisory Special Agent

Mitigating the Potential Risks and Building a Culture of Awareness, Communication, and Prevention

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Mitigating the Chemical Threat

Agenda

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• Chemical Countermeasures Unit Mission

A l i f th Ch i l Th t• Analysis of the Chemical Threat

• Threat Mitigation Strategy

• Building the Law Enforcement &Agricultural Industry Partnershipg y p

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FBI WMD Directorate

Vision • Eliminate the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by all adversaries.

Mission• Lead the FBI’s efforts to deny state and non-state• Lead the FBI s efforts to deny state and non-statesponsored adversaries access to WMD materials and technologies, to detect and disrupt the use ofWMD and to respond to WMD threats andWMD, and to respond to WMD threats and incidents.

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WMD Threat Assessment

Industrial Explosives

HighBiologicalToxins

Chemicals

BiologicalRadio-isotopes

Chemicals

Biological Pathogens

Explosives are highest threat based on ease of synthesis and

effectiveness

NuclearWeapons

Weapons

effectivenessLow

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Chemical Countermeasures Unit

CCU Mission• Within the FBI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction

Directorate, the Chemical Countermeasures Unitecto ate, t e C e ca Cou te easu es U tleads the FBI’s efforts to deter, detect, and disrupt the use of chemicals in terrorism incidents.

• A “countermeasure” is an intentional action takento prevent an undesirable outcome.p

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Chemical Threat ConcernsExplosive Precursor Chemicals • Many “over the counter” materials

Toxic Industrial ChemicalToxic Industrial Chemical• Manufacturing, storage, & transport• Releasable improvised deviceReleasable improvised device

Chemical Warfare Agents• Theft/Diversion of stored weapons• Home Synthesis

Ch i l E i t K l d– Chemicals, Equipment, Knowledge

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Terrorist Behavioral Resolve

“. . . experts in the fields of chemistry, physics, administration, electronics and media and all the specifications especially the atomists and explosivesspecifications, especially the atomists and explosives engineering experts, . . . we are in dire need of you. The field of jihad can satisfy your scientific ambitions and the large American bases in Iraq are goodambitions, and the large American bases in Iraq are good places to test your unconventional weapons, whether biological or dirty . . .”

-Abu Hamza al-Muhajer’s al-Qa’ida in IraqAbu Hamza al-Muhajer s, al-Qa ida in Iraq

in September 2006

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Synthesis Complexityy p y

Steps from precursor to productType of agent Minimum number of stepsChoking/TIC 0Choking/TIC 0Explosives 1

Bl d 1Blood 1Blister 1-3Toxins 4+Nerve 1-7

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KnowledgegFinding a Valid Recipe

B t f l i• Best for explosives.• TICs do not require a recipe for use in an attack.• CW are generally inaccurate for more complex• CW are generally inaccurate for more complex

syntheses, but overall good first step.

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Opportunities for Countermeasures

Acquisition PhaseP Ch i l• Precursor Chemicals

• Secondary Equipment• Personal Protective EquipmentPersonal Protective Equipment• Knowledge About Target

D l t PhDevelopment Phase• Device building

Chemical preparation• Chemical preparation

Execution PhaseExecution Phase• Operational

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Execution Phase Examplep

Times Square Bombing Attempt (2010)• Faisal Shahzad attempted to bomb Times Square with Vehicle-Borne Improvised Incendiary Device.

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Time Square, New York City

12Orientation of devices from attempted Times Square bombing.

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Time Square, New York City

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Development Phase Examplep p

New York City Subway Plot (2009)• Najibullah Zazi’s plot to attack the NYC subway.• Zazi’s acquisition of hydrogen peroxide from q y g p

beauty supply stores was not reported.

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Development Phase Examplep p

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Missed Opportunitypp yGetting past acquisition• Counting on a lack of chemical awareness.• Store owner: ...who would think that

something you find at the grocery store, at many different retail stores…would be cause f l ?”for alarm?”

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Acquisition Phase Exampleq p

Khalid Aldawasari Arrest (Feb. 23, 2011)• Aldawasri was arrested in Lubbock, Texas in

connection with the purchase of Phenol, a chemical explosive precursor.

• A company in Burlington, N.C. contacted FBI after a suspicious order.

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Mitigating the Chemical ThreatTOP DOWN APPROACH •Access to regional &

national chemical threat intelligence

•National view of chemical vulnerabilities

intelligence

•Operational Response and investigative actions

•Association/Corporate outreach

P t ith th US

•Relationships with chemical contacts locally

•Conduct local awareness•Partner with other US Agencies

•Create awareness training materials

•Conduct local awareness training

•Access to Subject Matter Expertstraining materials

•Chemical Outreach Day

National Tracking of

Experts

•Disseminate awareness material locally

BOTTOM UP APPROACH

•National Tracking of outreach activity

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WMD Coordinator

ONE POINT OF CONTACTONE POINT OF CONTACT

• Primary point of contact for WMD-related issues within the local FBI field office.

• Reporting of suspicious customers/purchase inquiries.• Available to provide training and outreach materials. p g• Conduit to Joint Terrorism Task Force investigators

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FBI Headquarters Outreach q OProfessional Associations

• Large conferences• Publications

P li k• Policy makers

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Retail Businesses of InterestExplosive Precursors

H lth d B t• Health and Beauty• Pool and Spa suppliers• Agricultural Stores• Agricultural Stores• Home Improvement• Pharmacy/Drug Storesy g• General Chemical Sales• Mold Remediation• Exploding Targets• Pyrotechnics

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Retail Businesses of InterestToxic Industrial Chemicals:• General Chemical Sales• Cyanide, Ammonia, and Chlorine• Pesticides• Pesticides• Business to Business

Chemical Warfare Agents:• General Chemical Sales• Online Chemical Sales• Sophisticated Chemistry

Eq ipment SalesEquipment Sales

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Identify Suspicious BehaviorIdentify Suspicious BehaviorPurchases:

V th i t d d f th

Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activities Related to the Agricultural Industry

Federal Bureau of Investigation

E h i di li d b l b b i lf l f l d b h i d l i h i f i h d b h U S C i i I ddi i h• Vague on the intended use of the product

• Pays cash

What Should I Consider Suspicious?People Who: Exhibit an unusual preoccupation with products containing

Ammonium Nitrate, Urea, Sodium Nitrate, Potassium Nitrate, Phosgene, Phosphine, Hydrosulfuric Acid, Calcium Polysulfide or Hydrogen Peroxide

Are unable or unwilling to answer basic questions on the use, application, safety, and handling of material; are evasive or vague about intended use of products

Possess little knowledge of agricultural operations Travel an illogical distance to purchase chemicals Exhibit an unusual preoccupation with the chemical composition of

certain fertilizers, pesticides, fumigants Display no interest in alternative fertilizers fertilizer combinations

Purchase Activities Including: Ordering unusual quantities of fertilizer, pesticide,

fungicide, and castor seeds inconsistent with the individual’s business or established ordering patterns

Using cash or credit card in someone else’s name for large transactions

Unusual ordering patterns (quantities, out of season, cash payments, orders over the phone, illogical shipping or contact information, shipping to P.O. Box)

Existing customer places order that is inconsistent with customer’s business or established ordering pattern.

Each indictor listed below may be, by itself, lawful conduct or behavior and may also constitute the exercise of rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, there may be a wholly innocent explanation for conduct or behavior that appears suspicious in nature. For this reason, no single indicator should be the sole basis for law enforcement action. The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action.

Pays cash • Reluctant to show ID• Shows little interest in alternative

d tWhat Should I Do?

Be part of the solution. Talk to customers, ask questions, listen to their responses and observe their behavior Note identifying information such as names, license plates, physical characteristics, etc. for suspicious people and/or activities;

Display no interest in alternative fertilizers, fertilizer combinations, pesticides or fumigants

Make suspicious inquiries regarding equipment (e.g., tank size, spray range)

Are reluctant or unwilling to produce valid identification Use a rental vehicle or a vehicle with out-of-state or temporary

license plates; request delivery to drop locations or non-operating facilities

Note: There may be a legitimate and lawful reason why these indicators are observed. Some of the activities, taken individually, could be innocent. We are asking you to determine when that is not the case so that the circumstances may be examined by law enforcement professionals in a larger context to determine whether there is a basis to investigate. The activities outlined on this handout are by no means all-inclusive but have been compiled from a review of terrorist events over several years. It is important to remember that just because someone’s speech, actions, beliefs, appearance, or way of life is different does not mean that he or she is suspicious.

products• Unusual ordering patterns• Purchase address different from

y g , p , p y , p p p ;Maintain your composure

Watch for people and actions that are out of place Require valid identification from all new customers Keep records of purchases and suspicious inquiries If something doesn’t seem right, notify law enforcement authorities immediately Establish a relationship with your local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and your FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMD) Coordinator Do not jeopardize your safety or the safety of others. Preventing terrorism is a community effort. By learning what to look for, you can make a positive contribution in the fight against terrorism. The partnership between the community and law enforcement is essential to the success of anti-terrorism efforts.

FBI XXXX Division Joint Terrorism Task Force

(XXX) XXX-XXXX • Purchase address different from shipping address

This document, or any segment thereof, may not be rewritten, posted on the internet or given to any other public or private entity without prior written or verbal approval from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Last Revised: 03/13/2012

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Distribute Awareness Material

Education Materials • FBI-DHS Poster Cards• Suspicious Behavior Indicator Posters• Agricultural, Chemical, and Petroleum

Industry Terrorism Handbook

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Retail Awareness Video

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FBI Headquarters Outreach

Manufacturers and Storage g• Livewire - Table Top Exercise• Reports suspicious behavior• Insider threat• Coordination with DHS CFATS

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Identifying Suspicious Behavior y g p

Manufacturers or Storage g• Probes to security• Surveillance of facilitySurveillance of facility • Attempts to gain access• Security procedures inquires• Security procedures inquires• Significant changes in

employee’s dispositionemployee s disposition• Inquires regarding effects of

an attackan attack

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Chemical Awareness Training

Industry Outreach DaysTh t b i fi• Threat briefing

• Improvised explosives• Chemical outreach• Chemical outreach • Explosives Demo• Private sector presentationp

Outreach Dates• Jul 12, 2012 Cedar Rapids, IA• Aug 9, 2012 New Haven, CT • Sep 14, 2012 Worchester, MD

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Summary of Resultsy

Does industry outreach work?y• In 2011 nearly 200 investigative leads involving

chemicals were generated.g• Several of these leads resulted in identifying

nefarious activity and full investigations were opened.

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Summary of Goals for Outreachy

Create a culture of awareness • Identify suspicious purchases, incidents, and

behavior.

Create a culture of communication• Establish contact with local FBI WMD CoordinatorEstablish contact with local FBI WMD Coordinator.

Create countermeasures • Participate in training opportunities and use training

materials.

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Mitigating the Chemical ThreatMitigating the Chemical Threat

Questions?Questions?

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