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MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION:SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPANSIONS OF RESOURCE

MOBILIZATION THEORY*

BERT KLANDERMANSFree University, Amsterdam

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approaches to social movements. Expectaticy-value theory is applied to movemertl

this framework applicable to movement participation. The theory is applied tomobilization campaigns of the labor movement, and empirically tested in alongitudinal study of a campaign during the 1979 collective negotiations in theNetherlands. Outcomes stfpport the theory. Theoretical and practical implicationsare discussed.

Resource mobilization theory was a reaction totraditional social-psychological theories ofsocial movements (Zurcher and Snow, 1981).Those theories focused on what attractedpeople to participation in social movements.Amongst the explanations were: personalitytraits (cf. Kenniston, l%8; Kerpelman, 1969);marginaiity and alienation (cf. LeBon [1903]1968; Freud, 1922; HofFer, I95I: Komhauser,1959); and grievances and ideology (cf. Davies,1962; Toch, I%6; Geschwender, 1968; Gurr,1970; Rothman, 1974; Landsberger, 1976).These explanations tended to be based on theassumption that participation in a socialmovement, like other forms of collective be-havior, is an unconventional, irrational type ofbehavior (Schwartz, 1976).' Thanks to re-source mobilization theorists themselves,these approaches became increasingly ques-tionable. Attempts to show that movementparticipants have characteristic personalitytraits were not very successful (Heberle, 1968;Roberts and KIoss, 1974; Klandermans,1983b), Marginaiity and alienation, for exam-ple, were not the typical background of partici-

*Direcl all correspondence to; Bert Klandermans.Department of Social Psychology, Free University.Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

I wish to thank two anonymous reviewers whoprovided many insightful comments on an earlierversion of this paper.

' Schwartz contrasts the social-psychological "ir-rational" approach with the stnictur^ "rational" ap-proach, I hope to show here that such a charac-terization of social psychology is ui\}ust.

pants in such divergent movements as fascismin Germany (Oberschall, 1973), the studentmovement (Kenniston, 1968), the civil nightsmovement (Morris, 1981), the union movement(Moore, 1975), political protest movements(Marsh, 1977; Bames and Kaase, 1979), theenvironmental, antiabortion, and antinuclearmovements (L.eahy and Mazur, 1978), and theunemployed movement (Klandermans, J979).The importance of grievances and ideology asdeterminants of participation in a socialmovement has been ambiguous (Gerlach andHine, 1970: McCarthy and ZaJd, 1976; Walsh,1978; Leahy and Mazur, 1978; Tilly, 1979).

In contrast to traditional social-psycho-logical interpretations, resource mobili-zation theory emphasizes the importance ofstructural factors, such as the availability ofresources to a collectivity and the position ofindividuals in social networks, and stresses therationality of participation in social movements(Oberschall, 1973; Gamson, 1975; Marx andWood, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1976; Zaidand McCarthy, 1979; Snow et al., 1980; Gam-son et al., 1982), Participation in a socialmovement is seen not as the consequence ofpredisposing psychological traits or states, butas the result of rationaJ decision processeswhereby people weigh the costs and benefits ofparticipation.

Currently, resource mobilization theory isthe dominant approach in the field. Paradoxi-cally, a demand for new social-psychologicaltheories of mobilizîon and p^ticipation hasdeveloped (Gamson etal , , 1982;Jenkins, 1983;Walsh and Warland, 1983). Resource mobai-

American Sociological Review, 1984, Vol. 49 (October:583-600) 583

584

zation theory went too far in nearly abandoningthe social-psychological analyses of socialmovements. In this paper a fresh case is madefor a soci^'psychologic^ analysis of mobiliza-tion and participation in a social movement. Bycombining new insights in psychology with re-source mobilization theory, the weaknesses ofearlier social-psychological approaches in thefield can be overcome.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND RESOURCEMOBILIZATION THEORY

Social psychology can expand resourcemobilization theory in an important way byrevealing processes of social-movement par-ticipation on the individual level. To resourcemobilization theorists, participation resultsfrom "weighing" costs against benefits. How-

• ever, little attention is given to weighing theseat the individual level. Nor is much attentiongiven to the interaction between individualsthat generates mobilization.^

Identifying the interaction between individu-als as the appropriate level of analysis has sig-nificant theoretical consequences. It takes intoaccount the psychological truism that peoplebehave in a perceived reality. Individual deci-sions to participate in a social movement arebased on perceived costs and benefits of par-ticipation. That perceived reality is capable ofbeing infiuenced, and both social-movementleaders and adversaries try to do so. Persua-sion is an important element in every mobiliza-tion campaign. The efficacy of a mobilizationcampaign in persuading the individual is a keydeterminant of participation.

Movement participation denotes activitiesranging from signing a petition to sabotage, andfrom part-time or one-time to full-time activity.The perceived costs and benefits for differentactivities can vary greatly (see also Tolbert,1981). Moreover, there can be substantial dif-ferences in perceived costs and benefits be-tween individuals, across regions, and duringthe life cycle of the movement. This has im-portant implications for mobilization cam-paigns. By timing, and by their choice of strat-egy and arena, social-movement organizationscan profoundly infiuence the costs and benefitsof participation.

^ A number of students of social iflpvementswhose approaches axe cognate with resource mobili-zation theory do pay attention to processes at theindividual level (Schwartz, 1976; Mitchell, 1979;Oberschall, 1980; Tolbert, 1981; Gamsonet al.. 1982).Their analyses bear resemblwices to the one pre-sented here. They have in common, however, theirlack of a systematic, psychologically based theoreti-cal framework. Moreover, they are not theoretical:they provide no empirical data at the individual level.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

A general criticism of resource mobilizationtheory has been that it underestimates thesignificance of grievances and ideology as de-terminants of participation in a social move-ment (Carden, 1978; Fireman and Gamson,1979; Useem, 1980; Isaac et al.. 1980). Thisshortcoming results from confusitig the indi-vidual and societal levels of analysis (see alsoGeschwender, 1968). The fact that grievancesand ideology cannot explain the rise of socialmovements does not mean that they do notplay a roie in the decisions of individuals toparticipate in a social movement. One of theaspirations of this social-psychological expan-sion of resource mobilization theory is to find amore satisfying theoretical solution for theproblem of grievances and ideology as deter-minants of participation in a social movement.

PERSUASION AND ACTIVATION: ASOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OFMOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION

Participation in a social movement fluctuates.Altematingly, a movement has its rank and filein action and then it falls back on its cadre.Mobilization plays an important part in thesefiuctuations. The remainder of this article willfocus on participation in a social movementand on the way it changes as a result of mobili-zation attempts.

The Willingness to Participate

A person will participate in a social movementif s/he knows the opportunities to participate, ifs/he is capable of using one or more of theseopportunities, and if s/he is willing to do so.This paper elaborates the third condition byapplying expectancy-value theory to move-ment participation. In general this theory "at-tempts to relate action to the perceived attrac-tiveness or aversiveness of expected con-sequences" (Feather, 1982:1).^ The key ele-

^ Expectancy-value models In psychology com-prise such concepts as attitude, motivation, choiceand decision. The motivation for a certain behavioris a function of the expectation that it will yieldcertain outcomes and the values of those outcomes(Rotter, 1954, 1972; Mitchell, 1974; Campbell andPritchard, 1977). The value of an outcome of behav-ior is a function of the instrumentality of the primaryoutcome for other, secondary outcomes and thevalue they have. Expectancy-value theory is arational-choice theory. It is one of the subjectiveutility theories in psychology. As such, it is easilycompatible with resource mobilization theory. How-ever, I do not want to suggest that social psychologyhas nothing more to offer that is useful to the study ofsocial movements (see Gamson et al., 1982; Pinard.1983; Ferrce and MiUer, 1984).

MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION

ments of the theory are expected outcomes(expectations) and the value of these out-comes. Theoretically, values and expectationscombine in a multiplicative way. Even if thevalue of an outcome is very high it will notmotivate individtials as long as they do notbelieve that the outcome can be produced bytheir efforts. Usually different outcomes (ma-terial and nonmaterial) are distinguished. Foreach outcome a value-expectancy product canbe calculated. Motivation is defined as the sumof these different value-expectancy products.''

A rational-choice framework does not implythat feelings, emotions or sentiments are unim-portant In relation to movement participation.Nor doe5 it argue that potential participants areconsciously multiplying and adding values andexpectations. The usefulness of the frameworkis that it provides a device for the systematicanalysis of the variety of beliefs, expectationsand attitudes that are related to participation ina social movement (see Schwartz [1976] andOberschall [1980] for defenses of the rationalview of human action).

However, before this general theoreticalframework can be applied to movement par-ticipation, it has to be modified in an importantway. The goals of social movements are "col-lective goods," Obtaining a collective good isnot directly contingent on the decision of anindividtial to participate (Olson, 1977). Ra-tional individuals will not participate in theproduction of a collective good unless selectiveincentives motivate them to do so. Though Ol-son's argument has been criticized (Schwartz,1976; Mitchell, 1979; Fireman and Gamson,1979; Oliver, 1980), it clarified the distinctionbetween collective benefits and selective ben-efits. If one finds it untenable that only thelatter motivates movement participation, onemust acknowledge that the relationship be-tween participation and collective benefits isdifferent from the relationship between partici-pation and selective benefits.

Collective heneftts and participation. BothGamson (1975) and Schwartz (1976) argue thatpeople participate in activities to produce acollective goal precisely because they areaware that the good would never be producedif everyone sat back and waited for someoneelse to do something. Oberschall (1980) re-marked that this was especially true for people*ho are strongly in favor of the collectivegood. Fireman and Gamson (1979) and

* There is considerable discussion in the literatureconcerning the mathematical part of the theory (see,^-g.. Kuhl. I9S2). Leaving aside the theoretical^gument, in practice most researchers use multipleregression analysis to combine the different vari-ables.

585

Fleishm^i (1980) stressed the importfuice offeelings of responsibility and solidarity m thisconnection. Schwartz (1976) and Oberachall(J980) added the probability of success as veryimportant. In their analysis the probability ofsuccess is related to the number of partici-pants. Oberschail (1980) pointed out that theimportant question for the individual is whathis/her participation will contribute to theprobability of success. From a hypothesizedrelationship between the number of partici-pants and the probability of success, the indi-vidual contribution as a function of the numberof participants can be derived. Oliver et aJ.(1983) made clear that there is a variety of suchproduction functions.

These arguments do not touch the funda-mental issue, namely, that persons have to de-cide to participate at a point when they do notknow whether others will participate. There isa social-psychological solution to this problem.Although people do not know what others willdo, they have expectations. Based on their ex-pectations about the behavior of others, peopleassess the probability of success and their owncontribution to it. The expectation that partici-pation helps to produce the collective good cantherefore be categorized as follows:

a. expectations about the number of partici-pants;

b. expectations about one's own contribu-tion to the probability of success;

c. expectations about the probability of suc-cess if many people participate.*These expectations combine in a multiplicativeway with the vaiue of the collective good toproduce the expected collective benefits of par-ticipation.

Applying expectancy theory yields the hy-pothesis that the value of a collective good is afunction of its instrumentality'' for socialchanges which the movement hopes to achieveand of the value of changes. To form an opin-ion about this instrumentality, an individu^must have knowledge about the collective goodand its implications.

Participation and selective costs and bene-

' On the basis of the expectations distinguished,we can define the free-rider problem more closely. Afree rider is someone who believes that his/her owncontribution to the probability of success will be verysmall, but who believes that the number of partici-pants and the probability of success are \axgt enoughto expect that the collective good will be produced.See Klandermans (1983a) for a reconsideration ofthe free-rider dilemma along Uiis line. Oliver et al.(1983) propose a similar limitation of the free-riderproblem.

^ in expectancy-value theory expectation is usedfor behavior-outcome relations and instrumentalityfor outcome-outcome relations.

586

fits. Selective costs and benefits are by defini-tion contingent on participation. ExpectationsatKJUt, and values of, these incentives directlyinfiuence the willingness to participate. In theliterature there are different classifications ofselective costs and benefits (cf. Freeman, 1979;Tolbert, 1981). An important distinction is thatbetween expected reactions of significantothers' and expected material costs and bene-fits like money, time, injury, entertainment.^

Motives. The willingness to participate in asocial movement can be defined as a functionof the jwrceived attractiveness or aversivenessof the expected consequences of participation.This signifies that willingness to participate is afiinction of:

(a) the expectation that participation willhelp to produce the collective good and thevalue of the collective good—the collectivemotive; (b) the expected selective costs andbenefits and the value of these costs and bene-fits. As distinguished in the reactions of signifi-cant others, these comprise the social motive.As they relate to nonsocial costs and benefits,they comprise the reward motive.

Expectations or instrumentalities and valuescombine in a multiplicative way and the threemotives in an additive way. The value of acollective good will be zero if it is not believedto be instrumental for valued societal changes,or if the changes it is said to be instrumental forare not valued. The value of a collective goodwill be negative if it is believed to hinder valuedsocietal changes, or if changes are valuednegatively.

If the value of the collective good is zero, thecollective motive will be zero. If this value isnegative the motive will be negative, unless theexpectation component is zero.

The collective motive will also be zero if theexpectation that participation will help to pro-duce the collective good is zero: persons willnot be motivated by the collective good if theydo not feel that their participation contributesto the probability of success, or do not believethat enough other people will participate, or donot feel there is any chance of success even ifmany people participate.

Since the different motives combine in anadditive way, they can compensate one an-other. If the collective motive is weak, zero or

' To avoid circularity, it is important to point outwho in a person's environment will be significant.Although it is difHcult to give exhaustive enumera-tions, certainly friends, colleagues and family mem-bers are among them.

* These costs and benefits can vary greatly de-pending on ^ e situation and the kind of participa-tion. However, often the main costs and benetits of aparticular form of participation can be specified.


negative, the other motives can be so strongthat a person is willing to participate. If thecollective motive is strong, the social motivesand/or reward motives can be negative withoutmaking a person unwilling to participate. Ofcourse there are also situations in which thecollective motive does not outweigh negativesocial and/or reward motives, either becausethe collective motive is too weak, or becausethe social and reward motives are too negative.Figure 1 summarizes the theory on the willing-ness to participate.

Mobilization

Mobilization attempts by a movement organi-zation have the aim of winning participants,that is, persuading people to support themovement organization by material and non-material means. Mobilization attempts alwayscontain two components. These are called con-sensus mobilization and action mobilization.

Consensus mobilization is a process throughwhich a social movement tries to obtain sup-port for its viewpoints.^ It involves (a) a col-lective good, (b) a movement strategy, (c)confrontation with the opponent, (d) resultsachieved. Neither collective goods nor types ofaction are fixed quantities. They change, andthis requires renewed consensus mobilization.Consensus mobilization does not take place ina vacuum. Collective goods and actions areoften controversial. Opponents, counter-movements, rival organizations counter thearguments of a social movement. A socialmovement will have to go into thesearguments. In short, a "paper war"" is waged topromote or to discourage the mobilization ofconsensus. The degree of success with whichconsensus is mobilized around the collectivegoods can be measured by the extent to whichthese goods are known and valued. Whetherpeople value a collective good depends on theextent to which consensus mobilization suc-ceeded in making them believe that this good isinstrumental for valued social changes,

Action mobilization is the process by whichan organization in a social movement calls uppeople to participate. Consensus mobilizationdoes not necessarily go together with actionmobilization, but action mobilization cannot dowithout consensus mobilization. Actionmobilization involves motivating people toparticipate. Ideally, social movement organi-zations will take a variety of approaches, ap-pealing both to collective and to social and

' Consensus mobilization bears resemblances tothe spread of generjdized beliefs (Smelser, 1971).Consensus mobilization, however, is a purposefuleffort of a social-movement organization.

MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION 587

Attitude theory

value of sQci'alchange advocated

instrumentality ofcollective good forsocial change advo-cated

- participation contributes to probabi-l i t y of success

- expected number of participants- expected success i f many people

participate

Motivation theory

value of collectivegood

expectation thatparticipation wil lhelp to achieve thecollective good*

value of reactionof significantothers

expected reactionof significantothers to part ici-pation and tonon-participation

value of costsand benefits

expected costs andbenefits of part i-cipation and non-participation

willingnessto part i-cipate

" X means a mulliplicative relationship.+ means an additive relationship.

Figure 1. A Theory of the Willingness lo Participate^

reward motives (Gamson, 1975; Carden, 1978;Stiow et al., 1980). They have every reason todo so. Participation because of collective mo-tives means that both the collective good andthe type of participation are attractive. But itwill seldom be the case that each and everymember of a collectivity is won over to thecollective good and the form of participation inthe time available. Particularly if nearlyunanimous participation is demanded, there isalways a certain percentage who, lacking com-plete consensus, will have to be mobilizedusing social and/or reward motives. Anotherfactor to be contended with is the occurrence

of free-rider behavior. Since free riders take apositive stand on the collective good but do notbelieve that its production depends on theirparticipation, it is not of much use to appeal tocollective motives. What remains is to try tomobilize them using socia! and/or reward mo-tives. Here, again, the chance that a socialmovement decides to do this will be greater if ahigher degree of participation is required.'*'

'" Not all types of action are equally vulnerable tononparticipation (cf. Fireman and Gamson, 1979;Klandermans, 1983a; Otiver et al., 1983). This wiUdiffer for different types of action.

588

A mobilizing organization will try to makethe beneHts of participation and the costs ofnonparticipation as high ^ possible, and thecosts of participation and the benefits of non-participation as low as possible. Apart frominfluencing the three motives directly, amovement also has indirect means of control-ling the costs and benefits of participation.Two important ones are (a) the choice of thetype of action and (b) the choice of the scene.A movement can choose among several typesof action, from moderate to militant. With itschoice of the type of action, a movement candetermine to a large extent the costs and bene-fits of participation. A movement can fightwhere it is strongest, that is, in sectors of soci-ety with strong movement networks where itcan organize many people. Resource mobiliza-tion literature has shown that people are moreeasily mobilized in such sectors (cf. Ragin eta!., 1982), The premise here is that this is prob-ably because a more favorable cost-benefitratio can be created in such sectors.

Psychologically speaking, there will be anelement of projection in estimates of the numberof participants in a movement. A person whodoes not wish to participate will make a lowerestimate of the number of participants than aperson who does wish to take part." In a col-lectivity this has all the look of a self-fulfilUngprophecy: if many people think that few peoplewill participate, many people will have doubtsabout the efficacy of their own participation.Thus a downward spiral ensues which is fatalto the willingness to participate. Mobilizationefforts attempt to reinforce the view that"many people wil! participate.'" If this is notsuccessful, the prophecy fulfills itself.

METHOD

The theory of mobilization and participationhas been applied in research on mobilizationcampaigns of the union movement, thewomen's movement and the peace movement.This paper presents data from a study of theeffects of a mobilization campaign by the In-dustrial Workers" Union of the Dutch UnionFederation, the largest union of industrialworkers in the Netherlands.

The Campaign

In 1979, the Industrial Workers' Union (IBFNV) tried to mobilize its members for ashorter work week. It was argued thatshortening the work week would reduce unem-


ployment. The campaign started in August1978 when the chairman of the IB FNVlaunched the 35-hour work week as the chiefdemand in the 1979 negotiations. The campaignincluded numerous publications in the pressand appearances on radio and television, issuesof the union's magazine, posters, bulletins, andpamphlets, work by union officials and bymembers. The union, however, quickly wenton the defensive. Not just their opponent, butpublic opinion and even many "friendly"economists or politicians turned against it. Inan effort to break this massive resistance, theunion twice changed its goals: first, by replac-ing the 35-hour week with a 39-hour week, laterby dropping the shorter work week and de-manding extra days off.

Collective bargaining is a series of events.Our study was devoted to some of them. Onedid have a great deal of influence: the failure ofa 6-week strike against the West German steelindustry in which the 35-hour work week wasat stake. This failure made the union keenlyaware of its small chances of success, even ifmilitant action were taken. Thus no action wastaken in the Netherlands that year. Ultimately,however, an agreement was reached giving afew extra days off. Although the memberswere not markedly dissatisfied with this result,many regretted the meager results. Few be-lieved it would have a favorable effect on em-ployment.

Research Design

Mobilization campaigns often last severalmonths. In this case the campaign started inAugust 1978, and the negotiations were notcompleted until June 1979. In such a situation,longitudinal research is to be preferred. Fromthe end of November 1978 through July 1979we interviewed a group of union membersabout once a month. We chose the timing sothat the interviews fell shortly before or afteran important event. Although a total of sevenwaves were held, for methodological reasons adesign was developed which ensured that norespondent would be interviewed more thanthree times. Seven groups of members wereselected, and they were interviewed accordingto the schedule in Figure 2. When the similarityof the seven groups was controlled on anumber of variables, the differences foundwere so few that the groups can be used forcomparison with no difficulty.'^ In addition,

'* See Granberg and Holmbet (1983) for an in-teresting elaboration of a similar assumption regard-mg voting behavior.

" To check whether the differences found affectedthe outcomes, analyses of covariiuice were carriedout on all effect variables, with the variables whichhad shown signiUcant differences as covariates. Notonce did ttwy kad to different conclusions.


group I

group II

aroup III

group IV

group V

group VI

group VII

1stinterview

Nov. 20-29

2n(iinterview

1stinterview

Jan. 4-18

2ndinterview

1stinterview

Jan. 29-Feb. 9

2ndinterview

lstinterview

Feb. 19-Mar^ 2

2ndinterview

lst

Apr. 3-16

2nd

ist

May 18-June 1

3rdinterview

3rdinterview

3rdinterview

3rainterview

3rd

2n&

lstinterview

June 11-July 11

Figure 2. Desig

this design'^ has many advantages. We can geta picture of the course of the campaign bycomparing the outcomes of the successiveinterviews. We can also study the effect of asingle event by comparing the outcomes of theinterviews before and after that event whilecontrolling for repeated measurement.

Respondents

Members of the IB FNV were interviewed atthree plants belonging to the AKZO concern:Enka in Emmen: Enka in Ede; and AKZOPharma in Oss. A sample of 746 persons wastaken from the membership lists of the union.The data set includes 490 complete series ofinterviews (66%), well distributed over plantsand interview waves. The first interview hadthe highest nonresponse rate. This interviewwas completed with 565 members (76%).Slightly less than half the dropouts refused totake part in this interview. The others were notat home, were no longer members, no longerworked for the company, were sick, or hadmoved. The refusals (!^ of the original sample)may have damaged the representativeness.Small percentages again fell off at the second(4%) and third interviews (6%), Half of thedropouts at the third interview were memberswho had already left for vacation.

" The design is one of the variants of the separatesample-pretest-posttest design (Campbell and Stan-ley, l%3):

R O,R

0;O

The Interviews

The interviews were held at the participants'homes and were carried out by the NetherlandsInstitute of Opinion Polls. Each questionnaireconsisted of one part that was the same eachtime and another that changed. The initialinterview included a general list of f>ersonaldata.

Th^' Questionnaire

The variables from the theory of willingness to .take action were operationalized as follows, (I)The familiarity with the collective good wasmeasured by the following questions: Are theunions demanding shorter working hours? (yes,no, don't know). In what way do they want toshorten working hours? (open question). (II)The instrumentality of the collective good forthe social change advocated: We asked the re-spondents if they felt that a "shorter workingweek would make a contribution to reducingunemployment" (definitely, I think so, I don"tthink so, definitely not). (Ill) The value of thesocial change advocated: From the responsesto various questions we were able to infer thatthe interviewees almost without exception at-tached much value to reducing unemployment.Theoretically, this means that the value of thesocial change advocated equals 1 for each re-spondent.

The question on the motives to participate inunion action always distii^uished between twotypes of action: militant action, such as astrike; and moderate action, such as hoklingmeetings on work time, a slowdown, a shortwork stoi^>age, etc.

Collective motives. (IV) ITie value of the

590

collective good: Union members were askedhow they stood on a shorter work week. Theycould reply on a 5-point scale from very posi-tive to very negative.

(V) The expectation that participation helpsto achieve the collective good; (a) The expec-tation about one's own contribution to theprobability of success was operationalized inthe following two statements; "It really doesn'tmake much difference whether or not I takepart in action." "It is important that I take partin action, because in doing this I support theunion" (agree entirely, agree, disagree, dis-agree entirely), (b) The expectation about thenumber of participants was established as fol-lows: "In your estimate, how many people atyour plant will participate in moderate/militantaction in connection with the negotiations?'"(very few, not so many, quite a few, verymany), (c) The expectation abo'ut success ifmany people participate was measured by thequestion: "Imagine that very many people takepart in moderate/militant action. Do you thinkthat this will induce the employers to take intoaccount the union standpoint in the negotia-tions?" (definitely, I think so, I don't think so,definitely not).

.Social motives. (VI) Three categories ofpeople seemed significant: members of one'sfamily, colleagues, and direct superiors. Avariable indicative of social motivation to par-ticipate was calculated. Basic data were (a) thevalue a person attaches to reactions of familymembers, coUeagues, and direct superiors, and(b) the expected reactions of these persons toparticipation and to nonparticipation. The so-cial motivation score is the sum of the productsof values and expectations. If persons expectfavorable reactions if they participate and un-favorable ones if they do not, then the score ispositive. If they expect unfavorable reactions ifthey participate and favorable ones if they donot, then the score is negative.

Reward motives. Two types of costs seemedimportant; (a) financial sacrifices, and (b)worsening of a person's position in the com-pany. (VII) For the financial sacrifices, weasked; "Suppose that it would cost money ifyou took part in any action in connection withthe negotiations. E)o you feel this is not toodetractive, detractive, or very detractive?" Bythis formulation we set the expectancy compo-nent at 1 and restricted ourselves to the valuecomponent. (VIII) For the position in the com-p l y , we assumed that no one would be indif-ferent about his/her position in the companyworsenir^. We set the value of a worsenedposition at - ! and restricted ourselves to thisexpectation by asking whether a person's posi-tion in the company would worsen by par-ticipating in moderate/militant action.


Willingness to take action. (IX) We mea-sured the willingness to take part in action byasking, "If it comes to action for the negotia-tions, wiil you t ^ e part in moderate/militantaction?" (definitely, I think so, I don't think so,definitely not).'*

RESULTS

The Theory of the Willingness to ParticipateTables I and 2 summarize the overall evalua-tion of the theory. Table 1 concentrates on theattitude towards the collective goal and Table 2on the willingness to participate.

Table 1 presents the correlations betweenbeliefs about the instrumentality of shorterworking time for unemployment reduction andthe attitude toward shorter working time in fivesuccessive interviews. The data show a signifi-cant relationship between these two variablesat alt five points in time. It could be that peoplebelieve that shorter working hours reduce un-employment as a rationalization for their desireto have a shorter work week. That is, it may bethat the attitudes produce the beliefs about in-strumentality rather than the reverse. The sec-ond part of Table 1 examines this issue. Thispart of the table presents the correlations of thechanges in the variables.'^ The argument thatinstrumentality produces attitudes is confirmedif changes in one are correlated with changes inthe other, for it is unlikely that other possibledeterminants of the attitude (for instance, theneed for more leisure time) change in the sameway. As Table 1 shows, changes in the vari-ables are sisnificantlv correlated.

Table 2 is derived from six hierarchical re-gression analyses with stepwise inclusion(three for moderate and three for militant ac-tion)."" Following a procedure suggested by

I* To overcome the drawback that an importantvariable would only be measured by one question,other questions were asked at other points in theinterviews about the attitude toward action. The an-swers to these questions correlated reasonably wellwith those to the direct question on the willmgness totake pan in action (mean r = .50 for moderate action,and .67 for militant action), and they did not showany differences in their relationships to other vari-ables.

" Residual scores were computed by substractingfrom the score on time 2 the score on time 1 multi-plied by the correlation between the two scores.

"• Originally, expectancy-value theory prescribedsimple addition of the separate motives. This un-realistically assumes that different motives aremutually independent and have the same weight. Amore realistic approach Is to account for intercorre-lations and different weights by using regressionanalysis rather than simple summation (cf. Mitchell.1974).


Table 1. The Attitudes Towards Shorter Working Time and the Instnunentality of Shorter Working Time forReducing Unemployment: Pearson Correlations of Single and Change Scores

* p<.05.•• p<.OI.•-' p<.001.

a) Single ScoresAttitude Towards—shorter working hours—shorter working week

b) Change ScoresAttitude Towards—shorter working hours—shorter working week

Nov.

AT". 3 5 "

Nov./Jan.

. 3 5 "

.19*

Jan.

.37**

.34**

Jan./Early

.29*

.36*'

Instrumentality

Early Feb.

.44"*

.33**

Early Feb./Feb. End of Feb.

.39**'

.25*

End of Feb.

.38"*

.38***

End of Feb.April

.44***

.11

April

.4«*"

.21*

Finn and Mattson (1978), in each regressionanalysis the variables connected with one ofthe three motives are included in the last step.The data show that the contribution of each ofthe three motives in this last step is significant;each helps to account for the variance in thewillingness to participate in action. Togetherthe motives account for 43 percent of the vari-ance in the willingness to participate in militantaction and 38 percent of the variance for mod-erate action.

The contribution of reward motives is rela-tively small, possibly because these costs onlyreally count when it actually comes to action,and then especially if the action goes on a longtime. Alternatively, it may be that the kinds ofcosts asked about (financial sacrifices, wors-ening of the position in the company) are ail inthe game for many people; only by becomingtoo high might they dissuade these people fromparticipation. There is a wide difference in thecontribution of the social motives for the two

Table 2. Regression of Motives on the Willingnessto Participate in Moderate and MilitantAction: R' Changes When a Motive is In-troduced in the Last Step"

Collective MotivesSocial MotivesReward Motives

ModerateAction

AR^

13%***4%***

0.8%*

MilitantAction

AR-

* This table reflects the results of six stepwiseregression analyses; the percentage in the tableapplies to the motive on the left when it is introducedin the last step.

* P<.05.**p<.01.

*

types of action (4 and 10 percent in the last stepand 20 and 31 percent in the first step). Militantactions are more controversial than moderateactions. Thus, reactions of significant otherswill be more pronounced and have more influ-ence. Theoretically significant is the largecontribution of the collective motives evenwhen the other motives are accounted for. Thisis in opposition to Olson" s (1977) argument thatpersons are not motivated to participate incollective behavior by the collective good butonly by selective incentives. For a bettertheoretical understanding it is useful to breakdown the collective motive again. Most of themembers had a positive attitude toward shorterworking time (see next paragraph); hence itfollows that whether a person will be motivatedto participate by the collective good dependsupon the expectancy component. The expec-tancy component is made up of three elements;the expectation that participation contributesto the probability of success; the expectednumber of participants; and the expected suc-cess if many people participate. The correla-tions between these elements were low, whichunderlines the fact that each plays his/her ownrole in the decision to participate. This is madeclear by the ^ coefficients in Table 3. Theprominence of two elements (a2 and b) de-serves some comment. Feelings of solidarityand responsibility are reflected in the willing-ness to support the union. Its weight validatesFireman and Gamson's (1979) argument thatgroup solidarity is an important determinant ofparticipation. The significance of expectationsabout the number of participants confirms theargument that the expected number of partici-pants is a se!f-ftjIfiHing prophecy. Contrary toOlson's logic, the willingness to participate incollective action appeare to be strengthened bythe belief that many others will participate.

592 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Table 3. Regressions of the Four Components of the Expectation that Participation Helps to Achieve theCollective Good on the Willingness to Participate

al. My participation doesn't matter

a2. I participate because I want to support the union

b. Number of participants

c. Expected success if many people participate

Moderate ActionB

.066(.027)'.2%

(.035).236

(.039).654

(.027)

/3

**

39., ,

28*"

. I J "

Militant ActionB

.052(.029).282

(.038).29

(.040).075

(.029)

/3

,35. . .

33 . . .

.12"

" Standard errors.• .15<p<.tO.

** p<.05.*** p<.001.

The remainder of this discussion concernsthe results over the course of the campaign.Table 4 gives a brief chronology of majorevents in the campaign in relation to the seveninterview waves.

Consensus Mobilization

Knowledge. Adequate diffusion of knowledgeof the collective good is the cornerstone ofevery mobilization campaign. Collectivegoods, however, are not invariable quantities.They can change, influenced by circum-stances, interaction with the opponent, etc.For a social movement, two dangers can arise:(a) the collective good as it is defined initiallydoes not become widely enough known; (b)changes in the definition of the collective gooddo not become widely enough known. As canbe seen from Table 4, there were two policychanges in the 1979 negotiations.

Figure 3 clearly shows that both policychanges led to difficulties about the knowledgeof the goals. After a quite adequate initial level(70-80% knew what the goals were), with thefirst policy change the number of people awareof the changed goals was cut in half, A monthand a half later this number was once againrising, btit it did not reach the level of earlyFebruary. At the end of May the second policychange took place, and again the number ofcorrect answers was cut in half.

in general, the union "elite" (the memberswith a higher education and/or level df partici-pation in the union) was better informed of thegoals of action after policy changes. Membersoutside these categories were less well in-formed and more vulnerable when it ctune todissemination of knowledge about changes inpolicy.

Beliefs and attitudes. Dissemination of

knowledge is never more than a condition forthe spread of a positive attitude toward a col-lective good. The key concept here is the in-strumentality of the collective good for socialchanges felt to be worth fighting for or for thepreservation of a desirable situation. Cam-paigns for the mobilization of consensus striveto'make such instrumentality plausible, oftenin the face of counterarguments by the oppo-nent. The 1979 campaign for a shorter workweek failed in this respect. The central ques-tion was whether a shorter work week wouldhave a positive effect on employment opportu-nity.

As Figure 4 shows, after an initial increasethere is a dramatic decrease in the extent towhich union members believed that a shorterwork week would reduce unemployment.

Figure 3. Percentages of Union Members WhoCould Correctly Fomiulate the Demandsfor a Shorter Work Week


Table 4. N jor Events in the Campaign .August 1978

November 27, 1978

December 1978

End of January 1979

Beginning of February 1979

March/April

April 17April 24May 15

May 23June 5-18

The chair of the IB FNV |»-oposes the 35-hour work week; oiobilizationcampmgn starts; discusskin on shorter work week begins.

November 20-29, 1978

Government and employer organizations refuse to negotiate a nation-wideagreement on a shorter work week.

Steel strike in West Germany for a 35-hour work week.

January 4-18, 1979

Steef strike in West Germany lost.

January 29-Febniary 9 3rd interview

First policy change: 35 hours becomes 39 hours.

February 19-March 2 4th interview

Negotiations with AKZO make no progress.

April 3-18 5th interview

Negotiations with AKZO break down.Second policy change: 39 hours becomes a few days off.Negotiations with AKZO start again.

May 18-26 6th interview

Agreement with AKZOMembership meetings: membership agrees with contract.

June 11-July 11 7th interview

From the end of February onwards a majorityno longer believed this. As expected, the de-velopments in the attitude toward a shorterwork week show the same picture, althoughwithout becoming negative. These resultsmake clear the importance of beliefs about the

instrumentality of the collective good forvalued social changes. Very often, as in thecase of reducing unemployment, the socialchange itself is above all discussion. The realproblem is to make people believe that thecollective good will advance this change.

Figure 4. Mean Perceived Instrumentality of ShorterWorking Hours for Reducing Unemploy-ment

Action MobilizationA mobilizing organization will try to make thebenefits of participation and the costs of non-participation as h^h as possible, and the costsof participation and the benefits of non-participation as low as possible. There arevarious ways of doing this: (a) choosing thetype of action; (b) choosing the scene, and (c)influencing the motives to participate. Thismust be viewed in the context of maneuvers bythe opponent and/or external events whichmay influence the costs and benefits of partici-pation. The degree of success achieved in anaction-mobilization campaign can be read fromthe willingness to take action.

Figure 5 presents the developments in thewillingness to participate in moderate and mil-itant action. The figures for Ede and Oss didnot differ significantly, so they are {Hvsentedtogether. In the establishments in Ede and Oss


MlXltant action

0

- .10

- .20 •

- .30 •

- .40 :

-1.00

Not willing to lateparticirate Nov.

ttotwilliJigto lateparticipate Nov.

mid-April

Motes Ede and Oss, no. significant diffarances between groups; 3 significant trend.

Bimen, moderate actions linear ttrendj F-unique •» 5.71i, df = 1, p < .05; F-Btep = 5.554. df =« 1,p < .05. Militant action: no significant trendj cUfforenc» Nov. - ; ^ i l : p •• .12.

Figure 5. Mean Willingness to Tiike Aciion

there was a weak willingness to pariiciputc inmoderate action, and no willingness lo partici-pate in militant action throughout ihc eniii'eperiod. In Emmen, willingness to pariiciputc inboth types of action was companilively high :iifirst, but it gradually melted away. Inilially.Emmen had the most potential participiints,but by April the opposite was true.

From these results we can conclmle that theunion did not succeed in mobilizing its mem-bers. In two of the three establishmenis therewas a willingness to participate in moderateaction, it is true, but it very soon became cle»rthat moderate action would not be of any help,and the initial willingness to panicipate in mil-itant action in the third establishment disap-peared.

Changes in the costs and benefits ofpariki-pation. Theoretically, the willingness to lakeaction is a function of collective, social andreward motives. We have already shown thatthe collective good lost in value. Over the sameperiod the expectation that participation wouldhelp to achieve^ the collective good tost itsforce, not beicause members no longer believedthat their participation would contribute to theprobability of success, but because they grewmore and more pessimistic about the numberof participants and the probability of successeven if many people were to participate.

Ntimber of participimis. Estimates of the

number of participants could vary from veryfew to very many. Because members estimatedthe efficacy of an action based on the numbert»f participants, the percentage that expectedvery many colleugues to participate was ofinterest.

Figure 6 concentrates on the outcomes forone of the three establishments (Emmen) be-cause of dramatic changes there. In the othertwo the peicentages were low throughout thecainpiiign.

As Figure 6 shows, the percentages of unionmembers who expected very many participantsdecline rapidly, indicating that the campaignwas losing its momentum. After an initial in-crease (up to 58 percent in the case of moderateaction and 39 percent in the case of militantaction), starting in January there was a sharpdecline which reached 4.5 percent in April, orthe level at Ede and Oss at the time.'^

" If, instead of the percentage that expect verymany participants, we use changes in the mean esti-mate of the number of participants, we find the samepattern, except thai the mean runs somewhat lesssteeply. For moderate action, we found a significantquadratic trend (F-unique = 7.074, df = 1, p = .01;F-siep - 6.181, df = I. p = .01). For militant actionwe found a marginally significant linear trend (F-uniqiie --3.33.df= l , p= .»«; F=step = 3.075, df =1. p - .08).


end of mid- early eind of mid-Nov. Jan, Febr. Febr. Apri

moderate action

Figure 6. Percentages of Union Members in EmmenWho Expect that Very Many Colleagueswill Participate in Action, by Type ofAction

Probability of success. Perhaps more thanthe other determinants of the willingness toparticipate, the probability of success is infiu-enced by external events. The 1979 negotia-tions provide a good example.

In 1979, at the start of the negotiations in theNetherlands, a strike broke out in West Ger-many in which a shorter work week was also atstake. The strike lasted six weeks. Both sidesplayed hard. Ultimately the West Germanunions lost the strike, and early in Februarythey concluded an agreement which made noreference to a shorter work week. This out-come also affected the negotiations in theNetherlands, and this was expressed mostclearly in the expected success of actionsthere. Figure 7 shows the changes in thoseexpectations. Since we found no significantdifferences between the establishments, the re-sults are here combined.

Even before the disappointing end to theWest German steel strike, the adamant attitudeof the Dutch employers had already made itclear that little could be gained by moderateaction. The number of union members who feltmoderate action would be effective showed animmediate and rapid decrease. Members re-mained optimistic longer about the effective-ness of militant action. But this optimism alsosuffered a setback when, around mid-Januaryand early February, the metal unions in WestGermany lost their strike. Of the union mem-bers questioned in early February, 60 percentfelt this would make the negotiations in theNetherlMds a good deal mot^ difficult. Figure7 reflects this gloomy outlook; the percentageof union members who were confident thatmilitant action would change the minds of the

employers went down to 25 percent, amd formoderate action to 10 percent.

Due to failing consensus mobilization, actionmobilization which lost its momentum, andexternal events that made success unlikely, thecollective motive to participate vanished. Itwas weak in two of the three establishmentsfrom the outset, and it disappeared in the third.Since the reward motives had been negative formany people from the beginnning,'* only socialmotives might have compensated for this lossin motivation. In Emmen, however, the socialmotives diminished as well, ^though not inthe same dramatic way as the collective mo-tives. In Ede and Oss the social motives forparticipation in militant action were negative,so they strengthened the aversion to militantaction. In the case of moderate action, how-ever, the social motives were positive and didcompensate for the absence of collective mo-tives. This explains why we found a weakwillingness to participate in moderate actionthere.

Type of action. Different costs and benefitsare associated with participation in differenttypes of action. Table 5 summarizes evidenceon the interaction of motives and moderate ormilitant action in relation to willingness to par-ticipate. Persons who only wish to take part inmoderate action are compared with personswho are also willing to take part in militantactions.'^ The first group is of interest becausethey perceive such differences in the costs andbenefits that they are not willing to participate

P < . D ! F r - n « - 7.11, df • i) p < .01.HlUtant actloi ; F-wtiqiie • t.Zl, H - 1, p .OSjF-.t»p. 6.17, df - 1, e<.OS.

Figure 7, The Effectiveness of Trade Union Actionin Attaining the Goal of a Shorter WorkWeek

I" For instance, on the average, 50% feared wors-ening of their position in the company in the case ofparticipation in militant action, and 32% in the caseof moderate action.

' Seventy-three persons were not willing to par-ticipate in any kind of action. They are omitted fromthis table because they are not relevant for this dis-


Table 5. Mean Costs and Benefits of Participation in Moderate or Militant Action by Willingness to TakeAction

Collective Motivesa. How many coUeagues will partici-

pate in moderate action?same for militant action

b. Is moderate action effective?same for militant action

Social Motivesc. moderate action

militant actionReward Motives

d. Will position in company growworse as a result of participationin moderate action?

same for militant action

Wishes to Participate inModerate Action Only

(n-79)

2.411.690.310.51

0.26-0.68

-0.33-0.66

Wishes to Participate inBoth Moderate and

Militant Action(n.2OO)

2.822.540.250.85

0.560.44

-0.25-0.40

in militant action. The first column of Table 5reveals these differences, especially in the so-cial and reward motives. In the perception ofthese persons, for militant action the costs ofparticipation are considerably higher than formoderate action. Such differences could bebalanced by collective motives. A look atTable 5, however, makes it clear that this is notthe case. There are no differences in perceivedefficacy, and regarding the number of col-leagues, these persons are more pessimisticabout militant action. In their perception,moderate action has a higher probability ofsuccess because they expect more people to bewilling to participate. So why should they takethe higher costs of militant action?

A comparison of this group with the groupthat supported militant action shows importantdifferences in social and collective motives.Whereas the social motives of the "moderate"group are negative, those of the "militant"group are positive. Optimism about the efB-cacy of militant action and the number of par-ticipants results in strong collective motivesamong the "militant"" group as compared to the"moderate" group.

It is of interest to note that the differencesbetween the two groups on the reward motivesare not very large. In both groups many per-sons expect a worsening of their position in thecompany. Nevertheless, ai! these people arewitling to participate because other motivescompensate for the costs.

The evidence in Table 5 warrants a final re-mark. The differences in perceived costs andbenefits of each type of action for the "mili-tant"' group suggest that for this group militantaction is more attractive. Tlie socisd and re-ward motives differ only slightly, whereas tiie

collective motive is stronger for militant actionbecause such action is perceived to be moreefficacious. If one has to accept costs anyhow,the more efficacious type of action is to bepreferred even if the costs are higher.

Different plants. There were large dif-ferences among the three plants in the strengthof the union (Table 6). Of the three establish-ments, the union was strongest in Emmen. Inaccordance with resource mobilization lit-erature, at the start of the negotiations thewillingness to take action was the highest inEmmen; Table 6 shows why. To summarizethe evidence: the stronger the position of theunion, the greater is the chance that colleagueswill motivate people to participate; the lessthey fear for worsening their position in thecompany, the more favorable can be the ex-pected number of participants. The result isthat the members are more easily mobilized. Aunion can capitalize on this state of affairs byfighting a conflict where it is strongest, that is,in plants that are highly unionized and have astrong union network. This does not imply,however, that the union can be assured ofwillingness to take action in such plants. Thisonly refers to the potential which may bemobilized. A campaign that does not go well,counterpropaganda, and setbacks can alsocrush willingness to take action in such plants.The negotiations of 1979 were a vivid exampleof this.

DISCUSSION

The theory formulated in this paper aims at abreak with both the tradit ional social-psychological approaches to socia] movementsand the neglect of social-psychological


Table 6. The Strength of the Trade Union, the Expected Inactions of Colleagues, the Fear for a WorsenedPosition, and the Expected Number of Participants in the Three Plants

Level ofOrganization

TradeUnion

Network

Expects PositiveReactions ofColleûes*

Fears for aWorsenedPosition-

ExpectsVery Many

Participants"

Enka-EmmenEnka-EdeAKZO-Iârma-Os!

• Expectancies of participation in militant action. Mean percentages from the series of interviews.^ Expectancies of participation in militant action. Highest percentage.

analyses by resource mobilization theory.Contrary to the traditional social-psychologicalapproach, participation in a social movement isasstimed to be rational. The emphasis is not onpersonality characteristics or psychologicalstates, but on the psychological process ofweighing costs and benefits. One of the objec-tions to the traditional approach is that it de-fines participation as tension release, and thusit does not matter in which movement a personparticipates. In the theory presented in thisarticle it does. Participation is seen as a ra-tional choice in the situation as the person per-ceives it, and as a way to obtain desired out-comes. In the eyes of the participant, partici-pation is a means of reaching valued goals.

These goals and their relation to factors suchas relative deprivation and frustration havebeen the subject of much discussion in social-movement literature. Resource mobilizationhas ruled this discussion out of order withoutsolving the problem. The theory developed inthis article attempts to reconcile the social psy-chological and resource mobilization ap-proaches in this respect. Feelings of relativedeprivation or frustration do not necessarilyevoke agreement with the goals of a movementwhich pretends to remedy these feelings: goalshave to be perceived as instrumental to theelimination of these feelings. The research re-sults support the validity of this argument.Theoretical emphasis must therefore shift fromrelative deprivation to the perceived instru-mentality of the collective good for the elimi-nation of relative deprivation. Such percep-tions do not originate spontaneously. Consen-sus mobilization is needed for this. Campaignsare needed which explain the situation andmake clear why the collective good will bringrelief (cf. Schwartz, 1976). Agreement with thegoals of the movement does not necessarilylead to participation: a person may doubtwhether participation will help to achieve thegoals, social and/or reward motives may be toonegative.

Theories that stress the rationality of partici-pation in a social movement have to soive theproblem of the dilemma of collective behavior.As Olson (1977) stated it, rational persons will

not participate in a social movement unlessselective incentives motivate them to do so.Resource mobilization theory does not reallysolve that problem. Concepts like ideologicalincentives (Gamson, 1975; Carden, 1978),feelings of solidarity (Gamson and Fireman,1979) or responsibility (Fleishman, 1980), theperceived indispensability of an individual'scontribution (Tolbert, 1981), differences be-tween action forms in vulnerability to free rid-ing (Gamson and Fireman, 1979; Oliver, 1980),different production functions (Oberschall,1980; Oliver et al., 1983), or thresholds(Granovetter, 1978) do not really touch theheart of the matter, which is that persons haveto decide at a point when they do not knowwhether others will participate.^" This articleargues that the problem can be solved on asocial-psychological level. Since people haveexpectations about others" behavior, they canformulate their "own" production functions.As the evidence presented demonstrates, thisproduction function heavily influences thewillingness to participate. On a collective level,the expectation that others will participateworks as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Counter toOlson's argument, a collective good can moti-vate persons to participate in a social move-ment if they expect that others will also par-ticipate.

Moreover, if the expectancy component is alittle larger than zero, a collective motive toparticipate can exist if the collective good isvalued highly (cf. Oberschall, 1980). If a personcomes from a supportive social background(positive social motive) then there can be quitea few nonsocial costs of participation (negativereward motive) before the balance turns to thenegative. Oliver et al.'s (1983) theoretical no-

="' Pinard (1983) arrived at the same conclusion.Using an expectancy-value framework, Pinard triedto soive the problem primarily by expanding the

âlue component with moral obligation as a separateforce. He mentioned expectancy of success as afactor but did not elaborate it in detail. In contrast toPinanj, the solution here is sought in the expectancycomponent by introducing "expectations aboutothers' behavior" as a sejarate factor.

598

tions about the different production functionsthat characterize the relationship between in-dividual contribution, the number of partici-pants and the production of the collective goodare not inv^idated by this argument. In par-ticular, their hypotheses concerning the dif-ferential mobilizability of people depending onthe part of a function that is relevant for themstill stand. We must keep in mind, however,that individuals construct their own functionsbased on their expectations; although theseexpectations need not be real, they are real intheir consequences.

The evidence presented makes it clear thatsuch expectations, in combination with selec-tive costs and benefits, are of great importancefor the choice a person makes among alterna-tive forms of action. For instance, in the eyesof some respondents the goal could be reachedby moderate action. Why should they take thehigher risks of militant action? For those v/hodid not believe moderate action to be effective,it did not make much sense to accept the costsof such action. They preferred to participate inmilitant action, even though the perceivedcosts were higher.

People's expectations are based on past ex-periences. In a mobilization campaign amovement organization tries to influence theseexpectations. Resource mobilization theoryhas used the mobilization concept in a ratherunspecific way. By making the distinction be-tween consensus and action mobilization weseparated the processes of convincing and ac-tivating. The research results on the spread ofknowledge and the beliefs about the instru-mentality of shorter working time showed theimportance of consensus mobilization as a sep-arate process. Schwartz (1976) made a similardistinction between "ignorance reduction" and"organizational disciplinization." The im-portance of such distinctions is that theyspecify convincing and activating as two dif-ferent processes with diff"erent determinants.In yet another way, research on mobilizationwould do well to specify mobilization efforts.Attempts to influence different motives requiredifferent efforts. Influencing the collectivemotive demands consensus mobilization forthe collective good, but also attempts to influ-ence the expectations about the behavior ofothers, the probability of success, and the indi-vidual contribution to the probability of suc-cess. For instance, by means of tryouts it canbe proved that others will participate. This is adelicate affair, because one can make personsbelieve that enough people will participate andthat their participation is not necessary. Inten-sifying social motives requires influencing aperson's social environment. Social networks(Snow et al., 19^ ) and mobilization en bloc


(Oberschall, 1973) we impor t^ t in this re-spect. Influencing reward motives demandsmanipulation of rewards and punishments, forinstance, by creating organizations that canhelp victims, decrease risks or collect money insupport of activists (cf. Morris, 1981).

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