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C H A P T E R 3

MOBILIZATION

“It was a period of colonial expansion and conflict of interest among the great powers. Warraged practically all over the world, except in the British Isles and in the ScandinavianPeninsula. But the expert juggling of British diplomacy, self-interested in the maintenance ofthe balance of power, went far to prevent the numerous minor conflicts from spreadinginternational conflagrations, such as those of the periods immediately preceding andfollowing. Queen Victoria’s reign would go down in history as that of the Pax Britannica.”

(R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy,The Encyclopedia of Military History)

The military strategy places an enormous premium on the ability of the United States togenerate forces. For the US Army, mobilization is the process by which it provides thesupported combatant commander with three basic components required for missionaccomplishment: forces (units), manpower (individuals), and logistics support. Mobilizationis a phased process designed to be concurrent and continuous, rather than sequential. It isdesigned to rapidly expand and enhance the response capability of the Army in support of amilitary response to a crisis or natural disaster.

Although mobilization pertains to both the active and reserve component (AC and RC)structure, the primary emphasis is directed to the Army Reserve structure. To achievemobilization, the NCA has the option to exercise, with the concurrence of the US Congress,one or more of the five authorized levels of mobilization. This chapter addresses theauthority and levels of mobilization, the five-phased mobilization process, requirementsdetermination (forces, manpower, and logistics), resources available to mobilize, andpremobilization planning.

MOBILIZATION AUTHORITY

Mobilization authority is cited under applicable sec-tions of United States Code (USC), Title 10. Law andpolicies are designed to differentiate between pre-mobilization options and mobilization force expansionoptions.

Certain policies and programs which instantly in-crease unit resources and readiness are available only3-0

when the President authorizes the mobilization of thereserve components of the military service or alerts theAC concurrent with a declaration of national emer-gency or war.

The levels of mobilization are not necessarily se-quential. Prior to the authorization of any mobilizationlevel, the active Army can be augmented by retireesand RC volunteers to perform any operational mission.

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Five ARNG personnel of the 228th SignalBrigade (South Carolina Army NationalGuard) were the first volunteers deployed toOperation Desert Shield.On the third day of Operation Just Cause,the US Army Reserve was tasked to form ajoint staff civil-military operations task force(CMOTF). Since the NCA had notauthorized any call-up or mobilization ofreserve units, this organization had to befilled with volunteers from USAR civil affairsunits and the Individual Ready Reserve.From over 700 volunteers, 311 reservistswere selected for this mission and deployedto Panama.

Retired members with 20 years or more activeduty service can be recalled involuntarily under10 USC 688(a) by direction of the Secretary of theArmy at any time. Any reserve member may also vol-unteer under 10 USC 672(d) to augment the activeArmy. Budgetary constraints, length of tour, and, in thecase of retired members, end-strength ceilings also im-pact on this decision process. Figure 3-1 provides asummation of various mobilization authorities.DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

During a crisis situation, starting with the PSRCand/or partial mobilization, those authorities main-tained at HQDA and MACOM level for emergency ac-tions need to be provided to installations to increase theinstallations’ abilities to provide mission support con-sistent with the situation and current directives. To as-sist in this action, installations maintain a list of thoseauthorities which could provide more flexibility in sup-porting the mission.FUNDING AUTHORITY

When RC units are ordered to active duty, fundingauthority remains in formal AC channels and is ac-counted for under normal procedures unless otherwisedirected. RC appropriations will fund all actions be-tween the time of alert and the time the units enter ac-tive duty. Following entry on active duty, Operationand Maintenance, Army (OMA) or Military Personnel

Appropriations (MPA) funds will fund RC units whilethey are on federal active service.

The appropriate supporting installation (IAWAR 5-91) will provide OMA funding from the effectivedate of the mobilization order until the RC units departfor their mobilization stations. Thereafter, the mobiliza-tion stations provide funding primarily from OMA andMPA funds. The reserve appropriation (Operations andMaintenance, Army Reserve [OMAR]; Operation andMaintenance, National Guard [OMNG]; and RPA/Na-tional Guard Personnel Army [NGPA]) will resumefunding of RC units once they are released from activeduty service.

MOBILIZATION LEVELS

A key aspect of the mobilization level concept is thegraduated mobilization response. GMR is a flexibledecision making process. It triggers five levels of re-sponse options which can be adjusted to the degree ofseverity and ambiguity of warning indicators or anevent. These options allow the government to takesmall or large, often reversible, steps to increase our na-tional security emergency preparedness posture.

GMR actions enhance deterrence, mitigate the im-pact of an event or crisis, and significantly reduce thelead time associated with a mobilization if the crisis in-tensifies. When planning, commanders should under-stand that a lower level of mobilization does notnecessarily precede a higher level of mobilization.PRESIDENTIALSELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP

By executive order, the President may augment theactive duty forces for an operational mission with up to200,000 members of the Selected Reserve of the armedforces for 90 days, with an extension of up to 90 addi-tional days. Units and individuals of the Selected Re-serve may be involuntarily called up under provisionsof 10 USC 673(b). The President may also considerusing volunteers under 10 USC 672(d) and/or activat-ing retirees under 10 USC 688.

A PSRC does not require a declaration of nationalemergency; however, the President must report toCongress within 24 hours on the current situation andanticipated use of the forces called.

1 Intraservice Support Installation Area Coordinator, 1 March 1984.

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PARTIAL MOBILIZATIONPartial mobilization requires a presidential or con-

gressional declaration of a state of national emergency.A partial mobilization may occur without a PSRC.Under a presidential declaration of national emergency(10 USC 673), up to one million members of the ReadyReserve may be mobilized/recalled for up to 24months. A congressional declaration of national emer-gency and subsequent reserve mobilization under 10USC 672(a) is not limited to a specific number of re-servists or length of tour unless specified in a congres-sional resolution.FULL MOBILIZATION

Full mobilization authorizes the call-up of all forcesin the current force structure to active duty, fullyequipped, manned, and sustained. Planners for full mo-bilization assume that actions for PSRC and/or partialmobilization have been completed and that Congresshas declared that either a state of national emergency orwar exists (10 USC 672(a)).

DOD and other federal agencies will initiate indus-trial mobilization and support to allies as required. AllRC units and individuals of the IRR, Standby, and Re-tired Reserve may be ordered to active duty. Thelength of service is for the duration of the war or emer-gency and for six months thereafter (10 USC 671(a),672(a), 675, and 688).TOTAL MOBILIZATION

Total mobilization expands the active armed forcesby organizing and activating additional units beyondthe existing approved troop structure when respondingto requirements exceeding the current troop structure.All additional resources needed, including productionfacilities, may be mobilized to support and sustain thearmed forces.SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION

Selective mobilization is an expansion of active dutyforces in response to a peacetime domestic crisis. ThePresident, or Congress, upon special action, may orderexpansion of the active duty forces by mobilizing unitsand individuals of the Selected Reserve to protect life,federal property, and functions or to prevent disruptionof federal activities. An example of this authority wasin early 1970 when RC units were mobilized as part ofOperation Graphic Hand.

Operation Graphic Hand was an executionof an augmentation plan designed toaugment the US Post Office in response topostal strikes. The National Guard wascalled into federal service to suppressinsurrection, unlawful obstruction or rebel-lion, conspiracy, and infringements of civilrights and to repel invasion or execute thelaws under the legal authorities of 10 USC331, 332, 333, 3500, and 8500.In May 1992 elements of the CaliforniaNational Guard were federalized inresponse to the Los Angeles riots as part ofOperation Garden Plot. Federalization, inthis case, provided unity of command foractive components and ARNG unitsdeployed to Los Angeles.

MOBILIZATION PHASESThe five phases of mobilization are planning, alert,

home station (HS), mobilization station, and port ofembarkation (POE). See Figure 3-2.PHASE I - PLANNING

This phase concerns all AC and RC efforts duringpeacetime to plan, train, and prepare to accomplish as-signed mobilization and deployment tasks. Force plan-ning is a process designed to identify combat, CS, andCSS forces and to identify logistics requirements tosupport the combatant commander’s OPLAN.

During Operation Desert Storm, the mostsignificant expansion of a major subordinatecommand in VII Corps was in the 2dCOSCOM. The austerity of the SouthwestAsia theater and the corps tactical missionpresented challenges that 2d COSCOM didnot have in Europe. Major organizationaladjustments, formation of provisionalorganizations, and recruitment andplacement of key personnel allowed theCOSCOM to expand in Southwest Asia toan operating level of over 25,000 soldiers.

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Other corps forces, including military police,engineer, signal and military intelligenceunits, expanded to more than double theirUSAREUR size.

Force structure requirements must also includeidentification of resources (forces [units], manpower[individuals], and logistics) to allow supporting com-manders to meet their mission, that is, for units to ex-pand the training base (USAR training divisions andreception battalions); operate the CONUS CRCs, ports,and Army medical treatment facilities; and perform in-stallation backfill and expansion.

Commanders, joint and service planners on theArmy staff, MACOMs, and planners down to battalionand installation levels are responsible for planning andexecuting mobilization and deployment. This responsi-bility includes —

Maintaining and improving combat readinessposture.Preparing mobilization plans and files as directedby higher headquarters.Providing required data to the mobilization sta-tion (MS).Ensuring unit movement data (UMD) accuracy.Conducting mobilization and deployment train-ing as required.

Advance preparation that addresses the total spec-trum of possible military operations will ensure effec-tive and efficient mobilization of units, individuals,and logistics.Support Planning

During the concept development phase of the delib-erate planning process, the combatant commander pro-vides his OPLAN concept of support planningguidance, which defines the project length of operation,force requirements, strategic lift requirements, supplybuildup requirements, and anticipated supply priorities.

The OPLAN identifies key factors such as transpor-tation priorities, available common- and cross-servicingcommand agreements, formalized bilateral and multi-lateral support agreements, personnel attrition factors,and ports of debarkation for planning strategic lift offorces and sustainment. Annex B of the JSCP provideslogistics planning guidance for the CINC and identifiesexpected critical items.3-4

Mobilization of Forces (Units)Planning for mobilization of units must take into ac-

count the operational requirements, training require-ments, equipment status, readiness of the units to bemobilized, and the impact of mobilization on soldiers,their families, and the community. Annex N of theJSCP provides mobilization planning guidance for syn-chronizing planning activities. Units will experiencedifferent levels of readiness due to structural changes,personnel posture, equipment transition, and trainingstatus. Units may have a number of untrained soldiersawaiting initial entry training, split-option trainees, andother nonmilitary occupational specialty (MOS)-quali-fied soldiers. Planning must include replacements fornondeployables whose condition cannot be correctedprior to unit deployment.

Logistically, units may lack all authorized equip-ment and supplies. They may be deficient in prescribedload lists (PLLs) or have a shortage of authorizedequipment and supplies. These are inherent problemsthat unit commanders must contend with, and plannersand installation commanders should understand asmuch. Commanders must plan for filling units that havesome nondeployable soldiers and determine the disposi-tion of nondeployable soldiers prior to their departurefrom the mobilization station.

Installations must plan for equipment transition andtraining and the additional resources required to con-duct training. MACOM directives should detail all ad-ministrative, logistics, and training actions required tomanage units in peacetime and to transition RC units toactive duty. Installations should plan to effectively usenondeployables in CONUS/OCONUS sustaining posi-tions. Effective planning and preparation will ensurerapid mobilization and subsequent rapid deployment.

The 265th Engineer Group (GeorgiaArmy National Guard) and the 212thEngineer Company (Tennessee ArmyNational Guard) were federalized on21 November 1990. They completedvalidation, deployed, and closed into theSouthwest Asia theater of operations insupport of Operation Desert Shield on12 December 1990. This process took atotal of only three weeks as compared tothe typical minimum of six weeks.

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Units without heavy equipment can beready even quicker. The first US ArmyReserve Civil Affairs companies needed inSouthwest Asia were deployed less than aweek after their activation. The averagetime between activation and deployment forArmy Reserve units was 29 days.

During the planning phase, each unit completes asmany administrative and personnel processing actionsas possible before being ordered to active duty, for ex-ample, completion of all medical, dental, financial, andlegal requirements. Family support activities and plansare also a major consideration. Specifically, for RCunits, plans for follow-on phases must include —

Completion of administrative actions necessaryto incorporate reserve units into the active Army.Unit movement planning that provides readymovement to MS with associated ADP productsto support strategic deployment of the unit.

Mobilization of IndividualsBased on the mobilization authorities expected,

manpower planners assess the projected availability ofpretrained and untrained military manpower as the mili-tary operation escalates through the various GMR op-tions. Some categories of manpower are availablewithout additional mobilization authority and can beplanned for in the early stages of a crisis or operation.These categories include —

Active duty soldiers in the trainee, transient,holdee, and student (TTHS) account.Volunteers from AC or RC units or activities.Volunteers and involuntarily recalled retirees.Volunteers from the IRR and Army civilians.

As a general rule, members of the IRR will be mo-bilized at installations that have the capability to pro-vide them with required clothing issues and the trainingnecessary to recertify them in their MOS and commonsoldier skills. Once certified (or trained), these soldiersare available for assignment. Other individuals, such asIMAs, civilians, and retirees recalled to active duty, re-port directly to their mobilization station and duty as-signment.

Planners who plan for use of these soldiers mustconsider the manpower ceiling limits that may be inplace in the early stages of a crisis or operation. Othercategories of manpower require action of a presidentialor congressional declaration of national emergency orwar.Logistics

Commanders and planners must look beyond mobi-lization. They must project the unit’s theater require-ments and provide the required support. In many casesa deploying unit should be able to sustain itself for aperiod of time after arrival within the theater. How-ever, planners must consider those units deployed with-out all their authorized equipment and supplies.

Planners may include pre-positioned war reservestock (PWRS) in the theater, at POEs, or afloat, therebyreducing logistical requirements and providing earlierforce closure for stabilization operations. Plannersshould consider host nation support as a resource if ap-propriate.

Deploying task forces must carry some capabilityfor self-sustainment. Armywide standards for consum-able stocks for deploying units are based on doctrineand CINC OPLANs. Pre-positioned logistics may aug-ment the supplies and equipment that accompany de-ploying units.

Initially deploying task forces may be confrontedwith virtually no logistics support in the AO. As the in-frastructure and supply levels in the AO improve, thelevel of unit-based logistics effort may be eased as airand sea LOCs close for specific classes of supply.Total asset visibility and in-transit visibility of equip-ment and supplies is required to efficiently support thisprocess.

Planners must consider the

possibility of units being

mobilized without an

authorized stockage

list/prescribed load list.

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The 1072d Combat Service SupportCompany (Maintenance Nondivisional,Direct Support), Michigan ARNG, wascalled into federal service on7 January 1991 and deployed to Germanyon 22 January 1991. The unit was originallyassigned on orders to the 2d Corps SupportCommand (COSCOM), VII Corps. In thatmost of VII Corps deployed to SouthwestAsia, HQ VII Corps maintained that the1072d belonged to V Corps, while V Corpsmaintained that it was a VII Corps unit.In an effort to resolve the confusion,3d COSCOM, V Corps, purchased the1072d's authorized stockage list (ASL) fromthe 2d COSCOM, VII Corps.

Using service planning guidelines and service doc-trine, support planners determine the quantities of sup-plies and services identified by a broad category tosupport a major regional contingency (MRC) or a lesserregional contingency (LRC). When strategical y de-ploying supplies, one must remember that sustainmentsupplies do not necessarily originate or follow the sameLOCs that units and personnel use. Some supplies(POL and ammunition) require special facilities andcannot be off-loaded at some ports without significantdisruption of port activity.

Additionally, the expected intensity of conflict andregional peculiarities may affect levels of certain com-modities, services, or closures of supply. BeforeOPLAN completion and definitely before OPORD exe-cution, logistics and personnel planners attempt to re-fine these requirements for strategic lift. Thisrefinement is an iterative process that continues to en-sure that the commander’s intent and priorities are met.

Support requirements include supplies, equipment,materiel, and replacement personnel for the forces. Re-quirements include civil engineerring, medical, special,and enemy prisoner-of-war (EPW) materials and civilaffairs supplies and equipment. (These requirementsinclude support for displaced civilians and refugees.)Support planning is complete when all significant sup-plies, equipment, and personnel requirements havebeen determined, consolidated by the joint force com-mand (JFC), and entered into the TPFDD.

Though host nation and contract support (sustain-ment support, facilities, labor, and services) reduce stra-tegic lift requirements for CSS units, they demand theJPEC community to program early deploying personnelwho are authorized to purchase goods and services, letcontracts, and render payments. When strategically de-ploying supplies, one must remember that sustainmentsupplies do not necessarily originate or follow the sameLOCs since some supplies (POL and ammunition) re-quire special facilities and cannot be off-loaded at someports without significant disruption of port activity.The JFC competes with time in having available andsustainable the appropriate mix and quantity of forces.

Planners must identify joint and/or combined logis-tics requirements as quickly as possible so that scarceresources can be distributed throughout the force. Thesupported CINC can establish an executive agency tomeet the demands of joint and/or combined operations.The logistics structure and service component logisticsC2 headquarters is essential for operational and tacticalplanning and execution.

Theater logistics planners must establish a theaterdistribution plan as soon as possible. Establishing pri-orities helps reduce competition for strategic lift anddefines TPFDD sustainment requirements. Plannersmust include Army operational level logistics and sup-port units in deployment plans to ensure logistics sup-port ashore.

Many Army logistics and support units will likelyhave joint and possibly combined logistics responsibili-ties. Command, control, and composition of EAC lo-gistics units are tailored for the situation. At the EAClevel, commanders and planners must take maximumadvantage of available host nation infrastructure andcontracted logistics support. In noncombat, nation as-sistance missions, elements from COSCOMs may bethe predominant mobilized and deployed forces.

Maximum advantage must be

taken of available host nation

infrastructure and contracted

logistics support.

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In that a "known" host nation supportinfrastructure existed within South west Asia,that is, ports and airfields, the earlymobilization of some types of support unitswas not required.

Family SupportA critical component in planning for mobilization is

the requirement to provide family support activities.Installation or unit commanders should implement,reevaluate, or adjust, as necessary, family care plans toprovide adequate care for dependent family members ofsingle parents and dual military service couples.Continued family support is required not only forfamilies of soldiers assigned to the installation but alsofor families of RC soldiers, DA civilians, and otherservice members’ families. Active installations orfamily assistance centers established by othercommands may assist these families.

Installation commanders are

required to provide family

support for families of active

component soldiers assigned

to the installation and for

families of reserve

component soldiers, DA

civilians, and other service

members’ families.

With the significant influx of mobilizedsoldiers at Fort Bragg, NC, the installationwas required to significantly expand familysupport services to support family membersof recently mobilized soldiers.

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PHASE II - ALERTThis phase of mobilization begins when a unit re-

receives notice of a pending order. To ease the burden onmobilization stations after partial mobilization is de-clared, state area commands (STARCs) and Army Re-serve commands (ARCOMs), after approval by DADCSOPS, cross-level individuals and equipment fromwithin their state or region to bring alerted units to min-imum deployability criteria. When these commandsinitiate cross-leveling, they must notify the appropriatechain of command, to include DA DCSOPS. Figure 3-3shows the mobilization notification process.

Actions to complete the administrative and person-nel processing actions begun in Phase I are im-plemented. Completion of these actions, which includefinal screening, are essential during the alert phase.This phase ends with the RC unit’s entry on active dutyat the home station or in the case of an AC unit, prepa-ration for deployment. DA, through PERSCOM andARPERCEN, will plan to fill individual requirementsfrom the IRR and Retired Reserve.

PHASE III - HOME STATIONThis phase begins with the RC unit’s entry on active

federal duty and/or the AC preparation for deployment.In some cases the HS may serve as an appropriate mo-bilization station, thereby permitting direct movementto the POE. Inventory of unit property, dispatch of anadvance party to the MS, and loading out-either onorganic equipment or on designated movement vehi-cles-are provided through coordination with theSTARC defense movement coordinator (DMC), unitmovement coordinator (UMC), ITOs, and MTMC.

Units with early deployment

missions may be required to

go directly from their home

station to the POE. Therefore,

home stations may serve as

appropriate mobilization

stations.

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The advance party of the 1185thTransportation Terminal Unit (TTU) wasalready on its way to annual training (AT) atWilmington, NC, when the unit got word thatthey were being diverted to Savannah, GA,to outload the 24th Infantry Division(Mechanized) for duty in the Persian Gulf.The USAR unit from Lancaster, PA,immediately departed for Savannah andbegan loading military equipment andcargo. As their two-week AT drew to aclose, the President had not yet invoked theauthority to recall the Selected Reserve.Based on MTMC’s concern that it could notmeet the 24th Division’s deploymentschedule without the continued support ofthe 1185th, the unit’s AT period wasextended 30 days. Finally, on 27 August,the unit was recalled to active dutyunder the PSRC, and the outload of the24th Division was completed several daysahead of schedule. It then operated severalother gulf and east coast ports until itdeployed to Rotterdam to load out one-thirdof VII Corps for Saudi Arabia. Finally,eleven months after leaving home for atwo-week training period, the 1185th TTUwas returned home and demobilized.

During this phase, units take actions to speed transi-tion to active duty status. Units required to convoy tothe mobilization station request convoy approval fromthe state movement control center, which provides anapproved convoy movement order using mobilizationmovement control. This phase ends when the unit ar-rives at the MS or is deployed.

Identification of shortages of

critical personnel and

equipment must be

completed at the home

station to ensure an efficient

transition to active duty.

In the case of the Army Reserve’s 138thAviation Company (EW) from Orlando, FL, itwas not the shortage of equipment thatcaused a problem, but the requiredchangeover of equipment. The unit’scombat intelligence systems had beenreplaced with systems more appropriate tothe counterdrug missions they had beenperforming for Joint Task Force 6. Within30 days of its activation, the 138thdisengaged from the drug war, reinstalledits modified table of organization andequipment (MTOE) electronic warfare gear,self-deployed to Saudi Arabia, and initiatedsignals intelligence (SIGINT) operationsagainst Iraq.

The 199th Medical Company (AirAmbulance), Florida Army National Guard,was mobilized on 1 February 1991 tosupport Operation Desert Storm. The unit’smission was to provide aeromedicalevacuation site support from Fort Bragg,Fort Stewart, Fort Pickett, Charleston AirForce Base, and Cherry Point Marine CorpsAir Station. However, the company hadlimited experience for this medicalevacuation mission. Only three monthsprior to this assignment, the company hadbeen converted from a combat assaultcompany to an air ambulance company.The company found itself short in qualifiedflight medics and flight operationsspecialists. Additionally, it did not have therequired medical equipment sets and wasshort 3 aircraft, 12 rescue hoists, and awrecker. The company was augmented bya detachment from the Kentucky ArmyNational Guard in order to perform itsassigned mission.

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PHASE IV - MOBILIZATION STATIONThis phase begins when the unit arrives at the mobi-

lization station or mobilization site and encompasses allactions required to meet deployment criteria or otherunit validation criteria, resulting in assurance of theunit’s mission capability. Depending on the situation,units may or may not move through a fully establishedmobilization station.

Upon arrival of an RC unit, command of the unitpasses, with the exception of ARSOF units, from theCONUSA to the installation of appropriate authority.Actions include processing personnel and equipment.Necessary individual and collective training are con-ducted and may vary as evaluations and circumstancesdictate. To ensure sufficient time to accomplish alltasks, MS commanders should verify any trainingand/or processing completed at the HS to preclude re-peating such training and/or processing at the MS. Ad-ditional training may vary as evaluation dictates. Thegoal of the unit during this phase is to achieve missioncapability in the shortest possible time consistent withits planned deployment.

The primary objective of all

actions at the mobilization

station is to achieve

mission-capable status in the

shortest possible time.

Within 18 days of its activation, the3d Battalion, 87th Infantry, an ArmyReserve unit headquartered at Fort Collins,CO, was validated and deployed to Europeto replace VII Corps elements departing forSouthwest Asia. This was the only reservecomponent combat maneuver unitmobilized during Operation Desert Storm.By 15 December 1990 (within 24 days afteractivation), the 142d Field Artillery Brigade(Arkansas National Guard), had all of itsequipment at the port of embarkation

(Galveston, TX). At the mobilization station,the unit borrowed equipment toconduct training and validation efforts. On16 January 1992, the brigade deployed toSouthwest Asia.

All units must conduct and continually update prep-aration for overseas movement (POM) and SoldierReadiness Program activities. Unit preparation includesusing the TC ACCIS to maintain and update unit move-ment data based on equipment/personnel deploymentpreparation activities.

This phase terminates when the unit arrives at thePOE. Nondeployers report directly to their mobilizationstations or mobilization sites and are assigned to theirgaining MACOM for mission assignment. Unitmembers at mobilization sites are accessioned to activeduty through coordination with the unit’s supportinginstallation.

To expedite deployment, all

units must be prepared to

successfully complete soldier

readiness and POM activities

at the mobilization station.

The 217th Maintenance Battalion (DS/GS),Arkansas National Guard, mobilized forOperation Desert Storm and experiencedsignificant problems at the mobilizationstation. Upon arrival, the unit was identifiedas being “short” many critical items ofequipment. These items had to be procuredfrom both the active military and reserveunits from other states. Additionally,personnel screening was not conductedprior to arrival at the mobilization station,which resulted in some personnel not beingable to deploy. Wills and powers of

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attorney were also not created at the HSand required significant effort at themobilization station. Incompatible automa-ted personnel systems between active andreserve forces also caused duplication ofrecords and efforts.

PHASE V - PORT OF EMBARKATIONThis phase begins with arrival of the unit at its POE.

Actions at the SPOE or APOE include preparing andloading equipment, as well as manifesting and loadingpersonnel. The POE phase ends with departure of per-sonnel and equipment from the POE.

FORCE REQUIREMENTSForce requirements to support specific OPLANs are

identified through the joint planning process. TheJSCP apportions the notional major combat unit types(above-the-line forces) available to the combatant com-mander. The services/forces specify the actual unitswhich will be provided to the combatant commander,as well as the required CS/CSS units (below-the-lineforces).CAPSTONE ALIGNMENT

The Army CAPSTONE Program organizes andintegrates active and reserve units to meet Total Armywartime requirements. CAPSTONE alignments are adirect result of the deliberate planning process andsupport the execution of the approved OPLANs.CAPSTONE aligns units based on HQDA guidanceand combatant commander stated requirements andpriorities for resourcing as listed on the approvedOPLAN TPFDD.

Of the 145,000 soldiers assigned to VIICorps at peak strength during OperationDesert Storm, less than one third deployedunder VII Corps control. Nearly half of theCorps strength, including critical combatsupport and combat service support (CSS)units deployed from CONUS and OCONUSlocations.

The CONUS sustaining base units are those unitsidentified as necessary to run the CONUS sustainingbase and support the mobilization concept. Duringcontingency operations, the combatant commander’soperational requirements will determine the forces allo-cated for a specific operation.ROUNDOUT UNITS

Roundout is a program where a unit from one Armycomponent is organizationally aligned to a unit fromanother Army component to complete the organicstructure of that parent unit. A roundout unit brings un-derstructured units in another component to a desig-nated MTOE organizational structure.

Roundout units are assigned a priority for allocationof resources through the DAMPL. DAMPL priority isconsistent with the unit’s strategic force package aspublished in The Army Plan (TAP).

Roundout units are organized and equipped the sameas the parent unit. According to the supported CINCpriorities, CONUS units programmed as roundouts forCONUS-based parent units will deploy with the parentunit or as soon as possible. CONUS units programmedas roundouts for OCONUS-based parent units will de-ploy according to supported CINC priorities.

RC units designated as roundout to CONUS ACunits will receive Directed Training Association (DTA)sponsorship from the parent AC unit. FORSCOM pre-scribes DTA sponsorship for RC units roundout to an-other RC unit or roundout to an OCONUS AC parentunit.ROUNDUP UNITS

Roundup is a program wherein an RC unit is orga-nizationally aligned to a fully structured AC unit to pro-vide the parent unit robustness and increasedemployment flexibility.

Roundup units are assigned a priority for allocationof resources through the DAMPL. DAMPL prioritywill be consistent with the unit’s strategic force pack-age as published in the TAP. Roundup units receiveDTA sponsorship from the parent AC unit.

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Roundup units may be

employed as a separate unit;

however, they are aligned as

a doctrinal fourth maneuver

brigade to an active Army

division.

Although extraordinary measures weretaken to ensure the combat readiness of thethree roundout brigades, they were able toreach deployable status much quicker thanany previous mobilization.

INDIVIDUALMANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The requirement for individual manpower falls intothe following four categories:

Military manpower requirements to bring an ac-tive Army or mobilized RC unit to the approvedauthorized levels of manning (ALO).Military manpower requirements for unit fillerand casualty replacements to allow forward-pres-ence units to achieve wartime requirements andto replace anticipated casualties.Civilian manpower requirements to meet ex-panded missions within the sustaining base andto support requirements of the supported comba-tant commander.Military and/or civilian manpower requirementsfor Army activities to meet sustaining base re-quirements for the expanded and deployedforces.

Plans for contingencies arc continuously updatedand sources of individual manpower to support thesecontingencies must be continually identified. Thefollowing are sources of individual manpower to meetrequirements.

TRAINEES, TRANSIENTS,HOLDEES, AND STUDENTS

The most readily available source of personnel is theTTHS account. Soldiers in the TTHS account may beassigned by the PERSCOM commander to meet world-wide requirements at any level of mobilization.Trainees

Trainees include all soldiers in initial-entry training(IET) or MOS-reclassification training. They are notavailable until graduation from their MOS-producingschool and, by law, may not be deployed OCONUS inother than peacetime until they have completed at leasttwelve weeks of military training.Transients

Transients are soldiers who have departed their pre-vious permanent duty station en route to a new assign-ment but who have not yet reported to their newassignment.Holdees

Holdees are soldiers assigned to medical holdingdetachments or to confinement facilities or who are as-signed to separation facilities while awaiting discharge.Students

Students are soldiers undergoing either military orcivilian courses of instruction other than IET. Includedin this category are —

Officer active duty obligors (OADO) enrolled inofficer basic courses, advanced courses, or higherlevel military schooling.Cadets at the United States Military Academy(USMA).Cadets enrolled in officer candidate school(OCS).

USMA cadets and officer candidates are not avail-able for assignment until after completion of branchqualification. AMOPES provides details as to whichtrainee or student courses are discontinued at the vari-ous levels of GMR.INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTERS

Individual mobilization augmenters (IMAs) aremembers of the Selected Reserve who are preassignedto active component positions which must be filled onor shortly after mobilization. IMAs are available forcall-up as part of the PSRC or any other level of

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mobilization. IMAs may volunteer for active duty atany time.VOLUNTEERS

As a general rule, RC soldiers, regardless of affilia-tion, may volunteer for active duty at any time under 10USC 672(d). Appropriate commands must approvemembers of reserve units (ARNG and USAR) andIMAs by verifying that loss of the soldiers will not im-pact on the unit’s capability to perform its mobilizationmission. Retirees and IRR members must coordinatewith the ARPERCEN commander in order to volunteer.End strengths and funding ceilings in place will restrictthe number of volunteers approved in each category.INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is composed oftrained nonunit reserve personnel who are liable for in-voluntary active duty in time of war or national emer-gency declared by the Congress or by the President. Inpeacetime, the IRR is commanded by the ARPERCENcommander.

Upon declaration of partial mobilization or full mo-bilization, IRR members are ordered to active duty asindividual fillers or replacements in accordance withpriorities set by DA. IRRs may volunteer for activeduty at any time.INACTIVE NATIONAL GUARD

Inactive National Guard (ING) are members of theARNG in an inactive status. Although attached to aspecific unit for administrative purposes, they are notpart of the Selected Reserve and do not participate inunit activities. They are available for involuntary ac-tive duty with the declaration of partial mobilization ora higher level of mobilization. Whereas IRR soldiersare ordered to active duty as individuals, ING soldiersare ordered to active duty as members of the ARNGunits to which they are attached.RETIRED RESERVE

Retired soldiers who have completed 20 years of ac-tive duty are subject to recall to active duty at any timethe Secretary of the Army determines a need. These re-tirees are a valuable source of trained manpower. Theyare available for most military assignments and deploy-ments subject to physical or other restrictions dictatedby Department of the Army, as well as the replenish-ment of critical civilian positions. All other retirees arealso available at the discretion of the SECDEF, but onlyafter Congress has declared war or a national emer-gency.

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Retirees may volunteer for active duty to meet spe-cific operational requirements at any time; however, re-call to active duty is subject to approval on acase-by-case basis by the Secretary of the Army.STANDBY RESERVE

The Standby Reserve consists of officer and enlistedsoldiers with or without a remaining military serviceobligation (MSO) but who have no statutory require-ments for peacetime training. Members of the StandbyReserve cannot be involuntarily ordered to active dutyunder less than a full mobilization.TEMPORARY APPOINTEES

Temporary appointments as commissioned officersmay be proffered by the service secretaries to highlyqualified civilians who have entered active duty invol-untarily through conscription or who volunteer for suchduty. Such temporary appointments are normally re-served for individuals possessing unique educational,scientific, or other skills which cannot otherwise be ob-tained by the military. While not restricted for use at aninitial level of GMR, temporary appointments are notnormally offered at levels of less than full mobilization.Temporary appointees are not deployable OCONUSduring war unless they have completed a minimum of12 weeks of military training.CONSCRIPTS

The SECDEF recommends to the President and toCongress the institution of involuntary conscription ofcivilians for training and use as military personnel. Arequest for conscription authority is based on overallmanpower requirements and is not tied to a particularlevel of mobilization. The decision to return to fillingmilitary manpower requirements with conscripts maybe made at any level of GMR or may be made for otherreasons.

If conscription is authorized, its equitableinstatement is the responsibility of the Selective ServiceSystem, which maintains current data on all males whoare US citizens or resident aliens who have reachedtheir eighteenth birthday. Civilians eligible forinduction (involuntary entry on active duty) aremales between 18 ½ and 26 years of age who havecompleted fewer than 24 months prior active duty orSelected Reserve service. Based on requirements of theDOD, the age of eligibility may be expanded, orselected conscription of civilians possessing specificskills could be authorized by Congress.

FM 100-17

CIVILIAN PERSONNELPlanning for requirements supported by DA civilians

and contractors includes identification of requirementsand qualified personnel to fill requirements. Civilianplanning is incorporated into the Total Army and musttake into account the use of civilians, who provide es-sential CS and CSS roles in a theater. Civilians requirethe same considerations for training, individual readi-ness, equipping, deploying, sustaining, and redeployingas the military. DOD 1404.10(D)2 gives instructionsfor deploying civilians. Appropriate proponents mustaccomplish deliberate or structured planning for civil-ian involvement in order to have identified civilian re-quirements filled in a timely manner. Categories ofcivilian manpower available include—

Department of Defense civilians.Department of the Army civilians.Employees of the American Red Cross.Employees of vendors and contractors.

This civilian work force includes CONUS expansionand OCONUS requirements in support of military oper-ations. In the event of full or total mobilization, civil-ians from the private sector mobilized in support of USgovernment objectives are also considered a part of thecivilian work force, although not necessarily employeddirectly by DOD or its elements. At any level of GMR,appropriated fund and nonappropriated fund retireesmay be invited to return to active service, as long as es-tablished manpower ceilings and budget constraints arenot exceeded.CONTRACTORS

Contractors have served the Army well, both duringpeacetime and during crises, and will be available forfuture operations. The most common use of civiliancontractors is their employment as technical representa-tives and maintainers of sophisticated, high-dollarequipment. However, contractors’ use is limited onlyby the requirement for services which can best be pro-vided by contractors.

A successful program for using contractors is theLogistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).LOGCAP uses civilian contractors for transportation,construction, and a variety of other services. UsingLOGCAP releases military units for other missions or

resolves Army capability shortfalls. LOGCAP appliesduring CONUS mobilization to assist the CONUS sup-port base and units in their readiness preparation.FILLER REQUIREMENTS FORACTIVE ARMY ANDMOBILIZED RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS

Manpower requirements to fill active Army and mo-bilized RC units to the appropriate wartime require-ments is derived from personnel reports and updatereports from units at home stations and mobilizationstations prior to movement. The installation com-mander is responsible for determining the fill require-ments for assigned units and reporting shortages thatcannot be filled internally.FILLER AND CASUALTY REPLACEMENTS

The ASCC of the supported combatant command isresponsible for determining the number of filler person-nel required for forward-presence units to bring them torequired ALO. The ASCC determines this by compar-ing the wartime required strengths of all units in the AOwith their peacetime authorized strengths.

The ASCC reports the difference between wartimerequired and peacetime authorized in the AO to thePERSCOM commander as the filler requirement. Ex-perience shows that units deployed to an AO at lessthan required strength require additional fillers to bemission-capable. The ASCC of the supporting comba-tant command or CONUS MACOM reports the actualstrength of deploying units to PERSCOM so that fillerrequirements can be met by increasing the number ofindividuals identified for movement.SUSTAINING BASE MANPOWER

Planners identify sustaining base manpower require-ments in the deliberate planning process by construct-ing comprehensive mobilization tables of distributionand allowances (MOBTDAs).

AR 310-493 provides detailed guidance for prepar-ing a MOBTDA. Requirements for IMA positions andmilitary and civilian augmenters are all reflected on theMOBTDA. Military positions are considered suitablefor fill by retirees unless coded to the contrary. Prop-erly prepared MOBTDAs support both the assignmentof IMAs, sustaining manpower requirements, and pre-assignment of retirees.

2 Emergency Essential DOD US Citizen Employees Overseas, 6 April 1990.3 The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS), 15 December 1980.

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FM 100-17

The activity mobilization planner reviews the docu-ment and identifies separately those positions which arerequired at each level of GMR. This review allows forthe rapid generation of requests for overstrength man-ning with RC volunteers and retirees at the lowest levelof GMR. It also allows for requesting augmentationwith RC volunteers and retirees beyond assigned IMAs.

PERSONNELSERVICE ADMINISTRATION

AND SUPPORT

Requirements for soldier and DA civilian supportvary considerably, depending on the nature and scopeof the operation or conflict. Requirements include thefunctions of soldier readiness, medical and dental sup-port, postal support, MWR support, public affairs, legalsupport, family assistance support, and finance support.SOLDIER READINESS

Commanders are responsible for ensuring all sol-diers meet soldier readiness requirements and stan-dards. This process includes meeting specified legal,medical, and administrative standards.MEDICAL AND DENTAL SUPPORT

Mobilized RC soldiers and recalled retirees may re-port to the MS requiring additional medical or dentalsupport to bring them to deployable standards. Medicaland dental facilities at the MS must be prepared to pro-vide extensive optical, dental, and other care to correctmedical disorders of the mobilized force. Medical anddental facilities also prepare to meet the increased re-requirement of providing support to the families of mobi-lized soldiers. This heavy workload comes at the sametime Professional Officer Filler System (PROFIS) per-sonnel are taken from the installation hospitals to de-ploy with units.LEGAL SUPPORT

Commanders and their staff judge advocates (SJAs)position legal personnel throughout their AOR toprovide responsive legal service when and whereneeded. To help support mobilization, commandersmust identify legal support personnel requirements onthe MOBTDA. Reserve component judge advocategeneral (JAG) service legal assistance teams are alsoavailable for this mission.

As an example, many soldiers deployed toOperation Desert Storm required specificupdates to legal documentation, that is,wills, powers of attorney, and so forth. Themajority of this support was provided byreserve SJA units such as the ArmyReserve’s 218th JAG Detachment fromBismarck, ND, which served at Fort Sill, OK.

POSTAL SERVICESPostal services, to include postal finance (stamps,

money orders, and registered, insured, and certifiedmail) are provided as far forward as possible, usually tobrigade level. The extent of service depends on thetheater postal policy, the tactical situation, the numberof DS postal units, and the size of the area served.

Adequate postal structure must be established earlyin the theater before the volume of mail reaches unman-ageable proportions. The postal network provides mailservice to sister services and allied forces, as required.The network arranges transfer of mail to and throughallied country postal systems to international locations.MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

The mission of MWR activities is to assist the com-manders in maintaining morale, esprit de corps, health,and the mental and physical fitness of their soldiers andcivilians. Success in this effort will, in turn, contributeto combat readiness.

The JTF command, in coordination with theArmy/Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), plans forand supports exchange operations. These plans mayinclude a combination of direct retail operations in thecommunications zone (COMMZ), tactical fieldexchanges operated by dedicated Army personnel, orAAFES imprest fund activities operated by unitpersonnel.PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Today’s instantaneous communications ensure thatthe probability of combat operations will generate ademand for immediate information from soldiers, DAcivilians, their families, and the media. DOD makespolicy decisions pertaining to media activities.

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FM 100-17

Commanders must have plans to increase PublicAffairs (PA) staffs to meet the increased CommandInformation (CI) needs. The PA staff must havecontingency plans to expand the CI program and torespond to media demands for assistance in coveringmilitary operations. A credible and timely CI programincreases individual morale and readiness.

The media’s right and obligation to report onmilitary operations, and the individual’s need toknow, must be balanced with security concerns. SeeFM 46-14 for additional information on PA operations.RELIGIOUS SUPPORT

Religious support is provided for all assigned sol-diers, family members, and authorized DA civilians byunit ministry teams (UMT). Early deployment of thesenior chaplain staff is essential for coordination andexecution of the commander’s theater religious supportplan. UMTs assist in alleviating stress and enhance thesoldier’s religious faith during all phases of an opera-tion, including preparation for redeployment. Early co-ordination with local community churches providesadditional help in providing support to families.

Providing religious support to families of deployingand deployed soldiers is a critical mobilization missionof garrison table of distribution and allowances (TDA)UMTs. Sufficient installation postmobilization staffingmust be provided. This staffing ensures an adequatenumber of trained UMTs filling MOBTDAs to providefamily support after deployment. STARC andMUSARC chaplains must be activated as soon as possi-ble to manage family religious support programs whereactive installations are not immediately available.FINANCE SUPPORT

Timely and accurate finance support during mobili-zation is critical to overall unit and individual soldiersuccess. Unit commanders and finance personnel —

Coordinate with ARPERCEN to ensure essentialpay information is included in individual mobili-zation orders.Promptly convert soldiers from RC status to ACstatus on JUMPS/JSS.Start new entitlements, pay options, and allot-ments.

Assist in establishing soldiers’ SURE-PAY ac-counts, support allotments and, where appropri-ate, powers of attorney.

Timely, accurate finance support to the soldier andthe unit, as well as families and communities at home,is critical to successful operations.FAMILY ASSISTANCE

Family assistance centers must be created early andremain in operation during the entire MDRD process.Maximum emphasis must be placed on communicationwith families, resolution of problems experienced byfamilies, and, as much as possible, involvement of fam-ilies in the Total Army community. Family support foractive components, reserve components, and civilians isa total community effort.

Commanders must stress the importance of familycare planning and the requirement to initiate a familycare plan in accordance with AR 600-20. 5 Agenciessuch as family assistance centers, family supportgroups, rear detachments, and Army Community Ser-vices are available to assist soldiers, Army civilians,and their families.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICSREQUIREMENTS

Logistical requirements for mobilization include allthose requirements for materiel, supplies, services, andsoldier support activities to accomplish the mobilizationprocess. Additionally, the requirement for logisticalsupport extends on a continuous basis throughout mobi-lization, deployment, redeployment, and demobiliza-tion.

Army units will maintain automated unit equipmentlists (AUELs) containing mobilization movement re-quirements data in accordance with appropriate com-mand guidance. Units will maintain accurate unitmovement data at all times during deliberate planningto reflect home-station-to-mobilization-station move-ment requirements. Units will update data as signifi-cant transportation changes occur to the unit’sequipment list.

The TC ACCIS supports the collection of detailedmovements data and allows for electronic submissionof the information to USTRANSCOM for scheduling

4 Public Affairs, 11 April 1986.5 Army Command Policy, 30 March 1988.

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FM 100-17

strategic transportation and to MACOMs for planningforce movements.

Materiel requirements encompass equipment andsupplies, generally end items, required by units formobilization and deployment. Planners must recognizethat RC units may not possess unit ASLs/PLLs.Mobilization materiel plans address these requirementsand how to meet them. When OPLANs specify thesupport relationship, the USAMC Materiel ReadinessSupport Activity (MRSA) computes the ASL for thedirect support unit and provides a copy to the unit andthe theater. USAMC retains responsibility forcomputing RC nondivisional ASLs for units notassigned to a specific theater.

Commanders and planners at all levels must ensurethat requirements are accurately stated and docu-mented. The most immediate requirement is installa-tion support to early deploying units/troops. Thissupport includes immediate repair or replacement ofequipment and provision of basic loads and other ac-companying supplies. The installation requisitions orcross-levels from other installations or organizationsitems that it cannot provide immediately. Plannersneed to plan for host nation support but not rely upon ittotally.

Logistics policies and

procedures should be in

place prior to mobilization to

ensure that all supply and

equipment requirements can

be met.

Many National Guard and Army Reservetransportation units were short of truckswhen mobilized for Operation Desert Storm.Where possible, the Army redistributedequipment in nonmobilized units to bringmobilized units up to full authorization.When shortages persisted, DA assignedvehicles from assembly lines. The 1461stLight Truck Company (Michigan National

Guard) and the 253d Light/ Medium TruckCompany (New Jersey National Guard)were sent to the factory to pick up 96 newM939A2 and M923A2 trucks and deliverthem to various RC units.

As RC units and individuals are mobilized with ex-isting authorization levels, and while funding levels areadjusted, the use of priority codes may be authorized.Mass cancellation of open requisitions must be avoidedas it increases paperwork. Units should simply upgradethe priority and change the delivery location. Com-manders must ensure that equipment is available andoperationally ready and that basic loads of all classes ofsupply are available for issue. Mobilization stationsshould be prepared to modify equipment, as determinedby materiel developers and materiel change regulatoryguidance.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTSHQDA, TRADOC, USASOC, and US Army Health

Services Command (HSC) publish plans, policies, andprocedures for conducting individual training and ex-panding the training base during each level of mobiliza-tion. Training base courses are expanded to meet TotalArmy trained manpower requirements for a JCS con-flict scenario. This expansion is in accordance with theMobilization Army Program for Individual Training de-veloped for that scenario.

This program identifies all courses to be conducted.It provides data showing the projected, programmed re-quirements to meet the time-phased incremental train-ing base output requirements determined for eachscenario.

HQDA, TRADOC, and USASOC determine train-ing base output requirements by comparing Total Armytrained personnel requirements for the scenario againsttotal personnel assets available. The training base mayalso provide mobile training teams and new equipmenttraining teams to support special training requirementsof deployed or deploying forces.UNIT TRAINING

Unit training at the MS will be restricted by thetime, equipment, facilities, and personnel available.The unit commander, in conjunction with the mobiliza-tion assistance team (MAT), determines his trainingpriorities based on such factors as table of organization

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and equipment (TOE) mission, capstone guidance, rec-ommendations of the MAT, and Soldier Readiness Pro-gram requirements.UNIT VALIDATION

The mobilization station commander is responsiblefor validating mobilized units. Unit validation is theprocess required to bring mobilized units to a requiredlevel of readiness prior to deployment. It includes as-sessments of each readiness area (personnel, materiel,and training). Generally, the validation standard iscompetency to perform mission-essential tasks. Thecommander completes unit validation in accordancewith AMOPES and other appropriate guidance. TheMS commander will validate ARSOF units and individ-uals based on recommendations and concurrence of thevalidation team representing the USASOC commander.

FACILITIES REQUIREMENTSFacilities requirements for mobilization include all

those requirements for existing facilities, space man-agement, and expansion of the installation. These re-quirements may include the use of off-post facilities tosupport installation requirements, new construction,and inactivation or disposal of facilities in peacetime tosupport MDRD.EXPANSION OF SEAPORTS

Transportation terminal units under command ofUSTRANSCOM/MTMC become responsible for mili-tary cargo loading documentation at ports which are notnormally used by the military during peacetime. OtherTTUs augment existing military ports, Rapid expan-sion of seaport operations is critical to deployment ofequipment and supplies. These responsibilities includereception and staging of equipment, planning of loads,contracting of commercial support, supervision of theactual loading, documentation, and manifesting ofcargo.

Systems are being developed to support ocean ter-minal operations cargo documentation and account-ability. These systems will significantly streamline andenhance operations at these ports. All TTUs, alongwith supporting deployment control units and portsecurity detachments, reside in the Army Reserve.Because of the crucial mission of these units, they mustbe brought onto active duty early to begin deployingforces rapidly.

In support of Operations Desert Shield andDesert Storm, the Army mobilized, from theArmy Reserve component, ten TTUs, threeport security detachments, two deploymentcontrol units, one railway service unit, andother movement control elements. Theseunits supported the entire east mast andgulf coast deployment from Bayonne,Wilmington, Savannah, Jacksonville, Hous-ton/Beaumont, Charleston, Newport News,and Sunny Point. Several of these unitswere also deployed to Europe andSouthwest Asia.

POWERPROJECTION PLATFORMS

The Army installations that support mobilization anddeployment activities must be seen as power projectionplatforms. Included are the facilities and infrastructureto support MDRD. Mobilization stations deploy speci-fied units and equipment; process, validate, and deploymobilized units; and process and move individuals des-ignated as nonunit-related personnel to CRCs. Theymay perform additional missions such as—

Regional marshaling area support for deployingforces,POE/POD (port of debarkation) processing sup-port (arrival/departure airfield control group[A/DACG] and port support activity [PSA]) atUSTRANSCOM-directed POEs and PODs.

All installations that have either active Army units,RC individuals, or individual units mobilizing and de-ploying through are considered power projection plat-forms. These installations must have the requiredfacilities in place to house, feed, train, and deploy theunits.

These facilities include training, maintenance, sup-ply, administration, billeting, and transportation. Primeexamples of these facilities are —

Airfields, railroads and railheads.Warehousing to support basic loads and addi-tional requirements at staging areas.

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Facilities to support actual deployments, asA/DACG operations, ammunition holding areas,staging areas, and port facilities to support instal-lation SPOE missions.

EXISTING FACILITIESThe immediate nature of force projection dictates

that the facilities available to support the operation arethose existing at the time the operation commences.Maximum use of all facilities is a must. Deployingunits must vacate all barracks, administrative, and re-lated facilities to provide space for mobilizing individu-als and/or follow-on units.

During peacetime unit deployments as emergencydeployment readiness exercises, units practice proce-dures wherein they clean the barracks, inventory andstore personal items in a portion of the facility, and pre-pare for the next potential occupants. For actual de-ployment situations, additional existing facilities, suchas service clubs or gymnasiums where latrine andshower facilities are located, are converted to barracksand provided to incoming units.EXPANSION OF FACILITIESON THE INSTALLATION

Expansion of facilities on the installation can bemade through the use of pre-engineered building sys-tems or other rapidly erectable light mobilization struc-tures (RELMS). Another means of expansion is tolease buildings identified through the nonindustrial fa-cilities (NIF) program.

When the real estate action cannot meet the requireddates, the installation procurement office, for a limitedperiod, can obtain the facility until the real estate actioncan be accomplished. The use of reduced space autho-rizations for unaccompanied enlisted housing can alsoprovide additional barracks space.

ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTSDuring mobilization, general environmental require-

ments and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)requirements apply.GENERALENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

During mobilization, all environmental requirementscovered in AR 200-16 remain in effect unless waived

by higher command. In some instances, environmentallaws contain specific procedures for waivers of all orspecific parts of the law under emergency conditions.Installations attempting to obtain waivers of this natureshall ensure the appropriate level of command is in-volved.

In lieu of waivers, commanders must adhere to local,state, and federal environmental requirements associ-ated with routine and repetitive procedures such as fuel-ing, maintaining, cleaning, and deploying forces to theMS and POE. These requirements include refuelingstops en route, oil and lubricants associated with motorparks and maintenance shops, wash racks, and open-burning/open-detonation (OB/OD) at the MS trainingareas.NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTALPOLICY ACT REQUIREMENTS

Mobilization plans may require a NEPA analysisprior to final approval of the plan. The NEPA analysisshall look at limitations during mobilization and in-clude contingency plans where needed to meet environ-mental standards. Contingency plans shall be specificand include prenegotiated waivers with regulatory au-thorities, if waivers are deemed necessary. Waiversshould be considered as a last resort; changes in pro-cesses and/or materiel shall be considered first.

OTHER MOBILIZATIONCONSIDERATIONS

Other considerations during mobilization include in-dustrial base expansion, financial management, con-tracting, and host nation supportINDUSTRIAL BASE EXPANSION

In accordance with HQDA guidance, USAMC, incoordination with DLA, plans industrial preparednessmeasures (IPMs) to satisfy mobilization requirements.Advance planning and early activation of the industrialbase may be required for long lead time supplies andmateriel, consumables, repairable, and replenishmenttroop support items.FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

HQDA issues resource management guidance toMACOM commanders. This guidance defines howMACOMs and mobilizations stations should captureand cover costs. When guidance is issued, MACOM

6 Environmental Protection and Enhancement, 23 April 1990.

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commanders should receive reprogramming authority.Currency support for both the procurement process andorganizational support in the AO are strongly tied tohost nation support (HNS). Finance units are responsi-ble for central funding operations. These operations in-clude supplying US currency, treasury checks, foreigncurrency, military payment certificates, and preciousmetals (if necessary) for all ground forces in the AO.

Funding is necessary not only to support the pro-curement process but also to support combat payments,other activities (field exchanges, commissaries, APOs),and other services. Early liaison with the host nationbanking industry is essential to accomplishing the cen-tral funding mission. Finance units create an OMAopen allotment fund cite to fund the travel and per diemof mobilized IRR soldiers. Once they are loaded ontothe Joint Uniform Military Pay System-Active Army(JUMPS-AA), IRR soldiers’ pay and allowances arepaid from MPA appropriations.

While other areas may receive considerable atten-tion, for example, military pay and travel, procurement

support is considered the most critical wartime financemission. This function is divided into two areas-con-tracting operations and commercial vendor services(CVS) operations.

Contracting operations are normally conducted byboth finance groups and theater finance commands.They involve the payment of commercial accounts forgoods and services obtained through formal contractingprocedures and may include all classes of supply, laun-dry and bath operations, transportation, real estate, andmaintenance.CONTRACTING

Contracting plays a vital role in mobilization, de-ployment, redeployment, and demobilization. Contract-ing can bridge the gap at the installation level forincreased support during mobilization for the followingtype of requirements:

Billeting Medical SuppliesFood Service Repair PartsTransportation ConstructionConsumable Supplies MaintenanceMiscellaneous ServicesAdditionally, contracting can provide the same type

of support during the deployment phase by filling the

FM 100-17

gap until LOGCAP and HNS become fully integratedinto the support plan. During the redeployment phase,contracts for transportation of materiel and mainte-nance will be used extensively to reconstitute the force.The key to obtaining optimum support from contractingis early and thorough planning.

Planning for the use of

contracts should be based on

the needs of the supported

combatant commander and

the applicable OPLAN.

During Operation Just Cause, there was noshortage of trucks or drivers in Panama.Designated purchasing order officers wereprepared to negotiate contracts, andvendors were prepared to provide services.Every battalion in the 7th Infantry Division(Light) had both a designated order officerand a Class A agent with cash.

The installation directorates of contracting providecontracting support during the mobilization phase. Mo-bilization plans should fully integrate contracting sup-port, and the installation directorates of contractingshould be included early in the planning process.HOST NATION SUPPORT

Planners should consider host nation capabilities butnot depend on them. Host nation support should be co-ordinated for and documented in peacetime, if possible.Based on the logistical preparation of the theater, HNScould play a large role in the provision of procurementneeds (supplies and services) to deployed soldiers.

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SUMMARY

Mobilization requires detailed planning, crossing numerous functional areas and departments.Non-DOD agencies, as well as DOD organizations, must fully participate in the creation andexecution of mobilization plans. Advance preparation addressing the total spectrum of possiblemilitary operations will ensure effective and efficient mobilization of units, individuals, andlogistics.

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