modelagem numÉrica dos processos de transporte

25
Thomas Campbell, Msc., PE Samantha Danchuk, Ph.D. Thomas Campbell, P.E., President Coastal Planning & Engineering, Inc. 2481 NW Boca Raton Boulevard Boca Raton, FL 33431 Lessons Learned from Deepwater Horizon Spill: Response Engineer’s Perspective

Upload: tranthuan

Post on 02-Feb-2017

218 views

Category:

Documents


4 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

Lessons Learned

from Deepwater Horizon Spill in Okaloosa County

Samantha Danchuk, Ph.D.

Thomas Campbell, Msc., PE

Coastal Planning & Engineering

Boca Raton, FL, USA

Samantha Danchuk, Ph.D.

Thomas Campbell, P.E., President

Coastal Planning & Engineering, Inc. 2481 NW Boca Raton Boulevard

Boca Raton, FL 33431

Lessons Learned

from Deepwater Horizon Spill: Response Engineer’s Perspective

Page 2: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

2

Discussion Topics

• Area Contingency Plan

• Unified Command

• Public Information/ Interaction

• Boom in Fast Currents

• Oil Spill Modeling

Page 3: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

3

Area Contingency Plan (ACP) •Last updated in 1990’s

•Did not include boom

plan for all

environmentally sensitive

areas

•Not fully vetted by local

government

•Boom configurations

that could not be

constructed or

maintained

Page 4: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

4

Evolution of ACP in Okaloosa County

ACP 1995

Chevron

Original Permit

May 2010

USCG denied

Pile supported

shoreline segments

June 2010

(deployed)

ACP

May 2010

ACP-less boom

June 2010

(failed to deploy)

Bay Alternative

(interferes with

recreation)

Outside Pass

(USCG suggested)

Open Chevron

(State EOC suggested)

Final Plan

(USCG/ CPE Joint Effort)

Page 5: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

5

ACP Issues • Did not address local needs

• Availability of resources impacted deployment

• Boom plan was not sustainable or effective under local conditions

• Plans were not communicated effectively to local government, State EOC or public

Page 6: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

6

Recommendations for ACP

• ACP should be revised to incorporate lessons learned and new designs used during Deepwater Horizon response

• Substandard approaches should not be deployed. Failure wastes time and increases risk. All strategies should be fully deployed and tested before becoming part of the ACP.

Page 7: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

7

Recommendations for ACP

• Boom strategies should be based on research and high-quality sources of information on local conditions

• ACP strategies should be pre-approved by local government, open to public comment, and the State EOC.

Page 8: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

8

Unified Command (UC) • BP: authority to approve or deny local/ state response

activities • Transocean • USCG • MMS, NOAA, US EPA • US Homeland Security • US DOI, DOD, FWS, NPS, Dept of State, USGS, CDC,

OSHA

• UC based in Louisiana • Incident Command Center in Mobile, Alabama

State EOC and local government were not part of UC!

Page 9: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

9

Example Approval Process

Local Response

Action

State EOC

Approval

(Tallahassee)

USACE Permit

(Jacksonville)

USCG Approval

(Transient)

UC Approval

(aka BP approval)

Mobile, AL

New Orleans, LA

Construction/

Deployment

BP Response

Action

UC Approval

USACE

General Permit

Construction/

Deployment

Bottom Up Top Down

Page 10: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

10

UC Issues

• BP authority prevented permitted, state approved local action items from being implemented

• State/ local government were not involved in UC response

• Consistent miscommunication between local/ state level and UC

• Continuous rotation of USCG and BP reps slowed progress and increased confusion/ miscommunication

• UC stalled local response activities while preparing conflicting response plans

Page 11: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

11

Recommendations for UC

• Responsible party should not have final authority on response actions.

• The State and local governments should be part of UC and have lead authority over response actions.

• Individual UCs should be located in each state with full decision making authority.

Page 12: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

12

• Team of spill response experts should be continuously cultivated within the USCG. These experts should be assigned to each county/ area and not rotated.

• UC agenda of response actions should be transparent, publicly accessible and not conflict with state or local response.

Recommendations for UC

Page 13: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

Public Interaction

• Public wanted to see boom but not have it interfere with recreation

Wet Staging

Crab Island

xljetsdestin.com

Need to have clear decision making process for full deployment that includes local government input and public notification Public use needs to be considered in contingency planning

Page 14: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

Public Influence on Design

• Public driven political pressure heavily influenced design of protection measures

ACP needs to be comprehensive, fully vetted, and tested prior to incident Protection measures should be based on research and proven methodology

Barge Plan Air Curtain

Page 15: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

Public Information • Local dissatisfaction with SERT Gator website led to daily

beach monitoring

Any public database has to consider impact of color schemes, overload of information, and potential of misinterpretation on tourism and public opinion End product should be tailored to user’s needs

Page 16: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

16

Boom in Fast Currents

Less than 0.7 knots Greater than 0.7 knots

Boom Floatation

Boom Skirt /

Curtain

Oil Turbulence

Droplet

Entrainment

Page 17: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

17

Hydrodynamic Modeling Known current speed

and direction at all

locations

Boom angle can be

adjusted to reduce

current speed relative

to boom

Forces along boom

can be calculated at

all locations

Can avoid failure of

boom!

Page 18: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

18

Boom Analysis Program

Quickly shows areas

likely to fail based on

hydrodynamic model

Page 19: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

19

Recommendations for Inlets

• Booms should be angled so that the relative current speed is less than 0.7 knots

• Forces should be calculated to determine appropriate anchoring system or piling support system

• Proper resources i.e. powerful boats should be used to deploy

• Increased floatation/ freeboard prevents boom from being pulled under

Page 20: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

Modeling & Contingency Planning

Water Probability Shore Probability

Stochastic Model Outputs

Modeling is an essential component of contingency planning.

Page 21: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

DETERMINISTIC MODULE FOR THE WORST CASE SCENARIO

Page 22: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

22

Berms in Louisiana

Berm’s

Impact

on

Currents

Oil

Transport

Louisiana

Page 23: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

23

What we should be modeling…

• Spill scenarios from offshore rigs, pipelines, tankers and fixed facilities near ALL at risk sites

• To determine sites at greatest risk and identify natural collection areas and response needs

• Hydrodynamics of all areas where protection measures would be deployed

• Submerged oil transport in the nearshore

Page 24: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

Summary

• Need to revise Area Contingency Plan

• Need to review/ restructure Unified Command

• The public is a major factor in response planning

• Boom CAN be deployed in fast currents if a technical approach is taken

• Modeling is essential for contingency planning and should be performed now

Page 25: MODELAGEM NUMÉRICA DOS PROCESSOS DE TRANSPORTE

THANK YOU