Models of Democracy Models of Democracy and Post-Democracyand Post-Democracy

Alistair ColeAlistair Cole

Regime TypologiesRegime Typologies

Traditional comparativists sought to distinguish between Traditional comparativists sought to distinguish between different types of regime: that is clusters of regimes which different types of regime: that is clusters of regimes which share sufficient characteristics to enable them to be considered share sufficient characteristics to enable them to be considered as belonging to a group of similar regimes. as belonging to a group of similar regimes.

Comparative politics traditionally operated a tripartite division Comparative politics traditionally operated a tripartite division of the world into: liberal democracies, Communist regimes, of the world into: liberal democracies, Communist regimes, ‘third world’ states (this last being the most unsatisfactory of ‘third world’ states (this last being the most unsatisfactory of the three). None of these categories was ever satisfactory.the three). None of these categories was ever satisfactory.

The Political Development school of the 1960s and 1970s The Political Development school of the 1960s and 1970s assumed eventual convergence to liberal democratic normsassumed eventual convergence to liberal democratic norms

Liberal democracy was assumed to be superior…Liberal democracy was assumed to be superior…

The ‘loss of clusters’The ‘loss of clusters’

The traditional tryptic has been challenged by The traditional tryptic has been challenged by the evolution of history, not least the collapse the evolution of history, not least the collapse of communism in 1989-1991. of communism in 1989-1991.

Unit of analysis less likely to be single Unit of analysis less likely to be single country, more identifying explanatory country, more identifying explanatory variables across countries variables across countries

Liberal Democracy aka Gordon Liberal Democracy aka Gordon Smith, 1986Smith, 1986

political competition for the highest offices of state, as expressed by political competition for the highest offices of state, as expressed by competing political parties, competing political parties,

the free interplay of interests, and an acceptance of political and economic the free interplay of interests, and an acceptance of political and economic pluralismpluralism

alternation in power ( or at least the theoretical possibility of it).alternation in power ( or at least the theoretical possibility of it). recognition of a boundary between the state and civil society, implying recognition of a boundary between the state and civil society, implying

freedom of the media. (liberal democracy)freedom of the media. (liberal democracy) recognition of the rights of legal opposition. recognition of the rights of legal opposition. a recognition of constitutionalism: i.e. that political processes are a recognition of constitutionalism: i.e. that political processes are

regularised by reference to respect for duly established rules and regularised by reference to respect for duly established rules and constitutional norms. This might take the form of a written constitution, or constitutional norms. This might take the form of a written constitution, or an unwritten form; but of greater importance than this is the extent to an unwritten form; but of greater importance than this is the extent to which each branch of government theoretically operates within the strict which each branch of government theoretically operates within the strict parameters of legal rules, safeguard against arbitrary government.parameters of legal rules, safeguard against arbitrary government.

Limitations and criticismLimitations and criticism This classic definition of liberal democracy is rather a formalistic one; it This classic definition of liberal democracy is rather a formalistic one; it

does not consider, by itself, whether democracies are capable of providing does not consider, by itself, whether democracies are capable of providing effective government, of delivering the goods. effective government, of delivering the goods.

It is one based on a model of competitive elitism: alternative elites stand by It is one based on a model of competitive elitism: alternative elites stand by ready to conduct the affairs of government. It is one that requires a ready to conduct the affairs of government. It is one that requires a minimal democratic participation. minimal democratic participation.

Too much participation can be destabilising; in one version of this (Lipset Too much participation can be destabilising; in one version of this (Lipset and Bendix) democratic stability requires limited participation. and Bendix) democratic stability requires limited participation.

The claim sustained by the liberal democracies to allow for the free The claim sustained by the liberal democracies to allow for the free interplay of democratic forces has in most cases proved accurate: this can interplay of democratic forces has in most cases proved accurate: this can be measured by the fact that most of the core 20 liberal democracies have be measured by the fact that most of the core 20 liberal democracies have at some time managed an alternation in power. at some time managed an alternation in power.

Moreover, it has been rare for any one government to remain in power for Moreover, it has been rare for any one government to remain in power for more than ten yearsmore than ten years

Limitations and criticism 2Limitations and criticism 2

Marxist critique: the liberties safeguarded by liberal democracy are Marxist critique: the liberties safeguarded by liberal democracy are excessively negative and formalistic, designed primarily to safeguard excessively negative and formalistic, designed primarily to safeguard existing property relations existing property relations

Marxist critique of the notion of pluralism - i.e. a dispersal of power Marxist critique of the notion of pluralism - i.e. a dispersal of power throughout the political, social and economic systems - is a myth; that the throughout the political, social and economic systems - is a myth; that the pluralist idea of fair interaction between competing interests is erroneous, pluralist idea of fair interaction between competing interests is erroneous, with the odds heavily stacked in favour of those possessing capital; and with the odds heavily stacked in favour of those possessing capital; and that the idea of democracy itself is a misnomer, since power is exercised by that the idea of democracy itself is a misnomer, since power is exercised by a small pro-capitalist elite.a small pro-capitalist elite.

liberal democracy has proved intolerant of genuine attempts at liberal democracy has proved intolerant of genuine attempts at revolutionary change: any attempt fundamentally to challenge the norms of revolutionary change: any attempt fundamentally to challenge the norms of capitalism, e.g, has invited a reversion away from democracy towards capitalism, e.g, has invited a reversion away from democracy towards dictatorship- such as in Chile with the overthrow of Allende's Marxist dictatorship- such as in Chile with the overthrow of Allende's Marxist government in 1973. government in 1973.

Reverse: attempts to impose democracy through arms, as in Irak. Reverse: attempts to impose democracy through arms, as in Irak. Huntingdon: crisis of civilizations and imposing democracy through the Huntingdon: crisis of civilizations and imposing democracy through the barrel of a gun. barrel of a gun. S. Huntingdon, S. Huntingdon, The Third Wave: The Third Wave: Democratization in Democratization in the Late Twentieth Centurythe Late Twentieth Century, 1991, 1991

Six Models of European DemocracySix Models of European Democracy

D. Held, D. Held, Models of democracyModels of democracy,1987, 1996, 2005,1987, 1996, 2005 Held 1: Athenian DemocracyHeld 1: Athenian Democracy Small communities, direct participation & Small communities, direct participation &

sovereignty (polis) over all public affairssovereignty (polis) over all public affairs Office short term, by election, lot & rotationOffice short term, by election, lot & rotation Women & slaves excludedWomen & slaves excluded Low participationLow participation Domination by demagogues & factions as/ more Domination by demagogues & factions as/ more

likely than ‘deliberation’; instabilitylikely than ‘deliberation’; instability

Held 2: Competitive elitist democracy Held 2: Competitive elitist democracy (Majoritarian Model)(Majoritarian Model)

Theoretical roots in Weber & SchumpeterTheoretical roots in Weber & Schumpeter Influenced by the protective model of democracy; Influenced by the protective model of democracy;

dominant 1945-70s – rather similar to the model dominant 1945-70s – rather similar to the model outlined aboveoutlined above

Key feature: competition between alternative elites Key feature: competition between alternative elites Governments are strong within parliaments, but Governments are strong within parliaments, but

subordinate to elections, and hence parliaments, over subordinate to elections, and hence parliaments, over time. This is particularly apposite to describe British time. This is particularly apposite to describe British democracy.democracy.

Participation limited and intermittent. Too much Participation limited and intermittent. Too much particpipation destabilising (Lipset and Bendix)particpipation destabilising (Lipset and Bendix)

Held 3: Legal Democracy (Consensual Held 3: Legal Democracy (Consensual model)model)

State strongly constrained by the law/the ‘rule State strongly constrained by the law/the ‘rule of law’of law’

Separation (sharing) of powers emphasisedSeparation (sharing) of powers emphasised Minimum role for state in societyMinimum role for state in society Markets and free trade should be given fullest Markets and free trade should be given fullest

possible scopepossible scope Epitomised by l.C20th ‘neo-liberal’ trendEpitomised by l.C20th ‘neo-liberal’ trend

Held 4: Participatory DemocracyHeld 4: Participatory Democracy

Inspired by developmental democracy & in C20th by Inspired by developmental democracy & in C20th by Macpherson & Carole Pateman Macpherson & Carole Pateman

A knowledgeable, participating citizenry is essentialA knowledgeable, participating citizenry is essential Participation in regulating the state, local Participation in regulating the state, local

community/ies and the workplacecommunity/ies and the workplace Party elites directly accountable to membersParty elites directly accountable to members Need for consistency between power structures in Need for consistency between power structures in

public and private spheres. Democracy can not thrive public and private spheres. Democracy can not thrive of structures of civil society remain authoritarian.of structures of civil society remain authoritarian.

Driver behind new social movements, participatory Driver behind new social movements, participatory democracy democracy

Beyond Held: Social DemocracyBeyond Held: Social Democracy Dahrendorf: 1945-1980 welfare states added a Dahrendorf: 1945-1980 welfare states added a

substantive (material) basis to the largely procedural substantive (material) basis to the largely procedural basis of liberal democracy. Democracy consists in a basis of liberal democracy. Democracy consists in a set of rights and duties, including expectations of set of rights and duties, including expectations of welfare rights. Democracy is a form of social welfare rights. Democracy is a form of social citizenship.citizenship.

Bobbio: ‘Rolling back’ the welfare state implies Bobbio: ‘Rolling back’ the welfare state implies rolling back/undermining democracy itselfrolling back/undermining democracy itself

R. Dahrendorf, R. Dahrendorf, After Social DemocracyAfter Social Democracy, , 19801980 N. Bobbio, ‘Liberalism old and new’ in: N. Bobbio, ‘Liberalism old and new’ in: idem. idem.

The Future of DemocracyThe Future of Democracy, 1987, 1987

C. Crouch, C. Crouch, PostdemocracyPostdemocracy, 2004, 2004 Early C21st world-historical peak for democracy, in terms of its Early C21st world-historical peak for democracy, in terms of its

geographical rangegeographical range But there are many problems in established democracies. But there are many problems in established democracies.

Everywhere there is increasing abstention, dissatisfaction with Everywhere there is increasing abstention, dissatisfaction with performance of democratic regimes, a challenge to the performance of democratic regimes, a challenge to the effectiveness of democratic regimeseffectiveness of democratic regimes

There is also, specifically, a problem with American democracy, There is also, specifically, a problem with American democracy, which is bound to impact upon European countries. US leadership which is bound to impact upon European countries. US leadership of democratic world established in the 1930s, on the basis of the of democratic world established in the 1930s, on the basis of the Roosevelt Welfare state, when most of Europe turned Right. But Roosevelt Welfare state, when most of Europe turned Right. But since the 1980s, USA has changed fundamentally: it no longer since the 1980s, USA has changed fundamentally: it no longer represents value-based, or normative leadership. represents value-based, or normative leadership.

For Crouch, post-Democracy is NOT non-democratic, nor anti-For Crouch, post-Democracy is NOT non-democratic, nor anti-democratic, but it is satisfied with residual democratic and welfare democratic, but it is satisfied with residual democratic and welfare rights. Individual market-based economic rights have the primacy rights. Individual market-based economic rights have the primacy over social or political rightsover social or political rights

In post-democracy, social movements are less vibrant, especially In post-democracy, social movements are less vibrant, especially those of Labour,,, and the trade unions are marginal actorsthose of Labour,,, and the trade unions are marginal actors

Post-Democracy (suite)Post-Democracy (suite)

unions are marginalisedunions are marginalised State as policeman → more prominent role for the state in State as policeman → more prominent role for the state in

regulating everyday lives, a more instrusive stateregulating everyday lives, a more instrusive state Wealth gap grows; taxation less redistributive with moves to Wealth gap grows; taxation less redistributive with moves to

the global economythe global economy The poor return to pre-democratic condition of non-The poor return to pre-democratic condition of non-

participation: in the US, this is flagrant, but is also evidence in participation: in the US, this is flagrant, but is also evidence in western European democracies, where electoral registration western European democracies, where electoral registration has declined. Poor do not register; either because they do not has declined. Poor do not register; either because they do not have a home, or because they fear the State (for taxation have a home, or because they fear the State (for taxation purposes, e.g.). purposes, e.g.).

The nature of political communication is changed in an age of The nature of political communication is changed in an age of mediatisation and soundbites. Genuine discussion in the public mediatisation and soundbites. Genuine discussion in the public space fades away. space fades away.

Lijphart’s Majoritarian and Lijphart’s Majoritarian and Consensual DemocraciesConsensual Democracies

Lijphart, A. (1984Lijphart, A. (1984). Democracies. ). Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in twenty-one Consensus Government in twenty-one countriescountries, ,

Lijphart, A. (1999). Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six CountriesPerformance in Thirty-Six Countries..

Lijphart’s Majoritarian and Lijphart’s Majoritarian and Consensual DemocraciesConsensual Democracies

Executive-parties clusterExecutive-parties cluster Concentration of executive power in a single party majority Concentration of executive power in a single party majority

cabinet/broad coalitionscabinet/broad coalitions Domination of Executive-Legislative relations by the Domination of Executive-Legislative relations by the

Executive/ an active legislature influencing policyExecutive/ an active legislature influencing policy The prevalence of a two-party system/ a multi-party systemThe prevalence of a two-party system/ a multi-party system A majoritarian electoral system(first past the post or two A majoritarian electoral system(first past the post or two

ballot)/ a proportional electoral systemballot)/ a proportional electoral system A pluralist interest group system, with ‘free-for –all’ A pluralist interest group system, with ‘free-for –all’

bargaining/ a corporatist style pattern of interest mediationbargaining/ a corporatist style pattern of interest mediation

Federal-Unitary clusterFederal-Unitary cluster

Unitary and centralised government / devolved or Unitary and centralised government / devolved or federal governmentfederal government

Unicameral concentration of legislative Unicameral concentration of legislative power/powerful second chamber representing societal power/powerful second chamber representing societal interestsinterests

Flexible constitutions/written constitutionsFlexible constitutions/written constitutions Legislative sovereignty re the Legislative sovereignty re the

constitution/constitutional arbitration in a system of constitution/constitutional arbitration in a system of shared and separated powersshared and separated powers

Executive-dependent Central Banks/independent Executive-dependent Central Banks/independent monetary authorities. monetary authorities.

Influential?Influential?

European democracies, for Lijphart, could be divided European democracies, for Lijphart, could be divided according to these two poles. In practice, individual according to these two poles. In practice, individual democracies would lie somewhere between the two democracies would lie somewhere between the two extremes. Britain, for example, as the archetype of the extremes. Britain, for example, as the archetype of the Westminster model, was clearly the representative of Westminster model, was clearly the representative of the first camp; more divided countries, such as the the first camp; more divided countries, such as the Netherlands, of the second camp. Netherlands, of the second camp.

This model has long been very influential, as a basic This model has long been very influential, as a basic way of differentiating between European way of differentiating between European democracies. democracies.

Lijphart’s 1999 studyLijphart’s 1999 study study increased also addressed the issue of substantive study increased also addressed the issue of substantive

outcomes. He considered which, of majoritarian or consensual outcomes. He considered which, of majoritarian or consensual democracies, performed better in relation to: A) Economic democracies, performed better in relation to: A) Economic performance and B) Democratic quality. performance and B) Democratic quality.

Lijphart’s main conclusion was that consensus/negotiation Lijphart’s main conclusion was that consensus/negotiation democracy pole is far superior to the majoritarian, ‘winner-democracy pole is far superior to the majoritarian, ‘winner-takes all’ one. takes all’ one.

Lijhpart found that there was little difference between Lijhpart found that there was little difference between Consensual and Majoritarian democracies in relation to Consensual and Majoritarian democracies in relation to economic performance. economic performance.

But that consensual, non-majoritarian democracies ensured a But that consensual, non-majoritarian democracies ensured a much higher dmuch higher democratic qualityemocratic quality. .

The consensus model ensures a positive logic of negotiation The consensus model ensures a positive logic of negotiation and compromise; whereas the Winner takes all system is and compromise; whereas the Winner takes all system is inherently conflictual and negative sum.inherently conflictual and negative sum.

Consociational DemocacyConsociational Democacy Lijphart’s concept of consociationalism was also very influential for Lijphart’s concept of consociationalism was also very influential for

many years. According to the consociational model, divided societies – many years. According to the consociational model, divided societies – such as the Netherlands or Belgium – could nonetheless support such as the Netherlands or Belgium – could nonetheless support effective and consensual political systems, as a result of elite-level effective and consensual political systems, as a result of elite-level compromises between the main pillars represented in a society.compromises between the main pillars represented in a society.

In a society divided by issues of religious identity, for example, elite In a society divided by issues of religious identity, for example, elite level accommodation ensured broad support for the system.level accommodation ensured broad support for the system.

The Lijphart model was a critique of the pretensions of the Westminster The Lijphart model was a critique of the pretensions of the Westminster model of democracy and celebrated the fact that negotiation, model of democracy and celebrated the fact that negotiation, compromise and coalition produced not only fairer, but also better compromise and coalition produced not only fairer, but also better politics. politics.

A CRITIQUE OF LIJPHARTA CRITIQUE OF LIJPHART One such critique was that of Paul Penning. The first criticism: that this One such critique was that of Paul Penning. The first criticism: that this

model betrayed the empirical reality, as much in Majoritarian systems, as model betrayed the empirical reality, as much in Majoritarian systems, as in Consensual ones.in Consensual ones.

TheMajoritarian model did not necessarily produce a winner takes all TheMajoritarian model did not necessarily produce a winner takes all mentality, because regular alternations in power meant that governments mentality, because regular alternations in power meant that governments exercised power with caution. exercised power with caution.

Likewise, the negotiated consensual and consociational mechanisms of Likewise, the negotiated consensual and consociational mechanisms of divided societies did not always succeed in producing a fairer, or more divided societies did not always succeed in producing a fairer, or more effective politics. effective politics.

The role of institutional incentives could be overstressed in these accounts. The role of institutional incentives could be overstressed in these accounts. In the consociational model, as in Belgium, this has clearly broken down, In the consociational model, as in Belgium, this has clearly broken down, with territorial elites ‘repillarising’ Belgian society. with territorial elites ‘repillarising’ Belgian society. P. Pennings, ‘Parliamentary control of the executive in 47 P. Pennings, ‘Parliamentary control of the executive in 47 countries’, paper prepared for the ECPR, April 2000 @: countries’, paper prepared for the ECPR, April 2000 @: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/cophttp://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/copenhagen/ws10/pennings.PDFenhagen/ws10/pennings.PDF

Penning, 2000Penning, 2000

Penning argued that the Lijphart model exaggerated Penning argued that the Lijphart model exaggerated differences – and explained these overly in relation to differences – and explained these overly in relation to institutional, rather than societal arguments. institutional, rather than societal arguments.

The dichotomous view of there being two types of The dichotomous view of there being two types of democracy is highly misleading. Contrary to democracy is highly misleading. Contrary to Lijphart’s assumptions, strong executives do Lijphart’s assumptions, strong executives do notnot automatically imply weak legislatures: this is far too automatically imply weak legislatures: this is far too mechanical and assumption, one that relies too much mechanical and assumption, one that relies too much on structure and not enough on agency explanations.on structure and not enough on agency explanations.

Role of electoral system and Role of electoral system and coalitionscoalitions

There have also been criticisms about the role of the There have also been criticisms about the role of the electoral system. PR systems can create stalemate and electoral system. PR systems can create stalemate and instability, just as easily as they can create instability, just as easily as they can create compromise and flexibility. On the other hand, ‘… compromise and flexibility. On the other hand, ‘… majoritarian electoral systems and moderate multi-majoritarian electoral systems and moderate multi-party systems, in particular, tend to generate slightly party systems, in particular, tend to generate slightly higher levels of institutional confidence than higher levels of institutional confidence than alternative arrangements' (p.234).” Institutional alternative arrangements' (p.234).” Institutional confidence is maintained because Majoritarian confidence is maintained because Majoritarian democracy can contribute to rapidly forming and democracy can contribute to rapidly forming and maintaining stable governments”maintaining stable governments”

Democratizing the Economy while Democratizing the Economy while Economizing on Democracy?Economizing on Democracy?

Economic benefits/Democratic DrawbacksEconomic benefits/Democratic Drawbacks Prosperity, consumerism, rising middle classesProsperity, consumerism, rising middle classes State denationalized, decision-making dispersedState denationalized, decision-making dispersed Capitalism is European (and Global), Democracy LocalCapitalism is European (and Global), Democracy Local

National democracyNational democracy: : Government Government byby, , of of and and for for the people + the people + withwith

Political participation, citizen representation, effective government Political participation, citizen representation, effective government + interest consultation+ interest consultation

EU ‘Democracy’EU ‘Democracy’ EU level: EU level: governance governance forfor and and withwith National level: government National level: government byby and and ofof

Puts pressure on National politicsPuts pressure on National politics EU: EU: policy without politics policy without politics Nat’l : Nat’l : politics without policypolitics without policy

Challenges to National DemocracyChallenges to National Democracy Citizen demobilization or radicalizationCitizen demobilization or radicalization

Interest group politics, social movements, INGOs Interest group politics, social movements, INGOs helps with ‘associative democracy’ helps with ‘associative democracy’ withwith the people the people does little for representative democracy does little for representative democracy byby and and ofof the people the people ‘‘civil society’ not what it seems: expertocracycivil society’ not what it seems: expertocracy

National government responses?National government responses? EuropeanizationEuropeanization

Blame-shifting, credit-taking on policiesBlame-shifting, credit-taking on policies Silence on ‘polity’ issues Silence on ‘polity’ issues

GlobalizationGlobalization Blame-shifting increases sense of powerlessness Blame-shifting increases sense of powerlessness

Whether ‘risk society’ (Blair) Whether ‘risk society’ (Blair) or ‘protection or ‘protection inin globalization’ (Sarkozy) globalization’ (Sarkozy)