modern defense force philippines

MODERNDEFENSEFORCE

Security Sector Reform

p h i l i p p i n e s

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense ForcephilippineS

Published by:

Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU)Department of Political ScienceWorking Group on Security Sector Reform (WGSSR)3/F Leong Hall, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City 1108 PhTel No: +632 426.6001Email: [email protected]

in partnership with

Armed Forces of the PhilippinesCamp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City 1110 PhTel. No.: +632 913.0952Military Tel. No.: +632 911.6001Military Line: +632 774.5625Website: www.afp.mil.ph

with funding support from:

Australian AidLevel 23-Tower 2 RCBC Plaza6819 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, 1200Tel. No.: +632 757.8100Fax: +632 757.8268

Philippine Copyright ©2014

ISBN 978-971-550-691-5

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, except brief quotations for review, without permission in writing from the Authors.

Disclaimer

This publication is produced by (or is a product of) Working Group on Security Sector Reform, Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University with support from the Australian Aid. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Australian Government.

EditorJennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D.

Copy EditorsKathline Anne S. Tolosa Mereniza C. GomezReyna Mae L. Tabbada Maribel Daño-LunaAlexis Jerome M. Tolibas

Admin SupportRamona Liza M. Paulino

Layout & DesignTyrone John A. ReyesEmail: [email protected] N. PatañagEmail: [email protected]

TThe authors have attempted to break apart the ten-point agenda towards a Modern Defense Force to problematize and translate the big words into smaller, bite-sized, chewable pieces. The essays attempt to elaborate on the intricacies of the concept ‘modern defense force,’ and engage the reader to think through the issues.

The authors have extensive knowledge as regards the issues they have dealt with in their essays – some of them are military officers in active duty, others are researchers who were involved in actual policy research while in the Department of National Defense (DND) and/or Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), while others are academics involved in security research. The writers are part of the technical working group (TWG) created for this research publication while some were invited contributors.

The papers, prior to publication, were all subjected to thorough discussion by the TWG. While the essay-writer has full responsibility to his/her work, each paper was vetted, challenged, and debated upon by the entire TWG. The series of TWG discussions happened during the period January to December 2012.

No confidential information is revealed in any of the papers.

ABOUT THE BOOK

ABOUT THE BOOK

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTSabout the book

foreword

chapters:

1 Dreaming of a Modern Defense Force

2 Policy Environment for a Modern Defense Force

3 Mapping Out the Legal Terrain of the Philippine Security Sector

4 AFP Modernization

5 AFP Force Structure

6 AFP Doctrine and Training

7 AFP Clear Operational Plans

8 Philippine Intelligence Community: A Case for Transparency

9 Civilian Engagement of the Military

10 Gender Inclusiveness in the Military

11 Ethnic Representation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines

12 Self-Reliant Defense and People-Centered Security

13 AFP Regional Security and Defense Cooperation

14 The Evolving Role of the AFP: Skewing Towards Non-Traditional Roles

15 Regional Cooperation on Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response

– Crisis or Opportunity?

JOINT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP

about the authors

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TThis publication comes at an auspicious time in the history of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In 2011, the AFP formally began its institutional reform with the adoption of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) “Bayanihan”. The IPSP puts on paper the positive strides that AFP units operating on the ground have accomplished. For many years, our soldiers and officers have carefully and painstakingly tried to rebuild their relations with communities and stakeholders, with lessons the IPSP Bayanihan has harvested and put into a formal document that now guides the doctrines and rules of engagements in the military. Alongside such efforts, the Major Services of the AFP embarked on crafting their respective transformation roadmaps, which allowed the units to collectively realize the future of the armed forces that they wish to become.

True to the spirit of multi-sectoral engagement, civilian-led advisory boards were created to help guide the transformation roadmaps in achieving their agenda, with distinguished members of the business, academe, and public service as members. Likewise, the AFP has also formalized its commitment to the Bantay Bayanihan, a network of civil society organizations (running now to almost 180 CSO-members nationwide), to allow the group to be the oversight in the implementation of the IPSP Bayanihan. Since November 2011, the AFP and Bantay Bayanihan network has institutionalized the quarterly dialogue with AFP Unified Commands, Divisions, and Brigades that allowed for candid and serious discussions between AFP officers and civilian groups regarding combat and non-combat operations of the AFP.

The IPSP Bayanihan and the Transformation Roadmaps, together, serve as the platform of the AFP reform agenda. Most significant in these undertakings is the fact that the drive to transform is coming from within the organization. The AFP is transforming to be a better armed forces that is more responsive in the fulfillment of its constitutional mandate as protector of the people and the State. It is recognizing the changing landscape of the Philippines as a democratic country, and the need for the military institution to adapt to this changing environment. It recognizes the increasing demand to address and manage territorial concerns due to competing claims to resources.

I am happy that military officers and civilian researchers have worked very closely in the true spirit of Bayanihan to put together the essays in this publication. Indeed, the discussion in this publication will greatly help the AFP in further realizing the needed transformation that the military requires to become a credible and modern defense force, worthy of Filipino pride.

Maraming Salamat at Mabuhay ang Sandatahang Lakas ng Pilipinas!

GENERAL EMMANUEL T BAUTISTA AFPChief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines

FOREWORD

FOREWORD

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1Dreaming of aModern Defense Force

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

by Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D.

T

1 DREAMING OF A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE


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The paradox of transitional societies is that while it attempts to strengthen and deepen the institutionalization of basic governance infrastructures, it also requires a significant democratic space for people to engage in democratic governance. It is a paradox since institutionalization requires regularity, standardization, and routinization of practices, which are easily disrupted, sometimes even compromised if people’s engagement is not managed well. During transition period, different groups may push for specific policies and measures on how to address issues confronting society. If avenues for people’s participation are unclear, this can have detrimental effects on the standardization-routinization demand of institution building. Policies that are within the ambit of “good governance,” if unpopular, can even succumb to public pressure. Yet, people’s engagement in governance is also the fundamental essence of democracy. A healthy level of people participation ensures that the political system is relevant and responsive to people’s needs, and transparent and accountable to merit the trust of the voting public.

Security governance is among the most controversial and contested terrain in transitional societies. Society always has ambivalent feelings towards security forces, depending on which side of the fence they are in. This is precisely due to the fact that it is the security forces – in this essay, the military and the police – that are usually utilized by the state to protect its survival. Oppressive leaders use the military and police to suit their agenda – to quell dissent and remove possible roadblocks to their rule. Expectedly, groups critical of the state receive the watchful

eye of security groups, while groups supportive of the state enjoy its friendship. During periods of democratization, security forces naturally experience, too, a transition – from “waltzing with a dictator” 1 and exclusive power circles, to periods where inclusivity and people engagement become the new normal.

In the Philippine context, the military and the police forces were heavily utilized by the Marcos’ government during the infamous martial law era (1972-1983), and even way after the official lifting of martial law until its fall in 1986. In more than a decade of the cozy relationship between the dictator and the security forces, hundreds have reported to have been victimized by the state’s strong hand, while others remained disappeared, mostly those who belong to the opposition and/or militant groups.

Naturally, when the failed coup d’etat of then Defense Minister Enrile produced the severing of ties between the defense departmentand Malacanang (with then AFP Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos joining the beleaguered Enrile),the attitude of the people was expectedly ambivalent – largely due to the perception that it was simply a staged play of the dictator, which had one-too-many. It was the intercession of the late (Catholic church’s) Jaime Cardinal Sin that swayed the favor of the people and eventually produced the now famously regarded “people power”. In this historical juncture, it was the military’s swinging of loyalty, from Marcos to Corazon Aquino2 that catalyzed the political change. This greatly changed the perception of people – especially the fence sitters – favorably towards the military.

1 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy. Vintage, 1987.2 Historical accounts of the event, however, claim that Enrile was not too eager to support President Corazon Aquino’s ascension to Presidency.


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Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force

The succeeding years of democratic transition under President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), however, were peppered with several attempts at power grab by the military, the same group that won the favor of the people due to their participation in the 1986 “people power.”

The second wave of “people power” in 2001 again placed the military in the center of controversy. The withdrawal of support of the military from the presidency of Joseph Estrada was, in military parlance, a mutiny, but it produced the desired result – the stepping down of the President from the seat of power.3 This showed again the capacity of the military institution as a decisive force during historical crossroads.

As shown, in both 1986 and 2001, it was the military that served as the ‘swing vote’ that changed the direction of events. The key role that the military played in crucial historical junctures is also the source of the mixed feelings of the people toward it.

The Crucible:Internal Security Operations (ISO)

In a democratic and fully functioning state, the monopoly of use of legitimate force is lodged only with the state, through its military and police

(Weber, 1919).4 After all it is the military that is the primary instrument of the state to protect its survival. This is the fundamental argument on why the institution should be out of politics. Finer (1975) argues that the military has the ability to usurp power anytime it wants to, and the fact that it does not is a clear testament to its professionalism.

During the administration of President Marcos, the Philippine Constabulary (PC)5 was the primary unit that managed and handled internal security, with the rest of the military acting as support units. Dealing with internal armed threat groups, therefore, falls in the lap of the PC. The PC was, to a large extent, similar to the gendarmerie of Western countries where it functions as a ‘hybrid’ police and military, and handles internal threats.

The administration of President Corazon Aquino (1986-1992) adopted peace negotiation with armed threat groups as a major pillar of its security policy. There was an attitude of reconciliation, viewing the armed threat groups no longer as adversaries but as possible partners in development. With the internal threat seemingly lessened due to the progress of the peace talks,6 the need for internal security operations was also lessened. This somehow justifies the move to collapse the PC with the Integrated National Police (INP), hence the new entity PC-INP was

3 This act was regarded by the Supreme Court as tantamount to resignation, hence, the swearing in to the Presidency of then Vice President Gloria

Arroyo. 4 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” (speech, Munich University, 1919).5 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People (Manila: New Day Publishers, 2000), 207. The Philippine Constabulary was the

nucleus of the Philippine Army during the Martial law regime. 6 The peace talks with the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National Democratic Front, however, eventually collapsed

under the watch of President Corazon Aquino. It was only the peace negotiations with the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) that was

signed under her leadership.



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born. This later on was further transformed to the now Philippine National Police (PNP).7 The major change was the removal of the semi-military or constabulary character of the unit, fully clothing it with civilian identity and function, and placing it under the Department of the Interior and Local Government. In short, the police was fully integrated in the government bureaucracy. With the PC out of commission, dealing with armed threat groups was left with the civilian police as it was regarded more as a law enforcement concern rather than an ISO (see RA 6975). Note however, that while the police was civilianized, the armed threat groups (e.g. the Moro National Liberation Front, New People’s Army, private armed groups) continued to function as guerilla units, with military-like chain of command and were still equipped with high-powered weapons. Unfortunately, when the function of going after them was transferred to the police, the capability upgrade of the police force, both in materiel and training, remained wanting. A civilian-trained and bureaucratized police dealing with armed guerilla fronts is an obvious mismatch that would have great repercussions in effectively quelling armed dissidence.

The institutional limitation of the police prompted President Ramos (1992-1998) to shift again the security policy, calling on the military to again take the lead in internal security concerns (see RA 8551 [Sec. 3], 1998). The difference this time was that there was no longer a hybrid or semi-military Constabulary to take on the internal security operations (ISO). Hence, it was the entire military institution, instead of just a unit, that was drawn into the ISO arrangement.

Continuous involvement of the military in internal security affairs would have great repercussion on the force structure of the AFP service units, the military code of conduct; the rewards, sanctions, and promotion mechanism, and the capacity of the institution for external defense.

Given the renewed thrust of the Aquino administration (2010-2016) to peace talks and political negotiations with armed groups, there again is renewed discussion as regards the role of the AFP in internal security operations, especially since the peace settlements are steadily moving forward. The basic contention is, if armed groups will forge political settlements with the government, they will no longer be considered ‘threats’, and hence, any infraction will be a law-enforcement concern, an issue well within the ambit of police function. With less of its force committed to ISO, more attention and resources of the AFP can now be devoted to improving its basic and fundamental function in a democratic state that is, protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. The crucible, however, is the lesson learned in transferring ISO to the police in 1992, and back again to the military in 1998. As shown, the sudden shift in transferring ISO from AFP to PNP was not a good move. A clear plan and transition strategy is key to generate a win-win solution to peace and security concerns.

This is the context by which the concept of a modern defense force is framed.

7 see Republic Act 6975, as amended by RA 8551 and RA 9708.


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Modern Defense Forces

Despite the positive developments in the peace tables and the impending gradual disengagement of the AFP in select areas, the reality remains that the military shall continue to engage in ISO whenever it is necessary, until such time that the police develops the necessary capability and institutional grounding in taking on the lead role in ISO. The concept of defensive forces relative to internal security, therefore, requires the broadening of the imagination to include both the military and the police. It is a concept put forward as the long-term agenda of security reform initiatives.

For this publication, however, the theme revolves around the security reform agenda necessary for the Armed Forces of the Philippines to move closer to becoming a modern defense force. In simple terms, a modern defense force is one that has the capacity and capability for effective and efficient provision of security that satisfies the demands of a democratic state, contributes to regional stability, and operates within a framework of democratic governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law.

The relevant question, hence, is how to create this professional and modern defense force? This concern, to a large extent, reflects the dilemma of security governance in transitional societies. The push and pull of the need for order and control on the one hand, and the need for inclusivity and accountability on the other permeate the whole discussion on security. What makes the entire process noticeable is the fact that we have an armed force that has been used to perpetuate power and privilege during the dictatorship period, but is now struggling to make itself professional and democratically accountable – and the driver

of the entire process to professionalize is coming from within the ranks of the institution rather than externally driven. This is what makes it interesting.

The ten-point agenda below attempts to capture this momentum for reform. A large part of the ideas presented are actually culled from formal and informal conversations with military officials. The humble contribution of this essay is the attempt to put the ideas in a cohesive and organized fashion.

The 10-point agenda towards a Modern Defense Force:

In order to provide for effective and efficient provision of security (state security and people security) that satisfies the demands of a democratic state, it is necessary that the armed forces:

• are trained and equipped to suit the strategic domestic and regional environment;

• maintain an appropriately-sized force structure for its army, navy, marines, and air force, whose size is consistent with the internal-external security demands;

• has sound organizational set-up that maximizes the strengths of the institution and ably complements its weaknesses;

• has sufficient budget to support its operations;

• can contribute to national and international goals of peace and security.

The armed forces is expected to operate within a framework of democratic governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and international



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humanitarian law. A clear showing that these values are respected are the following:

• The Armed Forces is under civilian authority;

• There is clear mechanism for feedback between the Armed Forces and civilians;

• The armed forces abide by the principles of accountability and good governance;

• The armed forces abide by the principles of human rights and international humanitarian law;

• The armed forces have representative composition in terms of gender, and ethnicity;

Obviously, pursuing the ten-point agenda would have operational and policy implications. Listed below are the key action points for each of the agenda:

1. The Armed Forces are trained and equipped to suit their strategic domestic and regional environment. To do this, the following are the necessary interventions:

• There is a need to strengthen the process for reviewing security threats and developing the capacity of the state to respond to them;

• It is important to capacitate the armed forces with modern equipment necessary to support its mission;

• It is necessary for the country to develop a self-reliant defense program;

• The training and education of military personnel must be improved; there is a need

to ensure that the training and education of the military personnel are consistent with the demands of the strategic environment

2. The Armed Forces maintain an appropriately-sized force:

• Clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of the military and the police in so far as internal security is concerned.

• The force structure of the armed forces must be consistent with its internal-external security tasks.

• There has to be a clear policy that defines situations needing military action, and situations needing law-enforcement/ police action.

3. The Armed Forces has sound organizational set-up that maximizes the strengths of the institution, and ably complements its weaknesses.

• The military institution must introduce integrated approaches to policy development, military expenditure, human resource planning, and management of military assets.

• It should improve the career development of military personnel.

• The institution must promote a transition and resettlement plan for those leaving the armed forces.

• It must establish clear feedback channels between force employers (users) and providers (deployment unit).


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4. The Armed Forces have sufficient budget to support its operations.

• The state must have clarity in national policy regarding the share of “security mission areas”8 in the national budget.

• The expectation between the demand of transparency in government procurement process should be balanced with the need to satisfy the military specs in equipment and materiel purchase.

• There has to be a clear state policy regarding budget-sharing of local government units and AFP in disaster response and humanitarian mission.

5. The Armed Forces can contribute to national and international goals of peace and security.

• Strengthening regional arrangements for military cooperation, confidence building, arms control and disarmament.

6. The Armed Forces is under civilian authority:

• There must be clear constitutional and legal framework regarding the role of the military in state building and national security.

• Clarify and strengthen the accountability lines in the chain of command.

7. The Armed Forces have clear mechanism for feedback from civilians:

• Encourage civil society debate, improve citizens’ awareness and engagement with defense reform issues.

• There must be clear mechanism for civilian oversight on security forces.

8. The Armed Forces abide by the principles of accountability and good governance:

• It complies with the requirements imposed by the Central government as regards transparency and accountability.

• Metrics on grievance, reward, and punishment regarding AFP personnel are clearly stipulated.

9. The Armed Forces abide by the principles of human rights and international humanitarian law.

• Establish clear Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) regarding complaints on HR/ IHL violations.

• Communicate to public the HR-IHL SOPs of the AFP.

10. The Armed Forces have representative composition in terms of gender and ethnicity;

8 ‘security mission areas’ are the assigned tasks given to the military. Internal security operations (ISO) is one mission area, while humanitarian

assistance and disaster response is other mission area. Regional peacekeeping work is another mission area, as well as the territorial defense

function. Other mission areas include ‘support to national development.



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• There must be a clear policy that promotes equal opportunity in the defense sector.

• There must be a clear program to improve the gender sensitivity of the institution.

• An affirmative action to increase the number of ethnic representation in the AFP must be initiated.

As a final note – defense reform is not just about changes in management or organizational structure. Its main agenda is changing mindsets, perspectives, and most importantly, security policies. Pursuing the ten-point agenda of a modern defense force, this publication believes, would allow the AFP to move closer to its dream of becoming a world class military worthy of the pride and confidence of the Filipino people.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

2Policy Environment for a Modern Defense Force


by Kathline Anne Sigua Tolosa

2 POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE

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Anchored on the basic tenet “the military is an instrument of policy,” this article pieces together a picture of a “modern defense force” based on existing national policies on defense and security.

A look at existing policies from the National Defense Act of 1935 during the Commonwealth era to the most recent National Security Policy 2011-2016 shows an ever-expanding role for the Philippine military. Over time, the military has been increasingly called upon to perform tasks beyond the core specialization of soldiery. True to its nature, the military does as the policies say. However, the military cannot perform its varied missions through sheer talent and fighting spirit alone. In this light, the article traces laws and policies that sought to develop the capabilities of the military for it to reach fully mission-capable readiness levels. Juxtaposing the two sets of policies, the article discovers that modernization policies are playing catch up to the expanding roles of the military.

Nonetheless, the article finds that one can form a coherent picture of a modern defense force: one that is fully mission capable. The article asserts in the end, however, that this picture is but a portion of the bigger puzzle of security sector reform. It asserts that modernizing the country’s defense force must extend beyond reforms and capability development in the military. Equally, if not more important, is the modernization of existing policies and other institutions in the security sector. The article ends by calling for these efforts to be framed within a coherent national security sector reform agenda.


POLICY ENVIRONMENT FOR A MODERN DEFENSE FORCE

SOURCE: PAO AFP



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T

Locating the military in national security planning and policy making

The military is an instrument of policy. This is especially true in a society such as the Philippines where the military is assumed to be under the firm democratic control of civilian authorities. In the words of Huntington (1957), “the superior political wisdom of the statesman (over the military) must be accepted as a fact.” In a democratic state, the military receives its marching orders from the civilian government as the representatives of the Filipino people. The supremacy of civilian authority over the military is enshrined as early as the 1935 Philippine constitution, which states, “The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines.” 1 The Commonwealth Act No. 1 reiterated this principle in Article 1, Section 2 (d), to wit:

This principle was further upheld in the 1987 Constitution and subsequent laws and policies thereafter.

In other words, the military implements national security and defense policies crafted by civilian

government agencies. This is embodied in the national security planning process. Simply illustrated, the process flows as such. All policies and programs of the state are anchored on the Constitution. From the Constitution, relevant laws are passed by Congress. Based on the Constitution and other pertinent laws and issuances, the National Security Council then crafts the National Security Policy and the National Security Strategy. From these, the Department of National Defense draws its National Defense Strategy. Based on the National Defense Strategy, the Armed Forces of the Philippines then crafts its own policies on how it will perform its role in the attainment of national security goals and the safeguarding of national interests. Currently, these plans are the National Military Strategy, the Unilateral Defense Plan, and the Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan.2

Moreover, the military’s performance of its role is subject to the oversight and control of civilian government institutions. The Department of National Defense is the lead line agency in formulating national defense and security policies, plans and programs.3 The Defense Department likewise exercises supervision and control over the Armed Forces of the Philippines.4 In addition, performing oversight roles on the military are the National Security Council, the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman,

“The civil authority will always be supreme. The President as the Commander-in-Chief of military forces, shall be responsible that mobilization measures are prepared at all times.”

1 1935 Philippine Constitution, Section 11. (2)2 The National Security Planning Process is further discussed in Kathline S. Tolosa and Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Revisiting the Policy Environment

on Peace and Security (Quezon City: ADMU, 2013).3 Executive Order No. 112 of July 9, 1999, Re-Directing the Functions and Operations of the Department of National Defense, Section 2. 4 Executive Order No. 292 of July 25, 1987, Administrative Code of the Philippines, Book IV, Title VIII, Subtitle II, Chapter 1 – General

Provisions, Section 18. Organizational Structure.

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and constitutional commissions, specifically the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on Audit.

It follows, therefore, that when one draws a definition of a Modern Defense Force, it cannot simply be from the point of view of the military. It has to be firmly grounded on national laws and policies on defense and security. It is in this light that this paper engages in a conversation with relevant policies in an attempt to surface a definition of a Modern Defense Force. This paper treats the picture of a Modern Defense Force as a puzzle, with its pieces drawn from existing policies on security and defense. It hopes to surface these pieces, the specific aspects and angles of a Modern Defense Force; how it is imagined, what roles the force is expected to play, and how this modernization is to be achieved. Lastly, this paper then attempts to piece them together into a more coherent picture.

The Roles of the Philippine Military: Protector of the People, Plus, Plus

The standard architectural maxim “form follows function” is often applied in military decision making for identifying the force structure and military technology that must be evolved to meet military needs. In layman’s terms, this means the military’s force structure, capability and technology must be based on the functions that

the military is expected to perform. Consequently, a modern defense force’s form (structure, capability, technology, etc.) must be dictated by its function. Based on key defense and security policies, this section traces the evolution of the roles and functions given to the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 1935 to present.

During the Commonwealth period, the prime duty of the Government was the protection of the state and all citizens may be required to render military or civil service.5 The armed forces may be called upon by the President, as Commander-in-Chief, “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof.”6 Under Commonwealth Act No. 1 or “The National Defense Act” of 1935, the military is the Army composed of the Regular Force7 and the Reserve. The Philippine Constabulary was likewise transferred under the control of the Chief of Staff. It is given the primary task of ensuring internal security (lawless violence, insurrection, or rebellion) and the performance of police duties in peacetime and wartime but may also be called upon in case of invasion or national defense. Ergo, the military in 1935 was organized as a ground force, a territorial organization, adapted as closely as possible to the territorial and administrative organization of the Philippines.

As a side note, back then, there was no Navy or Air Force yet.8 In fact, in the 1935 Constitution, Filipinos still owed allegiance to the United


5 1935 Philippine Constitution. Article II – Declaration of Principles, Sec 2.6 1935 Philippine Constitution. Article VII – Executive Department, Sec. 11 (2).7 The Regular Force is composed of the Infantry, the Cavalry, the Field Artillery, the Coast Artillery Corps, the Air Corps, the Corps of engineers,

the Signal Corps, and the active elements of the Offshore Patrol; the General Staff Corps; the Services consisting of the Adjutant General’s Service,

the Judge Advocate Service, the Quartermaster Service, the Medical Service, the Ordnance Service, and the Chaplain Service, the professors and

officers and enlisted men as may be provided for, and of the Constabulary.8 The U.S. Navy patrolled the Philippine’s waters until July 4, 1946.


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States.9 This is because the Commonwealth administration was a transitional arrangement with the end view of preparing the country for independence. It is assumed therefore that the territorial nature of the military and the dependence on the United States for external defense were intended as transitional arrangements as well, with the country eventually developing its own capabilities for external defense.

By 1987, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was anointed the “protector of the people and the State.”10 It was given the goals of securing the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.11 All members of the Armed Forces are bound by an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution.12 Moreover, with the country emerging from the shadows of the martial law era, the 1987 Constitution sought to clearly define the role of the military as an instrument of policy and thus, decreeing that no member should be involved in partisan politics, except in the exercise of their right to suffrage.13

While the 1987 Constitution clipped the political wings of the military, Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines provided for an expanded role of the AFP, under the auspices of the Department of National Defense (DND). Its roles are spelled out, to wit:

Clearly, from the twin roles of ensuring internal security and territorial defense under the Commonwealth-era laws, additional functions have been given to the military. This expansion of roles is a natural consequence of the broadened role of its “mother unit”, the DND, which is toguard the State against external and internal threats while providing support for social and economic development. The military likewise moved away from its transitional forcestructure under the Commonwealth regime to an Armed Forces of the Philippines comprisedof the following major services: Philippine Army, Philippine Air Force, Philippine Navy, Philippine Coast Guard, and the Philippine Constabulary. Evidently, this signals an attempt to developits own capabilities for external defensewhile performing police and coast guard functions as well.


9 1935 Philippine Constitution. Ordinance Appended To The Constitution. Section 1 (1).10 1987 Philippine Constitution. Article II – Declaration of Principles and State Policies, Section 3.11 Ibid.12 1987 Philippine Constitution. Article XVI – General Provisions, Section 5 (1).13 1987 Philippine Constitution. Article XVI – General Provisions, Section 5 (3).14 Executive Order 292, “Administrative Code of 1987”, Title VIII. National Defense, Subtitle II. Department of National Defense, Chapter 6.

Armed Forces of the Philippines, Section 33. Functions.

Republic of the Philippines against enemies, foreign and domestic;

2. Promote and advance the national aims, goals, interests and policies;

3. Plan, organize, maintain, develop and deploy its regular and citizen reserve forces for national security; and,

4. Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by higher authorities.14

1. Uphold the sovereignty, support the Constitution, and defend the territory of the

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Three years later, the military’s police functions and internal security role were removed15 by virtue of Republic Act 6975 or the “Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990” with the creation of the Philippine National Police and the transfer of the primary role of preserving internal security, with some considerations, to the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), to wit:

With the AFP relieved of its internal security function, it is assumed that it can now re-allocate its resources to the other functions given to it. Thus, in a bid to modernize the armed forces of the Philippines, the Congress sought to develop the AFP’s capability to (a) uphold sovereignty and territorial integrity; (b) assist civilian agencies in the preservation of the national patrimony; (c) protect the Filipino people from armed threats and natural and man-made disasters; (d) assist in the enforcement of domestic and foreign policies as well as international covenants; (e) support the PNP in law enforcement and ISO; (f) fulfill the country’s international commitments; and, (g) support national development.17 Plainly, the transfer of internal security operations to the PNP was not simply to allow the AFP to focus on its primary role for external security. In fact, there is an expansion of its roles which, by 1995, include responding to natural and man-made disasters, support to law enforcement and ISO, and support to national development. There is also a reiteration of its role as an instrument of foreign policy.

It must likewise be emphasized that considerations for the eventual (i.e. after a minimum of 2 years or a maximum of 4 years from the passage of the law) and full transfer of the primary role in internal security to the Philippine National Police (PNP) stems from a recognition that the PNP, as a new organization is not yet fully mission capable to address insurgency. Therefore, said transfer of function was not absolute. The law provided that


15 Later on, the Philippine Coast Guard was also established as a separate armed and uniformed service attached to the Department of

Transportation and Communications by virtue of Republic Act 9993 of 2009.16 Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as the “Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990”, Section 11, December 13, 1990.17 Republic Act 7898 otherwise known as the “AFP Modernization Act”, Sec. 3 – Objectives. February 23, 1995.

“Section 11. Relationship of the Department with the Department of National Defense. – During a period of twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) shall continue its present role of preserving the internal and external security of the State: Provided, That said period may be extended by the President, if he finds justifiable, for another period not exceeding twenty-four (24) months, after which, the Department shall automatically take over from the AFP the primary role of preserving internal security, leaving the AFP to its primary role of preserving external security. However, even after the Department has assumed primary responsibility on matters affecting internal security, including the suppression of insurgency, and there are serious threats to national security and public order, such as where insurgents have gained considerable foothold in the community thereby necessitating the employment of bigger tactical forces and the utilization of higher calibre armaments and better armored vehicles, the President, may, upon recommendation of the peace and order council, call upon the Armed Forces of the

Philippines to assume the primary role and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to play the supportive role in the area concerned.” 16


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military can be called upon, at any time, should circumstances require, to take on the cudgels of internal security. As history would tell us, this is exactly what happened. In 1998, by virtue of Republic Act 8551, the primary responsibility of suppressing insurgency was given back to the AFP, to wit:

Section 3. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

In 2004, within the ambit of the overall Philippine Defense Reform Program of the DND, the Secretary of National Defense (SND) issued the first ever Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG intended to institutionalize a defense planning system that is based on strategyand is responsive to capability needs. The DPG followed the “tradition” of calling upon the military to perform such peacetime tasks beyondthe functional specialization of soldiery. Itidentified seven mission areas that the DefenseDepartment, including the AFP should strategize,plan, implement, and develop capabilities for.

These are:1. internal security; 2. territorial defense; 3. disaster response; 4. support to national development;5. international defense and security

engagements;6. international humanitarian assistance and

peacekeeping operations; and,7. force-level central command and control,

support and training.

In 2011, the National Security Plan (NSP) was issued, prescribing a comprehensive definition of national security. Accordingly, national security has seven (7) elements: socio-political stability, ecological balance, territorial integrity, external peace and harmony, cultural cohesiveness, economic solidarity, and moral-spiritual consensus. Under the NSP, it is the policy of the state to “undertake the necessary steps to ensure that the Filipino national community’s welfare, well being, way of life, institutions and territory and sovereignty are enhanced and protected.” This is divided into a two-fold goal: promote internal socio-political stability and capacitate the Philippines to exercise full sovereignty over its territory and to provide protection to its maritime and other strategic maritime interests. Following the national security policy planning process, the military has to anchor its plans on the NSP.

To guide the performance of its internal security role, the AFP came up with the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan in December 2010. Under the Plan, the ISO function is divided into four (4) strategic tasks: contribute to the permanent and peaceful closure of all armed conflict; conduct of focused military operations


“SEC. 12. Relationship of the Department with the Department of National Defense. – The Department of the Interior and Local Government shall be relieved of the primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security. The Philippine National Police shall, through information gathering and performance of its ordinary police functions, support the Armed Forces of the Philippines on matters involving suppression of insurgency, except in cases where the President shall call on the PNP to support the AFP in combat operations.”18

18 Republic Act 8551 otherwise known as the “Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998,” Title II. The Role of the PNP

in Counter-Insurgency Functions, Section 3, February 25, 1998.

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against armed threat groups; support community-based peace and development efforts; and, carry out security sector reform initiatives in the AFP. These tasks are consistent with the thrusts and objectives of the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016 and the National Security Policy2011-106.

What is remarkable in IPSP Bayanihan is the paradigm shift that the entire military institution takes in the conduct of its decades-long task of suppressing insurgency. Rather than the traditional goal of defeating the enemy, the military instead should focus on “winning the peace” through a “whole of nation approach.” In doing so, it seeks to conduct military operations and support operations with the security and well-being of the people as the foremost consideration and in concert with different stakeholders. This is termed as “people-centered security” within the ambit of human security. Flowing from this, IPSP Bayanihan emphasizes multi-stakeholder engagement and respect for human rights, international humanitarian law and rule of law as imperatives in the dispensation of its duties. In addition to spelling out the principles that must underlie AFP internal security operations, IPSP Bayanihan articulates a clear intention to move away from internal security operations to give priority to territorial defense.

This intention was somewhat echoed in the 2013 Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations (IGRR) of the Revised AFP Modernization Program. The seven (7) mission areas were streamlined to four (4) mission areas:

1. Territorial Defense, Security and Stability;2. Disaster Risk Reduction and Response;

3. International Engagements, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Support Operations; and,

4. Force-level C2 (command and control), support and training.

Starting with roles distinctly assigned to the coercive organs of the state (internal security and territorial defense), the mandate of the Philippine military has been gradually redefined and expanded. Based on existing policies, the Philippine vision of a Modern Defense Force is one that can address the armed component of insurgency, defend the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, respond in times of natural or man-made disasters, support in the delivery of the State’s international commitments, and perform a broad array of tasks in support to national development. The title “protector of the people and the State” has been liberally interpreted to include protection from non-military/non-armed threats to the well-being of the people and the State.

As an instrument of policy, the military does as the policies say. Whether it has the necessary capabilities to do so or not is another question. Military training, logically, remains to be focused on honing the soldier’s professional specialization of warfighting. It goes without saying, however, that a Modern Defense Force should be appropriately organized, fully trained, sufficiently equipped, adequately supported, and able to maximize its effectiveness for all of its functions,19 not just for internal security and territorial defense. To look at whether capabilities being developed are aligned with the vision for a Modern Defense Force, modernization and capability build up programs within and for the Armed Forces of the Philippines


19 Executive Order No. 112 of June 18, 1999, Re-Directing the Functions and Operations of the Department of National Defense, directs the

entire Defense Department to maximize its effectiveness, i.e. maintain a mission capable status, for the performance of its functions.


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are discussed in the succeeding chapter.

Toward a Fully Mission Capable Defense Force

The Commonwealth-era reliance on the United States for external defense, which was supposedly a transitional arrangement, remained even as the country gained its full independence. While the Armed Forces of the Philippines was reorganized into three Major Services (Army, Navy, Air Force), the capability of the Navy and the Air Force were maintained at a dismal level and largely defined within the ambit of internal security. In fact, up until 1991 when the Philippine Senate rejected the renewal of the bases agreement, the Philippines availed of a de facto security umbrella from US military presence in the country. The primary responsibility for the defense of the country’s airspace was given to the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing of the United States.20

The early 1990s sought to fill the gaps in the country’s territorial defense capability. With the transfer of the internal security function to the PNP, the AFP was geared towards external defense. The Philippine Congress thought likewise. On February 23, 1995, the AFP Modernization Act was passed into law. It sought to “modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to a level where it can effectively and fully perform its constitutional mandate to uphold the sovereignty and preserve the patrimony of the Republic of

the Philippines.”21 The modernization process was to take place for a period of 15 years requiring a total budget of PhP 332 billion with PhP 50 billion intended for the first five (5) years of implementation. It was divided into five (5) components:

1. force restructuring and organizational development;

2. capability, material and technology development;

3. bases/ support system development; 4. human resource development; and,5. doctrines and development.

Attention is drawn to the fact that while the projection primarily was a credible defense capability, the Modernization Act actually intended to develop a multi-mission capable armed forces able to “engage in conventional and/or unconventional warfare, disaster relief and rescue operations, and contribute to economic development and other non-traditional22 military roles.”23 The goal, therefore, was not merely to focus the military to territorial defense (though this is the primary intention of the law) but also to ensure that it can continue performing non-warfighting tasks.

The implementation of the Modernization Program would tell an altogether different story.24 The dreams for a “modern” armed forces were quickly dashed when an assessment of defense capabilities in 2005 revealed that there


20 Kathline Anne S. Tolosa, “Owning Sovereignty,” OSS Digest, 4th Quarter (2008): 6. 21 Republic Act 7898, “AFP Modernization Act,” Sec. 2 – Declaration of Policy, 25 February 1995.22 It can be argued that what is “non-traditional” to Western countries are actually the “traditional” roles that have been given to the Philippine

military. 23 Republic Act 7898, “AFP Modernization Act,” Sec. 2 – Components of the AFP Modernization Program, para (a), 25 February 1995.24 The fate of the 1995 AFP Modernization Act is further discussed in Tolosa, “Owning Sovereignty.”

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was virtually very little to modernize. What capabilities the AFP had have been worn down by time and regular operations. There was a dire need to bring back the basic capabilities of the AFP to acceptable levels of readiness. Thus, instead of the Modernization Program, what were implemented instead were the Capability Upgrade and Philippine Defense Reform Programs. In addition, while the intention was for the development of multi-mission capabilities, the upgrade was focused on beefing up capabilities for internal security. The implementation was likewise distinctly skewed towards materiel and equipment upgrades, with very little attention given to ensuring that necessary skills and know how are transferred to the soldiers, especially for the performance of non-warfighting tasks. Moreover, the release of funds for the Modernization Program is dismal to say the least, with only PhP 33.9 billion released by the end of the implementation period.

Nonetheless, gains have still been achieved under the AFP Modernization Plan though it was not implemented according to plan. The Philippine Defense Reform likewise resulted in positive reforms inside the defense and military institutions.25 The White Paper on Philippine Defense Transformation of 2012 takes stock of these advancements and seeks to “sustain and institutionalize the reform measures initiated under the PDR Program” and to synchronize the improvements in materiel and technology capabilities under the AFP Modernization Program.26

The Philippine Defense Transformation (PDT) Program intends to ensure that the Department of National Defense is able to meet the strategic objectives laid down in the National Security Policy of 2011-2016. These objectives are to promote internal socio-political stability and to enable the Philippines to exercise full sovereignty over its territory and provide protection to its maritime interests.27 Thus, capability had to be developed to carry out five (5) strategic options:

1. securing the national territory and protecting strategic maritime interest;

2. securing communities and supporting local authorities;

3. reducing the risks of natural and human-induced disasters;

4. strengthening and expanding international defense alliances and partnerships; and,

5. strengthening the integrity of the defense establishment by subscribing to generally accepted principles of security sector reform.

The PDT attempts to balance modernization of materiel and equipment on the one hand with the modernization of knowledge and skills and transformation of mindsets on the other. This includes education and training so that the military can work within the framework of the primacy of the peace process. Appropriate skills for engaging other stakeholders in internal security are also sought to be developed, such as the capacity for inter-agency and multi-sector security cooperation and engagement activities, enhanced knowledge of ethnic communities’


25 These are discussed in detail in Melanie Rodulfo-Veril, “AFP Modernization” in this book.26 Department of National Defense, “Transforming the Department of National Defense to Effectively Meet the Defense and Security Challenges

of the 21st Century: A White Paper on Philippine Defense Transformation,” July 2012.27 National Security Policy 2011-1016.


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culture, customs, and traditions, key capabilities for strategic communications, and humane civil disturbance control capabilities, among others.

The bid to rejuvenate modernization efforts of the AFP under the PDT was given a fresh breath of hope with the passage of Republic Act 10349 also in December 2012, which established the Revised AFP Modernization Program. This was supported with DND Department Circular No. 3, series of 2013 or the Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations (IGRR) of the Revised AFP Modernization Act. This effectively extends the Legislative’s commitment to see through the AFP’s modernization for another 15-year period from 2013 with a promise of PhP 75 billion for the first five (5) years. While the Revised Modernization Program carries over the intention of its precedent plan to beef up military capability for external defense and other mission areas, the old and the new modernization plans differ into two points. First, instead of playing a support role to the PNP in internal security, the military’s new modernization program sought to “enhance its capability in the conduct of Internal Security Operations (ISO), particularly in the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security.”28 Second, from the intention of developing and transforming the AFP into a primarily external security-oriented force, the revised modernization program seeks to develop and transform the AFP into a multi-mission oriented force capable of effectively addressing internal and external security threats.

The AFP would be the first to say that modernization and true reform does not happen simply through the acquisition of new equipment. Particular attention has to be ensured to improve the entire military institution in terms of good governance and internal processes and systems. In addition to anchoring their plans andprograms on national policies on security, these should likewise be moored to the institution’s shared mission, vision and core values. The Philippine Navy took the initiative in 2006 and came up with the Philippine Navy Sail Plan 2020. The Philippine Army followed suit and released the Army Transformation Roadmap 2028. The General Headquarters, AFP is currently in the process of coming up with an AFP-wide transformation and governance strategy. Looking at these transformation plans, the military institution is telling us some things. First, the very nature of the institution requires that it is able to act as one. This can be done by clearly linking each individual’s tasks to the overall mission, vision and goals. This is done through the respective Governance Roadmaps. Second, equal attention must be paid to the non-tangible aspects of modernization – internal controls and systems, training and education, morale and welfare, ethics and values. Third, developing capabilities for a modern defense force takes time. Note that the Sail Plan charts the course for 16 years while the Army’s Roadmap spans 18 years. This means that efforts must be sustained, holistic, consistent, and coherent.


28 Department of National Defense, Department Circular No. 3 of April 11, 2013, “Issuing the Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations

of the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Act.” Article 1.1.2.

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Completing the puzzle: coherent patches, missing pieces, sketchy framework As we piece the different parts of the puzzle, we can coherently form a picture of a modern defense force. In a nutshell, this is an Armed Forces of the Philippines that is fully multi-mission capable. A look at the foregoing tells a story of a military with continually expanding roles with capability development and modernization policies playing catch up. Efforts under the current Aquino administration are laudable. Finally, it appears that the Philippines is committed to addressing the yawning gaps in our military’s capability to protect the people and the State. As of January 2014, Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin said that a total of 36 modernization projects worth PhP 41.2 billion have been completed and awarded under the current administration.29

In March 2014, the Philippines inked a contract for the procurement of 12 Korea Aerospace Industries FA-50 fighter aircraft.30 Indeed, things are looking up as we see the beginnings of a modern defense force.

But a modern defense force is not reached through transformation, reforms and capability development in the military alone. We realize that the puzzle we are trying to piece together must not just show the necessary capabilities of the military to be mission-capable. This is but a patch in the bigger picture of national security planning. First we look at the border pieces of the puzzle; those pieces that frame the entire picture,

that defines the parameters and limits of modern defense force.

When we look at the policies, we see consistency in the assignment of multiple roles to the military. But this does not mean that the multiple roles assigned to the military cannot be looked at and evaluated anew. At the very least, clear parameters have to be set to define the roles of the military. The limits, so to speak, to the military’s involvement in internal security and stability, support to law enforcement, and support to national development has to be clearly demarcated.

Therein lies the paradox of the military’s non-involvement in partisanship politics. While the military is required to separate itself from politics, national policies make this quite difficult to do so as the military is also required, in the same breath, to perform tasks that necessitate its involvement in the broader service delivery and governance tasks. The military has to liaise with national government agencies and local politicians; at times it takes the role of “catalyst” for governance and service delivery in provinces and municipalities that are strongly affected by violent conflict. When the military prods underperforming local government officials, or even links local communities with their local government unit and other relevant government institutions, it is inevitably exposed to politics. Ironically, it is the military that calls for its weaning out from internal security operations to a focus on territorial defense. No national-level policy calls for this

29 Frances Mangosing, “36 AFP Modernization projects completed under Aquino, says Gazmin,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 14, 2013,

Accessed http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/563845/36-afp-modernization-projects-completed-under-aquino-says-gazmin.30 Greg Waldron, “FA-50 buy puts Manila back in the jet business,” Flightglobal, March 28, 2014, Accessed http://www.flightglobal.com/news/

articles/fa-50-buy-puts-manila-back-in-the-jet-business-397548/.



transition. Perhaps another look at the strategic assumptions made when policies were crafted can ascertain if these could have changed with the positive developments in the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Cordillera Bodong Administration - Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CBA-CPLA), andthe Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa – Pilipinas/ Revolutionary Proletarian Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade Tabara PaduanoGroup (RPM-P/RPA/ABB TPG). The revisedAFP Modernization Program, which ends in 2028, includes the development of ISO capabilities. Do we still see a role for the AFP in ISO post-2028?

At the most ideal, the roles assigned to the military must be anchored on a clearly articulated national security frame based on nationalsecurity interests. While the National Security Policy identifies broad national objectives, it is silent on prioritization. It fails to identifywhich interest the Philippines, as a country, is willing to die for.31 This clear articulation of national priorities could then provide a firmanchor and rationale for the painful decision to involve the military in functions beyond its institutional specialization of warfighting. This safeguards that the deployment of the military for “civilian tasks” is borne out of national interests rather than simply calling the military to fill in gaps in service delivery that, for all intents and purposes, should be done by the civilian government. This also provides a clear basis for the development of the military’s capabilities beyond its core tasks.

Clear national interests, defined through broad consultations with a well-informed public, also cultivate a strong national will to modernizethe military – a firm resolve to beef up themilitary’s capabilities that is sustained even after incursions in the country’s territory by other countries is highlighted in the news and social media.The initial AFP Modernization Program faded into the background as the Chinese incursionsin Mischief Reef also faded from the frontpages of national dailies. The administration of President Benigno S. Aquino has consistently sought to safeguard the national territory from day one. This is reflected in a sustained commitment to the revised AFP Modernization Program. This national will must carry beyond the current administration and finally be seen to its completion.

If policies commit men and women in uniformto a certain task, then there must be firmnational resolve to commit full support toreach the objective. There must be a strong national resolve to organize, train, and equip them to ensure that they are fully mission capable to do so. For national commitment to happen, there must be a clear understanding of why such roles are given to the military. Moreover, commitment does not only mean the passage of laws and allocation of resources. This involves the commitment to journey with the armedforces in its modernization by seeing to it that the other parts of the puzzle are completed as well. Now we look at the missing pieces of the bigger picture.

31 The case for the need for a stronger and more coherent national security framing which will define core national security interests and priorities

and from which will be drawn a National Security Policy and a National Security Strategy is discussed in more detail in Kathline S. Tolosa and

Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Revisiting the Policy Environment on Peace and Security (Quezon City: ADMU, 2013).

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The hierarchical responsibility of the military, or its chain of command, directly places it under civilian control. A big part of modernizing the armed forces is ensuring that it is under firm democratic control under the supervision,control and oversight of civilian government institutions. These institutions must be “fully mission capable” as well. The legislative plays a significant role in the formulation of national laws on security, in bringing the voice of their constituents to national policymaking, in approving the budget for the military and ensuring transparency and accountability inspending. The Department of Defense is tasked with the direction and supervision of the military. It is now undertaking its own transformation plan to ensure that it is fully capable of dispensing its tasks. Other institutions in the security sector involved in preserving peace and security in the land should likewise be equally modernized. The Philippine National Police is undertaking its own transformation roadmap. As the two institutions (the military and the police) pursue their own tracks, national level policies must lay down the

general direction and milestones so that these are done in harmony and synergy.

Civil society likewise plays an important role. A strong constituency for peace and security issues, with a clear understanding of democratic institutions and values, the roles and functions of the military, can help frame a coherent strategy for reforms in the security sector. Civil society can also further strengthen the modernization process by performing oversight and monitoring roles.32

Developing a modern defense force entails more than just modernizing the armed forces. It calls for the modernization of policies and the entire security sector as well. All of these efforts must be done in unison, under a coherent framework of a clear national security sector reform agenda. The absence of one would mean that while reforms may move forward, these would be done in patches, silos even. This poses the danger that, at the end of the day, we would be holding parts of different puzzles rather than coming together to form a coherent whole.

32 One such effort is Bantay Bayanihan, a network of civil society organizations that performs an oversight role in the AFP’s implementation of

IPSP Bayanihan. Bantay Bayanihan likewise endeavors to create dialogue spaces to discuss defense and security issues as well as build a strong

constituency for peace and security.

3Mapping Out the Legal Terrain of the Philippine Security Sector


by Atty. Noel del Prado

MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR

3 MAPPING OUT THE LEGAL TERRAIN OF THE PHILIPPINE SECURITY SECTOR

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Upon the country’s reversion to democracy, the 1987 Philippine Constitution has mandated and established several oversight mechanisms to ensure that the Philippine security sector will never again return into a Martial law force characterized as highly-politicized, deeply-partisan and lacking in accountability.

The article examines the country’s legal foundations and the resultant institutional design and mechanisms which have the authority to control and the power of oversight over security forces such as the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). It provides an in-depth discussion of how the three (3) branches of government (i.e. executive, legislative, and judicial branches), autonomous constitutional bodies (i.e. CSC, COA, Office of the Ombudsman, and NAPOLCOM), and their agents carry-out their respective mandates and powers, and subsequently affect the administration and operations of the security forces.

The article asserts that the security forces were never insulated from the highly politicized culture and partisan environment despite the beauty and intent of the constitutional provisions and other legal instrumentalities to eradicate these socio-political illnesses. Instead of becoming more mature, these government entities relegated the security forces into becoming “gatekeepers of power” and “courts of last resort”. The article also characterizes the multi-layered security sector and oversight mechanisms as filled with the same institutional flaws attributed to the Marcosian regime: political misuse of security units, unaccountable bureaucracies, arbitrary policy-making, lack of transparency, risk- avoiding, amateurism, corruption, and nepotism.

In view of the institutional and legal gaps and shortfalls, the article offers several recommendations aimed at rationalizing, optimizing, and integrating the legal frameworks and policies which govern the security sector. It advocates for the reformation of institutions and the prevailing political culture that will veer the security forces and the rest of the government from the entrenched partisan politics. Furthermore, a comprehensive Security Plan and related policies should be enacted that will foster an integrated, whole-of-nation approach to national security.

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Introduction

In June 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino assumed office and declared that he is anchoring his administration on a 16-point Agenda that is built on a strong foundation of respect for human rights, which he appropriately denominated as his Social Contract with the Filipino People.

Thus, the President has embarked on a journey to attain a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace within the perspective of the rule of law, by eradicating the root causes of unrest, through poverty reduction and empowerment of the poor and vulnerable and transparent, accountable, and participatory governance. Likewise, the President has vowed to translate the gains from good governance into direct, immediate and substantial benefits for the poor, by building the capacities of, and the creation of opportunities for, the poor and marginalized; and increasing social protection and engaging the local government units in their own developmental processes.1

The Philippines is a democratic and republican state.2 While government authority emanates from the people, the people do not directly exercise that authority. The Philippine Constitution shuns a direct and unbridled rule by the people, and abhors the concentration of power on one or a few. Thus, the Constitution has created a government that is a “republican” state which is

run and governed by representatives. The term “democratic” refers to the manner, by which such representatives are chosen, and the mode and extent that such powers may be exercised by the people’s agents. The people’s sovereignty is expressed, and its authority is exercised, through representatives.

The Filipino people, coming from two (2) decades of martial rule that was characterized by monopolies of power, wealth and influence, and the inevitable abuses that are spawned by a unitary system, have decided to delegate the state authority to three (3) co-equal branches of government: the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary. Each branch is supreme within its own sphere, but their respective powers and authorities have inherent constitutional limits and may only operate within a well-defined system of checks and balances.3

This research aims to map out the legal terrain of the Philippine Security Sector. By demonstrating how the legal frameworks and policy instruments have served to isolate and dis-integrate the principles of good security sector governance4, we hope to build the philosophical, legal and policy “bridges” to rationalize, optimize and integrate the discordant and separate “islands” of the Philippine security sector “archipelago”.

1 Executive Order No. 43 of May 13, 2010, Pursuing Our Social Contract with the Filipino People Through the ReOrganization of the Cabinet

Clusters.2 1987 Philippine Constitution, Section 1, Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies.3 Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003, the main decision and the separate opinion of Justice Vitug;

Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998.4 Carolina G. Hernandez, SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND GOVERNANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES: “… looked at whether the

principles of good security sector governance (transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation, responsiveness) were present or absent in

the security sector…,” Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, www.isdsphilippines.org

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Scoping the Legal Terrain:An “Archipelago”

The policies relating to the Philippine Security Sector may be likened to a landscape of monolithic, self-contained and separate islands of legal frameworks, policies and rules. Their scope and application are defined within the confines of their specialized mandates and jurisdictions, but they are separated by “deep waters” of discontinuity, limited cooperation and non-integration.

Ironically, the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016 recognizes that peace and security are indivisible, and adopts a “whole-of-nation approach” that seeks to bring about a concerted effort towards national peace and security.5

Even between and among the core security forces, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), they are separated by the following lines:

1. national government agency;

2. geographical and political subdivisions; and

3. mechanisms for accountability.

While these lines promote administrative efficiency, they do not promote the basic principles

of good security sector governance, which are responsiveness, transparency, responsibility, accountability and wider participation, not just among the formal security forces, but also among the general citizenry.

A study undertaken by the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies found that martial law and authoritarianism has not only destroyed the democratic processes and political institutions, but also hindered the progress of the security sector in several ways: (1) limitation of elite recruitment and elite circulation; (2) underdevelopment or reversal of democratic institutions of governance; (3) the decline of the ethos of public service; (4) politicization of appointments to the executive departments including the foreign service, the courts, the constitutional bodies, the military and police officer corps, etc.; and, (5) failure to develop a responsible citizenry in a functioning democracy, among other democratic political development deficits.6

These deficits in public order and security are not products of conscious decision-making, but surfaced only through the natural accretion of historical events, social movements, and political upheavals. After the first EDSA Revolution, the Filipino people sought to eradicate the evils of the unchecked abuses of the concentration of power, and sought to disperse it by ushering in a regime of “oversight” and an era of checks-and-balances.


5 Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016, Chapter 9: Peace and Security.6 Carolina G. Hernandez, “Security Sector Reform and Governance in the Philippines,” Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, http://

www.isdsphilippines.org.



Over-seeing the Security Sector:A Case of Over-Oversight?

The 1987 Philippine Constitution has decreed several oversight mechanisms to ensure that the security sector will never again regress into the Marcosian armed force that is highly-politicized, deeply-partisan and lacking in accountability.

The new Constitution declares that: “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military”. 7 This principle finds practical expression in the constitutional designation of the President, the highest civilian official of the country, as the “Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines”.8 The Constitution is quick to qualify and limit this supreme authority over the military, and provides for a graduated manner of exercising this executive power.

In the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Convention, it was clear from the clarifications of Delegate Bernas that the President is authorized to exercise “graduated power” from being able to call out the Armed Forces as may be necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion; to the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus; until the exercise of the power to declare martial law. The power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and the power to declare martial law is subject to judicial review and conditioned upon the concurrence of the National Assembly. However, in exercising the lesser power of calling

on the Armed Forces, when the President deems it as necessary, his judgment cannot be reviewed by the Court or the Legislature.9

Executive Oversight

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.10 The President is likewise vested with the broad authority to appoint all executive officials, except for some high-level appointments that are subject only to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments (CA), who are composed of representatives from both Houses of Congress.

Aside from the power of appointment, the President has the authority to directly assume and exercise the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials.11 He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices, including all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The President exercises the power of control and supervision over the AFP and the PNP, either directly or through the Secretaries of the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), respectively.

7 1987 Philippine Constitution, Section 3, Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies.8 1987 Philippine Constitution, Section 18, Article VII: Executive Department.9 Joaquin G Bernas, S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers. Rex Bookstore, 1995.10 Sec. 17, Article VII: Executive Department, 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

[Emphasis supplied]11 Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569, 583 [1965].

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In recent years, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) has likewise been constituted, through the broad administrative powers of the President under the Revised Administrative Code, as an additional executive oversight of the security sector, with the end in view of pursuing peace negotiations, while complementarily addressing the root causes of conflict, through the effective and sustained delivery of basic services, institution of good governance, people empowerment, policy reforms, and local economic development.

Executive power generally refers to the power of the President of the Republic to execute and to implement the laws of the land.12 Executive power is vested in the President,13 and the cabinet secretaries who act as the President’s alter-egos, and whose actions and decisions, unless recalled or countermanded by the President, are for all legal intents and purposes, the acts and decisions of the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.14 It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.15

In the context of the security sector, the President is obliged to supervise the enforcement of the laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.16

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.17 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents.18 To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.19

Thus, any and all significant reforms in the security sector will necessarily entail an overhaul of the manner by which the President exercises his role as both the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief Executive of the institutions, organizations, and operations of the core security forces.

Legislative Oversight

Congressional oversight is the broad power of the Legislature to inquire into the implementation of any and all official activities undertaken pursuant to the laws that it has enacted. Both Houses of Congress likewise posses the inherent power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that: “the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees, may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” This power is founded upon the basic principle of necessity of information in the crafting of legislative measures.


12 Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259, 305 [1927].13 Sec. 1, Article VII: Executive Department, 1987 Constitution.14 Cruz, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW (1996): 173. 15 Tanada and Carreon, POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES 1 (1961): 275. 16 Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, (1962): 234-235. 17 Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 234. 18 Sinco, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 235.19 Blas F. Ople vs. Ruben D. Torres, et al., G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998.



The enactment of laws should be informed by the wealth of information and experience, culled from the operation of their offices; thus, the two Houses of Congress have the inherent power to access that information and to compel the disclosure thereof. This power of inquiry is exercised through established congressional committees such as, the Blue Ribbon Committee, National Defense Committee, Committee on Public Order and Safety, and such other ad hoc committees, that the Congress in the exercise of their broad legislative power, may create and constitute.

The power of legislative oversight covers all post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress:

• to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives;

• to determine whether agencies are properly administered;

• to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty;• to prevent executive usurpation of legislative

authority; and,• to assess executive conformity with the

congressional perception of public interest.20

Judicial Oversight

The Supreme Court of the Philippines, as well as all lower courts of competent jurisdiction,

may exercise the power of judicial review, in cases where the exercise of any official power or authority, by any branch or instrumentality of the government, to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or not in accordance with, or beyond, the limits imposed by the Constitution.21

Constitutional Oversight

The 1987 Constitution created several oversight bodies that are intended to exercise specialized powers of review, inquiry and enforcement in the field of security and public order.

Constitutional Oversight:Civil Service Commission (CSC)

As the central personnel agency and human resource organization of the national government bureaucracy, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) exercises concurrent jurisdiction over all personnel matters,22 including the disciplinary and administrative jurisdiction for violations of civil service rules and regulations.

While the core security institutions have their own specialized human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and their own

20 Primer on Separation of Powers, Inquiry in Aid of Legislation.”, http://jlp-law.com/blog/primer-separation-of-powers-inquiry-in-aid-

legislation/.21 Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,

and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government. [Emphasis supplied]22 Section 3, Article IX. B.: “The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a career service

and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen

the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management

climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.”

[Emphasis supplied]

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mechanisms to promote accountability, the CSC sets the minimum standards for qualifications, advancement based on merit, accountability and due process requirements for administrative investigations. While the military and police have their own Judge Advocate General Office(JAGO) and Internal Affairs Service (IAS), respectively, the Philippine Constitution provides for concurrent jurisdiction over all public officers and employees.

Republic Act No. 3019 tasks the CSC as the central repository of the records for all Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) of all public employees and officials. In coordination with the Office of the Ombudsman, the CSC is authorized to conduct lifestyle checks on all officials and employees of the security sector based on their baseline information and subsequent submissions of the SALN.

Constitutional Oversight:Commission on Audit (COA)

The Commission on Audit (COA) is the supreme audit institution of the Philippine bureaucracy. It is empowered under the 1987 Constitution to conduct examination, audit and settlement of all

accounts pertaining to the expenditure and use of public funds and property.23 All the core security forces are subject to the broad audit powers of the COA. In fact, it is constitutionally prohibited for Congress to pass laws that will have the effect of exempting any government entity from the jurisdiction of the COA.24

Constitutional Oversight:Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)

The 1987 Philippine Constitution devoted a whole article to “Accountability of Public Officers.” And true to its general distrust of the military establishment, the constitutional provision providing for the Office of the Ombudsman, mandated that a separate Deputy for the military establishment may be appointed. The other deputies of the Ombudsman correspond to the major island clusters of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Subsequent legislation implemented this constitutional prescription, and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs was created under Section 3 of R.A. 6770.25 Currently, the Office of the Ombudsman has denominated this Office as the Deputy Ombudsman for “Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers” or “MOLEO.”


23 Section 2. Article IX. D.: “(1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts

pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government

x x x

(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,

establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the

prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and

properties. [Emphasis supplied]24 Section 3, Article IX: Commission on Audit, 1987 Constitution.25 Republic Act No. 6770, An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for Other

Purposes, “The Ombudsman Act of 1989,” November 17, 1989.



The Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO exercises jurisdiction on all graft cases filed against the following:

1. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its service units;

2. Philippine National Police (PNP);3. Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP);4. Bureau of Jail Management & Penology

(BJMP);5. Bureau of Corrections;6. Philippine Coast Guard; and,7. All civilian employees of the above agencies.

When these constitutional provisions were being debated upon during the 1986 Constitutional Convention, there were extended debates on the need to insulate the security forces from politics. The solutions explored were often based on clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, as well as the institutionalization of a system of inter-governmental checks and balances, that are secured by a general constitutional prescription, and the use of the phrase “as may be provided for by law” to identify specific areas for further legislative determination.

These constitutional and statutory focus on the security sector reveals a deliberate effort to subject the core security forces to closer scrutiny in terms of anti-graft monitoring and integrity promotion.

Constitutional Oversight:National Police Commission(NAPOLCOM)

The focus on the core security forces finds another constitutional foundation in the creation

of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Thus, the authority over the police force would be shared between the NAPOLCOM and the local chief executives. The daily responsibilities and functions of the police, including but not limited to: criminal investigation, crime prevention and control, traffic control, peace and order initiatives, are under the operational control of the provincial governors, city and municipal mayors. The national police may, in certain exceptional cases where the local police cannot cope with or handle the situation, come in and take control. The NAPOLCOM has been tasked with the larger administrative matters, among others, the standardization of pay, professional training, organization and operation of crime laboratories, and investigation of administrative and disciplinary cases.

The PNP is now governed by Republic Act No. 6975. Under this law, the NAPOLCOM has been re-organized as an instrumentality or agency of the executive department, and thus, it is under the power of control of the President, and this “control” is exercised through the line agency department head or the cabinet secretaries. The governors and mayors were given the power to appoint, but this function has been declared by the Supreme Court as being exercised by the local chief executives as deputies of the NAPOLCOM, and as such, the decisions of the former, may be countermanded by the latter.26

RA 6975 likewise granted disciplinary powers to the People’s Law Enforcement Boards (PLEB), and made the decisions of the PLEBs appealable to the NAPOLCOM. The President exercises control and supervision over the national police force, not pursuant to his power as commander-in-chief, but his powers as chief executive.

26 Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, 14 February 1992.

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While the objective of the constitutional provision providing for a multi-level executive oversight of the PNP, and the legislative enactment that was meant to enflesh this constitutional purpose, the same evils that has plagued the pre-1987 Constitution security sector still hound our core security forces to this day.

During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Convention, Commissioner Natividad, speaking about the dangers of giving full control over the police to the governors and mayors: “[b]y our experience, this has spawned warlordism, bossism and sanctuaries for vices and abuses.” Despite several layers, and in some cases, overlapping jurisdictions over the discipline of the core security forces, we find the same structures, bumps and barriers in the security sector landscape:

1. Political misuse of security units2. Unaccountable bureaucracies 3. Arbitrary policy-making4. Lack of transparency5. Risk- avoiding 6. Amateurism 7. Corruption8. Nepotism

All of these elements are present in the core institutions of the security sector in the Philippines today. They do not only prevent modernization, but they point to a fundamental irony, that despite the institutionalization of multi-layered

oversight mechanisms, the Philippine security sector continues to reflect the highly-politicized environment that has developed into its natural habitat. The inter-governmental oversight structures have not only ironically institutionalized political intervention into the security sector, but have also informally installed the security sector as the “gatekeeper of power” and the “court of last resort.”

In its most palpable demonstration, the transition to power and installation of a replacement administration was made possible through the pivotal withdrawal of support of the Defense Secretaries, Chiefs-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Chiefs of the Philippine National Police. This is the discernible and indubitable formula for the two (2) EDSA Revolutions.

Even in the recently concluded impeachment proceedings, no less than the Presiding Judge,the Senate President of the Philippines, who himself served as the long-time Defense Secretary of then President Marcos, when asked aboutthe acceptability of the manner and outcome of the highly political exercise, conceded that: “[t]he only one that can stop us is the might of the military.”27

The underlying principle of insulating the security sector from partisan political activities and political opportunism in the 1987 Constitution, has effectively become a self-fulfilling prophecy.


27 Christine Avendaño, “ENRILE: ONLY MILITARY CAN STOP CORONA IMPEACHMENT TRIAL,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January

02, 2012, Accessed http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/121009/enrile-only-military-can-stop-corona-impeachment-trial.



Gaps in the Big Picture:Plain Oversight

Section 21 of Article X of the Constitution provides for a clear delineation of the responsibilities. On the one hand, the local police agencies are tasked with the preservation and maintenance of peace and order. On the other hand, the defense and security of the regions is clearly placed in the hands of the national government.28

The problem of ordinary criminal activities is the responsibility of the local police authorities. In the age of international terrorism and transnational organized crime, the local peace and order concerns have been elevated to a level that is beyond the capabilities of the local governments. The responsibility for the defense and security of the regions belongs to the national government.

Through the years, however, this unambiguous delineation of roles has been blurred into several gray areas of joint responsibility. In Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 7898, otherwise known as the “AFP Modernization Act,” provides that one of the objectives of modernizing the armed forces is “to enhance its capability to assist the Philippine National Police in law enforcement and internal security operations.” On its face, this provision appears to unduly stretch the boundaries of the constitutional assignment of duties for external defense and internal peacekeeping, and may be corrected by either legislative amendments, judicial relief, or by executive issuances. However, upon further review of other similar symptomatic indicators, we find that there are no

coherent standards where appropriate security sector policy reforms can be drawn.

Each major security establishment is governed by a law or a charter that embodies its general mandates and specific responsibilities and objectives. However, these laws and charters have institutionalized a fragmented approach to security policy. What was being practiced on the ground has been captured in legislation, and thus cementing an inert and solitary existence, which ultimately slows down any progress of thought, practice and vision.

A quick review of the existing structures and legal instruments reveal a terrain of unrelated, dis-integrated and self-contained “islands” of security policies and stakeholders. These “islands” must, therefore, be re-connected by philosophical, structural and policy “bridges,” if we are to successfully adopt a “whole-of-nation approach.”29

1. There is a need to integrate the local Peace and Order Councils into formal security sector structure and processes.

• The PNP should be given the authority to prescribe the structures, procedures and training of barangay peace and order.

• Barangay neighborhood watch systems are not integrated into the peace and order initiatives of the police and military establishments

• Provincial, City and Municipal peace and order councils should have a minimum set

28 Section 21 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution: “The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local

police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the

regions shall be the responsibility of the national government. [Emphasis supplied]29Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016, Chapter 9: Peace and Security.

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of objectives that are prescribed by the PNP and the DILG

2. There is a need to correct the mis-integration of cross-over institutions.

• Role of the Local Chief Executives over police and military units must be further de-limited

• Philippine Coast Guard as an adjunct of DOTC 30

• The administration of the Philippine National Police Academy (PNPA) must be returned the Philippine National Police (PNP)

3. The development of Military Bases must be based on a Comprehensive Security Plan.

• It should NOT be Secondary to social and economic development of communities.

• It should NOT be based on their historical, but on their strategic value.

• Procurement and acquisition of materiel should be based on established mechanisms of identifying and prioritizing security needs, as opposed to stockpiling and upgrading of existing facilities, equipment and supplies.

4. There is a need to foster a culture of “Security Consciousness.”

• Security education is not integrated into the

school system, except in formal security sector recruitment and formation

• There is a need to articulate the role of an “Informed Public”

• There is a need to identify the “pillars of the security sector” and to identify their specific roles and responsibilities

5. There is a need to define the role of an “informed Media establishment,” where their “watchdog” (outsider) function must be clearly delineated from their stakeholder (insider) function.

• “Distrust” for public institutions is exacerbated in the negative portrayal of state security agents in the media

• Reports of abuses, unresolved cases, and involvement of police and military officials and ex-police and ex-military officials in graft cases or organized crime

• The Freedom of Information Act (FOI) and/or the Public Ownership of Government Information (POGI) must clearly define matters of “national security,” “national defense,” and “national interest”

6. There is an urgent need to insulate the security sector from politics, without removing the built-in checks-and-balance functions of oversight agencies.


30 Republic Act No. 9993, otherwise known as the “Philippine Coast Guard Law,” and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).



Conclusion

While most of the above proposals will only require executive action through administrative issuances to be undertaken by the President and his cabinet secretaries, there are a few areas that will require legislative action. The President, as the Commander-in-Chief and as the Chief Executive of the State, is strategically installed at the helm of the formal security sector organizations, with all the legal mandates and capabilities to rationalize, re-organize and steer the security sector in the direction of integration, rationalization and encourage a wider ownership and internalization of the “whole-of-nation” approach.

One may argue that the resulting “isolation” of security sector stakeholders is a product of historical and cultural accidents. The Philippine Constitution envisions an integrated national and local government; security consciousness must pervade all levels of Philippine society, down

to the barangay, and even welcomed into each family unit. It would seem that the concepts of health and safety are generally accepted as being included in the concept of general welfare, but security remains to be perceived to be restricted to the national government, the core security forces and the intelligence agencies. While health and safety consciousness has been seamlessly integrated into the collective consciousness of the Filipino family, a shared responsibility for national security has yet to be internalized and institutionalized.

Unless we initiate and usher in an era of integration, not just of functions and processes, but also of vision and perspective, the stakeholders will remain standing on “separate islands,” unable to communicate, incapable of drawing support from other stakeholders, and cut-off from what would otherwise be a synergistic environment.

SOURCE: 4TH SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION, AFP

4AFP ModernIZATION


by Melanie Rodulfo-Veril

4 AFP MODERNIZATION

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AFP MODERNIZATIONConfronted by a number of challenges and threats to national security, there is an exigent need for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to develop and modernize its capabilities to fully support the effective implementation of national security and defense plans and programs. The article provides a quick historical review on the evolution of the AFP from being one of the superior militaries in the Asia-Pacific region after the Second World War into a one that lags behind its neighbors in terms of modern assets, materiel and equipment. It establishes the relationship between the capability and readiness of the AFP to the level of support and augmentation provided by the US, which peaked during the heydays of the US bases in the country.

The article characterizes the present state of the AFP as plagued with strategic, institutional, and operational deficiencies making the military only partially capable of performing all its critical mission areas. It offers several factors which have been crucial in the current weakened state of the Philippine military, including 1) end of Cold War and the subsequent expulsion of US bases in the Philippines; 2) reprioritization of AFP operations from traditional defense to internal security operations; 3) intricacies of the Republic Act (RA) 7898, otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Act of 1995, and the resulting complications and shortfalls in the implementation of the law; and, 4) lacking and delayed release of funds to support the implementation of the law and related modernization programs.

Consistent with the new administration’s policies and strategic intent, the article deems it imperative to fast track AFP modernization to effectively address prevalent national and regional security issues and concerns. It further recommends the continuous streamlining of defense planning and procurement processes, and allocation of significant budget to support the modernization programs and projects under the new AFP Modernization Law.

SOURCE: PAO AFP

S

4 AFP MODERNIZATION


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Security Sector Reform (SSR) is linked with security and development since ineffective and inefficient governance becomes a challenge in the development, democratization, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding of a state.1 The development of the AFP’s capabilities is included in the SSR component of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan. Furthermore, it is deemed important to have a credible deterrent posture in attaining peace and security in the country.

The Hope of an Independent Defense Force

By the end of the World War II, and upon declaration of Independence from the US, the Armed Forces of Philippines (AFP) was established with the three service units (Army, Navy, and Air Force) in 1947. Both states recognized the other’s strategic value to their respective national interests and thus entered into several bilateral arrangements. These are the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947, the Military Assistance Program (MAP) of 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951. The Clark Air Base located in the Philippines was then the biggest airbase outside US territory.2

It was the golden era of the AFP when it enjoyed military superiority from the 1950s until the early

1970s. At the height of its laurels, the AFP had a range of aircraft in its inventory to include jet-fighter interceptors – the F-5A/B and F-8 Crusaders. It also had 140 “Huey” helicopters, 35 attack helicopters, 30 trainer jets, and 12 C-130 “Hercules” planes. It also boasted of warships and gunboats for the Philippine Navy (PN).3 The AFP was equipped, although apart from minimal counter-dissident campaigns, its major role then was the occasional participation in the military exercises conducted by South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).4

The support from US was firm but like all military organizations, the AFP sought to professionalize its soldiers and develop its own capabilities. In the 1970s, during the outbreak of Muslim separatism in Mindanao, the government made an effort to upgrade the capability of the AFP. Then President Ferdinand Marcos particularly aimed for an independent armed forces that will be capable for an autonomous defense posture. This attempt was further encouraged following the reluctance of the US to provide the AFP with counter-insurgency materiel. Considered as the first major step in the AFP capability upgrade, the government allocated USD 25M to support research and development of the Philippine Army (PA) capabilities.5

The government’s vision of having an autonomous defense capability was furthered in the 1980s.

1 InciteGov & Stiftung, “A Primer on Security Sector Reform (SSR) focused on Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF),” Manila, 2010. 2 Renato De Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance?,” Pacific Affairs 78 No. 3

(2005): 403-422. 3 Ben Cal, “SPECIAL REPORT: AFP modernization still an elusive dream”. July 11, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.interaksyon.com/

article/8682/special-report-afp-modernization-still-an-elusive-dream. 4 De Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy, “ 404. 5 De Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy, “ 405.

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In 1989, with the brewing tensions in the West Philippine Sea, the Department of National Defense (DND) aimed to strengthen the maritime security of the country and this time proposed the modernization of the PN. The acquisition of six fast attack crafts (FAC) was projected to better control the maritime borders. The PN, lacking any missile or blue water capabilities, requested the funds.6 This was encouraged by the Senate and the Congress and directed the AFP to formulate a 15-year plan for arms acquisition and ultimately, a plan to lessen dependence on the US. The conclusion of the Cold War welcomed the plan in view of the possible withdrawal of US bases in the country.7

Post Cold War, the general view is that Manila and Washington no longer shared similar security interests. By then, the Philippines requested payments from the US for hosting the latter’s military facilities. A new basement treaty was proposed but was not ratified in the Senate in 1991, which led to the withdrawal of US forces in the Philippines.8

The turn of events created strife in the RP-US relationship, and there was an obvious impasse on the alliance. This was reflected in the reduced US military and economic aid to the Philippines. The need for the modernization of the Armed

Forces became apparent. This prompted the AFP to create an initial 10-year plan for modernization. It initially focused on the acquisition of weapons system, and was billed for a total of PhP 140 billion or USD 560 million for the 10-year program. This, however, was way below the USD 200 million provided by the US for military support annually before the withdrawal of the bases.9 The 10-year plan also experienced criticisms from various sectors in the Philippine society, and was therefore hampered. It took the Congress three (3) years to approve the AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP).

The road to a modernized AFP

The AFPMP was finally approved on February 23, 1995 as a legal and policy framework. This program aims to “modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to a level where it can fully and effectively perform its constitutional mandate of upholding the sovereignty and preserving the patrimony of the Republic”.10 This 15-year Program is mandated by Republic Act (RA) 7898, otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Act and is implemented through Department of National Defense Circular (DC) No. 1 dated 06 March 2000 (replacing DC 29 dated 19 May 1996).11

4 AFP MODERNIZATION

6 De Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy, “ 410.7 _________”The 20-Year Strategic Plan: Self-Reliant Defense Posture”. Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines. 2002.8 Bayoneto M Victoria, “The Former U.S. Bases in the Philippines: An Argument for the Application of U.S. Environmental Standards to Overseas

Military Bases.” Fordham Environmental Law Review 6 Issue 1 (2011). 9 De Castro, “Philippine Defense Policy, “ 411. 10 Armed Forces Of the Philippines Modernization Program Management Office. AFP Modernization Program Primer. Quezon City: Armed

Forces of the Philippines, 1996.11 Jaime Frumencio Montañez, “The Need For Qualified Contracting Officers In The Armed Forces Of The Philppines (AFP) Modernization

Programme,” (Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 2008).


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The modernization program focused on five components namely:

1. Capability, Materiel and Technology Development;

2. Bases and Support System Development;3. Human Resource Development;4. Doctrines Development, and;5. Force Restructuring & Organizational

Development.12

The program was given a PhP 331.62 billion budget broken down into two sub-programs:Sub-program 1 has a budget of PhP 164.55 billion while Sub-program 2 has a budget of PhP 167 billion. This was also distributed down tranches, PhP 50 billion to implement the first five years of the AFPMP, PhP 74.2 billion for the second year, and PhP 37.6 billion on the third year, while the remaining five years is PhP 2.8 billion.13

Under the Program, the Air Force hoped to acquire two squadrons of multi-role fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missile and gun systems. The PN projected the procurement of three frigates, six corvettes, 12 offshore patrol vessels and 12 missile boats along with nine helicopters and six fixed-wing aircraft to develop its naval aviation capability.14

The proposed acquisition was deemed timely following the incidents in the West Philippine Sea over the territorial disputes in the area.The Philippines has been ill-equipped in confronting China upon the discovery of Chinese military structures in Mischief Reef in 1996.The incident verified how the AFP scantilyoperated in view of potential and sensitive flash points.

RA 7898 stipulated parameters to limit the effect of hefty military spending in the country. The first set of parameters is that AFPMP allocation will not hamper the basic economic and social services provided by the government. As such, the DND was required to make the program sustainable by creating its own trust fund.15

The AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund was to be sourced out from:

1. Appropriations for the AFPMP;2. Proceeds from the sale, lease, or joint

development of military reservation, as may be authorized by Congress, include such immovable and other facilities as may be found therein, not covered by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, as provided for in Republic Act (RA) No. 7227 16;

4 AFP MODERNIZATION

12 Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program Management Office. AFP Modernization Program Primer. Quezon City:Armed

Forces of the Philippines. 1996.13 Montañez, “The Need.”14 Armed Forces Of the Philippines Modernization Program Management Office. AFP Modernization Program Annual Report 2008. Quezon

City: Armed Forces of the Philippines.15 Montañez, “The Need.”16 RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 declared the policy of the Government to accelerate the sound and balanced

conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions (John Hay Station, Wallace Air

Station, O’Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and Capas Relay Station), to raise funds by the sale of

portions of Metro Manila military camps, and to apply said funds for the development and conversion to productive civilian use of the lands

covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US.

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4 AFP MODERNIZATION

3. Share of the AFP from the proceeds of the sale of military camps provided for under RA No. 7227;

4. Proceeds from the sale of the products of the Government Arsenal;

5. Proceeds from the disposal of excess and/or uneconomically repairable equipment and other movable assets of the AFP and the Government Arsenal;

6. Funds from budgetary surplus, if any, as may be authorized by Congress subject to the provisions of Section 8 of RA 7227; and,

7. All interest income of the trust fund Congressional funding however will only be made available if there is a surplus in the appropriations.17

The second set of parameters guarantee the economic and technological benefits of the country from AFP acquisitions. The program must be able to reduce foreign exchange outflow, contribute to local employment, and enhance technology transfer to the Philippines. With this, the DND must ensure the following:18

• Give preference to Filipino contractors and suppliers or foreign contractors and suppliers willing and able to locate a substantial portion of production in the Philippines;

• Incorporate as far as possible, in each contract/ agreement provisions for countertrade, in-country manufacture, co-production schemes or other innovative arrangements; and,

• Include in the contract the transfer to the

AFP of principal technology involved for the operation and maintenance of the equipment.

Unfortunately, the Asian financial crisiscaught up with the program in 1997. When the modernization plan was crafted,the exchange rate was only PhP 20 to 1 USD.The peso depreciated by almost 40 percentand financial investments in the countrywere greatly reduced. Funding formodernization was austerely challenged.In 1998, with the advent of increased Muslim separatist activity in Mindanao, the AFP shifted priorities from external defense to internal security, which also shifted the priorities of the modernization program to enhance Internal Security Operations (ISO) capabilities.19

The Revised Reprioritized Project List (RRPL) was approved in 2004 based on the project lists identified in the years 2001 and 2002.

On the side, for its contribution to the US-led global war on terrorism as an offshoot of the 9/11 incident, the Philippines and the US prompted the Joint Defense Assessment which led to the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR), and the AFP Capability Upgrade Program (CUP). In the assessment as early as 1999, the findings were able to identify 65 key and 207 ancillary areas of concern. The key areas have been distilled into ten (10) key recommendations, which the PDR implements throughout a multi-year time frame: 20

1. Implement a strategy-driven multi-year defense planning system;

17 AFPMPMO, 2008.18 Montañez, “The Need.”19 AFPMPMO, 2008.20 Department of National Defense. “The Philippine Defense Reform Program (PDR)” Retrieved from:http://www.dnd.gov.ph/

DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/pdrpage.htm.


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2. Improve AFP operational and training capacity;

3. Improve operational readiness rates of key AFP systems;

4. Improve operational level expertise by addressing organizational, management and operational systemic deficiencies;

5. Develop an effective AFP personnel management system;

6. Plan, program and execute a Multi-Year Capability Upgrade Plan for the AFP;

7. Optimize the defense budget and improve management controls;

8. Create a professional acquisition workforce and establish a centrally- managed defense acquisition system;

9. Increase capability of the AFP to conduct civil-military operations; and

10. Develop accurate baseline data on critical AFP functional areas.

Program 6 of the PDR, the Multi-Year Capability Upgrade Plan (CUP) was aligned in the AFP Modernization Plan. The program is an 18-year defense acquisition period that is divided into three phases:

Phase 1: (2006–2011)—acquisition and upgrade of equipment for enhancing the ISO;

Phase 2: (2012–2018)—the transition phase from ISO to territorial defense; and,

Phase 3: (2019–2024)—acquisition geared for territorial defense and peacekeeping operations.21

The development of military capabilities for2012-2018 is anchored on seven mission areas namely: ISO, Territorial Defense, Disaster Risk Reduction Management and Response, Support to National Development, International Defense and Security Engagements (IDSE), Peace Support Operations (PSO), and Force-Level Command and Control, Support and Training (FLC2ST).22

AFP Modernization 15 Years After

The implementation period of the RA 7898 expired on December 2011 without any significant progress in terms of modernizing AFP capabilities. What was pursued instead was the upgrading of basic capabilities to bring these back to acceptable levels of readiness.23 However, of the total amount of PhP 331 billion approved for the total fund requirements of the Program, only PhP 35 billion was used for the capability upgrade program of the AFP for internal operations. On the July 2011 report released by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5, only three hundred seventeen (317) projects (59.36 percent) were completed from the five hundred thirty four (534) planned projects. There are still two hundred nine (209) ongoing projects and eight (8) projects suspended for review.

The Commission on Audit (COA) found that the AFP itself was slowed down by its complex acquisition structure, which would commence from the Circular Requirements (COR) formulation to

21 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5. AFP Capability Upgrade Plan. Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines. 2007.22 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5. AFP Medium Term Development Plan (2012- 2018). Quezon City:Armed Forces of the

Philippines. 2010.23 Vincent Cabreza, “Gazmin admits AFP upgrade a dud,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 19, 2012. Accessed May 8, 2012, http://

newsinfo.inquirer.net/148403/gazmin-admits-afp-upgrade-plan-a-dud.

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contracting phases. Certain RA 7898 stipulations would also make complications inevitable to wit:

This section made it difficult for Filipino contractors who were willing to invest on defense industry, as they were required to sell to other countries before selling in the Philippines.

In this pretext, RA 7898 contradicts itself as the Section 10 of the law explicates,

The modernization plan also shouldered changing priorities from the government. The Reprioritized Capability Upgrade Program (RCUP) was primarily designed to speed up the procurement of equipment for ISO and realign modernization with AFP missions. A 2010 AFP Office of the Special and Strategic Studies report however noted that RCUP directs the AFP to consider foreign military sales or government-to-government transaction in the procurement of equipment, which contributed yet again to the complex procurement process.

The lack of and the delay in the release of funds for the program were the main reasons

raised by Secretary of National Defense (SND) Voltaire Gazmin for the poor implementation of the program. The Commission on Audit agreed and added that the lack of funding was a major reason for the program’s poor implementation since only Php 35 billion or 10.02 percent of the total projected amount of Php 331 billion was appropriated.

Interventions to address the concern

President Benigno Aquino intends to fast track the delayed modernization plan under his term. In 2010, with the commitment from the SND, the AFP Long Term Capability Development Program was crafted. It pushes for an immediate development of a modest deterrent capability to protect the country’s vast maritime borders and to protect its territorial claims in the Spratlys.24 This transition from internal security to territorial defense is timely and well reflected in the IPSP Bayanihan.

The DND also released Department Circular No. 11 to effectively implement the Defense System of Management (DSOM) in the entire defense establishment. DSOM was created to support the planning, resource and financial management and decision-making responsibilities of the SND, the Chief of Staff, AFP and other senior leaders of the AFP and DND in determining the needs and priorities of the defense system.

The DND has lined up one hundred thirty eight (138) projects spread over a period of five (5) years. The bulk of the budget has been earmarked for

“The SRDP intends to induce the AFP to give preference to Filipino contractors and suppliers or to foreign contractors or suppliers willing and able to locate a substantial portion of, if not the entire, production process of the terms involved, within the Philippines.”

24 Office of the Deputy-Chief-of-Staff for Plans (J-5). DND-AFP Thrust for Capability Upgrade: The AFP Long-Term Capability. Quezon City:

Armed Forces of the Philippines. 2010.

“That no major equipment and weapons system shall be purchased if the same are not being used by the armed forces in the country of origin or used by the armed forces of at least two countries”.


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the Philippine Air Force (PAF) and PN.25 Planned acquisitions for the PAF include eight brand-new combat utility helicopters along with multi-role and lead-in fighter planes, surface-attack aircraft, and long-range reconnaissance planes. The PN on the other hand has projected the acquisition of multi-role attack vessels, off-shore patrol craft, and even surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. Materiel for “joint maritime surveillance, defense, and interdiction operations in the South China Sea” were also included in the plan.26 Among the notable acquisitions under the Aquino administration is the Hamilton Class BRP Gregorio del Pilar. The DND has approved 10 percent of the 138 modernization projects meant to modernize the military in securing our borders and protecting our territory.27 The Php 70 billion initial budget has already been approved.

The office of the expired AFP Modernization Program on the other hand was deactivated and has transitioned into a Defense Acquisition Office, under the direction of the Department of National Defense. Sec. Gazmin stressed that the modernization of the AFP is finally moving and the program will support not only internal security but also external security, disaster risk management and support to national development.28

The bill for the amendment of the AFPMP was passed by Congress in 2012. In a statement by Senator Panfilo Lacson, a new system for the

procurement process will be introduced and will be cut down from 29 stages to two assessment levels in addition to the actual procurement and contracting stages. There are also amendments on the AFP Modernization Trust Fund.It is proposed that funds should be used to “cover all necessary expenses to implement the procurement of equipment such as expenses for the pre-selection and post-qualification stages”.In addition, the “approval of congress will no longer be required in the lease or joint development of military reservations”.29 Additional funds will also be sourced from the earnings of the Malampaya gas wells from the new oil exploration service contracts in the Sulu Sea.

Way Forward for theAFP Modernization

While recent acquisitions of defense materiel and equipment, and continuing efforts toward defense reform and transformation are recognized and lauded, it is still apparent that there is a need for the the continued allocation of funds for bigger acquisitions of defense materiel and equipment, and the continuing defense reform efforts of the government.

There is also a need for more focused efforts, programs and policies within the defense establishment to facilitate more effective and

25 “AFP modernization awaits funding,” Manila Times, January 30, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/news/

nation/16081-afp-modernization-awaits-funding.26 OJ5, 2010. p. 3.27 Frances Mangosing & Katherine Evangelista, “DND approves 10% of military modernization projects,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, February

18, 2012, accessed May 8, 2012, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/148187/dnd-approves-10-of-military-modernization-projects. 28 Elena Aben, “AFP Modernization Projects Partially OK’d,” The Manila Bulletin, February 18, 2012, accessed May 29, 2012, http://www.

mb.com.ph/node/351788/afp-modernization-project. 29 Interaksyon, “Senate Passes Bill Amending AFP Modernization Program,” Interaksyon, June 5, 2012, retrieved from http://www.interaksyon.

com/article/33822/senate-passes-bill-amending-afp-modernization-program.

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fast implementation of modernization projects. At the same time, such policies promote a more responsive defense institution in a changing security environment.

At present, the modernization of the AFP is moving and looks positive. Budget allocations for the procurement of materiel and equipment to modernize the AFP have already been approved and released. According to Sec. Gazmin, before the term of the President Aquino III ends in 2016,

the 138 modernization projects will be achieved.

The AFP faces different security challenges in light of the changing security environment. This highlights the need to sustain capability development efforts. Otherwise, the AFP might be left behind once again, and might not be able to address these challenges. The AFP must at all times be able to perform its mandate of upholding the sovereignty and preserving the patrimony of the Republic.

Other references:

Cal, Ben. “SPECIAL REPORT: AFP modernization still an elusive dream”. July 11, 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.interaksyon.com/article/8682/special-report-afp-modernization-still-an-elusive-dream

Cabreza, Vincent. “Gazmin admits AFP upgrade a dud” 19 February 2012. Inquirer News Retrieved from http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/148403/gazmin-admits-afp-upgrade-plan-a-dud 8 May 2012

Department of Budget and Management. http://www.mb.com.ph/node/351788/afp-modernization-project nt. Retrieved from http://budgetngbayan.com/mybudget-2012/the-2012-budget-a-summary/

Elena L. Aben. “AFP Modernization Projects Partially OK’d”. The Manila Bulletin Newspaper Online. 18 February 2012. Retrieved from http://www.mb.com.ph/node/351788/afp-modernization-project 29 May 2012

Interaksyon. “Senate Passes Bill Amending AFP Modernization Program” June 5, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.interaksyon.com/article/33822/senate-passes-bill-amending-afp-modernization-program

InciteGov&Stiftung. “A Primer on Security Sector Reform (SSR) focused on Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)” January 2010. Manila, Philippines

Manila Times.net. “AFP modernization awaits funding” January 30, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/news/nation/16081-afp-modernizationawaits-funding

Mangosing, Frances & Evangelista, Katherine. “DND approves 10% of military modernization projects”. 18 February 2012 Inquirer News. Retrieved from http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/148187/dnd-approves-10-of-military-modernization-projects 8 May 2012

5AFP FORCE STRUCTURE


by Capt Roy Vincent T Trinidad (GSC) PN

5 AFP FORCE STRUCTURE

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The Armed Forces is classified as one of the core state security actors. It is utilized by the government to implement its policies. Currently, it is a primary tool of the government to suppress insurgency. Additionally, the AFP is heavily land-based, even though the Philippines is archipelagic in nature, thus requiring an armed force with strong air and naval capabilities.

The paper examines the different events and factors that led to the current AFP Structural Organization. These events include the post martial law culture, counter-insurgency operations, organizational expansion and modification, utilization of reservist, and strategic direction.

The author argues that a national policy framework is an imperative in coming up with the AFP’s strategic direction, which is the hinge in devising the organization’s force. Additionally, policies should be cleared on the handover of areas to civil authorities and declaration of insurgent-free areas. A Transition Plan that would govern the shift from ISO to Territorial Defense should also be formulated.


AFP FORCE STRUCTURE

SOURCE: PAO AFP

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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Introduction

The Armed Forces is classified as a core security actor and a state actor. It is one of the political tools of the government to implement policies. The AFP is a security sector institution whose core competency is war fighting, may it be real or for intimidation. It is the government actor tasked to protect the territory of the state and its sovereignty.

In the current Philippine setting, the AFP is used by the government as a primary tool to suppress insurgency. Yet the government should be circumspect in the utilization of the armed forces in resolving conflicts whether local or international. The use of military strategy to settle conflicts should be the last option of the government since it is violent and expensive. The resultant damage to people and properties and the financial equivalent of such damage is widely greater than when other options are used. During the rise of disputes and even response to crisis situations, other approaches should be employed first since the use of military forces beget greater collateral damage and leaves no viable option once committed initially.

In the aim of transforming the AFP, one of the things to be looked into is the suitability of its organizational structure to the dynamism of the current societal setting. It is devised to be land based, army-based per se, though the Philippines is archipelagic in nature. Instead of being heavy with land forces, the organization should be equipped with air force and naval personnel which the geographical and strategic setting demands. The assumption of a more active role in territorial defense and other non-traditional tasks such as disaster relief and response operations also

stresses the need to review the organizational structure of the AFP to befit the Philippine setting.

Source of Problems inAFP Structural Organization

The Post Martial Law Culture

The effects of Martial Law are still apparent in the security sector even decades after its fall. With the overthrow of dictatorship after the massive display of people power in 1986, the reins of power were handed to civilian revolutionary leadership which paved the way for the gradual strengthening of democratic institutions. The end of Martial Law symbolized the triumph of military force over dictatorship. This made an impression of a strong military force and even emphasized its vital role in society. Martial Law created a culture of the use of inherent force since it is how the AFP was trained to perform its task. The military became the immediate option in every emergency situation and conflict.

Even during the Marcos administration, the military was given non-traditional duties in economic development and infrastructures under the banner of ‘civic action’ to bridge gaps on resources, manpower and logistical requirements. Moreover, military members/officials were given posts in the government which were traditionally appointed to civilians. This practice of utilizing the military in activities other than war continued even after the fall of the Martial Law. Indeed, the end of martial law and the utilization of the military during the Marcos regime led to the emergence of a more participatory role of the AFP in the civilian government, which in turn led to the modification for the structure of the military to address this

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role. The employment of the military in various government endeavors also led to the change of focus of the AFP from its true mandate of territorial defense to the performance of tasks beyond the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces.

Counter Insurgency Operations

Through Republic Act 8551, which holds that the DILG (PNP) be relieved from the primaryresponsibility on matters involving thesuppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security, the AFP is tasked to lead on matters involving internal securityoperations. Yet there had been difficulties indefining the scope of efforts where the AFP should lead, even in defining suppression per se. There are also no definite set of parameterswhich will accurately measure the success of suppression of insurgency.

Since there is no definitive boundary on where the task of the AFP in the suppression ofinsurgency starts and ends, there is also aconfusion in the internal security functions that should be assumed by government agencies, especially the local government units (LGUs). In its fight against insurgency, the AFP was able to determine the factors and roots of insurgency. Itfurther asserted that these cannot be solved solely through a militaristic approach but through a holistic national effort. However, localgovernment units do not take an active role on matters concerning insurgency in spite of the problem being rooted in concerns that necessitate the LGU’s participation and efforts. The AFP is forced to perform various tasks even those which are beyond its mandate and competency since those are held to be part of its broad mission of suppressing insurgency.

Since the transfer of the ISO lead role from PNP to AFP in 1998, the AFP performsactivities such as nation building efforts, community organizing, medical services and other engineering projects. The military personnel who were once trained to engage in combat became teachers, engineers, medical practitioners, law enforcers etc.This elicited mixed responses from LGUs.Some grew complacent and dependent on the military for the performance of their tasks while others felt disrespected or encroachedupon by the AFP. On the other hand, there areothers that failed to fully grasp their roles andfunctions in internal security as the AFP has been performing these tasks since previous administrations.

Hence, the capability build-up for territorial defense has been sacrificed to supportISO efforts. The war fighting capability of theAFP which should be its core competency had been neglected likewise and modified to suit its ISO mission.

The roles played by the AFP in ISO led to the structuring of the military organization asland-based with a heavy army force. Thestructure is expected to remain as such while the lead role in ISO remains on the shoulders of the military. Additionally, improvements on the AFP’s capabilities for its other mission areas willcontinue to be compromised.

Organizational Expansion/ Modification

The demands of fulfilling the ISO missionforced the AFP to train and build up capabilities to satisfy needs which should have been catered by civilian sectors such asengineers, health workers, educators,



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community organizers and others. This resulted to the activation/ establishment of AFP branches, units and offices that will provide said services.

The lack of an efficient human resourcesystem led to the abuse in the creation ofpositions even exceeding in number to thatauthorized by the law. As to recent cases, Grade 07/BGen positions are filled up with Grade 06 Officers/Colonels since piled up promotionscannot be accommodated anymore in the Congress.

Utilization of Reservist

There are currently two (2) types of reservistsin the component of the AFP Reserve Force; the Ready Reserve and the StandbyReserve. Ready Reservists are personnel that arealways on constant alert and on call whenever themobilization order has been given, while Standby Reservists are the personnel that support and augment the Ready Reserve Force only when needed. At present, the AFP organization lacks proper accounting of the reservists as well as a clear concept or strategy on how to integratereservist into the regular force. The organiza-tion is devised from a ‘peace time perspective’ thus the reservists are not seen as integrated in the force. There is no clear strategy forintegration; whether reservists would be tucked into the regular force or there will be a separate regular organization with regular soldiers ascadre. Moreover, the capabilities that reservistsmay contribute to the force are unspecified. Thus it would be hard to mobilize them when the need for integration arises. The reserv-ists are also not considered in most contin-gency plans and are likewise not included in the array of forces of the Unified Commands.

Strategic Direction

The absence of a comprehensive policyframework such as the National SecurityStrategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military Strategy (NMS)for the defense and military establishmentsmade it more difficult to have a strategic direction for the AFP. Policy baselines and national frameworks are very importantin setting military objectives and coming up with the appropriate framework tosupport said plans. The absence of a forward looking plan will make it hard for the organization to set its own specific and measurable objectives and provide a suitable structure to accomplish them. The strategic direction of the AFP is hinged only on available references such as the NationalSecurity Policy, the Defense System ofManagement, the National Military Intent, theInternal Peace and Security Plan andthe Unilateral Defense Plan.

Interventions Needed to Improve AFP Force Structure

The publication of a national policy frameworkis very vital in coming up with the AFP’sstrategic direction which is the hinge in devising the organization’s force structure. There is a need toexpedite the formulation of the NSS toconsequently publish NDS and NMS.

There should also be clear policies on the transition of the law enforcement concept which covers the handover of areas to civil authorities and declaration of insurgent free areas. A government policy should also be crafted renderingthe military as the last option in addressing


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emergency or conflict and even in theenforcement of government policies.

Upon fulfillment of above mentionedinterventions, a Transition Plan for the shift ofmilitary operations focus from ISO to TerritorialDefense should be formulated. This shouldincludes the exit plan of AFP from internalsecurity operation and defined roles of AFPunits in territorial defense. This transition planshould also provide a clear concept andstrategy on the utilization/ employment ofreservists. Contingency plans and Rules ofEngagements should also be consistent with this transition plan. There should also be a review of the Unilateral Defense Plan and its implementation plans. Mobilization plans should also be revisited to ensure itsrelevance and consistency with the transitionplan.

There should also be an in-depth review of the force structure of the AFP organization based on the strategy laid down by the agency. Reservists’organization should be rationalized and beincorporated in the structure of the AFP. There should also be strict observance of the forceemployer/ provider concept. The AFPorganizational structure should also followa simpler command and control mechanismto avoid confusion in assuming responsibilitiesand chain of authority. The structure should also address different war time scenarios may it be internal or international conflicts and caneasily adapt to different situations. The AFP also needs a force structure that complies withnational policies, can easily be adapted and iscentered in the core competency of theorganization.

The concept of having a sole headquarters for all the Major Services of the AFP should also be considered. This will aid in bettercoordination, supervision as well as command and control among the services. It will also avoid the advent of creating a separate domain per MajorService. This may also provide a unitedatmosphere among the highest leaders of the AFP and translate to a strengthened armed forces.

Should the AFP be structured to addressmaritime security and other non-traditional tasks, there is the need to reprioritize programs to the support the modernization of the AFP, particularly the PN and PAF, and upgrading its capabilities build-up. This will also entail the procurement of equipment, material and assets.

Consequences

There is a growing recognition of the need for defense and security sector transformation in our society. The reform in the Armed Forces is just a miniscule element that may contribute to thereformation of the security sector yet the AFP gives great value in every minimal step that the institution may do to effect change.These may only be viewed as baby steps toward a reformed security sector but these small steps when done in a consistent and determined pace will eventu-ally lead to the bigger goal.

Should there be no revision in the AFPstructure, deterioration of the AFP capability may follow. The core competency of the AFP in warfighting may be compromised. The country mightgradually lose the AFP affixed to its ‘real’mandate and mission.



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Addressing the concerns and issues on force structure of the AFP entails a deep political will among the leaders and members of theorganization. This will also call for a wideadvocacy of this endeavor to policy makers and other stakeholders. The rationalization of the AFP structure into a more fitting organization will affect other government instrumentalities as the AFP



had been doing a big role not just in the provision of security but also in the internal dynamics of the state. In this light, the support of various government sectors to the gradual changes in the uniformed service in terms of strategy and roles in society is one key factor toward developing a reformed AFP.

6AFP Doctrine and Training


by Col Amador T Tabuga Jr (GSC) PA

6 AFP DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

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In 1998, RA 8551 assigned the task of handling insurgency from the PNP to the AFP. However, a document crafted in 2010 redefined military operations, with the end goal of the military focusing on territorial defense and only as a support to the country’s domestic threats.

The paper examines the possible gaps in the AFP’s doctrines and training that may have been crucial in the battle against insurgency. It discusses how the absence of an ISO doctrine has greatly hampered the fulfillment of the AFP’s assigned task of suppressing insurgency. The absence of an ISO doctrine would also impact on the quality of military training, rendering military training weak and inadequate.

The author argues that there is a need for a National Security Strategy that will provide the basis in the formulation of the AFP’s ISO doctrine and other related military doctrines. Furthermore, there is a need to transform the US-patterned doctrines to suit domestic requirements and incorporate regional, cultural, and territorial differences.


AFP DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

SOURCE: PAO AFP

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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Background

The Philippines has been fighting insurgency throughout history, from the Huk rebellion, to the communist and Muslim insurgencies. Insurgency is defined as an organized movement aimed to overthrow a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The communist insurgency is considered as the longest running insurgency in the country that lasted for more than 40 years and affected and killed thousands of combatants and innocent civilians.

The passage of Republic Act No. 8551 in February of 1998, entitled: ‘An Act Providing for the Reform and Reorganization of the Philippine National Police’, formally transferred the task of handling insurgency from the Philippine National Police to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Section 3 clearly provides:

Since then, the AFP has been in-charge and in the forefront of every operation against insurgency. But despite numerous attempts, the AFP continuously failed in putting an end to insurgency. This resulted in a growing debate on whether the Armed Forces is capable of handling

insurgency or it is beyond their capacity, looking traditionally at the Armed Forces who were basically trained to defend territorial boundaries and not internal conflicts.

Several researches, studies, dialogues and fora were conducted to look closely on this particular issue and one common finding stood out, that Philippine insurgency is multi-dimensional, covering the political, cultural, sociological and economic dimensions, and requires a multi-dimensional approach, a new frame in addressing insurgency.

However, a document was crafted in 2010 that would redefine the whole military operation, with the end goal of leaving its primary role on domestic threats, assuming functions therein and refocusing on territorial defense. Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan, as a military document, provides the strategic guidance in the AFP performance of its mandated functions of protecting the state and the people.

Issues

While the AFP considers a new direction come 2016, it is still fundamental to re-examine past performances versus counter-insurgency operations. Experience is the best teacher after all. It is agreed that the military invested their lives, their knowledge and learnings, and to an extent, their own families, in their attempts to suppress insurgency. These investments are worth highlighting and should not be overshadowed by failures.

The military’s learning talks about training, education, experience and doctrine; logically

“The Department of the Interior and Local Government shall be relieved of the primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security. The Philippine National Police shall, through information gathering and performance of its ordinary police functions, support the Armed Forces of the Philippines on matters involving suppression of insurgency, except in cases where the President shall call on the PNP to support the AFP in combat operations.”

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perceived to be present in every man-in-uniform in actual operations. All military at the forefront of insurgency operation are assumed to be fully equipped and ready. Room for mistakes is hardly considered.

The government on the other hand is in full support and poured a substantial amount of resources and services, year by year and administration by administration to really put closure on the insurgency problem. The only issue here perhaps is political.

However, success is usually short-lived and pocket-based, because in the long run the problem on insurgency resurfaces. So, what could be or where could it be wrong?

1. Is it the doctrine or the lack of it? The Internal Security Operation (ISO) doctrine is supposed to serve as the guiding principle in all AFP’s operations against all forms of insurgency. This way, heavy reliance on best practices and lessons will be minimized. Rather, these will be utilized only as models or modes of reference in an operation.

2. Is it the existing AFP doctrines that were patterned from foreign principles, from the United States? The kind of doctrine that does not address regional differences nor contextualize regional conflict-based groups.

3. Is it the absence of national security strategy on insurgency? The strategy would clearly define strategic approaches among stakeholders or courses of action towards insurgency.

4. Is it systematic? The way the military training was developed and conducted rely heavily

on best practices and lessons learned rather than ISO doctrine.

5. Is it be doctrinal development? This pertains to technical capacity, the available documents, the systematic approach and motivational attributes towards doctrine development.

Sources of the Problem

On Doctrine

The absence of an ISO doctrine has been largely considered as one of the major setbacks why the military was unable to suppress insurgency despite substantial investment and resources provided in every operation. The AFP Manual “Doctrine Development” (AFPM 8-03) defines doctrine as a body of principles in any branch of knowledge that is set forth as a speculative and or self-evident truth, or as speculative working principles as taught or recommended for acceptance by others. It is based on the accumulation of knowledge gained through experience, study, analysis, test and validation.”

Without doctrine or the so called “guiding principles,” all operations conducted against insurgency will rely on past operations, as the next most logical approach to do so. Interpretation will not be cohesive and likely be based on individual belief and interpretations vis-à-vis best practices and lessoned learned. Point of consensus will only be achieved should exchange of opinion be given enough space; however we also have to observe the concept of individuality.

Other existing military doctrines on the other hand were patterned from the United States, the remnants of American occupation that shaped the



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Philippine Armed Forces from structure, system and academic institutions. The overarching principles were foreign in nature. The doctrine does not constitute Filipino discipline nor put into context territorial, regional and cultural differences in this archipelago.

In addition, the doctrine centers or offices observed that little attention has been given to doctrine development in the Armed Forces notwithstanding that it is one of priority areas in Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program and also one of the major pillars of the earlier AFP Modernization Program. Instead, priority is given to pressing operational requirements for ISO. Consequently, emphasis was given to units that were created for ISO and not units dedicated for doctrine development.

Less or inadequate doctrinal emphasis when correlated to degree of importance would eventually affect personnel assigned or being assigned to doctrine development in terms of attitudes, technical capacity and motivational attributes (facilities, promotion and monetary support to programs).

Doctrine Development at GHQ andMajor Services

AFP Doctrine Development Center. The AFPDDC was established on February 10, 2007 as an AFP-Wide Support and Separate Unit (AFPWSSU). Historically, it is the Doctrine Development Office (DDO), a Special Staff of the Chief of Staff, AFP (1977). In 1984, its functions and personnel were transferred to the AFP Command and General Staff College (AFPCGSC) and became the Research and Doctrines Development Group of the college. The center underwent several renaming and

eventually become the AFPDDC today. Aside from developing doctrines, its primary roles include managing GHQ and AFPWSSUs’ doctrine research and development activities, and to reinforce doctrine proponents in support to the AFP mission. Since 1977, AFPDDC has published 80 doctrine manuals, 23 are current while 57 are for review and revision.

Philippine Army. Doctrine development for the Philippine Army (PA) is undertaken by the Doctrine Center established in 1995 under the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) of the PA. The primary mission of DC, TRADOC is to develop, test, evaluate and validate doctrines; publish manuals and pamphlets for doctrinal/historical information and instructional purposes. To date, TRADOC has developed 34 doctrine manuals and 145 reference materials.

Philippine Air Force. Doctrine development for the Philippine Air Force (PAF) is handled by the Air Power Institute (API) which was organized on January 16, 2002. API is mandated “to develop doctrines and advance airpower for the Philippine Air Force”. As of the end of 2012, API has already developed 39 manuals (34 organizational, 4 functional and 1 operational manual).

Philippine Navy. The task of developing naval doctrine has been given to Naval Doctrine Office (NDO) of the Philippine Navy (PN). The office was established on December 2, 2009 and was later organized as a separate office from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Education and Training, N8, PN on July 26, 2010. The PN Basic Doctrine is still on test and evaluation at its Headquarters and would soon set for promulgation by the Chief of Staff, AFP.


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On Military Training

Fundamental to military training is the presence of doctrine that would provide guiding principles for courses of action in the conduct of operations. In the absence of doctrine, military training would be weak or inadequate to some extent. Assumptions are: (1) context and direction setting if not difficult will be mostly trial-based, (2) discourse might be all over the place and interpretation is widely open, (3) cohesiveness or consensus building will be quite hard to achieve; and lastly, (4) targets or mission might suffer.

The AFP defines training as the development of a particular skill or group of skills through a regimen of teaching, drills, exercises, practices, and systems primarily designed to enhance precision and discipline response (AFP ETS, 1997). Syjuco (1977) on the other hand defines military training as the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks.

If doctrinal development in the AFP has issues on emphasis, absence or inadequacy, and contextualization or localization, then the kind of training given to the military would likely reflect the same. And while both training and doctrine are still far from enjoying priority and support, the nature of insurgency in the country continuously evolves, becoming more and more complex or multi-dimensional. Quite a mismatch. Then comes the military’s transition to external defense in 2016. Imagine adding this to the equation. As a paradigm shift, will it create opportunity for doctrinal support or would it merit support insufficiency?

During the AFP Education and Training Summit 2012 at GHQ, participants observed and identified the following major gaps and challenges on training and education, among others:

1. Apprehension of some unified commanders to conduct joint training due to the absence of clear policy. ISO remains to have utmost priority compared to training.

2. Some participants including ground officers agree that the present AFP peace education for soldiers is insufficient. Its creation should be designed to encompass building trust, communications, human relations, social marketing and stakeholders’ management.

3. There has been no local doctrinal basis for training. Training is usually anchored on US and allied doctrines. Akin to operations, training relies heavily on domestic best practices and lessons learned.

4. Lastly, the participants observed that there is no institutionalized and functional development program in training institutions or units primarily due to the following circumstances:

• funding challenges;• lack of permanent faculty;• absence of standards for instructor’s

qualification;• lack of training facilities and amenities; and,• ambivalent attitude of officers and personnel

towards training and assignment to training units.



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Recommendations/Interventions

On Doctrine

1. To hasten the process of formulating a National Security Strategy (NSS), thru the national leadership, to provide basis in the formulation of AFP’s ISO doctrine and related military doctrines that would in turn provide overarching principles and guidance in training and actual operations. Subjective interpretations in the conduct of operations will be avoided, if not minimized.

2. To transform the current US patterned doctrines to suit domestic requirements and incorporate regional, cultural and territorial differences.

3. To highlight the importance of doctrine development and encourage DND/AFP to consider the following:

• include doctrine development in all AFP training courses;

• come up with policy that would encourage officers, enlisted personnel and civilian employees assignment in doctrine centers and offices;

• allocate additional resources on doctrine facility improvements and other logistical needs/amenities like transports and billeting areas;

• consider interface with learning institutions, civilian agencies and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), local and foreign, in support to doctrine formulation; and,

• transform the proposal of the then Lieutenant Colonel Alexander V. Ambal, PA on AFPDDC leadership described in his paper entitled

“Armed Forces Joint Doctrine Development Strategy” (2006) into policy, to wit:

On Training

1. To formulate policies that would amplify emphasis and support on training in order to further enhance AFP capacity and to generate more quality and skilled personnel.

2. To create a more comprehensive AFP education and training system. The design of which will include policies and procedures in conducting individual, unit, joint and combined training exercises with emphasis on pre-entry training, professional military education program, and instructor development program. It should also include the interface between the AFP and civilian learning institutions, both local and foreign, within the objective of enhancing the capacity of AFP training institutions. In addition, it should also include modules on peace building, conflict transformation, human relations, communications, social marketing and stakeholder’s management.


“The rank or grade that will head this AFPWSSU will be O-7. This new AFPWSSU requires a matured, seasoned, and experienced flag officer to steer and lead it. Having a flag officer rank means that he has already gained much knowledge and experience in the military service and this could be utilized to motivate and inspire the personnel to attain the goal of producing joint doctrines. His rank and authority could be used to leverage needed resources for the center. Relatedly, having a star-rank as the head of this AFPWSSU will show that the AFP is now serious in pursuing the development of doctrines.”

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3. To create a policy on the motivational attributes of training. Examples are:

• credit on promotion among instructors both for local and foreign trainings;

• improvement on training facilities and amenities; and,

• allocation of additional fund support and resources to training institutions.

4. To support the proposed Senate Bill No. 675, the ”National Defense and Security Act” that would strengthen military training and education. In addition, it should

also include modules on peace building, conflict transformation, human relations, communications, social marketing and stakeholder’s management.

“Article 18 which provides for the following; (1) establishment of National Defense University (NDU) (Sec. 66), (b) DND shall maintain a defense and security education system (Sec. 62), (2) DND shall enter with learning institutions, local or foreign, for the conduct of education, training and research programs designed to keep the defense establishment abreast with current trends and developments (Sec. 64).”

SOURCE: PAO AFP

7AFP ClearOperational Plans


by Col. Isidro L. Purisima (GSC) PAand Iren C. Gumpal

7 AFP CLEAR OPERATIONAL PLANS

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The AFP has employed various operational concepts and approaches in addressing insurgency and its root causes. The AFP implemented the Bantay Laya series from the early to the latter part of the 2000s that brought together tested operational concepts such as Win-Hold-Win, Sustained Operations, and the strategic precepts of Lambat Bitag (Rapid Conclusion, Gradual Constriction, One-on-One, and Keyhole Approach). With the termination of Bantay Laya 2 in 2010, AFP crafted the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) – Bayanihan, a seemingly fresh approach addressing insurgency and translating the government’s peace and security agenda at the local level.

The paper discusses the specific operational concepts employed in the various Operational Plans implemented by the AFP. It also talks about the innovations introduced by the IPSP Bayanihan, such as the People-Centered Approach, Human Security, and the Whole-of-Nation Approach.

The authors argue that there are interventions needed to be conducted to address the current gaps in the plan. There should be a national policy that will compel other line agencies to take part in internal security operations. Furthermore, the AFP’s campaign plan should be clearly understood by its personnel and staff.


AFP CLEAR OPERATIONAL PLANS

SOURCE: PAO AFP

O



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Overview of the operational approaches/concepts employed by the AFP over the years

Lambat Bitag/ Bantay Laya

Over the years, the AFP has employed various operational concepts and approaches in addressing insurgency and the root causes that propelled insurgency. While some of these approaches were unique in concept and implementation, most were a metamorphosis of one or two operational concepts.

Since the AFP’s assumption of the lead role in internal security operations through RA 8551, its main thrusts mostly orbited on the suppression from insurgency and other threats to peace and security. RA 8551 prescribed the relief of the PNP of its primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious internal threats to national security.

The AFP implemented the Bantay Laya series in early up to the later part of 2000’s bringing together combinations of time tested operational concepts such Win-Hold-Win, Sustained Operations and the strategic precepts of the Lambat Bitag (Rapid Conclusion, Gradual Constriction, One-on-One, and Keyhole Approach). Preceding the original Bantay Laya was the AFP Lambat Bitag campaign plan.

On the tactical level, the Win-Hold-Win approach focused on combat power to WIN against the identified principal threat group while employing economy of force to HOLD and contain lesser priority threats. Upon defeat of the targeted priority threat, forces will be shifted on the next priority threat. Should the threat posed by the less

priority group develops into a more dangerous threat, the AFP will shift its priority focus and WIN against the emergent threat while containing the other threat groups.

In the strategy of Sustained Operations, the strategic precepts of Lambat Bitag were employed. The AFP used the Rapid Conclusion, which aimed at dismantling, in the shortest possible time, the major guerrilla fronts and decisively defeats the main enemy forces through simultaneous and sustained campaign. This likewise is aimed at drawing out the armed threat groups to do battle in a situation determined by the military. The Gradual Constriction, on the other hand, slowly constricts the targeted guerrilla fronts by progressively organizing the enemy affected barangays “in reverse” starting from the outskirts of the guerrilla front and moving slowly towards the central district of the given front. This is coupled with seeking decisive engagements. Further, the One-on-One concept prescribes the deployment of forces to be on a one-on-one basis: one task unit under one commander against one of the guerrilla fronts. It is about focusing or concentrating forces and resources of one unit to an enemy target. The guiding principle is “focus rather than spread.” This enhances unity of command in launching “gradual constriction” against each of the enemy guerrilla front. Furthermore, the Key Hole Approach applies to units with enough forces to form a mobile battalion that sit right in the central district of the armed threat to serve as the unit strike force and disrupt threat group activities in the central districts and threaten his rear.

By and large, the AFP employed the operational principle of Clear-Hold-Consolidate-Develop (Support) to carry out the coordinated and

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integrated efforts of the entire government machinery, with the support and participation of civil society. In the operational plan, it is accomplished within a frame of four overlapping, supporting and interrelated stages that may be conducted sequentially or simultaneously depending on the specific situation in the area. The CLEAR stage ensures decisive defeat of armed groups and neutralization of its politico-military structure. The HOLD stage preserves the initial gains by strengthening the local defense system to secure the cleared areas. The CONSOLIDATE stage involves the collaborative participation of the military, the PNP and the civilian government agencies and instrumentalities in the delivery of basic services. The DEVELOP stage is the implementation of government’s socio-economic, psychosocial and political reforms. The deployment of Special Operations Team (SOT) operations integrate combat, intelligence and civil-military operations. SOT activities are components of the CLEAR phase which frees the barangays from insurgent influence. It dismantles the mass base political structure developed by insurgent groups at the barangay level. This doctrine, having been proven to be effective, has undergone several refinements leading to the development of COPD, PDOP, Peace and Development Team/ BayanihanTeam which the AFP has been using until today.

In its basic sense, the CLEAR stage is also referred to as the Area Clearing wherein it aims for the decisive defeat of the insurgent armed groups and the neutralization of the insurgent’s politico-military infrastructures in target priority fronts.The aforementioned tactical approaches were variedly used in this stage.

Apart from these operational approaches, concepts such as the Red Area/ White Area Operations demand for two distinct operations conducted simultaneously to break the redarea-white area symbiosis. Red Area Operations focus on the armed threat groups in the countryside while the White Area Operations focus onguerrilla front committees piloting generaluprising in the urban areas.

To reinforce the HOLD stage, the AFP utilized/developed the Community Security Mechanism/Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS)/Integrated Area Community Public Safety (IACPS) Plan by integrating the efforts ofterritorial forces (AFP, CAA and PNP), local defense organization, local government, local sectoral organization, and local populace into an effective defense and security system that will secure and insulate the locality from threat group influence, incursion or re-entry.ITDS starts as soon as all affected barangays are cleared of armed groupsand mass-based organization. Furthermore, under the Bantay Laya, the AFP also employed the TRIAD Concept, asynergistic employment of combat operations, intelligence, and civil-military operations. As supplementary measure, the AFP, in close coordination with the PNP and other law enforcement agencies exercised legal offensive operationsagainst armed threat groups to ensure thesuccessful prosecution of those responsible for committing atrocities by filing cases against leaders and members of the differentthreat groups. The establishment of Inter-AgencyLegal Assistance Group (IALAG) has strengthened the effort on legal cooperation.



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While the AFP employed various approaches to address the armed threat groups, it has not ceased in providing opportunities to those who are sincere to return to the folds of law. The DND-AFP Balik-Baril Program in coordination with LGUs, LGAs and NGOs continued to encourage armed insurgents to lay down their arms and be productive members of the society. Rebel returnees who availed of the program benefitted from firearms payment, emergency cash loan, livelihood assistance and amnesty. The Amnesty Program of the government thru the Proclamation No. 405, s. 2000 grants amnesty to all rebels who have committed crimes in pursuit of their political beliefs. Rebels who applied in this program benefited from integration into a peaceful, pluralistic and democratic society. Furthermore, the AFP has also supported the rehabilitation of conflict-affected areas through peacebuilding initiatives by constructing barangay roads and school buildings, and other community-based infrastructure projects.

Civil Government Agencies Involvement

While the Lambat Bitag series prescribedintensified military operations against threat groups, it has likewise called for the active support of civil government agencies (CGAs) such as Peace and Order Council (POC), National Reconciliation and Development Program (DSWD, DND, DILG, DTI, DPWH), Joint Legal Action Committee (DOJ, DILG, DND) and other related bodies of instrumentalities of the government to the overall counterinsurgency campaign. In the document, the POC was described as a coordinative body designed to orchestrate a unified and strongly coordinated mechanism in the conduct of overall counter-

insurgency efforts of the government, combines the energies and capabilities of LGUs, the AFP the PNP, concerned CGAs and some committed citizenry at the national, regional, provincial and city/municipal levels. This can be viewed that the AFP has always been clear on the role of the POCs and the importance of the support of other line agencies in the campaign against insurgency. However, the AFP is just part of the whole gamut of the counterinsurgency efforts.

IPSP Bayanihan

With the termination of Bantay Laya 2 in 2010, the AFP saw the crafting of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) – Bayanihan, a seemingly fresh approach to address insurgency and translate the government’s peace and security agenda at the local level. In this plan, the AFP is the catalyst. The crafting of the IPSP Bayanihan has introduced several concepts unfamiliar to the exclusive military organization. It has put emphasis to People-Centered Approach which seeks to enhance human rights and promote human development efforts, the necessary conditions to create a peaceful and secure environment under the broader frame of Human Security. Human Security centers on the protection and respect for human rights, good governance, access to economic opportunities, education and health care. It addresses the seven components which are economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security requiring the entire government bureaucracy, the private sector, and the civil society to collectively implement. This, however, does not eliminate the


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role of the ordinary citizen and the entire Filipino nation as active contributors to internal peace and security. In the Whole-of-Nation Approach, security is shared not just among security forces and government institutions but also with civil society and the communities.

Moreover, it introduced the concept of “Winning the Peace” wherein it shifts from a predominantly militaristic solution to a people-centered security strategy that is founded on broad-based consultations and engagements with key stakeholders. It strives to pursue collaborative efforts with other internal peace and security actors and participants in sharing the responsibility of the peace and security agenda. It also strengthens interagency coordination which effectively and efficiently synchronizes and integrates efforts and responses of the entire government machinery and non-governmental entities to overcome insurgency and to identify areas of exclusivity, coordination, and integration to ensure unity of efforts.

While it pursues collaborative efforts, the AFP under the IPSP, conducts Focused Military Operations against all internal armed threat groups threatening the safety and well-being of the people. Under the IPSP, adherence to the principles, concepts, provisions and spirit of Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law or Law on Armed Conflicts and Rule of Law became a must in all its operations. It has not ceased to support Community Based Peace and Development through the deployment of specifically organized community peace and

development teams that shall use the combination of military and non-military activities to counter coercive activities and diminish the influence wielded by armed threat groups in barangays. With the IPSP, the AFP has embraced a new approach to check and balance by integrating interagency assessment and stakeholder’s analysis as part of its approach to enhance its operational cohesiveness in the implementation of IPSP. In the essence of the whole-of-nation approach, the AFP in return, employed support operations to establish and maintain a just and lasting thorough support to civil law enforcement, civil-military cooperation such as conflict resolution, peace advocacy, peace constituency and human security.

Moreover, under this new campaign plan, it introduced the concept of Security Sector Reform which is operationalized by adhering to the principle of Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) with emphasis on democratic principles, such as transparency, and accountability. It identifies three main thrusts, to develop AFP capabilities; to enhance professionalism in the armed forces; and, to institutionalize stakeholders’ involvement.

As new operational approaches were introduced in the plan, several gaps were identified that need clarification. There is a need to review the old operational concepts and approaches whether they are still applicable or needs revisions. There are concepts in the IPSP that need further elucidations because they are not purely military in nature.



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Interventions needed for improvement of the plan and operational environment

The need for a national policy that shall necessitate other line agencies to take part in the internal security operations.

The publication of the National Internal Security Plan (NISP) in 2001 embodied the “Strategy of Holistic Approach” involving the entire instrument of power of the government. Past experience indicated that these were not achieved on the ground. In a review of the implementation of Bantay Laya, it was identified the lack of awareness and dissemination of the NISP to other government agencies and their lower units/offices resulted to the limited participation, if not the non-participation of line agencies in the peace and security agenda of the national government.At the local level, subsequent to the area clearing operation of the AFP, the development phase of cleared barangays was either delayed or lacking at all. As a result, the psychological impact of the government’s development projects and the delivery of basic services remained marginalized.

The NISP has provided a mechanism to address insurgency however; this plan is more viewed as a military defense/security plan rather than a plan that requires the essential participatory and holistic approach to address insurgency. Thus, efforts of all involved were not coordinated and focused. Even with the PNP, its support role to ISO was taken nonchalantly that pre-emptive measures against insurgent offensives were overlooked. As a result, local PNP stations and detachments have become lucrative sources of firearms for the insurgents.

The publication of the IPSP Bayanihan has relatively defined what it hopes to achieve under the peace and security agenda of the government. Compared with the all-military plan Bantay Laya, the IPSP necessitates sincere commitment from other relevant actors and stakeholders for it to achieve its maximum potential. The plan gives equal emphasis on the combat and non-combat dimensions of military operations and the increasing involvement of national and Local Government Agencies, NGOs, Civil Society and the entire citizenry.

While the government has published the National Security Policy 2011-2016 which lays down the fundamental and comprehensive framework on inter-related issues and concerns that may impact on national security, it lacks the National Security Strategy (NSS) which embodies the method by which the instruments of national power are developed, applied and coordinated to attain the national security objectives. In the absence of an updated NISP, the IPSP is in need of a comprehensive national plan that shall necessitate the commitment and involvement of all government line agencies and other relevant stakeholders in addressing internal security concerns. This national policy shall also be expected to clarify the roles of government units, especially the PNP, and the AFP.

Empowering of the POCs and LCEs/LGUs

The Peace and Order Council with the LGU are the focal point and central authority responsible to deal with human security issues at their level. This is clearly stipulated in the Local Government Code of the Philippines wherein the local government units are empowered by law to


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exercise efficient and effective governance. They shall have the lead role in creating a structure that shall address human security issues at the local level. Moreover, they are the lead actors in promoting the general welfare of the people within their respective territorial jurisdiction such as maintaining peace and order. Furthermore, under Section 4 of the E.O. 546 signed on 14 July 2006, the local chief executives (LCEs), in coordination with the POCs are tasked to include their priority program of action/thrust in their respective Integrated Area/Community Public Safety Plan on resolving insurgency and serious threats to national security. As such, the POCs and LCEs should be strengthened and empowered to pursue the peace initiatives in their area of jurisdiction.

In totality, the DND/AFP is just a part of the whole-of-nation approach toward the attainment of the national goal. Imperative to this is the mutual support of all government agencies and stakeholders working toward good governance, delivery of basic and services; economic reconstruction and sustainable development; and security sector reform. While the AFP on the ground is yet to polish its grasp of the approaches embodied in the plan, it lacks the central authority to compel key players and line agencies in the local arena to commit and get involved.

The need to repeal Section 3 of RA 8551

One of the main issues in the defense reform is delineating clear roles and responsibilities with the PNP for internal security operations. This is apparent in the need to repeal Section 3 of the RA 8551 which prescribed the relief of the Philippine National Police/DILG of its primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious

internal threats to national security. The RA 8551 provides that the AFP is the lead agency involving in the suppression of insurgency. The urgency of this concern is relevant because the Defense Planning Guidance 2013-2018 projected the AFP to focus its main efforts on its highest core security concern which is the challenges on the country’s territorial integrity. It shall however, render support to other actors and government agencies on matters pertaining to internal security.

Continuity of the Modernization Program in preparation of its transition to territorial defense (RA 7898)

The issuance of RA 8551 in 1998 prompted the AFP to shift its priority from the then called External Defense to Internal Security Operations. This event led to the refocusing of the modernization program from building AFP’s future territorial defense capability to addressing shortages in the ISO. The RA 7898 known as the AFP Modernization Act which was signed by the President in February 1995 purposely declares, as a policy of the state, to modernize the AFP to a level where it can effectively and fully perform its constitutional mandate to defend the sovereignty and protect and preserve the patrimony of the republic. This was extended in 2012 for another period of 15 years under RA 10349.

The need for parallel understanding of the AFP and stakeholders of the plan.

As the AFP has entirely shifted from purely military plan to co-authoring the internal security plan with stakeholders and civilian counterpart, it caused diverse appreciation on how this will be operationalized on the ground. The need for comprehensive advocacy and education of all actors involved in the implementation of IPSP is



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essential. This lack of parallel grasp of the plan is evident in the study conducted by the Working Group on Security Sector Reform of Ateneo de Manila University, Political Science Department to various AFP units and offices across the country. Intervention on this is crucial.

Implications If No Interventions Are Done

In the absence of interventions on the gaps in the plan, the potential of the AFP’s current operational plan will not be fully realized. With the lack of a national policy that will compel other line agencies to take part in the internal security operations, the plan shall remain an entirely AFP plan – no different to previous plans crafted by the AFP. Non-functioning POCs/LCEs shall again put greater weight on the AFP to pursue the peace and security agenda of the government in the local level.

Furthermore, with RA 8551 still in force, the AFP shall not be able to focus its energy and resources to territorial defense. It cannot be fully effective in

its core mission of upholding the sovereignty and defend the territory of the country as long as it performs primary role in ISO.

Yet, the PNP must be prepared and equipped to take the lead role so as not to compromise the gains the country has achieved so far against armed threats. The Joint Peace and Security Coordinating Center (JPSCC), an AFP and PNP partnership, must be enhanced as one of the mechanisms in the gradual transition of the AFP’s ISO to law enforcement functions of the PNP.

In addition, without the support of the government’s modernization program, the AFP cannot be fully mission-capable in territorial defense. It is primary that this be emphasized as the AFP is working towards its shift to territorial defense.

Lastly, that the personnel and staff of the AFP have no clear and unified understanding of its own plan is a serious concern that should not be neglected. Disjointed appreciation of the plan breeds indifference to commanders and field operators.


References:

Armed Forces of the Philippines, Primer on AFP Campaign Plan (LOI 23/88) Lambat Bitag of December 16, 1988.

Armed Forces of the Philippines, Campaign Plan (“Lambat Bitag II”) of November 18, 1991.

Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP ISO Plan 02-01 (“Bantay-Laya”) of February 24, 2002.

Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP ISO PLAN s-2007 (“Bantay Laya”) II of December 01, 2006.

Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFP ISO Plan 02-01 (“Bantay Laya”) Review Report and Briefing of January 06, 2007.

Armed Forces of the Philippines, IPSP Handbook of December 2010.

Armed Forces of the Philippines, Rules of Engagement for AFP IPSP “Bayanihan” of March 31, 2011.

Department of Interior and Local Government, Executive Order No. 546 of July 14, 2006.

National Internal Security Plan (NISP) Version 3.0

National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011-2016 of April 2011.

Armed Forces of the Philippines, GHQ and AFPWSSUs CY 2011 Yearend Accomplishment Report of December 2011.

8Philippine IntelligenceCommunity: A Case forTransparency


by Francis Domingo

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The continuously evolving global security landscape has prompted states across the world to establish intelligence agencies to effectively protect national sovereignty and security from prevailing and emerging security challenges and threats. Anchored on Western ideas, a general notion of intelligence is that it is “stolen information” acquired through espionage or clandestine activities. This information normally pertains to matters critical to aspects of national security and threats from actual or potential adversaries. Thus, secrecy of intelligence information, processes, and organization is absolutely necessary to prevent any damage to the prestige and national security of a state.

Despite the need to ensure secrecy across all aspects of intelligence, the article argues that the prevailing tradition or practice of security restrictions should not impede public understanding or awareness of basic intelligence information in the Philippines. The article provides anin-depth examination of the Philippine Intelligence Community (IC) by focusing on the following critical junctures of analysis: 1) identification of the notions of the intelligence; 2) implications of secrecy of intelligence activities; 3) structure and organization of the Philippine IC; and,4) mechanisms for intelligence oversight.

Furthermore, the article offers some recommendations in developing and ensuring intelligence transparency in the Philippines. These include 1) maintaining public transparency through the dissemination of basic information on intelligence agencies (i.e. use of media platforms and linkages with academic and civilian research entities), and 2) developing intelligence oversight mechanisms, either through executive or congressional oversight mechanisms, which will ensure that intelligence agencies operate in accordance with democratic principles and controls.


PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY

8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY

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Democratic states, both new and established, are confronted with fundamental and inevitable dilemma in combining intelligence agencies that are effective and under democratic civilian control. This is due to the tension between the necessity of intelligence agencies to work in secret and the requirement of democratic government for accountability, obliging intelligence transparency.1 The ultimate challenge for policymakers and scholars is to understand this dilemma and to manage it in a consistent and productive manner.2

In the case of the Philippines, basic information regarding the mandate, functions, and objectives of intelligence agencies are not available to the public due to the ‘culture of secrecy’ embedded in members of the intelligence community. And without the benefit of a freedom of information law which provides access to ‘all information pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, as well as government research data used as basis for policy development…’3, it would be impossible for ordinary Filipinos who help fund intelligence agencies to develop awareness and gain basic knowledge about the activities of the Philippine Intelligence Community.

Considering that transparency and openness are instituted norms in intelligence communities

in democratic states,4 the general mindset towards intelligence and intelligence agencies in the Philippine is still dominated by secrecy and resistance to transparency. This is manifested by the fact that government agencies that engage in intelligence work do not have official communication mediums like websites and do not consistently publish information briefs and annual reports where basic details can be imparted to the public. It is also significant that scholars, local and foreign, have not produced any research that focuses primarily on the intelligence community. While some commentators and journalists have written about issues that challenge intelligence agencies, their works did not consider the emerging academic literature on intelligence studies and the substantial information available from other states.5

With this background, this article argues that while numerous aspects of intelligence should remain secret, security restrictions should not impede the public from understanding the purpose, objectives and basic functions of intelligence agencies. The article examines the Philippine Intelligence Community (IC) in the context of the following questions: What are the notions of intelligence in the Philippines? Why is secrecy necessary in intelligence activities? What is the structure and


1 Refers to the oversight function for different sectors including legislative and judicial branches of government, media, academia and non-

government organizations to ensure the Philippine Intelligence Community is undertaking its mission legally, effectively, and efficiently.2 Thomas Bruneau, “Introduction: Challenges to Effectiveness in Intelligence due to the Need for Transparency and Accountability in Democracy,”

Strategic Insights Volume VI, Issue 3 (2007). 3 Freedom of Information Act of 2009, S.B. No. 3308, 14th Congress, Second Session (2009).4 Adam N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent War Understanding the World of Intelligence 3rd Edition (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002),

102-103.5 Kimberly Tan, “Drilon wants intelligence coordinating agency reorganized” GMA News Online, October 10, 2010, accessed, May 13, 2012,

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/203297/news/nation/drilon-wants-intelligence-coordinating-agency-reorganized; Cathy Yamusan,

“Open records of Marcos’ spy agency, Enrile urges,” Inquirer News Online, December 12, 2011, accessed, May 13, 2012, http://newsinfo.inquirer.

net/109377/open-records-of-marcos%E2%80%99-spy-agency-enrile-urges; Maila Ager, “Drilon, Enrile question intelligence agency’s 811

‘unjustified’ positions,” Inquirer News Online, November 13, 2010, accessed, May 13, 2012, http://globalnation.

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organization of the IC? What are the different mechanisms for intelligence oversight? The last section presents recommendations for developing intelligence transparency in the Philippines.

Understanding intelligence

The concept of “intelligence” in the Philippines is predominantly influenced by Western notions of intelligence. In fact, the whole concept of“coordinating intelligence” and establishing agovernment agency that would coordinatenational intelligence efforts and provideassessments can be attributed to Americaninfluence.6 Therefore, currently Philippine civilian and military intelligence strategies and policies are mostly based on the practices of the United States Intelligence Community.7

There are three dominant notions of intelligence which are generally accepted by intelligence scholars and practitioners. These notions classify intelligence into focus on three general catego-ries: information, process, and organization.8

One notion is that intelligence is information. In their seminal work Silent Warfare,intelligence scholars Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt define intelligence as “information

relevant to a government’s formulation andimplementation of policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats from actual or potentials adversaries.”9 In most cases, this “relevant information” is collected fromdifferent sources (secret and open) andpertains to matters regarding an adversary’smilitary capabilities and intentions, diplomaticaffairs, and intelligence activities.10 Theinformation is then processed and analyzedto generate what is referred to as an “intelligence product.”

Another notion is that intelligence is alsoconsidered a systematic process. MarkLowenthal, a former American intelligenceofficial offers another perspective on intelligence. He asserts that intelligence is a “process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers.”11 This notion ofintelligence is broader and considers the entire intelligence cycle, from planning and direction to dissemination, as “intelligence.”

Lastly, intelligence is defined as an organization. Prominent intelligence scholar and formerBritish intelligence officer Michael Hermanasserts that while there are several perspectiveson intelligence, the key element in these


6 Executive Order No. 235 of 1949, “Creation of the National Intelligence and Security Authority.”7 See for example: Executive Order No. 246 (1987). “Providing for the Creation of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, and for

other Purposes.”Malacanang, Manila, med Forces of the Philippines, AFPM 2-2 Tactical Intelligence (Quezon City, General Headquarters,

Camp Aguinaldo, 1978), Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFPM 2-5 The Armed Forces Attaché (Quezon City, General Headquarters, Camp

Aguinaldo, 1981), and Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFPM 2-02 Joint Intelligence Collection Manual (Quezon City, General Headquarters,

Camp Aguinaldo, 2008)8 Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent War.9 Ibid.10 Ibid.11 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence from Secrets to Policy 4th Edition (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2009).


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perspectives is the organizational aspect. Heexplains that “intelligence in government is based on the particular set of organizations with that name: the ‘intelligence services’ or (sometimes) the ‘intelligence communities.’ 12 Consequently, aside from information or a systematic process, intelligence also refers to governmentorganizations. These organizations or intelligence services have been a twenty-first century growth industry and are now permanent institutional structures in governments around the world.13

The definitions presented above are certainly useful in increasing our understanding of intelligence but they are not considered as “official” or “accepted” definitions. In fact, for the past years, a number of practitioners,academics, and specialists (intelligencescholars) have attempted to develop viabledefinitions of intelligence.14 While these studies have contributed to the emerging academicliterature of intelligence, a viable definition ofintelligence is still lacking until this time.

Secrecy and intelligence

Since a general notion of intelligence is that it is stolen information that pertains to criticalaspects of state’s national security and threats from actual or potentials adversary, secrecy isabsolutely necessary to prevent any damage to the prestige and national security of a state.

Therefore, information from open sources - newspapers, television broadcast, or academicpublications may be valuable, but it is notnecessarily intelligence.

In terms of methodology, there are different ways of stealing information. Information can be stolenthrough technical means such as encipheredcables from foreign embassies can be intercepted and decoded or satellites can surreptitiouslyphotograph a terrorist training camp hidden in a desert. Information can also be the work of ahuman agent, perhaps by slipping classifieddocuments into a briefcase when leaving work at the end of the day, the classic secret agent of the spy movies. However the information is stolen, its theft involves two extremely sensitivecomponents that intelligence agencies have to protect at all cost: the source of information and the method used to steal the information.15

The maintenance of secrecy has provenessential to the successful development, implementation, and completion of plans and missions of the government.16 Secrecy isimplemented through levels of classification,reflecting the sensitivity of the intelligence orintelligence means. More specifically, theconfidential classification level prevents thedisclosure of information that is expected to cause ‘damage’ to a state’s national security, the secret classification level prevents the disclosure ofinformation that is expected to cause ’serious


12 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: University Press, 1996) 13 Ibid.14 Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition for Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence Vol. 46 Issue 2 (2002).15 Thomas Patrick Carroll, “The Case Against Intelligence Openness,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 14 (2001):

559-574.16 Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy

(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997): 6.

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damage’ to a state’s national security, while the top secret classification level prevents the disclosure of information that is expected to cause exceptionally grave damage’ to a state’s national security. These classifications are driven by concerns that disclosure of sources and methods will allow other actors to implement measures to prevent collection, effectively negating the collection system.17

Therefore, intelligence and secrecy are directly correlated. Since intelligence is informationacquired through espionage or clandestineactivities, secrecy is required to protect the sources of information and the methods utilized to steal the information. Having established the connection between intelligence and secrecy, the next section examines the structure andorganization of the Philippine IntelligenceCommunity.

The Intelligence Community

The structure of the IC is generally patternedafter the US Intelligence Community prior to 2004. Much like the United States, the President of the Philippines is the highest authority on mattersinvolving national security. The NationalSecurity Advisor (NSA) is the chief advisor of thePresident on national security matters andbelongs to the official cabinet of the President. The National Security Council (NSC) is thePresident’s principal forum for deliberating on

national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials.18 The President chairs the NSC, which is composed of members of key governmentdepartments including foreign affairs, national defense, military, interior and local government, justice, labor and employment, science andtechnology.19

To translate policy into action, the NSC relies on the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) which is the main intelligence agency of the Philippine government. The agency which was originally established as the NationalIntelligence and Security Authority (NISA) by President Elpidio Quirino in 1949 was tasked to “organize and coordinate the intelligencecollection activities of various governmentinstrumentalities concerned.” However since 1987, NICA’s mandate has shifted to a broader scope of “directing, coordinating, andintegrating all government activities involving national intelligence.” 20 In addition, the agency plays a central role in preparing intelligenceassessments for consideration of keydecision-makers in the Philippine government.

Under NICA, there are two functional bodies, the National Intelligence Committee (NIC) and the Regional Intelligence Committee (RIC). The NIC is the principal arm of the National Intelligence Board for providing direction and control ofintelligence operations and activities of theintelligence community. The NIC is also a


17 Lowenthal, Intelligence From Secrets to Policy 18 The White House, National Security Council, last modified 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc.19 Shiela Coronel and Yvonne T. Chua (eds.), The PCIJ Guide to Government (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism,

2003).20 Department of Budget and Management, National Expenditures Program 2009 Executive Offices, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency.

Quezon City: Department of Budget and Management, 2009.


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high-level forum where the IC can conductintelligence exchanges to generate inputs forNICA’s national intelligence estimate (NIE).21

RICs have the same mandate and structure as the NIC, however the scope of these units is narrower or more “localized”. RICs have direct operational function thus permitting them to act on intelligence reports requiring immediate action.22

The National Intelligence Board (NIB) is the highest forum for intelligence exchange among senior officials from selected governmentdepartments and units.23 The NIB provides the NICA Director-General with an independentsource of advice on the effectiveness of theIC in meeting the country’s intelligencerequirements and the coordination and integration of local and global intelligence operations. Due to the nature of its mandate the NIB has access to allinformation needed to perform its functions and includes senior officials of all governmentdepartment and units of the Philippinesgovernment.24

The Special Monitoring Committee (SMC) was established in 2002 for counterintelligence operations, particularly to monitor domestic threats such as destabilization plots against the administration, and terrorism against the general public. Two groups were created within

the SMC, SMC-Alpha and SMC-Bravo. Alpha closely monitors domestic threats specifically destabilization plots against the administration while Bravo serves as “the body principally tasked to undertake threat assessment work”including intelligence monitoring of terrorist plans and activities.” 25

Recommendations for intelligence transparency

The emergence of transnational security threats originating from state and non-state actors has proven that intelligence is anessential tool for states in the twenty first century. While developing an internal security service is a standard procedure for states to securetheir citizens, few states still take the view that they can dispense with a foreignintelligence service. Two basic patterns exist fororganizing security and intelligence. The firstinvolves the establishment of a single agency integrating domestic and foreign intelligence(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, theNetherlands, Spain and Turkey). The secondnecessitates the creation of separateagencies for domestic security and externalintelligence, with either distinct or coinciding territorial capabilities (France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, the UK and the USA). Even withthe variations in the organizational structure or


21 National Intelligence Board Directive No. 1 Series 2003 cited in Ariel Perlado, “Assessing the Effectiveness of the Intelligence Coordination

System of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (unpublished master’s thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines, 2011).22 Ibid.23 AFP-J2, AFP-ISAFP, PNP-IG, PNP-ITG, NBI, Presidential Security Group, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Local Government, Budget and

Management, Finance, Energy, Transportation and Communication, Labour and Employment, Transportation, Environment and Natural

Resources, Social Welfare, Public Works, Trade and Industry, Heath, Agriculture.24 Executive Order No. 158 ______ (1968).25 National Intelligence Board No. 2 Series 2002 cited in Perlado, Assessing the Effectiveness.

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governmental set up, security and intelligencepose a common set of challenges foraccountability across different states.26

The central issue in advocating for intelligence transparency through oversight is the challenge of how to provide democratic control ofintelligence and intelligence agencies which are essential to the survival and prosperity of the state, but which must operate secretly.Consequently, this study submits the following recommendations which are basedon the practices of democratic governments.

Maintain public transparency

There are two basic strategies that intelligence agencies employ to maintain public transparency. One strategy is for intelligence agencies through their public affairs office, publish basic information, whether printed or online, about their work. A second strategy is forthe intelligence agencies to collaborate with academics and researchers to allowthem to understand and assess different aspects of intelligence agencies.

Publishing basic information about intelligence agencies such as US National Intelligence: A Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence released in 2009 and the UK National Intelligence Machinery published in 2010 provides American and British citizens with a general understanding of how the intelligence agencies will protect them against

various threats to national security.27 On the other hand, setting up official websites that feature basic information about intelligence agencies indicates a high level of transparency and respect for democratic processes. Indonesia’s Badan Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Agency), Mexico’s El Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional (Center for Research and NationalSecurity) and India’s Central Intelligence Bureau are examples of developing countries that have been successful in disseminating information to the public through the Internet.28

Collaborating with academics and researchersis another basic strategy which intelligence agencies implement to maintain transparency. Since intelligence is a process, intelligence agencies work with academics and researchers to ensure that their administrators, analysts, and officers develop new and progressive perspectives regarding the different aspectsof intelligence, particularly clandestine collection, counter intelligence, analysis and covert action or in Philippine parlance ‘special operations’. While the literature on intelligence is well developed, it is strictly dominated by Western academics and practioners. Important examples of scholarly works on intelligenceinclude: Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War and Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence which discusses clandestinecollection from an historical perspective;Jennifer Sims, Buton Gerber, Vaultsand Mirrors and Masks Rediscovering


26 Hans Born and Ian Leigh, “Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services” Geneva Centre for the Democratic control of Armed forces

Policy Paper 19 (2007), 6-7.27 Office of the Director for National Intelligence, National Intelligence: A Consumer’s Guide (Washington D.C.: U.S. Director for National

Intelligence, 2009) and UK Cabinet Office, National Intelligence Machinery (London: The Stationary Office, 2010)28 Center for Research and National Security, What is the CISEN?, last modified 2010, http://www.cisen.gob.mx/ cisen.htm; BadanIntelijen

Negara, Profile,last modified 2012, http://www.bin.go.id/#; Ministry of Home Affairs, Organisational Setup, last modified May 16, 2011.


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US Counterintelligence and William John-son, Thwarting Enemies at Home and Aboard discusses prospective reforms in US counterintelligence; Stephen Marrin,Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging theGap Between Scholarship and Practiceand Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainly, Intelligence Analysis and National Securityprovide key ideas on how to improve intelligence analysis; and, finally Gregory Treverton, Covert Action The Limits ofIntervention in the Postwar World and William Daugherty, Exec tive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency offer recommendationto address controversial issues regarding covert actions in the United States.

Aside from the two basic strategies, it isnecessary for the Philippine Congress to pass legislation requiring intelligence agencies todisclose basic information which should at the least, include “descriptions of its central and field organization” and “statements of the general course and method by which its functions are channeled and determined.” 29 As mentioned previously, the Filipino people have yet tobenefit from a law that mandates easy andefficient access to public information. While the latest version (2012) of the freedom ofinformation bill, An Act to Strengthen the Right of Citizens to Information held by the Governmentrequires all government agencies to “regularlypublish, print and disseminate” updated key information regarding mandate, structure,

powers, functions, duties, decision makingprocesses and other information that does not damage the national security of the State, it is still uncertain whether this bill will be approvedby both legislative and executive branches ofthe government.30

Develop intelligence oversight mechanisms

The central issue in ensuring intelligencetransparency is the challenge of how to provide democratic control or oversight on intelligence functions and institutions which are essential to the survival and development of a state, but which must operate in justifiable secrecy.

In contrast to other areas of governmentalactivity, it is accepted that officialcommunications and operations of intelligence agencies can only be transparent to a limited extent. Prevailing mechanisms for oversight applied by a majority of governmental activities need to be modified to match the requirements of intelligence agencies. Therefore, the need forrigorous oversight is much greater than in the case of activities such as education or welfare.31

Intelligence oversight is still an emerging concept in the Philippines.32 The mission of investigating “illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient” actions by public officials resides with the Office of the Ombudsman, the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and the House


29 The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 as amended by Public Law No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524.30 Proposed Freedom of Information Act of 2012, accessed on 16 July 2012, http://www.gov.ph/foi/.31 Born and Leigh, Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services.32 Senate Bill 765, The Intelligence Oversight Act of 2010, accessed on 17 July 2012,

http://www.senate.gov.ph/lis/bill_res.aspx?congress=15&q=SBN-765

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Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability.33 While these may be considered successful in uncovering vital information regarding national security matters, these investigative institutions are not necessarilysuitable to implement effective intelligence oversight because they lack the focus and security protocols present in specialized department or committees of more advance democratic states like Argentina, the United Kingdom and the United States.34 The succeeding section discusses the two dominant types ofintelligence oversight mechanisms which could be appropriate for the Philippine government.

Executive oversight

The definitive authority and legitimacy of intelligence agencies rest on legislative approval of their powers, activities and budget. However, for practical reasons and because of thesensitive nature and urgency of the tasks of involving intelligence, effective external control of these agencies must rest with the executive branch of government.35

There is no inherent conflict between executive control and congressional oversight. In fact, the congress depends on the executive for effective oversight because congress can only reliably call members of the executive branch to account for the actions of intelligence agencies only if these officials have actual powers of control and have sufficient information about the operations

they authorized. In states where this system is absent, the only democratic alternative is for a congress to take over. However, this alternative is questionable because, while legislative bodies can effectively investigate the use of powers and expenditure after the fact, they are not capable of directing and managing real time intelligence activities unlike the executive branch ofgovernment.36

Congressional Oversight

The international norm is for Congress to create a specialized body which is mandated to provide oversight of the intelligence services. Without a specialized committee, it is difficult if notimpossible for the Congress to exercisesystematic and focused oversight of the intelligence services. The extent of the mandate of the Congressional intelligence oversight committee is critical for its success. One option is for the mandate to be comprehensive, reviewing both policy and operations (Germany and United States). A Congressional oversight body that focuses on operations may have greater credibility and may be given greater powers, such as powers of subpoena. However, it will encounter unavoidable restrictions on how it undertakesinvestigations and on what can be reported to the Congressional Committee or thepublic. It will operate in effect within a ‘ring ofsecrecy’ and that will create a barrier between the specialized body and the remainder of the


33

34 Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh (eds.), Who’s Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Dulles,

Virginia: Potomac Publishers, 2005).35 Born and Leigh, Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services.36 Ibid, pp. 10-11.


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Congressional Committee. As long as thecommittee establishes a reputation forindependence and thoroughness, this barriershould not affect its legitimacy. With this arrangement, the Congressional Committee and the public will have to trust that there exists proper oversight of operational matters even without readily available supporting evidence.37

The alternative approach is to limit the mandate of the Congressional oversight committee to certain aspects particularly policy and finance (United Kingdom) or human rights and the rule of law (Norway). These aspects are generally examinedin the public arena with fewer restrictions ondisclosure, although the publication of exact budgetary details may be damaging to national security. The difficulty of this approach, however,is that it undermines one of the key tasks ofCongressional scrutiny: ensuring thatgovernment policy is carried out effectively and within the boundaries of the law. Without access tooperational details, an oversight body can have or give no assurance about the efficiency or the legality of the intelligence agencies.38

Conclusion

The concept of “intelligence” in the Philippines is dominated by Western ideas which defineintelligence as not only information but also a process and an organization. Since a dominant notion of intelligence is that it is stoleninformation, secrecy is absolutely necessary to prevent damage to the prestige and national

security of a state. More specifically, secrecy is absolutely vital in protecting the sources ofintelligence and the methods utilized to obtainintelligence.

In terms of structure, the Philippine Intelligence Community is generally patternedafter the US Intelligence Community prior to 2004.Much like the United States, the President of the Philippines is the highest authority on mattersinvolving national security while the National Security Adviser is the most influential senior staff member when national security matters are involved. The NSC which is also patterned after the American National Security Council, is the President’s principal forum for deliberating on national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. To implement policies developed within the NSC, the President relies on the NICA, which is the main intelligence agency of the Philippine government. Under the NSC, there is also the National Intelligence Board where the highest forum for intelligence exchange among senior officials from selected government departments and units take place.

With the emergence of transnational security threats originating from state and non-stateactors, there is no question that intelligenceagencies are necessary for states to survive in the twenty first century. While there are differentpatterns and procedures for organizingintelligence agencies, achieving intelligence transparency will always remain a main challenge for democratic states.


37 Ibid.38 Ibid.

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Increasing public transparency and developing intelligence oversight mechanisms arerecommendations to develop intelligencetransparency in the Philippines. As discussedpreviously, intelligence agencies can increasepublic transparency by developing an official website, publishing documents regarding the Philippine Intelligence Community and collaborating with academics and researchers.Intelligence oversight is still an emergingconcept in the Philippines. Executiveoversight and congressional oversight are two dominant mechanisms to ensuring thatintelligence agencies are a countable for their actions. Although definitive authority and legitimacy of intelligence agencies rest on legislative approval, executive oversight is a

practical oversight mechanism because with the sensitive nature and urgency of the tasks ofinvolving intelligence, effective external control of these agencies must rest with the executive branch of government.

On the other hand, Congressional oversight is the dominant mechanism adopted by different democratic states because these committees are generally effective in investigating the use of powers and expenditures of intelligence agencies. However, the problem with these committees is that they are not capable of directing and managing real time intelligenceactivities that the executive branch ofgovernment can implement.


9Civil-Military Operation: Models of InstitutionalEngagement in the Philippines


by Maribel Daño-Luna

9CIVIL MILITARY OPERATION: MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES

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It is recognized that a transparent, effective, and institutionalized civil-military engagement is one of the characteristics of a modern defense force. Additionally, civil-military relations is a necessity for reforms in the defense force to be sustained. In the case of the Philippines, this is enshrined in the Philippine Constitution, which recognizes a ‘civilian authority (that is) supreme over the military”, and characterized by the robust involvement of various civil society organizations in the country.

The paper foregrounds the evolution of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Civil-Military Operations in support of Security Sector Reform amidst different contexts and realities regarding implementations on the ground. Emphasis is also placed on how the shortcomings in the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Civil-Military Operations implementations can be addressed.

The author reiterates the importance of Civil-Military Operations to enacting Security Sector Reform. However, there is a need to clearly define the focus of Civil-Military Operations, aligned with the apparent paradigm shift brought forth by a post-agreement security arrangement.


SOURCE: PAO AFP

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATION: MODELS OFINSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES

9 CIVIL MILITARY OPERATION: MODELS OF INSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES


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IIntroduction

In the broader frame of security sector reform (SSR), there is recognition that a modern defense force is not only a function of upgraded capability but also a result of transparent, effective and institutionalized civil-military engagement.1 In order for the reforms to take root, a healthy civil-military relation is a necessity.2 This relationship is anchored on unique Philippine democratic context – first, the Philippine Constitution’s principle that the “civilian authority, is at all times, supreme over the military;” 3 and second, the vibrant civil society organization (CSO) involvement in the Philippines. The manner in which the military cultivates relationship with stakeholders on the ground is concretized through civil-military operations (CMO).

The Philippines’ rich history as a democratic nation tells us that strengthening of civil-military relations over the years paved the way for gains in SSR in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to be instituted. After the EDSA Revolution in 1986, there had been sustained effortsfor CMO to veer away from treatingcivilians as “subjects-to-be-won-over” 4 to treating

stakeholders as “partners-to-be-engaged”.5 Theimportance of this paradigm shift is emphasized in the AFP’s Internal Peace and Security Plan(IPSP) Bayanihan indicating the “involvement of all stakeholders in the pursuit of internal peace and security” 6 as a strategic imperativein pursuing military mission.

However, there are realities surrounding CMO implementation that has to be taken into mind. On the part of the AFP, they operate under conditions of “limited funding, weak combat capabilities, poor human rights records, corruption…”7

among others, which affect how they perform their mandate and consequently, how they professionalize their ranks. On the part of the civilians, history of antagonism brought about by military human rights abuse stays in the discussion table and affects the quality and to a certain extent, transparency of the engagement. Moreover, implications of CMO activities on communities remain points of debate as to how it addresses insurgency while raising community dependence on the military and militarization in the area. 8

1 OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform (2007) mentions a similar argument “ A recognition that SSR is not only about increasing

operational capacity but also about enhanced service delivery, governance and accountability highlights that other skills are required…”2 C. Pangatungan, “Implementing Security Sector Reform in the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Issues and Prospects,” AFP Office of Strategic

and Special Studies (AFP-OSS) Digest 18 Number 2 (2013): 8.3 The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. Section 3 of Article II of Declaration of Principles and State Policies, page 1.4 R. Alcudia, “Civil Military Operations or Civil-Military Operations? What’s in a Hyphen?,“ Philippine Army Journal (2007): 4, accessed at

http://www.army.mil.ph/e_publications/pa_journal/pa_journal_2nd.pdf.5 Ibid.6 AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan (2010), page 27. Ava.7 D. Russel, “Examining the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Civil Military Operations. A Small Power Securing Military Relevancy in

Nontraditional Military Roles,” Small Wars Journal Vol. 6 Issue 1 (2010): 15.8 Oreta, J. and Tolosa, K. (2012). IPSP Assessment: Assessing the readiness of the military institution and the commitment of security stakeholders’

to the AFP’s Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP). Working Group on Security Sector Reform, Ateneo de Manila University.

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Against this background, the following questions are raised – since its inception, how did the AFP’s CMO evolve in support of security sector reform? What are the means in confronting dilemmas in CMO implementation? How do we imagine civil-military operation in support of a modern defense force?

With reference to the context discussed, this paper presents practices in civil-military operations of the AFP and how it contributed to gains in security sector reform. Equal emphasis is put in the discussion on how predicaments in AFP CMO implementation can be addressed. Corollary to this, the paper presents models of institutionalized clear feedback mechanism between the Philippine military and the civilians – both civilian government and civil society.

Fundamental Concepts ofCivil-Military Operation

There are two concepts recognized by the United Nations system in the performance of civil military coordination (CIMIC), that is, humanitarian and military.9 These two concepts differentiate how the NATO and the UN conduct CMO. The NATO is “generally deployed as a military force”10 hence the need for them to establish their separate mandate from UN and other groups performing peace building activities in the same country.

On the other hand, the UN humanitarian context calls for “coordination between the military component and the civilian components of the same integrated mission…” 11 Responsive to the context and security environment, CMO implementation varies in different countries.

In the Philippines, the concept of AFP-CMO is regarded as “sui generis” (Russel, 2010) where concepts have been developed from unique military culture and rich military history of the AFP. As early as 1950’s under the administration of President Ramon Magsaysay, the elementsof CMO are seen in efforts towardscounter-insurgency and nation building.12

This continued until democratization effortspost-EDSA 1986. However, it was only until 2006 when the AFP CMO Doctrine was crafted – regarded as a broad doctrine providing the scope and necessity for CMO while leaving room for subjective interpretation.13 Also, this doctrine has not yet updated upon arrival of IPSP Bayanihan. In 2013, the CMO Handbook was developed to provide clear guidelines in the conduct of CMO activities.

AFP-CMO Pillars and Components

The AFP defines civil-military operations as “planned activities undertaken independently or in coordination with civilian entities in support

9 Coning and Holshek, “United Nations Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CIMIC) Course Manual,” Peace Operations Training Institute

(2012): 16, accessed at http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/course_promos/civil_military_coordination/civil_military_coordination_english.

pdf.10 Ibid., page 26.11 Ibid., page 27.12 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, “AFP CMO Doctrine,” AFP CMO Handbook: CMO Assessment Tools. 2013.13 AFP CMO Handbook: CMO Assessment Tools. (2013). Published by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, page 31.



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to the accomplishment of the AFP mission to gain popular support and weaken the will of the enemy to fight.”14 AFP-CMO activities can take many forms from model behaviors of soldiers on the ground to big-ticket projects for the community facilitated and or participated bythe AFP. Put simply, CMO takes a counterinsurgency stance while dictatedlargely by developmental orientation.15 CMO doctrine is founded on winning the hearts and minds of the people while facilitating the cooperation of stakeholders to support operational objectives. As will be discussedin more details later, this poses challenges both for the military and the civilians. All in all, CMO efforts “complement Intelligence and Operations as an integral part of the AFP Triad” 16 where commanders on the ground ensure that these three components (intelligence, operations, CMO) work in support of each other towards accomplishment of AFP mission. Balancing these three is important, as efforts given to one must augment the other two.

Primarily, the objective of CMO activities is to reduce the will of the armed threat groups to fight and to gain popular support forthe AFP. The secondary objective is to support the government’s development activities, protect the environment, and help the people prepare for and cope with the hard realities ofdisasters/calamities.17 CMO activities are

categorized into three pillars targeting a specific audience: Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) or Information Support Affairs (ISA).18 While each pillar addresses specific concerns of CMO,“one pillar must always be supported” bythe other two to ensure maximum effectiveness. Programs under each pillar are in coordination with the civilian government and civil society organizations (CSO) while being implemented in three levels: strategic, operational and tactical. Below is the summary discussion of AFP-CMO pillars and its respective components.19

The Public Affairs (PA) pillar is concerned with gathering support from the public in order to accomplish military missions. Its activities are geared towards acquiring support fromthe people through Public Information (PI) and Community Relations (COMREL) activities.

The second pillar, Civil Affairs (CA), “encompasses socioeconomic development activities undertaken by the AFP in coordination with or independent of civilian government and non-government entities in support of national development.”20 Among the three pillars, the CA is where the military can directly affect the people by facilitating the delivery of basic services through strengthened linkages in civil relations (CIVREL) and mobilization of resources in coordination with stakeholders during civic action (CIVAC) activities.

14 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, “AFP CMO.”15 Russel, D. (2010)., page 15.16 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, “AFP CMO.”17 AFP CMO Doctrine Powerpoint Presentation by ARESCOM, shared in 2011.18 AFP CMO Doctrine (2006) as cited by Russel (2010)., page 16.19 Discussion of this section is majorly sourced from the AFP CMO Handbook. (2013).20AFP CMO Handbook, 2013, page 6.


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Formerly known as Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), the third pillar is Information Support Affairs (ISA). It includes activities that “are geared to redirect or influence the beliefs, emotions, attitudes, opinions and behavior of a given target audience.” 21 This pillar is also responsible in processing former rebels and in helping their reintegration into the communities.22

Similar to the AFP triad, care and balance is required in the conduct of activities under the three pillars and its components. The strength of intended impact of AFP-CMO activities is dependent on its interconnectedness as exemplified in the history of AFP-CMO practices in the Philippines.

Evolution of AFP-CMO Practicesin the Philippines

Albeit absence of clear CMO doctrines in the past, the AFP has adapted CMO strategies responsive to the prevailing context and pressing needs of the country at specific periods in time. Primarily as an instrument of national policy, the AFP inched its way towards achieving a more comprehensive CMO approach by initially varying the application of the present AFP-CMO pillars. Especially during the critical transition years of 1986-1998,23 the CMO has played an important role in national reconciliation and has influenced the onset of peace negotiations with the different armed groups. Critical to understanding the present AFP-CMO is tracing the history of how civil-military engagement shaped AFP-CMO practices through the years.

As far back as 1950’s, CMO has always been a vital part of the Philippine military’s history. CMO elements were employed together with armed combat right from the start when the rise of communist insurgency began with threats from the Hukbalahap (Huks)25 to topple down the government and cause chaos in the countryside. Dubbed as one of the best counterinsurgency practices, the method of President Ramon Magsaysay, which attempted to address the socio-economic-political roots of Huk rebellion, failed to fully eradicate insurgency as a small

21 Ibid., page 7.22 Interview of Russel, D. (2010) to LTC Ferozaldo Paul T. Regencia in AFP NADESCOM, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City Philippines,

October 8, 2007.23 Hernandez, C. (1999).24 Russel, D. (2010)., page 16.25 “an agrarian-based and Soviet-influenced insurgency”, (Hernandez, 1999), page 2.

Figure 1. AFP CMO Pillars and components, Adapted from the AFP CMO Handbook (2013)



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faction of the Huks – committed to the political goals of the movement – still remained in the society.

In 1965, President Ferdinand Marcos began his office touting economic development as the permanent solution to internal security threats. He then deployed the AFP to the countryside to embark on a “socioeconomic program of unprecedented scale under the banner of ‘civic action’.” 26 Meanwhile, the late 1960s saw the recovery of insurgency which gave birth to two groups: the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).27 With these developments, President Ferdinand Marcos placed the country under Martial Law in 1972. This gave rise to military corruption and human rights violations “negating any impact civic action had on the community.” 28

After the Marcos dictatorship was toppled in 1986, the government underwent Democratization under President Corazon Aquino. Because the security forces were used as abusive instruments during Martial Law, the Cory administration placed emphasis in restoring civilian authority over the military. The AFP replaced OPLAN Katatagan

with OPLAN Mamamayan, with focus on the protection of the people rather than the state. This was coupled with the 1987 counterinsurgency strategy seeking to encourage insurgents to turn in their arms and return to the fold of law in exchange of loans so they can start their new life.29 Replaced by OPLAN Lambat Bitag, CMO was first introduced in Special Operations Teams (SOTs),30 which is a composite of combat, intelligence gathering and CMO that gave birth to AFP Triad.31 This involved holding dialogues in the communities to undo insurgency in the area.

In 1994, when the AFP engaged in CMO activities under OPLAN Unlad Bayan, modest gains were seen as evident in the turnover of 236 firearms from the Moros.32 The administration of President Fidel V. Ramos and President Joseph Estrada, more AFP and PNP33 coordination was seen under OPLAN Pagkalinga, Kaisaganaan, and Balanga from 1996-2000. Cleared areas were turned over to DILG-PNP while establishing development programs.34 However, AFP turned its attention to modernization brought about by the closure of US Bases. At this point, CMO was not a top priority in the AFP.35 When President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took office, OPLAN Bantay Laya was launched, implementing a new security

26 Hernandez, C. (1999)., page 2.27 Ibid., page 2-3.28 R. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines (New haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 144.29 Pobre, A History of the Armed Forces, p. 596. Cited by Hernandez (2005), Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces of

the Philippines. A Background paper submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the Philippine Human Development

Report 2005., page 11-12.30 AFP CMO Doctrine (2006) as cited by Russel (2010)., page 16.31 Discussion of this section is majorly sourced from the AFP CMO Handbook. (2013).32 AFP CMO Handbook, 2013, page 6.33 Philippine National Police.34 L. Pena, “Finding the Missing Link to a Successful Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy” (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).35 Russel, D. (2010), page 17.


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operations where instead of the traditional methodology of ‘clear, hold, consolidate and develop’, the new methodology is ‘clear, hold and support’. This is in admission of the fact that the military is not equipped in handling development and the last phase should be done by the civilian government. However, territorial defense forces were still used in the hold phase.36 Up until this time, even though elements of CMO are seen in the implementation of AFP campaign plans, there was no clear doctrine outlining its conduct.

Nonetheless, CMO was renewed in 2006 with the publication of the first CMO doctrine, the AFP Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.37 Under the 2011 IPSP Bayanihan, SOTs are replaced by Peace and Development Teams (PDTs) or Bayanihan Teams giving equal importance to combat and non-combat operations on the ground. It is under this plan that the role of civil-military operations in the achievement of military goal is most pronounced.

Paradigm Shift: Models of Institutionalized Engagement

“The IPSP acknowledges that the contribution of each and every government agency, civil society organization, and even local community, is vital in ensuring peace and security.”

- President Benigno S. Aquino III

Clearly spelled out in the IPSP Bayanihan is the “involvement of all stakeholders in the pursuit

of internal peace and security” as a strategic imperative. This is an “admission and recognition by the military” that purely militaristic solution alone cannot solve the pressing problems in peace and security.38 Under the IPSP, “CMO emerges as the best tool available to manifest the paradigm shift from a predominantly militaristic solution to a people-centered security strategy that is founded on broad-based consultations and engagements with key stakeholders.”39 It is therefore critical for the AFP-CMO to be clearly translated on the ground through guidance and protocols. After all, the abolishment of the National Development Support Command (NADESCOM) and some engineering brigades was done under the expectation that all units must be able to conduct CMO embedded in their respective operations. Thus far, the AFP has published the CMO Handbook: CMO Assessment Tools in 2013, which outlines detailed steps in the conduct of comprehensive CMO in an area. For the institutionalized engagement with the civilian government and civil society, the following models are presented.

Signing Memorandum of Agreement with National Government Agencies

Enshrined in the constitution is the supremacy of the civilian authority over the military at all times. The President, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the military, exercises this. Likewise, the civilian government agencies and local chief executives are also inherently involved in the conduct of CMO. Without encroaching on

36 Hernandez, C. (2005). Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict, page 16-17.37 Ibid.38 2011 Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan.39 AFP CMO Handbook, 2013, page 2.



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the responsibilities of concerned agencies, the AFP must also learn to project a cooperative stance. The Office of the Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations (OJ7) created lines of convergence with the civilian government by entering into Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) with national government agencies. Indicated in a broader CMO Plan, the MOA indicates areas for joint cooperation where tasks of both parties are indicated.40 This partnership addresses two concerns in the conduct of CMO. One, it breaks the notion of military as the only face of government in far-flung areas. Two, it clarifies the tasks of government agencies in peace and security. When people in the communities see different government offices working together with the military, this raises the bar for the involvement of all stakeholders in the pursuit for peace. With clear objectives, expectations are managed within the bounds of the agreement in terms of how the projects can support peace and security.Although not perfect and in need of a more policy-aligned approach, the MOA partnership facilitates a clear feedback mechanism on the functions of the AFP and government agencies on the ground.

Bantay Bayanihan asCivil Society Oversight

The Philippines enjoys the vibrant presence of civil society organizations (CSOs) fromnon-government organizations (NGOs) cateringto the needs of marginalized sectors to progressive think tanks pushing for policy reform in the country. CSOs acts as enablers, making them an important partner in pushing for peace and security. The crafting of the IPSP Bayanihan opened doors to this partnership when they were invited by the military to provide inputs to the Bayanihan plan. With reference to the strategic imperative in the IPSP Bayanihan, the institutionalized engagement of the AFP and CSOs was born. Formally launched in 2011, the Bantay Bayanihan (BB) carries out its mandate41 as the network of CSOs performing an oversight role on the implementation of IPSP Bayanihan. The tangible expression of the network’s monitoring role is the Bantay Bayanihan Assessment Matrix,42 a tool that guides the dialogue between local CSO members and local AFP commanders. Deviating from the numbers game, the assessment is focused on how the AFP performs their mandate in light of adherence to Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and Rule of Law while being transparent and accountable. The nature of engagement is both critical and constructive where monitoring results are discussed with the AFP with shared recommendations on how they can address negative findings. Although noticeable positive

40 Interview with BGen. Lysander Suerte at the Office of the Chief of Staff for Civil-Military Operations (OJ7), Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City,

February 21, 2014.41 Indicated in Bantay Bayanihan Manifesto, a document signed by the former AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Eduardo Oban, Bantay Bayanihan

founding convenor Dr. Jennifer Oreta, OPAPP Sec. Teresita Deles and other stakeholders.42 The assessment matrix was jointly developed and localized by the AFP and CSOs in 2012.


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improvements are seen on the ground, the challenge is in the policy gaps to ensure that reforms take root and continue even under a different leadership. This engagement, the first of its kind in the Philippines and conceivably in Southeast Asia, is a relevant institutional mechanism for civil society to engage defense reform issues.

Confronting Dilemmas of AFP-CMO

As AFP-CMO does not exist in a vacuum, its implementation in support of and complementing other military functions creates issues that need to be confronted. The deployment of Peace and Development Teams (PDTs) in far-flung communities makes them wear the development hat in a conflict-affected area where there is practically absence of the face of government. The prolonged stay of the military in communities, although for facilitating the delivery of basic services, poses challenges as to shaping the mindset and attitudes, both of the military and the communities. One of them is the perspective of some soldiers that CMO breeds soft soldiers. Another concern is the dependency of the communities, even civilian government, on the military in ensuring peace and security in their area.43

Looking from within the AFP, the function of CMO in a triad, which is in support of counterinsurgency strategies, becomes problematic when this puts the military in a position where simple profiling of progressive CSOs leads to harassment and consequently human rights accusations. For the

part of the civil society, this feeds the historical antagonism between the military and the CSOs, which affects the transparency and effectiveness of civilian-military relationship towards security sector reform.

Civilians and military vary on how they think and how they operate, a nuancing that has to be considered in an environment where CMO is implemented.

Conclusion

Strong, transparent and institutionalized civilian engagement is an imperative towards security sector reform.

Balancing CMO in AFP Triad

Similar to how UN recognizes two (2) concepts of CIMIC, counterinsurgency strategies have utilized the right hand and left hand approach. In the conduct of such, clarity should be shed on the main purpose of CMO. Is it to support the internal security operation, which is militaristic in nature? In the evolution of AFP CMO, are we on the right track towards a modern defense force?

With developments in the peace process, CMO must be recalibrated to balance the AFP triad. An epitome of an armed forces focused on territorial defense does not conduct heavy CMO activities.44 In a post-agreement security arrangement, CMO in support of counterinsurgency may not be the best utility for civil-military engagement. Instead, activities related to humanitarian and nation

43 Oreta, J. and Tolosa, K. (2012). IPSP Assessment.44 R. Hall, “Modern soldiery interrogated: cataloguing the local military’s task and their perception of local civilian actors,” Philippine Political

Science Journal 33 (2012): 18.



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building is seen as the likely focus in support of the envisioned modern defense force.

The AFP’s mandate to perform ISO functions does not only prevent them from improving on other mission areas but causes serious implications in the community. It is thus crucial for the civilian units (LGU and PNP) to take the lead role in ISO.45

Institutionalized engagement

The AFP provides security of the state and its people while bearing capacity to influence the democratic processes and still contribute in the pursuit of just and lasting peace.46 In a democratic country such as the Philippines, where the military plays a vital role in peace and security, it is only fitting to create a safety net on how best to be in a critical and constructive stance when it comes to the performance of their mandate. Stakeholder engagement must not only be aligned with the national security policy, but institutionalized as well.

In terms of how civilians can contribute in engaging defense reform issues, there is a need to clearly understand the roles and functions of different stakeholders. Blurred lines must be clarified. Previously in the National Internal Security Plan, the tasking of different government agencies in terms of peace and security was underscored. However, the tasking was not known to the government agencies because the NISP was a secret document. Current efforts of the AFP-CMO to ink memoranda of agreement with government agencies is just a stopgap measure. There is a need for a national security strategy

to outline clear sharing of efforts towards peace and security. Transparency in the performance of mandates ensures that both parties, civilian and military, perform their tasks while combining and complementing their efforts.

Balance implementation of activities

As a major contributor to internal security operations, the deployment and employment of CMO must be reviewed. Perhaps capitalizing from the gains of the PNoy administration, CMO can be widened in such a way that shared responsibility in peace and security can now be sustained. This also goes without saying that the developments in the security environment and peace process have to be taken into consideration in the review of CMO.

Some CMO activities are mere dole-outs which perpetuate the culture of dependency on the military of local communities and local security providers (e.g. tanod, barangay captain, police).47

Reviewing CMO’s shift towards the other AFP mission areas (e.g. disaster risk management and regional security etc.) and how it can contribute to a modern defense force should be examined. The existing AFP-CMO Handbook 2013 has to be implemented with strong monitoring to ensure balance in the implementation of CMO pillars and components.

Taking into consideration the historical context of AFP-CMO evolution, the dilemmas that emanated from it and the developments in the security environment and peace process, a review of the conduct of AFP civil-military operation is

45 Oreta, J. and Tolosa, K. (2012). IPSP Assessment. 46 Arugay, A. (2007).47 Alcudia (2010).


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strongly recommended. In imagining a modern defense force, there must be clear protocols and guidelines in moving away from simple support to internal security operations but towards complementing territorial defense. Aligned with national policies in peace and security, the

civilians must be continuously engaged with clear taskings to allow the stakeholders to do their part. After all, a modern defense force is not only a function of upgraded capability, but also a result of transparent, effective and institutionalizedcivil-military engagement.

SOURCE: BANTAY BAYANIHAN

10Gender Inclusivenessin the Military


by Carla Isabel M Ravanes

10 GENDER INCLUSIVENESS IN THE MILITARY

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The Women’s Movement in the 50’s and 60’s increased the participation of women in various working sectors. Since 1980’s, there is a considerable rise in the percentage of women in armed forces. However, this increase in proportion does not even exceed the 15 percent threshold, which would elevate it to more than just being token membership. Aside from the low percentage of women in the military, there is a lower number of women who perform direct combat roles.

The author discusses how physically suited women are for direct combat and consequently the effect of the presence of women in combat units on its effectiveness.Additionally, she also examined how women are integrated into the Philippine forces.

The author argues that increased female participation in the defense forces is practical, necessary and beneficial in operations. However, more interventions should be conducted in order to realize this potential.


GENDER INCLUSIVENESS IN THE MILITARY

SOURCE: PAO AFP

SOURCE: PAO AFP



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TThe integration of women in various working sectors has increased since the Women’s Movement of the ‘50s and ‘60s (Harries-Jenkins, 2002). This can be observed in virtually all aspects of the workforce, such as in law, politics, business, and of course, the security sector. Since the late ‘80s, there has been a considerable rise in the percentage of women in armed forces (Segal, 1988).

However, comparing this increase in involvement to that of the civilian sector, most Western (or Western-style) military forces seem to have a low degree of integration of women. Despite the increase in recruitment of women over the past decades, one would still be hard-pressed to find a military force with a proportion of women that would approximate 15 percent. Fifteen percent, as such, is an important number in organizations since leading analysts have pointed out that women must number 15 percent of an organization to be considered more than a token (Kanter, 1977). Being extremely underrepresented in the contemporary military, women are not only a minority population; they actually form an even smaller classification – the token population. To address this, positive recruiting policies and strategies that are reflective of the best practice in major organizations must be adopted. Said policies must be effective in military systems, as well (Harries-Jenkins, 2004).

Aside from the aforementioned population issue, a widespread military concern, in terms of gender inclusiveness, is the small number of women who perform direct combat roles. Although personnel policy in various countries do not discourage women in filling combat roles, majority still serve in non-combat roles (e.g., military nurse) or combat service/support roles (e.g., clerk, radar operator) (Harries-Jenkins, 2002). The commonness of this

issue may lead one to ask how physically suited women are for direct combat, consequently, would the presence of women in combat units negatively impact effectiveness.

Several studies have demonstrated that with the proper physical training methods and given an appropriate amount of time, women volunteers could effectively execute duties traditionally carried out by men in the military (Wilson, n.d.; Casey, n.d.). Furthermore, it has been shown that in mixed-gender groups, members have identified leadership and teamwork as more important factors than gender in determining variations in morale, lack of cohesion, and military performance (Harrell & Miller, 1997; London Ministry of Defence, 2002).

It is important in this subject matter to consider women’s views on being assigned to combat units. A survey of female cadets on West Point in the ‘90s showed that only 30 percent would join a combat arms branch if these were opened up to women. From those who did not have a desire to enter combat units, only 12 percent expressed a lack of faith in their physical capabilities as motivating their decision. Majority of those who said no were just not interested in combat arms (Field &Nagl, 2001). From this, it can be deduced that a possible key reason as to why women do not have the same population in combat units as men is because they are, first and foremost, not drawn to it.

In connection to this, it has been proposed that the main hurdle for women integration into numerous military roles is the “warrior framework” that is present in the military culture (Davis & McKee, 2004). The warrior framework reinforces the traditionally ideal military image of a physically strong, emotionally tough, masculine

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war-fighter. The emphasis on masculinity, with its associated attributes such as courage, tolerance of pain, sense of sacrifice, etc.; are in contrast to those qualities socially ascribed to women. It is propositioned that military women are stigmatized, “simply because they [are not viewed as having] those socially legitimate qualities that define soldiers,” (Sorin, 2004). Woman as a Soldier is not easily deemed as a natural social concept. It is up to each military force, then, to determine if there should be any changes in its structural relationships so that it would be able to combat this inherent conflict. Specifically, this would target the issue of the retention of the masculine culture, as opposed to gender-neutral norms, and its supposed importance to the effectiveness of military forces (Pinch, 2004).

It is recognized that women often possess a variety of skills which make them better at defusing and de-escalating potentialy violent confrontations, and are less likely to be involved in problems with use of excessive force. In addition, women not only have a useful skill set, but in certain contexts, their inclusion may become an operational imperative since they can carry out tasks that men can have a difficulty taking on, if at all. These include: screening of female ex-combatants, assisting in the aftermath of sexual violence, performing the cordon and search of women. Anecdotal evidence also points to women as more able to gain the trust of the community, ensure the full involvement of local women, and exercise communication and crowd control skills (Valasek, 2008).

Gender Integration in thePhilippine Forces

As of March, 2012 there are 2,905 enlisted women serving in the AFP. The 2,905 constitute

2.64 percent of the total population of enlisted personnel (“Percentage Fill-up of Enlisted Woman in the AFP”, 2012). An equally significant statistic shows that female officers, as of March 2012, are at a relatively high proportion of 9.22 percent (“Percentage Fill-up of Female Officers in the AFP,” 2012). Even with the comparatively large percentage of women officers in the country, the presence of women in the higher positions paints a different picture. Most outstandingly, Brig. Gen. Ramona Go, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, is the first female line officer to become a general. She is currently the only female general in the active service (“More women joining in AFP,” 2012). This circumstance mirrors the state in other countries wherein women are almost inexistent in the more senior ranks (Sorin, 2004).

The Women’s Auxiliary Corps (WAC), an all-woman division in the AFP which was based on the now defunct Women’s Army Corps of the US Army, has been deactivated. This progression is parallel to the fate of the US Army WAC, as well as to the closure of Écoleinterarmées du personnel militairefémini (EIPMF) – the joint service women’s school of the French Army. Similar to the closing of the US Army WAC and the EIPMF, the deactivation of WAC aims to improve the circumstances of the women in the force by discontinuing the gender-based segregation and by giving women greater chances to get to the service of their choice.

And while the intent may have been great, the AFP failed to couple the deactivation with the necessary adjustments and preparation in terms of addressing the impact of the dissolution of the Office of the Chief WAC, AFP to its members. For instance, WAC has no representatives in various functional areas of personnel and logistics management. And though the integration of the



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WAC members to the Major Services is possible, there is still a need for a clear-cut policy and uniform procedure for the implementation of the integration process (Gat-Eb, 2008).

Through the implementation of RA 7192 (Women in Nation Building Law), the AFP recruited female line soldiers. This action enabled the Filipino women to now have a chance to study military science in the Philippine Military Academy, participate in combat operations and mobilize military assets. But the AFP overlooked the crafting of implementing rules and regulations that will address the proper utilization of this new set of females in the AFP (Gat-eb, 2008).

Similar to the need for clear-cut policies in dealing with the deactivation of WAC, there is also a lack of clear-cut policies in handling “Gender and Development (GAD)” as mandated by RA 9710 (Magna Carta for Women). GAD policies and programs are vital instruments for any organization if it wants to promote and/or further develop gender-inclusiveness.

On the national policy level, gender and development concerns are not integrated into the plans and programs of the government on defense or armed forces, which is basically what the essence of gender mainstreaming is all about. On the ground level, many offices of the armed forces are conducting efforts related to GAD simply to follow the word of the law and for substantial compliance. In effect, these GAD efforts are short term and nominal. Without an implementation strategy, GAD is not utilized as a strategic tool to boost the morale of the armed forces or to enhance the capability of the military organization. This is further aggravated by the misleading perception of the military leadership on “gender” and “gender and development” (Caluag, 2010).

While examining the gender-inclusiveness of the Philippines’ defense forces, it is also important to look at the gender-mainstreaming condition of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA). The PMA first opened its gates to female cadets in 1993 (Romero, 2012). Since then the AFP has seen an increase in the number of women in the military. While this may be the case, the gender-inclusiveness of the academy is still found to be wanting. In 2010, Rivera subjected the The Cadet Core AFP Regulations (CCAFPR) 2008, also known as the gray book, to a limited textual analysis to determine its gender-sensitivity, particularly, if it is free of any sexist word. Unsurprisingly, the research showed that only 2/27 of the document’s sections are completely free from any sexist term. Since language used articulates consciousness, reflects culture, and affects socialization (Gender-Fair Language, 2008), it would be safe to say that the gender-insensitive terms in the current CCAFPR are highly reflective of the academy’s framing of the cadets and officers.

Also, by comparing the surveys on the perceived capacities and capabilities (physical, intellectual, and emotional) of male and female cadets answered by the PMA classes 2000, 2001, and 2002 with those from the classes 2010, 2011, and 2012; the study (Rivera, 2010) showed that there has been an increased favouring of the male cadets over the female cadets.

Institutional Interventions

The Department of National Defense (DND), since 2009, has been conducting Gender Sensitivity Training (GST) with military officers. The program aims to: identify, assess, and analyze the gender issues and gaps that is present in the society, and in the participants’ personal and work situation;


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recognize the significance of attaining gender equality, and develop in the participants the confidence to do their work as gender advocates. (“Gender Sensitivity Training Module”, n.d.) There are at least three GSTs held every year, with 30 participants for each training session.

Initially, majority of the participants of the GSTs were women, but for 2012, the male participants constituted 55.56 percent of the total participant population for all GSTs held that year. It could be said that over the years, the GSTs conducted have encouraged male officers to be more participative in the said program.

Apart from the GSTs, there is also the Trainer’s Trainee Program designed to create a larger and better skilled pool of trainers among the military officers for the Gender Sensitivity Trainings. This is held once a year (Quinzon, 2012).

The efforts undertaken by the DND, although commendable, are far from sufficient. For the gender issues present in the PMA, it has been suggested (Rivera, 2010) that the next revisionists of the CCAFPR, should consider language reform as an approach to gender-sensitize it. The change in identification will be a step towards the needed change in framing and thinking with regards to gender-sensitization. This effort should extend to the reviewing, revising, and removal of any form of gender bias in all military documents/references.

The PMA should also conduct its own regular Gender Sensitivity Seminar among the cadets, officers, and civilian employees to further raise gender awareness. Moreover, a GAD Focal Person or committee in PMA should be institutionalized and strengthened.

More than the recruitment and education of female cadets, substantial retention of the female military personnel will give the necessary weight to the gender-inclusive efforts of the AFP. This will be achieved by strengthening gender-mainstreaming in the AFP, through the development of substantial and long-term GAD programs.

It has been suggested that a three-pronged, integrated institutional strategy of changing the thinking, attitude and practices in the military institution should be pushed forth (Oximoso-Ignacio, 2004, as cited in Caluag, 2010). The three strategies identified were: 1) A Championing strategy aimed to obtain support from the highest ranks of the military; 2) A Social Marketing/Information Campaign Strategy aimed to change the way military personnel of the AFP think and behave regarding gender and development; and 3) An Organizational Development Strategy aimed to make the GAD initiative relativelyeasier by eliminating organizational barriers such as gender-bias regulations, policiesand facilities and establishing mechanism that would complement the change process(Oximoso-Ignacio, 2004, as cited in Caluag, 2010).

A strategy to make GAD program more responsive and effective should include a strategy to enhance the capability of the primary unit/office that would see the fruition of the GAD program. This strategy should cover the need for mandate, the operational need of the organization and the mechanism for control, management and oversight (Caluag, 2010). This way, the overall GAD strategy will ensure that the organization that will handle the GAD-related concerns would be able to address the GAD issues of the armed forces with maximum effect.



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Further, the success of any GAD initiative greatly depends on the support of the higher leaders or commanders. To increase the leaders’ commitment, they must be made accountable to the actual achievement of gender mainstreaming. Making them realize that gender is actually a force multiplier for its mission’s success and acknowledgement of such benefit would require acceptance, support, actual involvement and accountability in its implementation and achievement of its goals. Similarly, to effectively persuade the other commanders, a “gender champion” must rise from the ranks that can positively influence the commanders.

Apart from the effective integration of women into a crucial mission structure and functions, it is also a component of the efforts on gender-inclusiveness to recognize the need and importance of improving the health and living condition of both male and female personnel. To achieve this, other GAD-related training programs and seminars, especially those focused on health and education, such as breast cancer examination and education campaign should be conducted. Improvement of physical infrastructure, like living quarters, should also be constructed for the benefit of the women members of the various military units.

The constructive but critical engagement of CSOs with the AFP should not only be on internal security operations (ISO), territorial defense (TD), but should also include gender-mainstreaming in the Armed Forces. Women’s groups should push for greater engagement of women in civil society (Valasek, 2008). A strong and influential CSO that can effectively represent the women’s needs in gender-inclusiveness should hold a dialogue with the military wherein both parties can come up

with concrete output and/or recommendations. In Fiji, this strategy has brought forth significant recommendations which include: Inclusion of the Minister of Women as a member of the National Security Council, women should be effectively and equitably represented on Provincial and District Security Committes, etc. (Valasek, 2008).

On the part of the military as regards engagement with stakeholders, they need to take steps to ensure that, not only the concerns of the primary stakeholders are addressed, but also that these primary stakeholders are encouraged to participate in the creation, implementation and assessment of GAD programs.

It is mandated by law that 5 percent of the budget allocation of a government organization must be for GAD program, with an option to increase allocation by 10-20 percent after five (5) years. However, most are not able to meet the 5 percent budget appropriations. Since 1995, only an average of 0.33 percent of the expected 5 percent is actually allotted for GAD programs (Caluag, 2010). Nonetheless, the defense force should still aim to appropriate the supposed 5 percent for their GAD programs.

Forecasting for the worst case scenario in budgeting for the implementation of GAD programs, only 0.33 percent of the 5 percent would be allocated. On the other hand, with the implementation of GAD program in best-case scenario, there could be at least 10 percent budget allocation for GAD. But given the present restriction on military funds, it is likely that strict implementation of 5 percent GAD appropriation program would be maintained.


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Conclusion

There is growing recognition that increased female participation in the defense forces is practical, necessary and beneficial in operations. A more gender-inclusive defense force will ultimately lead to an increased access to additional human resources and will create a more diverse pool to select better qualified staff (Valasek, 2008).

While the AFP has formulated and issued several gender supportive policies such as the increased quota allocation for female cadets and officer candidates from its previous quota of 5 percent to the present quota of 20 percent, and the authorization for female military members to marry upon completion of only 1 year active service instead of the previous waiting time of three (3) years, more substantial and long-term

GAD policies/programs still need to be established to enable more women to actively participate and contribute in addressing security (“Initiatives for Women in the Military”, 2011).

If there are no interventions done, the movement towards forming a modern defense force would be incomplete. The advantages of a gender-inclusive defense force would not be experienced by the AFP. The Philippines’ defense forces would not be able to maximize the utilization of citizens to directly be involved in the military. Moreover, the females of the armed forces may continue to be perceived as a marginalized population.

As such, in order to fully realize a modern defense force, it is essential to factor in the effective promotion of a gender-inclusive defense force.


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SOURCE: PAO AFP

11Ethnic Representationin the Armed Forcesof the Philippines


by Carla Isabel M Ravanes

11 ETHNIC REPRESENTATION IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

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The 140 indigenous groups of the Philippines collectively represent nearly 20 percent of the country’s population. They are mostly concentrated in the Northern Luzon and Mindanao regions. In 2003, the Department of National Defense (DND) committed to giving five percent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) recruitment quote to indigenous peoples (IPs). Accordingly, the AFP lowered its height and education requirements to accommodate IPs. It was also in this year that the AFP was geared to draft “lumads” (indigenous or native) as regular soldiers and members of the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU).

The paper discusses how the efforts to make the AFP more inclusive of IPs have polarized sides. There have been claims that the IPs are placed at the frontline in the fight against the Communist threat group New People’s Army (NPA), thus making their communities permanent battlegrounds. On the other hand, the recruitment and reintegration processes can be perceived as efforts in creating a more diversified army.

The author argues that the initiation of affirmative action for greater ethnic diversity in the AFP must be jointly conducted by the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP), given that it is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies for Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) / IPs, and the General Headquarters (GHQ), being the policymaking arm of the AFP. Furthermore, in order to bring in more IPs to the AFP, a unique and culturally-sensitive employment strategy must be crafted.


ETHNIC REPRESENTATION IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

SOURCE: BADZ PATAÑAG, WGSSR



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MMajority of the Philippine population are descendants of the Austronesian peoples, who hails from Southeast Asia and Oceania. But because of the long history of Western colonial rule, combined with visits from merchants and traders, it is often difficult to accurately distinguish the lines between the numerous ethnicities present in the country. In addition, the National Statistics Office (NSO) does not account for the racial background or ancestry of each Filipino, thus rendering it almost impossible to produce an official population count of mixed-race Filipinos.

In this regard, the initiation of affirmative action for ethnic representation in this paper will mainly refer to the ethnic representation of the Indigenous Peoples (IPs) in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines

The 140 indigenous groups of the Philippines collectively represent nearly 20 percent of the country’s population. The estimated 14-17 million IPs are mostly concentrated in the Northern Luzon and Mindanao regions, with a few groups situated in the Visayas.

The IPs of the Northern Luzon are found in the Cordillera Mountain Range. The peoples of the Cordillera could be grouped according to the following major ethnolinguistic groups: Kankaney, Ibaloy, Bontok, Kalinga, Isneg, Itneg, Ifugao, Iwak, and Gadang (Florendo, n.d.).

In Mindanao, the IPs are referred to as “lumads,” a Visayan term meaning “native” or “indigenous.” The name was adopted by a group of 15 Mindanao ethnic groups to distinguish themselves from other main groups of Mindanaoans, namely the Moros and the Christians. Its usage was made

official in Republic Act 6734 during the Cory Aquino administration, to differentiate these ethnic communities from the Bangsamoro (Ulindang, n.d.).

To safeguard the rights of the indigenous cultural communities (ICCs)/(IPs), RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 was enacted. The IPRA states that:

AFP Recruitment andIntegration of IPs

During the time of former Secretary of National Defense Angelo T. Reyes in 2003, the Department of National Defense (DND) committed to giving five percent of the AFP’s recruitment quota to indigenous peoples. Accordingly, the AFP lowered its height and education requirements to accommodate high school graduates standing below five feet and four inches.

It was also in the same year that the AFP was geared to draft lumads as regular soldiers and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU). In Region 11, the recruited lumads became a part of the Philippine Army’s 4th Infantry Division.

The State recognizes the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of Philippine society as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace. The rights of indigenous cultural communities/ indigenous peoples are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. It is, therefore, the policy of the state to recognize and promote all individual and collective rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and development in accordance with the Constitution and applicable norms andprinciples.

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Then Defense Secretary Reyes proclaimed that the commitment of drafting lumads (and other IPs) into military service “comes with appropriate and adequate education, training package and assurance that the AFP will guard against discrimination of IPs not only in recruitment but also in the duration of their service in the military (“AFP open recruitment,” 2003).

This effort of the DND to make the Armed Forces more inclusive to IPs has been met with numerous criticisms from various organizations such as the human rights group Karapatan, the Catholic Bishop Conference of the Philippines-Episcopal Commission on Indigenous Peoples, as well as from an alliance of lumad organizations called the Pasaka Regional Lumad Confederation.

Groups opposing the AFP’s recruitment of lumads claim that the motive of the military is to put them at the frontline in its fight against the New People’s Army (NPA), and in the process, this transforms their communities into permanent battlegrounds (Ribaya, 2007). It has also been purported that the civilian recruitment of IPs is contradictory to the provisions stated in the IPRA, one of which is under Chapter 5, Section 22, prohibiting the recruitment of indigenous peoples “… for use against other ICCs/IPs.”

The AFP, has negated these claims, stating that the recruitment of IPs, through self-volunteering, is part of the regular civilian recruitment for the CAFGU. This does not violate any laws and as a matter of fact, the recruitment constitutes the IPs’ constitutional right to self-protection, as provided in the IPRA.

In 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo enacted Administrative Order (AO) No. 18(2001) which integrated qualified members

of the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA), an armed group of indigenous people in the Cordillera Region, into the AFP. ThroughAO 18, fifteen (15) members of the CPLA were integrated as officers while 249 were integrated as enlisted personnel. Other CPLA members who were not accommodated in the 264 quota for integration were given an option to join the CAFGU Active Auxiliary Companies that were organized and deployed in each of the provinces in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR).

Affirmative Action By providing quota allocation in its recruitment and integration processes, the AFP is actually implementing some form of affirmative action for the indigenous groups of the Philippines. This promotes diversity in the Armed Forces, albeit it is still not completely representative of the IPs in the country.

However, majority of the criticisms on the steps taken by the government to bring in IPs into the AFP revolves around the central idea that the critics do not percieve the recruitment and integration processes as efforts to diversify the armed forces. Instead, these are seen as direct tactical approaches to augment the AFP’s counterinsurgency operations.

On the AFP’s part, it is yet to proclaim any intention to increase the ethnic diversity among its military personnel, or to aid in promoting equal opportunities among IPs and non-IPs. Based on the AFP’s latest operational plan, the IPSP “Bayanihan”, it will impose “training programs which give importance to indoctrination on... ethnic sensitivity, and indigenous peoples,” as part of its thrust to carry out Security Sector Reform



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(SSR) initiatives in its institution (AFP, 2010). It does not mention conducting further affirmative action programs for IPs.

Necessary Interventions

The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is mandated to protect and promote the rights of the ICCs/IPs. Additionally, the NCIP has the power to formulate policies and regulations for the proper implementation of IPRA. The commission was designed to function as an independent agency with its members being representative of IPs themselves (Muhi&Pasimio, 2009). As such, any actions to be taken concerning IPs will require the involvement of the NCIP.

Therefore, initiation of affirmative action for greater ethnic diversity in the AFP must be jointly conducted by the NCIP, and theGeneral Headquarters (GHQ) since it is thepolicy-making arm of the AFP. However, both the NCIP and the AFP must have the desire and follow-through to create a military force whose cultural diversity will enrich the activities and operations of the Armed Forces.

In order to effectively bring in IPs into the AFP, an IPs employment strategy must be crafted. The employment strategy must focus on the recruitment and retention (includingintegrated IPs) in the forces, including the creationof an inclusive environment and meaningful communication lines for IPs. To avoid violationsof Rule V, Section 2 of IPRA which states that,“The state shall not require indigenous individuals to work for military purposes underdiscriminatory conditions,” the AFP must fosteran environment, especially on the ground,

that is culture-sensitive to IPs. Cultural awarenesstraining for military personnel involved withrecuited and integrated IPs and their corresponding ICCS could be conducted.

Due to the differences in cultures and traditions of the various ICCs/IPs, a “one-size-fits-all” IPs employment strategy may not be feasible. Instead, there should be an overall general framework that will ensure a consistent approach for recruitment and retention, though the actual implementation plans will utilize a more specific and nuanced approached to account for the differences among the indigenous groups.

Implications in the Absence of Interventions

It is important to note, however, that affirmative action programs for IPs, the Armed Forces may take several years or decades to produce an increase in the representation of minorities among senior military officials.

Without implementing meaningful affirmative action programs for IPs, the armed forces will fail to benefit from the unique inputs that could be contributed by a culturally diverse AFP. Further, the armed forces will miss out on the opportunity to bridge its security operations and the indigenous communities.

Further, initiating half-hearted or misguided affirmative action programs that will not effectively improve the opportunities and progress of minority groups will only fuel the speculations of of groups accusing the AFP of using IPs for token roles.


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References:

Administrative Order No. 18 of 2001, PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF QUALIFIED MEMBERS OF THE CORDILLERA

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY INTO THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, (2001):

http://www.gov.ph/2001/08/31/administrative-order-no-18-s-2001/.

Armed Forces of the Philippines-Civil Military Operations. “AFP to open recruitment for lumads.” Retrieved on October 30, 2012.

http://afp-cmo.tripod.com/articles-2003/04-27-afp-to-open-reruitment-to-lumads.html.

Armed Forces of the Philippines. “Internal peace and security plan ‘Bayanihan.’” Retrieved April 30, 2012. http://www.afp.mil.ph/

pdf/IPSP%20Bayanihan.pdf.

National Commission for Culture and the Arts and Florendo (n.d.). “Ethnic History (Cordillera).” Retrieved on November 14, 2012.

http://www.ncca.gov.ph/about-culture-and-arts/articles-on-c-n-a/article.php?igm=2&i=192.

Muhi, A.R. and Pasimio, J.P. “Legal overview of Philippine Indigenous Rights. Customary Land Rights in Southeast Asia

Conference.” Retrieved on November 14, 2012. https://customarylandrightssea.wordpress.com/2009/10/22/going-beyond-the-

indigenous-peoples-rights-act-ipra-in-the-philippines-ana-rhia-muhi-legal-rights-and-natural-resources-center-friends-of-the-ear-

th-philippines/.

Republic of the Philippines, “Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA).” Official Gazette 94 (1997).

Ribaya, R.R. “Armed forces seek budget to hire 8.400 CAFGUs.” The Manila Bulletin. Retrieved October 31, 2012 from http://

www.mb.com.ph/node/36630#.UKWgYuQvXz4

National Commission for Culture and the Arts and Ulindang, F. (n.d.). “Lumad in Mindanao.” Retrieved November 14, 2012 from

http://www.ncca.gov.ph/about-culture-and-arts/articles-on-c-n-a/article.php?igm=2&i=189.

Montañez, Jaime Frumencio J. “The Need For Qualified Contracting Officers In The Armed Forces Of The Philppines (AFP)

Modernization Programme.” Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 2001.

12Self-Reliant Defense and People-Centered Security


by Joseph Raymond Franco

12 SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE AND PEOPLE-CENTERED SECURITY

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Sharing the vision and core principles of the Filipino First Policy, the Self-Reliant Defense Program (SRDP) was enacted through the late Ferdinand Marcos’ Presidential Decree (PD) 415 issued in 1974. The program was envisioned to enable the Philippine Government with a “self-reliant defense posture” through the promotion and/or establishment of strategic industries essential to national defense and security.

The article provides a historical examination of SRDP’s development from its inception to its present state under the current administration. Citing various cases of local industries which once thrive under the auspices of SRDP, the article sheds light on the multiple factors that hindered its successful implementation. It asserts that a combination of different factors – political, economic, and technical – continue to pose significant challenges in pursuit of the country’s self-reliance objectives. Fund support from the government remains the primary obstacle to its effective implementation, further aggravated by policy arbitrariness, limited market base, and intermittent institutional and bureaucratic discontinuities. However, the article expresses optimism on the the country’s future self-reliance initiatives, taking into consideration the renewed interest of the new administration for indigenous defense materiel production. The recent success stories of ARMSCOR’s small arms industry and the joint Propmech Corp. – Philippine Iron Construction and Marine Works Inc.’s shipbuilding capability prove the viability of small arms and watercraft manufacturing in the country. In order to fully realize SRDP capability, the article recommends greater policy interventions from the government through organizational/bureaucratic reforms and adequate funding allocation.


SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE AND PEOPLE-CENTERED SECURITY

SOURCE: PAO AFP



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DIntroduction

Developing self-sustaining capabilities is one of the hallmarks of a modern defense force. From an operational standpoint, a self-reliant Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is better poised to contribute in fulfilling the goals, aspirations and well-being of the Filipino people as a tool of national policy. Under the overarching theme of security sector reform (SSR) and“people-centered security,” a self-reliant defense posture has two strategic benefits. First, it is consistent with initiatives for enhanced civilian oversight over the military: with more independent means, the AFP could readily transition into a more depoliticized institution. Related to this is the issue of making the Philippine security sector more resilient in pursuing modernization effort, which unfortunately has become a ‘buyer’s market’. Second, self-reliant defense accrues benefits for the whole nation by opening up opportunities for synergy among industries/commercial enterprises and the nascent defense industry.

But except for a few success stories, theSelf-Reliant Defense Program (SRDP) has largely failed to live up to expectations since it

began in March 19, 1974.1 Nonetheless, optimism remains as recent initiatives in small-arms2 and watercraft3 manufacturing show thepotential rebirth of a defense industry in the Philippines. Thus, appropriate government intervention is necessary to encourage the growth and sustainment of these enterprises. Along with proper policy, stakeholders must demonstrate commitment to the long-termgestation associated with building a viable defenseindustry. The passage of the 2011-2016Philippine Development Plan (PDP) and the National Security Policy (NSP) marks an opportunity for policymakers and all stakeholders to bring SRDP into fruition. Amongst other specific security sector reform initiatives,SRDP is fully aligned with the three broad strategies of the PDP, namely: for high and sustained economic growth; opportunities acrossgeographic areas and across different incomeand social spectrum; and the implementation ofeffective and responsive social safety nets. SRDP can also be aligned with the earlier thrust of the P-Noy Aquino administration to pursue and encourage “public-private partnerships” (PPP) in various areas of the economy.

1 Presidential Decree (PD) No. 415 of March 19, 1974, “Authorizing the Secretary of National Defense to enter into defense contracts to

implement projects under the self-reliant defense programs and for other purposes,”.2 The Government Arsenal has just embarked on a project to restart the in-country production of AR-15 type carbines and assault rifles to meet

the domestic requirements of the security sector, which includes the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP).3 Propmech Corporation (based in Subic Bay, Zambales) was awarded a contract to build “the largest locally-built naval vessel”, the BRP

Tagbanua(AT-296) in 2010. The ship was subsequently commissioned into service by the Philippine Navy in November 2011. Propmech was

also responsible for the construction of three (3) Multi-Purpose Attack Craft (MPAC), “an all-Filipino designed and built watercraft”—an

improved and indigenized version of a Taiwanese Coast Guard watercraft. These MPACs joined the Philippine Navy on 22 May 2012.

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A Review of the Self-Reliance Defense Program

SRDP, the “Filipino First” policy, and the 1987 Constitution

On March 19, 1974, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 4154 has initiated the Self-Reliant Defense Program, premised on the objective to attain a “self-reliant defense posture.” It was intended to establish strategic industries deemed necessary for national defense and security. Reflecting the zeitgeist at the time (i.e. the ascendance of import-substitution industrial policies)5, PD 415 envisioned SRDP implementation to “generate labor, spur industrial and commercial activities, and conserve foreign currency.” Funding appropriated for SRDP was pegged at PhP 100 million annually under the purview of the Secretary of National Defense.

Sans the ascendance of import-substitution policies in the Philippines’ external environment, the stronger imperative for SRDP was the prevailing internal security situation at the time. In the early seventies, the escalation of Muslim secessionism, specifically the campaign waged by Nur Misuari’s Moro National Liberation Front, shook up the government and brought to fore a strategic vulnerability. At that time, the

AFP was entirely dependent on the American security umbrella with almost all ordnance and ammunition coming from US stockpile. In short, the SRDP was a response for the need to provide the AFP “necessary materiel to accomplish its mandate of upholding the sovereignty of the state and protecting the national territory.”6

At the policy level, SRDP is a tacit continuation of the prevailing “Filipino First” policy that started with Republic Act (RA) 5183.7 RA 5183, Section 1 states that:

Decades on, the 1987 Constitution would reiterate this stance with Article II, Section 19 stating that “The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy.” It would be further stated in Article XIV, Section 10 that the State “shall support indigenous, appropriate,


“No contract either through a public bidding or negotiated contract for the supply to, or procurement by, any government-owned or controlled corporation, company, agency or municipal corporation of materials, equipment, goods and commodities shall be awarded to any contractor or bidder who is not a citizen of the Philippines or which is not a corporation or association at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens…”

4 The full title of PD 415 is “Authorizing the Secretary of National Defense to enter into defense contracts to implement projects under the self-

reliant defense programs and for other purposes”.5 Import-substitution industrial policies were first adopted in Latin America in the 1970s as a result of global oil shock. The concept gained

currency amongst developing countries such as the Philippines as a proactive response to offset the dominant position of foreign governments and/

or multinational corporations in local economies.6 AFP Modernization Program Management Office, “The Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program witnessing a rebirth,” Retrieved at http://www.

afp.mil.ph/afpmpmo/SRDP/srdp.html.7 Republic Act No. 5183 is known as “An act regulating the award of contracts for the supply to, or procurement by, any government-owned or

controlled corporation, company, agency or municipal corporation of materials, equipment, goods and commodities, and providing penalty for

the violation thereof”.


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and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, and their application to the country’s productive systems and national life.”

SRDP’s mixed record

The explicit support of the Philippine government to SRDP has resultedin varying levels of success, mostly during the 1970s. But by 2002, the estimated PhP 4 billion spent on SRDP failed to achieve its main objective since the small number of industries established were most often not sustained.8 The various SRDP-related projects came in various forms, which included combat clothing and individual equipment for soldiers such as the AFP Bolo-Bayonet9 and combat boots by the now-defunct, Marikina-based Ang Tibay brand. Vetronix Corporation, on the other hand, was able to manufacture locally in 1974, the URC-187 and URC-601 radios for frontline infantry units.

The SRDP was able to produce relatively more complex items. To help satisfy the mobility requirements of the AFP’s ground (Army) and Constabulary units, Delta Motors started to manufacture the ¼ - ton “Mini-cruiser” in 1974, a jeep which became the most proliferated land mobility asset of the AFP.10

Other land warfare systems were also developed, but most only got as far as the concept development phase; even fewer were built as actual prototypes such as the Santa Barbara11 multiple rocket launcher. Prototypes of more complex projects such as aircraft were seen with the Defiant12 and Hummingbird13 projects spearheaded by the state-run Philippine Aerospace Development Corporation (PADC), which, though not formally under the SRDP, followed the “spirit” of this initiative. Most of these projects, however, were terminated after funding and support dried up. While the PADC was never formally within the ambit of the SRDP14, it cannot be argued that its initiatives were fully aligned and advanced the objectives of PD 415.

These examples demonstrate the inherent difficulty of starting projects under SRDP. Research and development (R&D) requires substantive start-up costs and, more importantly, time for institutional knowledge to be accumulated and utilized. The success stories associated with SRDP did not come from in-house R&D by the Department of National Defense (DND) / AFP.

One success story was achieved by a private corporation in the production of small arms with support from the Philippine government. As part


8 AFP Modernization Program Management Office, “The Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program”.9 The Bolo-Bayonet was an indigenously designed bayonet incorporating features of the ubiquitous jungle bolo. It was issued in limited numbers

to deployed infantry units.10 Carolina Hernandez, “Arms Procurement and Production Policies in the Philippines” in Chandran Jeshurun, ed. Arms and Defence in

Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989).11 The Santa Barbara was a truck-mounted multiple rocket launcher system, designed to complement the howitzers (large cannons), the latter

solely comprised the inventory of AFP artillery units.12 The Defiant was an aircraft designed for pilot training.13 The Hummingbird wasdesigned and built as a light helicopter.14 Currently, the PADC is under the supervision of the Department of Transport and Communication (DOTC).

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of the SRDP, Arms Corporation of the Philippines (ARMSCOR) developed in-house production capability for 5.56 mm ammunition used in the AFP’s standard-issue weapon, the M-16 rifle. ARMSCOR credits itself as “one of the very few surviving SRDP participants, if not the only one” as a result of its business model which pursued the “commercial market and not relying solely on government contracts” (emphasis added).15

Other positive examples of relatively successful SRDP is through license-based production of defense materiel. Still in service with the Philippine Navy are the 44-meter Aguinaldo-class patrol gunboats, which were built in the Philippines based on a West German design.16 Decades later, the Philippine Army would lead the initiative for the in-country assembly of the Simba Fighting Vehicle17 in Clark Field, Pampanga under license from GKN Simba by the Philippines’ Asian Armored Vehicle Technologies Corporation.18 While it was a licensed design, the domestic assembly of the Simba proved the viability of taking the initial steps for in-country armoured vehicle production. However, due to the limited production runs of the Simba, the start-up local corporation which undertook them either closed shop after the fulfillment of their contracts or reverted to their non-defense related core businesses.

Elisco Tool: a missed opportunity for self-reliance?

The most compelling case that illustrates the challenges faced by SRDP is the short-lived production of the M-16 rifle in the Philippines by

Elisco Tool Manufacturing Company.19 It is a little known fact that for nearly four years, from 1983 to 1987, the Philippines was able to be self-reliant in the production of standard-issue firearms used by the security forces. Facing financial difficulties in the United States, Armalite Inc. sold the rights for the production of the M-16 to the Elisco Tool Manufacturing in 1983. Inventory, tooling, and machinery were subsequently shipped from Armalite’s Sterling plant to the Philippines. Within a few months, full-scale production of the M-16 commenced and met the domestic requirements of the AFP. What terminated the operation of Elisco was the shift in government priorities in 1987, which emphasized other productive sectors of the economy. Elisco ceased production of the M-16, with its production assets falling into a decrepit state. Consequently, Elisco ceded rights to the M-16 license, with most of its machinery sold as scrap by the mid-nineties.

The Challenges to Self-Reliance

Hurdles faced by Philippine self-reliance initiatives are an amalgamation of different factors reflecting the overall state of the economy and society. An examination of the various SRDP projects discussed above reveal the multiple factors that hinder SRDP to take flight. Discussed below are the political, economic, and technical factors that pose a challenge to self-reliance. Focus will be on the SRDP’s small arms and watercraft manufacturing experiences, together with analogous initiatives overseas.


15 Quotes from ARMSCOR 70th Anniversary publication dated17 November 2011.16 There are two active Aguinaldo-class ship bearing the pennant numbers PG-140 and PG-141.17 The Simba is the workhorse of the Philippine Army’s light armor and mechanized infantry units. It replaced the Vietnam-era M113 and V150

armored personnel carriers.18 GKN is a British corporation specializing in land warfare systems.19 The account of Elisco Tool Manufacturing is culled from “A Historical Review of Armalite” dated 04 January 2010 by Armalite Inc.


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Political As the Elisco Tool case illustrates, SRDP initiatives suffer from changes in the priority of the national leadership. At the time of the acquisition of Armalite Inc. assets (1983), the in-country manufacturing of the AFP’s standard-issue M-16 rifle not only marked a logistical/technical milestone. It was also viewed as a political statement, an embodiment of national pride of being able to produce assault rifles with little dependence on foreign actors. Notwithstanding the positive nature of the Elisco acquisition, the production lines at Bataan were allowed to atrophy.

Even earlier, another missed opportunity showed the impact of political expediency in hampering SRDP, this time in the more complex aircraft manufacturing sector. In 1968, the Philippines embarked on a project to convert the US Navy’s T-610 Pinto trainer aircraft into the Super Pinto. This variant was marketed by its proponent, American Jet Industries, as a low-cost light attack aircraft for counterinsurgency missions. By 1974, the Philippine Air Force’s Self-Reliant Development Wing bought the schematics, patents, and flight test data for the T-610, which led to the manufacture of the first Super Pinto prototype, christened as the Cali Pinto. The first example, while built in the United States, was subsequently followed by a second unit; that was manufactured in the Philippines. Both prototypes were flight-tested over Manila. Unfortunately, the then Ministry of Defense pulled the plug off the project due to serious doubts over the commercial viability and marketability of the aircraft.

A decade later, a similar story would emerge, this time on the area of aircraft production. In the mid-nineties, a single-engine trainer plane called the Defiant was designed and envisioned to fulfill a counter-insurgency role. At the same time, a prototype of a Philippine-made light utility helicopter named the Hummingbird was also completed. By July 1997, the Ramos administration authorized spending for the projects with the PADC spearheading the effort. Unfortunately, just a year after, the succeeding Estrada Presidency terminated both projects.20 While both are non-military, non-SRDP projects, they would have nonetheless formed the core of a budding Philippine aerospace industry, which would have synergized well and strategically align itself with a prospective military aviation sector. In general, the high degree of political patronage and support required for a defense contractor to flourish bodes ill for the SRDP. Political backing for any project is co-terminus and co-dependenton the incumbent. As such, the time horizon for project gestation — from inception to full-scale manufacturing — becomes severely limited and short. This bodes ill for research and development, which is intrinsically time-consuming and resource-intensive. Even simpler projects that do not require research and development incubation, the actual construction and manufacturing would take a substantive amount of time. The construction of the Tagbanua (to be described below) was an illustration of the challenges facing SRDP as a whole, “noteworthy for the numerous twists and turns in its three year run” which included the deferment of bid opening in eleven occassions.21


20 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/philippines/industry.html.21 http://adroth.ph/afpmodern/?p=845>.

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To further illustrate the long time horizonsrequired by R&D, Singapore Technologies Kinetics (ST Kinetics) took nearly two decades before establishing the knowledge base, industrial capability, and financial sustainability to produce the SAR-21, the Singaporean Armed Forces’ standard issue rifle.22 The AFP Bolo-Bayonet case illustrates a type of “quick-win” project, reminiscent of backyard industries and the resulting low production outputs. Simply put, the temporality of political favors and the arbitrariness of political backing preclude the accumulation of long-term sustainable support needed for R&D.

Organizational/Bureaucratic

Arbitrariness in SRDP also manifests not only with the national leadership but within the defense and military establishment itself. The build-up institutional knowledge has been hampered by the cyclical activation-reactivation of units/entities which are indispensable to SRDP. Following PD 415, General Order (GO) No. 187 was issued which activated the Material Development Planning and Programming Office (OJ8) as a Special Staff at the General Headquarters (GHQ), AFP.23 The OJ8 subsequently went several restructurings and deactivation.

In 1999, the AFP office primarily tasked to manage and implement the program, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Development (OJ9) was deactivated in 1999, relegating its main function to a division of the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (OJ4).24 A succeeding reorganization did not fail to arrest the dilution of the SRDP, wherein25 its functions were subsumed under the AFP Modernization Program Management Office (AFPMPMO) in 200426. This implicitly sidelined SRDP projects as the AFPMPMO was more focused in administering and fulfilling secretariat functions in support of the various AFP project management teams (PMTs) assigned to acquire defense materiel from foreign sources.27 This trend of institutional discontinuity was further illustrated by the reversion of OJ9/AFPMPMO/SRDP functions back to the OJ4.

The lack of attention to SRDP in recent years also seemed to manifest with the omission of provision of R&D funding. As late as the 2011 General Appropriations Act (GAA), an explanatory note for the DND under the sub-heading “Research, Feasibility Studies, Development Projects, and Test and Evaluations” stated that:


22 ST Kinetics was incorporated in 1967 as the Charter Industries of Singapore with the primary mission of making ordnance (i.e. ammunition)

for the Singaporean Armed Forces. While there had been several small arms projects made by the ST Kinetics, only the SAR-21 had a very

extensive production run. Use of ST Kinetics as an example is due to its analogous nature to the effort of Elisco to produce the M16 in-country.23 Hernandez, Arms Procurement, 135. 24 AFP Modernization Program Management Office, “The Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program” 25 While the SRDP is formally under the Secretary of National Defense, the implementation of projects are under the effective control of the Chief

of Staff, AFP.26 “Big structural reforms set at AFP; 3 offices to be abolished” Manila Bulletin dated 27 December 2012.27 Culled from “Issues and Concerns” section of the 2007 AFP Modernization Program Annual Report.

“The Secretary of National Defense, upon direction of the President of the Philippines, and


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Omission of this provision in the subsequent 2011 and 2012 GAA illustrates the lack of commitment in supporting SRDP. It neglects the fact that PD 415, which is still in force, allocates a fixed amount of PhP 100 million for SRDP. Without the provision on R&D, SRDP projects are deprived of specific legislative clause that would empower stakeholders in the defense industry to obtain and leverage government support. It is a belated reflection of the declining support for SRDP, a trend which started in the mid-nineties.28

Another complicating factor is the Government Procurement Act or RA 9184 which stifled nascent

SRDP. While the intent of the law is laudable, in trying to stem corruption, it did not discriminate over the the distinct nature defense acquisitions. As stated in successive AFPMPMO reports, RA 9184 can hamper the purchase of either time-sensitive or classified military materiel. Further compounding the problem is inherent tendency of start-up defense projects to lack institutional robustness. Simply put, there is a lack of nuance for the uniqueness of defense acquisition.

Economic/Commercial

While government-provided financial support is essential, public funding cannot and should not be expected to fully support manufacturers of defense materiel. After domestic security sector contracts are fulfilled, the local defense industry should endeavor to tap outside markets, whether civilian or military. Without an expanded market base, it is just a matter of time before sunk and operating costs would diminish industry revenues and lead to bankruptcy.

Aside from possible public equity issues (i.e. the oft-quoted guns-and-butter dichotomy), heavy public subsidies are inimical to the market-oriented nature of the Philippine economy. Government should instead focus on creating a policy and political environment that would be conducive to defense industries. Specifically, the “Filipino First” Act (RA 5183), while laudable, limits the sources of capitalization for potential and existing defense manufacturers. As discussed earlier, R&D is inherently capital-intensive, with the necessary financial resources not easily accessible from domestic sources.


upon favorable recommendation of the Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized to conduct research, feasibility studies, and development studies for projects planned and approved under the Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) Program, including materiel requirements of the AFP on weapons and armaments, air and naval armaments, air and naval materiel requirements, ammunition, communication - electronics and quartermaster items, the cost of which shall be chargeable to the appropriations provided for the SRDP Program, Research and Development (R & D) Program and other special funds as provided by law. The Secretary of National Defense, upon favorable recommendation of the Chief of Staff, AFP, is likewise authorized to farm out R & D projects to private entrepreneurs or government scientific agencies when these are not within the capability of the AFP to undertake: PROVIDED, That the amount to be spent for such research, feasibility and development studies shall not exceed four percent (4%) of the contract price of the direct cost of each project.” (emphasis added)

28 AFP Modernization Program Management Office, “The Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program”

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To illustrate, the sole commercially-viable SRDP company in the Philippines, ARMSCOR, thrived because it capitalized on economies of scale. Aside from the manufacture of ammunition required by the Philippine government, it also embarked on commercial products such as hunting and sporting firearms. Anticipating the relatively smaller non-government market in the Philippine domestic sector, ARMSCOR made exports to the United States a core business imperative.29 The ability to tap foreign markets is therefore a critical part of any defense-related corporation currently or potentially based in the Philippines. The key challenge here is to maintain the potential of private defense industries to support national policy objectives while not prejudicing their profitability—and ultimately, their sustainability.

Compounding this problem is the lack of an explicit and specified SRDP policy document.30 Although PD 415 contained the underlying objectives and basic principles of the SRDP program and DND Circular 24 prescribed policies, organization and procedures in the management of SRDP projects, there is a perceived lack of an explicit program that defines priority areas for development.31 Thus a gap between the development and the independence stages emerge. With the process of weaning away industries from government support still unclear, SRDP failed to benefit from

economies of scale — as per-unit cost would be driven down by foreign sales.32

Technical

Even with extensive government support or financial capital, another factor which prevents the emergence of a self-reliant defense industryis the diminished state of industries in the Philippines. As early as 1998, it has been recognized that SRDP can only meet its full potential with deliberate and protracted“foreign procurement coupled with technology transfer”.33 The same Defense Policy Paper pointed out that it takes a long process to develop infant industries before it can be “initially capable of at least providing repair and maintenance support” and evolve into mature industries with sufficient investment in research and development. Ultimately, it will be capable of “providing upgrades and even move into the [commercial-scale] manufacture of defense products.”

The most critical technical hurdle is the lack of a manufacturing base for defense industries. The substantive public debt of PhP 1.46 trillion means there is no room for establishing an entirely new state-run weapons manufacturing complex.35 But even with unlimited funding, efforts to jumpstart SRDP will be hampered by the lack


29 ARMSCOR secured an ISO 9001 certification in 1997 and claims to be the largest privately-owned arms and ammunition manufacturer in

Southeast Asia. 30 AFP Modernization Program Management Office, “The Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program” 31Ibid.32 Ibid.33 From “Chapter 6-Policy Areas” 1998 Defense Policy Paper. 34 Ibid. 35 Philippine Defense Today, “Sustainable weapons manufacture in the Philippines.” Retrieved at http://adroth.ph/?p=608.


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of upstream industries.36 Theoretically, although manufacturing may grow at an enormous rate, the technology of upstream industries may not be able to cope with the demands for specialized materials such as high-quality metals and alloys.

Realizing Self-Reliance

Notwithstanding the challenging circumstances, self-reliant initiatives persisted, with recent initiatives demonstrating the viability of small arms and watercraft manufacturing in the Philippines. These two industries warrant special attention as they represent areas that exhibit a more established knowledge base and, at the same time, greater salience for the AFP. Small arms are the foundation of the inventory of any defense force, while watercraft is a necessary enabler for the AFP’s maritime strategy to secure the archipelago.

Recent Developments

In 2010, the Government Arsenal (GA) embarked on a program to undertake in-house production of a line of rifles based on M-16.37 The project is intended to meet the requirement of the AFP for standard-issue and special purpose rifles.It includes the Recon/ Special Operations,Service Rifle and Special Purpose Variants.38 The end-state is for the Philippine Government to

be self-sufficient in meeting its small arms needs. Upon acquisition of manufacturing equipment at no cost to GA, the project will operate as part of a joint venture or similar agreement with another entity, most likely of foreign origin. Costs are estimated at PhP 1.4 billion for the joint venture with no cost to the government fromyears one to five. An annual production rate of 20,000 units is envisioned to meet AFP and PNP requirements.

The following year, in November 2011, the Philippine Navy (PN) commissioned with the Fleet its first 51.43-meter landing craft utility (LCU), the Tagbanua (AT-296).39 The Tagbanuas are jointly constructed by Propmech Corporation (engine and propulsion system) and the Philippine Iron Construction and Marine Works Inc. of Misamis Oriental (hull). The project is intended to provide the PN an additional “inter-island and coastal operations watercraft capable of logistics transport and amphibious operations.” Manned by a crew of 15 members, the Tagbanua has a freight capacity of transporting 200 soldiers with a cargo space area of about 250 square meters, or a maximum of 110 tons. Specifically, the ship is optimized:


36 AFP Modernization Program Management Office, “The Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program” 37 Jonathan C Martir, “The Government Arsenal (GA) M-16 Manufacturing Project,” GA Bullet-In Vol. 1 No. 2 (2011).38 The Recon model adheres to the M-4A1 system as used by most Western and allied Special Operations Forces (SOF). The Service rifle model

will replace the standard service rifle for the AFP, the M16A1. The Special purpose model is aa continuing development from the 5.56mm Marine

Scout Sniper Rifle (MSSR). 39 Business Mirror, “Navy prepares for first PHL-made landing craft.” Retrieved at http://businessmirror.com.ph/home/nation/19621-navy-

prepares-for-first-phl-made-landing-craft-.

“to transport combat personnel, vehicles, artillery equipment, and cargoes in support of military amphibious operations and secondarily, to perform noncombatant

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The Tagbanua is the largest locally-manufactured Philippine Navy ship to date.40 The previous record holder was the Marcos-era 44-meter Aguinaldo class patrol gunboat. The Tagbanua in comparison, is 51 meters, making it 15 meters longer than existing LCUs. Costing the DND PhP 189.934 million, it was intended to initiate a viable production line that would replace the ex-US Navy LCU Mk.6s which were remnants of the Second World War.41 The 2011 commissioning was the culmination of a protracted project management process, which started with the LCU being conceptualized as part of the 2002 Revised Reprioritized Project List of the AFP Capability Upgrade Program.

Propmech would be involved in another project, this time for the construction of three (3) Multi-Purpose Attack Craft (MPAC) via a joint venture with Safehull Marine Technologies, costing PhP 268.9 million.42 The high-speed MPACs can accommodate 16 soldiers each and is optimized for the insertion and extraction of special operations forces in hostile operational areas. Its ability to operate in harsh environments also makes it an appropriate asset for search and rescue mission in areas which could not be accessed by ordinary watercraft.43

Policy Interventions

These recent developments illustrate the nascent viability of defense contractors in the Philippines, notwithstanding the multi-faceted challenges. Hence, the response of all stakeholders through policy interventions should also be comprehensive as well. This paper argues for broad strokes to reinvigorate the fledgling defense corporations in the Philippines.

At the level of national policy, the symbiotic relationship between SRDP and the wider national development agenda should be fully emphasized. A new SRDP plan should both complement and support the proposed 2011-2016 National Development Plan. It would not suffice to have vague references to SRDP. Specific, time-bound project goals should be conceptualized with consultation of the widest stakeholder base. To initiate an industry-wide knowledge base, sustained research and monitoring process should be considered to periodically determine policy gaps. For instance, the PADC’s organizational and institutional relationship with the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) needs to be reconsidered. One option is to enhance its interactions with entities such as the PAF, which would in effect bring the producers of materiel to their most important stakeholder: the prospective end-users. At the same time, legislation pertaining to acquisitions (RA 9184) must be reviewed periodically reviewed to ensure that it does not stifle innovation.


40 Philippine Defense Today, “Landing Craft Utility acquisition project.” Retrieved at http://adroth.ph/afpmodern/?p=845. 41 Ibid.42 Philippine Star, “Only one firm bids for P 276-M Navy craft.” Retrieved at http://www.philstar.com/Article.

aspx?articleId=635716&publicationSubCategoryId=63.43 Ibid.

evacuation, medical mission, disaster, rescue-and-relief operations and transport-logistic mission, in support to national socioeconomic projects of the government.” (Emphasis added)


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Next, it must be stressed that policy intervention by the government should ensure that local industries are weaned off direct support (i.e. government funding) or indirect assistance (i.e. tariffs and non-tariff barriers to competing products) once local defense corporations achieve a viable level of sustainability. Admittedly, the threshold for industry independence would have to be made on a case-to-case basis, albeit with well-defined general criteria. Sans these criteria, it would suffice in the interim to explicitly inform local defense manufacturers that government assistance (financial/non-financial) would not be provided indefinitely. To reiterate the points raised earlier, it is imperative that local defense materiel be marketed not only domestically. Fixation over cornering the relatively small Philippine market would only lead to a repeat of the short-lived life cycles of local corporations in the defense industry.

Finally, it must be recognized that government and government-led institutions do not have a monopoly over good management practices—especially in the realm of R&D and constructing viable business models. Corporate or private stakeholders must be brought on board. A critical requirement is for a publicly-known, transparent SRDP Roadmap that would highlight which specific areas prospective corporations can pitch in, in support of the overarching national goal of attaining a self-reliant defense force. The thrust of the government should be on providing the institutional framework to operationalize the PPPs being promoted by the government. Operationalizing PPP would require going beyond speaking engagements with the plethora of chambers of commerce and business (i.e the Makati Business Club). This should include basic steps such as the creation of templates for

Memoranda of Understanding or processes for liaising between government / defense entities and corporate stakeholders.

Funding Requirements (Long-term)

Aside from a responsive policy, a critical requirement for SRDP is adequate funding. The following prescriptions require a longer time horizon due to the need for legislative action. As discussed above, funding from the government should be focused on jumpstarting entities that can demonstrate viability. First, the synergy between the SRDP and the AFP Modernization Program (formally known as Republic Act 7898) must be enhanced and fully institutionalized. The lapse of the AFPMP and the current initiative to legislate an extension (Senate Bill 3164) is an opportunity to highlight its dynamics. Supplemental funding set aside for the AFPMP has been proven effective in stimulating the acquisition process (i.e. the AFP Capability Upgrade Program or CUP). A similar, separate funding stream for SRDP should be considered as well.44

To emphasize the nuanced appreciation required by SRDP within the context of the AFPMP, the government should consider legislating a specific SRDP Law along the lines of the lapsed RA 7898 or SB 3164 that is currently being deliberated on. While there is nothing intrinsically undesirable about the subsuming of the SRDP to the broader AFPMP, it would insulate the former from the sudden shifts in modernization-related acquisitions. For example, a deterioration of the internal security environment in 2003 (due to the 2003 Buliok Campaign) led to the Capability Upgrade Program, which relegated acquisitions of external defense-related materiel as a secondary priority.


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Funding Requirements (Short-term)

In the interim, there are funding policies that can be pursued which could lead to quick wins and serve to initiate the protracted process of building a knowledge base for SRDP. For starters, the SRDP would benefit from the reinstatement of the four-percent clause found in the pre-2011 GAAs. To further the funding of SRDP projects, appropriations should be allocated to specific line items, not simply as discretionary financing by the Office of the Secretary of National Defense (OSND). This proposal is not in any way an attempt to circumvent civilian oversight for SRDP but to make sure that even with operational imperatives, SRDP funding is not sidelined inadvertent as it may be.

To maximize this prospective funding, limited as it may be, a specific SRDP fund can be handled as a venture capital fund. The DND, with its military and government stakeholders, can disseminate or publicize defense-related requirements, accept unsolicited project proposals, or consider potential dual-use projects for integration with security sector procurement plans. Companies with potential would then be provided seed money. If needed, the government can act as guarantors for such corporation to apply for financing from government or government operated and controlled corporations (GOCCs) such as the Development Bank of the Philippines.

The selection criteria could follow on the tack proposed in a 2002 policy paper that would see SRDP:

Conclusion

The preceding discussion presents the challenges and opportunities in attaining a self-reliant defense posture. While there have been significant setbacks and substantive hurdles, small successes have shown the potential for indigenous defense corporations to thrive and prosper. The multi-faceted nature of problems requires a comprehensive approach by all stakeholders both public and private. The thrust of the Aquino administration to engage the entire nation — the Filipino people as a collective force — bodes well for a self-reliant defense posture. In the short-term, feasible policy and financial interventions must be made available to jumpstart SRDP. Ultimately, these small successes will


“SRDP programs should give emphasis on projects for which the country has comparative advantages and should avoid one-shot projects or projects whose economic viability is doubtful. Beyond achieving defense self-reliance, a local defense industry, arising from today’s self-reliant defense posture programs, will provide employment opportunities, enhance the depth and diversity of the Filipino’s technological expertise and help build an industrial base for economic growth.”45

44 For several years, the AFP Capability Upgrade Program (an internal-security focused sub-program of the AFPMP) was provided PhP 5

billion annually. It allowed the AFP to expedite the acquisition of mission-critical equipment for forward-deployed units. The specific capabilities

acquired were focused on move-shoot-communicate ability for infantry units. The CUP also had a specific focus on improving the individual

survivability of soldiers in the field through the procurement of Combat Life Saver kits.


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accrue towards a deliberate and sustainable SRDP initiative. What is needed now is for the political will and commitment to see through the

vision of having a modern, professional security sector which is in step with the well-being and prosperity of the Filipino nation.



13AFP Regional Security and Defense Cooperation


by Melanie Rodulfo-Veril

13 AFP REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION

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The Philippines, despite the country’s strategic advantages from its geographic positioning, has perennially been challenged by a multitude of security issues emanating from a volatile regional environment. Having a military force that has relatively outmoded materiel and equipment, the country remains vulnerable to traditional and non-traditional regional security concerns capped by rival claims over the South China Sea, instability in the Korean peninsula, environmental hazards due to climate change, and political and economic impacts of oil dependency and rapid expansion of emerging industrialized states.

The article provides a substantial overview of the AFP’s International Defense and Security Engagement (IDSE) framework. It highlights relevant defense cooperation arrangements entered by the Philippine Government, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with allied countries and strategic partners such as the United States, Australia, South Korea, and the ASEAN. The implementation of AFP’s IDSE serves as an essential component of the government’s national policies and strategies aimed at establishing a credible AFP which is capable of addressing the myriad of threats and challenges to national security. Moreover, leveraging on its cooperative framework, the Philippines can gain a stronger stance for the promotion of its interests over key geopolitical and strategic security issues (e.g. expedition of a binding Code of Conduct or establishment of a Joint Authority over the South China Sea).

In conclusion, the article calls for the enhancement of the country’s bilateral and multilateral security-defense cooperative engagements toward maximizing derived benefits in pursuit of national interests. Comprehensive review and/or reassessment of various policies and IDSE programs are strongly recommended to enhance relations with emerging powers (i.e. China) and to support prevailing defense programs (i.e. prioritization of defense materiel and equipment transfer or acquisition to support shift to territorial defense operations).


AFP REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION



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TThe Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is striving to promote defense and security cooperation based on the principles of equality, mutual benefit and full respect of sovereignty with the desire of strengthening mutual cooperation at the operational level. The AFP remains committed to the promotion of regional and international peace and stability through its continued presence and involvement in various international engagements.1

The Philippine Security Landscape

As a country located in a politically strategic, but environmentally cataclysmic area, the Philippines is inundated with several security challenges topped by a number of potential flash points in the region.

With the politics of oil, geopolitics of navigation and politics of marine resources, there is no doubt that the West Philippine Sea will remain a primary security challenge in the Philippines’ relations with claimant nations, most recently with that of China. The potential economic benefits from the resources in the contested islands and the political leverage derived from effective control of the area is urging countries in the region to an arms race thereby increasing tensions and rigidities among claimant states’ militaries and affecting the regional security. Despite not siding with any of the claimant states, The US declares and upholds the freedom of navigation in the West Philippine Sea an integral component of its

national interest.2

Nevertheless, over the years, the West Philippine Sea dispute has remained a potential flash point as concerned countries have different perspectives in resolving their conflicting positions. China favors bilateral negotiations, and subsequently opposes internationalization of the issue and the involvement of the US. On the other hand, multilateral negotiation is favored by ASEAN member-claimants, including the Philippines, which strongly pushes elevating the issue to the International Tribunal on the Laws of the Sea.3 However, the multilateralism was constantly repudiated by China, which maintains its claim to undisputed sovereignty over the West Philippine Sea. In response, President Aquino in his 2011 State of the Nation Address (SONA) said that the Philippines is prepared to use military force to protect its territory in the West Philippine Sea and subsequently ordered the fast tracking of the new programs for AFP modernization to support this objective.4

The security in the Korean peninsula also remains a potential flash point with the North and South Korea, in principle, still at war. Recent North Korean missile tests and continued proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons development program have not discounted the possibility of military conflict in the peninsula. Filipinos living in South Korea will be the main concern of the Philippines with a number of its citizens estimated at 70,000 permanently residing in said countries based on official records

1 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, “The Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Regional Security.” 2008.2 Zha, Daoijing , “Security in the South China Sea,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 26 (2001) 3-51. 3 Carolina Hernandez, “Changing Discourse on Security: 1946 to the Present,” in Enhancing Philippine National Security Against External

Threat Report and Selected Paper Discussion, ed. Rowena Pangilinan (Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman,

2008). 4 Baviera ,Aileen San Pablo. The South China Sea Disputes: Is the Aquino Way the ‘ASEAN Way’?. Singapore: Rajaratnam School of

International Studies Singapore. 2012.

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with another estimated 14,000 - 15,000 Filipinos undocumented.5 With North Korea embarrassed by the failed missile launch in April 2012, tensions between the two Koreas and instability in the entire East Asian region are not completely tempered and may even be exacerbated by the strong possibility of future missile launches by North Korea.

A full blown China-Taiwan armed conflict will also have serious repercussions on the Philippines. Although “unlikely, but not impossible”, cross-strait conflict has a spill-over impact to Philippine interests wherein the eventual war between the mainland China and Taiwan will jeopardize the safety of its citizens in the said territories.6

Most Philippine security policies are stillanchored on the realist perspective which centers on the protection of the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty from possible aggression and threat intentions of other states. The theory downplays the effects of non-traditional security issues which, in recent years, have emerged as more urgent concerns among states.7

Most critical of which are climate change and disaster management. Climate change is apparent, and with increasing populations

and environmental degradation, this current phenomena creates greater unprecedented risks to the country. The most prominent of these environmental risks is evident in the significant increase in the number and intensity of storms and weather disturbances which have occurred in the Philippines in recent years.8 In 2010 alone, the country was severely affected by at least22 typhoons, to include super typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng which left nearly 1,000 peopledead and resulted in about USD 700 million damages in infrastructures particularly those around Manila.9 In 2013, super typhoon Yolanda caused catastrophic damages to affected provinces. The Philippines is still on its wayto recovery from the destruction the typhoon left on its wake. In the last decade, on average, more than 200 million people were affectedand about 10,000 people were killed by disaster and calamities in the country which accounts to 25 percent of the world total. The extentof these damages to life and propertycaused by these disasters is comparable to that caused by war.10 Given the impact of environmental hazards brought about bynatural disasters to national security, the AFPhas been deputized and delegated with an expanded role and involvement in disaster management.11


5 Esplanada, Jerry. “Philippines readies evacuation of Filipinos in South Korea”. March 27, 2012. Inquirer. Net.

Retrieved from: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/30565/philippines-readies-evacuation-of-filipinos-in-south-korea.6 Hernandez, Carolina. “Changing Discourse on Security: 1946 to the Present” in Pangilinan, Rowena (ed).”Enhancing Philippine National

Security Against External Threat” Report and Selected Paper Discussion Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman.

2008. 7 Ibid.8 Habito, Cielito F. Climate Change and National Development. A presentation made at the Meeting on Climate Change and National

Development in the Philippines, held on November 8, 2002 at the Justitia Room, Ateneo Professional Schools, Rockwell Center, Makati City,

Philippines.9 H.Y. Kim, “Disaster Management In Asia: Where Are We Now?,” Asian Journal of Public Affairs 3 (2010).10 USAID, 2008. Retrieved from: www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/pdf/AIDRF_Feasibility_Study_Report_annex6-10.pdf.11 Dencio Acop, “Assessing the Expanded Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Nation-Building.” Asia-Pacific Social Science Review.

Retrieved from http://www.dlsu.edu.ph/research/journals/apssr/pdf/200612/science_5.pdf.


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Moreover, though the Philippines is classified as an oil-importing country, energy security remains underappreciated in the country. The country’s dependence on oil and coal as energy sources accounts for 50 percent of its electricity, with the remainder sourced from renewable energy sources. A recent study suggests that the country may suffer from potentially dangerous energy shortage in the future.12 China, with its expanding economy realized this early on and has been hoarding oil for its reserves since 2008 which add to the build up in global oil demand. This can also explain their increased movements in the Spratlys for the search of oil fields, and construction of dams in the Mekong region for hydroelectric power.13

Call a Friend: AFP’s Strategic Networking and Defense Cooperation

In the previous article, it was explained that the country has limited defense capability to address these challenges. Amidst gaps and shortfalls in the modernization of AFP, the defense department relies on cooperation and relationship with its friends and allies to uphold its mission and objectives. Consistent with national policies and strategies, the AFP continues to leverage its alliances and engagements with foreign militaries to augment and/or enhance its sorry-state capability to effectively address and respond to security threats.14 The implementation

of the various international engagements of the AFP is facilitated through the interaction of three (3) key different systems: the J5-network[i.e. overseeing of the overall IDSE implementation in accordance with the country’s security-defense agreements); the J2-network (i.e. utilization of the intelligence network through the variousDefense Armed Forces Attaché (DAFA)]; and,J4-network (logistics network).

For the Philippines, its alliance with the US continues to be its single, most importantbilateral relationship.15 Albeit the withdrawal of US military bases in the Philippines in 1992, the treaty allies have maintained their cooperative ties through the regular conduct of joint military activities on counterterrorism and maritime security. The relationship was further strengthened through the recent signing in 2011 of the “Manila Declaration” by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and DFA Secretary Albert F. del Rosario. The joint declaration “reaffirmed the bilateral security relationship and called for multilateral talks to resolve maritime disputesin the region” in the American’s “return to Southeast Asia.”16 In June 2011, the Philippines submitted to Pentagon a “wish list” of military equipment for securing the country’s maritime territory. The US has likewise provided an initial fund for the Coast Watch System.17

PH-US cooperation also extends to humanitarian assistance and disaster response, civil-military operations, and peacekeeping operations among


12 Kevin Punzalan, “Aquino’s Challenge: Energy Security,” RSIS Commentaries (2010).13 Carolyn Cui, “China Seen Bolstering Oil Reserves.” The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052

702304587704577335722040019632.html.14 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, “The Strategic Direction of AFP International Military Affairs,” 2010.15 Ibid.16 Thomas Lum, ”The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests,” (Washington: Congressional Research Services, 2012).17 Pia Lee-Brago, “US willing to help Phl get F-16 jets,” The Philippine Star, Retrieved December 25, 2011 from http://www.philstar.com/

Article.aspx?articleId=761971.

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others. Despite the entrenched relationship of the two countries, the strength of this relationship will be tested on whether the US will support the Philippines in case tensions in the West Philippine Sea escalate into an armed conflict.

The Philippines also sees Australia and South Korea as potential allies. Next to the US, Australia is the largest provider of training to AFP personnel under the Defense Cooperation Programme (DCP). The Australian government has provided assistance to the Philippines on counter-terrorism (CT) in the wake of the US-led global war on terrorism in 200218 and have likewise assisted the maritime needs analysis (MANA) to determine specific requirements for the Coast Watch South (CWS)19 project initiatives. Most importantly, with the recent concurrence of the Philippine Senate with the ratification of the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) between the two, military cooperation between the Philippine and Australia are expected to become more robust in the coming years through the conduct of more military-to-military trainings and engagements.20

Common security concerns also strengthens Philippines-South Korea defense relations which was formalized under an MOU on Logistics and Defense Industry Cooperation. Under this agreement, the two countries “assist each other through defense logistics and defense industry agencies and manufacturers and the development of a workable framework for

capability enhancement.” This is manifested by the USD 90 million worth of military assistance from South Korea. The AFP continues to support the Honor Guard Company which provides ceremonial security and support to the United Nations Command (Korea) in the 38th Parallel pursuant to the Treaty of Armistice between the Two Koreas. The Philippines, being one of the original parties who partook in the Korean War was given honorary slots to this “Company” which is part of functions of the current DAFA in South Korea.21

Other agreements on Defense and Logistics Cooperation were also forged with countries such as Spain, Japan, India, and United Kingdom. These countries have uttered their willingness to assist in the AFP modernization.

Power of 10: The Role of ASEAN

As a member of the ASEAN, the Philippines is committed to the establishment of a peaceful region which is free of conflict and anchored on a friendly and cooperative relationship. The armed forces of ASEAN nations recognizes the need for a strong ASEAN Security Community (ASC), which acknowledges the principle of comprehensive security, and commits to address the broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects of building an ASEAN Community. It also acknowledges that political and social stability,


18 ______. Living in the Shadow of the Hegemon: Philippine-Australian Relations and the Global War against Terrorism Australasian Political

Studies Association Conference. University of New Castle 25-27 September 2006.19 The Coast Watch South (CWS) is a national mechanism for securing the borders and addressing maritime security of the Southern Philippines.

It is envisioned to stage a surveillance, control and response capability covering the critical maritime domain of the Sulu and Celebes Seas. It is a

coordinating body for joint civil, military and law enforcement surveillance and response operations. This has been further expanded to the Coast

Watch System which covers a bigger strategic maritime area.20 IMA, 2010. 21 Dr. Azmi Mat Akhir, “ASEAN Regional Security: The Threats Facing it and the Way Forward,” Retrieved April 10 2006 from http://www.

aseansec.org/18394.htm.


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economic prosperity, narrowed development gap, poverty alleviation and reduction of social disparity would constitute a strong foundation for a sustained ASC given the ASEAN’s subscription to the principle of comprehensive security.22

To complement this goal of attaining an ASC, ASEAN strongly encourages military-to-military engagements among ASEAN member-states to further facilitate community cooperation and shared identity in the region. It recognizes defense cooperation and synergy among ASEAN militaries as important elements in preserving the peace and security of the region. This is because Defense Security Cooperation involves the provision of financial and technical support, transfer of defense materiel, provision of training and services to allies, and promotion of military-to-military contacts. It fosters and oversees security-cooperation arrangements and promotes security relationships among allies or partner countries. The goal is to lead, resource, and educate the Defense Security Cooperation community in order to shape, refine and execute innovative security solutions for partners in support of their respective national interest, and regional or global security. In realizing the Blueprint for establishing ASEAN Political-Security Community, the Association has increased cooperation activities, establishing the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) which is the highest ministerial defense and security consultative and cooperative mechanism for regional security issues among the ASEAN Member States.23

Within the framework of ADMM, besides preparatory meetings such as ASEAN Defense Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM) and ADSOM Working Group (WG), it is worth to mention the Track II Network of ASEAN Defense Institutions (NADI) as a supporting tool for the ADMM. Founded in 2007, NADI is a forum where scholars and researchers in ASEAN meet and exchange insights and perspectives on defense and security matters that are relevant to ADMM, with a view of seeking innovative recommendations to ADMM.

ASEAN military-to-military cooperative activities have been conducted at various levels through the conduct of annual or regular top-level military meetings such as ASEAN Chiefs of Defense Forces Informal Meeting - ACDFIM (since 2001), ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting - ACAMM (since 2000), ASEAN Navy Interaction – ANI (since 2001) ASEAN Air Force Chiefs Conference - AACC (since 2004) and ASEAN Military Intelligent Informal Meeting (AMIIM). All in all, the growth and expansion of military-to-military interaction and cooperation have contributed to building mutual confidence and understanding, thus, deepening and strengthening solidarity among ASEAN defense forces.24

With regard to external cooperative relations, ASEAN has been increasing the defense cooperation with its partners outside the region under the framework of the ASEAN Regional


22 VietNews, “Briefing on developments of ASEAN defence and military cooperation by ADMM+ Chairman,” Retrieved October 12, 2010 from

http://www.dztimes.net/post/politics/briefing-on-developments-of-asean-defence-and-military-cooperation-by-admm-chairman.aspx. 23 “Briefing on developments of ASEAN defence and military cooperation by ADMM+ Chairman” VietNews, 12 October 2010, http://www.

dztimes.net/post/politics/briefing-on-developments-of-asean-defence-and-military-cooperation-by-admm-chairman.aspx.24 Ralf Emmers, “The De-Escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian Relations,” RSIS Working Paper Series (2007).

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Forum (ARF), specifically the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC), ARF Defense Officials’ Dialogue (DOD) and ARF Heads of Defense Universities/ Colleges/ Institutions Meeting (HDUCIM). At these meetings, participants engage in extensive discussions on regional security issues, taking stock of the role of defense establishments in the evolving regional security architecture, and mapping out future plans for ARF defense cooperation aimed at boosting the experience exchange in maritime security, HADR, natural disaster and climate change.

ASEAN political instruments also continue to influence confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution among members. These instruments include the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN 1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TACSEA 1976), and the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ 1995). To address the issue on West Philippine Sea, claimant countries signed the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the West Philippine Sea in 2002.25 Aside from the Philippines, other ASEAN member claimants are Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei. However, competing claims on the ownershipof the islands continue to be a source ofsecurity anxieties in the area. The DOC elucidates that “parties reaffirmed their respect to the freedom of navigation in and over flight above the SCS, as provided for by universally

recognized principles of international law andthe UNCLOS”.26 However, the DOC implementing guideline was just adopted in 2011. Thishowever is non-binding, and a policy with more teeth and hold is needed to manage tensions between ASEAN claimant states and China.27

The ASEAN must strengthen its security cooperation mechanisms and guideline, institutionalize the peaceful resolution of conflict and make these binding on member-states. Because of the securitization of many non-traditional threats,28 ASEAN militaries must synergize their roles thru the framework of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. This Blueprint aims to intensify sharedresponsibility on regional security by ASEAN member states.29 To do this, ASEAN militaries must lay the groundwork for informationsharing, mutual support and assistance, especially on common security concerns.Second, a common understanding on thepromotion and protection of human rights as an essential element of human security is also recommended. Realistic assessment of the defense capabilities of ASEAN militaries is necessary in order to outline cohesive responsibilities or roles and to ensure transparency of military actions among members. Finally, continuous dialogue and exchange on best practices in defense security and peace operations that are applicable at the regional level must be promoted.


25 Emmers, Ralf, “The De-Escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian Relations”, RSIS Working Paper Series(6 June 2007).26 Rommel Banloi, Philippines-China Security Relations: Current Issues and Emerging Concerns, (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace,

Violence and Terrorism Research, 2012).27 Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Briefing for the New Commander in Chief (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City: Office of Strategic and

Special Studies, July 2010). 28 Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Briefing for the New Commander in Chief (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City: Office of Strategic and

Special Studies, July 2010).29 “Chinese Drilling Ship Leaves Disputed Waters,” Japan Economic Newswire, November 4, 1992.


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To address the tensions in the West Philippine Sea, a legally-binding regional Code of Conduct in the West Philippine Sea that is aimed to establish an open and co-operative engagement framework in the area should be pursued. A creation of a joint authority dedicated to common development of resources within the Spratlys area may also be adopted as a logical solution for a territorial disputes as convoluted as this one the West Philippine Sea case. Establishing a “Spratly Resource Development Authority” would be consistent with statements by the Chinese government which aver that while sovereignty over the Spratly Islands is non-negotiable, joint ventures to exploit the natural resources of the West Philippine Sea may be discussed.30 Thus, a kind of multilateral “Authority” analogous to that for mining the deep seabed in the 1982 LOS Convention may be established, which would be responsible for managing resource exploitation, including fisheries, the environment, and safety of navigation.31 Measures of engaging all the parties for a discussion must be explored to resolve the issue; otherwise a status quo will likely prevail and will be most favorable to the country with the most dominating military force - China.32

The Prospects for AFP Advantage

Despite all challenges, the AFP is committed to have a professional and capable armed force responsive to various challenges confronting the Philippines and the region where it is situated. While the AFP is on the process of modernizing

its capabilities, the Philippines aims to bolster and leverage its alliances.33 In reality, however proactive the Philippines is, it lacks the power to fully leverage. In addition, despite the willingness of allies and partners for mutual defense agreements, defense materiel transfer is often not utilized or maximized since the Philippines does not have excess or even advanced materiel worthy of being exchanged.

For this reason, the Philippines can use its reliable human resources activities such as peacekeeping missions, training and education exchange, where the AFP has vastexperience, as the bargaining piece. The exchange of military exercises has been consistent in the Philippines particularlywith the United States. To enhance its military operations other than war (MOOTW) capabilities, the AFP conducts bilateral and multilateral exercises with the US such as the Balikatan Exercises. The AFP also regularly participatesin the Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT) which is a regional cooperation mechanism in support of cooperativeresponse to terrorism and transnationalcrimes at sea.

Since the Mutual Defense Treaty with the US is the only defense treaty of the Philippines, it must therefore be maximized. A review to reprioritize U.S. security assistance programs to make them responsive to the AFP’s shift from internal security to territorial defense is essential.34 The Pentagon and AFP can also explore acquisition of defense equipment (newer and not just Excess Defense


30 Mark J. Valencia, “A Spratly Solution,” Far Eastern Economic Review (1994). 31 Valencia, Mark J. “A Spratly Solution,” Far Eastern Economic Review (31 March 1994): 1.32 Dagdag, 2011. 33 Renato Cruz De Castro, ”Balancing Gambits in Twenty-First Century Philippine Foreign Policy Gains and Possible Demise?,” Southeast

Asian Affairs (2011). 34 De Castro, “Balancing Gambits”.

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Articles) through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) since government-to-government transactions are faster than the bidding process of the AFP.

In the midst of issues and tensions in West Philippine Sea, the Philippines must learn to

engage with China, and curb the view that China is an imminent threat. The AFP must play the “China Card” to gain diplomatic leverage.35 The AFP must be clever in the international playing field, as they say; countries have no hearts but only national interest to protect.


35 De Castro, Renato Cruz. “Balancing Gambits in Twenty-First Century Philippine Foreign Policy Gains and Possible Demise?” Southeast

Asian Affairs, 2011.

References:

Banlaoi, Rommel C. “Broadening Philippine-Australia Defence

Relations in the Post 9/11 Era: Issues and Prospects.”

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2003.

Baviera, Aileen San Pablo. The South China Sea Disputes: Is

the Aquino Way the ‘ASEAN Way’?. Singapore: Rajaratnam

School of International Studies Singapore. 2012.

Baviera, Aileen San Pedro. “China-Philippines Relations:

Cautious Cooperation.” Hawaii: Asia-Pacific Center for

Security Studies, 2004.

Chau, Andrew. “Security Community and Southeast Asia:

Australia, the U.S., and ASEAN’s Counter-Terror.” Asian

Survey 48 (2008): 626-649.

De Castro, Renato Cruz. “Balancing Gambits in Twenty-

First Century Philippine Foreign Policy Gains and Possible

Demise?” Southeast Asian Affairs (2011).

Emmers, Ralf, “The De-Escalation of the Spratly Dispute in

Sino-Southeast Asian Relations”, RSIS Working Paper Series

(2007).

Habito, Cielito F. “Climate Change and National

Development.” Paper presented at the Meeting on Climate

Change and National Development in the Justitia Room,

Ateneo professional Schools, Rockwell Center, Makati City,

Philippines Philippines, November 8, 2002.

Hernandez, Carolina. “Changing Discourse on Security:

1946 to the Present.” In Enhancing Philippine National

Security Against External Threat Report and Selected Paper

Discussion, edited by Rowena Pangilinan. Quezon City:

Asian Center, University of the Philippines, Diliman, 2008).

Kim, H.Y.. “Disaster Management in Asia: Where Are We

Now?.” Asian Journal of Public Affairs 3 (2010).

______. “Living in the Shadow of the Hegemon: Philippine-

Australian Relations and the Global War against Terrorism”,

Australasian Political Studies Association Conference.

University of New Castle: 2006.

Long, Bernard Fook Wen. “Transforming the Strategic

Landscape of Southeast Asia.” Contemporary Southeast Asia

27 (2005): 388-405.

Lum, Thomas. The Republic of the Philippines and U.S.

Interests. Washington: Congressional Research Services,

2012.

Office of Strategic and Special Studies. Briefing for the New

Commander in Chief. Quezon City: Office of Strategic and

Special Studies, 2010.

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. “The Role of the

Armed Forces of the Philippines in Regional Security.” 2008.

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. “The Strategic

Direction of AFP International Military Affairs.” 2010.

Pangilinan, Rowena. “Enhancing Philippine National Decurity

Against External Threat.” Report and Selected Paper

Discussion Quezon City: Asian Center, University of the

Philippines, Diliman. 2008.

Punzalan, Kevin. “Aquino’s Challenge: Energy Security.”

RSIS Commentaries. 2010.

Valencia, Mark. “A Spratly Solution.” Far Eastern Economic

Review, 1994.

Zha, Daoijing. “Security in the South China Sea.” Alternatives:

Global, Local, Political 26 (2001): 3-51.

14The Evolving Role of the AFP:

Skewing TowardsNon-Traditional Roles


by MERENIZA C GOMEZ

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In international relations, security is associated with sovereignty while focusing on deterrence, power balancing, and military strategy. Traditionally, security is equated with the non-existence of military threat and protecting the state from subversion and attacks posed by external forces. In the post-cold war era, security has broadened to include unprecedented and emerging sources of insecurity such as terrorism, transnational crimes, health crises, environmental degradation, hunger, unemployment, social conflicts, and political repression. This changing concept of security consequently reshapes a military’s mission, which was evident in the case of the Philippines and its armed forces.

The author discusses the changing roles of the AFP and how these affect not just the military but also civilian actors. The author also examines the various factors that redefine the capacities of the members of the armed forces.

After examining the evolving role of the AFP, the author concludes that the changing concept of security continues to dictate how militaries of the modern world behave. Thus, refocusing military operations to non-traditional security concerns is not a zero-sum scenario, ‘where the performance of one is detrimental to the other.’


THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE AFP: SKEWING TOWARDS NON-TRADITIONAL ROLES

14 THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE AFP: SKEWING TOWARDS NON-TRADITIONAL ROLES

SOURCE: PAO AFP

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“The AFP of the 21st century shall be a highly effective, technologically driven, efficient combatant but socially oriented institution; it shall possess the versatility to undertake non-military roles in aid of development and governance and its members shall remain role models for the Philippine citizenry.” - The AFP 2020 Vision

Introduction

In international relations, security has been conventionally associated with the concepts of sovereignty, often with focus on the dimensions of deterrence, power balancing, and military strategy.1 In its traditional sense, security is equated with the non-existence of military threat, or is identified with safeguarding a state from subversion and attack posed by the external forces.2

Since the decline of the Cold War Era, security has evolved from being a single function of geo-politics and power-balancing of major powers into a nexus of economic, political, and societal forces.3 Thus, security has broadened its scope to include prevalent, often unprecedented and emerging, non-traditional sources of insecurity. These alternative sources of security challenges

include terrorism, transnational crimes, health crises, environmental degradation, hunger, unemployment, social conflicts, and political repression, among others.4

This changing concept of security continues to reshape a military’s mission, and this has been evident in the case of the Philippines and its armed forces. Since its formation more than a century ago, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has played an important, if not a central role, in the process of nation-building and state formation over the past decades. The primary mission of the AFP is “to protect the people and secure the sovereignty of the state and the integrity of the national territory.” 5 However, as the concept of national security becomes conventionally more comprehensive, the basic role of the AFP broadens from a traditional defense and military force into an agent of political, social, and economic development in the country.6

This backdrop frames the discussion on the changing roles of the AFP and how these emerging new roles affect not just the military but also the civilian sectors. It will identify various factors that redefine the capacities of the military over time and present some possible scenarios for the AFP as it is continuously influenced by the changing concept of security.


1 Boutin and Tan, Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2001). 2 Ibid., p. 6.3 E. Rothschild, “What is Security?,” Daedalus 124 (1995): 53-98. 4 Boutin and Tan, Non-Traditional Security Issues.5 1987 Philippine Constitution. Section 2 of Article II Declaration of Principles and State Policies, p. 2.6 C. Hernandez, “Controlling Asia’s Armed Forces.” (International Forum for Democratic Studies, 1996).

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The Traditional Roles of the AFP

The evolving concept of security has been influential in shaping and defining the AFP’s mission. The 2002 National Military Strategy (NMS), which sets the strategic direction of the military leadership, identifies five mission objectives on how the AFP shall address the various threats to national security. Among these mission objectives, only two can be construed as traditional roles:

1. to maintain territorial integrity and defend the national territory; and,

2. protect the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Maintain territorial integrity and defend the national territory. As provided in the Philippine Constitution, the AFP shall be the protector of the people and the state.7 In line with this mandate, territorial defense remains the top priority mission of the AFP. This means that it is the core responsibility of the AFP to ensure that the country’s vital interests are protected and that all intrusion into the national territory by external aggressors are detected, identified, documented, intercepted, and if necessary, neutralized. Territorial defense ensures the dominance of the state powers over all Philippine-claimed territories and features, including airspace and territorial seas, and the prevention of any dismemberment, encroachment, or foreign occupation over these areas.8

Protect the EEZ. Protection of the EEZ is paramount to defending and upholdingsovereignty over national territory and territorial

claims and likewise, is of utmost importance in the pursuit of the Philippine’s economic and strategic interests. The overlapping EEZ in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) shared by at least six Asian countries and territories has adversely affected the relations of claimant countries and has since been regarded as a potential flashpoint for military conflict in the region. The continued military developments and the increasing aggressive stance and show of force in the contested WPS area pose serious threats to national security.

The Non-Traditional Roles of the AFP

The remainder of the mission objectives identified in the NMS can be classified as non-traditional. These include:

1. decisively defeat all armed internal security threats;

2. contribute to regional peace and stability; and,

3. support national development.

Decisively defeat all armed internal security threats. As a result of the country’s persistent insurgency problem, the AFP has assumed responsibility over the government’s internal security operations (ISO) by virtue of Republic Act (RA) 8551.9 Although internal security presupposes comprehensive solutions and approaches, AFP’s focused military operations remain at the center of the government’s efforts to suppress insurgency, reduce internal armed threats, and subsequently establish peace and order in conflict areas.


7 1987 Philippine Constitution.8 AFP National Military Strategy (2002).9 Hermogenes C. Esperon, “Progress in Counter-Terrorism: The Philippine Experience” (paper presented at the 6th Shangri-La Dialogue,

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore, June 2-4, 2007).


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Contribute to regional peace and stability. The AFP supports the government’s diplomatic initiatives through continuous participation in confidence-building measures, security dialogues, and other defense cooperation activities with allies and friends. In consonance with national policies, the AFP shall implement and participate in various bilateral and multilateral engagements with foreign partners to further national security and interests.

Support national development. National development is of paramount importance to national security. It is for this reason that the AFP has always been tapped to perform peacetime roles in support of infrastructure, disaster relief and rehabilitation, search and rescue, protection of national resources, preservation of the environment, and civic action, among others.

Looking into the Factors: Catalysts for Change

Various factors can be accounted as major catalysts for the changing roles of the military. Issues regarding professionalism and politicization of the AFP remain the greatest challenges the Philippine military as an institution must face. Lack of professionalism emanates from within the armed forces while politicization comes from the outside of the AFP.

Historically, the native Filipino fighters who mounted the resistance against Spanish and American colonizers were driven by deep martial traditions of bravery, sacrifice, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. It was only during the American

occupation of the Philippines that the concept of a “professional armed forces” was first introduced. A professional military would mean an rmed force that possesses expertise in managing violence, has an unwavering responsibility to the state, and a corporate interest of protecting its traditions and organizations.10

The signing of various bilateral defense agreements, such as the Military Bases and Military Assistance Agreements in 1947 and the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1951, paved the way for the institutionalization of an independent Philippine military. The nascent AFP’s culture, equipage, organization, training, education, doctrines, operations, logistics, and personnel management were all patterned after the US military systems. The professionalization of military personnel was further facilitated through the creation of the Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), which was instituted to give advice to the AFP and supervise the implementation of various military agreements between the US and the Philippines.11

The professionalism of the military, however, deteriorated in the post-World War era. With some elements of the military joining the insurgencies against the newly-formed government, the Defense Department, under then Secretary Ramon Magsaysay, introduced reforms in the training and equipage of the armed forces in order to boost their morale and fighting performance.12 The role of the AFP further expanded with the creation of the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), which took charge of giving resettlement areas to rebel returnees in the process of reintegration.


10 S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (Colorado, USA: Westview Press, 1988), 20-21. 11 Cesar P. Pobre, History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2000) ,76.

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Under the Marcos administration, the AFP became a “close partner” of the government for national development under the “New Society” movement. In addition to suppressing violence and lawlessness, the military performed substantial socio-economic roles. Former President Marcos, although for a different reason, “deployed the AFP in development projects, particularly in areas where civilian agencies lacked the resources to undertake the project themselves.”13 But beyond being a partner in nation-building, the AFP became the regime’s self-preservation apparatus, used to suppress the opposition, control media, and curtail the people’s freedom of expression.

The imposition of martial law exposed the military’s vulnerability to patronage politics and corruption as it was made to perpetuate politicians in power, thereby effectively alienating it from public interest. This resulted in public distrust against the regime and the military, with many people joining the communist movement and the middle class demanding drastic political reforms. The politicization of the military however took its toll on the dictatorship and the AFP as calls for reforms brew within the uniformed services. The assassination of then Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. in 1983 became an impetus for the creation of the REFORM the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) by young military officers in 1985.14 Calling for reforms in the military, RAM became instrumental in the ouster of the dictatorship as its failed coup d’état spurred the first People Power Revolution in February 1986.

The role of the RAM in the restoration of democracy enabled the AFP to regain the trust and confidence of the Filipino people as the military was perceived to be a powerful balancing force in the nation’s political life. Meanwhile, the role of the AFP as the “protector of the people and the State” was codified in the 1987 Constitution.15 As such, it is the AFP’s core responsibility to be the guardian of democracy, the Constitution, and people’s freedom and liberties.

However, the same provisions of the Constitution which legitimize the role of the military are being used by some sectors to justify its involvement in the political affairs, claiming that as the protector of public interest, the AFP must support calls to unseat an incumbent president. Even with a regime change, there remain clear indications that the military are not entirely free from political partisanship. This phenomenon of military interference has been evident through various coups d’état that have challenged post-Marcos presidencies. Notable among these were the series of coup attempts against President Corazon Aquino between 1987 and 1989, the military’s withdrawal of support from President Joseph Estrada in 2001, the failed Oakwood Mutiny in 2003, and the unsuccessful withdrawal of support by two Brigade Commanders in 2006 during the term of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

The political interferences of military elements in recent years are manifestations of continued, if not renewed, calls for reforms within the organization.


12 Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, (USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 2005), 196.13 Patricio N. Abinales, “American Military Presence in the Southern Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview.” (East West Center

Working Papers, 2004), 196. 14 The acronym R.E.F.O.R.M. meant Restore Ethics Fair-mindedness Order Righteousness and Morale.15 1987 Philippine Consitution, Article II, Section 3.


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The thwarted Oakwood mutiny resulted in the creation of the Feliciano Fact-FindingCommission by former President Arroyo to investigate the incident. The report acknowledged the “reality and legitimacy” of the grievances of the disgruntled junior military officers involved as compelling factors to execute such mutiny.16 The report concluded that the issues of graft and corruption and the poor conditions of soldiers in combat operations create a “powerful emotive force” for soldiers to be easily recruited to stage coup attempts.17 These grievances of the mutineers have underscored the need for corruption control mechanisms and modernization of the AFP.

The US Connection

The enactment of the Military Bases Agreement between the US and the Philippine governments in 1947 ensured a large American military presence in its former colony. With American bases operating in the country, the AFP was able to benefit from US military assistance through military capability upgrade and training, while extending a security umbrella for the Philippines. Territorial defense of the country was guaranteed through the air and naval support of the US forces.18 Moreover, the Philippine Government logically gained savings in defense expenditures, which were further complemented by additional compensation and grants in return for allowing American bases to operate in the country. Between 1980-1989 alone, it is estimated that the

Philippines was able to save more than USD 7 Billion for a ten-year period of US bases presence in the country.19

The greatest challenge to the Philippine security framework came upon the non-renewal and the eventual closure of American military bases in 1992. The eviction of the military forces severely reduced the strong deterrence of the country against external aggression and the significant amount of military assistance needed to develop AFP’s capabilities. Albeit presenting opportunities for the Philippine government to assert full sovereignty and independence, the capability of the AFP to defend the state and national territory has since deteriorated. Similarly, even the AFP’s capability to address internal security concerns has weakened in order to sustain both combat and non-combat operations. To date, the current armed forces lacks a credible defense capability due to the government’s inability to acquire new equipment for the AFP or, at the very least, even maintain the military’s ageing equipment.

From Modernization to Back-to-Basics

Losing the security benefits from the US military bases in the country, it became imperative for the Philippines to modernize the capabilities of the military to effectively perform its constitutional mandate. In 1995, the Philippine Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) 7898, otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Act in order to develop a self-reliant and a credible strategic armed


16 Florentino P. Feliciano, “Report on the Fact-Finding Commission.” (Pasay City: 2003), 36. 17 Ibid.18 Raymund Jose G. Quilop, Bilateralism, Regional Security and the Philippine-US Alliance (OSS Working Paper) (Quezon City: Office of

Strategic and Special Studies, AFP, 1999), 8. 19 Eriberto C. Varona, “An Economic Analysis of the US Military Bases in the Philippines” (Thesis).

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force which is capable of defending sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines and preserve national patrimony. Under the law, the AFP’s Modernization Program was intended to be implemented over a period of 15 years with a PhP 50 billion budget ceiling for the first five years. The program’s implementation was to be funded through the AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund (the breakdown shown in Figure 1) which was to be sourced out mainly through the annual appropriations by Congress and other prescribed complementary sources.20

However, no funds were allocated by Congress for the modernization program in its nascent years. It is only through the AFP’s initiative that the Modernization Trust Fund was initially financed using the AFP’s share from the proceeds of the sale of Fort Bonifacio in 2002, amounting to PhP 5.4 billion. For more than half of the intended duration of the modernization program,

all funds for the Trust Fund were sourced out from the AFP’s share from proceeds of subsequent bases conversion, from the Government Arsenal,sale of excess AFP assets, and the Malampaya Gas Project, from which the AFP receivedPhP 1 billion. Despite the law authorizing the Congress to appropriate annual funds for AFP modernization, it was only in 2007 that appropriations was made by the Congress amounting to PhP 5 billion. Almost twelve (12) years into the program, the Trust fund only holds roughly 36 percent of the PhP 50 billion intended for the first five years of the modernization program. Notwithstanding the fact that while the PhP 50 billion should have been appropriated by the National Government, only PhP 10 billion has been disbursed to date.

Aside from the expected appropriations from Congress, the sale and lease of military lands through the BCDA has been a primary source of


20 In addition to the annual appropriations made by the Congress, RA 7898 provides that the AFP Modernization Act Trust shall also be sourced

out through the proceeds of the sale, lease, or joint development of military reservations not covered under the Bases Conversion Development

Authority (BCDA); shares of the AFP from the proceeds of the sale of military camps; proceeds from the sale of the products of the Government

Arsenal; proceeds from the disposal of excess and/or uneconomically repairable equipment and other movable assets of the AFP and the

Government Arsenal; funds from budgetary surplus, if any, as may be authorized by Congress; and, all interest income of the trust fund.

Figure 1: AFP ModernizationTrust Fund

GA REMITTANCES

51,257,165

0%

Source: AFP MPMO

BCDA Shares

6,943,770,376

39%

FY 2007 GAA

5,000,000,000

27%

MNGP Proceeds

1,000,000,000

5%

BCDA Shares

271,144,000

1%

FY 2002 GAA

5,000,000,000

28%


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the Modernization Fund. RA 7227, as amended by RA 7917, stipulates that the AFP shall receive a 35 percent share from the proceeds of sale or transfers of military camps while the rest of the proceeds are then to be divided up to at least fifteen (15) other government agencies.21 The logic of these government agencies receiving shares from the proceeds of military camps is being questioned by the Feliciano Commission, especially since the functions of these said agencies are deemed “non-military-related”. Moreover, the Commission recommended that the shares allocated to the AFP Modernization Program should be increased substantially. The Commission held that it appears only reasonable that all the “proceeds from the sales of military land should be shared only by the AFP (for its modernization program) and the BCDA.”22 Indeed, if the 37.5 percent of the proceeds being shared by said government agencies were to be shared solely by the Modernization Program and the BCDA, there would be a considerable increase of much needed resources for the Modernization Program.

Another issue that demands attention is that while the Trust Fund generates its own interest income, these earnings are deposited with the Bureau of Treasury and therefore do not form part

of the Trust Fund. As of the end of 2006, the Trust Fund has already generated PhP 256.77 million in interest income. Given that this interest income is earned by the Trust Fund, it is but logical that the said amount be transferred from the Bureau of Treasury to the Trust Fund. It would also be worthy to look at the possibility of exempting the said interest income from tax deductions to maximize the various of resources for the Trust Fund. This would remain true to the spirit behind the creation of the Trust Fund, which is ensuring peak and sustained availability of funds for projects under the program.

The insufficiency of the Trust Fund is further aggravated by the continuous tapering of the AFP annual budget, which is distinct and separate from the modernization appropriation. Not only is the AFP now faced with the responsibility of stepping up and filling in the air and naval support lost from the US bases pullout, it was also forced into a dwindling budget. As shown in Figure 2, the budget appropriated to the AFP vis-à-vis the country’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been on a continuous decline in the most recent years: from 1.42 percent in 2002, to 1.29 percent in 2003, 1.14 percent in 2004, 1.00 percent in 2005, and 0.90 percent in 2006. Notably, the country’s budget for defense in 2006 is even


21 Section 1 (d) of RA 7917 dated February 24, 1995, names the following government agencies: BCDA (27.5%), National Housing Authority;

National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (12%); Philippine Health Insurance Corporation

(3%); Department of Public Works and Highways and Department of Transportation and Communications (5%); Philippine Veterans Affairs

Office (2%); Commission on Higher Education (1%); Department of Science and Technology (2%); Office of the Secretary, Department of

Justice and the Ombudsman (1%); National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Corrections, Philippine National Police and the Bureau of Jail

Management and Penology (2% but not to exceed P2 Billion); Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts, Sandiganbayan, Court

of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals (1% but not to exceed P1 Billion); Department of Education, Culture and Sports and Department of Social

Welfare and Development (2%); Department of Labor and Employment (½% but not to exceed P5 Million); Department of Social Welfare and

Development (1%); Mount Pinatubo Assistance, Rehabilitation and Development Fund (3%); and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority

(2%).22 The Report of the Fact Finding Commission Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 78 of the President of the Republic of the Philippines Dated

July 30, 2003, Part Three, October 17, 2003, p. 142.

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smaller compared to the budget in 1991 when the US military bases were still in the country.

Equally important to delve into is how the annual appropriations of the AFP are being spent. On average, 70 percent of the total AFP appropriations are used to compensate personnel services, while the remainder is primarilyused to sustain its operations. On the other hand, capital outlay receives very minimal funding, which could have been used to complement the Modernization Trust Fund for capability upgrade and acquisition.

The decline in AFP appropriations and the virtually non-existent allocation for capital outlay have been detrimental to the AFP modernization, which was further worsened by the reduction in military assistance from the US, the loss of

air and naval support from US bases, and the absence of bases compensation. It thus comes as no surprise that from one of the finest armed forces in Asia, Philippine defense capability is now considered as “a perennial joke within ASEAN” and “the weakest military force among ASEAN states”.23 This sentiment is shared by Zachary Abuza of the U.S. Institute of Peace, who discredited the role of AFP in the regional security arena since it has “almost no navy” and its “ability to protect its exclusive economic zones and maritime resources is nil.”24

Unfortunately, the Philippine Government could not easily brush off these criticisms as the AFP itself concedes to the fact that the military has long been burdened with capability challenges. A capability assessment of the AFP in 2007 reported various inadequacies and gaps in the military’s


Source: AFP RMO

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06

2.50 %

2.00 %

1.50 %

1.00 %

0.50 %

0.00 %

TOTAL AFP APPROPRIATIONS CAPITAL OUTLAY

Figure 2: Real AFP Appropriations (% of Real GDP)

23 Sheldon W. Simon, “Asian Armed Forces: Internal and External Tasks and Capabilities,” NBR Analysis, Accessed May 2000, http://www.

taiwandocuments.org/nbr01.pdf. 24 Carlos H. Conde, “Corruption Troubles Philippine Military,” International Herald Tribune, Accessed http://www.iht.com/

articles/2005/05/25/news/ phils.php.


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adeptness to support both traditional and non-traditional operations.25 The apparent incapability of the AFP for territorial defense, or for some, the “lack of it”26, can be summarized as follows:

• The Philippine Air Force does not have a credible air defense capability to perform its mission of territorial defense.27 It does not have any modern air-defense, surveillance, airlift, and ground attack capabilities.28 Its air assets cannot fully conduct and sustain operations,29 particularly with its fighter fleet being severely depleted with the decommissioning of the F-5s. Its surveillance equipment are either obsolete or non-functional and its radars are unable to provide nationwide coverage. Meanwhile, most air bases do not even meet the requirements of a standard air force base.

• The Philippine Navy is greatly challenged in the conduct of maritime defense over the country’s territorial waters and EEZ. Out of the Philippine Navy’s more than 50 patrol ships, ten are almost 50 years old. A limited number of naval assets are also worsened by the non-existence of anti-submarine, anti-

aircraft, and mine sweeping capabilities for modern naval warfare. Serviceability of air assets, with ages averaging almost 30 years, is likewise low due to insufficient funds for maintenance, communication support, and night-flying capabilities.30

• The Philippine Army has no modern fire control systems. It has no air defense system and anti-aircraft weapons except for small arms and machine guns. Similarly, the Army has no capability for inshore defense except for the fire support assets of the infantry divisions. Communication equipment are likewise insufficient while intelligence highly relies on human assets and lacks technological capability. Mobility assets, logistics support, and bases maintenance are also hampered by lack of funds.31

The modernization of AFP’s capability for territorial defense was further encumbered by the shifted focus towards internal security operations. In 2005, the AFP leadership implemented the first block of the military’s Capability Upgrade Program (CUP), which was dubbed as “back to basics”. The upgrade of AFP capabilities was focused


25Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5, AFP, AFP Capability Assessment Report, September 2007.26 Kathleen C. Villamin, as quoted in Renato Cruz De Castro and Walter Lohman, “U.S.–Philippines Partnership in the Cause of Maritime

Defense,” The Heritage Foundation, August 8, 2011, Asia-Pacific Section, Accessed http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/us-

philippines-partnership-in-the-cause-of-maritime-defense#_ftnref19.27Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, AFP Capability Assessment Report.28 De Castro and Lohhan, “US-Philippines Partnership in the Cause of Maritime Defense.”29The AFP Capability Assessment Report states that the F-5s of the Air Force, its last fleet of fighter jets,have reached peak performance and

were eventually decommissioned after more than three decades in operation. Its current air assets mainly composed of the S-211s, which are

primarily trainer aircrafts, and OV-10As, which are primarily as observation aircrafts but are converted into de facto bombers for internal security

operations, are old and lack the necessary capabilities. The MG-520s are the only light attack helicopter of the PAF. Its flyable aircrafts are

decreasing in number. Lack of armaments has also become one of its main problems aside from its lack of instrumentation for night flying missions.30 AFP Capability Assessment Report.31 Ibid.

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on providing the basic and critical capabilities to support internal security operations, such as mobility, firepower, communications, command and control, force protection, and combat life support for individuals and units. An examination of the procurement program would reveal thatone of the first items procured are for force protection such as helmets, body armor, and combat life-saver kits, which are generally considered and should have been basic and regular provisions to soldiers on the ground.

In addition to its internal security functions, the AFP also takes an active role in support of the government’s national development initiatives. Notable among these is the use of the military’s engineering brigades to support infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, school building, core shelters, and water systems. Takinginto consideration all of these expanded roles of the military, substantial increase in the AFP’s budget is an apparent imperative. On the contrary,the AFP remains hard-pressed to spread its meager resources to cover both its core and expanded missions.

What Lies Ahead? Possible Scenarios for the AFP

The traditional professional specialization of soldiery is fighting wars. That is, the military’s traditional role is to ensure the continued existence of the state amidst external threats of aggression. However, the conclusion of the Cold War era has significantly changed the international security landscape wherein threats no longer come primarily from outside thestate’s territorial boundaries as given the emergence of non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and climate change. Corollary

of a security paradigm shift is the utilization of the military in operations other than war, wherein armed forces will no longer be employed just to fight wars but also to support peacetime government activities to achieve national objectives.

In the absence of any clear external threats to the national territory or indications of external aggression against the state, the future mission and activities of the AFP are likely to be driven by non-traditional security challenges. This shifting role of the military is not completely remote to AFP as the military has been utilized not to solely confront threats to national security that emanates externally, but also those that exist within its territorial boundaries. That is, the AFP has since been at the forefront of the government’scounter-insurgency efforts, despite such operations being constabulary and not traditionally military in nature.

Given the geographic exposure of the country to natural hazards such as typhoons and earthquakes, the military will remain a critical force of the government for humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR). Despite being theoretically “non-military” in nature, it has been increasingly evident that armed forces around the world play a crucial part in responding to natural calamities in support to civilian authorities. Particular to the case of the AFP, the geographic deployment of military personnel and equipment across the archipelago allows the military to be first-responders in times of calamity. Albeit being considered as below par to international standards, the AFP has capabilities and equipment that may not be readily available to civilian government agencies. Moreover, the military’s organizational structure, discipline, and operational conduct are added advantage for the conduct of HADR operations.



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In terms of internal security operations, the AFP is still at a much superior stance over the national police to quell insurgency and acts of terrorism in the country. However, looking at the live case of Afghanistan, combating terrorism and insurgencies should not be construed as pure and traditional military operations. Rather, such operations necessitate a comprehensivecivil-military approach for humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.

The increased involvement of the military in operations other than war directs the AFP towards a future centered on maintaining domestic order and fostering the nation’s social and economic development. However, a caveat should be considered since veering away from traditional operations may compromise the military’s combat readiness and deviate from its core mission. While the end of international ideological conflict has led to widespread acceptance of democracy and capitalism, the need for combat-ready armed forces has not disappeared. The central task of the armed forces should remain the defense of the nation’s territory against external attack and the preservation of Constitutional order. Even when such traditional security threats do not manifest, the AFP must remain vigilant against their resurgence. To ensure its potency in territorial defense, the AFP should continue pursuing internal reforms designed to improve the military’s technological sophistication and quick-response capabilities.

It is within the legal prerogative of the central government to exercise oversight and effective control of the armed forces to achieve national objectives. However, utilizing the military for non-traditional security purposes presupposes a clear legal construct that will not only identify AFP’s responsibilities, but more importantly, will

promote and direct interagency efforts and further civil-military interactions.

Conclusion

The changing concept of security continues to dictate how militaries of the modern world behave and operate. Historically, the evolving security landscape, both at the international and domestic levels, has been redefining the role of the country’s armed forces, or at the least,a determinant for the military’s internal or external security missions.

It could be argued that refocusing military operations for non-traditional security concerns is not a zero-sum scenario that is completely detrimental against traditional security missions. However, long-drawn prioritization in favor of non-traditional military missions could produce adverse effects on the armed forces’ traditional security missions, particularly in the modernization of its territorial defense capabilities, wherein the latter are tempered, if not superseded,by more pressing requirements of internaland non-traditional security operations. Needless to say, modernization efforts are furtherhampered by budgetary constraints.

It is indeed the sovereign right of a state to determine how it intends to utilize and employ its military. However, the perception of otherstates as regards the capability of a certain country to defend itself from external aggression is a matter of great consequence to its sovereign standing in the international community.The current international system continues to exist as a function of power – political, economic, or otherwise – that is solidified by considerable military might.


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A state without a credible external defense is a very vulnerable state. It is therefore prudent for any state to balance its priorities by employing a right mix of traditional and non-traditional military capabilities. A state must continuously look at the evolving security landscape wherein

non-traditional military missions may be undertaken without compromise to the military’s core traditional missions. The military should always ensure that the sovereignty of the state is never threatened and its people protected from any danger.


References:

Hernandez, C. Controlling Asia’s Armed Forces. International

Forum for Democratic Studies. 1996.

Rothschild, E. “What is Security?.” Daedalus (1995).

Boutin, K., and Tan. Non-Traditional Security Issues in

Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic

Studies, 2001.

Esperon, Hermogenes. “Progress in Counter-Terrorism: The

Philippine Experience.” Paper presented at the 6th Shangri-

la Dialogue, International Institute for Strategic Studies,

Singapore, June 2-4, 2007.

Lucero, Daniel. “Development and Security: The Role of the

AFP.” Digest (1997).

Finer, S.E. The Man on Horseback. Colorado: Westview

Press, 1988.

Pobre, Cesar. History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino

People. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2000.

Abinales, Patricio, and Amoroso, Donna. State and Society in

the Philippines. USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 2005.

Abinales, Patricio. American Military Presence in the Southern

Philippines: A Comparative Historical Overview. East West

Center Working Papers: 2004.

Feliciano, Florentino. Report on the Fact-Finding Commission.

Pasay City: 2003.

Quilop, Raymund. Bilateralism, Regional Security and the

Philippine-US Alliance (OSS Working Paper). Quezon City:

Office of Strategic and Special Studies, APF, 1999.

Varona, Eriberto C. “An Economic Analysis of the US Military

Bases in the Philippines.”, Thesis

The Report of the Fact Finding Commission Pursuant to

Administrative Order No. 78 of the President of the Republic

of the Philippines Dated July 30, 2003, Part Three, October

17, 2003

Simon, Sheldon. “Asian Armed Forces: Internal and External

Tasks and Capabilities.” Accessed May 2000. http://www.

taiwandocuments.org/nbr01.pdf.

Carlos H. Conde. “Corruption Troubles Philippine Military.”

International Herald Tribune, Asia-Pacific Section. Accessed

http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/25/news/ phils.php.

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5, AFP, AFP

Capability Assessment Report, September 2007

15Regional Cooperation on Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response– Crisis or Opportunity?


by Saya Kiba, ph.d. and Rosalie Arcala Hall, Ph.D. Invited contributors

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The military’s engagement in humanitarian assistance/ disaster response is seen as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it opens up an avenue for dialogue between the military and civilian actors such as NGAs, LGUs, NGOs, and international humanitarian organizations, which in turn leads to enhanced military accountability and encourages oversight on the military’s performance. On the other hand, it can undermine local civilian authorities who are perceived as “weaker” or “less” effective than the military.

The paper examines how the globalization of disaster response norms and emerging international cooperation have affected civil-military relations in the Philippines and Thailand.

In the case of the Philippines, the authors conclude that there is little danger of undermining civilian control tasks since soldiers generally accept local government leadership in disaster response. However, there is much room for improvement in the Philippine military’s asset-poor condition (air and land vehicles) for disaster response, thus making coordination and linkages with international humanitarian agencies and foreign militaries crucial and imperative.


REGIONAL COOPERATION ON CIVIL-MILITARYCOORDINATION IN DISASTER RESPONSE – CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITY?

15 REGIONAL COOPERATION ON CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN DISASTER RESPONSE – CRISIS OR OPPORTUNITY?

SOURCE: PAO AFP


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WIntroduction

While frequently-occurring natural disasters have threatened Southeast Asian countries, civil-military cooperation has been a crucial issue on disaster relief operation. Some scholars and practitioners expect that the military’s involvement in humanitarian assistance/ disaster response (HA/DR) opens up opportunities for mutual communication between military and civilian actors, such as central government agencies, local government units, non-government organizations (NGOs) and international humanitarian organizations. Experiences of civil-militaryengagements are argued to eventually create more military accountability or better public relation policies, which in turn can changethe military’s professionalism or the behavior ofhigh-ranking soldiers. It might also encourage parliament, media, and civil society organizationsto exercise more oversight on the military’sperformance and defense budget.

On the other hand, it is also true that the military takes advantage of its HA/DR activities as a tool to achieve its own objectives – for instance, to integrate themselves to local communities through psychological operation, to publicize its civilian-friendly image to enjoy future public support. However, an unintended effect could be a feeling of inadequacy of other civilian government agencies which have less assets and human resources. In societies where the military traditionally played an important domestic political role (e.g. Thailand and Philippines), the institution’s involvement in HA/DR can be parlayed to somehow demoralize local civilian authorities, which are seen as “weaker” and “less effective” than the military.

Disaster response by the military gives soldiers a chance to encounter civilians and offers great possibility to stimulate professionalism and improve the capabilities of the state security forces. But it can also undermine civilian control and initiatives in this functional area, where the military is presumed to have no core capability (assuming that the military is, primarily, a war instrument). Under what condition cancivil-military engagement in disaster response be a good trigger point? And in what condition does it turn to an unfavorable opportunity?

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response: Setting Parameters on Military Involvement

Civil-military cooperation in disaster management is not only a trend among Asian countries, but also a new model of international cooperation. It is inevitable that multi-sector and multinational actors such as military, international humanitarian organizations, NGO, and private sectors “encounter” each other on the ground in disaster relief operations. All countries now take it for granted that disaster management is a matter of governing global and diverse actors and stakeholders. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and other international humanitarian agencies have tried to institutionalize coordination in HA/DR among these multiple and diverse stakeholders, including the military, by the crafting of guidelines. The Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Response (Oslo Guidelines) and 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) to support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex


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Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines) govern the use of foreign military assets and their interface with UN humanitarian organizations. The Oslo guideline addresses natural disasters in peace time while the MCDA guideline assumes the presence of armed conflict. Both instruments see the use of military assets, especially in logistics and planning as “last resort” and clearly articulate that the primary responsibility for response lies with the affected country’s civilian agencies. Although these guidelines are non-binding to states, UN agencies and international humanitarian organizations try to “nationalize” its principles by negotiating with individual governments to come up with country level guidelines. The norm of “last resort” however, is far from normative; many national governments rely habitually on their armed forces as primary responders to large scale natural disasters (Madiwale and Virk 2011, 1089).

The military has traditionally played a crucial role in disaster response and reconstructionin many Southeast Asian countries.Role-sharing and command and control between civilian government agencies and military have been widely discussed in each country as a matter of democratic control over the military. Whilemulti-sectorial and multi-national stakeholders, such as national/local governments, military, international organizations, private business sectors, religious groups, and local and international NGOs, are engaged in disasterrelief, civil-military relation is not yet fully institutionalized based on consensus of the military’s role and division of work in order to secure democratic governance over disaster management.

HA/DR has also attained international import as many militaries have been deployed to affected

areas in foreign countries to provide assistance; enabling the armed forces to diversify its role, which the US armed forces doctrine categorizes as “military operations other than war.” The US Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-07.6 defines foreign humanitarian assistance as “operations intended to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters of other endemic conditions...” (Thompson 2012, 3). Unlike combat operations, humanitarian assistance exercises are limited in scope and duration, while also assumed as add-ons to efforts by host nation’s civilian authorities or agencies which have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Natural disasters and conflicts create different operational environments for humanitarian assistance. As such, the US military further distinguishes between humanitarian assistance as disaster response (HA/DR) from humanitarian assistance during complex emergencies defined as “internally, socially derived disasters that may be incited by some kind of violent political event.” (Thompson 2012, 3). In the latter, the latent or overt security concerns underpin relief distribution. The notion of HA/DR as a military mission area has since found great conceptual resonance among other military institutions.

The years following the outpouring of international assistance to large scale disasters like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami saw the mainstreaming of HA/DR as a key mission area for many overseas military deployments. From the Pakistani floods in 2010, Haiti earthquake in 2012, and the recent Typhoon Haiyan destruction in the Philippines, more and more foreign militaries are being deployed as part of their government’s assistance package. In the Southeast Asian region, the erstwhile “traditional” military focused on internal security/ defense has responded with relatively



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flexible attitude towards the recently-emerging regional activities on HA/ DR. The ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus are the arenas to discuss international cooperation on massive or large-scale disasters for which international assistance will be needed. In June 2013, the ADMM countries conducted joint HA/DR exercises in Brunei. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also started practical cooperation among 26 member courtiers and the European Union. It organized disaster relief exercises in Indonesia in 2011 and in Thailand in 2013. Pacific Partnership, which has been led by the U.S. since 2007, is another framework for conducting multi-nation medical exercise and cultural exchange aimed at smoothening coordination among governments, military, international organizations and NGOs. Although multinational security cooperation is still a new concept in Asia Pacific, the East Asian countries are now trying to strengthen regional cooperation through HA/DR.

Notwithstanding, there remains outstanding debates surrounding these deployments:

1. legitimacy of HA/DR role for the military given lingering concerns that shift in resources towards this task compromises the military’s combat readiness (Farrell 2005, 6; Thomas 2012, 3);

2. greater military (foreign)-to-military (host) interface that provides both broader operational experience but also sharpened duality (separation from civilian stream) in disaster response (Hall 2009, 29);

3. the foreign military’s integration into the affected country’s civilian mechanisms for disaster response with due considerations for respect of sovereignty and cultural sensitivity to foreign presence (Hall 2008); and,

4. engagements with civilian actors also involved in disaster response – elected authorities, UN agencies and NGOs – on the ground and how these are informed by the presence and functionality of the Oslo Guidelines and country-level iterations that confine these engagements to the emergency phase with a limited timetable.

Belo (2006) and Sheller (2012) issue a reminder that while foreign militaries bring much needed mobility assets and logistics expertise crucial to relief operations, their presence could not be readily separated from the geopolitical strategic considerations at play. In the Haiti earthquake, Sheller (2012, 187) argues that the militarization of the relief operations logistics was connected to efforts at controlling migration and the border, ultimately conferring differential mobilities between victims who can go out versus the internally-displaced population who cannot. The tsunami operations was dovetailed with US interests in opening Indonesia for the war-on-terror efforts in Asia and was regarded as a preview to later amendments of Indonesian law resuming normal military exchanges with the US (Belo 2006, 282). Concerned over how foreign military presence may affect the internal conflict (i.e. insurgents may take advantage of foreigners to advance political and military objectives), the Sri Lankan government asked the US military to scale down its deployment in the island (Samaratunge et al. 2008, 694). Madiwale and Virk (2011) point out the gray area between “natural disasters” and “complex emergencies” set out in the Oslo and MCDA guidelines, such as in the case of the international response to the Pakistani 2010 floods that also affected conflict areas. In their analysis, civil-military engagements were nuanced and context specific; that there remains differential understanding whether the crisis was


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seen as a disaster or complex emergency and that local and international NGOs diverge on the use of military assets as “last resort.” For many militaries, HA/DR deployments ushered new structures and demands for greater integration modalities. Civil-military operations center (CMOC) and joint command and control centers (CCC) are now standard features in this type of short-term and area-confined mission. CMOCs serve as liaison nodes with civilian actors while CCCs are used to plug into the host nation’s military. Thompson (2012, 11) argues that the deployment of Task Force Griffin for response to the Kashmir region flood in 2005 portrayed the effectiveness of the unit’s vertical nesting strategy which allowed the US troops to operate seamlessly under the mission directives from Pakistani authorities and with a conscious effort to take the back seat even with their logistics expertise (they offered the army aviation tasking chain to the Pakistani leaders without taking credit). In his assessment, the US troops formed good relationship with the Pakistani authorities by accepting any tasks given to them and earned good points with some civilian actors for the transparency in the way they ran their airlift operations. Hall and Cular’s (2010) study on the patterns and dynamics of civil-military engagement in the St. Bernard, Southern Leyte, Philippine mudslide response in 2006 reveal nuances of how the legal framework and military mechanisms intersect on the ground. Among their findings, there is dense interface between civilian and military actors with the local Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) personnel acting as lynchpin. The Philippine military dealt almost exclusively with the foreign troops, while the only civilian link for the foreign military was the Red Cross. There were separate and largely independent civilian

and military streams of coordination, owing partly to the division of tasks (search and rescue, relief) and areas of operations (ground zero, town proper). The military units provided logistical help in relief operations but were largely confined in search and rescue as well as in providing physical security (with the police) for relief goods and personnel/equipment at ground zero. The officers took policy direction from civilian authorities (the provincial governor) on deployment, activities, tasking, reporting procedure, and timetables. However, it is noted that the governor appointed all military officers to lead the various operations. As one of the early examples of US forces participating in HA/DR mission in the Philippines, the case illustrates remaining gaps in the disaster response: 1. How foreign troops are to be plugged into

given the specific security ecologies of the disaster area are not fully articulated;

2. There is no standard rule on how local civilian agents may access military assets, especially communications.

This paper is based on a research project which analyzed how the globalization of disaster response norms, and the emerging international cooperation on disaster relief, has affected civil-military relations in the Philippines and Thailand along three dimensions.

First is legal framework to support democratic governance of disaster response including:

• military’s role on disaster relief as a mandate; • policies and practices that define the role

sharing between the military and government; and,

• guidelines, either developed by civilian



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authorities or by the military institution, that define military’s involvement and NGO-military cooperation in HA/DR

Second is peacetime communication mechanism among government, military, and civil society organizations, including:

• opportunity of joint evacuation drill, shared emergency plan or emergency contact network;

• opportunity for soldiers to participate in forums/ conferences organized by civilians such as business or international NGOs; and,

• opportunity for civilians to participate in military’s training or joint exercises.

Third is the awareness of civilian Defense Ministries and military officers including:

• self-evaluation on the military’s role in disaster relief;

• ideal/actual role-sharing between military and civilian; and,

• perspective towards NGOs.

The research was done both in the Philippines and Thailand from June 2013 to December 2013.1

The authors examined the relevant laws and policies of the two countries and interviewed military officers and NGO representatives.

Globalizing Disaster Management and Royal Thai Armed Forces Legal framework to support democratic governance

As the 2007 Constitution of The Kingdom of Thailand tasks the military to protect independence, sovereignty, national security, the institution of monarchy, and “national interests and the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State and for the development of the country,” there is a widespread consensus that national development and disaster management are military principal roles.2 In terms of mechanism, the prime minister’s order is necessary to mobilize the military in large-scale disasters. However, city mayors who are appointed by the Ministry of Interior can request commanders of each Region’s Army to deploy the troop for relief operation in case of disaster in a small area. Disaster Management Act 2007 defines that the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) of the Ministry of Interior plays prior role in disaster management. However, both Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense admit that disaster relief has actually been led by military. Policy on disaster management is decided at the Disaster Relief Division, Office of Civil Affairs of Ministry of Defense, while actual relief operation is

1 This research was supported by The Nippon Foundation’s Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Collaborative Grant “Comparative Analysis on

Military-NGO Cooperation Policies in Asia.” The views of the author do not reflect those of the API Fellowships Program, The Nippon Foundation,

the API International Selection Committee, the API Regional Coordinating Institution, and/or the Partner Institutions.2 CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND, B.E. 2550 (2007), Section 77. “The State shall protect and uphold the institution

of monarchy, independence, sovereignty and integrity of the territorial jurisdiction of the State and shall provide such armed forces, military

weapons and technology as are modern, necessary and sufficient for protecting and upholding the independence, sovereignty, national security, the

institution of monarchy, national interests and the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State and for the development

of the country.”


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led by Disaster Relief Center of Thai Royal Army. Exercises and training are managed by Joint and Combined Exercise Planning Office, Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters. Disaster Relief Center has regional offices which correspond to four (4) Army Region command offices, which coordinate with DPMM regional offices in each province.

In 2013, the Ministry of Defense drafted “Guidelines of Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response,” which is expected to be finalized by 2015. In November 2013, it organized a 3-day international workshop on the guidelines in Pattaya, inviting DDPM, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public Health, Diplomatic Corps, Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance of U.S. Pacific Command, and NGOs such as the Thai Red Cross.

Colonel “B,” who is in charge of drafting says that the Ministry expects the guideline to “clarify organizational structure of government agency, military, and NGOs so that everyone can easily find its counterpart to smoothen interagency coordination,” and “make rules and regulations on how military provides its assets upon NGOs’ requests.” He says that those are high priority during 2011 flood in Thailand.3 On the other hand, drafting the guidelines has been one of the important agenda of the Ministry even before the 2001 flood . This has been a priority since February 2009, when Thailand hosted ADMM Plus, which

adopted the ASEAN Defense Establishments and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Cooperation on Non-traditional Security Concept Paper4 he says. He also stresses the hope that the guidelines, as a Thailand model, will contribute to future disaster cooperation within the ADMM and ADMM Plus framework.5 One of the facilitators of the said workshop, Group Captain “W” of Air Force Civil Affairs Office, also states that the momentum of civil-military dialogue has emerged in the Thai military after ASEAN agreed on the Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations in 2009 and started drafting Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP). He admits that the experience of the 2011 flood was also an opportunity to strengthen civil-military cooperation.6

Peacetime communication mechanism

In the closing ceremony of the workshop, Colonel “B” said to participants, “it is important that military and civilian talk to each other in the same language. We need to minimize the gap among us.” 7 In the provinces, the Thai Army’s Disaster Relief Center held joint exercise coordinating with DDPM regional offices. Local evacuation drills are done separately and independently by each village chief. However, the military has tried to organize the sharing of emergency contacts and evacuation plans.

3 Interview conducted on November 5, 2013 at Ministry of Defense.4 http://www.adpc.net/cso/Downloads/CD/Documents/2ADOPTED%20Concept_Paper_ASEAN_Defence_Establishments_and_CSO.

pdf.5 Interview conducted on November 5, 2013 at Ministry of Defense.6 Interview conducted on November 13, 2013, during International Workshop on the Guideline for Civil-military Coordination in Disaster

Response, in Pattaya.7 November 13-15 2013, Pattaya. The author attended it as an Adviser of Embassy of Japan in Thailand.



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The Thai military has been positively encouraging NGOs to participate in these joint exercises. Cobra Gold, the largest Asia-Pacific Military exercise held in Thailand every year, includes medical exercises or non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) which involves local villagers and civilians. In May 2013, the 3rd ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx) hosted by Thailand and South Korea invited international organizations. The Thai military is now planning to host the ASEAN Disaster Exercise (AHEx) with Malaysia in April and May 2014, inviting local governments, volunteer organizations and local and international NGOs.

Meanwhile, the military’s approach to the NGOs is not a new trend. Colonel “J,” who served in the Army’s Disaster Relief Center in the 2001 flood, points out that the Thai military has been always “ready” to closely work with ordinary citizensand NGOs because the Army’s Staff College provides special education on civil affairs.He says that staff officers over lieutenantcolonel have the opportunity to learn communication skills with civilian classmates who have different ideas and mindsets. Other soldiers also mentioned that civil-military cooperation is already embedded in Thai military’s training program as civil assistance, including rural development which is one of theprincipal mandates of military.

Awareness of Defense Ministries and military

No informant said that military’s role in HA/DR must be scaled down. Colonel “B” of Ministry of Defense said, ideally, military should be a support

unit, not a main service provider. However, it is usual practice for the military to be the first responder on the disaster scene. Therefore it is necessary that guidelines defining roles and norms are crafted, recognizing and accepting actual practice and action. “Civilian organizations are not at all competitors to the military,”8 he says. Group Captain “W” of the Air Forces insists that the purpose of making the guidelines is to share the military’s tools for needs-assessment with civilians so that DDPM and NGOs can also follow the military’s good practice.9 All military informants were quite confident in the military’s comparative advantage over NGOs. Colonel “J” recalls his relief operation for 2011 flood victims in the Army’s Disaster Relief Center. “As water came little by little, politicians in the affected area used to ask military to save his/her own constituents. I received phone calls from them every day and commanders always must consider such ethical problems. NGOs are even worse in coordination. The military always try to eliminate political bias and cooperate with local government.”10

Colonel “A” of the same Center also criticized NGOs, saying “NGOs never approach the military, they are overconfident in their ability and assets although Thai NGOs are small-scale and less effective. Civilian organizations cannot start action immediately because it takes too much time for administrative arrangements. For ordinary people, military is the one who comes first and serves first.”11

On the other hand, it is remarkable that some soldiers find the “new identity” of the military in disaster relief. Scholars also point out that the

8 Interview conducted on November 5, 2013 at Ministry of Defense.9 November 13-15 2013, Pattaya. The author attended it as an Adviser of Embassy of Japan in Thailand.10 Interview conducted on November 4, 2013 at Channel 5 (military’s channel). 11 Interview conducted on November 5, 2013 at Army Headquarters.


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military recovered its public support by helping flood victims, perhaps changing the bad image of 2006 Coup and 2010 Red-shirts crackdown. Colonel “S” of Civil Affairs Office of the 3rd Region Army said military’s involvement in disaster relief is not a psychological operation, unlike development aid or defense medicine. For him, “It is the soldiers’ duty to help people. However, it is true that disaster relief benefits us if the image of ‘military for people’ is rooted in people’s mind and it helps our other operations.”12

The Philippine Military:Disaster Response Veteran

Legal Mandates and the Philippine Military’sHA/DR Role

Following the democratic transition in 1986, the Constitution has been amended to confine the military to non-political roles. Prohibition against the government appointment of active duty personnel and political partisanship were provided in the Constitution. In turn, the Philippine military was reorganized, removing the constabulary under its control, placing the entire administration under the supervision of the civilian Ministry of Defense and instituting greater administrative oversight (by the Congress and Commission on Audit) over its budget and procurements. Further inroads on human rights accountability were made by placing the jurisdiction for cases involving human rights violations by soldiers to civilian courts and by putting restrictions on the hiring of paramilitary personnel.

Disaster response was formalized as one of the Philippine military’s seven mission areas, thus institutionalizing a role which it has historically

assumed since the 1970s (Hall 2004). Under Presidential Order 1566 (1978), the military is one of the many agencies tasked for disaster response, which in turn is coordinated by a civilian National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) with the Office of Civil Defense as administrative hub. The Philippine’s tiered disaster response system (there are disaster coordinating councils at the regional, provincial, municipal, and barangay or village level) locates the primary responsibility to local government units and the civilian local government executive (governor, mayor, barangay captain) to spearhead coordination, allowing further for a “scaling up” where the affected areas extend beyond administrative boundaries. A later shift to a cluster-based system placed the military under the tasks of search and rescue, transportation and communication. In line with the Calamities and Disaster Preparedness Plan (1988), the military formed reaction teams for natural disasters in each military unit (Quilop 2009, 119). Disaster response task groups in military installations (both regular and reservists) and disaster response coordinating centers are collocated with the civilian-led DCCs. Each disaster response task group is required to provide communication linkages, assist the local police; assist in reconstruction, and provide transportation of relief goods and personnel. The military is also tasked to ensure peace and order in support of the police and provide force protection where disaster happens in a conflict zone (Quilop 2009, 127). The Philippine military also has a standing HA/DR mechanism for integration of deployed US forces in a disaster area, there is a provision for a Combined Coordination Center (brigade level and up) for both forces. In such a case, the military serves as a focal point for coordination between the US forces and civilian agencies.

12 Interview conducted on October 17, 2013 at the 3rd Army Region Headquarters, Pitsanulok.



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In 2010, a new legal framework for disaster (Republic Act 10121) came into force, which shifts the focus from disaster response to risk reduction and management. The new framework locates responsibility for these tasks to local government units, with help from other agencies including the military. More emphasis and fiscal investments are given to community-based early warning system, geo-hazard and vulnerability mapping, risk assessment & contingency planning, maintaining a database of disaster volunteers and education and awareness-raising. Unlike the previous framework which was government-centric, the new law recognizes the participation of civil society, private sector, and volunteers in these tasks. It also follows international norms and standards for humanitarian assistance/disaster response including cluster-based coordination among actors (e.g. logistics, telecom, evacuation center management, relief distribution). The law authorizes the President to declare need for international assistance and provides explicit mechanisms for international humanitarian assistance.

This law has important implications to the military responding to disaster. According to Colonel “P”, a multi-year military liaison officer at the OCD, the new framework entails that the military must invest in capital outlay for risk reduction.13 To finance this, a Quick Response Fund under the Department of National Defense (DND) or pooled funds under the line-item budget of each military unit are set aside specifically for these tasks. It also means more robust organization of reserves and engineering units (for rehabilitation/reconstruction) as opposed to reliance on regular forces, which in the past have been tapped more for this mission area. In terms of coordination,

the military has been assigned to thelogistics and telecommunications clusters. This assignment considerably narrows down whatthe military may be deployed for and limitsits coordinative relationships to organizations that deal with food and health.

The new Philippine disaster law firmly assigns the task of coordinating government agency efforts to civilian authorities at applicable tiers: local chief executives for municipalities and provinces while the National Disaster Risk Reductionand Management Council is chaired by theOffice of Civil Defense Chief (a Presidential appointee). The law requires for an Incident Command Post within the affected area to be established for information sharing and coordination to transpire. The military is a member of local and national DRRM councils, as are the local police. While the law does not explicitly mention the military as first responder, it is the standard practice of many local chief executives to call on the military for assistance. This linkage is not unusual, as there areother existing institutional mechanisms (e.g. Peace and Order Councils) where thelocal civilian authorities and the armed forces work together. Moreover, given the advance alert and early warning systems for typhoons especially,much can be done as “preparation” including evacuation and forward deployment basesfor relief stockpiles and personnel, for which military logistics could be utilized.

This new mandate for disaster response also transpired within the military’s new Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) dubbed “Bayanihan.” Bayanihan anchors the armed forces’ activities in support of the government’s peace efforts. With

13 Interview conducted on September 21, 2013 at Iloilo City.


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more emphasis on non-kinetic means, Bayanihan makes it imperative for the military to engage civilians (local authorities, agencies, NGOs and peoples organizations) in all its mission areas. Premised upon “whole-of-government” effort, the military is seen as not taking the lead, but rather providing support to civilian efforts. The premise behind this “support role” is because the military can’t solve conflict or bring about peace on its own. NGOs specially are engaged as partners, since they have the resources and capabilities that can benefit communities. In disaster response, this translates to deference to local government executives (Mayor and Governor) and DSWD personnel for operations falling within the military unit’s area.

Meaning versus Doing: Civilian-Military Engagements during Disaster Response Operations to Typhoon Pablo The following section describes how the Philippine military’s new HA/DR role and the Bayanihan framework intersect and mapped out on the ground using Typhoon Pablo relief operations as template. Typhoon Pablo (international name Bhopa), which struck the provinces of Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley (Mindanao) in December 2012, was the first large scale disaster to which these new frameworks were applied. The response featured a strong international element with contributions from UN agencies and ASEAN countries. The typhoon’s ground zero (the municipalities of New Bataan, Cateel and Baginga) also happened to be an active communist conflict zone, with two army battalions from the 4th Infantry Division (4ID) in place for internal security operations. The confluence of disaster and armed conflict in these

locations makes for an interesting study on howmilitary-civil society engagements transpired during the emergency phase.

A national alert was issued for Typhoon Pablo three (3) days before its landfall, thus not requiring individual declarations of state of calamity by local councils in affected areas. Mindanao, already has a standing framework for international humanitarian assistance (Humanitarian Action Plan in Mindanao) in place since 2008. This means that international humanitarian actors already have prior structures with which to coordinate their actions on the ground. For Typhoon Bhopa, a UN Humanitarian Action Team (formerly interagency standing committee) was created involving 15 major UN and international agencies (e.g. Christian Aid, Oxfam). A direct link was made between this team and the NDRRMC in Manila, allowing for a quick processing of paperwork needed for foreign goods and personnel to come in.14 A one-stop shop center was created at the Davao International Airport for customs, immigration, and quarantine matters to be settled. Assistance from ASEAN also came quickly with several C130 load of stockpiles from the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center stockpile in Jakarta, a bilateral assistance from Malaysia. That said, the international actors all understood and respected the norms surrounding relief assistance, which puts the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as lead. The DSWD template for family access card as basis for distribution and documentation was followed.

On the ground, there were two parallel mobilizations following the landfall in Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley. On the military


14 These insights were shared by Colonel “P”, who was directly involved in the operations. Interview conducted on September 21, 2013 at Iloilo

City.


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side, a unified command (army, navy, air force) was created at the 4ID level.15 A Joint Peace and Security Coordinative Center was also set up with the Philippine National Police. Having not received communication from the 66th and 67th Infantry Battalions (on ground zero), a decision was made to send one company each from the unaffected 84IB and 39IB to Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley, respectively, as advance party on Day 1 following the landfall. Said troops were only able to reach ground zero on Day 2 by foot and immediately went on search, rescue and retrieval operations. On Day 3 additional troops were sent out to clear the roads from Davao City and also from Caraga, Agusan del Sur. Only on Day 3 has communication been firmly established with DSWD for relief delivery by land to Compostela Valley. In Davao Oriental, relief operations was easier as Philippine Navy and other ships could make deliveries by sea.

Within Davao City, two hubs came into being: Hub 1 at Panacan near the 4ID Headquarters organized by the military’s Civil Relation Service (CRS, brigade level) unit using the neighboring DPWH warehouses for relief stockpiling, sorting and deployment, and Hub 2 at the DSWD Regional Office. Hub 1 only operated for a limited period; from December 16, 2013 onwards, management was turned over to DSWD and to other military officers at the Division level. The hubs were centers for relief drop-offs and for volunteers. All NGOs interviewed who participated in the relief efforts were cognizant of the two hubs and their

interesting dynamics. On the whole, the military officers interviewed were aware of the principle of civilian supremacy in emergency situations and deferred to DSWD personnel on relief matters. Colonel “G” was the officer-in-charge behind Hub 1; when queried why a different hub from that of DSWD was created, his response was that DSWD region has limited space and could not accommodate voluminous third party assistance.16 The DSWD personnel were also deployed in the Panacan Hub (1) but they were generally seen by the NGO representatives interviewed as less reliable and efficient than their military counterpart in organizing the relief operations.17 More third party assistance and volunteers were recorded going to Hub 1 than Hub 2 prior to December 16.

To analyze civilian-military engagements, this paper offers viewpoints derived from interviews of 66IB (whose area of operations included Campostela Valley) and 67IB (headquartered at Baganga, Davao Oriental) commanders at the ground level. Because the affected areas are also communist conflict areas, very few NGOs had presence in the communities prior to Typhoon Pablo. Given the known security concerns, many NGOs also feared going there directly. The local governments of New Bataan, Campostela Valley and Baginga, Davao Oriental, which had been designated as Incident Command Posts also had differential capacities in handling the response operations. In New Bataan, 66IB commander Colonel “F” initially acted as Incident Commander

15 The succeeding discussions came from the interview of General “B” conducted on October 7, 2013 at Camp Panacan, Davao City.16 Telephone interview conducted on October 3, 2013. 17 This view came from Ms. “F”, Dr. “Y” and Ms. “A” who represented local NGOs. Interviews conducted on October 5, 2013 and October 7,

2013, respectively, in Davao City.


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because the mayor was himself a survivor and couldn’t immediately attend to his duties.18 The post was quickly turned over to the mayor after a few days. Unlike in New Bataan where the mayor was on top of the situation, the local government leaders of Baginga disagreed with each other, leading 67IB commander Colonel “M” to be appointed by the Governor as Incident Commander until May 2013. In his capacity as Incident Commander, Colonel “M” had numerous engagements with NGOs who came through his office for coordination of relief deliveries. He also directed civilians (teachers and health personnel).19

At New Bataan, the 66IB spearheaded the search and retrieval operations which lasted for almost a month and involved a large number of personnel (apart from military augmentation from the 10th Infantry Division, they also had numerous volunteers from Davao, MMDA and foreigners). Colonel “F” was able to focus his unit’s work on search and retrieval as the task of taking care of VIP visitors was carried out by the Brigade Commander. For deliveries (mostly directed to the LGU), the 66IB partnered with parishes by using military vehicles for relief transport. There were two types of NGO-military engagements that transpired. Coordination or informing the military about NGO activities in the area comprise the bulk of the engagements. The standard practice was for the NGOs with projects at hand to report to the military about it, as these have security implications in the area.

In relief deliveries, this means the NGOs come to the local army unit to report where they are going (often); ask for transportation assistance (few); or request for security escort (rare). The NGOs in most cases already had parish and civil society contacts they want to deliver the goods to. The local military unit did little to persuade them to change the destination of relief operations. In fact, all local commanders strongly suggested for NGOs to coordinate with the LGU to avoid duplication of efforts. Given Colonel “M’s” unique position as Incident Commander, he was able to direct NGOs coming for the first time to deliver relief goods in the upland areas with the military. If NGOs returned for more deliveries, they usually go on their own sans the military.

For rehabilitation activities, NGO-military engagements differed depending on activities initiated solely by the NGO or by the battalion. For the 66IB, the NGOs typically coordinate to ensure that no pending military operations are happening in or around the area where they wish to go (something which the military is reluctant to disclose for concerns of leakage to the insurgents).20 The ICRC which provided cash-for-work in the affected barangays of Padsabanga, Manurigao, and Cagan is an example of such coordination linkage. Colonel “F” observed that while relief operations were carried out in an ad hoc fashion, more careful planning and deliberation were made with rehabilitation activities by the municipal government. The Kiwanis, by contrast, which had a school-based feeding and water supply project, asked and

18 Interview conducted on October 10, 2013 at Davao City.19 Interview conducted on October 7, 2013 at Davao City.20 Interview conducted on October 7, 2013 at Camp Panacan, Davao City.



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were provided with manpower, security and transportation assistance by the military. Other projects with this type of engagement include those funded by TV5, a retired military personnel group and an OFW family circle. For the 67IB, local commander Colonel “M” opined that NGOs that came to their area typically:

1. have narrow, confined goals that do not correspond to actual needs on the ground;

2. have no prior on-the-ground needs assessment and have limited timelines for engagement;

3. come in with their pre-selected target sites and project templates.21

In his experience, the NGOs initially relied on military assessment data but later came up with their own. He lists the International Labor Organization (ILO), World Health Organization (WHO), Merlin, UNICEF, and UNDP as having undertaken rehabilitation projects in their area covering health, shelter construction, agriculture, and livelihood and rehabilitation of public infrastructure.

Battalion-initiated engagements with NGOs are understood as part and parcel of the unit’s overall Bayanihan mandate. The requirement for “multi stakeholder engagement” under Bayanihan encompasses all mission areas, including disaster response and puts premium on the officers’ negotiating and social skills. Structurally, every military unit has a designated civil-military operations (CMO) officer who serves as point

person and lynchpin for engagements with other government agencies. For all commanders interviewed, they emphasize that the LGU is their first priority for civilian engagement; second, other government agencies and NGOs last. The officers likewise distinguish between NGOs which are “outside of the community” organizations and people’s organizations that are community-based, says 66IB commander Colonel “L” whose AOR also includes Lumad (indigenous) areas, and have a distinct mandate of engaging Lumad communities.22 But for Colonel “M” no distinction exists between the types as both bring in resources on the ground. While the commanders expressed openness (to accept any NGO help), it was nevertheless the practice to be selective when it comes to NGOs they wish to partner with for military-conceptualized undertaking. Residual concerns about the “leftist” connections of some NGOs require vetting or screening of groups who want to come into their area. However, they were also careful not to be accused of “red baiting.” Colonel “L” says that his unit’s strategy when an NGO of suspicious credentials indicate that they want to do a medical mission, they usually put together a counterpart mission themselves and schedule it ahead (“inuunahan”) of the NGO.23 Yet even in military-initiated medical missions, for instance, the commanders are careful not to mix such with armed operations. Colonel “L” related that in one instance, their intel revealed that communist rebels were initially in the vicinity where the unit was holding a medical mission; he opted not to pursue said rebels because that was NOT the unit’s mission for that day.24

21 Ibid.22 Ibid.23 Ibid.24 Ibid.


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Two cases of post-Pablo responses illustrate how the military puts Bayanihan to practice for self-initiated projects. Colonel “G”, then key Civil Relations Service officer for the Brigade,organized a fund-raising concert featuring local and national musicians. The concert was his first engagement with NGOs, although he had considerable experience putting together youth camps and had been previously posted in Aceh where he had a chance to observe NGO work close at hand. In the interviews, he lamented about how NGOs have serious time commitments; are personnel deficient (relies only on volunteers, no permanent staff) so that many were unable to deliver on the tasks consistently until the completion of the project.25 While the project ended up earning little money, he considers it a relative success for its advocacy component. Second, the military carried out its own Task Force Tambayayaw in which 40-50 teams of engineering units were deployed for shelter construction/repair from a one million peso donation by NGOs matched by the Department of National Defense (DND). The limited proceeds from the concert also went to Task Force Tambayayaw.

HA/DR Convergences and Divergences

The nature of civil-military engagements in the context of Typhoon Pablo disaster response did not vary much from the observations made by Hall and Cular (2010) that the military are the de facto primary responders, and that civilian agents and communities are accepting of the military’s key role in the crucial emergency phase. There was no test for “last resort” (were there other civilian alternatives to military assets and personnel?) by

the civilian authorities; nor were there local DRRC assets or manpower to tap given the widespread destruction. What is notable is that the military self-organized the search-and-rescue operations themselves; and even took the initiative to create a relief operations hub in Davao City. Only by Day 3, after the military has established communication and mobility, have the civilian agencies made it to ground zero. The time frame points to the civilians actors relatively conceding to the military’s lead (where to go; how to get there) in the first few days following the disaster. However, in succeeding days, when more information is available and prior relief delivery run has been made, NGOs gain confidence and become more independent. To many local NGOs, working with the military appeared to be a non-issue. The military also displayed little concern for physical/kinetic security of relief distribution; they offered to escort or provide transportation assistance to NGOs delivering relief goods but did not insist on it nor did they make strong efforts to channel relief distribution in certain villages. NGO-military coordination where they transpired was limited to reporting; NGO requests for military logistics and security assistance were few or rare. Even in rehabilitation, the military has taken a back seat; NGOs with projects only coordinate with the local unit for information purposes (making sure the project staff will not be adversely affected by planned military kinetic operations). Similar to relief operations, NGOs come to the area prepared with their own templates for project goals, planning, and implementation. The local military unit suggests that it would be better for NGOs to coordinate with the local government than with them. Even with limited resources, the

25 Telephone interview conducted on October 3, 2013.



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military also tries to conduct its own rehabilitation initiatives by actively seeking partnership with NGOs, although they tend to be selective and more inclined towards charitable outfits with whom the commander has personal connections. The fund-raising concert to support Task Force Tambayayaw was one such initiative, although the military officer in-charge of the event admitted that it made more inroads in improving the military’s profile among Davao-based NGOs.

The engagements between local military units and local elected authorities are fundamentally different. It was clear that military officers and local civilian authorities alike have a shared understanding of civilian supremacy in keeping with the country’s disaster response guidelines-- the local chief executive is in charge and the military takes direct order from him/her. The three battalion commanders interviewed conceded control immediately to the mayors/governors of the affected towns (mindful that in the first few days, the mayor/s also being a survivor may be initially psychologically immobilized). Colonel “M’s” position as Incident Commander was an exception, but it was an appointment made by the governor on account of the political squabbles between the local elected authorities. It was also interesting that the commanders are generally differential to mayors and the local government when it comes to relief distribution and rehabilitation plans.

On the whole, the military exhibits openness to working with international humanitarian agencies as was evident in its involvement in the crafting of guidelines for humanitarian action in Mindanao. The establishment of a one-stop shop at the staging area (Davao City airport) made for the easy entry of relief deliveries from ASEAN

countries and also facilitated the entry of foreign medical personnel and other foreign emergency responders. This set up is a marked improvement from the CCC that limits engagements between military-to-military. However, as the research did not cover interviews of international humanitarian agencies, no arguments can be made regarding issues that have arisen from relief distribution involving these actors.

Synthesis

The prevailing norms and practices in HA/DR operations in regional and international settings do not necessarily influence the Thai military, which has a long experience of undertaking civil assistance as a physiological operation and intelligence, and also mobilized for disaster relief operations if necessary. Perhaps on account of just experiencing more large scale disasters than any other country in the region (and with the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Mindanao due to the Moro conflict) the Philippine military, by contrast, has far more experience under its belt working with international humanitarian actors. These encounters have made the Philippine military more attuned to international norms (e.g. protocols for receiving international aid; use of military assets for relief operations), yet when it comes to local civilian actors, its engagements are more nuanced. The Philippine military historically performed disaster response role, separate and distinct from internal security operations. Given the likely confluence between disasters and conflict, the Philippine military surprisingly is not all too kinetic security conscious when it comes to relief operations, nor are NGOs necessarily reliant on military assets or assessments for relief deliveries.


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The globalization of disaster management cooperation framework has helped Thai civil-military relations to be more democratic. The drafting of guidelines or the inclusion of NGOs to military joint and combined exercise are relatively new activities. As Colonel “B” of Ministry of Defense says, the ASEAN’s momentum encouraged the Thai military to lead, making such a good example in institutionalizing civil-military cooperation mechanism. A Thai political scientist also remarked that Thailand could start thinking “civil defense” from a different angle of “civil-military cooperation” thanks to multinational dialogue among ASEAN countries.

In the Philippines, a civil defense framework is already in place since the 1970s, clearly putting civilians on the driver seat when it comes to decisions on disaster response. The military’s role is confined to search and rescue and relief operations, mainly as support or assistance to local civilian efforts tasked under the framework. There is a convergence between what the framework stipulates and actual practice: as indicated in Hall (2009) and in this research project’s examination of the Typhoon Pablo response, the military defers to and takes directions from local civilian authorities, even to the DSWD when it comes to relief operations (for which the military offers indirect assistance).

For the Thai military, civil-military cooperation in HA/DR remains conceptual or at the dialogue level; and is a conversation initiated by the military. As revealed in the interviews, the military has incentive to work with civilian organizations not because of pure sincerity but for pragmatic

consideration of gaining public support. There remains a serious gap between the Thai military rhetoric of respecting civilian control and on-the-ground reality. More inquiry is needed as to whether recent “encounters” of military and multi-spectral civilian actors in table top exercises about disaster relief has really changed the military or civil-military relations. Still, peacetime communication and joint activities among civilian and military, particularly in transnational setting, can provide good opportunities for both military and NGOs to know different cultures and organizational restrictions. One example is the Japanese Ministry of Defense-organized Tokyo Defense Forum. In 2013, the forum focused on HA/DR coordination. Japan’s Ground Self Defense Forces have likewise been inviting counterparts from the region since 2006 to the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP). A SDF officer who was sent to Leyte in response to Typhoon Hayan recalls that he could achieve good coordination with AFP and foreign military in Camp Aguinaldo as he was trained to do so in table top exercise in MCAP. Moreover, he met several MCAP participants in the Philippines.26

The Philippine military, being a veteran in HA/DR role, is continuously learning and developing denser networks with civil society groups, including NGOs. Under Bayanihan, the imperative for multi-sector engagement in disaster response, whilst limited to its cluster-based assigned role of food and health, nevertheless is enabling soldiers and civilians to get to know each other more from across the ideological (communist insurgency) divide. The ASEAN framework and various opportunities for joint exercises with

26 Newspaper ASAGUMO, January 2, 2014.



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other militaries in the region are also providing fertile grounds for military-to-military interface, from which it is hoped more global norms on conducting humanitarian activities will filter. There is little danger of undermining Philippine civilian control in this task, as Philippine soldiers generally accept local government leadership in this disaster response. What is more critical

is the Philippine military’s asset-poor condition (air and landing vehicles) for disaster response, which makes the country ever more dependent on external logistics assistance for large-scale disasters. For this reason, coordination and linkages with international humanitarian agencies and foreign militaries are crucial.



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All rights reserved.

Copyright © 2014

ISBN 978-971-550-691-5

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense ForcephilippineS

Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D.Kathline Anne S TolosaAtty Noel del PradoMelanie Rodulfo-VerilFrancis DomingoCarla Isabel M RavanesJoseph Raymond FrancoIren C GumpalCOL ISIDRO L PURISIMA (GSC) PACAPT ROY VINCENT T TRINIDAD (GSC) PNCOL AMADOR T TABUGA JR (GSC) PALTC ISMAEL P MANDANAS JR PALTC CHARLEMAGNE F BATAYOLA JR INF PA MAJ JO-AR HERRERA PA

JOINT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP


175JOINT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP

K

J

N

Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D.JENNIFER SANTIAGO ORETA holds a PhD in Political Science. Her research interests include

security sector reform and development, peace and security, arms and gun-violence, gender and

social movements. Dr. Oreta is Asst. Professor on Political Science at the Ateneo de Manila University.

She has been appointed as Assistant Secretary to the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace

Process (OPAPP) last February 2013. She is in-charge of the DDR (disarmament, demobilization,

and reintegration) program, as well as the Knowledge Management and Resource Center of the

institution. She is also the focal person in mainstreaming the cross-cutting issues of gender, children,

indigenous communities, human rights, and security sector reform, and ensuring there is consistency

in policy as regards these issues.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

177

Kathline Anne Sigua TolosaKATHLINE ANNE S TOLOSA is Co-Convenor of the Working Group on Security Sector Reform. As

the head of the National Secretariat, she convenes the Bantay Bayanihan, a network of civil society

organizations performing oversight on the Philippine military, creating dialogue spaces, and building

a constituency for peace and security issues. She has co-authored Pagpati’ut: Mediating Violence

in Sulu, published by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and Revisiting the Policy Environment

on Peace and Security, published by the Australian Aid-The Asia Foundation partnership in the

Philippines. She has served in various capacities at the Department of National Defense, Armed

Forces of the Philippines, Department of Transportation and Communications, and the Office for

Transportation Security.

Atty. Noel del PradoNOEL ROMERO DEL PRADO graduated from the Ateneo de Manila University with a degree in AB

Philosophy in 1992, and the Ateneo de Manila University College of Law in 1997. He teaches Filipino

Literature at the Ateneo de Manila University. He is a Board Member of the Inter-Country Adoption

Board (ICAB) and the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). He worked as

the Legal Service Director of the Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),

and as a Legal Consultant in the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Department of Education

(DepEd), UNICEF and USAID. He served as the Chief of Staff in the Senatorial Campaign of Hon.

Grace Poe. He is also a volunteer lawyer for Bantay Bata 163, the Council for the Welfare of Children

(CWC), and the National Council on Disability Affairs.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS178

M

RCaptain Roy Vincent T. Trinidad (GSC) PNCAPT ROY VINCENT TRINIDAD PN (GSC) is currently the Chief of the Territorial Defense Division

of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3. Prior to his serving as the Chief TDD, he

is the Assistant Division Chief of the Manpower and Organization Division, and at the same time the

Chief of the Administrative Division of OJ3. He has been working with OJ3 for three (3) years.

Melanie Rodulfo-VerilMELANIE ROSE RODULFO-VERIL is a graduate student from the University of the Philippines

majoring in Asian Studies. Her area of research is in comparative Southeast Asian politics and is

particularly interested on issues on Philippine security relations, disaster management, and disaster

diplomacy. As a professional, she has been involved in several foreign-funded peace and development

programs, including those implemented in conflict and post conflict affected areas in the Philippines.

She currently works for the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program of the Department of Social Welfare

and Development as a Planning Officer.

AColonel Amador T. Tabuga Jr. (GSC) PACOL AMADOR T TABUGA, JR. graduated from the Philippine Military Academy in 1986. He is the

Chief of Unified Command Staff of Western Mindanao Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines

which covers the whole of ARMM region, Zamboanga Peninsula and the two Lanao provinces. Prior

to this, he was the Assistant Chief of the AFP Doctrine Development Center and was the Team Leader

of the Poject Management Team (PMT) in the revision of the AFP Basic Doctrine and Joint Doctrine

manuals which were approved for publication by the CSAFP.

IColonel Isidro L. Purisima (GSC) PACOLONEL ISIDRO LA MADRID PURISIMA is currently the Chief of Staff of 3rd Infantry (Spearhead)

Division, Philippine Army based in Panay Island, Western Visayas. His recent assignments include

Chief, Research and Doctrine Division and Executive Officer of the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations, J3, AFP. He is a member of PMA ‘Sandiwa” Class of 1985. He finished his Diploma in

Strategic and Defence Studies in University of Malaya in Malaysia and is a graduate of Master of Arts

in Strategic Security Studies at the National Defense University, USA.

F

IIren C. GumpalIREN CACHOPERO GUMPAL is a Research Analyst of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations, J3, GHQ, Armed Forces of the Philippines. She took her Master of Professional Studies

in Development Communication at the University of the Philippines Open University, and her BS in

Development Communication at the University of the Philippines Los Baños. She is currently under

the Research and Doctrine Division of OJ3.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 179

Francis DomingoFRANCIS DOMINGO is an Assistant Professor at the International Studies Department of De La

Salle University and concurrently a postgraduate research student at the Department of Politics and

International Relations of University of Reading. Before joining academia, he was a military analyst

with the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Associate Managing Director of RVD Business

Intelligence Consultancy, a pioneering competitive/business intelligence consultancy firm based in

Makati City for several years. He completed a BA in Political Science from De La Salle University in

2004 and an MA in Intelligence and Security Studies from Brunel University in 2009.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS180

JJoseph Raymond FrancoJOSEPH FRANCO is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security

(CENS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University,

Singapore. He holds a BA in Political Science from the University of the Philippines-Diliman and

an MSc in International Relations from RSIS (ASEAN Graduate Scholarship). Joseph is currently

working on issues surrounding radicalization in the Southern Philippines. His other research interests

include internal conflict, counter-insurgency, special operations forces and peacekeeping.

CCarla Isabel M. RavanesCARLA ISABEL M. RAVANES is a graduate of Bachelor of Science in Psychology from the University

of the Philippines Diliman. She has previously worked for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations, OJ3 of the Armed Forces of the Philippines under the said office’s Research and Doctrine

Division. Currently, she is a part of the Policy Unit of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the

Peace Process (OPAPP) which aims to mainstream the different cross-cutting concerns on gender,

children, human rights and international humanitarian law, indigenous peoples, and security sector

reform in the various Philippine peace tables.

MMaribel Daño-LunaMARIBEL DAÑO-LUNA is a researcher for peace and security from the Working Group on Security

Sector Reform. She serves as the coordinator of Bantay Bayanihan, a nationwide network of CSOs

that acts as oversight for the implementation of the AFP’s IPSP Bayanihan on the operational and

policy level. Her first-hand experience in promoting civilian and democratic control of the armed

forces stems from her background both from the civil society and the military. She began her career

as a researcher for Task Force Mapalad, an NGO helping farmers in Mindanao and Negros. After

her transitory residence in Mindanao, she proceeded to work as a researcher/analyst for the Armed

Forces of the Philippines where she took on research positions in the Philippine Navy and the Office

of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (OJ3). She studied BA Communication Research in the

University of the Philippines Diliman.

MMereniza C. GomezMERENIZA DELA CRUZ GOMEZ is a member of the Ateneo de Manila University Working Group

of Security Sector Reform (WGSSR). She was a faculty of the Makati Medical Center College of

Nursing teaching Philippine History, Government and Constitution. She is also a part-time faculty

of De La Salle University Department of International Studies. She worked for the Armed Forces of

the Philippines as a Defense Analyst for International Affairs from 2008-2011 under the Office of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5. She is a graduate of BA Organizational Communication from UP

Manila and earned her graduate degree, Master in International Studies, at UP Diliman.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 181

S

RRosalie Arcala Hall, Ph.D.ROSALIE ARCALA HALL is a Professor of Political Science and University Scientist I at University

of the Philippines Visayas Miagao, Iloilo. She earned her graduate degrees (Ph.D. in Public and

International Affairs; MA Political Science) from Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts

under a Fulbright Fellowship. She published articles on civil-military relations in the Philippine Political

Science Journal, Asian Security, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis and Scientia Militaria. She

has completed various research projects on civil-military engagements during counterinsurgency,

humanitarian, disaster response and anti-terror operations; gender issues inside the armed forces

and police; and rebel integration into the armed forces with grants from The Nippon Foundation,

Toyota Foundation, East Asian Development Network, Fulbright Advanced Research, and the Austrian

government North-South Exchange Program.

Saya Kiba, Ph.D.Saya Kiba is a political scientist. She studied at the Graduate School of International Cooperation

Studies, Kobe University (Ph.D. in Political Science 2010) and the Third World Studies Center,

University of the Philippines (2003-2004, 2010). Her major fields of interest are civil-military relations,

international cooperation studies, and social movements especially in urban poor communities.

She has worked in the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines and the House of Representatives of

Japan. She is currently an adviser in the Embassy of Japan in Thailand. In 2013, she is awarded The

Nippon Foundation’s Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Collaborative Grant for her joint research project,

“Comparative Analysis on Military-NGO Cooperation Policies in Asia.”

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