Contemporary Crises 12:91-100 (1988) © Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht - Printed in the Netherlands

Monitoring the monitors: accountability, democracy and policewatching in Britain

TONY JEFFERSON, EUGENE MCLAUGHLIN & LIZ ROBERTSON University of Sheffield, UK

The political context

There is now broad agreement among commentators of most political persuasions that mass unemployment, all pervading institutionalized rac- ism, alienation from the traditional structures of representation and politics provide the tinder that the trigger of racist policing is able to ignite (Cook 1985: 23).

The continuing.riots of the 1980s within inner city conurbations, as Cook's comments on them suggest, are manifestations of three simtlltaneous crises gripping Britain: a crisis of capitalism marked by mass unemployment and the institutionalised racism that ensures the black population is disproportionately affected; a crisis of democracy characterized by the inability of existing demo- cratic mechanisms to adequately represent the interests and aspirations of the most disadvantaged and least powerful segments of British society; and a crisis of policing, of which racism is but one manifestation. (On the latter, see Policy Studies Institute 1983).

Our concern is with particular aspects of the last two crises. Firstly, the crisis in police accountability within which existing institutional mechanisms are proving to be inadequate to the task of controlling police (mis)behaviour, whether racist harassment of black youth, sexist refusal to acknowledge the needs of women, aggressive pubtic order tactics or the inappropriate use of firearms (cf. Jefferson and Grimshaw 1984, Spencer 1985). And secondly, the crisis in democracy, as manifested in the failure to represent adequately disadvantaged communities, leading to their gradual withdrawal from partici- pation in the system. However, this is not a voluntary withdrawal. The attempt to give birth to a post-urban-industrial order in Britain has created a situation where, to varying degrees, sections of society are being deprived of the material means and/or the legal and political rights to partiCipate. Those at the sharpest end are being deprived of virtually all the conventional means of participation in the socio-economic and political systems. As Dahrendorf (1985) has cogently argued, they are being defined out of the edifice of citizenship - they are the dispossessed.

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There are those who are in and those who are out and are not needed . . . there is no place for them in the scheine of citizenship (Dahrendorf 1985: 102-3).

At the same time as certain sections of British society are losing their rights, there has been a strengthening of the powers of those who have the role of policing the outsiders. Jointly these crises provide us with both out empirical object - the development of police watching bodies in London I and our key theoretical concerns: the questions raised by the notions of 'community', 'representation' and 'participation', which are key notions within present debates. Specifically, we shall be concerned to see how divergent police watching bodies reflect and address, in their policies and practices, these issues of democracy.

The policing context

The position of the police within a liberal democratic structure poses key questions for those who believe that officials who are appointed or elected to positions where they routinely exercise power over others should be account- able for their actions. In this respect the institution of the police is particularly problematical because of the nature of the powers it has been delegated and the implications of the (mis)use of those powers. The crucial question is to whom are the police accountable for the exercise of those powers? In Britain the 1964 Police Act was the result of the findings of a Royal Commission. This examined the arrangements for controlling the police which had developed in a piecemeal fashion, on the basis of locality, over the last two centuries. Different administrative structures developed in London (the capital), the municipal boroughs (urban conurbations) and the counties (rural), each with differing relationships between the police, judiciary, local government and central government. The controversial question within this tangled web has become who exactly is responsible for the control of police operations - local government, central government or the police themselves?

The Commission's recommendations were

based on a continuance of the idea of partnership between central and local government in the administration of the police service but with a shifting emphasis . . . towards firmer control by central government . . . (Royal Commission 1962: Para 23).

It was recognized that the office of the chief of police, the Chief Constable, was inherently problematical. A means had to be devised allowing him/her to be

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able to enforce the law in an impartial manner without political interference, whilst having a means of external supervision to ensure channels of redress should things go wrong. The result was a tripartite arrangement, involving the Chief Constable, the local Police Authority and the central government repre- sentative, namely, the Home Secretary. Each component of this arrangement was given particular responsibilities and duties.

The 1964 Police Act effectively guaranteed the Chief Constable operational independence. The Police Authorities (made up of two thirds local political representatives and one third magistrates (local judiciary)) were to provide and equip so as to ensure an adequate and efficient police force, advise the Chief Constable on local conditions and, where necessary, ask for reports on the policing of the locality from the Chief Constable (although the latter was under no obligation to comply with the request). The third part of the tripartite structure, the Home Secretary, the central government representative, was given legal responsibility to promote the efficiency of policing generally, a range of powers not possessed by local police authorities, and the role of arbiter in the case of disputes between chief constables and their police authorities. However, the Home Secretary was n o t given the power to direct the operati0ns of chief constables.

The only part of England and Wales to which this arrangement did not apply was London. The Commission recommended that the Home Secretary remain the sole authority responsible for the policing of the capital.

In view of the exceptional police responsibilities in London, control should be in the hands of the government (Royal Commission 1962, para. 222).

Consequently, London, despite being the largest conurbation, had a police force that was not locally accountable to the people who paid the taxes necessary for its maintenance, but only to the Home Secretary. As the 1970s and 1980s developed, policing became an increasingly important part of politi- cal debate in Britain. In London the nature of that debate was fuelled by a series of incidents, especially incidents involving the aggressive policing of public order (for example, Red Lion Square 1974, Grunwick 1977, Southall 1979) and the 'saturation' policing of black communities (see Rollo 1980), that were indicative of an almost complete lack of accountability for police oper- ational actions. Pressure on the Home Secretary for public inquiries produced only two: into Red Lion Square and the Brixton riots, both conducted by Lord Scarman (1974, 1982). It became clear that lack of accountability existed/exists at two distinct levels: the level of police officers for their a'ctions; and the level of the Home Secretary, as the supposed Police Authority, for the actions of the Metropolitan police force. In each case, the effective 'cover' for such a lack of accountability was the idea of police impartiality requiring freedom from political interference in 'operational matters'.

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In May 1981 a radical left Labour Party administration gained control of the Greater London Council 2 promising as one of its electoral commitments to press for the establishment of a Police Authority for London, monitor the actions of the police, and campaign for a more effective form of police accountability. To fulfill this commitment a Police Committee was established with a Support Unit to gather and disseminate information about the policing of the capital and thereby assist the campaign for democratic accountability.

This Committee encouraged, both financially and administratively, the development of local independent Police Monitoring Groups. These were concerned with either general issues of policing or specific issues, such as the policing of black people, homosexuals, etc. In May 1982 the Greater London Council campaign for greater police accountability was strengthened when a number of Labour Party controlled boroughs were elected with a similar commitment and set up their own Police Committees.

Meanwhile, in the wake of the 1981 inner city riots Lord Scarman's report (1982) argued for the establishment of statutory arrangements which might take the form of local Liaison Committees to facilitate consultation between the police and the 'community' (defined as being the police force area/division/ subdivision) without that affecting the operational independence of the police.

These respective developments constituted a new element in British polic- ing arrangements and were reinforced when the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 followed Scarman's recommendations requiring all Police Author- ities to make arrangements for community consultation concerning policing. What is beyond doubt is that these developments represent divergent non- statutory and statutory responses to the same crisis in policing. Anyone who doubts that there is a crisis in policing in Britain should remember the concerns expressed about the aggressive policing of the miner's strike 1984-5 (cf. Sheffield Policewatch 1984, Coulter, Miller and Walker 1984) and the events of Broadwater Farm Estate, London 1985 when the end point of intimidatory 'overpolicing' of black youth on the estate was a riot during which youths killed a police officer and shotguns were used (see Gifford 1986). For most people such incidents happened in other countries - and the north of Ireland - not Britain. However, many British inner city areas in the 1980s are tinderboxes capable of being ignited by the most minor of policing mistakes. As Reiner rightly says, police/black relations have usually been both a background factor and the immediate spark of the riots (Reiner 1985: 150).

Responding to the crisis and the questions of participation, representation and community

These policing initiatives should also be understood as part of the divergent

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responses to the broader crisis of British democracy, wherein questions of the participation and representation of hitherto neglected communities have be- come crucial. The advent of a radical right goverment in Britain, elected for another term of office in June 1987, by no means precipitated the 'crisis in democracy' , but it has certainly acted as a stimulus to left thinking on the question. Whilst for some sections of the left Thatcherism is seen as a conse- quence of a failure of 'socialist nerve' , for others the left's democratic short- comings were/are as rauch to blame in opening up a space that could be and is being exploited by the right. For the former, the 'correct response' has been to argue for a harder and undiluted class-based set of socialist policies; for the latter, democratic renewal has come to be seen as a pre-condition for any progress. Given that such a renewäl was dependent on broadening the social base to include the new social movements, progress would be anything hut undilutedly class-based. On the contrary, the key question to be addressed is how to construct a common notion of 'socialism' out of this diversity of progressive interests.

The important agents in this process of democratic renewal in Britain have been the radical local councils such as the Greater London Council. Within this context, the funding of Police Monitoring Groups by such councils cän be seen as part of the attempt to break with the passive, Fabian inspired character of the relationship routinely obtaining between the Labour Party and those who they claim to represent, and to harness the activities of the various social movements located outside the state (Hall 1984). This project of renewal entails more thän just ensuring that previously un/under represented groups, such as women, ethnic and social minorities, are physically present on the relevant committees.

What the experience of the women's committees reveals is a greater com- mitment to reflect on representativeness than we've come to expect from local government. In claiming space for the unrepresented, women's com- mittees have to ask themselves - as some of them do - whether they themselves are the authentic representatives of women. They run the risk, well established in local government, of reducing an already depoliticised and pessimistic citizenry to clients and claimants (Campbell 1984: 34).

Campbell neatly highlights part of the problem using an example highly pertinent to our concerns.

Different women wanted different things. A common cause raised in wom- en's committees is women's fear of the streets and public places at night. Black women, on the other hand, are orten worried that more policing simply means more aggravation for black residents (ibid.).

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Rustin also addresses the issues of representation arguing that because of the fragmentation that has occurred within the British electorate the Labour Party organization requires a much greater pluralism allowing for the incorporation of a much wider range of interests. He also suggests the inclusion of various modes of participating including the use of the ballot. Additionally he makes an important point concerning the difference between 'active' and 'passive' participation.

Active members should gain influence by their [active] ability to persuade others, not merely by their [passive] tenacity in turning up at meetings of all kinds (Rustin 1984: 14).

Ensuring adequate forms of participation and levels of representation is a necessary though not sufficient prelude to unifying diverse groups, interests and communities. Additionally, the construction of an alliance will also de- pend on achieving agreement about the criteria for deciding priorities. In so rar as such criteria will claim the mantle 'democratic', we would argue that they will have to engage with notions of fairness and/or justice concerning compet- ing claims.

Within the debates then that have emerged concerning the general notion of democratic accountability, whether it be policing or other areas of public policy in Brittain, community, participation and representation have been recurrently employed. Notions such as 'representing the community', 'ac- countable to the community' and 'community participation', are common- place within political debate and have become crucial within the debates on policing. Before seeing how these variously inform the police watchers' pol- icies and practices, we need first to highlight the nature of the difficulties posed especially for the left by each of the concepts in turn. That these problems be acknowledged we see as being crucial to any debate on democratic socialism utilising them as organizing principles.

a. Representation

Representation as a concept is virtually synonymous with democracy; witness the notion of representative government. However, in complex societies there are real difficulties in an individual, institution, political party or indeed government claiming to represent the wishes of the people or the community. The question that taust be addressed is how to create a correspondence between the representatives and the represented, knowing that this cannot be assumed, especially given an increasingly fragmented British social structure, that is where sections of society have interests that are not directly represented

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by the existing traditional representative institutions such as trade unions or political parties (Dahrendorf 1985: 109).

The theoretical issues to be addressed here include those of articulation (cf. Laclau 1977, Laclau and Mouffe 1985), that is how a diverse set of demands from the represented can be successfully subsumed within a single project; and the way in which discourses, practices and effects rarely coincide (cf. Foucault 1981). Practically, the issue must be to create structures that will be flexible enough to allow for the representation of the needs and interests of those presently not represented. This will not be an easy task but it has to be part of any serious agenda of democratic socialism. If the experience of existing socialism has taught us anything it is that there can be no assumed correspond- ence between the so called representative organ and the represented. 3

b. Participation

Like representation, participation is universally seen to be an essential compo- nent of a democracy on grounds which emphasize the rights of citizens to be involved in the decision-making process which affect their lives, and to facil- itate accountability. It can be direct, as when people partake through their own self activity, or indirect, as when people are represented through intermedi- aries or nominees. What is not clear is whether direct modes of participation are intrinsically more democratic than indirect modes, though Rustin has reiterated the argument for 'face-to-face deliberative decision, after due dis- cussion' as 'the proper socialist definition of democracy' (Rustin 1984: 14).

We cannot discuss participation without referring to the structural dimen- sion of power and powerlessness. Pateman (1970) has distinguished between two types of participation in respect to power. Full, where individuals have equal power, and partial, where one party retains the final power. In a situation characterized by full participation it may be possible that rationality alone could be the basis for a just outcome to decision making. However, in 'actually existing' situations of partial participation, effective power based upon what resources particular individuals or groups can mobilize is crucial to the outcome.

c. Community

There are many difficulties that can be identified with the concept of communi- ty not least the fact that sociologists cannot even agree upon a common definition. This, however, does not stop individuals, pressure groups, political parties and governments of every political persuasion using it to justify their

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decisions, policies and demands and to legitimate their claims, for example to be representative. As Williams (1976) has argued, the term never seems to be used unfavourably as it conjures up images of homogeneity and unity. How- ever, British inner city areas are not homogeneous unified entities. They are differentiated and sub-differentiated by area, class, race, gender and age. Therefore,

To speak of a community when working politically on issues such as housing, health, play or welfare can cause great confusion, since, however one tooks at it no community exists; on the contrary one is confronted with a cluster of class positions, conflicts and interests, some of which are irreconcilable (Cowley et al. 1977: 5).

Thus we would argue that there are real dangers with utilizing this concept in an unproblematic way as the premise for policy recommendations concerning policing or indeed any other aspect of social/political or economic issues, and failing to recognize its ideological dimension. Though it has to be recognized that the response of the left to the challenge of the new social movements to simple class analyses has been to emphasize that they are part of 'community'- based struggle. A similar point can be made about the claims to be repre- sentative of 'the community' or about 'the community' as the basis for partici- pation.

The police watchers and the theoretical issues

In an attempt to see how aware they were of the problems or issues concerning the above-mentioned concepts, a single pilot questionnaire was administered to members of nine Monitoring Groups, seven Borough Police Committees and five Liaison Committees. Though the situation has slightly changed in the interim, at the time of the administration (summer 1983) this was a complete sample. It should be noted, methodologically, that the questionnaire was not intended to produce strict quantitative measures but as a means of exploring the issues we thought to be important and to see broadly if any one structure was more 'representative', or 'participatory', and thereby more accountable to the 'community', than the others. (For preliminary reviews of provincial Consultative Committees at work, see Morgan and Maggs 1984, Morgan 1985, and Morgan 1987).

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Representation and discrimination

All the Monitoring Groups, Borough Police Committees and Liaison Com- mittees claimed an intention to represent their communities. Such repre- sentational status was also thought to be achievable with very different mem- bership profiles since the representational presence of particular groups was by no means uniform. The majority of the Monitoring Groups had open membership, i.e. self appointment, which then elected a management com- mittee. Borough Police Committees tended to be elected by the political groups who made up the local council, and the Liaison Committees were all appointed as a result of nomination by either 'communities', councillors or the Home Office. These various types of membership tended to reflect the bodies respective origins: for the Monitoring Groups, community concern, for the Borough Police Committees, the local Labour Party Council, and for the Liaison Committees, the Home Office.

These diverse membership profiles were partly a product of conscious policy decisions to discriminate in favour of particular groups, to improve their representation. The majority of Monitoring Groups and Borough Police Com- mittees, as well as a minority of Liaison Committees, claimed to have discrimi- nated positively in favour of particular sections of the community, particularly ethnic minorities, the young and women, in that order of priority.

Yet this positive discrimination was more than a simple exercise to ensure all groups achieved 'fair' representation. The most popular justifications were that the favoured groups 'suffered most at police hands' or 'as victims', an evaluative conception of rival justice claims. However, they were also 'in- tended to be representative of the area/community' through either: a) the opportunity for direct public participation (Monitoring Groups) or; b) the indirect participation of either elected councillors (Borough Police Commit- tees) or non-elected community representatives (Liaison Committees). What- ever the favoured mode for achieving representational status, that repre- sentation broadly referred to the 'majority' within the community. There was clearly a problem between the claim to represent the community, a general majority, and the practice of discriminating in favour of particular sections of it premised upon a comparative evaluation of rival justice claims. We would argue that out survey illustrates the inherently problematical and complex relationship between representation, discrimination and justification. This needs to be acknowledged and discussed more directly than is currently the ease.

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Participation and consultation

All groups claimed liaison or consultation as an aim since it is a primary means of inviting the participation of groups, individuals or the 'community'. Howev- er, there was considerable diversity as to the kind of consultation or liaison undertaken and hence of the involvement of particular groups or individuals within the community. The Liaison Committees and the Borough Police Committees had a greater tendency to have official contacts (i.e. with Council Committees, the Home Office and representatives of the police), whereas official contacts for the Monitoring Groups tended to be with particular individual Members of Parliament and councillors. On the specific point of contact with the police, the liaison committees were uniformly of the opinion that contact with the police reflected police sincerity about taking community views seriously. However, the Borough Police Committees and particularly the Monitoring Groups saw police contacts as being, at best, public relations exercises, of, at worst, attempts to whitewash, excuse or gain knowledge.

Contact with the 'community' through the means of public meetings, which tended to be advertised and quarterly, was a universal feature. With regard to police presence at such meetings, the Liaison Committees (successfully) in- vited them to all of their meetings, the Borough Police Committees to their public ones (but unsuccessfully), whereas the Monitoring Groups did not make them welcome at any of their meetings, private or public (though the police did attend these).

The attempt actively to involve the community was also a universal feature. However, the means of achieving this varied. Monitoring Groups were more likely to do so by publishing a newsletter inviting the community to contact the groups with any ideas, grievances/complaints, etc. Borough Police Commit- tees and Liaison Committees were more likely to invite the responses of local groups before making decisions.

Perhaps the most interesting point of difference we found centred on the different attitudes towards public meetings. Borough Police Committees and Liaison Committees unanimously opted for making all their meetings open to the public and the press. By comparison the Monitoring Groups were more circumspect with regard to having open meetings. On the part of some of the monitoring groups there was the fear of extreme, right wing, fascist infiltration or the presence of other 'undesirables', i.e.. those who would be opposed to the aims of the groups. It was this danger that appeared to be behind the greater reluctance of the Monitoring Groups to see open public meetings as an absolute and unqualified good.

Whilst fascist infiltration in public meetings where 'race' may be an issue can be a serious possibility in many inner city neighbourhoods of London and Britain generally, it raises important questions about the general democratic

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criteria which can legitimately be invoked for closing particular meetings or excluding particular individuals, groups and sections of the community. It is conceivable that a Monitoring Group could exist in a neighbourhood, repre- senting the needs of particular groups, and at the same time claim to be representing the community but without feeling able to hold public meetings because the majority of that community is right wing, unreservedly supports the police, and is anti-Monitoring Group because it does not represent 'their' interests.

Community and satisfaction

The groups'/committees' perception of 'community' knowledge of and satis- faction with their work was differentially distributed, no doubt in part because the notion of community was variously understood, in some instances clearly referring to specific groups/sections within the 'community'. The Monitoring Groups were more confident that the 'community' knew about and was satisfied with their work, citing a combination of contact, surveying, publicity and the fact their services were used. The Borough Police Committees and Liaison Committees were more uncertain and regarded the matter as problem- atical.

The Monitoring Groups and Borough Police Committees, when asked precisely who was satisfied specified various groups, e.g., 'blacks and progres- sive whites'; 'blacks, young trade unionists, tenants and middle class social- ists'; 'community groups'. However, when asked how they would describe the community/area in which they worked the Borough Police Committees, Mon- itoring Groups and Liaison Committees all serviced areas which were predom- inantly white, working class (or mixed) and deprived. There would appear to be the potentional basis for tension to arise between the community as de- scribed hefe and the much narrower notion used before in analysing 'commu- nity satisfaction'. The question of the relationship between representing the community and positively discriminating in favour of particular sections of it, as a marter of policy, is posed, as is the question of representing mixed communities.

The majority of Monitoring Groups and Borough Police Committees when asked how they would reconcile community differences on questions of polic- ing, either failed to respond, or said that they 'can't', or more to the point they 'don't'. The Liaison Committees denied the existence of any real differences or thought that if there were any °listening' would resolve the matter. This refusal to recognize the importance of this question was sometimes accompa- nied by a simple endorsement of particular groups/sections, a restatement of whom, in practice, they really represented, i.e. 'those with problems', 'the

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working class'. Similarly, the question of establishing policing priorities was almost universally seen by Monitoring Groups and Borough Police Commit- tees as the unproblematical matter of 'consulting the community', with the supplement of expert, media or local council advice.

Summary and conclusion: democracy and justice

Our starting point was the broader crisis of democracy in Britain, of which the crisis in policing is orte of the most striking manifestations. The various London 'policewatching' bodies discussed represent a response to this crisis in democratic policing. We would argue that the central concepts connoted by the crisis of democracy - representation, participation and community - are inherently full of difficulties. We then analyzed the police watching initiatives to see how well their policies and practices showed an awareness of the issues raised by the concepts. Attempting to assess which initiative was/is more democratic is difficult. Although Monitoring groups were most sensitive to the needs and representation of particular disadvantaged sections/groups, they arguably fell behind the other committees on certain aspects of the question of participation, in so far they were more likely to hold closed meetings. More- over, there were at least implied differences even as to what might constitute a more democratic practice, as the variety of forms of representation - self appointment, election, nomination - reveal. There is clearly an implicit cri- tique of purely electorally based democratic politics in the establishment of these initiatives. They highlight that there are groups in British society, and issues, that cannot be/are not being satisfactority dealt with by the existing structures of electoral politics.

Overarching the issues of representation and participation and the difficult problems these pose, was the recurrent issue of reconciling differences be- tween sections of the community. Ensuring under-represented sections of the community achieve fair levels of representation may prove easier than ensur- ing the active (as opposed to purely formal) participation of represented groups; but both issues seem easier, since they are at least recognized, than the all but invisible question of how to achieve 'unity-in-difference' within and between divergent 'communities'. Whether the issue is positive discrimi- nation, establishing policing priorities or assessing 'community satisfaction', the underlying question is which communities, interests are being addressed (and which ignored), and how can the choices made be justified. For when all communities are adequately 'represented' and 'participating', the dilemma of reconciling conflicting interests remains. Thus, the question of the democratic criteria for evaluating competing claims must be recognized and addressed.

Rustin suggests, as we noted earlier, the importance of decision-making

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following face-to-face discussion for a socialist definition of democracy, and Habermas argues that rationality may help distinguish between a distorted and an undistorted consensus. However, neither address the question about justi- fying particular choices. We would argue that what is missing is a conception of justice, a principle which can be used to interrogate and arbitrate between rival claims.

Justice in a democracy connotes equality, of outcome in the case of socialist states and of opportunity in capitalist ones. Equality of outcome justifies unequal treatmënt, to compensate for unequal starting points, as in the exam- ple of positive distimination; and equality of opportunity equal treatment, an expression of its blindness to unequal starting points, as in the ideal notion of 'equality before the law'. With such a concept in mind, and its various connota- tions of equality, it is possible to rescue 'face-to-face deliberative decision' from its otherwise pragmatic quagmire. Take, for example, the postponed question of the difficult relationship between representation, positive discrim- ination and justification. Without an explicit notion of justice !t is possible to get into the absurd position of claiming one notion of democracy in principle - representing the community - whilst working with another in practice - the notion of democracy as the attempt to achieve equality of outcome, or repre- senting particular groups/sections of the community. A notion of justice can be used to j ustify both the practices of positive discrimination and representation, since it is concerned with equality o f representation.

The same is true concerning the question of justifying particular choices. The concept of justice enables choices, on access to police resources for example, to be rationally defended according to how well they ensure the equal treatment, in terms of opportunities or outcomes, of groups of citizens. Again with the notion of 'community satisfaction'. When discussed in relation to justice, this enables the needs of particular communities, sections or group- ings to be justifiably prioritised, in the interests of equality of satisfaction. Indeed, insofar as policing predominantly affects particular disadvantaged sections of the community, or indeed whole communities, it could be argued that the satisfaction of these dispossessed (dispossessed in terms of access to justice, rights and equality before the law), as a marter of justice has highest priority rating.

Finally, as increasing social fragmentation creates more sites wherein new inequalities might emerge, the question of a justificatory principle to arbitrate competing claims becomes more urgent. On the other hand, as 'old' in- equalities disappear, with the advance of democracy, the question of a princi- ple of equality to arbitrate where parties are equal becomes less relevant. At that point, but only then, a different principle will be required. As far as the 'policewatching' bodies are concerned, insofar as all represent diverse forms of democratization in the areas of policing, and insofar as the means of achieving

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that goal are varied, sometimes contradictory and even, as in the case of justice, not yet properly on the agenda, to evaluate any of these bodies, negatively or positively, would be premature. Rather all should be seen as sites where experimentation, discursive and practical, with questions of repre- sentation, participation, etc., can only multiply the information base flora which more/less promising tactics and strategies of democratization can be developed.

However, this is not to say that we see the Monitoring Groups, Borough Police Committees and Liaison Committees as being no different from each other. Ideologically we side with the monitoring initiatives as the most pro- gressive component since they are the ones who are attempting to represent the interests of the disadvantaged and dispossessed. The Liaison Committees are government responses and consequently have serious limitations because, in their attempt to represent the whole community, they allow representatives from all constituencies. However, not all constituencies suffer equal disad- vantage with respect to policing, and most certainly many of them are not progressive. Consequently, the needs and concerns of the disadvantaged are not necessarily prioritized but just seen as one of many competing claims. (The reality of the situation, as Morgan (1987) has found, is that the middle classes are over represented on Liaison Committees). Indeed, there is no way they can be prioritized, particuIarly if they area community minority, because the wishes of the majority community will be adhered to particularly with police, as Morgan (1987) has pointed out, having the agenda setting role within these committees. I f a concept of justice is not used to prioritize the needs of disadvantaged communities/sections of the community, their needs will not be listened to never mind realized. Similarly with the Borough Police Commit- tees. Whilst more progressive than the Liaison Committees politically because they are institutionalized as part of the local government structure, since they are tied to a particular political party they may not necessarily represent the needs of those who do not have much to offer in electoral terms.

Hirst (1986) has argued that in order to make democratic socialism a viable political theory in Britain, the lefl will have to stop sloganizing about such things as working class democracy and start thinking seriously about the necessary components of that theory. We would agree with his point: the ct~mocratic left will have to stop sloganizing about notions such as 'repre- sentation', 'participation', 'accountability' and 'community' and confront the theoretical problems, dilemmas and practical implications surrounding such notions. This applies to all areas of economic/social/political life, not just policing. Our illustrations flora policing have simply been an attempt to justify placing these issues on the agenda for urgent discussion.

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Acknowledgement

T h e a u t h o r s g ra t e fu l ly a c k n o w l e d g e the f inanc ia l s u p p o r t g iven by Shef f ie ld

U n i v e r s i t y R e s e a r c h F u n d .

Notes

1. Developments in areas out of London, such as West Glamorgan, Brighton, Rochdale, Sheffield and, most notably, Manchester raise quite similar theoretical issues.

2. The body responsible up until 1986 for the co-ordination and administration of utility services for the 32 localities (boroughs) making up Greater London. However, the London Strategic Policy Unit, financed by the boroughs, continues to support a Unit concerned with police accountability in London.

3. On the theoretical issues raised by the notions of correspondence and non-correspondence, see the work of Gramsci (1971), Foucault (1981), Hindess (1987), Hirst (1986), and Mouffe, ed. (1979).

4. See Richardson (1983: 247) and O'Hagan (1984: 129-30) as well of course as Habermas (1984), for discussions of the notions of rationality and participation.

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