Monterey Institute Of International Monterey Institute Of International StudiesStudies

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: TREATY:

A REGIME IN NEED OF INTENSIVE A REGIME IN NEED OF INTENSIVE CARECARE

bybyJean du PreezJean du Preez

DirectorDirectorInternational Organizations and Nonproliferation ProgramInternational Organizations and Nonproliferation Program

Center For Nonproliferation StudiesCenter For Nonproliferation Studies21 January 200321 January 2003

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: TREATY:

A REGIME IN NEED OF INTENSIVE A REGIME IN NEED OF INTENSIVE CARECARE

Course outlineCourse outline

Part I : Overview of the nuclear nonproliferation Part I : Overview of the nuclear nonproliferation regimeregime

Part II : The NPTPart II : The NPT• Overview of major developments in the NPTOverview of major developments in the NPT• Challenges to the regimeChallenges to the regime• Will the regime survive?Will the regime survive?

WHAT IS NONPROLIFERATION?WHAT IS NONPROLIFERATION?

Prevention of the spread of weapons of mass Prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological) destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological) and their means of delivery*and their means of delivery*

• Horizontal nuclear proliferationHorizontal nuclear proliferation: spread of weapons to : spread of weapons to states not currently possessing nuclear weaponsstates not currently possessing nuclear weapons

• Vertical nuclear proliferationVertical nuclear proliferation: increase in number and : increase in number and destructiveness of nuclear weapons within a state already destructiveness of nuclear weapons within a state already possessing thempossessing them

** Mostly applicable to nuclear weapons as biological and chemical weapons are Mostly applicable to nuclear weapons as biological and chemical weapons are banned banned

WHAT IS DISARMAMENTWHAT IS DISARMAMENT ? ?

Total elimination of weapons of mass Total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear destruction, including nuclear weapons, through the prohibition on weapons, through the prohibition on development, production and use development, production and use and destruction of all such weapons and destruction of all such weapons

WHY IS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT WHY IS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION A AND NONPROLIFERATION A

PRIORITY?PRIORITY?

30,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS30,000 NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Estimated 30 000 nuclear warheads Estimated 30 000 nuclear warheads worldwideworldwide

5 NPT nuclear weapons states (China, 5 NPT nuclear weapons states (China, France, Russia, UK, USA)France, Russia, UK, USA)

3 states outside the NPT (India, Israel, 3 states outside the NPT (India, Israel, Pakistan)Pakistan)

North Korea, Iraq, IranNorth Korea, Iraq, Iran Others?Others?

Hiroshima: August 6, 1945Nagasaki: August 9, 1945

NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMSSYSTEMS

Delivery systems capable Delivery systems capable of delivering nuclear of delivering nuclear weaponsweapons

• Ballistic missilesBallistic missiles• Cruise missilesCruise missiles• ArtilleryArtillery• RocketsRockets• SubmarinesSubmarines• AircraftAircraft• OtherOther

WHAT IS THE NUCLEAR NON -WHAT IS THE NUCLEAR NON -PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

REGIME?REGIME?

Collective term for international Collective term for international initiatives to prevent the spread of initiatives to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons leading to their nuclear weapons leading to their total eliminationtotal elimination

COMPONENTS OF THE NUCLEAR COMPONENTS OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIMEREGIME

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION & NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION & DISARMAMENT REGIMEDISARMAMENT REGIME

NPT IAEASAFEGUARDS

EXPORT CONTROLS

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS NWFZs

United Nations Security Council & United Nations Security Council & Disarmament machineryDisarmament machinery

CTBT ?

THE TREATY ON THE NON-THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONSWEAPONS

Parties: 188 Non-parties: India, Israel, Pakistan

A cornerstone of global security

Embodies the international community's efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and its aspirations for global disarmament, while also facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under safeguards

Entails commitments by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states

Verification of compliance with nonproliferation undertakings through the application of safeguards was conferred on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Encourages & assists research, development and Encourages & assists research, development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the worlduses throughout the world

Establishes & administers safeguards designed to Establishes & administers safeguards designed to ensure that the use of nuclear energy is not used ensure that the use of nuclear energy is not used for military purposesfor military purposes

Applies safeguards to relevant activities at the Applies safeguards to relevant activities at the request of Member Statesrequest of Member States

Applies mandatory Applies mandatory comprehensive safeguards incomprehensive safeguards in NNWS to the NPT & otherNNWS to the NPT & other international treatiesinternational treaties

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMIAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

• extensive set of technical extensive set of technical measures by which the measures by which the IAEA Secretariat IAEA Secretariat independently verifies the independently verifies the correctness and the correctness and the completeness of the completeness of the declarations made by declarations made by States about their nuclear States about their nuclear material and activitiesmaterial and activities

• confidence‑building tools of confidence‑building tools of the nuclear non-the nuclear non-proliferation regime. proliferation regime.

Why are safeguards Why are safeguards important?important?

Prevent the proliferation Prevent the proliferation of nuclear weaponsof nuclear weapons

Foster the beneficial uses Foster the beneficial uses of atomic energyof atomic energy

Provide confidence and Provide confidence and build trustbuild trust

Continual monitoring of nuclear material to ensure it is not used for military purposes

INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS:INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS: 3 key components3 key components

AccountancyAccountancy: reporting by states on the location : reporting by states on the location of fissionable material under their control, on of fissionable material under their control, on stocks of fuel and of spent fuel, on processig stocks of fuel and of spent fuel, on processig aand nd reprocessing of nuclear materials, etc.reprocessing of nuclear materials, etc.

Containment & SurveillanceContainment & Surveillance: techniques such as : techniques such as seals or video recording inside a facilityseals or video recording inside a facility

InspectionInspection: by IAEA inspectors, checking : by IAEA inspectors, checking instrumetns and seals, verifying bookkeeping, instrumetns and seals, verifying bookkeeping, confirming physical inventories of fuel or spent confirming physical inventories of fuel or spent fuelfuel

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATYBAN TREATY

Bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any Bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion (true zero yield)other nuclear explosion (true zero yield)

Verification regime includes an international Verification regime includes an international monitoring system (IMS) composed of monitoring system (IMS) composed of seismological, radionuclide (16 laboratories), seismological, radionuclide (16 laboratories), hydro acoustic and infrasound monitoring; hydro acoustic and infrasound monitoring; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence building measuresand confidence building measures

Treaty provides for measures to redress a Treaty provides for measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions, and for settlement of disputes. sanctions, and for settlement of disputes. Conference of State Parties or Executive Council Conference of State Parties or Executive Council can bring the issue to the attention of the United can bring the issue to the attention of the United NationsNations

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY ORGANIZATIONBAN TREATY ORGANIZATION

Adopted by UNGA Adopted by UNGA 9/24/19969/24/1996

Signed by 165 State with Signed by 165 State with 93 State Parties93 State Parties

Entry into force requires Entry into force requires ratification of 44 specific ratification of 44 specific States with nuclear power States with nuclear power capacities: 41 have signed capacities: 41 have signed - only 31 ratified - only 31 ratified

Non-signatories include Non-signatories include India, North Korea, and India, North Korea, and PakistanPakistan

The US (led the effort to The US (led the effort to conclude a CTBT and first conclude a CTBT and first to sign) and China, among to sign) and China, among those that have signed but those that have signed but not ratifiednot ratified

U.S. Senate voted in 1999 U.S. Senate voted in 1999 not to ratify not to ratify

Global verification regimeGlobal verification regime Worldwide network of 321 Worldwide network of 321

monitoring stations built & monitoring stations built & run by the host countries in run by the host countries in cooperation with the cooperation with the (Provisional) Technical (Provisional) Technical Secretariat (some 100 Secretariat (some 100 stations already transmit stations already transmit data to the International data to the International Data Center (IDC) in Vienna Data Center (IDC) in Vienna via satellite-based global via satellite-based global communications communications infrastructure)infrastructure)

On-site inspections and On-site inspections and confidence-building confidence-building measures measures

Administrated by a Administrated by a (Provisional) Technical (Provisional) Technical Secretariat Secretariat

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROL REGIMESEXPORT CONTROL REGIMES

Zangger CommitteeZangger Committee • Trigger list & conditions Trigger list & conditions

of supplyof supply

Nuclear Suppliers Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)Group (NSG) • Harmonization & Harmonization &

strengthening of export strengthening of export control guidelinescontrol guidelines

Missile Technology Missile Technology Control Regime Control Regime (MTCR)(MTCR) • Guidelines to control Guidelines to control

missile systems & missile systems & technologiestechnologies

Wassenaar Wassenaar ArrangementArrangement• Dual-use, all WMDDual-use, all WMD

Membership limited to suppliersVoluntary export controls Exchange of information

BILATERAL TREATIES AND BILATERAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTSAGREEMENTS

US-Russian strategic US-Russian strategic reductionreduction treaties and treaties and agreementsagreements• SALTSALT• INFINF• START ISTART I• START IISTART II

Anti Ballistic Missile Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty Treaty

SORTSORT

DPRK-ROK Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula

US-DPRK Agreed Framework

India-Pakistan Non-attack agreement

Lahore Declaration

START I & IISTART I & II

START ISTART I limits the total number of limits the total number of

strategic nuclear delivery strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for the US and vehicles for the US and Russia to 1,600 each, Russia to 1,600 each, warheads to 6,000 each, warheads to 6,000 each, warheads mounted on warheads mounted on ballistic missiles to 4,900 ballistic missiles to 4,900 each, warheads mounted each, warheads mounted on mobile ICBMs to 1,100 on mobile ICBMs to 1,100 each, and the total ballistic each, and the total ballistic missile throw-weight for missile throw-weight for each party to 3,600 metric each party to 3,600 metric tons (t)tons (t)

Bans the testing and Bans the testing and development of certain development of certain types of ballistic missilestypes of ballistic missiles

START IISTART II limits strategic weapons limits strategic weapons

for each party, with for each party, with reductions to be reductions to be implemented in two implemented in two phases:phases:

Phase I reduce total Phase I reduce total deployed strategic nuclear deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250warheads to 3,800-4,250

Phase II total number of Phase II total number of deployed strategic nuclear deployed strategic nuclear warheads may not exceed warheads may not exceed 3,000-3,5003,000-3,500

Both US and Russia have Both US and Russia have ratified ratified

US declared withdrawal US declared withdrawal from ABM Treaty on 13 from ABM Treaty on 13 June followed by the June followed by the Russian Federation Russian Federation announcement that it announcement that it would withdrawal from the would withdrawal from the START IISTART II

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATYANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

The US & Russia undertook to limit ABM systems, and not to The US & Russia undertook to limit ABM systems, and not to deploy ABM systems for the defense of their countries or an deploy ABM systems for the defense of their countries or an individual region except as provided by the Treaty: individual region except as provided by the Treaty: • Deployed ABM systems were limited to two sites: one around Deployed ABM systems were limited to two sites: one around

the national capital with no more than 100 ABM launchers and the national capital with no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles, and the other no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles, and the other around ICBM silo launchers with no more than 100 ABM around ICBM silo launchers with no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles, with launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles, with the requirement that the two sites must be separated by no the requirement that the two sites must be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometersless than thirteen hundred kilometers

President Bush announced the US withdrawal on 13 June 2002 President Bush announced the US withdrawal on 13 June 2002 thereby marking the end of the ABM Treaty. The US is committed thereby marking the end of the ABM Treaty. The US is committed to developing, testing and deploying defenses against limited to developing, testing and deploying defenses against limited missile attacks. Construction of silos in Alaska to house missile missile attacks. Construction of silos in Alaska to house missile defense interceptors will commence by 2004 defense interceptors will commence by 2004

SORTSORT A Joint Declaration was signed at the U.S.-Russian summit A Joint Declaration was signed at the U.S.-Russian summit

held in Moscow and St. Petersburg on May 24-26, 2002 held in Moscow and St. Petersburg on May 24-26, 2002 outlining the foundation of a new strategic relationship and outlining the foundation of a new strategic relationship and claims that the era in which both countries “saw each other claims that the era in which both countries “saw each other as an enemy or strategic threats has ended.” as an enemy or strategic threats has ended.”

The The Strategic Offensive Reductions TreatyStrategic Offensive Reductions Treaty provides for provides for reduction of strategic arsenals in both countries to 1,700-reduction of strategic arsenals in both countries to 1,700-2,200 warheads from the current levels of 5,949 for the 2,200 warheads from the current levels of 5,949 for the United States and 5,858 for RussiaUnited States and 5,858 for Russia

Will remain in force until December 31, 2012 but is not Will remain in force until December 31, 2012 but is not bindingbinding

Both sides are free to define the composition and structure Both sides are free to define the composition and structure of their offensive forces within the imposed ceilings. of their offensive forces within the imposed ceilings.

US-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK (1994)US-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK (1994) DPRK to halt operations and infrastructure development of its DPRK to halt operations and infrastructure development of its

nuclear program in return for a package of nuclear, energy, nuclear program in return for a package of nuclear, energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits from the United Stateseconomic, and diplomatic benefits from the United States

DPRK agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear DPRK agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons grade reactors; allow the IAEA to monitor the freeze of weapons grade reactors; allow the IAEA to monitor the freeze of its reactors; allow the implementation of its safeguards agreement its reactors; allow the implementation of its safeguards agreement under the NPT; allow the IAEA to resume ad hoc and routine under the NPT; allow the IAEA to resume ad hoc and routine inspections of facilities; come into full compliance with its inspections of facilities; come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA; remain a party to the NPT; safeguards agreement with the IAEA; remain a party to the NPT; take consistent steps to implement the North-South Joint take consistent steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and engage in North-South dialogueengage in North-South dialogue

In return for its obligations above, the DPRK will receive two light In return for its obligations above, the DPRK will receive two light water reactors financed and supplied by an international water reactors financed and supplied by an international consortium, by 2003; 150,000 tons of heavy fuel oil by October consortium, by 2003; 150,000 tons of heavy fuel oil by October 1995 for heating and electricity production foregone due to the 1995 for heating and electricity production foregone due to the freeze of its graphite-moderated reactors, and 500,000 tons freeze of its graphite-moderated reactors, and 500,000 tons annually thereafter until the completion of the first LWR; and annually thereafter until the completion of the first LWR; and formal assurances from the United States against the threat or use formal assurances from the United States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.of nuclear weapons.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES

A NWFZ prohibits the development, manufacture, A NWFZ prohibits the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession, control, assistance in stockpiling, acquisition, possession, control, assistance in research on the development, manufacture, stockpiling or research on the development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession, of any nuclear explosive device acquisition, or possession, of any nuclear explosive device within the zone of application by any contracting party. within the zone of application by any contracting party. Peaceful applications and uses of nuclear energy, under Peaceful applications and uses of nuclear energy, under appropriate IAEA safeguards, are allowedappropriate IAEA safeguards, are allowed

The first NWFZ to affect a major inhabited region applies to The first NWFZ to affect a major inhabited region applies to Latin America, and was open for signature in 1967, prior to Latin America, and was open for signature in 1967, prior to the signing of the NPT. The impetus for it was the stationing the signing of the NPT. The impetus for it was the stationing of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba during the Cuban missile of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 crisis of 1962

NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE TREATIES TREATIES

More than 110 states coveredMore than 110 states covered

AntarcticAntarctic Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco)Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco) South Pacific (Rarotonga)South Pacific (Rarotonga) South Asia (Bangkok)South Asia (Bangkok) Africa (Pelindaba)Africa (Pelindaba) MongoliaMongolia Central Asia (?)Central Asia (?) Middle East (?)Middle East (?) South East Asia (?)South East Asia (?)

UN SECURITY COUNCILUN SECURITY COUNCIL

Nonproliferation accomplishmentsNonproliferation accomplishments:: mandatory sanctions against Iraq mandatory sanctions against Iraq Counter-Terrorism Committee Counter-Terrorism Committee

exchanges information on the exchanges information on the possession of WMD by terrorist groupspossession of WMD by terrorist groups

responded to 1998 nuclear tests by responded to 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan -- denied NWS India and Pakistan -- denied NWS statusstatus

recognizing negative security recognizing negative security assurances by the NWS in April 1995assurances by the NWS in April 1995

urged all States to pursue in good faith urged all States to pursue in good faith effective measures relating to nuclear effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international under strict and effective international controlcontrol

declared the proliferation of all WMD declared the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international constitutes a threat to international peace and securitypeace and security

Organs established by the UNSC:Organs established by the UNSC:Monitoring, Verification and Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC):(UNMOVIC):

• a reinforced, ongoing monitoring and a reinforced, ongoing monitoring and verification system to ensure Iraqi verification system to ensure Iraqi compliance with Security Council compliance with Security Council resolutionsresolutions

• Undertake the responsibilities of the Undertake the responsibilities of the former (UNSCOM)former (UNSCOM)

Special Commission on Iraq Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM): (UNSCOM):

• Established for the purposes of Established for the purposes of eliminating Iraq’s capabilities vis-à-vis eliminating Iraq’s capabilities vis-à-vis WMD and ballistic missiles WMD and ballistic missiles

Promote the establishment and maintenance of international Promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security, including through disarmament and the peace and security, including through disarmament and the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

15 members: five permanent members: China, France, Russia, UK 15 members: five permanent members: China, France, Russia, UK USA; and 10 non-permanent members USA; and 10 non-permanent members

UN DISARMAMENT MACHINERYUN DISARMAMENT MACHINERY

General Assembly First CommitteeGeneral Assembly First Committee Conference on DisarmamentConference on Disarmament UN Disarmament CommissionUN Disarmament Commission Advisory Board on Disarmament MattersAdvisory Board on Disarmament Matters UN Institute for Disarmament ResearchUN Institute for Disarmament Research UN Department for Disarmament AffairsUN Department for Disarmament Affairs

PART IIPART II

THE TREATY ON THE NON-THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS (NPT)WEAPONS (NPT)

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Opened for signature on June 12, Opened for signature on June 12, 1968, signed by 62 states 1968, signed by 62 states including 3 depositary including 3 depositary governments (US, USSR, UK)governments (US, USSR, UK)

UN General Assembly approved UN General Assembly approved NPT text on March 11, 1968NPT text on March 11, 1968

Entered into force: 1970Entered into force: 1970 Extended indefinitely: 1995Extended indefinitely: 1995

THE NPT: A DEAL BETWEEN THE THE NPT: A DEAL BETWEEN THE “HAVES” AND THE “HAVE-NOTS”“HAVES” AND THE “HAVE-NOTS”

Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) – (China, France, the Russian – (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States):Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States):• may retain their nuclear arsenals; may retain their nuclear arsenals; • may not transfer nuclear weapons to any one;may not transfer nuclear weapons to any one;• may not assist any NNWS to acquire, manufacture or control may not assist any NNWS to acquire, manufacture or control

nuclear weapons; andnuclear weapons; and• commit to pursuing negotiations in good faith towards ending commit to pursuing negotiations in good faith towards ending

the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament.

Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) – (Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) – (defined as those states that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967)• must not build, acquire or possess nuclear weapons;must not build, acquire or possess nuclear weapons;• may research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful may research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes; and purposes; and • must accept safeguards (audits and intrusive on-site must accept safeguards (audits and intrusive on-site

monitoring) on all of their nuclear activities and materials to monitoring) on all of their nuclear activities and materials to verify they are not being used for nuclear weapons.verify they are not being used for nuclear weapons.

NPT: A NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION NPT: A NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT DEALAND DISARMAMENT DEAL

NWS not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear NWS not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture or assist, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture or otherwise acquire them (Art I)otherwise acquire them (Art I)

NNWS not to receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear NNWS not to receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices from any transferor, and not to explosive devices from any transferor, and not to manufacture or acquire them (Art II)manufacture or acquire them (Art II)

NNWS to place all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear NNWS to place all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards (Art III)activities under IAEA safeguards (Art III)

All parties to facilitate and participate in the exchange of All parties to facilitate and participate in the exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Art IV)information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Art IV)

All parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective All parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control (Art VI)international control (Art VI)

NPT COMPLIANCE & VERIFICATION : NPT COMPLIANCE & VERIFICATION : IAEA ROLE IAEA ROLE

NNWSNNWS

Full scope safeguardsFull scope safeguards : legal agreements required under Art III : legal agreements required under Art III Verification of declared records on nuclear material & facilities Verification of declared records on nuclear material & facilities

through inspections, surveillance and physical inspectionsthrough inspections, surveillance and physical inspections

Additional protocols (93+2):Additional protocols (93+2): As a result of failures in Iraq & DPRK, As a result of failures in Iraq & DPRK, voluntary measures + expansion of legal agreement with IAEAvoluntary measures + expansion of legal agreement with IAEA

Goal: to detect undeclared nuclear facilities and activities in Goal: to detect undeclared nuclear facilities and activities in addition to detecting diversion from peaceful to military useaddition to detecting diversion from peaceful to military use

Strengthen the Strengthen the EEffectiveness & ffectiveness & iimproving the mproving the eefficiency of fficiency of safeguardssafeguards

Comprehensive picture of a State’s nuclear related activities, Comprehensive picture of a State’s nuclear related activities, including imports and exportsincluding imports and exports

Requires an eRequires an expanded declarationxpanded declaration IAEA has authority to inspect any facility – declared or notIAEA has authority to inspect any facility – declared or not

THE NPT : A SECURITY ASSURANCETHE NPT : A SECURITY ASSURANCEPositive Security AssurancesPositive Security Assurances Nuclear aggression against any NNWS parties would require Nuclear aggression against any NNWS parties would require

immediate action by UNSC (resolution 255, 1968)immediate action by UNSC (resolution 255, 1968)

Negative Security AssurancesNegative Security Assurances NWS will not threaten to use, or use nuclear weapons NWS will not threaten to use, or use nuclear weapons

against NNWS partiesagainst NNWS parties All NWS have made several formal pledges not to use, or All NWS have made several formal pledges not to use, or

threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS partiesthreaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties UNSC formalized NWS commitments in resolution 984 of UNSC formalized NWS commitments in resolution 984 of

19951995 NWS required to undertake legal obligations not to use or NWS required to undertake legal obligations not to use or

threaten to use nuclear weapons against NWFZ parties threaten to use nuclear weapons against NWFZ parties The US and other NWS actively used SC resolution to lobby The US and other NWS actively used SC resolution to lobby

for the indefinite extension of the treaty. for the indefinite extension of the treaty. 1995 Review & Extension Conference incorporated negative 1995 Review & Extension Conference incorporated negative

security assurances in the P&O which was vital to securing security assurances in the P&O which was vital to securing the indefinite extension of the treatythe indefinite extension of the treaty

NWS & IAEA SAFEGUARDSNWS & IAEA SAFEGUARDS

NWSNWS

Concern that NNWS are at a commercial Concern that NNWS are at a commercial disadvantage because of safeguardsdisadvantage because of safeguards

NWS have also concluded agreements with the NWS have also concluded agreements with the IAEA to put their non-military nuclear facilities IAEA to put their non-military nuclear facilities under safeguardsunder safeguards

Trilateral Agreement: US, Russian Federation & Trilateral Agreement: US, Russian Federation & IAEA IAEA

THE NPT : AN OVERVIEW OF THE NPT : AN OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTSDEVELOPMENTS

Idea the result of fear by the superpowers (US & Soviet Idea the result of fear by the superpowers (US & Soviet Union) that other industrialized nations would develop Union) that other industrialized nations would develop nuclear weapons – following 1nuclear weapons – following 1stst French test in 1960 French test in 1960

1961 ”Irish resolution” in the UN GA 1961 ”Irish resolution” in the UN GA 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Negotiated in the late ’60s in the Eighteen Nation Negotiated in the late ’60s in the Eighteen Nation

Disarmament Committee (forerunner of the CD)Disarmament Committee (forerunner of the CD) Adopted by the UN GA on 12 June 1968 – 62 States signedAdopted by the UN GA on 12 June 1968 – 62 States signed Entered into force on 5 March 1970 upon ratification of 3 Entered into force on 5 March 1970 upon ratification of 3

depository states (US, UK, Soviet Union) & 40 other states – depository states (US, UK, Soviet Union) & 40 other states – France & China only joined in 1992France & China only joined in 1992

NPT REVIEW CONFERENCESNPT REVIEW CONFERENCES

Review conference 5 years after entry into force and Review conference 5 years after entry into force and additional review conferences at 5 year intervals (Art VIII)additional review conferences at 5 year intervals (Art VIII)

Conference after 25 years to determine the duration of the Conference after 25 years to determine the duration of the Treaty (Art X)Treaty (Art X)

Only the 1975, 1985 and 2000 Review Conference adopted Only the 1975, 1985 and 2000 Review Conference adopted Final Documents due to lack of consensus on key Final Documents due to lack of consensus on key nonproliferation & disarmament nonproliferation & disarmament

NPT INDEFINATE EXTENSIONNPT INDEFINATE EXTENSION

1995 Review & Extension Conference extended the treaty indefinitely 1995 Review & Extension Conference extended the treaty indefinitely

as part of a package deal:as part of a package deal:

Strengthened review processStrengthened review process Principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and Principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and

disarmament, including a Program of Action for implementing Art disarmament, including a Program of Action for implementing Art VIVI

Resolution on the Middle EastResolution on the Middle East

No Final Document was adopted – differences between NNWS & No Final Document was adopted – differences between NNWS & NWS over the implementation of Art VI (nuclear disarmament)NWS over the implementation of Art VI (nuclear disarmament)

2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

Adopted a final Document following agreement on “13 Adopted a final Document following agreement on “13 practical steps” towards the total elimination of nuclear practical steps” towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenalsarsenals

Result of negotiations between “New Agenda” countries Result of negotiations between “New Agenda” countries (Egypt, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa & (Egypt, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa & Sweden) and the NWS Sweden) and the NWS

NWS made an “unequivocal commitment” to nuclear NWS made an “unequivocal commitment” to nuclear disarmamentdisarmament

13 “PRACTICAL STEPS” TOWARDS 13 “PRACTICAL STEPS” TOWARDS THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF

NUCLEAR ARSENALSNUCLEAR ARSENALS

i.i. early entry into force of the CTBTearly entry into force of the CTBTii.ii. moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions

pending CTBTpending CTBTiii.iii. treaty banning the production of fissile material for treaty banning the production of fissile material for

nuclear weapons within five yearsnuclear weapons within five yearsiv.iv. CD nuclear disarmament bodyCD nuclear disarmament bodyv.v. irreversibility to disarmament, arms control and irreversibility to disarmament, arms control and

reductionreductionvi.vi. unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total

elimination of nuclear arsenals elimination of nuclear arsenals vii.vii. entry into force of START II and the conclusion of entry into force of START II and the conclusion of

START III while preserving and strengthening the ABM START III while preserving and strengthening the ABM viii.viii. completion and implementation of the completion and implementation of the

US/Russia/IAEA US/Russia/IAEA Trilateral Initiative Trilateral Initiative

13 “PRACTICAL STEPS” TOWARDS 13 “PRACTICAL STEPS” TOWARDS THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF

NUCLEAR ARSENALSNUCLEAR ARSENALSix.ix. Steps by all NWS: Steps by all NWS:

efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterallyefforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally increased transparency regarding nuclear capabilitiesincreased transparency regarding nuclear capabilities reduction of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weaponsreduction of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons measures to reduce operational status of nuclear weapons measures to reduce operational status of nuclear weapons diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies engagement of all NWS in the process of elimination of engagement of all NWS in the process of elimination of

nuclear weaponsnuclear weapons

x.x. all NWS to place fissile material under international all NWS to place fissile material under international verification (IAEA)verification (IAEA)

xi.xi. Reaffirmation of ultimate objective of general and Reaffirmation of ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international complete disarmament under effective international control (notice de-link with step 6)control (notice de-link with step 6)

xii.xii. Regular reports on the implementation of Art VI and Regular reports on the implementation of Art VI and Program of Action in P&OProgram of Action in P&O

xiii.xiii. development of verification capabilities to assure development of verification capabilities to assure compliance with nuclear disarmament agreementscompliance with nuclear disarmament agreements

NPT 2002 PREPARATORY NPT 2002 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR 2005 REVCONCOMMITTEE FOR 2005 REVCON

Chairman’s Factual SummaryChairman’s Factual Summary

Important new issues: Important new issues: • Tactical nuclear weaponsTactical nuclear weapons• Disarmament educationDisarmament education• Material security/terrorismMaterial security/terrorism

DisagreementsDisagreements::• reportingreporting• Article 6 implementationArticle 6 implementation

NPT : A REGIME IN NEED OF NPT : A REGIME IN NEED OF INTENSIVE CARE?INTENSIVE CARE?

Not universal – 3 states with nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan & Not universal – 3 states with nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan & Israel) remain outsideIsrael) remain outside

Non-compliance – Iraq & DPRK (Art II), US & other NWS (Art VI)Non-compliance – Iraq & DPRK (Art II), US & other NWS (Art VI) Lack of progress towards elimination of nuclear arsenals – Lack of progress towards elimination of nuclear arsenals –

abrogation of the 13 “practical steps” & P&O program of actionabrogation of the 13 “practical steps” & P&O program of action No progress in CD on FMT, PAROS, nuclear disarmamentNo progress in CD on FMT, PAROS, nuclear disarmament Nuclear terrorism – international mechanisms (export controls, Nuclear terrorism – international mechanisms (export controls,

IAEA Safeguards & treaties) vs. unilateral actionIAEA Safeguards & treaties) vs. unilateral action Defense doctrines by the US (other NWS?) threaten security Defense doctrines by the US (other NWS?) threaten security

assurances given to NNWS – new kinds of nuclear weapons assurances given to NNWS – new kinds of nuclear weapons (“bunker busters”) & pre-emptive strike policy(“bunker busters”) & pre-emptive strike policy

Safeguards & peaceful uses of nuclear energy – slow Safeguards & peaceful uses of nuclear energy – slow implementation of Additional Protocol implementation of Additional Protocol

Relevancy of multilateral approach (NPT, IAEA, UNSC) in a unipolar Relevancy of multilateral approach (NPT, IAEA, UNSC) in a unipolar worldworld

WILL THE REGIME SURVIVE?WILL THE REGIME SURVIVE?

How relevant and viable is the NPT in the current How relevant and viable is the NPT in the current international security climate?international security climate?

Is real progress possible towards achieving a world free of Is real progress possible towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons?nuclear weapons?

What are the possible consequences of North Korea’s What are the possible consequences of North Korea’s withdrawal?withdrawal?

What will be the impact on other members of the “axis of What will be the impact on other members of the “axis of evil” given US policy of pre-emptive strike? evil” given US policy of pre-emptive strike?

Will nuclear capable NNWS continue to believe that their Will nuclear capable NNWS continue to believe that their security lies within the NPT, or will they too acquire NWS?security lies within the NPT, or will they too acquire NWS?

CONCLUSIONCONCLUSION

Security cannot be achieved through the continued reliance on Security cannot be achieved through the continued reliance on nuclear weapons, but only through international cooperation in nuclear weapons, but only through international cooperation in developing and maintaining effective, binding, and verifiable developing and maintaining effective, binding, and verifiable multilateral agreements such as embodied in the NPT and the multilateral agreements such as embodied in the NPT and the CTBT CTBT

Vertical and horizontal proliferation should be given equal priorityVertical and horizontal proliferation should be given equal priority Fulfillment of NWS commitments is integral to maintaining the NPT Fulfillment of NWS commitments is integral to maintaining the NPT

itself - if NNWS are to be convinced of the continuing value of not itself - if NNWS are to be convinced of the continuing value of not pursuing nuclear weapons and staying within the NPT, they will pursuing nuclear weapons and staying within the NPT, they will need to be convinced that the NNWS are taking active steps need to be convinced that the NNWS are taking active steps towards eliminating their nuclear arsenals and decreasing rather towards eliminating their nuclear arsenals and decreasing rather than increasing the changes of these weapons being usedthan increasing the changes of these weapons being used

If the NWS fail to adequately address these concerns, the nuclear If the NWS fail to adequately address these concerns, the nuclear nonproliferation regime may be unraveling by the time the 2005 nonproliferation regime may be unraveling by the time the 2005 NPT Review Conference convenes - litmus test for undertakings NPT Review Conference convenes - litmus test for undertakings given in 1995 and 2000given in 1995 and 2000