Toby Moody Spring 20111

Redeeming Speech: Socrates’s Reclamation of Rhetoric in Gorgias

Plato’s attack on rhetoric and a new reading of Socrates’s speech in Gorgias

Plato’s works give voice to the concerns of a society at its threshold. Marveled for its

innovation, Athenian democracy quickly proved raw, fickle, and downright ineffectual less than

a century after its inception. Its principles of equality, openness, and majority rule remain as

attractive today as they must have been to the demos then, but its unparalleled flexibility and

susceptibility to foolhardiness resulted in crises that read with a striking modernity today.

Democratic ambition gave rise to the flourishing artistic and intellectual center of the classical

world, but the fallibility of the political structure failed to achieve the profitable end to the

Peloponnesian War often within its grasp and, in 404 BC, brought the cultural capital of the

eastern Mediterranean to economic ruin. The swift coup d’état against the Spartans’ chosen

Thirty shows the Athenians’ yearning to restore and rectify their democracy; the executions of

the Arginousae generals and then of Socrates expose the rashness that underlies it. Thriving in

the tumultuous political climate of fifth-century Athens, Sophists made up-and-coming youth

into political dynamos, capable both of excellence and disillusioned vice. The Socrates of

comedy furnishes an archetype for the dreaded Sophist - a teacher of rhetoric who makes his

students deceitful and disingenuous. The torch that Protagoras lit and Gorgias carried was

passed on to swindlers looking to exploit the Assembly with formulaic arguments and frenzied

appeals to the insatiable pathos of the demos. Enter Plato, whose formative years saw the

magnificent heights of Athenian culture and the utter depths of political blunder. Reflecting on

                                                                                                               1  This paper was first prepared Spring 2011 for the 20E:230 Classical Rhetoric course with Professor Takis Poulakos at the University of Iowa.  

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the errors of the previous generation and cultivating a vision for a better future, Plato heaps the

blame largely at the foot of rhetoric in several works.

The traditional, forensic schema of Plato’s critique of rhetoric sidesteps a major issue. As

it is clear that Socrates’s death shook Plato and other Socratics profoundly, so too can we see that

Plato gives unfair treatment to the leading rhetoricians of his era. In reality, however, rhetoric as

a persuasive vehicle in the political realm was foundational to the endurance of the political

experiment that gave rise to the intellectual and artistic bastion that was Classical Athens.

Furthermore, this analysis promulgates the incomplete picture of Plato as a reclusive, apolitical

thinker who withdrew himself from the flawed democratic sphere to pursue higher-order truths.

On the contrary, Plato took personal involvement in political affairs in Syracuse after the death

of Socrates and maintained aspirations of training politicians in his Academy.2 What is more, in

Gorgias, Socrates sheds the pretense of abstention from the political realm that he dons in

Apology, where he claims that his philosophical inquiries merely fill a personal curiosity.3 In

Gorgias, we see a Socrates who shows deep interest in the health of the state. The trajectory of

the argumentation centers on the proper course of action in deliberative matters, and Socrates

roots justice in the political, not as a generic ordering principle apropos to the soul, as in

Republic.4 Given how many of Socrates’s associates undertook prominent roles in the

democracy, doubtless the primary motivating factor in his prosecution, the Gorgias’s Socrates,

with his keen interest in defining political justice, seems, indeed, to bear a stronger semblance to

the historical figure than that in the Apology.

                                                                                                               2 See Nails, The People of Plato, pp. 247-9, for a discussion of Plato’s travels to Sicily and his involved with the royalty there. 3 Plato, Apology, 21a ff. Socrates’s philosophical inquiries begin after Chaerephon proclaims that the oracle at Delphi has declared Socrates to be the wisest person. 4 Plato, Gorgias, 464 b ff. Cf. Republic, Bk. II, in which the political analogy is a vehicle to understanding how justice functions on a personal level in the soul.

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Moreover, in the traditional rendition of Plato’s attack on rhetoric, dialectic vanquishes

rhetoric and illuminates the path to truth. This view is adequate if we superficially limit Plato’s

interests to epistemology and metaphysics, but given his affinity for the political, evident through

both his works and biography, the rejection of a political discursive vehicle becomes

problematic.

In this paper, I propose that what Plato really rejects is the nefarious use of language in

Gorgias, not rhetoric itself. To draw out this nuance, I will first focus on constructing Plato’s

image of the “discursive-tyrant,” the democratic analogue of Macedon’s murderous tyrant

Archelaus, held as an archetype by the rhetor Polus in Gorgias. Next, I will develop Plato’s

desire to define some kind of political discourse because of his unusual concentration on material

consequences in the Polus section. Finally, I will examine Socrates’s final speech in Gorgias, in

which he defends his philosophical life as a service to the political welfare of the state. Given

the political nature of Socrates’s speech, a more complete reading of Plato’s project in Gorgias

and, by extension, in his broader political philosophy, recognizes rhetoric not an evil

contrivance, but as a tool for philosophical persuasion in matters of political contingency, where

the aporetic back-and-forth of dialectic is ineffectual at driving the political unit. Through

proper control of persuasive language, Socrates permits us to read rhetoric as the political cousin

of the more abstract dialectic.

Defining rhetoric in ethical terms and Polus’s discursive-tyrant

Gorgias possesses many unique characteristics in the corpus of Plato. While many other

dialogues take pains to establish a believable and recognizable setting, Gorgias cannot be

reliably dated; the “contemporary” references in the dialogue are so varied that it must be either

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entirely fabricated or deliberately anachronistic for some literary effect.5 Socrates’s

uncharacteristic abrasiveness toward Polus further complicates the dialogue; while Socrates

treats Gorgias well in the opening discussions, in keeping with his congenial temperament, he

addresses Polus with disconcerting hostility. The inhospitable tone that marks the Gorgias

contributes to a shortcoming in its treatment of rhetoric. Whereas dialectic stands as an ideal for

philosophical discourse, Plato’s characterization of the personae dramatis in Gorgias narrow the

scope to the reals of rhetoric. After Gorgias gives way to Polus, the argumentation works from

inherently unequal planes. On the one hand, Socrates invites Gorgias to “answer as briefly as

possible” in a back-and-forth format, i.e. dialectic, as a display of the philosopher’s method.6 On

the other, once the master rhetorician steps aside early in the dialogue, the rhetorical perspective

comes only from Polus, a student of Gorgias who was belittled by Socrates from the start and

who clearly is upset at the perceived trap that Socrates set for Gorgias. Once the discussion of

rhetoric deviates from the ideal, it can no longer stand as a general description of how rhetoric

should function, but how it has functioned in practice. This overlooks the fact that in any field,

even philosophy, some adherents bastardize and corrupt the practice, and commits us, therefore,

to view Polus’s encounter with Socrates as a good faith treatment of rhetoric. Not only has

Socrates pulled Gorgias into a trap, but Plato himself as author has fallen in headlong with him.

When Gorgias reaches a dead-end in his discourse with Socrates, his student Polus,

author of a known treatise on rhetoric, hijacks the conversation, enraged at the perceived abuse

of his teacher by Socrates.7 Stauffer points out that, while Polus is angered when he interjects in

the conversation, Socrates in fact imparts the “spirit of a battle rather than a friendly

                                                                                                               5 Ibid., pp. 326-7. 6 Gorgias 449c. 7 Ibid., p. 252. Socrates and Phaedrus discuss the treatise by Polus at Phdr. 267b.

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discussion.”8 Perhaps inspired by Socrates’s vehemence in rejecting the validity of rhetoric,9

Polus proceeds to sketch his ideal rhetorician.

Although the Athenians often found themselves under considerable influence by a single

politician in the fifth century – most notably Themistocles and Pericles – and smaller groups

managed to supersede democracy at various points – the oligarchy of 411 and the Thirty Tyrants

– the political climate at Athens did not give rise to a king or tyrant proper after the disposal of

Peisistratus and his sons a more than a century before Plato flourished.10 In a society that prided

itself on ostracizing any man who became too threatening to its democratic ideals, Polus’s

archetype of power and self-assertion proved a practical impossibility. By way of comparison, it

is necessary for us, however, to look at why Polus esteems Archelaus of Macedonia to such an

extent that he deems him the model rhetorician, which I term the “discursive-tyrant.”11

Seething with sarcasm, Polus details how Archelaus, born of a slave-woman and,

therefore, unfit to join his uncle’s royal contingent in Macedonia, proceeded to ignore his natural

inclination toward happiness and instead pursue ambition to the fullest by doing “the greatest of

wrongs.”12 Desiring power, Archelaus brought his uncle, the king Perdiccas, and his son, the heir

Alexander, into his confidence, indulging them with wine and hospitality, before taking

advantage of their inebriated state to commit murder and aid his prospects of succession. Polus,

                                                                                                               8 Stauffer, The Unity of Plato’s Gorgias, p. 43. 9 462c ff. Socrates defines rhetoric as a type of “flattery,” a false image of an intrinsically good property; rhetoric is the impersonator of justice, the means of correction in moral transgressions. 10 The murder of Hipparchos in 514 became the symbolic rise of democracy in Athens. The reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 codified proto-democratic rule, although the precise origins of fifth-century democracy are debated. 11 At both 470d, where Polus offers Archelaus as a man both happy and powerful, and 472d, where Polus answers in the affirmative that Archelaus is both wicked and happy. 12 471a ff. Polus’s references to unhappiness and wretchedness in this section are meant at least part ironically and recall Socrates’s claim that acting justly in all cases constitutes justice, which in turn produces happiness. See note 18.

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again ripe with sarcasm, boasts, “And these crimes he committed without realizing that he was

the most wretched of men, and felt no regrets.”13 One more person stood in Archelaus’s way: his

uncle’s seven-year-old son. Telling the child’s mother that he died in an accident, Archelaus

drowned the boy in a well to become “the most wretched, not the happiest, of all Macedonians,”

but ruler nonetheless.14 Thus Polus recalls the ascension of Archelaus. Why Polus regards him

as such a wretched man and the reason for his sarcastic jabs at Socrates we shall discuss

presently, but first we are apt to look at the historicity of Polus’ss account.

Stauffer points out that our other ancient sources do not corroborate the murderous

intrigue by which Archelaus became ruler of Macedonia.15 Soon after claiming power,

Archelaus became an important ally of the Athenians, who, having just lost their fleet in Sicily,

were in desperate need of timber. Thucydides writes approvingly of Archelaus because of the

improvements that he made to Macedonian infrastructure,16 and Stauffer quotes Saxonhouse’s

observation that “Polus ignores those activities of Archelaus which strengthened the status of

Macedonia . . .”17 That Polus insists on indicting Archelaus despite an overall favorable

characterization of him in our other sources reveals much more about Polus and his moral

disposition than we should take as fact about Archelaus. How this idolization for, perhaps, false

criminal charges against Archelaus colors our view of Polus and, more importantly, informs the

moral disposition of the discursive-tyrant, we will discuss after considering why Polus

sarcastically regards Archelaus as wretched and unhappy.

                                                                                                               13 471b. Tr. W.D. Woodhead, in Hamilton and Cairns, Plato: Collected Dialogues, p. 253. 14 Ibid., p. 254. 15 Stauffer, Unity, p. 61. 16 Thucydides, 2.100.2 ff. 17 Saxonhouse, “An Unspoken Theme in Plato’s Gorgias,” quoted in Stauffer, Unity, p. 61.

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Superficially, Polus’s claims should be taken in jest as being in response to the argument

that Socrates has made before his speech, with the claim that those who commit injustice are by

virtue of the unjust act, unhappy.18 For Socrates, happiness lies in the harmonious ordering of

the soul;19 when one acts unjustly, the proper ordering of the soul disintegrates and the person

has, by choosing to do the unjust act, willingly harmed himself and deprived himself of

happiness. While Polus reluctantly claims to agree with Socrates’s argument, his “rebuttal”

speech, i.e. the description of Archelaus above, indicates that Socrates has not persuaded him.

Stauffer suggests that, while Polus agrees unjust acts can be harmful if one should be caught, an

act is not wrong in itself on the grounds of an objective definition of justice.20

Even while reading the notes of sarcasm in Polus’s condemnation of Archelaus, however,

we also must take notice of the fact that Polus genuinely believes Archelaus is both guilty and

morally blameworthy for his acts of tyranny.21 For our project of examining the moral character

of Plato’s archetypal discursive-tyrant, this second point is very instructive. That Polus readily

admits and, given his dismissive attitude toward Socrates’s consideration of objective morality,

even praises the moral deficiencies of Archelaus gives form to the moral character of the

powerful rhetorician. For Polus, our Macedonian tyrant represents the pinnacle of self-asserting

power; in monarchy, where ascension to power may require nothing more than the intestinal

fortitude to dispose of a few relatives, a man with opportunity and Polus’s view of ethics can

take what he wants with relative ease. While for Socrates the status of his soul demands further

                                                                                                               18 468e ff. 19 Socrates explicitly defines justice and its relation to the parts of the soul at Republic II.368d, at which point he introduces the city analogy. 20 Stauffer, Unity, pp. 58-9. 21 Ibid., p. 62. See also Dilman, Morality and the Inner Life, pp. 31-36 for a discussion of the psychology and philosophical implications of Archelaus’ desire for, and attainment of power and wealth, esp. in light of Polus’s speech.

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examination,22 for Polus the fact that Archelaus claimed what he wanted without, or, worse, in

spite of, any moral reservations makes him a supremely powerful individual.

We have already noted that the Athenian political landscape precludes the assumption of

power by the murderous devices employed by Archelaus, so why ought we so thoroughly

examine what it is that Polus likes about him? Polus in his first statement to Socrates asserts that

rhetoric is a type of power whereby the rhetoricians are able to “put to death any man they will,

and deprive of their fortunes and banish whomsoever it seems best.”23 In this passage, Polus

explicitly links this type of rhetorician with a tyrant, as well. It seems that Polus holds that the

tyrant, with Archelaus serving as a model, is in fact the most powerful man he can imagine. He

exercises his power directly without interference from or approval of any other. Self-interested

behavior without concern for moral implications elevates an aspiring tyrant to his desired

position; once there, he no longer needs to conceal his intentions. Whomever he wishes to kill,

banish, or humiliate he handles at his leisure, in the open as a display of his power.

If Polus fancies himself such a man, the political structure in Athens seems not to afford

him the possibility. Here, too, I think we can explicate an aspect of Plato’s deep misgivings

about persuasive language. Eliminating monarchic rule does not remove with it the type of man

who desires absolute power. The Athenians, as we have said before, took great precaution to

stymie any potential tyrant, and Plato, while he also rejects the democratic form of government

for its malleability, also fears the rise of a tyrant. In the Polus argument, we see how persuasive

language can be problematic. For they are not just tyrants who “put to death” and “deprive …

and banish” any person they please, but rhetoricians, too, possess this power in a democratic city,

                                                                                                               22 Plochmann and Robinson, A Friendly Guide to Plato’s Gorgias, pp. 82-86. Socrates does not condemn Archelaus, perhaps to withhold that satisfaction from Polus, but rather he reserves judgment about his moral and psychological qualities. 23 466c. Tr. Woodhead.

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according to Polus.24 Within the Athenians’ new political structure, the need arose for some

vehicle of persuasion whereby the citizens could resolve a course of conduct in the Assembly.

Early rhetoricians like Gorgias helped sort through the ramifications of a bold new political

experiment25 and, while Plato attacks his brand of rhetoric, the conversation between Gorgias

and Socrates remains civil, perhaps in hopes of learning from one another.26

The second-generation rhetorician Polus has abandoned any notions of aiding the

Athenians in navigating through the new political waters.27 With the system up and running,

Polus’s interest was in exploiting, not amplifying, the democratic openness. After the first group

of rhetoricians worked out what types of speech would prove effective in the Assembly, Polus’s

hypothetic discursive-tyrant could set out to refine his skills of persuasion to the point where

language would be as effective a weapon against enemies as the his tyrant-king cousin’s sword.

With complete disregard for the actual welfare of the state, the discursive-tyrant pursues his own

interest in the guise of executing the Athenian laws. This ability to circumvent the law while

appearing to defend it raises the principal moral quandary that puts Plato at tension with rhetoric.

Despite Socrates’s vehement argument that committing an injustice always does harm, the

rhetorician Polus is unmoved. In a world of immediate practical outcomes, the imperceptible

objective morality, if indeed such a thing exists, is innocuous in quelling a tyrannical man’s lust

for instant gratification. That the dialogue never seeks to define justice, even at this critical

juncture, indicates how at odds Polus and Socrates are.28 Polus only entertains material

                                                                                                               24 466b ff., Tr. Woodhead. 25 For background on Gorgias and his associates, see Nails, pp. 156-8. 26 Stauffer, Unity, see pp. 36-40, et al. Stauffer argues that Socrates sees Gorgias as a potential political ally with the possibility of a reciprocal teaching-learning relationship. 27 Gorgias and Polus, like all Sophists, immigrated to Athens. Gorgias and Polus both came to Athens from Sicily. 28 Stauffer, Unity, p. 62.

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consequences of behavior whereas Socrates grounds his reasoning on the assumption of an

objective justice; neither makes a serious attempt to reconcile the two intellectual frameworks,

again illustrating the gap between real and ideal that problematizes the entire dialogue. The

rejection of an objective morality by the discursive-tyrant frees him from any obligation to

uphold the laws for the common good, and this artificial exoneration from moral obligation is

Plato’s first qualm with Polus’s use of persuasive language.

The second flaw of the discursive-tyrant is not abstractly philosophical; because Polus

admits that Archelaus, and his discursive-tyrant by proxy, does harm against people willingly,

we see a figure willing to exploit the laws not merely by pursuing personal interest over the

common good, but one who prides himself on wickedness with material harms. While the first

point detracts from the rhetorician only insofar as he does not recognize a hypothetical hierarchy

of legal precepts, this second instance roots the flaw squarely in the material world. In the first

objection, we see the discursive-tyrant asserting that he should use the laws in his own favor

because he acknowledges no transcendent obligation to work for the general welfare of society.

While dissatisfying, the philosophical problem that this view exposes stands in only cursory

resolution in Plato’s works. The second claim that the discursive-tyrant makes, however,

indicates his true character. No longer is he framing his worry in a philosophical context.

Instead he boldly asserts that he willingly does material harm to those undeserving because, by

virtue of his mastery of rhetoric, he can justify anything he desires to do and defend himself

should an accusation arise. We see a man who no longer hides behind a philosophical question

to cover his intentions. Now, like Archelaus’ murderous rise to power, the discursive-tyrant

singles out enemies and destroys their material well being for no reason other than he has the

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ability and desire to do so. Polus says that, yes, what he does is cruel and at some level wrong,

but the fact that no one can stop him is sufficient justification for him to flaunt his power.

Reconsidering the problem: Persuasive language and a need for rhetoric

Rhetoric originated out of necessity as the formalized discipline of political persuasion.

As the law became codified and the political process opened its doors to the entire demos,

training in persuasion, both in legal trials and Assembly debates, naturally grew into a

profession. This is the core of rhetoric as Gorgias constructed it – a systematized

implementation of language to drive political affairs. Neither the historical Gorgias nor Plato’s

Gorgias, who defines rhetoric as persuasion in matters of justice, by which he means politics,

would condone the persuasive language that Polus endorses. Whereas Gorgias’s rhetoric

employs logic to examine all possible implications of a proposed action, Polus’s “rhetoric”

amounts only to lies and slander, told movingly enough to effect an affirmation of guilt from a

jury. Polus describes a tyrannical man whose weapon rests on his tongue instead of in his

sheath. If we take Polus’s account of rhetoric as representative of all rhetoric, then we make a

regrettable mistake, taking the part for the whole and the real for the ideal. Plato cannot

seriously endorse this portrait as the whole of rhetoric, either, for if Gorgias’s rhetoric is guilty of

creating the imagined discursive-tyrant, then how can Plato exonerate Socrates’s philosophy of

having created actual tyrants, like Alcibiades, who loved Socrates more than any other man, and

who orchestrated the failed Sicilian Expedition before defecting to Sparta, or Charmides and

Critias, both among the Thirty who terrorized Athens with vicious and unlawful killings?29 The

traditional reading of Gorgias, which clearly delineates good from evil, Socrates from rhetoric,

leads to unintended conclusions for Plato and a juxtaposition of rhetoric and philosophy that

                                                                                                               29 For Alcibiades’ praise of Socrates, see Symposium 215a ff. For biography on Alcibiades, Charmides, and Critias, see Nails.

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shatters our fundamental view of Socrates’s project. If we understand Polus’s speech as a

pointing to a corrupted rhetoric, an implementation of language for nefarious purposes whereby a

cruel tyrant exploits the political arena, then we look elsewhere for a more favorable and

accurate understanding of rhetoric and its function in the political sphere. Just as some

philosophers practice a useless and unproductive brand of philosophy, so can we understand

some rhetoricians becoming tyrannical and exploiting their skillset.30 The fact that in the real

some fail to achieve the intended purpose of either endeavor, however, should not color our

discussion of the ideal. Again, Plato at the very least invites us to conflate these two planes of

existence in his discussion of rhetoric.

Now that we understand why it is philosophically important to extend our analysis of

rhetoric another step, we should further point out how committed Plato seems to be to rooting the

discussion in the political. Although Plato does reject democracy in Republic for its inevitable

shortcomings, he nonetheless remains a humanist; the urge to make all segments of society

happy drives the ideal state’s construction.31 The material harm that the discursive-tyrant inflicts

elicits a vigorous objection from Socrates; while the objective immorality in itself makes the

discursive-tyrant unjust, the material outrages that he commits against individuals earns him the

“tyrant” label in his dubious title.32 Historical Socrates was, after all, harmed by ambitious

rhetors, and his uncles’ outrages led Plato to shirk Athenian political life.33 Thus, it is on firm

                                                                                                               30 See Republic VI for Plato’s discussion of false and real philosophers. 31 For democracy’s origins and flaws, see Republic VIII, 562b ff. The desire to satisfy all segments of society derives from the description of the soul in Republic II. 32 See Gorgias 466b ff. and the discussion above. 33 For Socrates, his prosecution and death by Meletus and others in 399 BCE. For Plato’s departure from Athens, again see Nails, pp. 246 ff. Charmides and Critias, mentioned above, were maternal uncles of Plato.

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ground that we embark on an effort to redeem Plato’s view of rhetoric as a political counterpart

to philosophy’s dialectic as we examine Socrates’s defense speech at the end of the Gorgias.

Socrates’s reclamation of rhetoric: καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ

πάσῃ πράξει

The Gorgias ends with Socrates telling a myth that resituates the place of rhetoric in the

political landscape. Socrates suggests that he will be prosecuted for his brand of political

intervention, which he calls the political art, and in which, perhaps, he alone engages.34 He

equates himself with the doctor who is unable to persuade a patient of his condition despite

knowing the truth, and his prosecutor will be like a cook, who wins the favor of the jury through

pleasure.35 Socrates finds this position utterly hopeless; he does not possess the skill to persuade

the jury despite knowing the truth. Likewise, his political advice goes unheeded because,

although he speaks with insight, he stands in “lack of flattering rhetoric.”36 Socrates claims that

he will meet his death on these charges – of “[corrupting] the young by bewildering them or

[abusing] the older in bitter terms” – with courage and a clean conscience because he knows that

the good deeds went unnoticed by those who condemned him,37 but the fact that some skill in

persuasion could prevent this unjust conviction counts against the view of Socrates as a martyr

for the philosophical life. Since an unjust act is wrong both in itself and in its material

consequences, the death of Socrates represents an evil on both accounts. It is not just the

prosecutor’s rhetoric that condemns him, either, but also the privation of persuasive skill in his

philosophical practice, which leaves his completely defenseless, seals his fate, and ultimately

facilitates the unjust action.

                                                                                                               34 Gorgias 521d. 35 Gorgias 521e. 36 Ibid., 522d, Tr. Woodhead. 37 Ibid., 522b, Tr. Woodhead.

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Socrates then tells his myth. In light of the realization that rhetoric is ethically neutral,

because the practitioner, not the practice itself, gives it ethical quality, we can read the myth as

an allegory for an idealized political sphere in which rhetoric merges with philosophy. Socrates

describes a primordial world in which people know the hour of their death and can prepare

witnesses and fancy clothes to mask their true nature before the judges, who are also still living

and will rule on the soul’s destiny in the afterlife.38 This arrangement belongs to the age of

Cronus, deposed father of Zeus, and represents, therefore, an archaic model of judgment that in

due course will be reformed. In the myth, indeed, newly ascended Zeus decrees that souls

should be judged only after death, without character witnesses and unclothed, so that only their

true nature remains, and the judges of souls must, too, be dead and unclothed, so as to recognize

without prejudice the real nature of the soul. As a last measure of impartiality, Zeus limits the

jury to three sons of his and even includes an appeals process, all “so that the judgment about

which path men take may be as just as possible.”39

If taken as an allegory, this restructured judicial system could represent any of a number

of Athenian political venues. The trial of Socrates, like all in Athens, contained a massive jury

and was carried out in a single day; the defendant had no chance at an appeal, nor any time

between the verdict and sentencing for the jury to reconsider the gravity of the matter. Likewise,

the Prytany on which Socrates served when the Arginousae generals were condemned to death,

even though the demos deeply regretted the verdict after the execution, had no legal measure to

remedy the hasty decision.

The souls reside in a realm of pure thought. Gone are the frills of appearance and

emotion that can move the judges to rule on superficial grounds. Nonetheless, the souls are

                                                                                                               38 Gorgias 523a ff. 39 524a, Tr. Woodhead.

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judged in a court and must make their cases in rhetoric’s arena. The naked souls, without

character witnesses to move the judges or cosmetic affectations to alight their passions, must

resort to a purer persuasion, namely an idealized rhetoric, to make their cases. Seeing this too as

allegory, we can understand that rather than tearing down rhetoric entirely, Plato is imaging a

political arena in which persuasion relies solely on intellectual merits rather than emotional

appeals, in contrast with those who bringing crying wives and children to the court in hopes of

wining sympathy.40 Further, rather than withdrawing from the political sphere, Plato through

this myth challenges it and proposes a restructured judicial system with more rational measures

in place to ensure the dispensation of justice.

Although the bulk of the dialogue pits Socrates the philosopher in opposition with the

rhetoricians, the myth seeks a middle path between the two endeavors. Without measures in

place to assist justice, the philosopher’s soul is sent on the path to punishment while the

tyrannical soul, with its entourage and beautiful garments hiding its true nature, persuades the

judges to send it to eternal bliss. Zeus’s measures do not topple the democratic model; instead

the reforms infuse philosophical provisions into the democratic political landscape so that the

philosopher has an equal chance to receive fair judgment. The philosopher’s merits for having

lived justly stand in the open when he is judged, and reason itself, without any dressings at all,

stands to persuade the judges.

It is striking that Socrates offers such a loaded allegory immediately after he has claimed

that he will be defenseless in court against his prosecutor’s charges.41 Since the Apology lacks

any mythical allegories such as we see here in Gorgias, it seems that this move to employ

                                                                                                               40 Plato, Apology, 34c. Though a common practice in Athenian courts, Socrates refuses to bring his crying family to the courtroom in hopes of earning sympathy. 41 Gorgias, 521e. “I shall have nothing to say for myself in court.” Tr. Woodhead.

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persuasive mythical language belongs to Plato’s Socrates rather than the historical one and

indicates an acknowledgment of dialectic’s shortcomings as a discursive political vehicle. The

myth envisions a world in which the political realm invites the philosopher’s justice to stand as

evidence for itself. Perhaps telling such a myth in his historical defense would have won the

court’s favor for Socrates without abandoning his commitment to the philosophical life, for the

allegory both captures the imagination and tugs at the intellect to grasp the broader critique

embedded within the beautiful language. Indeed, what Plato seems to give us here is an example

of a rhetorical device used to great effect by a philosopher. What we see is that the philosopher

can both persuade and remain true to the political art by pointing out the ills of the democratic

process in a way that stimulates both logic and emotion through its layering of mythological and

political discourse. Thus, the myth stands both as a reclamation of rhetoric for the philosopher as

an inroad to the political sphere that to this point has left him defenseless despite the truth of his

speech and, in its particular context, to soften the philosopher’s deep commitment to one way of

approaching language. To engage meaningfully in the political realm and prevent the willful

outrages done by the discursive-tyrant, the philosopher must fuse his intellectual truth with the

persuasive tactics of rhetoric so as to win over the judges.

After the myth, Socrates entreats all, especially Callicles, to follow his pursuit of justice,

for that will ensure the best afterlife, and, in the context of the myth, improve the material world,

as well.42 His final statements show an indisputable fusion of philosophy and rhetoric; they work

as a pair to improve the health of the state in Socrates’s vision of the ideal. While the

rhetoricians cannot explain why one should live a just life as a philosopher can, the rhetorician is

                                                                                                               42 Gorgias, 526e.

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able to persuade others to act justly and punish those who do not.43 The final mention that

Socrates makes of rhetoric comes in this unexpected statement, «καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον

ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει» (And thus, one must always employ rhetoric, and every

other activity, in the power of justice).44 Socrates then discusses how a proper education can

lead to a virtuous life and open the path to justice and happiness.45 While education generally

belongs to philosophy, the fact that Socrates claims rhetoric should be used for justice indicates

that Plato’s new vision of education education first discovers the truth through philosophy and

then adds the element that historical Socrates lacked, i.e. the capacity to persuade others of what

is true and good through rhetoric.

Conclusion: Rhetoric as an element of philosophy and a path to the good

Through poetic myth, Plato exposes the fact that philosophy, too, can be insufficient to

spread truth and justice, despite the philosopher’s knowledge of it. The “rhetoric” that Polus

promotes in his speech shows the real possibility of the corruption endemic to a free and open

political system. Further, Socrates’s lack of a defense in the courts reveals that philosophy’s

dialectic, which fails to move either Polus or Callicles in the Gorgias, also carries no weight in

the political arena. In his final vision of a just society, Plato subtly reconciles rhetoric and

dialectic; the dialectic helps the philosophically inclined to learn the truth while rhetoric gives

them a vehicle whereby they can share at least some aspect of that truth with the demos who

operate the political engine of democracy. Despite his deep misgivings about rhetoric in the law

courts, Plato’s concluding section of Gorgias reveals a marked change of heart whereby he

moves rhetoric out of the mouths of the ignorant and unjust and, handing it instead to his

                                                                                                               43 Gorgias, 527b-c. 44 Ibid., 527c. The translation is my own. 45 Ibid., 527c-e.

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Socrates, redefines the political mechanism as a potential realm of actual, not perceived, justice

with procedural refinements suggested in the myth that serve to alleviate the rapid vacillations of

the emotional demos. Even with the changes to the judicial system in the myth, however, Plato

still must turn to rhetoric as the final means of sharing truth in a venue that has neither the time

nor training to appreciate the dialectic discourse in which Socrates and his philosophic friends

communicate. Out of the hostile arguments between Socrates and both Polus and Callicles, in

which Socrates attempts to demonstrate the superiority of dialectic, yet fails to persuade either

man in the least, although both admit some of his proposals are logically sound, Plato moves his

Socrates into a beautiful and persuasive use of language, a rhetorical device about the proper role

of rhetoric in the political sphere. While the historical Socrates failed to move the real jury with

his philosophical defense, the rhetorical ending to the Gorgias opens a new interpretation of

Plato’s view on rhetoric and allows us to see rhetoric as one facet of a political ideal, a move that

is impossible in Polus’s speech, as the fixation on the real restricts the discourse to sketching the

discursive-tyrant, from whom Plato wrests away the power of language in a new ideal that relies

on both philosophical dialectic and his old enemy, rhetoric.

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