moral and epistemic saints

METAPHILOSOPHY Vol, 17, Nos 2 & 3 , April/July 1986 0026-1068 $2.00

MORAL AND EPISTEMIC SAINTS

MARK BERNSTEIN

Let us say that one is morally saintly regarding a particular act if one performs that act intentionally where that act is of a supererogatory moral character. Let us say that one is epistemically saintly regarding a particular act if one performs that act intentionally where that act is of asupererogatory epistemic character, What I wish to do is delve into the nature of such saints. In this way we may be able to learn something more of the supererogatory and of the agents who perform this type of action.

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Two prefatory comments are in order. As I am using the word ‘saint’, it is definitionally related to ‘supererogatory’. I don’t claim that this is the only appropriate use of that term. For example, one might use the word ‘saint’ as a rubric for any person who demonstrates unusual and admirable tenacity and strength in doing his duty; a tenacity and strength that is absent in most persons. Such a use would sever the tie between saints and performers of supererogatory acts.

Secondly, one might deny the existence of such saints. Although this denial in itself needn’t invalidate the enterprise, it is a question that merits consideration. There seem to be two major ways in which an objection might be form- ulated as to deny directly the existence of supererogatory acts. The first denial might come from those with Hard Determinist affinities. They might argue that since (a) intentionality entails freedom, (b) Determinism entails unfreedom and (c) Determinsim is true, we are left with the non- existence of any intentional actions. To try to meet such an objection would take us into the murky waters of the Free Will problem, waters whose murki- ness I will not now try to wade. The second denial may come from those who believe, e.g. that all moral actions can be exhaustively divided into those which are (im) permissible or (non) obligatory. An argument that has been made to this effect goes essentially as follows: (Pybus, 1982)

(1) ‘Supererogatory’ acts are justifiably commended. (2) Justifiable commendation of an act entails the (justified) belief that

people ought to act in that way; i.e. people who fail to act in that way in the appropriate situations have failed to discharge their moral respons- ibility.

( 3 ) If an action is an action that one ought to do (that one is under an obligation to do), then the action cannot be supererogatory.

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(4) So the ‘supererogatory’ is really the obligatory, and thus there are no moral saints.

But premise (2) is questionable. There are, of course, many senses of ‘ought’ that are independent of moral implications. To exemplify but a few: (a) if you want to return home in the shortest possible time, you (prudentially) ought to turn left at Broadway (b) you (legally) ought to get your car regis- tered before you buy car insurance (c) when one adds 2 and 2 one (mathe- matically) ought to get 4.

These examples should make us suspicious of the validity of the inference which took us from the justifiable Commendation of acts (and thus in one sense of ‘ought’ implying that others ought to act likewise) to the claim that others are under obligations to perform such acts in the appropriate situations. This suspicion is fortified when we examine a concrete case, e.g. the case of Kitty Genovese. Several years ago in New York City, Kitty Genovese was attacked and killed in full-view of many onlookers who were, at the time, in their apartment buildings. Suppose, contrary to fact, that one of these persons had come to the aid of Ms. Genovese by trying to wrestle the knife from her assailant. Most of us, I am sure, would commend such an action. This commendation would have moral force but certainly it doesn’t carry the burden of moral obligatoriness. Compare this to another commendable act, also unfortunately contrary to fact, that one of the onlookers calling the police on the telephone. This, it might plausibly be maintained, is an act which the onlookers were obligated to perform. The actions are in this respect morally disanalogous, and so the conclusion to be drawn is that the ‘logic is commendation’ is neutral as to the question of moral obligatoriness.

At any rate, the concept of a moral saint involves the performance of supererogatory acts, and there seem to be degrees of saintliness. This seems to have two major parameters - the number of such acts one performs and the quality of the supererogation. This second parameter is a measure of how far beyond the call of duty the action is. To return to the Genovese case, consider a person who not only ran down to the street to ward off her assailant, but who also, then, captured the assailant and brought him to the police station. Concerning this affair, such a person would be enormously saintly.

Although acts of supererogation are often self-sacrificing and risk-taking ventures, they need not be. Returning to the Genovese case, if one of the persons who saw her attacked was a black-belt karate expert, and so with little or no risk to himself repelled the assailant, the act would still be one beyond the demands of duty. Or consider a scenario where the assailant has already been captured and rendered harmless, and still several onlookers urge on traffic so as to make police access to the criminal somewhat easier. Or, finally, consider the very different case of an elementary school teacher spend- ing hour after hour of his own time trying to help a youngster understand the mysteries of multiplication.

The point to be emphasized is that although most examples of supereroga-

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tion seem t o concern themselves with an exercise of extreme courage (a soldier juinping on a live grenade, a doctor entering a plague-ridden city to administer medicine t o the sick), acts of supererogation are exemplified by an extreme use of many of the other virtues. The case of the school teacher, for example, demonstrates supererogatory patience. Other examples involv- ing temperance, prudence, etc. can be easily manufactured.

Indeed it is this notion of the ‘extreme use’ or ‘extreme exercise’ of a virtue which helps us understand our attitude toward the moral saint; why, that is, that we take a person to be good and worthy of moral praise. For if right acts are just these actions which duty enjoins, then it becomes apparent that we don’t think highly of an agent of supererogatory acts solely for the performance of right acts. Indeed, when we view the two great theories of ethical obligation, Utilitarianism and Kantianism, we find the first precluding the supererogatory, and the second permitting it though leaving its nature somewhat mysterious. Utilitarianism tells us, generally, that we ought to perform that action, which among the possible alternatives, produces the greatest net happiness. Given this stricture, it appears impossible to find a place for commendable acts which are not duty-directed. For recall the Genovese case. Where it seeins that the person who physically wards off her assailant is doing a good not dictated by duty, utilitarianism tells us that either (a) this action is obligated (which would be the case if a hedonic calculus were t o give it the highest rating), or (b) the omission of this action is obligated (which would be the case if a hedonic calculus proved other actions more profitable). That is, given any action, we are obligated either to perform it or obligated not t o perform it. Kantianism, on the other hand, seeins to allow for the supererogatory. From the universalizable maxim ‘help people who are in distress’ we realize n o duty t o ward off Ms. Genovese’s assailant (perhaps a telephone call would satisfy our duty). Similarly from the equivalent imperative to treat persons only as ends and not as means, we don’t seem to generate that duty. One can treat another as an end in a variety of ways, in a spectrum of ways, and Kant- ianism would seem t o allow for the supererogatory by placing it a t the far end of a spectrum with duty constituting the near end. Nonetheless, although Kantianism seems t o allow for supererogatory actions where Utilitarianism doesn’t, it does so without giving us any insight into the nature of the supererogatory, an insight which may be supplied by a virtue-centered theory of ethics of the type proffered by Aristotle. A caveat, though, should be mentioned. These remarks are critical of Utilitarianism and Kantianism (or any moral theory with similar ‘deficits’) only if one demands of a moral theory that it explain, t o some degree, the nature of the supererogatory. This might be considered an unreasonable demand by those who see the major task of an ethical theory to elicit canons of obligation, and who see the explanation of our moral sentiments best left to some theory of psychology rather than one of ethics.

We are still left with the question of how even a virtue-centered theory of ethics can help explain our moral sentiments toward the moral saint. And


as hinted at, the answer resides in part, at least, in the notion of the extreme exercise of a virtue. That is, I wish to suggest that our admiration of the morally saintly derives from the belief we have that he instantiates the heroic; that he is acting larger than life, at least larger than human life. He is acting, in the extreme exercise of a virtue, divinely. We see the divine in the human - what better cause for admiration, respect, and even awe.

This point gains clarity if we compare this theory to Utilitarianism in their treatments of the soldier-grenade case. Whereas Utilitarianism would demand this action if in fact it were to produce greater net happiness than other possibilities we can alternatively view this case as an extreme use of the virtue ‘bravery’. We can act bravely and extremely bravely, and the lack of any sharp demarcation adds credence to the account. For I don’t believe we take it to be a clear-cut division between good persons and heroes between dutiful deeds and supererogatory ones. Yet this is not to imply that there aren’t paradigm cases of the heroic use of a virtue - the soldier who intentionally jumps on a grenade to same many lives, is surely one. We do call such a soldier a hero, and, under the auspices of a virtue-centered theory of ethics, justifiably so.

Yet, though we respect and admire such saintly actions, it does not follow that we have a desire to emulate such actions. We needn’t wish that we could bring ourselves to the commission of heroic deeds. Any hint of tension or paradox should dissipate once we recall that many of us admire beauty in others without wishing that we had that (type of! appearance. Thus admiration, respect, and even reverence of a quality that we lack is quite compatible with a lack of desire to obtain the quality.

Still, one might contend, far from epitomizing courage or some other virtue, the saintly agent actually demonstrates foolhardiness or rashness. But to see that this attribution is warped, consider again the case of a soldier who knows that he has the opportunity of picking up and tossing the grenade instead of jumping on it. Assume further that this throwing of the grenade would serve the same purpose that he had intended, namely the saving of the lives of his friends and comrades. If such a person were then to fall on the live grenade, undoubtedly a foolhardy action would be performed. And con- comitantly, our attitude toward such an agent would be greatly different. Indeed, consideration of this example seems to provide some hope for a quan- tification of foolhardiness based upon some interpretation of the probability calculus. Intuitively, the idea is that one is foolhardy if one takes greater risks than necessary to secure a particular end. Since very few ends can be guaranteed by the use of any given means, some probability function seems helpful. We would set a particular degree of certainty of satisfaction that would serve as our minimum (a degree that would depend on the importance of obtaining the goal) and then try to determine which course of action would incur the least risk (this, too, could be given a probability function). So, for example, let us say that we would wish to secure the goal of saving our comrades with a 99% degree of certainty. Let us assume that there are two but only two

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ways of achieving this - either by tossing the grenade or by jumping on it. Then, assuming as seems evident, a greater risk is assigned t o jumping on the grenade, it would be a foolhardy act to fall on the live grenade, while it would be a supererogatory act of courage t o toss the grenade away. One should not get the very mistaken impression, however, that such a calculus or decision- procedure in some way ‘mechanizes’ the supererogatory. It is one thing to make a decision, it is quite another to acf upon it. After all, our positive attitude toward the agent of the supererogatory is derived not from his decision but from his acting on that decision.

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Consider the case of Phillips, a geologist. He believes that he has made an important discovery in his area of specialty - plate tectonics. He has worked carefully, diligently, and has observed sound scientific methodology. As a result, his belief that he has made an important advance is justified.

It seems clear that Phillips has some episteniic responsibilities or duties, the avoidance of which would result in Philips’ epistemic negligence. For example, if Phillips were made aware that an upcoming geology conference included speakers of whom it was reasonable t o expect might cast doubt upon his findings, Phillips, it seems, has an episteniic duty to attend that conference. If he did not attend, then ceteris paribus, he would be epistemically negligent .

But consider a variant scenario. Phillips is aware of an upcoming geology conference but knows full-well that such a conference has little chance of having speakers who will upset his findings, This conference traditionally is quite weak, and very little of substance or quality has been issued from this meeting. Given this, it s e e m fair to say that if Phillips attends the conference, on the negligible chance that something relevant will be said about his findings, Phillips is acting as an epistemic saint - he is acting supererogatorily in the epistemic realm.

As with moral saintliness, episteniic saintliness comes in degrees, and here too, there seem t o be two major parameters - the quantity and the quality of the supererogatory actions. That is, roughly, the more of these minor con- ferences that Phillips attends the more saintly he is, and his saintliness will be inversely proportional (with qualifications mentioned below) to the likelihood of the conference being relevant.’

The epistemic saint, like his moral counterpart, typically indulges in risk-taking adventures. Of course the risks are of a very different nature. Instead of risking life and limb as d o the soldier who jumps on a live grenade

’ The issue is really more complicated. At a minimum, distinctions should be made among Philips’ subjective beliefs, the beliefs he ought to, as a rational agent, have, and the beliefs that an ideally rational agent would have. These complications have been ignored to facilitate exposition of my major point.


or a doctor who administers to the sick in a plague-ridden town, the epistemic saint risks the validity of his knowledge claims. These are large stakes, perhaps the biggest, to a person qua epistemic agent.

As with the moral saint, the epistemic saint deservedly receives our admiration and respect. His actions are commendable, and qua epistemic agent, a t least, such a person is praiseworthy. And as with the moral saint, a virtue- centered ethics can help us understand why we have this attitude. The epistemic saint nianifests heroic use of the virtue of truth (or knowledge) -seeking. Again, we find the extreme or heroic use of this virtue as exemplary and extra- ordinary, as being beyond the reach of virtually all mortals virtually all of the time.

The question then naturally arises whether there is an epistemic vice that corresponds t o the moral vice of foolhardiness. One might believe that one can never err on the side of seeking the truth “with too much fervor.” This attitude is probably most perspicuously exemplified by Karl Popper’s philosophy of knowledge. To Popper, the corroboration of a scientific theory is the measure of a theory proving its mettle; it is the degree of success a theory has in thwarting attempts at falsification. The duty of the scientific theorist, qua epistemic agent, is t o subject his theory to as many possible falsifying instances as he can. Thus stated we have a consequence similar t o the one in the moral realm when we considered Utilitarianism as our general theory of ethical obligation, viz. a blurring of the distinction between the epistemically obligatory and the epistemically supererogatory. There would be n o episteniic saints. And as with Utilitarianism, where it would be senseless to claim that you had an unwise production of greater pleasure, it would, for the Popperian, be absurd to claim that onc unwisely submitted his knowledge claims t o an exorbitant number of possible falsifying examinations.

This does not mean that Popper cannot avail himself of the notion of epistemic foolhardiness. If there were a test which could not possibly falsify a given theory, then, even for the Popperian, it would be episteniically foolhardy to make the attempt. But if this were the best account we could devise of epistemic foolhardiness, it would not serve as a satisfying analogue to the moral vice. What we need to find is an account of epistemic foolhardiness which allows for the existence of the vice, even though as a result of the exercise of this vice, we gain knowledge. That is, from an epistemic point of view does it make sense t o speak of an unwise use of truth-seeking where knowledge would be gained?

Perhaps the strategy employed in the moral sphere can be transported to the episternic arena. Typically there are many ways in which we can come t o know a particular fact. We might read a book, ask a friend, d o a calculation, and so on. We can assign t o each of these methods a certain probability of ascertaining the truth. And for each truth that we are seeking, we can assign a minimum degree of desired ascertainability. So, t o use a mundane example, suppose we wanted with 95% assurance, to ascertain the truth about the identity of California’s governor. Suppose, furthcr, that by reading an easily

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available book we have a 98% chance of finding the truth, and that by travel- ing t o Sacramento, the capital of California, we would also have a 98%chance. Given this scenario, one would be episteniically foolhardy to go t o California. The intuitive idea, then, parallels the moral case. One should try to accomplish one’s epistemic goals with as little epistemic risk and waste as possible. If one is not as “epistemically efficient” as possible, one is acting in an episteniically foolhardy manner. From an epistemic point of view, one is, a t a rnininium, using time for a plane trip t o California which would be better spent seeking more knowledge. Or, returning t o the case where Phillips supererogatorily attends a weak geology conference, a foolhardy act would have been performed had Phillips attended an even weaker conference which was scheduled at the same time. For i t certainly is an epistemic vice and not a virtue t o knowingly follow a course of act which tends to yield lower episteniic dividends than another, more epistemically propitious avenue.

There is much then in common between the moral and epistemic saint. This should not be suprising since our attitudes toward them are so similar. But although there is good reason for our admiration and even reverence for such persons, it is quite a different question whether one, qua rational agent, ought t o aspire t o be one. The qualities that are necessary for sainthood may be quite antithetical t o leading a fully satisfying and happy life in the type of world that we presently inhabit. Although these are ‘merely’ empirical con- straints governing the wisdom of emulating such saints, it provides yet more reason for viewing the saintly as intimate with the divine.

Universiry of Texas at Sun Antonio San Antonio, TX 7828.5 USA

References

Dennett, Daniel, “How t o Change Your Mind” in Brainstorms, Bradford

Popper, Karl, Logic of Scientific Discovery, Basic Books, 1959, Ch. 10. Pybus, Elizabeth. “Saints and Heroes” in Philosophy, Vol. 5 7 1982.

Books, 1978.

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