moral community and animal--sapontzis rights

8/3/2019 Moral Community and Animal--Sapontzis Rights

1/8

North American Philosophical Publications

Moral Community and Animal RightsAuthor(s): Steve F. SapontzisSource: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul., 1985), pp. 251-257Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014103 .

Accessed: 05/10/2011 01:14

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

University of Illinois Press andNorth American Philosophical Publications are collaborating with JSTOR to

digitize, preserve and extend access toAmerican Philosophical Quarterly.
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=illinoishttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=napphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20014103?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20014103?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=napphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=illinois


2/8

American Philosophical QuarterlyVolume 22, Number 3, July 1985

MORAL COMMUNITY AND ANIMAL RIGHTSSteve F. Sapontzis

TN this paper I discuss three possible justifications-^ for what I believe to be the basic objection toextending moral rights to non-human beings; "Butthey're just animals!" Many people who are wellinformed about not only the physical but also thepsychological and social interests of animals stillfeel justified in treating animals as resources forfulfilling human interests. This is because animalssupposedly lack that something of fundamental

moral worth which calls for respect and not merelyfor humane treatment and slaughter.It is three interpretations of that morally signif?icant something which I want to consider here.These three interpretations all involve the idea thatonly those who participate in some kind of moralcommunity with us can be entitled tomoral rightsagainst us. These three interpretations are themajorpremises of the following arguments against animalrights:

Al :Only those who respect themoral rights of othersare entitled to moral rights, ("the reciprocityrequirement")A2: Animals cannot respect moral rights.A3: Therefore, animals cannot be entitled to moralrights.1Bl: Only moral agents are entitled to moral rights.("the agency requirement")

B2: Animals cannot be moral agents.B3: Therefore, animals cannot be entitled to moral

rights.2Cl: One is entitled tomoral rights against others onthe basis of his (capacity for) familial, personal,political, economic, etc., relations to them, ("therelations

requirement")C2: Animals cannot enter into such relations withhumans.

C3: Therefore, animals cannot be entitled to moralrights against humans.3

I will take up each of these arguments in turn.But before doing so, Iwant briefly to indicate whatI think animal rights are about, so that it will beclear to what the above are objections. I believe

that talk of "liberating" animals and extendingmoral "rights" to them refers to changing ourattitude toward animals from one which regardsthem as beings who must be treated humanely butwho are, nonetheless, fundamentally resources forfulfilling human interests to an attitude whichregards animals as fellow creatures whose interestin an enjoyable, satisfying life must be respectedand protected in the way basic human interests arerespected and protected. Currently, basic animalinterests, e.g., in life and liberty, are routinelysacrificed to satisfy human interests, some of

which, e.g., in hunting and gourmet cooking, arefar from basic; the primary purpose of extendingmoral rights to animals would be to insure thattheir interests could be sacrificed for fulfillinghuman interests only in the sorts of situations andaccording to the sorts of principles which justifysacrificing the interests of some humans to fulfillthe interests of others.4

I. The Reciprocity RequirementThis requirement is based on one interpretationof the correlation between rights and duties. This

interpretation is number (3) onW. D. Ross' famouslist of possible interpretations of that correlation:(3) A right of A against B implies a duty of A to B....What is meant by (3) is that A's having a right tohave a certain act done to him by B implies a dutyfor A to do another act to B, which act may be eithera similar act (as where the right of having the truthtold to one implies the duty of telling the truth) or adifferent sort of act (as where the right to obedienceimplies the duty of governing well).5

When this correlation is coupled with the commonbelief that animals are incapable of recognizing andacting on duties, it quickly follows that animalsare incapable of having moral rights.The most obvious response to this argument isthat our common practice shows that being able to

251


3/8

252 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYrecognize and act on duties is not a necessary con?dition for having moral rights. Infants and theseverely retarded, brain damaged, and senile arenot regarded as resources for fulfilling the interestsof normal humans (even though they could provideoutstanding material for medical research). In spiteof their inability to recognize and act on duties,their interests are protected by moral rights.6 How?ever, while this "argument from marginal cases"strongly suggests that our attachment to our speciesis stronger than our commitment to the reciprocityrequirement, it is neither particularly telling norinsightful.It is not particularly telling because if we makethe following revision in our formulation of thereciprocity requirement, nearly all the marginalcases can be easily and reasonably accommodated:

AT: Only those who do, will be able to, are to athreshold degree able to, may again be able to,or did respect themoral rights of others are entitledto moral rights.

The remaining marginal cases, namely, theseverely, incurably retarded or psychopathic from

birth, constitute a very small, sequestered groupwhich can be treated as "honorary rights-holders"out of deference to the feelings of species affinitymost all of us share. This special treatment of theseuncommon, isolated cases does not compromisethe reciprocity requirement, for that requirement isintended for common cases. Just as giving womenand children first place in the lifeboats does notimply that they normally have superior rights to

men, so making a few, extraordinary people hon?orary rights-holders does not imply that the recip?rocity requirement is not being observed in normalsituations. Morally special cases are situations inwhich our common moral principles must be super?seded; consequently, we cannot infer from our prac?tice in such special cases to what our commonmoral principles are.This argument from marginal cases is not particu?larly insightful because it does not come to gripswith the reason why the reciprocity requirementhas such intuitive appeal. I think the reason behindthis appeal is not species prejudice but a matter offairness: A's having a right against B is correlatedwith B's having a duty to A; itwould be unfair for

B's liberty to be thus restricted without A's libertyalso being similarly (or otherwise appropriately)restricted. For example, if A has a right to the fruitsof his labor, then B is obligated (ce ter is paribus)not to go into A's field and take his corn. Itwouldbe manifestly unfair, then, for A not to be obligatedto respect B's right to the fruits of his labor and toremain free to go into B's field and take his corn.Thus, fairness, coupled with the commonlyaccepted principle that "a right of A against Bimplies a duty of B to A" ( (1) on Ross' list),requires that one is obligated to respect the moralrights of others only if they are obligated to respecthis moral rights.The Achilles heel of that argument is that itcannot provide a basis for the obligations of thepowerful to the powerless. The argument presumesthat A is powerful enough to interfere with B's

well-being and that he can inhibit that power inexchange for B's inhibiting his power to interferewith A's well-being. But what if A is blind, sickly,

malnourished, timid, squeamish, poor, ignorant, aweakling, kindhearted, or otherwise unable to posea threat to B's well-being? B cannot be obligatedthrough exchange to inhibit his power to interferewith A's well-being when A has no power to inter?fere with B which he can inhibit in return. Thus,if reciprocity were a necessary condition for havingmoral rights, the weak would be excluded fromhaving moral rights against the strong.The reciprocity requirement implies that onlythose strong enough to pose a threat to us can gainmoral rights against us. Such aMachiavellian viewof moral rights fits ill with our common morality.One of the basic purposes of moral rights is toprotect the weak against the strong, so that theweak can have a fair chance of fulfilling theirinterests. To the extent that a theory of moral rightscannot provide a basis for this function, it is surelyinadequate, for we are not discussing a few mar?ginal cases here but a primary, pervasive purposeof moral rights.In order to remedy this inadequacy, we may notethat just as there is a strong intuitive appeal to thereciprocity requirement, so there is a strong intui?tive appeal, again based on fairness, to limiting theapplication of that requirement by having differentrequirements for A's having moral rights against


4/8

MORAL COMMUNITY AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 253

those who are as powerful as he is and againstthose who are vastly more powerful than he is. IfA and B are equally powerful, then if B gives upa power which A does not reciprocate, he will beat a disadvantage in the competition for fulfillinginterests. Reciprocity is needed here to preventexploitation and to insure an intuitive sort ofequality of opportunity. However, when the weakare dealing with the strong, the situation is reversed.In order to prevent the strong from exploiting theweak and to insure that the weak have a fair chanceof fulfilling their interests, what is required is thatthe strong inhibit their power over the weak and/orthat the weak be given additional power againstthe strong. Giving moral rights to the weak, withcorrelative duties for the strong but without correla?tive duties for the weak, would help accomplishthis.

If this distinction is correct and the reciprocityrequirement does not apply to dealings between thestrong and the weak, then the reciprocity require?ment generally does not apply to dealings betweenhumans and animals and, therefore, generally doesnot pose an obstacle to extending moral rights toanimals. Humans are vastly more powerful thananimals. No animal preys on us or ordinarilythreatens human lives; no animal ordinarilythreatens to imprison us, to take our territory, todestroy our societies, to cause us pain, or otherwiseto interfere with our fulfilling our basic interests.7On the other hand, we routinely do all these thingsto animals. So, if fairness is the goal, what is neededis not that animals agree to treat us "as well as"we treat them; what is needed is to protect animalsfrom human exploitation. Extending moral rightsto animals would help accomplish this.

II. The Agency Requirement

This requirement maintains that only moralagents are entitled tomoral rights. "Having a rightto" something is in the same family as being ableto claim something "as one's due," being "entitledto" it, being "owed" it, "meriting" it, "deserving"it, and having "earned" it. These phrases suggestthat in order to have rights we must do somethinglike pass a test, achieve a certain standing, or attaina plateau to which the appropriate response is

respect. We can earn the respect embodied inmoralrights only by being (capable of being) moralagents, because respect, being the highest of moralacknowledgements, must be reserved for thehighest of values, and as Kant said, "Nothing inthe world?indeed, nothing even beyond theworld?can possibly be conceived which could becalled good without qualification except a goodw///."8

Kant believed that since animals lack practicalreason, they aremerely creatures of nature excludedfrom the community of moral agents, or "kingdomof ends," and may, therefore, be regarded as meremeans to human satisfaction. Others have disag?reed: Hume thought it so evident that animals havepractical reason that he declared it would beridiculous to spend time defending that they do;9Darwin thought that animals exhibit a great varietyof virtues, at least some of which contemporarynaturalists also believe they have observed;10 andeven Harry Truman declared, "If you want a truefriend in this life, get a dog!" So, that animalscannot meet the agency requirement is not obvious.However, since I and others have elsewhere exten?sively discussed the ability of animals to meet thisrequirement,11 I want here to discuss the agencyrequirement from the same perspective from which

we viewed the reciprocity requirement, namely,that of accomplishing the goals of morality.Thoroughly settling this issue is certainly out ofthe question here, but enough can be said brieflyto establish a reasonable presumption against the

agency requirement and to indicate where theburden of proof lies. We have already noted thatprotecting the weak and insuring that all have afair chance of fulfilling their interests are goals of

morality. Kant to the contrary notwithstanding,minimizing suffering and increasing enjoyment ofand satisfaction with life are also goals of commonmorality. Finally, promoting and rewarding virtuessuch as integrity, courage, and compassion are alsogoals of common morality. How the agencyrequirement impacts these three families ofcommon moral goals will give a substantial indica?tion of its moral worth.

The agency requirement functions directly inpromoting and rewarding (the capacity for) virtues:only the (potentially) virtuous will have their


5/8

254 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLYinterests protected by moral rights. However, ful?filling this third family of moral goals does notrequire the agency requirement, since those capableof being moral agents can be recognized as beingof superior worth even if those who are not capableof being moral agents are accorded moral rights.Although liberating non-moral agents (assumingthat is what animals are) would prohibit routinelysacrificing their interests, it would not prohibitgiving fulfilling the interests of moral agentspriority over fulfilling those of non-moral agentsin non-routine situations, such as the traditional"burning building" examples. Giving moral agentspride of place in our hierarchy of values need notinvolve extending to them something like the divineright of kings, so that they may dispose of nonmoral agents in the way serfs could be disposed offor their master's benefit. Like the rulers in Plato's

Republic, moral agents may be entitled to andreceive the rights and responsibilities for whichtheir special talents qualify them without beingencouraged or even allowed to be tyrants over thosewho do not share their talents.

Intuitively, minimizing the suffering andmaximizing the happiness of all beings withinterests should be most readily accomplished byrejecting obstacles to the impartial considerationof the interests of all, and the agency requirementis such an obstacle. Some philosophers have ques?tioned whether a species-neutral utilitarian calculuswould really call for an end to treating animals asresources.12 However, several billion birds and

mammals and trillions of fish are slaughtered annu?ally just in the United States, and in virtually allcases there are non-animal alternatives for fulfillingthe human needs for which these animals lose theremainder of their potentially happy lives. Thesefacts put the burden of proof squarely on those who

would counter the intuitive and contend that utilitymay be maximized by treating animals as resources.To date, this burden has not been met; so, we mayfollow our intuitions and conclude that the utili?tarian family of moral goals would be more effec?tively pursued without the agency requirement.13

Similarly, the goals of protecting the weak andgiving all a fair chance at fulfilling their interestscould be more effectively pursued by extendingmoral rights to all beings with interests. Since in

this world the clearly moral agents, namely,humans, are vastly more powerful than the sup?posedly non-moral agents, encouraging moralagents to regard non-moral agents as resourcesexacerbates rather than corrects the disparities ofpower in our world. So, once again, common moralgoals could be more effectively pursued byrejecting the agency requirement.Itmight be countered that our power over animalsand our consequent use of them to satisfy ourinterests do not constitute an unfair advantageneeding moral correction. Since we are moralagents and they are not, we are entitled to havepower over them and to exercise that power(humanely, of course) to our advantage.In response, we may note that it is rather strangeto say that our ability to judge and act disinteres?tedly entitles us to disregard with impunity theinterests of others. Intuitively, the power that moralagents ought to have and exercise is the power tocarry out moral judgements and to establish thereign of morality in the world. Once again, it isnot the power of the feudal lord to use others(humanely, of course) as he pleased but somethinglike the restricted, counter-balanced power of

Plato's philosopher-kings which is the power befit?ting moral agents. Only Kant's "holy will," a being

who cannot be tempted from or mistaken in thepursuit of the good, is worthy of having and exer?cising uninhibited power over others. Con?sequently, it remains arbitrary that other beingswith interests are so vastly weaker than we are thatthey cannot protect their interests from beingroutinely sacrificed by us. In order to provide theseothers a fair chance at fulfilling their interests, weneed to inhibit, not rationalize, our self-interestedexercise of power. The agency requirement is sucha rationalization.

Thus, none of our three families of commonmoral goals needs the agency requirement, and twoof them would be more readily attained without it.The linguistic tradition cited earlier in favor of thisrequirement is lightweight in comparison to thesereasons against it.While Kant provides a substan?tive argument for treating all moral agents as endsin themselves, he merely presumes that only theinterests of moral agents should be protected againstroutine sacrifice. To my knowledge, no one has


6/8

MORAL COMMUNITY AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 255

provided a substantive justification of the agencyrequirement. This may be due to coupling the intui?tive appeal of the idea that those who have actedimmorally deserve to have (some of) their rightstaken away (at least temporarily) with a failure todistinguish clearly between immoral and non-moralagents, thereby leaving the agency requirementlooking intuitively acceptable and in need of nofurther justification. Whatever the reason for thisomission, until a substantive justification for theagency requirement is provided, the arguments justdeveloped indicate that being (capable of being) amoral agent should not be a requirement for havingmoral rights.

III. The Relations RequirementThis requirement derives from one of the tradi?tional objections to both utilitarianism and Kan?

tianism: the universal egalitarianism they professis both unfaithful to common morality and uncon?vincing as a goal for moral reform. In common

morality we are not under an obligation to giveequal consideration to everyone. We are not onlypermitted but even obligated to give priority to theinterests of our families, friends, colleagues, andcompatriots, and a world from which these nonegalitarian commitments were abolished would notbe enhanced but impoverished. Consequently, amoral theory based on universal impartiality mustbe artificial and unconvincing. Moral rights andresponsibilities are not based on abstract principlesbut on our living together, entering into familial,personal, political, economic, etc., relations witheach other, and, in general, being involved in eachother's lives. It follows that since animals cannotenter into these relations with us, we are not onlyjustified in giving priority to fulfilling humaninterests but even obligated to do so.

An obvious response to this argument is that wecan have personal, extended-familial, and quasieconomic relations with animals, and even if themore extensive relations we can have with humanswould, according to this theory, justify our givingpriority to fulfilling human interests, they do notjustify our treating animals as resources for humansatisfaction. This is because, as we have alreadyseen, there are ways of giving priority to fulfilling

human interests which do not sanction the routinesacrifice of animal interests. Consequently, morethan a justification of giving priority to fulfillinghuman interests is needed to justify withholding

moral rights from animals?especially, since, aswe have already seen, common moral goals wouldbe more readily attained through extending moralrights to animals.A more fundamental response to the argumentfor the relations requirement is that it is asmistakenabout common morality as is abstractegalitarianism. One of the primary functions of

morality, especially of moral rights, is to inhibitfavoritism based on familial, personal, etc., rela?tions. To accomplish this, we have developed a"justice is blind" family of moral imperatives: "takea disinterested viewpoint," "give equal considera?tion to all concerned," "try to universalize youractions," "disregard (as if behind 'a veil of ignor?ance') individual differences," and so forth. Thisfamily of moral imperatives is as much a part ofcommon morality as are the relational prioritiesnoted above. For example, while a father is justifiedin giving priority to fulfilling the interests of hischild, he would not be justified in doing so bytaking food from another needy child, enslaving astranger, or killing a business competitor. A fathercan be morally criticized even for using his dis?cretionary income to purchase luxuries for his childwhile contributing nothing to help starving childrenin other parts of the world. Thus, in addition torelational rights and responsibilities, common mor?ality also contains egalitarian rights and respon?sibilities, with the latter counter-balancing theformer by restricting the ways in which relationalpriorities may be pursued, imposing impartial obli?gations on us, requiring us to add a disinterestedappraisal to our judgements of what is right, andso forth.

The advocates of the relations requirement seekto incorporate common egalitarian principles intotheir theory by claiming that these principles arebased on the capacity humans have to enter intopersonal, political, etc., relations with any otherhuman and the fact that today we do have politicaland economic relations with people throughout theworld. In these two ways we form a global, humancommunity which, it is claimed, creates the moral


7/8

256 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

rights and responsibilities we have against and toall humans?but, of course, not to animals, sincethey lack this capacity and are not partners in ourglobal politics and economy.This analysis simply does not ring true. When Icontribute to charities helping starving children inAsia or refuse to purchase products made in South

Africa, it is not at all because Asian children orSouth African blacks are my partners in a globaleconomy or because Imay come to have personalor political relations with them. I contribute andboycott because I recognize a need I can help meetand an injustice I can help combat. In so far asthere is a sense of community underlying myactions, it is not a political, economic, or linguisticcommunity but, roughly, a sense that we are allvulnerable, suffering beings and ought to help eachother out. It is not being part of a global communitythat creates our moral obligations to all humans;rather, it is feeling that "we're all in the same boat"and morally bound to each other that gives us asense of being part of a global, moral community.Thus, at the global level, the relations theory hasthe relation between morality and community back?wards. Consequently, it does not succeed in incor?porating the common egalitarian principles whichcounter-balance our familial, political, etc.,priorities.If our sense of a global, moral community derivesfrom our ability to be moved by and feel obligatedto help relieve the suffering of others, then thatanimals are unable to enter fully into familial,economic, etc., relations with us does not precludetheir entering into a global, moral community withus and benefitting from having moral rights againstus. It would be our inability to feel moved by andobligated to help relieve the suffering of animalswhich would prevent the extension of moral rightsto animals on the grounds of this sort of community.However, the existence of the animal rights move?ment shows that we are capable of being so movedand feeling so obligated.The fabric of common morality is a weave ofcontrary forces; arguments for animal rights neednot deny this nor otherwise attempt to makecommon morality out to be simpler than it is. Thisis because what is being sought for animals are thesame basic moral rights against the routine sacrifice

of one's interests which are already enjoyed byhumans. If equality and priority can interweave toform a practicable morality when dealing with interhuman relations, they can do so when dealing withrelations between humans and animals. PerhapsPeter Singer's clarion call for "equal considerationof interests"14 has caused misunderstanding on thispoint. However, ifwe remember that such phrasesas "all men are created equal," "equal standingbefore the law," and "equal opportunity for all"have become standard parts of our moral traditionwithout denying that "charity begins at home" andsimilar traditional priorities, such misun?derstanding should simply fade away.

IV. ConclusionThere is no denying that for the reasons cited in

support of the reciprocity, agency, and relationsrequirements, animals cannot enter fully into thecommunity that humans can enjoy with each other.

However, that this incapacity justifies treating ani?mals as resources for human satisfaction is neitherself-evident nor established by the arguments forthat inference which have been offered to date. Thearguments offered here do not demonstrate that thatinference could not be justified, but I think theydo show that until (if ever) such justification isprovided, that inference should be rejected.Most people, philosophers included, seem to feelthat we are obviously justified in sacrificing animalsas resources for human satisfaction and, con?sequently, that calls for liberating animals fromsuch treatment must be wrong. Anti-animal rightsarguments are attempts to justify that feeling. Thearguments of this paper have tried to combat thatfeeling not just by criticizing the proposed justifi?cations for it but also by emphasizing that liberatinganimals is at least strongly suggested by a varietyof moral concerns which also have strong intuitiveappeal. In closing, I would like to quote a fewsentences from William James which, I think,express the feeling which motivates advocates ofanimal rights: "Take any demand, however slight,which any creature, however weak, may make.

Ought it not, for its own sake, to be satisfied? Ifnot, prove why not."15

California State University, Hayward Received February 21, 1984


8/8

MORAL COMMUNITY AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 257NOTES

1. See Richard A. Watson, "Self-Consciousness and the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature," Environmental Ethics, vol.1 (1979), pp. 088-129; and L. B. Cebik, "Can Animals Have Rights? No and Yes," The Philosophical Forum, vol. 12 (1981),

pp. 251-68.2. See Bonnie Steinbock, "Speciesism and the Idea of Equality," Philosophy, vol 53 (1978), pp. 249-56. John Rawls suggestsan agency requirement for being "entitled to equal justice" in Sect 77, "The Basis of Equality," of A Theory of Justice (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1971).3. See Cora Diamond, "Eating Meat and Eating People," Philosophy, vol 53 (1978), pp. 465-79, and Leslie Francis and Richard

Norman, "Some Animals Are More Equal than Others," Philosophy, vol 53 (1978), pp. 501-21.4. P has an interest in x if and only if x affects (will affect, would affect) P's feelings of well-being. "Feelings of well-being"

refers to pleasure and pain, feeling fit and feeling ill, elation and depression, feelings of fulfillment and frustration, and the manyother feelings which contribute to or detract from the enjoyment of or satisfaction with life. In this paper, as throughout the animalrights literature, "animal" refers to all and only non-human beings with interests, which is almost certainly a more limited usethan the biological understanding of the term. See my "The Moral Significance of Interests," Environmental Ethics, vol. 4 (1982),pp. 345-58, and "Interests and Animals, Needs and Language," Ethics and Animals, vol 4 (1983), pp. 38-49.

5. The Right and the Good (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 48.6. Some philosophers claim

that infants and marginal people donot have morale rights; see, for example, H. L. A. Hart, "AreThere Any Natural Rights?," The Philosophical Review, vol 64 (1955), pp. 175-91. However, these philosophers would not agree

that infants and marginal people may be routinely sacrificed as resources for fulfilling the interests of normal humans. Consequently,viewed from the perspective of what animal rightists are seeking for animals, these philosophers are extending moral rights toinfants and marginal people; the difference here is merely terminological.7. That some animals occasionally threaten human interests cannot be used as an objection to regarding animals as too weak to

be considered under the requirements for moral rights and obligations among the equally powerful. Marginal case arguments areno more telling against animals than for them.

8. Foundations of theMetaphysics of Morals, tr. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 9.9. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 176.

10. See Chapters III and IV of Darwin's The Descent of Man and the ethological studies cited inMary Midgley's Beast and Man(Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1978).11. See Mary Midgley, Beast and Man, my "Are Animals Moral Beings?," American Philosophical Quarterly, vol 17 (1980),

pp. 45-52, Stephen R. L. Clark, The Nature of the Beast (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), and Lawrence E. Johnson,"Can Animals Be Moral Agents?," Ethics and Animals, vol 4 (1983), pp. 50-61.12. See, for example, R. G. Frey, Rights, Killing and Suffering (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), pp. 197-203.13. The only at all plausible response so far to these facts is the so-called "replacement argument:" slaughtered animals are replaced

by animals bred just for that purpose; so, slaughter does not cause a loss of happiness in the animal world. Since this argumenthas been adequately rebutted elsewhere, I shall not deal with it here. See my "On Being Morally Expendable," Ethics and Animalsvol. 3 (1982), pp. 58-72, and George P. Cave, "On the Irreplaceability of Animal Life," Evelyn B. Pluhar, "On Replaceability,"and James E. White, "Are Sentient Beings Replaceable?," all in Ethics and Animals, vol 3 (1982), pp. 91-117.14. See Chapter 1, "All Animals Are Equal," of his Animal Liberation (New York: Avon Books, 1975).15. Essays in Pragmatism, ed. A. Castell (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948), p. 73.

moral community and animal--sapontzis rights

Documents