Moral Constraints, Distributive Justice and

Equality in Context

A short, explanatory review of Nozick’s justifications of the existence of a minimal state

and general criticism on the functions and responsibilities of the state

Prepared by:

Mathias Royce, ID3915

Doctoral Candidate in Political Economy

Swiss Management Centre University

Zurich, Switzerland

Prepared for:

Prof. Kurt Leube,

Swiss Management Centre University

Zurich, Switzerland

May 29th, 2010

Abstract:

A detailed review of Anarchy, State and Utopia by Robert Nozick does not leave much room

for interpretation with regards to Nozick’s actual intention, which is to incorporate Kantian

logic to a higher degree in assessing the impacts of a number of shared moral codes amongst

humans and animals alike, and to an extent more fundamentally, to be in stark controversial

opposition and critique of Rawls’s political theory of organised redistribution endorsed by the

state. Nozick’s main tenet throughout his work was to uphold a principle that refutes

aformentioned redistribution as a responsibility of the state and by doing so he rallies

arguments for the minimalist state. Rawls’s earlier work A Theory of Justice, on which

Nozick takes the opportunity to respond through his work, should be seen as an interpretation

to propagate a rather social strain of liberalism and as such stands in direct continuation of

some of the most prevalent principles of Bentham, Mill and Keynes. Nozick in comparison

dismisses the equality of opportunity derived out of state-endorsed redistribution and bases

his logic on negative liberty – an individual’s liberty free from intrusion and intervention of

other individuals or entities, propagated through history by e.g.: Hobbes, Locke. With this

argumentation, Nozick defends and takes Hayekian neoliberal and libertarian tenets into

account, which focus precisely on negative liberties of individuals that are in stark contrast to

the artificially administered equality of opportunity of social-liberalism.

From Anarchy to the Ultraminimal State:

Nozick argues along Locke’s theory, which foresees the emergence of a state-like entity from

the state-of-nature due to the inherent characteristics of property which calls for protection

through means of a limited government that not only establishes but enforces the basic rights

and freedoms under the rule of law. The key point in Nozick’s argumentation lies in the

limitation of government. In his view, the emergence of a minimal state is precisely due to

such – I would go as far as saying natural requirements of property protection, which has

materialised from an initial state of anarchy. The minarchist view upheld by Nozick evolves

out of the principles of a Night Watchman State and in essence explains the unjust growth and

spread of state power beyond aforementioned limits of a minimalist state. Any manifestation

of state power above this minimalist threshold, so Nozick argues concisely, would then call

theoretically for a treaty, hence only a state that has received the full accordance of every

citizen that was entitled to select between alternatives forms of being governed, can be

considered as an authorised and compliant state in view of the endorsement of its citizenry.

This thought raises philosophical questions with regards to the emergence of political

governance and Nozick addresses these by means of digression, where he questions the

general criteria that are morally permissible for states arising out of anarchy, and in

particular, whether any state – and to this extent, what kind of state is better than none?

Nozick’s theory differentiates the minimal state from the ultraminimal state. The latter,

favoured and advocated by Nozick is free of any redistributive characteristics, in particular

the coerced redistribution to pay for the protection of others. As such, the characteristic of the

ultraminimal state features a protective association controlled through the state that claims a

monopoly on the use of force but does not protect everyone, apart from its subscribers. In

reviewing Nozick’s concepts, we understand that the state-of-nature knows two inherent

deficiencies: a) the seemingly endless feud, which is constructed out of different perceptions

of the gravity of the infringement viewed once from the perspective of the offender and once

from the perspective of the victim, and b) the apparent enforceability of natural rights of the

individual – albeit those are granted, the individual might lack capabilities defending those

when challenged. In logical succession, Nozick proposes the formation of a private

protection agency that resembles a special purpose alliance for the sole rationale of

defending each member’s protective interests, which would theoretically counteract these two

aforementioned deficiencies. Such private protection agencies thence are subject to natural

growth and logistical reasons would consequently limit their operational radius. Exerting

such contracted protective power thus would expand beyond the current form into a state

similar to a regional force – a regionally prevailing security agency. Nozick provides three

different ways of dealing with conflicts arising out of opposing verdicts of jurisdictional

systems of different regionally prevailing security agencies: a) war between conflicting

entities, b) recognition of opposing jurisdictional systems and c) the establishment of a

framework regulation that governs the exposure to such conflict situations with regards to

possible assistance of an arbitration board. The subsequent evolvement would be the

ultraminimalist state succeeded by the minimal state – both of which have been discussed

earlier.

Self-Ownership and Individual Rights: the Individual in the Minimal State:

In Nozick’s belief, the individual is self-owned and inherently inviolable. This is true to the

Kantian logic of individuals being rather ends than means. He furthermore argues that such

aforementioned individuals, as a matter of consequence, would be invested with rights to

themselves. Nozick’s assertion and defence of individual rights concerning property and

liberty extends on the use of fundamental tenets which were already established under Locke.

A night watchman state in the minimalist sense, so Nozick’s argument, protects its citizen

from aggression, violence, thievery and contractual infringements whilst concurrently

administers and regulates fair property transfers whilst safeguarding a non-interference policy

concerning the right of pursuing an individual’s own ends.

Distributive Justice:

Nozick bases his understanding of distributive justice around Hayekian thought, which in

essence outlines that it is impossible to know an adequate amount about an individual’s

situation to distribute justly to each individual in accordance to what his morals merit him to

receive. By saying this he refutes any impression of a deliberately chosen pattern of

distribution on society, regardless of its order of equality or of inequality. In a free society

distribution nevertheless would naturally occur as a matter of value rather than being based

upon an individual’s moral merit. Value here should as such be contrasted with society’s

perception of an individual’s actions that concern others. Under Nozick, redistribution in the

sense and context of a free-market economy is unjust and he explains in his Entitlement

Theory that redistribution is conditionally justified by means of consent. Not only are these

clear maxims which in significance are similar to Locke’s ideas of property emerging out of

the state of nature, but Nozick delivers an analogy that compares tax payments to the state

with forced labour, in order to illustrate precisely such missing consent. Upon closer

examination of Nozick’s arguments his obvious disdain for distributive justice becomes

apparent and as such he argues that distributive justice really means that society as a whole or

an entity would have means available for redistribution, while in reality redistributive

resources only appertain to individuals who possess the sole right to do with them as they

please – either holding on to their assets and resources or transferring them. It’s within the

last part of this argument where the linkage to Locke’s thought is the most striking. Under

Nozick only voluntary distributions are just – just in the sense that none of the parties have a

valid reason for complaint, since complaints are a sign of injustice. Consequently, voluntary

distributions that do not produce any reasons for complaint are thus considered to be just.

Utilitarianism:

Nozick, strongly in opposition of utilitarianism gave the undeniable and convincing

counterargument to its prevalent obsession with accrual of private pleasure. When all that

matters is the build up of the greatest probable quantity or sum of individual happiness (or

rather subjective states of happiness), individuals most certainly would feel the desire to be

everlastingly connected to what he calls “Experience Machines” – contraptions capable of

delivering illusionary experiences detached from their ordinary cause that individuals

indisputably would yearn to be subjected to. Nozick hence argues that viewing total

happiness as a solitary value is rather an absurd and simplistic view of setting aforementioned

utilitarianism in context, since any individual being alone in illusionary experience would

feel discomforted by the absence of additional things, individuals would ordinarily care

about. He highlights that in addition to the happiness that is derived by an individual through

perception of how an individual would feel about his life from an inside perspective,

additional matters individuals care about would need to be included, making happiness not

the only value under utilitarian constraints. Utilitarianism is commonly seen as having a

fortifying and supportive character with regards to the defences of welfare states. Bentham’s

utilitarian philosophy impacting Victorian England is only one, but perhaps the most striking

example. In conclusion of this, Nozick postulates that the limits of state action generally are

being framed by the rights of individuals and expounds the prevalent, inherent weakness of

utilitarianism in terms of conflicting interests between the inviolable rights of an individual

and the needs of society and how such individual rights can override the joint requirements of

society. It is thus the inviolable individual rights that influence and lastly determine the

various possibilities in which society engages in establishing and accomplishing its goals.

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Hayek, F. A. (1960). The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Rawls, J. B. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Barnett, R. E. (1977). Whither Anarchy? Has Robert Nozick Justified The State. In: Journal of Libertarian

Studies Vol.1, No.1, pp. 15 – 21

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March 23rd, 2002

Laski, H. J. (1920). Political Thought in England from Locke to Bentham. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston

Singer, P. (1976). Why Nozick Is Not So Easy To Refute. In. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 29, No.2 pp.

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