morality impact file free

8/8/2019 Morality Impact File Free

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Wake Policy Project 2006 1Morality Impact FileMust Act Morally -- General.........................................................................................................................................2

Must Act Morally Intervening Actors ........................................................................................................................3

Consequentialism Is bad................................................................................................................................................4

Consequentialism Is bad................................................................................................................................................5

Consequentialism Is Bad...............................................................................................................................................6

Moral Constraints Apply To Governments ...................................................................................................................7

Morality Cant Be Solved by Other Actors...................................................................................................................8

War is Immoral..............................................................................................................................................................9Moral Decision-Making Applies to Policy..................................................................................................................10

Utilitarianism Bad .......................................................................................................................................................13

AT: Callahan Rights Specific...................................................................................................................................14

AT: Callahan -- General ..............................................................................................................................................15

Categorical Rules Justified Even If One Can Imagine Exceptions..............................................................................16


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Wake Policy Project 2006 2Morality Impact File

Must Act Morally -- General

WE MUST ACT MORALLY, EVEN IF IT MEANS OUR OWN DEATH

Watson, philosophy professor, Washington University, WORLD HUNGR AND MORAL OBLIGATION, 1977, pp

118-9.

One may even have to sacrifice ones life or ones nation to be moral in situations where practical behavior

would preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead) patriot even

when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly, if one is to be moral,

one distributes available food in equal shares even if everyone dies. That an action is necessary to save ones

life is no excuse for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to be a patriot or moral. No

principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to save ones life or nation. There is a strict

analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake of being moral, and adhering to Christian

principles for the sake of being Christian. The moral world contains pits and lions, but one looks always to

the highest light. The ultimate test always harks back to the highest principle recant or die. The ultimate

test always harks back to the highest principle recant or die and it is pathetic to profess morality if one

quits when the going gets rough.


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Must Act Morally Intervening Actors

THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERVENING ACTORS MEANS WE ARENT MORALLY

CULPABLE FOR THE DA IMPACTS. JUST LIKE MARTIN LUTHER KING WASNT

RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RIOTS AND VIOLENCE OF THE WHITE

SUPREMACISTS, WE ARENT RESPONSBILE FOR INTERVENING ACTORS AND

THEIR NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES

Alan Gewirth, philosophy professor, Chicago, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS, 1994,

p. 38.

An example of this principle may help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin Luther King,

Jr. was repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally

responsible for the disorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking the American Republic to its

foundations. By the principle of the intervening action, however, it was Kings opponents who were

responsible because their intervention operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and injuries. King

might also have replied that the Republic would not be worth saving if the price that had to be paid was the

violation of the civil rights of black Americans. As for the rights of other Americans to peace and order, the

reply would be that these rights cannot justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks. It follows

from the principle of the intervening action that it is not the son but rather the terrorists who are morally aswell as causally responsible for the many deaths that do or may ensue on his refusal to torture his mother to

death. The important point is not that he lets these persons die rather than kills them, or that he does not

harm them but only fails to help them, or that he intends their deaths obliquely but not directly. The point is

rather that it is only through the intervening lethal actions of the terrorists that his refusal eventuates in many

deaths. Since the moral responsibility is not the sons, it does not affect his moral duty not to torture his

mother to death, so that her correlative right remains absolute.

Just like Martin Luther King wasnt responsible for the violence of white supremacists, we arent responsible

for negative consequences of intervening actors

Alan Gewirth, philosophy professor, Chicago, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS, 1994,

p. 38. (PDNSS1622)

An example of this principle may help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. Martin Luther King, Jr. was

repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally responsible for thedisorders, riots, and deaths that ensued and that were shaking the American Republic to its foundations. By the

principle of the intervening action, however, it was Kings opponents who were responsible because their

intervention operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and injuries. King might also have replied that the

Republic would not be worth saving if the price that had to be paid was the violation of the civil rights of black

Americans. As for the rights of other Americans to peace and order, the reply would be that these rights cannot

justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks. It follows from the principle of the intervening action that it

is not the son but rather the terrorists who are morally as well as causally responsible for the many deaths that do or

may ensue on his refusal to torture his mother to death. The important point is not that he lets these persons die

rather than kills them, or that he does not harm them but only fails to help them, or that he intends their deaths

obliquely but not directly. The point is rather that it is only through the intervening lethal actions of the terrorists tha

his refusal eventuates in many deaths. Since the moral responsibility is not the sons, it does not affect his moral

duty not to torture his mother to death, so that her correlative right remains absolute.


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Consequentialism Is bad

CONSEQUENTIALISM LEADS TO PARALYSIS ALL ACTION RISKS POSSIBLE

CATASTROPHE, SO NO ONE ACTS

Charles Fried, law professor, Harvard, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CRITICS, 1994, p. 170.

This line of analysis is enough to show that some quite plausible interpretations of absolute norms lead to

impossibly stringent conclusions, lead in fact to total paralysis. But the case is in fact even worse. For it the

absoluteness of the nor is interpreted to mean that the consequences such as the death of an innocent person

is overwhelmingly bad, then not only are we forbidden to do anything, for anything carries with it a risk of

death, we are indeed required to do nothing but to seek out ways to minimize the deaths of innocent persons.

For if such a death is so bad that no good can outweigh it, we are surely not justified in pursuing some good,

even if that good does not present this risk when we might instead be preventing this most undesirable of all

consequences. So this interpretation is to actually a prescription for paralysis, it is more like an obsession.

This norm, by virtue of this view of its absoluteness, takes over the whole of our moral life. Finally, since

every action will endanger the life of some innocent, even action intended to rescue some otherinnocent, we

cannot escape the further corollary of this interpretation that we must choose that course and only that course

of action expected to produce the greatest net saving of life including, if need be, the deliberate, cold-

blooded killing of an innocent person. This situation is worse still, for this interpretation is not only

obsessive, it also opens the possibility of insoluable contradictions within any system containing more than

one absolute norm. The judgement that it is categorically wrong to lie would be interpreted in an analogous

way to mean that a false belief is absolutely bad that is, so bad that nothing can justifiy producing or even

not eradicating it. But obviously, telling the truth will very often increase to some small extent the chances

that an innocent person will die, and in any event the time spent in eradicating false belief will not be spent in

warding off the danger of death from innocent persons. Now, deontological systems avoid the paralysis,

obsession, and contradiction of this interpretation. They are at once less and more stringent. They would not

allow killing an innocent even to save several innocents from death; but the consequentialist interpretation

would require the killing.

LACK OF CERTAINTY AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES MAKE

CONSEQUENTIALISM PRODUCE PARALYSIS

Germain Grisez, St. Marys College, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS, 1994, p. 49.

Artificial as the example is, it makes the crucial point that whenever we have a real choice to make it is

because we are confronted with various possibilities, each embodying a diverse mix of human goods.

Consequentialism of proportionalism requires that one weigh and measure the good as represented in the

various possibilities and opt for the instance promising more good. But each of the several possibilities

comprises not merely so much (on an imaginary scale) of a certain human good, but a unique package of

instances of various goods whose very uniqueness makes it impossible to measure it against other, similarly

unique packages competing to be chosen. Many proportionalists recognize the difficulty with their system

and have tried to correct it. However, it cannot be corrected. Their system requires that two incomparible

conditions be met: first, that a morally significant choice be made; second, that the option offering the grater

quantity of good be known. Their approach is not just false but utterly unworkable, and thus it is

meaningless as practical guidance.


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Consequentialism Is bad

IF CONSEQUENTIALISM VALUES LIFE, EACH ACTION MUST AVOID ANY RISK

OF KILLING INNOCENTS, PRODUCING PARALYSIS

Charles Fried, law professor, Harvard, ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CRITICS, 1994, p. 71.

For if the death of an innocent person really were that bad, then the norm would be no longer a limited, but a

pervasive one. What, for instance, if some action of mine carried a very slight risk of causing the death of an

innocent person? If the absoluteness of the norm is to be interpreted as making the fact of death so

overwhelmingly bad, it seems clear that I must not even take the slightest risk of killing an innocent person.

But really everything I do carries some risk that it will contribute to the death of an innocent person. Indeed,

we cannot even save the situation by limiting our calculations to the foreseeable consequences, for the limits

of the foreseeable are set by what we are obliged to look out for, if the consequence is as bad as all that, then

we must also hunt about to see if there is any conceivable way that we might inadvertently be facilitating it.

Of course there will always be some conceivable way, and that will be enough to stop us.

UTILITARIANISM SUBORDINATES JUSTICE IN THE NAME OF THE GENERAL

WELFARE.

David Lyons, PhD., Harvard, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW, 1984, p. 127.

Utilitarianism can be understood as a theory of justice in this sense, one that makes all moral appraisal

subordinate to the service of welfare. But we also use the idea of justice ot refer to a specific virtue of

actions, individuals, and institutions. In this narrow sense, justice is distinguished, for example, from mercy

and benevolence. Utilitarianism has no clear theory of justice in the narrow sense, and utilitarians have

generally neglected this aspect of morality. Some utilitarians have suggested that the specific virtue of

justice amounts to decisions made uniformly or according to rule. This is plausible when justice concerns the

application of rules to particular cases, but it does not seem an adequate conception of the justice of rules

themselves or of social institutions more generally.

CONCEDING TO CONSEQUENTIALISM THREATENS INDIVIDUALITY *&

INTEGRITY

Judith Lichtenberg, research associate, Center for Philosophy & Public Policy, University of Maryland, YALE

LAW JOURNAL, 1983, p. 546-7.

If I am normally required to produce the objectively best state of affairs available to me, my life will not be

my own. My own concerns and desires will be lost in the larger calculus of goods and bads, and the shape

and content of my life will be at the mercy of that calculus. Full-time do-goodism will be my inescapable

duty. This may seem not only unrealistic, but also wrong and misguided, for human beings will cease to be

agents who are sources of choice and value and become machines that churn out the good. As a result,

consequentialism seems to undermine our integrity as agents. Call this the idea behind the view that it is

not always wrong not to maximize the good the objection from integrity.

J.J.C Smart, philosophy professor, University of Adelaide, UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST, ed.,Knightbridge, 1973, p. 99

A feature of utilitarianism is that it cuts out a kind of consideration which for some others makes a difference

to what they feel about such cases: a consideration involving the idea, as we might first and very simply put

it, that each of us is specially responsible for what he does, rather than for what other people do. This is an

idea connected with the value of integrity. It is often suspected that utilitarianism, at least in its direct forms,

makes integrity as a value more or less unintelligible. I shall try to show this suspicion is correct.


6/16


Consequentialism Is Bad

UTILITARIANISM JUSTIFIES RAPE

David Lyons, philosophy professor, Harvard, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW, 1984, p. 121

Utilitarianism holds that the only values that are basically capable of supporting reasons for action are human

interests, and that all human interests do so. We have already seen an argument challenging this claim. This

is the argument that rape could not be justified, to whatever degree whatsoever, by the pleasure that it gives

the rapist. Many arguments of this type are possible.

UTILITARIANISM JUSTIFIES SLAVERY

David Lyons, philosophy professor, Harvard, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW, 1984, p. 122

Suppose, for example, that it would be more costly overall to eliminate slavery and at the same time meet the

needs of former slaveholders, such as Bernard, than it would to continue slavery. Utilitarianism must then

argue that it would be better to continue slavery; but the other course of action appears morally preferable. A

utilitarian might argue that slavery could not be supported by utilitarian calculations. He might claim that the

burdens imposed on slaves always outweigh the benefits realized by slavery. This is a plausible contention.

But a critic would reply that it is beside the point. Whether or not slavery creates more burdens for the

slaves, or creates more benefits than could be achieved by any alternative system, it is morally objectionable.

It subjugates some people to others control. It violates their rights.

NO WAY TO EVALUATE A MORAL ACTION BASED ON CONSEQUENCES

J.J.C Smart, philosophy professor, University of Adelaide, UTILITARIANISM FOR AND AGAINST, ed.,

Knightbridge, 1973, p. 82

No one can hold that everything, of whatever category, that has value, has it in virtue of its consequences. If

that were so, one would just go one for ever, and there would be an obviously hopeless regress. That regress

would be hopeless, even if one takes the view, which is not an absurd view, that although mean set

themselves ends and work towards them, it is very often not really the supposed end, but the effort towards

which they set the value that they travel, not really in order to arrive (for as soon as they have arrived they

set out for somewhere else), but rather they choose somewhere to arrive, in order to travel. Even on that

view, not everything would have consequential value; what would have non-consequential value would in

fact be traveling, even though people had to think of traveling as having the consequential value, and

something else the destination the non-consequential value.


7/16


Moral Constraints Apply To Governments

GOVERNMENTS STILL ACT WITH INTENT AND SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO

MORAL CONSTRAINTS

Thomas Donaldson, professor of business and ethics, ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1995, p. 147.

States may not be human individuals, but they often behave with foresight and must be accountable to certain

moral principles. Genocide and torture are not to be weighed up by states on the scale of future

consequences; rather, states simply must not engage in them. The moral language of deontology may not be

sufficient for the moral interpretation of international affairs, but it turns out to be necessary.

STATES STILL POSSESS AN INTENT THAT CAN BE MORALLY EVALUATED.

Thomas Donaldson, professor of business and ethics, ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1995, p. 149.

The state is not deprived of intentionality, as Hardin alleges, by the fact that various officials of a particular

state must typically reach different conclusions about what is rationally required. Like corporations and

judicial systems, states possess decision-making procedures designed to allow inferences abut the acts andintentions of the state itself fro the acts of individual members. When, for example, majorities of the duly-

elected members of both houses of the U.S. Congress approve aid to Poland for the purposes of developing

its economic infrastructure, and when the U.S. President concurs, then we may correctly infer that the United

States has acted intentionally in giving aid to Poland.


8/16


Morality Cant Be Solved by Other Actors

ONE MAY ARGUE THAT MORALITY CAN BE SOLVED BY OTHER ACTORS, BUT

THIS IN NO WAY AFFECTS THE MORAL OBIGATION OF THE OUR PLAN ACTOR

TO ACT

Aiken, philosophy professor, Catham College, WORLD HUNGER AND MORAL OBLIGATION, 1977, p. 53-4.

There is a danger in adopting this last resort condition since it poses and additional epistemological

difficulty, that is, the determination of whether or not I am the last resort. Beyond this, it is an undesirable

condition because it will justify inaction where more than one person couldact but where no one is acting. In

most emergency situations, there is more than one potential assistor. For instance, five persons may

simultaneously come across a drowning child. Each would be obligated to act as if (s)he were the last resort,

but no single one is the last resort, then all five may refuse to act, claiming that it is not their duty to act any

more than it is the duty of the other four and so each would be justified in not acting. If this condition is

placed on the right to be saved, the child could drown and none of the five spectators could be held morally

accountable. But surely the presence of another person at an accident site does not automatically relieve me

of a moral duty to assist the victim in need, any more than the presence of one police officer called to the

scene of a bank robbery relieves other officers in the area from attempting to apprehend the suspect.


9/16


War is Immoral

Just war language reinforces militarism

Sara Ruddick, Professor of Philosophy and Feminist Studies, New School for Social Research, GENDERING

WAR TALK, Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, eds., 1993, p.114-5. (MHSOLT1499)

These ideals, I suggest, are exemplified in just-war languages and the "realities" to which they refer. In Westernphilosophy, ideals of reason have sometimes been created in explicit connection with the ideals of war. As Plato put

the point boldly, an education in reason "must not be useless to warlike men [or women]"; rulers must prove

themselves "best in philosophy and with respect to war." Whatever the historical connections between reason and

war, contemporary war theorists, like other men of reason, resort to abstraction, binary oppositions, and sharply

bounded concepts.

Just war theory conceals and licenses violence

Sara Ruddick, Professor of Philosophy and Feminist Studies, New School for Social Research, GENDERING

WAR TALK, Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, eds., 1993, p.115-6. (MHSOLT1500)

Taken on its own terms, just-war theory is far more like its technostrategic counterpart than its moral concern would

suggest. Like their strategist counterparts, just-war theorists resort to abstraction, dichotomy, and bounded

definition. Like their counterparts, just-war theorists employ abstraction to take a distance from unreasonedemotionality. Partly because the language of just-war theory is less evidently sexual/aggressive itself, it is even more

able than strategic discourse to occlude the sexual aggressivity of war. The moral emotions just-war theorists do

invoke -- righteousness, indignation, and (perhaps) shame and guilt -- conceal as well as license the cruelty and

delight in destruction that war provides. Most seriously, like its technostrategic counterpart, the language of morality

too easily obscures the realities of terrorizing and injuring, the defining activities of war. To repeat: Just-war theory

does not deny, and indeed insists on, the pain of victims. But as one learns to speak within the theory, to unravel the

puzzles the theory sets for itself, to assess "causes" and strategies by criteria the theory establishes, it becomes

increasingly difficult to give weight to the varieties of loss and pain suffered by individual victims and conquerors,

their communities, and their lands.

Just war theories sanitize war

Sara Ruddick, Professor of Philosophy and Feminist Studies, New School for Social Research, GENDERINGWAR TALK, Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, eds., 1993, p.115. (MHSOLT1501)

Superficially, the languages of justice and strategy seem quite unlike. just-war theorists do not deny war's sufferings

if war weren't so damaging, one would not require a moral theory first to justify and then to control the damage.

Unlike technostrategists who explicitly eschew moral questions, just-war theorists insist upon the interdependence

of ethics and politics, thereby providing the moral (soft and feminine) counterpart to realistic (hard and masculine)

instrumentality. Yet despite these differences, the justificatory languages of morality and strategy are intertwined.

The success of just warriors is dependent on the strategies that defense intellectuals legitimate. just conduct of a war

(jus in bello) depends upon the "smartness" and "cleanliness" of weapons, who acquire these virtues within the

strategic discourse that brackets pain and suffering as "collateral damage." To be sure, there is a frightening

disconnection between morality and strategy: might does not make right, but it does make victories. The capacity to

defeat and demoralize depends far more upon economic and technological than on moral resources. But the high

moral tone and abstract moral puzzles of just-war theory tend to divert attention from this fundamental, often

heartbreaking indifference of war to virtue.


10/16


Moral Decision-Making Applies to Policy

Should consider morality in strategic policy information

Robert S. McNamara, Former Secretary of Defense, Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in

the Post-Cold War World, eds. Baylis and O'Neill, 2000, p. 169 (MHHAR0772)

I would argue also that Kissinger and Sandel's emphasis on balance-of-power politics in the twenty-first century

assumes we will be willing to continue to accept a foreign policy which lacks a strong moral foundation. I am aware

that the majority of political scientists, particularly those who are members of the political realist school, believe

morality - as contrasted with a careful calculation of national interests, based on balance-of-power considerations - is

a dangerous guide for the establishment of foreign policy. They would say that a foreign policy driven by moral

considerations promotes zealousness and a crusading spirit, with potentially dangerous results. But surely, in the

most basic sense, one can apply a moral judgment to the level of killing which occurred in the twentieth century.

There can be no justification for it. Nor can there be any justification for its continuation into the twenty-first

century. On moral grounds alone, we should act today to prevent such an outcome. A first step would be to

establish such an objective as the primary foreign-policy goal both for our own nation and for the entire human race.

Morality has often been a part of US foreign policy


the Post-Cold War World, eds. Baylis and O'Neill, 2000, p. 169-70 (MHHAR0773)

The United States has defined itself in highly idealistic and moral terms throughout our history. We have seen

ourselves as defenders of the human freedoms across the globe. That feeling was the foundation of Woodrow

Wilson's support for normative rules of international behavior to be administered by a League of Nations. Our

moral vision has had an impact on the world. It has led to the formation of a score of international institutions in the

economic, social, and political fields. But it remains under attack both within and outside the USA - by those who

put greater weight on considerations of some narrow national interest.


11/16


Morality Applies in Foreign Policy

Leaders arent exempt from moral considerations in foreign policy

Joseph Nye, Director, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard, NUCLEAR ETHICS, 1986, p.8.

(MHSOLT0076)

In their personal lives, most people feel strongly bound by the sixth commandment: "Thou shalt not kill." Butpresidents may have to take decisions that violate that rule if they are to protect their own people in wartime. The

fact that international politics is a difficult domain for ethics means that one must be cautious about too simple a

transposition of moral maxims from relations among individuals to the domain of states. But being president does

not release the statesman from the duty of moral reasoning; it merely complicates his or her task. One must examine

the arguments leaders give for claiming there is no choice or for why they think normal moral rules that we use in

daily life should not be applied in particular cases. The burden of proof rests on those who wish to depart from

normal morality. While that burden may often be met, the quality of their argument and conclusions deserves close

examination. Some arguments for disregarding normal moral rules are fallacious.

Critics of morality in foreign policy covertly employ moral standards

Joseph Nye, Director, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard, NUCLEAR ETHICS, 1986, p.7.(MHSOLT0077)

Considering the nature of the international milieu, it is not surprising many diplomats and serious students of

international politics have tended to be cautious about the role of ethics in foreign policy and have warned about the

possible disastrous consequences of well-intentioned moral crusades in such a difficult domain. But there is a

difference between healthy realism and total skepticism. It does not follow from the difficulty of applying ethical

considerations that they have no role at all. The total skeptic who argues that there is no role for ethics in

international politics tends to smuggle his preferred values into foreign policy, often in the form of narrow

nationalism. When faced with moral choices, to pretend not to choose is merely a disguised form of choice.

Accepting moral concerns in foreign policy make intervention less necessary

Robert Kagan and William Kristol, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and editor ofThe Weekly Standard, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Spring 2000, p.62. (MHSOLT0477)

It is worth pointing out, though, that a foreign policy premised on American hegemony, and, on the blending of

principle with material interest, may in fact mean fewer overseas interventions than under the "vital interest"

standard, not more. Had the Bush administration, for example, realized early on that there was no clear distinction

between American moral concerns in Bosnia and America's national interest there, the United States might have

been able to nip the Balkan crisis in the bud. With the enormous credibility earned in the Gulf War, President Bush

might have been able to put a stop to Milosevic's ambitions with a well-timed threat of punishing military action.

But because the Bush team placed Bosnia outside the sphere of "vital" American interests, the resulting crisis

eventually required the deployment of thousands of troops on the ground.

Morality has often been a part of US foreign policyRobert S. McNamara, Former Secretary of Defense, Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in

the Post-Cold War World, eds. Baylis and O'Neill, 2000, p. 169-70 (MHHAR0773)The United States has defined itself in highly idealistic and moral terms throughout our history. We have seen

ourselves as defenders of the human freedoms across the globe. That feeling was the foundation of Woodrow

Wilson's support for normative rules of international behavior to be administered by a League of Nations. Our

moral vision has had an impact on the world. It has led to the formation of a score of international institutions in the

economic, social, and political fields. But it remains under attack both within and outside the USA - by those who

put greater weight on considerations of some narrow national interest.


12/16


Morality Applies in Foreign Policy

Many US foreign policies are based on moral judgments


the Post-Cold War World, eds. Baylis and O'Neill, 2000, p. 170 (MHHAR0774)

Many of the most controversial foreign-policy debates have found both sides basing their arguments on moralconsiderations. US policy towards Cuba today is justified on moral grounds by its supporters who say it is immoral

to support dictators who abuse human rights. And it is attacked, on moral grounds, by its critics who say it leads to

suffering by the mass of the Cuban people. Similarly, a US policy toward China which placed primary emphasis on

support of individual civil rights might well weaken the Chinese government's ability to increase the access of the

mass of its population to advances in nutrition, education, and health.

Leaders arent exempt from moral considerations in foreign policy

Joseph Nye, Director, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard, NUCLEAR ETHICS, 1986, p.8.

(MHSOLT0076)

In their personal lives, most people feel strongly bound by the sixth commandment: "Thou shalt not kill." But

presidents may have to take decisions that violate that rule if they are to protect their own people in wartime. Thefact that international politics is a difficult domain for ethics means that one must be cautious about too simple a

transposition of moral maxims from relations among individuals to the domain of states. But being president does

not release the statesman from the duty of moral reasoning; it merely complicates his or her task. One must examine

the arguments leaders give for claiming there is no choice or for why they think normal moral rules that we use in

daily life should not be applied in particular cases. The burden of proof rests on those who wish to depart from

normal morality. While that burden may often be met, the quality of their argument and conclusions deserves close

examination. Some arguments for disregarding normal moral rules are fallacious.


13/16


Utilitarianism Bad

Utilitarianism allows totalitarianism and war

Kateb, 1992 (George, Prof of Politics, Princeton Univ., The Inner Ocean: individualism and Democratic Culture;

Cornell University Press, p.11) (PDCL1162)

I do not mean to take seriously the idea that utilitarianism is a satisfactory replacement for the theory of rights. The

well-being (or mere preferences) of the majority cannot override the rightful claims of individuals. In a time whenthe theory of rights is global it is noteworthy that some moral philosophers disparage the theory of rights. The

political experience of this century should be enough to make them hesitate: it is not clear that, say, some version of

utilitarianism could not justify totalitarian evil. It also could be fairly easy for some utilitarians to justify any war

and any dictatorship, and very easy to justify any kind of ruthlessness even in societies that pay some attention to

rights. There is no end to the immoral permissions that one or another type of utilitarianism grants. Everything is

permitted, if the calculation is right.

Utilitarianism justifies the tyranny of the majority

Maximiano, Associate Professor of business ethics DLSU School of Business, 03 (Jose Mario Maximiano, Nov 6,

Business World, The View from Taft,) (PDCL1163)

According to the utilitarian principle, the correct action, decision or judgment is the one that will produce thegreatest net benefits at the lowest net costs for the greatest number of people. Sad to say, this principle has no eyes

to see and no brains to know who are those who have less in life, and those who are disadvantaged and less gifted.

Like a horse with blinders, utilitarianism automatically focuses on the majority, regardless of socio-economic status.

In the application of the utilitarian principle, therefore, it is possible that those who have more in life would benefit

more, while those with less would benefit less. The utilitarian principle seems inadequate when applied to situations

that involve the basic rights of others. Was the government ethically correct in demolishing some shanties to pave

the way for the beautification project specifically for a visiting leader? Similarly, was the government ethically

correct to drive away some indigenous tribes to give way for the construction of a dam? While some would see

beautification, greening, cleaning and the construction of the dam as benefits, others may see the same as unjust and

unfair, and hence as costs, because those projects may at times violate the basic rights of others.

Utilitarianism justifies doing evil in the name of preventing evil, causing war and violence

Richard Norman, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Kentucky, ETHICS, KILLING, AND WAR, 1995,

p. 207 (PDCL1164)

Since the waging of war almost invariably involves the deliberate taking of life on a massive scale, it will be

immensely difficult to justify. I have argued that utilitarian justifications are not good enough. We cannot justify the

taking of life simply by saying that the refusal to take life is likely to lead to worse consequences. An adequate

notion of moral responsibility implies that other people's responsibility for evil does not necessarily justify us is

doing evil ourselves in order to prevent them. We cannot sacrifice some of our people for the others and claim that

we are justified by a utilitarian calculus of lives.


14/16


AT: Callahan Rights Specific

Rights must come first or they will always be violated in the name of security

Kateb, Professor of Politic Princeton University, 92 (George, The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic

Culture; Cornell University Press, p. 5) (PDCL1165)

All I wish to say now is that unless rights come first they are not rights. They will tend to be sacrificed to some

purpose deemed higher than the equal dignity of every individual. There will be little if any concept of the integrity

or inviolability of each individual. The group or the majority or the good or the sacred or the vague fixture will be

preferred. The beneficiaries will be victimized along with the victims because no one is being treated as a person

who is irreplaceable and beyond value. To make rights anything but primary, even though in the name of human

dignity, is to injure human dignity.

Protection of rights over all else creates a quality to life which promotes community development sustaining

human survival; making survival the ultimate goal promotes and unsustainable authoritarian society

Schroeder, Professor of Law, Duke University, 86 (Christopher H. Schroeder, RIGHTS AGAINST RISKS,

APRIL, The Columbia Law Review, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 495, p. 519-20) (PDCL1166)

Actually, expanding the idea of preservation to include bodily integrity on the basis of quality of life considerations

has already pointed the way to a more realistic statement of those individual characteristics worth protecting. The

same considerations of quality of life counsel recognizing some freedom of action and initiative within the definition

of the morally relevant aspects of the individual. Doing so is consistent with a long political and philosophical

heritage. Deeply ingrained in practically all theories of the rights tradition is the vision of a person as capable of

forming and entitled to pursue some individual life plan. 91 Given this vision, placing survival or bodily integrity

absolutely above all other ends would be tantamount to saying that the life plan that one ought to adopt is that of

prolonging life at all costs. That idea is unacceptably authoritarian and regimented. It would be extremely

anomalous for a theory supposedly centered on the autonomy of the individual to result in a conception of justice

that constrained all individuals to a monolithic result. Individual human beings want more from their lives than

simple bodily integrity, and the conception of an individual, of what defines and constitutes a person, as so limited is

peculiarly impoverished. Individuals are capable of formulating and pursuing life plans, of forming bonds of love,

commitment, and friendship on which they subsequently act, of conceiving images of self- and community-improvement. Some of these may directly advance interests in human survival, as when dedicated doctors and

scientists pursue solutions to cancer or develop chemical pesticides with a view to assisting agricultural self-

sufficiency in developing countries. Some may dramatically advance the "quality of life," rather than survival itself,

as when Guttenberg's press made literature more widely available or when Henry Ford pioneered the mass

production of the automobile. However, even individual initiatives of much less demonstrable impact on the lives of

others constitute a vital element that makes human life distinctively human. A just society ought to understand and

value this element both in the concrete results it sometimes produces and in the freedom and integrity that are

acknowledged when individual liberty to conceive and act upon initiative is respected.


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AT: Callahan -- General

Survival is not a value in itself- people take risks all the time we must uphold rights otherwise there would be

policy paralysis

Henry Shue, Professor of Ethics and Public Life, Princeton University, 1989 (Nuclear Deterrence and Moral

Restraint, pg. 45-6) (PDCL1167)

When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that we face difficult

tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that value and little else. Survival is a

necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient. Logical priority does not

make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they

would never enter an automobile. We can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the

paralyzing status of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid

paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both

prudential and moral reasoning.

Utilitarian justifications for embryonic stem cell research endorse commodification of humans

Robert D. Orr, MD, Director of Ethics, Fletcher Allen Health Care at the University of Vermont College of

Medicine, Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics, Fall, 2001, 2 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 189, p. 195(PDOCSS218)

Moreover, the Nuremberg tribunal, guided by the overarching principle that human beings are never to be treated as

a means to an end, but must always be ends in themselves, soundly rejected the above arguments. It is sad and ironic

that as the generation that bequeathed to us the Nuremberg Code is passing, we are discarding the wisdom it gained

at such a high price. Using identical utilitarian and pragmatic reasoning, contemporary politicians, scientists, and the

public at large are endorsing the commodification and destruction of members of our human family.

Utilitarian justifications for embryonic stem cell research endorse commodification of humansRobert D. Orr, MD, Director of Ethics, Fletcher Allen Health Care at the University of Vermont College of

Medicine, Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics, Fall, 2001, 2 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 189, p. 195

(PDOCSS218)

Moreover, the Nuremberg tribunal, guided by the overarching principle that human beings are never to be treated as

a means to an end, but must always be ends in themselves, soundly rejected the above arguments. It is sad and ironic

that as the generation that bequeathed to us the Nuremberg Code is passing, we are discarding the wisdom it gained

at such a high price. Using identical utilitarian and pragmatic reasoning, contemporary politicians, scientists, and the

public at large are endorsing the commodification and destruction of members of our human family.


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Categorical Rules Justified Even If One Can Imagine Exceptions

Categorical rules still justified even if there are circumstances where they could be violatedMarkTushnet, Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Wisconsin Law Review,

2003, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 273, p. 282 (HARVCL3470)

Categorical approaches are designed to offset this tendency by screening out of consideration the features of thecircumstances that are likely to induce misjudgment. And, under some conditions, they may succeed in doing so,

when the categorical rules address decision-makers who might not appreciate the importance of considerations

thought to be peripheral to their more central tasks. Consider, for example, a categorical rule against torture by

police officers. Judges might think that in the abstract they can imagine situations in which torture might be a

valuable investigative technique. Judges might think that they must communicate rules effectively to police officers.

They might also think that any verbal formulation of the (limited) circumstances in which torture might be

acceptable is too likely to be misinterpreted in ways that would lead the officers to engage in torture more often than

they should. The judges could then conclude that they should announce a categorical rule against torture despite

their awareness that such a rule does not correspond to their own sense of what is acceptable.

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