MORALITY WITHIN THE LIFE­

AND SOCIAL WORLD

ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA

THE YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

VOLUME XXII

Editor-in-Chief

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning Belmont, Massachusetts

SEQUEL TO VOLUME XV

Foundations of Morality, Human Rights,

and the Human Sciences

AND TO VOLUME XX

The Moral Sense in the Communal

Significance of Life

MORALITY WITHIN THE LIFE­

AND SOCIAL WORLD Interdisciplinary Phenomenology of the Authentic

Life in the "Moral Sense"

Edited by

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

The World Phenomenology Institute

Published under the auspices of The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning

A-T. Tymieniecka, President

D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY

A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER ACADEMICPUBUSHERSGROUP

DORDRECHT/BOSTON/LANCASTER/TOKYO

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Morality within the life- and social world interdisciplinary phe­nomenology of the authentic life in the "moral sense" / edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.

p. cm. -- (Analecta Husserliana ; v. 22) Papers of the 15th International Phenomenology Congress, held by the

World Phenomenology Institute, June 21-28,1985, in Frankfurt, Germany. "Published under the auspices of the World Institute for Advanced

Phenomenological Research and Learning." Includes index.

1. Ethic~ongresses. 2. Phenomenology--Congresses. I. Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. II. International Phenomenology Congress (15th : 1985 : Frankfurt am Main, Germany) III. World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning. VI. Series. B3279.H94A129 vol. 22 [BJ19j 142'.7 s-<ic 19 [171' .2] 87-22745

ISBN-13: 978-94-010-8179-5 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-3773-4 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-3773-4

Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland.

Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers,

101 Philip Drive, Assinippi Park, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A.

In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group,

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All Rights Reserved © 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company,

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 18t edition 1987 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or

utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner

T ABLE OF CONTENTS

THE THEME / Morality and the Life-World or the "Moral Sense" within the World of Life ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xv

PART I

PRIMOGENITAL MEANING-BESTOWING IN THE

MAKING OF THE SPECIFICALLY HUMAN

LIFE-WORLD AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY

OF THE "MORAL SENSE"

CL YDE PAX / The "Moral Point of View" in Tymieniecka's The Moral Sense 3

MARY ROSE BARRAL / Some Truths about Morality 15 A VELIN A CECILIA / The Axiological Dimension of the

Human Being (Concerning the Moral Sense in the Thought of A-T. Tymieniecka) 23

ALGIS MICKUNAS / The Vital Connection 35 KLAUS WIEGERLING / Value-Acquiring (Wertnehmung) and

Meaning-Bestowal (Sinnzueignung) 55

PART II

QUESTIONS OF APPROACH REVISITED:

METHODOLOGIES, RATIONALITY, THEORY

KARL-ERNST BUHLER / Rationalitat, Perspektive und Regel-bezug: Vorarbeiten zu einer intentionalen Psychopathologie 71

LOTHAR ELEY / Konstruktiv-phanomenologische Erorterung der Voraussetzungen einer kiinstlichen Intelligenzforschung 113

ANNIBALE SALSA / The "Life-World" as a Moral Problem in Merleau-Ponty 131

v

VI T ABLE OF CONTENTS

MARIO SAN CIPRIANO / Experiences de methodologie phCn-omenologique: L'historiographie 139

PETER EISENHARDT / The Presuppositions of Meaning­Bestowing (Sinngebung) in the Life- World: Existence versus Theory 153

EDWARD VACEK, S. J. / Scheler's Evolving Methodologies 165

PART III

FACTORS OF MORALITY EMERGENT WITHIN

THE LIFE-WORLD CONTEXT

JORGE GARCfA-G6MEZ / Moral Responsibility and Practice in the Life-World 187

GODWIN SOGOLO / On the Autonomy ofthe Moral Agent 215 JOHN M. MICHELSEN / Kierkegaard on Choosing Oneself

and the Ground of the "Moral Sense" 227 HEIMO HOFMEISTER / Conscience and Moral Responsibility 239 HSUEH-LJ CHENG / Zen Morality within This World 245 C L Y D EPA X / Society, Time, and Religious Imagination 259 MARTIN HIELSCHER / Morality and Corporeality 273 LUDWIG GRUNBERG / The "Life-World" and the Axiological

Approach in Ethics 287

PART IV

DIMENSIONS OF MORAL

EXPERIENCE-WITH-THE-OTHER

DALLAS LASKEY / Empathy and the Moral Point of View 299 WOLFGANG SCHIRMACHER / The Faces of Compassion:

Toward a Post-Metaphysical Ethics 313 JOHN R. SCUDDER, JR. / The Moral Sense of Education in

William James' Philosophy 327

PART V

INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND THE MODALITIES

OF MORAL COMMUNICATION

HIROSHI KOJIMA / The Phenomenology of the Thou 337

TABLE OF CONTENTS vii

CESAR A. MORENO MARQUEZ I The Curvature of Inter­subjective Space: Sociality and Responsibility in the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas 343

CHAN WING-CHEUK I Phenomenology and Communicative Ethics 353

WOLFGANG JACOB I Art and Creativity in the Encounter between the Healthy and the III Person - The Moral Sense of Being III 365

HUBERTUS TELLENBACH I The Phenomenology of States of Health and Its Consequences for the Physician 371

PART VI

TRUTH, NORMS, FREEDOM

ANGELA ALES BELLO I What Is Truth According to Husserl's Life-World 385

KAL Y ANKUMAR BAGCHI I What Is Truth? 389 FRAN<;:OIS LARUELLE I La verite selon Hermes 397 ASSEN IGNATOW I Norm and Facticity: Some Remarks on a

Paradox of the Concept of the Life-World 403 WOLFGANG BLANKENBURG I The Dialectics of "Freedom"

and "Unfreedom" in the Psychiatric View 409 PIERRE C. FRUCHON I Truth According to Eric Weil's Logic

of Philosophy 425 ILJA MASO I Truth, Freedom, Art and the Task of the Social

Sciences 435 CL YDE PAX I Truth in Religious Experience 443 LOUIS DUPRE I The 'Truth" of Religion 457 ALEXANDRU BOBOC I Norm and Value in the Horizon of

the "Life-World" 465

PART VII

CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING THE

TECHNOLOGICAL MEANINGFULNESS OF THE

HUMAN WORLD

RAFAEL CAPURRO I Technics, Ethics, and the Question of Phenomenology 475

viii TABLE OF CONTENTS

REINHARD MARGREITER I Nietzsches Thematisierung der Lebenswelt 483

MARY ROSE BARRAL I The Good in a Technological Society 497

CLOSURE

IN RETROSPECT: EDMUND

HUSSERL'S MORAL IDEAL FOR MANKIND

AURELIO RIZZACASA I Life-World, History, and Ethics in a Husserlian Perspective 509

ELFRIEDE WALESCA TIELSCH / The Evolution of Human Wisdom and Its Role in the Moral Education of Future Mankind 519

EFRAIM SHMUELI I The Universal Message of Husserl's Ethics: An Explication of Some Ethical Premises in Transcendental Phenomenology 551

ANNEX 571

INDEX OF NAMES 579

THE THEME

MORALITY AND THE LIFE-WORLD OR THE

"MORAL SENSE" WITHIN THE WORLD OF LIFE

In our investigations of morality we have recurrently stressed its paradoxical situation. Every human group has moral principles by which it sets its rules and forms its attitudes, principles which it holds to be universally valid. Yet not only do laws differ from one code to another, but those laws and understandings which are meant to safe­guard the individual so that he may on an equal footing with others forward his own aspirations while serving the common cause are either ignored or subverted. This paradox is particularly striking in Occidental cultures where ever more precise systems of societal regulation seek to establish in the midst of the increasing interdependence of individuals on each other guarantees of each individual's conscience, interests, privacy, and opportunity to pursue happiness. Yet even here the balance theoretically established between the individual's rights and obligations continues to be jeopardized in practice.

Today, just as at the origins of our culture in ancient Greece, our attention is focused on the nature, origin, and significance of moral principles and societal norms. We expect, naturally, to find in the philosophical elucidation of these questions enlightenment for the practice of life. But a question which has divided Western culture throughout its history remains controverted - more than ever, namely, that of where moral principles, norms, and laws find their legitimiza­tion. Is it in the highest principles of metaphysical reality as Plato taught, or, on the contrary, in the actual nature of societal life as Aristotle taught? Or, following the religious lawgivers, should we see them as proceeding from life-transcendent divine laws given to human­ity? Or, lastly, should we fall in with modem naturalism which sees in them refinements of the survival mechanisms of animal nature?

There is a thread to be picked up, however, which runs through all approaches, that of the interrelations between human beings in their complete endowment. We have followed this thread in our previous investigations. We have unravelled how the entire specifically human person unfolds as such in her moral directedness towards an Other, and shown that this directedness is spurred by the benevolent sentiment

IX

x THE THEME

unique to the human being, the exercise of which makes her human, and is infused with the specific significance of the "moral sense" that the benevolent sentiment bears. We have emphasized further that the linkages which found social life reside in the reciprocal "transaction" which takes place in the exercise of the benevolent sentiment.

Now we propose to look into the issues which underlie the theories of social behavior and the practice of morality. That means inquiry into the entire network of human life in its freedom and constraint and as it is concretely governed and implemented in the field which all of the members of a societal group constitute. This is essentially the entire life-world which phenomenology has uncovered. We enter the arena where the individual's struggle takes place but where through this struggle that life also originates and unfolds.

Phenomenology has provided us with the manifold conception of the life-world. The conception has been adopted not only be numerous philosophers but has exercised a stimulating influence beyond the confines of philosophy, especially in sociology. Yet in each case it has to be seen what is meant by it. As is well known, Husserl himself proposed at least four perspectives within which the life-world as the ground of human experience and genesis is to be seen. Essentially his conception is related to his quest for a certain, apodictic, cognition and to the so-called phenomenological reductions which have the aim of gaining access to it. In the main, the conception of the life-world was in Husserl always coupled with his pursuit of the ways in which the constitutive function of the transcendental subjectivity unfolds; the life­world, whether it is the "world of perception," or the "world of immediate experience," or the level of "mundane" ontology, or the world of the ultimate ground below any constitutive stratum, the ground where transcendental subjectivity exercises its primogenital operations, can be apprehended only through a suspension of our preconceptions, beliefs, scientific theories, cultural biases, etc., and most of all, of the so-called "natural attitude." It appears that it is over this suspension and over the life-world's ties to transcendental subjec­tivity that the various interpretations of the concept of the "life-world" held by philosophers and thinkers in the human sciences diverge.

THE LIFE-WORLD OF EVERYDA Y LIFE

Alfred Schutz seems to have in his sociology brought the various

THE THEME xi

intuitions of the life-world to their furthest conclusion. Striking the nail on the head, he sees the life-world as the field of societal life. His emphasis is on the societal network of interaction among human individuals, not on subjectivity with its specter of the isolated self - on the "interactive we-relationship" that characterizes basic "face-to-face" process-like situations. Although Schlitz is also concerned with the basic meaningfulness of the human universe and in distinguishing several "provinces of meaning" stresses their ontological equality, he singles out one of them, the "finite province of meaning of everyday­life," as the "paramount reality." The province of meaning of everyday­life is in essence constituted by the "world of work." This is seen as the reality "natural" to the human being, that of inter- and intra-action with others, fluctuating, disruptive, and unpredictable, the full concreteness in which human life is played. The life-world is seen here without any suspension of the natural attitude; to the contrary, for Schlitz natural faith in the reality of the life-world and acceptance of it are essential for the progress of the living individual.

Where in the Husserlian perspective the focus is on the tie between transcendental subjectivity and the life-world, on their conjunction, for Schutz the life-world subsists in the concreteness of everyday existence. That concreteness is found in the we-relationship which he places at center stage thus leaving aside questions of subjectivity and the difficult Husserlian problems of intersubjectivity.

Yet Alfred Schutz was perfectly aware of the insufficiency of his position. We may, indeed, give descriptions of the ways in which human beings interact within the social network, we may even detect invariant knots of interactive conflicts, solutions, etc., within the flux of life. But in order to find the reasons, principles, norms, and invariant structures upon which these are ultimately suspended - to find, at last, the foundational "truths" to which they refer - we have, as Schutz himself points out, to elaborate an "ontology of the lifeworld." We may attempt to avoid the traps of the circularity of Husserlian transcendental consciousness, but we must still seek these ultimate foundations, a quest whose fruits are to be put directly at the service of a simultaneous elaboration of a "phenomenological anthropology." Once the barrier of subjectivity has been pulled down, it is clear that this task has to proceed from premises other than those of Edmund Husserl.

XlI THE THEME

THE WORLD OF LIFE

It is true that after the suspensions are performed Husser~ expects to find a field of primogenital life-world structures which the transcen­dental constitution then unfolds. This field he calls "mundane phe­nomenology" which he sees as the ontology of the life-world; it takes in on the one hand the basic intentionalities of transcendental conscious­ness, and on the other the revelation of the potentialities of the structural intertwining of the prospective unfolding genesis of world­consciousness. Thus "mundane phenomenology" proves to be poles apart from the "everyday world" which in the "natural attitude" we take for granted. To adhere to that attitude means to give up the search for answers to foundational questions. But how can we bypass the pitfalls of the reductions, validate the concreteness of life's interaction, and reach its foundations?

In my previously published investigations I proposed the conception of "human transaction" as a point for orientation, as the key to disentangling the intricacies of societal life. Simultaneously being a relation of reciprocal attitudes - intentional, empirical, and moral -that comprise the various functional circuits of subjectivity, and being the practical enactment of subjectivity's transactional objective schema, human transaction is the essential linkage within the intra-subjective network of the societal as well as the natural life-world. Extending through the complete ladder of human functioning, involving its organic, vital, sentient, psychic, intentional, and spiritual circuits, it brings the hitherto disconnected realms of the organic, societal, and cultural life-world together opening them for fresh, unobstructed investigation. Most significantly, however, human interaction reveals the essentially moral significance of the "we-relationship" in all types of inter-action. Thus, observation of it shows us first, that the principles and norms of the moral codes which man establishes to govern his societal life have their source within the we-relations of the concrete human dealings which make up the sphere of the societal and life­world. Secondly, and most significantly, observation of human inter­action shows that societal ties in their recurrent forms not only express the ways in which the human being exercises his moral sense through the modalities and the enactment of we-relationships, but that these ties refer for their principles and norms, not to a priori ontological structures of a life-world per se and of transcendental consciousness in

THE THEME Xlll

its constitutive powers, but to the entire field in which the great game of human life in its constructive powers is being pre-delineated. Here is the Human Condition as the depository of the virtualities of life which contain in their inter motivations the prerequisites for the unfolding of the human being in all the circuits of his functioning as well as the prerequisites of his world of life, natural, societal, cultural.

The shift in attention away from subjectivity and towards the intra­subjectivity of human transaction calls for a new envisaging of the life­world. Only now is it open for study as the world of the whole of life. This vindication of the priority of LIFE over the world is also the vindication of the strategic locus where the crucibles of human life await being put into action: the Human Condition.

With this reversal in priorities, new ground is broken for phe­nomenological inquiry, a new beacon is provided it. Its Husserlian intuitions and the wealth of its observations may now be capped with applications in the world of life.

A-T. T.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This tightly interconnected collection of essays comes from the pro­gram of the XVth International Phenomenology Congress held by The World Phenomenology Institute and its three incorporated international societies June 21-28, 1985, in Frankfurt, Germany.

Our warm thanks go to Professor Wolfgang Schirmacher for his help in the local organization of the conference. We owe gratitude to the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, represented by its Vice-President Othmar Spann, for its hospitality and reception. Mrs Maria Marchel of the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University deserves our particular thanks for her most helpful cooperation in organizing and her day-to-day care seeing to the accomplishment of practical matters during the congress.

And last, but not least, I want to thank Dr Peter Eisenhardt for his precious assistance.

On bringing this volume into production I want to thank also Mr Robert Wise, my editorial assistant, who deserves appreciation for his painstaking efforts in copy-editing this volume.

A-T. T.

xv