motion for reconsideration: live coverage of the am

7/30/2019 Motion for Reconsideration: Live Coverage of the Am

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

IN RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND

TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE

MULTIPLE MURDER CASES

AGAINST MAGUINDANAO

GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET.

AL. ,

x-----------------------------------------------------------x

LETTER OF HIS EXCELLENCY

BENIGNO C. AQUINO III,

PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES,

DATED 22 NOVEMBER 2010

A.M. No.10-11-5-SC

A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC

X----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Petitioners, through undersigned counsel, respectfully allege:

1.0 On 21 November 2012, undersigned counsel received a Notice from the Clerk of

Court En Banc, signed by Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court, notifying the undersigned that the

Honorable Court issued a Resolution dated 23 October 2012, the dispositive portion of which

states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

1. DENY the Partial Motion for Reconsideration datedJune 29, 2011 of petitioners Editha Mirandilla andGlenna Logarta;


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2. PARTIALLY GRANT the Motion for Reconsiderationdated June 27, 2011 filed by accused Andal Ampatuan,

Jr. and to MODIFY this Courts Resolution dated June14, 2011, by disallowing the live media broadcast of the

trial in Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-

09162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-163766, subjectto the following guidelines on audio-visual recordingand streaming of the video coverage:

xxx xxx xxx

2.0 Petitioners reiterate their argument, among others, that theAquino andEstrada

policies reinstated in the assailed resolution violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on

constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed, that outright prohibition cannot stand when

regulation is a viable alternative. Accordingly, petitioners hereby re-plead by reference all their

arguments in their Petition dated 19 November 2010 and reproduce them herein by incorporation

and reference.

GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION

I. Compelling circumstances militate against blind adherence to stare decisis.II. The balancing-of-interests test applied in the resolution runs contra to the Courts

established rulings on freedom of speech, and in truth, the rights of the accused

and those of a free press, to information and to a public trial are not repugnant to

each other.

III. There are no factual bases to sustain the conclusion that live televised coveragewill unduly influence judges and witnesses.

IV. Regulation is to be preferred over outright prohibition; neither should prohibitionin the guise of regulation be preferred.


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DISCUSSION

COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES MILITATE AGAINST BLIND ADHERENCE TO STARE DECISIS.

xxx Supreme Court rulings are not written in stone so that they will

remain unerased and applicable for all times. The Supreme Court's

review of rulings and their binding effects is a continuing one so

that a ruling in one era may be declared by the Court at some

future time to be no longer true and should thus be abandoned and

changed.

-- separate opinion of Justice Arturo Brion,

De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council

3.0 In its Resolution dated 14 June 2011, a unanimous Court1

voted to overturn a doctrine

first enunciated in 1991 inRe: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President

Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case2

then reiterated in 2001 inRe: Request Radio-TV Coverage of

the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E.

Estrada3

to the effect that live coverage by television and radio of courtroom proceedings are

absolutely prohibited. The resolution, penned by former Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-

Morales, held that

The rationale for an outright total prohibition wasshrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon of a feared

speculation which no scientific study in the Philippine settingconfirms, and which fear, if any, may be dealt with by safeguards

and safety nets under existing rules and exacting regulations.

4.0 In this day and age, the Court ruled,

1With the exception of former Chief Justice Renato Corona, who was on official leave at the time, and Associate

Justice Arturo Brion, who was on sick leave.

2En Banc Resolution dated 22 October 1991, hereinafter referred to asAquino.

3A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC dated 29 June 2001, 360 SCRA 248, hereinafter referred to as Estrada.


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it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall notcompromise rights in the criminal administration of justice,

sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with theintegrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings.

Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a

workable solution to the concerns raised in these administrativematters, while, at the same time, maintaining the same underlyingprinciples upheld in the two previous cases.

5.0 In effect, it took two decades to overturn a prohibition, no doubt impelled by the

unique circumstances of the instant case, yet in its Resolution of 23 October 2012, it took the

Court all of 16 months to reverse itself, confiscate a boon it had extended to the people and

revert to a ruling that, whether one acknowledges it or not, is based antiquatedly on an American

case decided in the mid-1960s.4

The point need not be belabored that petitioners are greatly

alarmed by the change-of-heart since it represents another instance of what has been described as

the Courts recent tendency to flip-flop.5

6.0 While the resolution does not expressly so state, it in truth demonstrates the

application of the principle ofstare decisis et non quieta movere. This much is evident since the

resolution virtually replicatesEstrada andAquino, citations which in themselves are problematic

since they are the very same decisions being questioned on constitutional grounds by petitioners.

Further, the resolution persists in relying onEstes,6

albeit indirectly since it citesAquino citing

Estes. Continuing reliance on these authorities, petitioners maintain, renders the Courts recent

resolution as constitutionally suspect as its progenitors.

4Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). As argued in the petition, Estes does not represent the most contemporary

position of the Supreme Court of the United States on the issue of television cameras inside the courtroom; it has

been overtaken by Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).

5The more notorious examples of these flip-flops are the Dinagat, FASAP and Hacienda Luisita cases. Of more

recent vintage is Keppel v. Pioneer, G.R. Nos. 180880-81, 18 September 2012, where the Court en banc once again

recalled a decision that had become final and executoryand recorded as such in the Book of Entries of

Judgmentscomplicated by a similar circumstance in the FASAP, in that the losing party sent a letter to then Chief

Justice Renato Corona.

6See footnote 21 of the resolution.


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The doctrine ofstare decisis

7.0 In English, stare decisis et non quiete movere means to stand by decisions and not

disturb the undisturbed.7

In matters of jurisprudence, it is deemed sound practice to follow and

obey precedents as established by a superior court. InNegros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of

Appeals, the Court held, to wit:

Adherence xxx is dictated by this Court's policy ofmaintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance with the legal

maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere" (Follow pastprecedents and do not disturb what has been settled.). Where, as in

this case, the same questions relating to the same event have beenput forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case

litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisisis a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. In Woulfe v.

Associated Realties Corporation, the Supreme Court of NewJersey held that where substantially similar cases to the pending

case were presented and applicable principles declared in priordecisions, the court was bound by the principle of stare decisis.

Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger vs. Gill, it was held that underthe doctrine of stare decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who

are strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by thejudgment under the res judicata doctrine. The Philadelphia court

expressed itself in this wise: "Stare decisis simply declares that, forthe sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be

applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially thesame, even though the parties may be different."

8

8.0 Stare decisis has its uses. To begin with, it permits society to presume that bedrock

principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby

contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in

fact.9

It reflects a policy judgment that in most matters it is more important that the applicable

rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.10

On more practical terms, the principle is

crucial since it insure[s] that people are guided in their personal and business dealings by prior

court decisions, through established and fixed principles they announce.11

7Blacks Law Dictionary, 9

thed.

8281 SCRA 534, 542-543 (1997).

9Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-266 (1986).

10Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).

11Corby v. McCarthy, 154 Md. App. 446, 840 A.2d 188, 207 (2003).


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9.0 Apart from its theoretical importance, the doctrine has been said to possess

operational significance as well. Thus, it has also been held that the application ofstare decisis

saves resources and promotes judicial efficiency.12

10.0 Here, whether the doctrine has been applied correctly remains to be seen because, as

authorities attest, the rule ofstare decisis is not an inexorable command.

The rule ofstare decisis is

not absolute; exceptions

11.0 The general rule can be formulated that courts refrain from deviating from precedent

especially when it has been followed for a long period of time.13

It is safe to say that there is no

definite period in terms of exact days, months or years which will render a particular judicial

pronouncement immutable, if indeed there can be any. Prior to the Courts reversal of its 14

June 2011 resolution, the ban on television cameras inside courtrooms had been in place for 20

years beginning in 1991 withAquino and continuing through 2001 inEstrada. In those two

decades, the prohibition had been tackled no oftener than two times until challenged here; thus, it

cannot be said that stare decisis ought to be observed because many have relied on it.14

In those

two challenges, the Court basically found that the constitutional rights of the accused greatly

outweigh the freedom of the press, the right of the public to information and the right to a public

trial.

12State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 796 A.2d 1118, 1138 (2002).

13See Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 75 (1936).

14Stare decisis tends to be more strictly observed in cases involving property rights. See, for instance, City of Las

Vegas v. Oman, 110 N.M. 425, 796 P.2d 1121 (Ct. App. 1990); Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 243 Minn. 58, 66

N.W.2d 763 (1954).


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12.0 The Courts 14 June 2011 resolution, however, saw fit to rule differently. As the

ponencia held, The indication of serious risks posed by live media coverage to the accuseds

right to due process, left unexplained and unexplored in the era obtaining in Aquino andEstrada,

has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information.15

In fact, in

a sharp departure fromAquino andEstrada, the Court re-visioned the aforesaid freedoms as only

seemingly competing but actually complementary rights.

13.0 As earlier mentioned, when compared to the 20-year lifespan ofAquino and

Estrada, the 16 months it took for the Court to reverse itself since its 14 June 2011 resolution is a

wink in time. (It can even be argued thatAquino andEstrada have roots that go way back, to the

mid-1960s, in fact, because of their dependence onEstes.) During those 20-plus years,

substantial changes occurred, in technology, social mores, and more to the point, in

constitutional interpretation both here and in the United States. As the Courts resolution of 14

June 2011 recognized, Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent

limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.16

14.0 These radical changes, however, cannot be said to have taken place in the 16 months

between the Courts first resolution and the second. Petitioners cannot identify a single

compelling circumstance or circumstancesother than plain tergiversationthat merited a

complete volte face,17

underscored, moreover, by the fact that the first resolution was handed

down by a unanimous Court! As it is, the assailed second resolution does not reveal the voting

of the Justices; thus, petitioners, as well as the bench and bar, are in the dark as to how the voting

went in granting the Ampatuans motion for reconsideration.

15 652 SCRA 1, 18.

16Id..

17The only notable change, as far as petitioners can tell, involved the impeachment and conviction of a Chief

Justice and the appointment of another.


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15.0 This departure was possible because, as a judicial policy, stare decisis is not an

inflexible rule to be slavishly followed. In this connection, it has been held that the policy is at

its weakest in constitutional disputes (such as the case at bar) first, because a Supreme Court

interpretation of a Charter provision can only be altered by a constitutional amendment or the

overruling of precedent,18

and second, because in such cases, correction through legislative

action is practically impossible.19

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, a four-

way test was formulated by which obedience to, or abandonment of precedent, was in order,

thus:

xxx when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment iscustomarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmaticconsiderations designed to test the consistency of overruling a

prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge therespective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus,

for example, we may ask whether the rule has proven to beintolerable simply in defying practical workability xxx; whether

the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a specialhardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the

cost of repudiation, xxx; whether related principles of law have sofar developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of

abandoned doctrine xxx; or whether facts have so changed, orcome to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of

significant application or justification xxx. (citations omitted)20

16.0 As applied to this case, we may legitimately ask if, first, the prohibition against live

television coverage inAquino andEstrada has become unworkable; second, if overturning these

authorities will work undue hardship to those who have relied on them; third, whether related

principles of law have evolved such as to render these precedents an anachronism; and fourth,

whether facts have so changed as to render the prohibition irrelevant or unjustifiable.

18Agostini v. Felton, supra note 10, 235.

19Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996).

20Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-855 (1992).


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17.0 Anent the first, the inquiry begs itself because the prohibition is absolute: no

television cameras are allowed inside courtrooms. In other words, there is nothing to unwork

or that has become unworkable. Now, if the opposite were true, that is, if live coverage of

criminal trials were allowed, then the inquiry will turn on whether or not live TV coverage has

become so cumbersome, so unfeasible in practice that the effort does not justify the result. But

that is not the case.

18.0 As to the second, neither may it be argued that overturningAquino andEstrada will

unduly prejudice those who have relied on them. Pertinent thereto, it has been held that

In assessing reliance as a factor weighing against possible

overruling of a previous case, the court must ask whether theprevious decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so

fundamental to everyones expectations that to change it wouldproduce not just re-adjustments but practical real-world

dislocations; to have reliance, the knowledge must be of the sortthat causes a person or entity to attempt to conform his or her

conduct to a certain norm before the triggering event.21

19.0 To repeat an earlier point, the issue of television cameras in Philippine courts has

arisen only twice, precisely in these two cases, so anyone will be hard put to argue that over the

years, a great number have relied upon them and that the rights of these non-existent great

numbers will be gravely prejudiced by reversingAquino andEstrada.

20.0 With regard to the third and fourth, in the years intervening between Aquino and

Estrada and the Courts resolution of 14 June 2011, relevant facts and principles of law have

evolved, beginning with Chandler v. Florida22

(which both cases failed to mention and which the

Courts resolution of 23 October 2012 continues to ignore) in conjunction with the many

authorities cited in the petition pertinent to constitutional rights, history and current events23

21People v. Petit, 466 Mich. 624, 648, N.W.2d 193, 199 (2002).

22

See footnote 4.

23In the interest of brevity, petitioners will not reproduce them here, but in passing, these would include the

model law of California and the state-by-state guide. Suffice it to state that a signal failing of the resolution dated

14 June 2011, as well as that of 23 October 2012, failed to directly address the many constitutional issues raised by

petitioners. The Courts own resolution of 14 June 2011 acknowledges also, thus: Other jurisdictions welcome

the idea of media coverage. Almost all the proceedings of United Kingdoms Supreme Court are filmed, and


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which persuasively establish that prohibiting television cameras inside courtrooms finds no home

in the open and transparent atmosphere of the 21st

century. Facts, too, have changed: advances

in technology, for one, have addressed many of the concerns raised in Estes about the intrusion

of television cameras inside trial courts. As the Court itself noted in its 14 June 2011 resolution,

Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advancestechnology has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of keyconstitutional precepts into the workable context. Technologyper

se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof thatneed fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage

and furtherance of the various rights herein involved, within thecontours of defined guidelines.

24

21.0 The inescapable conclusion to be drawn is that stare decisis is not to be adhered to

when the precedent is a mere survivor of obsolete constitutional thinking.25

Separate opinions asstare

decisis

22.0 In the assailed resolution, the en banc held, to wit,

In this case that has achieved notoriety and sensational

status, a greater degree of care is required to safeguard theconstitutional rights of the accused. To be in the best position to

weigh the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, the judge mustnot be affected by any outside force or influence. Like any human

being, however, a judge is not immune from the pervasive effectsof the media.

23.0 To support this argument, the resolution cites the separate opinions on the Hon.

Justice Arturo D. Brion inBiraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission26

andLejano v. People.27

Concurring or dissenting opinions, however, have been held to have no stare decisis effect.28

sometimes broadcast. The International Criminal Court broadcasts its proceedings via video streaming in the

internet.

24Estrada, at 17.

25Planned Parenthood, supra note 20, at 857.


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THE BALANCING-OF-INTERESTS TEST APPLIED IN THE

RESOLUTION RUNS CONTRA TO THE COURTS ESTABLISHED

RULINGS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECHAND IN TRUTH, THE RIGHTS OF

THE ACCUSED AND THOSE OF A FREE PRESS, TO INFORMATION

AND TO A PUBLIC TRIAL ARE NOT REPUGNANT TO EACH OTHER.

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx

promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all

courts, xxx. Such rules xxx shall not diminish, increase, or modify

substantive rights.

-- section 5(5), article VIII, Constitution

24.0 Often, a motion for reconsideration is junked on the premise that the movant failed

to adduce new and convincing arguments that will warrant a reversal of the order or judgment

being assailed, the operative word being rehash. It is unfortunateand indeed quite strange

that both the resolutions dated 14 June 2011 and 23 October 2012 failed to even discuss, among

other points, with some semblance of detail, petitioners assertion that the proscription against

television cameras in the courtroom offend (1) freedom of the press; (2) right to information; (3)

right to a fair and public trial; (4) right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of

grievances; (5) right of free access to courts; and (6) freedom of association. This failure is all

the more marked especially where the issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the case, as

it is here, and the Court usually takes pains to discuss the issues raised, knowing full well that its

decisions are not intended for the parties solely, but also for the profession of law and for the

academe. As a result, petitioners are compelled to re-state the arguments in their petition, and to

be fair, if petitioners are to be condemned for recycling arguments raised in support of the

instant motion, the same adjective can also be applied to the resolution of 23 October 2012

which virtually reproduces the ratioalready traversed by petitionersofAquino andEstrada.

26637 SCRA 78 (2010).

27638 SCRA 104 (2010).

28In re Thomas-Pinkney, 840 A.2d 700 (D.C. 2004); Boode v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 458 P.2d 653 (Wyo. 1969).


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25.0 In the questioned resolution, the Court held,

While this Court recognizes the freedom of the press andthe right to public information, which, by the way, are rights that

belong to non-directparties to the case, the rights of the directparties should not be forgotten. In a clash among these competing

interests and in terms of the values the Constitution recognizes,jurisprudence makes it clear that the balance should always be in

favor of the accused[,]

and as support, proceeds to citeEstrada. As already mentioned, the citation is problematic

because it submits as an authority the very same decision whose constitutionality is being

assailed. And then there is the obiter dictum to the effect that petitioners are non-direct parties

to the case, a characterization which leads to some head-scratching. In a criminal case, the

direct parties thereto are the People of the Philippines and the person of the accused; the

victim of the crime ceases to be the offended party and as such, his or her interest becomes

limited to the civil liability arising from the crime. In the process of splitting hairs, somehow,

petitioners have become something less than people of the Philippines and presumably

something else entirely, they know not what.

26.0 In any case, prescinding from the above, the assailed resolution regurgitates the

notion that the rights of the accused are in competition with the peoples rights, a contention

already debunked by the Courts resolution of 14 June 2011, to the effect that these rights, far

from being competitive with each other, are in truth complementary. What the two resolutions

fail to mention is that this latter characterization has legal support, duly cited by petitioners, in

the case ofPress-Enterprise Co., v. Superior Court, thus:

[i]t is difficult to disagree in the abstract with that court's analysisbalancing the defendant's right to a fair trial against the public right

of access. It is also important to remember that these interests arenot necessarily inconsistent. Plainly, the defendant has a right to a

fair trial but, as we have repeatedly recognized, one of theimportant means of assuring a fair trial is that the process be open

to neutral observers.29

29478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986).


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The crucial difference here is that the authority cited by herein petitioners is not one whose

constitutionality is under attack, unlike the Courts continued reliance onEstrada.

27.0 Two points ought to be kept in mind. First, [the freedom of the press] are not for

the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the

press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society.30

Second, freedom

of the press is not merely a private property right inuring to mass media enterprises.31

The result is only as valid

as the test applied

28.0 That the banning of television cameras inside courtrooms is a content-based

prohibition brooks no argument. This much is clear based on the case ofChavez v. Gonzales 32

cited in the petition whichagainthe resolutions fail to address. The error of the resolution of

23 October 2012 is that it stubbornly persists in applying a balancing-of-interests test when

according to the Chavez, it shouldnt be so. As Chavez explains, freedom of the press has four

components: (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from subsequent punishment; (3)

freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of circulation. Most relevant here is the

freedom from prior restraint which consists, basically, of actions by the State to restrict

expression and the media in advance of publication or dissemination. The prior restraint element

inAquino and Estrada is evident because they prohibit the mere presence of television cameras

inside the courtroom even before broadcasting.

30 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).

31State ex rel Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh (Fla), 340 So 2d 904 (1976); Firstamerica Development

Corp. V. Daytona Beach News-Journal Corp., (Fla) 196 So 2d 97, 15 ALR3d 1238 (1966).

32545 SCRA 441 (2008).


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29.0 Chavez is also insightful in that it explains the difference between a content-neutral

prohibition and a content-based one: the former is merely concerned with the incidents of the

speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards

whereas the latter is one where the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or

speech. The distinction has to be made because it is determinative of the test appropriate to a

free speech challenge.

When the speech restraints take the form of a content-

neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest isrequired for its validity. Because regulations of this type are not

designed to suppress any particular message, they are not subjectto the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate

approach somewhere between the mere rationality that isrequired of any other law and the compelling interest standard

applied to content-based restrictions. The test is calledintermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the

validity of a law but also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant governmental

interest that is unrelated to the suppression of expression. Theintermediate approach has been formulated in this manner:

A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is

within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers animportant or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental

interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and ifthe incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech &

expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of thatinterest.

On the other hand, a governmental action that restrictsfreedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the

strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Onlywhen the challenged act has overcome the clear and present

danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the governmenthaving the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the

content-based restraint will be struck down.

With respect to content-based restrictions, the government

must also show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrainedwould bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of

the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid.Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by

hypothetical fears, "but only by showing a substantive andimminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on

ground." As formulated, "the question in every case is whether thewords used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature

as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about


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the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is aquestion of proximity and degree."

The regulation which restricts the speech content must also

serve an important or substantial government interest, which is

unrelated to the suppression of free expression.

Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater

than what is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Arestriction that is so broad that it encompasses more than what is

required to satisfy the governmental interest will be invalidated.The regulation, therefore, must be reasonable and narrowly drawn

to fit the regulatory purpose, with the least restrictive meansundertaken.

Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-

neutral regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review. Acontent-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption ofinvalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger

rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by acompelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither

overbroad nor vague.33

30.0 In the instant case, the prohibition does not purport to regulate the incidents of

speech or control the time, place or manner of expression. On the contrary, it absolutely forbids

a very specific set of content: video and audio of the trial itself. Because the ban on television

cameras is a content-based prohibition, the conclusion is inevitable that the correct test to apply

is the clear and present danger test and not that of balancing-of-interests.

31.0 In applying the clear and present danger test, the State bears the burden of showing

that a clear and present danger of a substantive evil exists, one which it has a right to prevent;

said evil, being a question of proximity and degree, must be both substantial andimminent. As

petitioners have repeatedly said that, in the absence of empirical evidence that television cameras

will undoubtedly prejudice an accuseds right to a fair trial, fear is not the equivalent of proof.

33Id., at 493-496.


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With respect to content-based restrictions, the governmentmust also show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained

would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence ofthe threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid.

Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be

justified by hypothetical fears, "but only by showing asubstantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of areality already on ground." As formulated, "the question in every

case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances andare of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they

will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right toprevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."

The regulation which restricts the speech content must also

serve an important or substantial government interest, which isunrelated to the suppression of free expression.

Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no

greater than what is essential to the furtherance of that

interest. A restriction that is so broad that it encompasses more

than what is required to satisfy the governmental interest will

be invalidated. The regulation, therefore, must be reasonable andnarrowly drawn to fit the regulatory purpose, with the least

restrictive means undertaken.34

32.0 Till now, the assailed resolution has failed to explain why it persists in applying the

balancing-of-interests test.

THERE ARE NO FACTUAL BASES TO SUSTAIN THE CONCLUSION

THAT LIVE TELEVISED COVERAGE WILL UNDULY INFLUENCE

JUDGES AND WITNESSES.

33.0 In asserting that live televised coverage of judicial proceedings involve an inherent

denial of due process, the assailed resolution once more returns to Aquino, to the effect that

Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect oftelecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened, play to

the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinaryout-of-court influences which might affect their testimony. Also,

telecasting not only increases the trial judges responsibility toavoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his

own performance. Judges are human beings also and are subject tothe same psychological reactions as laymen. For the defense,

telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him toexcessive public exposure and distracts him from the effective

presentation of his defense.

34Chavez, at 459.


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The television camera is a powerful weapon whichintentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case

in the eyes of the public.

34.0 Prejudicial publicity, however, has been debunked in a succession of cases35

as

sufficient ground to either (a) overturn a conviction, or (b) to enjoin trial. More to the point, in

People v. Teehankee, the Court formulated a totality of circumstances test, as follows:

We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the

right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that theprint and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity,

just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then andnow, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is

not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsiblereporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as well

pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as thehandmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the

criminal field . . . The press does not simply publish informationabout trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by

subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes toextensive public scrutiny and criticism."

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right ofan accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant wasgiven a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself

prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judgeand impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the

minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-courtpublicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our

communication system brings news as they happen straight to ourbreakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part

of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another,our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is

out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury systemwhose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose

their impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system are mountingand Mark Twain's wit and wisdom put them all in better

perspective when he observed: "When a gentleman of high socialstanding, intelligence, and probity swears that testimony given

under the same oath will outweigh with him, street talk andnewspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred

jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and stupidity . . .Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains

and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants?" Our

judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-courtevidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation.

35People v. Sanchez, 302 SCRA 21 (1999); People v. Sesbreo, 314 SCRA 87 (1999); Larranaga v. Court of Appeals,

287 SCRA 581 (1998); Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995); Martelino v. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106, 117 (1970).


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Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice

on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that

characterized the investigation and trial of the case. InMartelino,et al. v.Alejandro, et a1., we rejected this standard of possibility ofprejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that

to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must beallegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced,

not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In thecase at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed

actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensivemedia coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of

circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judgeacquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which

is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial.Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not

discharged the burden.36

(emphasis supplied)

35.0 A few points bear repeating, even at the risk of redundancy:

1. the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press;2. pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial;3. judges are learned in the law and are unlike juries in that the latter need to be protected to

preserve their impartiality; and

4. there must be both (a) allegation and (b) proof that the judge has been unduly influenced.

36.0 Mystifyingly, the assailed resolution ignores Teehankee even though the totality-of-

circumstances test formulated therein was subsequently applied in the case ofEstrada v.

Desierto where it was held,

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsmanshould be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases

filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on hisguilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed

bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his rightto due process.

36249 SCRA 54, 104-106 (1995).


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There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schoolsof thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity

during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. The Britishapproach the problem with the presumption that publicity will

prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop

criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers athreat. The American approach is different. US courts assume askeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity

on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developeddifferent strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial

probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and presentdanger, etc.

This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has

been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions inhigh profile criminal cases. x x x

x x x x x x x x x

We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequentcase ofWebb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc. and its companion

cases. viz.:

Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on theirright to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation.

We find no procedural impediment to its early invocationconsidering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a

preliminary investigation.

x x x

The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of

sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, itsexcessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the

telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match thehigh volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the

preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of factsand fiction about the case continues unabated even today.

Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many ofwhich are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in

the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and theirsympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The

possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trialnotwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the

press and public. In the seminal case ofRichmond Newspapers,Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:

x x x

(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trialin Anglo-American justice demonstrates conclusively that the time

this Nations organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both hereand in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving

assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to allconcerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of

participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In


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addition, the significant community therapeutic value of publictrials was recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community

reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafterthe open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic

purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and

emotion. To work effectively, it is important that societyscriminal process satisfy the appearance of justice, Offutt v.United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can

best be provided by allowing people to observe such process.From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons

as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that apresumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal

trial under this Nations system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v.United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.

(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly

guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core purposeof assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the

functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as thoseof speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting

the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to thoseexplicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive

information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that theguarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit

government from summarily closing courtroom doors which hadlong been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was

adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, havingbeen regarded not only as an independent right but also as a

catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendmentrights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. A

trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally andrepresentatives of the media have a right to be present, and where

their presence historically has been thought to enhance theintegrity and quality of what takes place.

(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by

its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials,various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have beenrecognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights.

The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of theFirst Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which

people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedomof speech and of the press could be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and

prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive anaccused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, inMartelino, et

al. vs. Alejandro, etal., we held that to warrant a finding ofprejudicial publicity there must beallegation and proofthat the

judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be,by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in

the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicitythat attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the

fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot justrely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness

of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond


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knowing. To be sure, the DOJPanel is composed of an AssistantChief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long

experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider indetermining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights

of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no

indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that theyconsidered any extra-record evidence except evidence properlyadduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was

conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity withwhich they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners

speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitionersseek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the

ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicialpublicity. (emphasis supplied)

Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not

enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin thepreliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondentOmbudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostileheadlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show more

weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impairedcapacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the

cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminaryinvestigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the

respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been madeby the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special

panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasiveprejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet

to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guesswhether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.

The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent

Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioners submission,the respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the barrage of

slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats andpressures directed at him by the mobs.

News reports have also

been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman hasalready prejudged the cases of the petitioner and it is postulatedthat the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced

by this bias of their superior.

Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner isinsubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the

petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Courtespecially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as

to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith andregularity in the performance of official duty to which he is

entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice ofpetitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows

to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure, give investigating prosecutors the independence to

make their own findings and recommendations albeit they arereviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they

cannot be compelled to change their recommendations nor canthey be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve

dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be


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treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondentOmbudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the

latter believes that the finding of probable cause against him is theresult of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the

proper court.37

37.0 Petitioners reiterate that while the Court is not a trier of facts, it nonetheless remains

a court of facts. It cannot make its rulings based on conjecture and assumption; a decision must

have something to support itself, which pertinently in this case would consist of weighty social

science evidence. The assailed resolution perpetuates the erroneous and illogical belief that

actual evidence is not necessary to uphold the view that television cameras per se prejudice an

accuseds right to a fair trial.

38.0 To drive home the point further, it isnt as if a host of evidence materialized out of

nowhere in the 16 months between the June 2011 resolution and the October 2012 resolution that

can satisfactorily explain the Courts sudden turnabout.

39.0 Incidentally, insofar as the assailed resolution asserts that the right to a public trial

belongs to the accused, such is not an entirely accurate description of the right. As

acknowledged in the petition, just as an accused has a right to demand that his trial be held

publicly, so too are the peoplein this case the People of the Philippinesentitled to demand

that they be allowed to attend a trial. Again, the assailed resolution failed to address this, just as

it overlookedRichmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia cited in the petition, to the effect that

People in an open society do not demand infallibility fromtheir institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are

prohibited from observing. When a criminal trial is conducted inthe open, there is at least an opportunity both for understanding the

system in general and its workings in a particular case.

The educative effect of public attendance is a material

advantage. Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligentacquaintance acquired with the methods of government, but a

strong confidence in judicial remedies is secured which couldnever be inspired by a system of secrecy.

38

37353 SCRA 452, 524-530 (2001).

38448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980).


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40.0 The same case holds that, in modern society, media have evolved beyond being

portals of news and information and have become surrogates that enable people to make life-

changing decisions based on accessible data.

In earlier times, both in England and America, attendanceat court was a common mode of "passing the time."x x x x With

the press, cinema, and electronic media now supplying therepresentations or reality of the real life drama once available only

in the courtroom, attendance at court is no longer a widespreadpastime. Yet [i]t is not unrealistic, even in this day, to believe that

public inclusion affords citizens a form of legal education, andhopefully promotes confidence in the fair administration of

justice. x x x Instead of acquiring information about trials byfirsthand observation or by word of mouth from those who

attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print andelectronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of

functioning as surrogates for the public. While mediarepresentatives enjoy the same right of access as the public, they

often are provided special seating and priority of entry so that theymay report what people in attendance have seen and heard. This

contribute[s] to public understanding of the rule of law and tocomprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice

system. . . .39

REGULATION IS TO BE PREFERRED OVER OUTRIGHT

PROHIBITION; NEITHER SHOULD PROHIBITION IN THE GUISE OF

REGULATION BE PREFERRED.

The devil is compromise.

- Henrik Ibsen

41.0 Evidently, by ordering that CCTV cameras in lieu of public TV transmit images and

audio to selected venues instead of general broadcast, the Court is attempting to forge a

compromise between allowing the public to watch the proceedings and closing the proceedings

to the wider public. Yet this compromise is unsatisfactory because it delimits the viewing

possibilities to those who have the time and opportunity to go to the designated courts where

CCTVs have been placed. The general public, in effect, is disenfranchised.

42.0 The Court rationalizes its ruling in this wise:

39Id., at 572-573.


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To address the physical impossibility of accommodatingthe large number of interested parties inside the courtroom in

CampBagong Diwa, it is not necessary to allow the press tobroadcast the proceedings here and abroad, but the Court may

allow the opening of closed-circuit viewing areas outside the

courtroom where those who may be so minded can come andwatch the proceedings. This out-of-court, real-time viewing grantsto a larger audience the opportunity to monitor the proceedings as

if they were inside the trial court but at the same time obviates themassive publicity entailed in media broadcasting. This is similar

to the procedure adopted by this Court in allowing members of thepublic to watch its oral arguments at a viewing area outside of the

Session Hall where a large monitor projects the image and soundsfrom inside the Session Hall in real time.

Aside from providing a viewing area outside the courtroom

in CampBagong Diwa, closed-circuit viewing areas can also beopened in selected trial courts in Maguindanao, Koronadal, South

Cotabato, and General Santos City where most of the relatives ofthe accused and the victims reside, enabling them to watch the trial

without having to come to CampBagong Diwa. These viewingareas will, at all times, be under the control of the trial court judges

involved, subject to this Courts supervision.

It would seem that the Court took inspiration from the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 cited in the petition. The problem, however, is that this solution benefits the victims

and their families yet extends practically nothing to the rest of the populace who, by the terms of

the resolution, must travel all the way to the designated areas to watch the proceedings. Thus, if

a resident of Samar wishes to apprise himself of the developments in the case, it will not be a

simple matter of tuning in; instead, he will have to travel to either Mindanao or Manila to be

updated in real-time. A citizen-journalist-blogger will also face the same difficulties, as will,

say, crime watchdog organizations that monitor cases such as these. In other words, the

compromise is no compromise at all because it severely delimits the audience who can watch the

proceedings.


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The imposition of

unreasonable conditions

43.0 In its 14 June 2011 resolution permitting the live televised coverage of the

Ampatuan trial, the Court saw fit to impose conditions which many in the media saw as unduly

harsh and completely unworkable. Among the more objectionable stipulations were (1)

paragraph B disallowing selective or partial coverage; (2) paragraph E which requires that

broadcasting for a particular day be continuous and in its entirety; (3) paragraph F which forbids

commercial breaks or gaps of any kind; and (4) paragraph G which bans voice-overs and

extended commentary.

44.0 Initially, when apprised of these conditions, petitioners were agog at their severity

since they completely brushed aside the realities of broadcast news. Par. E, for one, presented

huge logistical problems. Suppose that in the course of the live broadcast of the trial, a meteor

crashed into the front portico of the Court; by the terms of the proviso, the broadcaster is not

allowed to switch to breaking news. Par. F, in turn, had important financial consequences:

commercial advertisements are the lifeblood of television; by prohibiting commercials, the

proviso effectively cut off the means by which news programs sustain themselves financially.

45.0 However, counsel for petitioners reasoned that the Court could not possibly be

malicious but instead was forging a new path, necessarily new and untested. Paragraph K, in

particular, gave cause for hope since it apparently gave petitioners room to maneuver. At the

very least, paragraph K enabled the stakeholders to engage in a continuous dialogue with an

agent of the Court to address issues that may arise in such a novel undertaking. With its October

2012 resolution, however, all those provisos have been scotched.

46.0 Nevertheless, some words need to be said about the imposition of unreasonable

conditions.


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Averting a confiscatory

policy

47.0 In filing the instant motion, petitioners wish to avert a scenario wherein the Court

reconsiders but in the process re-imposes the conditionsand then someenumerated in the

resolution of 14 June 2011. This would represent no advancement at all. In such a case, the

imposition of unworkable conditions gives credence to petitioners Editha Mirandilla-Tiamzon

and Glenna Logartas assertion that continuous broadcast without commercial breaks constitute

undue taking of private property,40

yet another issue that the Court chose not to address (and

essentially a moot point in view of the Courts 23 October 2012 resolution).

48.0 The solution to the impasse can be found in paragraph K in the resolution of 14 June

2011, to wit:

(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, designand recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations, and

administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live broadcast ofthe proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines.

The Special Committee shall also report and recommend on the feasibility,availability and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein

requirements. It may conduct consultations with resource persons and experts inthe field of information and communication technology.

49.0 A possible source of friction may lie in the fact that the Court sees the media as an

adversary when in fact, the opposite can be true. The Court, in its Action Program for Judicial

Reform, recognized that,

5.10 The judicial guarantees of and support for free speech, fair

comment and public criticism encourage active mass media, whichin turn can be influential in strengthening economic security,

political liberties, legal and human rights, among other freedoms.

5.11 At the same time, because judicial reforms, currentinnovations, and latest judicial doctrines and decisions can be

communicated through the mass media, the media can help ensureadequate, objective and balanced coverage of the Judiciary and

therefore help create an informed public. They also serve as acheck-and-balance and feedback mechanism for the general public,

and help mobilize community action in support of policies and

programs of the Judiciary.41

40Partial Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 June 2011, 11-12.

41APJR 2001-2006 (with Supplement), at 94.


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50.0 Accordingly, the Court can take its own advice and convene the special committee

mentioned in paragraph (k) that will study, design and recommend appropriate actions in relation

to the issue of television cameras inside the courtroom. In other words, there is no prohibition

against consultation among the stakeholders in the issue leading to the formulation of acceptable

guidelines on the matter.

51.0 To recapitulate, absolute prohibitionor a disguised version thereofcannot be

justified in the area of constitutional rights when reasonable regulation is a viable and preferred

option.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:

a. grant instant motion for reconsideration and set aside the Courts resolution dated 23October 2012;

b. convene the special committee per paragraph (k) of the Courts resolution dated 14 June2011 to formulate the appropriate guidelines for live coverage of the subject trial;

c. the allowance of live televised coverage be not made on a pro hac vice basis and insteadbe a definitive pronouncement applicable to similar cases that may arise in the future.

Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.

Makati city for Manila city; 05 December 2012.

PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTERCounsel for Petitioners

4/F Kaija Bldg. 7836 Makati Ave.

corner Valdez St., Makati CityTel. No. (632) 8993439; Telfax: (632) 8993416

Email Address: [email protected]


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Copy Furnished:

ATTYS. PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN & ALBERT LEE G. ANGELESFortun Narvasa & Salazar Law Offices

23rd

Flr. Multinational Bancorporation Centre

6805 Ayala Avenue, 1229 Makati City

HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO IIIMalacanang Palace

San Miguel, Manila

SOLICITOR GENERAL FRANCIS JARDELEZA134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village

1229 Makati City

HON. JOCELYN A. SOLIS-REYESPresiding Judge

Regional Trial Court, Branch 221

Quezon City

motion for reconsideration: live coverage of the am

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