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Copyright © 2007 Thunderbird School of Global Management. All rights reserved. This case was prepared by LauranneBuchanan, Thunderbird School of Global Management, and Carolyn J. Simmons, Washington and Lee University, forthe purpose of classroom discussion only, and not to indicate either effective or ineffective management.

Lauranne BuchananCarolyn J. Simmons

Motorola and the RAZRWhat a difference a year makes.

CEO Edward Zander was riding high at Motorola Inc.’s 2006 annual shareholder’s meeting.Based on sales growth of 18% in 2005 and 23% in the first quarter of 2006, he declared, “Our salesgrowth is among the strongest, if not the strongest, of large-cap tech companies.” The driving forcebehind this growth was the firm’s cell phone business. Zander boasted, “Our iconic products like RAZR,SLVR, and PEBL have established Motorola’s design leadership...We are more and more identified asthe cool, innovative company with quality to match.” To sum up the year’s performance, he para-phrased Frank Sinatra lyrics, proclaiming, “2005 was a very good year.”1

By comparison, Zander’s performance at the 2007 annual meeting was positively meek. Motorola’shandset business had suffered declining margins and share.2 The firm lost $180 million in the firstquarter and its stock had declined by about a third since October. In response, Zander had announcedcost-cutting efforts, including the layoff of thousands of employees and a not-clearly defined plan toreinvigorate the appeal of the firm’s handset offerings.3 He was a different man, ending his remarks tothe shareholders with an awkward, “That’s it for me, I guess.”4

In the space of a few months, Motorola had gone from the darling of the cell phone market to ahigh-share but unprofitable handset manufacturer. Both identities derived from the management andprofitability of the RAZR handset. Analysts everywhere were debating the question, “Can Motorolareverse the fortunes of the RAZR?”

How had Motorola arrived at this crisis point?

Motorola Develops the Market, Then Falters (1984-2001)

Motorola introduced the cell phone in 1984. It was the size of a brick, weighed 28 ounces, and cost$4,000.5 For the next 15 years, Motorola—with its strong engineering culture— advanced cell phonetechnology and, in so doing, dominated the market. Motorola led competitors in reducing the size ofthe phone while improving its capabilities and lowering costs. And consumers took notice. By the mid-1990s, the cell phone had become a necessity for everyone from business people demanding greaterconnectivity to soccer moms appreciating additional security. Motorola’s dominance of the categoryseemed all but assured with its 1996 launch of the clam-shaped StarTAC. At five cubic inches and 3.1ounces,6 it was the smallest, lightest cell phone in existence. And it was so stylish that supermodelscarried it as a runway accessory, and rap artists immortalized it in song. Even with a price tag of $1,100,it was the “must-have” gadget of the fashion elite.

November 8, 2007

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But the sands were beginning to shift in this nascent industry. Service providers—a fragmentedgroup of competitors including the long-distance companies, Baby-Bells and many regional carriers—were converting from analog to digital technology. Digital technology allowed carriers to handle morecalls simultaneously. It also supported expansion into data services, which would increase their revenuestreams. For consumers, the switch to digital meant better quality sound as well as lower service feesfrom roaming charges.

The consequences of the technology shift for handset manufacturers like Motorola were twofold.The first was that the service providers became more demanding customers. The investment in digitalequipment put enormous financial pressure on the carriers, which led them to expand into each others’regions and gobble up smaller competitors. As competition within the industry increased, so did thepressure for carriers to differentiate their services to attract more customers. The result was that theservice providers—who had become more important to the handset manufacturers as their customerbase grew—began to demand unique phones and greater service from the cell phone manufacturers.

The second outcome of the technology shift was that it opened the door for Motorola’s competi-tors to gain a foothold in the U.S. As the leader in analog technology, Motorola was slow to switch todigital. Nokia, the Finnish manufacturer, moved quickly to take advantage of this opportunity. It al-ready dominated the European market, where digital technology was the standard. Its experience thereallowed Nokia to meet the technical needs of the U.S. carriers faster than Motorola. And Nokia’s smallercandy-bar-shaped phones—made possible by digital technology—quickly captured consumers’ atten-tion.

By the late nineties, Nokia was challenging Motorola in global market share. And yet, Motorolaseemed blinded by its past dominance in the industry. Its undoing, according to John Stratton, chiefmarketing officer of Verizon Wireless, was its “arrogance.” “Listening, for Motorola, was waiting foryou to stop speaking so they could tell you what to buy. It was endemic to their culture… Motorolamade the dangerous mistake of forgetting that its customers weren’t just the people carrying their phone,but the wireless carrier as well. It is the carrier who determines which phones they will offer in theirretail stores and which ones they will promote with special offers.”7

Given this culture, Motorola’s response to the demands of the service providers was slow. Whenusing cell phones while driving became a public policy issue, SBC Wireless asked handset manufactur-ers to display a safety reminder on the screen. Nokia responded in 24 hours; Motorola took two weeks.When SBC asked for a unique color for its 8200 series, Nokia delivered a phone in “technoblue.” As forMotorola? “I can’t recall if Motorola ever offered a proprietary color,” stated VP Frank Boyer.8

Even worse, Motorola started missing crucial deadlines on product delivery, and, in some cases, itnever sent a product at all. Alltel ordered an inexpensive Motorola model for the Christmas season.When it didn’t arrive, Alltel turned to Nokia for a similar product; Nokia delivered. SBC orderedseveral Motorola models in 2000, but Motorola axed several phones and delayed delivery on others.“We had made our plans… on the premise that some of those products would be available. We had torevise our plans and turn to Nokia and Ericsson to meet our needs,” recalled Boyer.9

Perhaps the service providers would have tolerated Motorola’s poor service if the company hadstayed on top of its game. But it didn’t. Ironically, Motorola failed to recognize that its success withStarTAC had fundamentally changed consumer demand. The StarTAC made innovation as much aboutthe outside of the phone as about its inside. Consumers’ attention had turned to size and design. “Atmeetings in Silicon Valley, men (it’s usually men) kick things off by placing their phones on the confer-ence table in a sort of silent showdown. ‘If your phone is even a quarter-inch smaller than theirs, you’vewon,’ says Shelley Harrison, a consultant to start-up companies. ‘There is definitely a little phone envygoing on.’”10 But at Motorola, product design had become a secondary consideration, and the firm nolonger produced phones that anyone envied. As one designer lamented, “Just a few years after the

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StarTAC success, products were being built in engineering labs, then sent to what employees called the‘beauty parlor’ for a last-minute face-lift.”11

As it began to feel the heat from Nokia, Motorola’s response was to churn out lots of differentphones—finished inventory, after all, could be forced onto carriers. Motorola’s product line expandeddramatically, resulting in massive inefficiencies. By 2000, Motorola offered 100 different phones, basedon 40 different wireless handset platforms.12 Margins shrank to a low of minus 17% in the first quarterof 2001. In comparison, Nokia had limited product offerings and kept production simple. Working offthree generic platforms enabled Nokia to use common components across products—and contributedto operating margins of 22%.13

In short, Motorola had sailed directly into a perfect storm. The company’s internal operationswere bloated and inefficient. It lacked customer focus—consumers were unimpressed with its handsets,and service providers no longer felt any loyalty to the company. And Motorola couldn’t keep up withcompetitors. Only five years after introducing the StarTAC, Motorola’s share of the global market haddropped from 33% to 14%, while Nokia’s had climbed from 22% to 35%.14

Motorola’s lackluster performance in the cell phone business was a major contributor to the de-valuation of its stock price—which lost three quarters of its value in a little more than a year. In the firstquarter of 2001, the company reported a $533 million loss, the first quarterly loss in more than 16years. The Personal Communication Division was responsible for an operating loss of $402 million.15

Righting the Ship (2002-2003)

CEO Christopher Galvin—whose grandfather founded Motorola—knew that drastic steps must betaken to reverse course. He cut more than 56,000 jobs—a third of the firm’s workforce—and replacedor reshuffled three quarters of his senior officers within a two-year period.16 He also broke with com-pany tradition and brought in a team from outside to revitalize the handset division. Mike Zafirovski,or Mike Z as he became known within the company, came from GE to lead the personal communica-tion division. He brought in Teresa Metty from IBM to lead operations. Geoffrey Frost was hired fromNike as Chief Brand Officer, a newly created position. And Tim Parsey was lured away from Apple tohead the design group. Although the team didn’t know one another, they understood the challenge theyfaced, and they knew they had to work together to succeed. They also knew they didn’t have much time.

Getting Production Right

As head of the communications division, one of Mike Z’s first objectives was to reconnect with theservice providers: “We are more humble than ever before. We know now how to work with the carriers.Execution is clearly ahead of us.” He began by spending a quarter of his time with service providers,trying to repair relationships. They liked what they saw. Alltel’s group president for communicationsaid, “I see positive signs in a guy like Mike. Inside his first 30 days on the job, he was at our offices inLittle Rock.” Voicestream was also impressed. Mike Z changed his schedule to address a group of 1,200Voicestream employees when the carrier launched its service in Chicago. Bob Stapleton, president andCOO, said, “We’re finally getting immediate and direct involvement from Motorola senior manage-ment.”17

Mike Z knew that carrier support would mean little if Motorola couldn’t offer providers the rightprice. The firm had to reduce its cost structure. The first step was to trim production facilities. ButMike Z knew that plant shutdowns alone wouldn’t translate into greater efficiency. Operations also hadto improve. At the time, Motorola phones had about 600 parts; Mike Z’s goal was to reduce the numberto 150. He also wanted to standardize parts so that they could be used in different phones. In itself, thischange could cut the time needed to assemble a phone from 30 minutes to 10 minutes.18

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To improve Motorola’s moribund supply chain, Mike Z placed Teresa Metty in charge of thefirm’s $42 billion procurement budget. Metty recognized that in order to be globally competitive,“You’ve got to have world-class procurement and strategic sourcing.”19 Her first step was to abolish thecompany’s regional procurement structure. “Before we had factories and distribution centres for all theregions…Imagine the inefficiencies of dealing with that.”20 She then helped create a global supply chainsystem, supplemented at the regional level by procurement experts working in “commodity councils” toaddress local component sourcing needs. Decisions regarding product specification, technology re-quirements, and designs were centralized, giving Motorola a panoramic view of its global needs. As aresult, the company leveraged its purchasing power from a central source and cut its supplier base bymore than 50%.21

According to Metty: “We were able to set up world-class global experts to leverage the spend, to dotechnology road mapping with key suppliers, to reduce the supply base, and to establish preferred partsthat we would like designed into our phones so that we could reduce the complexity of our products.”22

The new strategy duplicated the automotive industry model of reducing costs and making productionlines more efficient through the sharing of similar platforms among various product models. Becausecustomization could then take place later in the manufacturing process, Motorola was able to respondmore quickly to carrier needs. Motorola was further able to cut inventory by sharing information withcarriers.

Results were impressive: between 2000 and 2002, Motorola squeezed $2.6 billion in costs out ofits supply chain, reduced inventory by $1.4 billion, and improved customer response time by 40%.23

Getting the Brand Right

While Mike Z concentrated on rebuilding relationships with service providers and improving opera-tions to reduce costs, the task of rebuilding the Motorola brand was left to Geoffrey Frost. Frost knewthis would be an uphill battle both within the company and with consumers. When he arrived, Motorola’sadvertising campaign was based on “You Can’t Always Get What you Want” by the Rolling Stones.“Not exactly the right message for a company struggling to regain leadership,” Frost quipped.24 Theirony was lost on most of Motorola’s management.

Frost’s first objective was to get product design back into the forefront. His right-hand man wasTim Parsey, Consumer Experience Officer, another new position within the company. Parsey’s experi-ence at Apple gave him an understanding of the strategic importance of product design: “If you don’tuse design as a weapon, then you’re not going to survive…Design had been more of a service—couldyou decorate this box?—instead of a provocative force in its own right.”25

As Frost and Parsey struggled to change Motorola from within, there was an ominous change inthe market. This time the tidal wave came from Asia and from a company that had barely been onMotorola’s radar screen: Samsung. The South Korean company, which had primarily been associatedwith cheap consumer durables, had entered the U.S. cell phone market in 1997 with a clam-shapedsilver phone priced at $149.26 It was a successful debut. But as an unknown brand in a field of well-established competitors, Samsung knew it had to take a different approach from its competitors. Itsstrategy: develop a strong relationship with the service providers to push its brand to consumers. WhenNokia and Motorola balked at putting the service providers’ names on their phones, Samsung com-plied. Within five years, Samsung had climbed from nowhere to a distant fourth behind Nokia, Motorola,and Siemens.

By 2002, Samsung was poised to become a force in its own right. It planned to take the lead byintroducing in the U.S. the color screens and camera phones that were already a hit in Asia. Afterreaching an agreement with T-Mobile in April, Samsung assembled 80 designers and engineers from itschip, telecom, display, computing, and manufacturing operations to develop a prototype. The com-pany then flew 30 engineers to Seattle to field-test the phones for T-Mobile servers and networks.27 By

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November, the phones were rolling off the production line. Priced at $350—a 20% premium overother phones—T-Mobile reported sales of 300,000 units the first month.28 By year-end, global sales ofSamsung phones had increased 51%, and the average price of a Samsung phone was $230.29

Believing U.S. and European customers would not be willing to pay for these features, Motorolaand Nokia had bet against investing in development of similar phones. Once they realized their mis-take, they were too far behind to catch up. Both companies missed the Christmas season. When theygot to market in mid-2003, sales had slowed and prices had plummeted. Nokia’s sales were almost flat,with an average selling price of $154; Motorola’s sales rose only 4%, with an average selling price of$147.30 Motorola was no longer just trying to catch up with Nokia; it was trying to stay ahead ofSamsung. Acknowledged Frost, “The one that keeps you up at night is Samsung.”31

Frost needed management’s commitment to meet the Samsung challenge. But first he needed toget their attention. He took the extreme step of assembling 240 of the top brass to listen to nine youngmen, ages 18 to 24, whom he flew into Chicago to sound off about the company’s cell phones. “Motorola’sproblem is, Samsung kicks ass,” one young man told the audience of top bananas. That started a cascadeof complaints. Even the revered Nextel walkie-talkie phone came in for a shellacking. “That’s a productplumbers or construction workers with low-slung pants use,” said another.”32 The insults were exactlywhat Frost had in mind. And it worked. He finally got the resources to begin developing a top-notchdesign team; within a year, he had added 120 designers—doubling the staff—and opened new designstudios, including one in Milan, to soak up the fashion vibes.

By mid-2003, Mike Z’s and Teresa Metty’s efforts to improve operations culminated in the unveil-ing of three new clamshell phones—the V300, V500, and V600. The three phones were dubbed “TheTriplets” because they were the first products to be based on Motorola’s new strategy of deliveringdifferentiated products from a common platform. All featured color screens with double the resolutionof most displays and were based on Motorola’s cheaper and more powerful i250 chipset. But they haddifferent features and sold at different price points.

Now that he had product to run with, Geoffrey Frost began his branding assault in earnest. Usingguerrilla marketing tactics, he gave away handsets to hip-hop artists and sought movie placements. Heheld a party—with celebrities in attendance—on the rooftop of a hip Manhattan hotel to unveil thenew products. And he collaborated with the advertising agency on an edgy new campaign, featuringyoung, hip consumers and headlines like “HelloMoto” and “DivaMoto.” The Rolling Stones were out;cutting-edge deejays like Paul Van Dyk and Felix Da Housecat were in.

Despite the team’s efforts, 2003 was not a good year. Motorola trimmed costs by 20% per hand-set, but prices dropped 13%.33 Motorola introduced a dozen new camera phones; Samsung launched20. Motorola changed its product line every 12 to 18 months; Samsung changed its every nine months.34

And once again, Motorola missed the U.S. Christmas selling season. It failed to deliver Verizon’s cameraphone on time because of delays in testing. Cingular didn’t get its phones until mid-December—toolate for any major marketing effort.35 During 2003, Motorola’s market share dropped from 16.3% to14.5%, while Samsung increased its share from 9.8% to 10.8% and Nokia held onto the lead with34.8%.36 Citing differences with Motorola’s Board on the direction of the company, Christopher Galvinresigned.

Motorola’s Transformation (2004-2005)

The Board selected Ed Zander, the former head of Sun Microsystems, as the new CEO. While manyinside Motorola took the choice of an outsider to be a slap in the face, the business press applauded thechoice: “Motorola is an engineer-driven company, not well attuned to customer needs. It spends mil-lions on R&D that never sees the light of day. And having lost confidence in itself, it needs a shot in thearm… [Ed Zander] has the people skills, marketing expertise, operational background, and leadershipability to engineer a turnaround.”37 Zander characterized his task as a “turn-up,” not a “turnaround.”

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His challenge, as he saw it, was to become more customer-focused and to do a better job at movingR&D out of the lab and into the marketplace.

To start, he began to break down barriers within the organization. Padmasree Warrior, Motorola’schief technology officer, says a day-long meeting between marketing and engineering was the first in her20 years at the company. To ensure a change in working relationships, Zander asked her to spend nomore than 70% of her time on operational issues.38 He also shifted the balance of power to designers.According to one designer, “It used to be the engineers threw us a chunk of circuit boards and said, ‘Putsome plastic around that.’ Now we base everything on some experience we want to project and thenhave the engineering team help us get there.”39

Still, Zander’s first year was no picnic. Quarter after quarter, market share slipped; Samsung over-took Motorola as the Number 2 global brand of cell phones. Motorola’s stock continued to tumble. Byhis own account, Zander underestimated the insular nature of the company. He would later recallthinking, “…we ought to get back to putting the customer first. Why weren’t we talking about Verizonevery day? ...I noticed that after three weeks, nobody was in my office to call a customer. I thought it wasstrange. In my previous life, we’d bring a customer in or we’d be pounding away at our market share.And I just didn’t see that. So I asked who our top customers are and started calling them, and thenvisiting them, one by one.”40

Motorola’s turnaround finally came with the introduction of the RAZR in mid-2004. At 3.9inches long, 2 inches wide, and ½-inch thick with a large, vivid color screen, the RAZR was, simply put,a beauty.41 It worked on all four bands of GSM/GPRS standard, allowing it to work in Europe as wellas in the U.S. With prices ranging from $499 to $799, it was expensive enough that most carriers didn’tthink it would sell. Cingular took the chance and reaped the rewards. “We actually had two customersget in a fight over the RAZR,” said one Cingular store manager.42 Hip-hop impresario, Russell Simmons,took one look at the phone and declared it “hot.”43

Throughout the product’s development, Geoffrey Frost was the RAZR’s primary cheerleader.Once it was ready for market, he insisted the company move away from the common practice of nam-ing phones with numbers and letters to a naming system reminiscent of instant messaging. He alsoorchestrated a big launch, including TV advertising and an appearance in a Gwen Stefani music video.Later, Russian tennis pro Maria Sharapova was enlisted to promote the phone, and the company sentRAZRs to key Oscar nominees.44

Expecting to sell two million handsets in the first year, Motorola sold more than ten times thatnumber.45 By the end of 2005, Motorola’s market share had jumped to 18.7%—solidifying its lead overSamsung with a 12.5% share.46 With the RAZR’s success, Frost saw the opportunity to spin an appeal-ing narrative about how Motorola was cool again—a story he shopped widely throughout the mediaand with analysts. It worked. As one analyst put it, “Two years ago, Motorola was your dad’s old radiocompany. Today it is a hip, cool brand for younger users.”47

Thus, it was the RAZR—born of the efforts of former CEO Christopher Galvin’s team of outsid-ers and the support of new CEO Ed Zander—that led to Zander’s triumphant performance at the 2006annual shareholder’s meeting.

History Repeats: Motorola Falters in the Handset Market (2006)

In November 2005, the company was stunned and saddened by the sudden death of Geoffrey Frost,who only days before had been promoted to Executive VP-Chief Marketing Officer.48 The loss was bothpersonal and professional, as the need for marketing leadership had never been greater. In the fast-moving cell phone market, it was time for an innovative new product that would enable Motorola tobuild on RAZR’s success. Motorola’s management knew this, but disagreed on how it could be accom-plished.49

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In the end, management decided to introduce a higher-end phone, the KRZR, to win morestatus-conscious customers and boost profit margins, while using RAZR to build market share. RAZRprices were slashed, and service providers were soon offering the RAZR for $30 or even free with aservice contract.50,51,52 Sales of RAZR soared, but KRZR was a disappointment. The two brands weren’tclearly differentiated, and consumers didn’t see sufficient added value with KRZR. Market share wasgained, but at the expense of profit margins.53,54

Other attempts to extend the brand while maintaining the cachet of the instant-messaging nam-ing convention—the SLVR, PEBL, RCKR—similarly failed to win consumer response.55,56 Hence, thelosses that began in late 2006 continued into 2007. To make matters worse, Motorola lagged behindcompetitors in the development of third-generation (3G) technology, which allows phones to handlehigh volumes of data and to play music and video. Motorola’s competitors had already bet that thesefeatures would dominate the market in the near future.57

It was this series of blunders which led to Zander’s humbled position at the 2007 annual share-holders meeting. This, and Steve Jobs’s announcement that the new iPhone was set to launch in June2007.58

Notes1 Wolinsky, Howard (2006). “Motorola’s Zander Basks in Glory of ‘Very Good Year’ for Schaumburg Giant,” TheChicago Sun-Times. May 2, 47.2 Stone, Brad (2007). “Motorola Ties Its Rebound to a Sequel and New Gear,” The New York Times, May 16, C3.3 Taylor, Paul (2007). “Motorola Seeks to Reverse First Quarter,” Financial Times, London, April 19, 28.4 Strahler, Steven R. (2007). “Zander Faces Next Test: Motorola Chief under Pressure to Make Deeper Cuts inCosts.” Crain’s Chicago Business. May 14, 2.5 Pringle, David, Jesse Drucker and Evan Ramstad (2004). “World Circuit: Cellphone Makers Pay a Heavy Tollfor Missing Fads,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 30, A1.6 Hochman, Paul (1996). “World’s Smallest, Lightest Cellular Phone: Motorola StarTAC,” Forbes, Winter, 137.7 Ibid.8 Ibid.9 Ibid.10 Mehta, Stephanie N. (1998). “When They Build a Better Cell Phone, Less is Usually More,” Wall Street Journal,August 24, A1.11 Stone, Brad (2005). “Motorola’s Good Call,” Newsweek, March 14, 42.12 Petersen, Andrea (2001). “Softer Sell: Once-Mighty Motorola Stumbled When It Began to Act that Way.”13 Daniel, Caroline (2002). “Motorola Answers a Wake-Up Call,” FT.com, October 23, 1.14 Petersen. “Softer Sell.”15 Ibid.16 Condon, Bernard (2003). “Booby Prize,” Forbes, May 12, 104.17 Petersen, “Softer Sell.”18 Ibid.19 Ojo, Bolaji (2003). “Motorola’s Master Plumber,” EBN, March 31, 21.20 Daniel, Caroline. “Motorola Answers a Wake-Up Call.”21 Ojo. “Motorola’s Master Plumber.”22 Ibid.23 Ibid.24 Daniel, “Motorola Answers a Wake-Up Call.”25 Ibid.26 Edwards, Cliff, Moon Ihlwan, and Pete Engardio (2003). “The Samsung Way,” Business Week, June 16.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 Pringle, David, Jesse Drucker, and Evan Ramstad (2003). “World Circuit: Cellphone Makers Pay a Heavy Tollfor Missing Fads,” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 30: A1.30 Edwards et al. “The Samsung Way.”31 Daniel. “Motorola Answers a Wake-Up Call.”32 Tatge, Mark (2003). “Recharged,” Forbes, September 15, 62.33 Ibid.34 Edwards et al. “The Samsung Way.”

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35 Drucker, Jesse (2003). “Leading the News: Motorola to Miss Key Season to Sell its Camera Phones,” Wall StreetJournal, September 26, A3.36 Pringle, David (2004). “Motorola Trails Rivals’ Growth in Cellphones,” Wall Street Journal, February 4, B5.37 Roberts, Bill (2004). “Dialing It Up a Notch at Motorola,” Electronic Business, March 30, 3: 2.38 Rhoads, Christopher (2004). “Motorola Shows Signs of Life,” Wall Street Journal, July 23, A10.39 Crockett, Roger O. (2005). “How Motorola Got its Groove Back,” Business Week, August 8: 68.40 Rhoads, Christopher (2005). “Boss Talk: Motorola’s Modernizer,” Wall Street Journal, June 23, B1.41 Mossberg, Walter S. (2004). “Handsome New Phone by Motorola Is Skinny, Sleek—and Expensive,” Wall StreetJournal, November 4, B1.42 Pringle, David, Christopher Rhoads, and Evan Ramstad (2004). “The Gift of Gab,” Wall Street Journal,December 16, B1.43 Crockett, Roger O. (2004). “Phone Magic,” Business Week, November 8, 112.44 Rhoads, Christopher, and Li Yuan (2007). “Dropped Call: How Motorola Fell a Giant Step Behind,” Wall StreetJournal (Eastern Edition), April 27, p. A1.45 Lashinsky, Adam (2006). “RAZR’s Edge,” Fortune, June 12, 124.46 Silver, Sara (2005). “Can Motorola Ride RAZR’s Edge?” Wall Street Journal, December 13, C1.47 Cuneo, Alice Z. (2005). “Frost’s Death Leaves Legacy, Leadership Void,” Advertising Age, November 21.48 Ibid.49 Rhoads and Yuan, “Dropped Call.”50 Hughlett, Mike (2007). “Motorola’s Circle of Woes Widens,” Knight Ridder Tribune Business News,Washington, May 6, p. 1.51 Yuan, Li, and Joann S. Lublin (2007), “Motorola’s Call for Help; A Management Shuffle May Signal Board’sImpatience with Zander,” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), March 23, A6.52 Stone, Brad (2007), “Motorola Ties Its Rebound to a Sequel and New Gear,” The New York Times, May 16, C3.53 Anonymous (2007). “Motorola: Upwardly Mobile?” Marketing Week, London, March 1, 22.54 Hughlett. “Motorola’s Circle of Woes Widens.”55 Crockett, Roger O., and Olga Khaif (2007). “All This and Icahn, Too; As Ed Zander Battles Falling Earning,Motorola Attracts a Demanding Investor,” Business Week, Feb. 12, 4021, 34.56 Stone. “Motorola Ties Its Rebound to a Sequel and New Gear.”57 Rhoads and Yuan. “Dropped Call.”58 Hughlett, Mike (2007). “Motorola Short on New: Phone Unveiling Lacked Substance, Analysts Note,” KnightRidder Tribune Business News, Washington, May 16, 1.