moving towards integrated safegaurds · 4 modules 70 tonnes full 60 tonnes empty. 15 into the...

SAFEGUARDS PERSPECTIVES

James A. CastertonCanadian Nuclear Safety Commission

WNU Summer InstituteAugust, 2008

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OverviewOverview

Safeguards in Canada: Past, Present & Future

Safeguards Challenges

Conclusions

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Safeguards in CanadaSafeguards in Canada

The Policy Framework

Longstanding commitment to peaceful useStrong support for effective nuclear non-proliferation regimeEmphasis on cooperation & transparency

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The Legal Framework

Atomic Energy Control Act, 1946Nuclear Safety and Control Act, 2000

Health, Safety, Security, Environment

InternationalCommitments

Nuclear Regulation

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Fuel Cycle Characteristics

Uranium Mining & MillingRefining & ConversionFuel FabricationNuclear Power ReactorsResearch ReactorsSpent Fuel StorageR&D

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The Canadian Fuel Cycle

Uranium Miningand Milling

U3O8

Uranium Refining

UO3

Uranium Conversion UraniumFuel Fabrication

Power Reactors

UO2

UFuel

Research and Development

DSCs

Wet Storage

Spent Fuel in Wet Storage

Spent Fuel In Dry Storage

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Safeguards: Where in Canada?

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The Early YearsThe Early Years

Focus on Effective Safeguards Approaches

C/S system for powerreactors

Closed-circuit TVSealsYes/No monitorsBundle counters

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The Early YearsThe Early Years

Promote Safeguards Efficiency

AECB/IAEA pursuit of alternative safeguards approaches

1980’s: Developed, tested & implemented the zone approach for natural uranium1990’s: Development & testing of

unannounced inspections (ATAP)real-time reporting conceptremote monitoring capability

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Current ExperienceCurrent Experience

Implementing strengthened safeguards

Additional Protocol signed in 1998, in force in 2000Broad conclusion attained in 2005

Moving towards State-level integrated safeguards

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Implementing Strengthened SafeguardsObjectives:

Attain/Maintain broad safeguards conclusionHigh level of confidence in Canada’s compliance with peaceful use commitments

Optimize safeguards implementation through State-level integrated safeguards approach

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Attaining Broad ConclusionChallenges

Activities pre-dating safeguards agreementPolicy change on starting point of safeguards

Required close IAEA/CNSC/Industry cooperation

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Moving towards State-level ISConsultations mechanisms

IAEA

CNSC

INDUSTRY

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Phasing-in approachAgreed prioritiesAvailable resources

Transfers of spent fuel to dry storage

Moving towards State-level IS384 bundles

4 modules70 tonnes full

60 tonnes empty

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Into the FutureInto the Future

Implementation of State-level IS approachCurrent Implementation

Research reactors, static dry storages, LOFsDry storage transfers of spent fuel at multi-unit stations

Under DevelopmentProcedures for natural uranium processing facilities (refining, conversion, fuel fabrication, fresh fuel storageProcedures for multi-unit power reactors, transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at single-unit power reactorsChalk River Nuclear Laboratories

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Maintaining the broad conclusion

Successful implementation of Canada/IAEA Safeguards Agreements

Meeting reporting requirementsFacilitating inspector access

Ensuring appropriate regulatory oversightEffectiveness of the SSAC

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Addressing industry developments

Refurbishment of power reactors

Nuclear renaissanceNew power reactorsNew supporting infrastructure (e.g. new mines)

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Safeguards in Canada: ConclusionSafeguards in Canada: Conclusion

Canada and the IAEA have had a long history of working together to facilitate effective safeguards in Canada, efficiently implementedEffective interactions between industry, SSAC and the IAEA are keyOpenness, transparency are required for the IAEA to do its job – provide credible conclusions

Commitment, Communication & Cooperation

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“This global challenge (viz. the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery) requires a multifaceted solution….We have a range of tools available to tackle this threat…While all of these instruments are necessary, none is sufficient by itself. Not all proliferation challenges require the same remedies. We need to deploy the tools which are most effective in each case…”

G8 Declaration, Evian Summit

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Safeguards ChallengesSafeguards Challenges

The Global ContextRecognition/Relevance ChallengesImplementation Challenges

20/20 and Beyond

Conclusions

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The Global ContextRecognition/Relevance Challenges

Current EnvironmentThreats to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime (DPRK, Iraq, Iran)Debate on Multilateral Institutions as appropriate mechanisms for prevention or responseCriticism of the Agency’s Safeguards System

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VerificationCommitment

NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

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The Global ContextChallengesTo continue to foster an enhanced understanding of the IAEA’s mandate

Role and value of Agency’s safeguardsReporting on Safeguards Implementation (SIR)

To promote maximum commitmentAP as the norm

To deal appropriately with non-complianceCurrent Iranian situation

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The Global ContextImplementation Challenges

To ensure that safeguards efforts are appropriately focused To maximize the potential of the APTo develop and implement State-level IS approaches

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SAFEGUARDS CHALLENGES

Focused Safeguards Effort

Focus verification activities where they are needed most (materials, situations)

DifferentiationAdaptability

Appropriate balance betweenQuantitative and Qualitative

The Global Context

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IAEA Verification Effort

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IAEA Verification Effort

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The Global ContextImplementation Challenges

Maximizing the potential of the Additional Protocol

Increased commitment + increased access + increased information = basis for credible assuranceValue of credible assurance?Effectiveness/efficiency

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The Global ContextImplementation Issues

Develop & implement State-level IS approachesGreatest potential for optimizationElaboration of State-level considerations and incorporation into IS approachesAppropriate balance between quantitative analysis and qualitative considerations

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The Global ContextImplementation Issues

Expert judgment

State EvaluationInformation gatheringInformation analysis

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20/20 and BeyondVision 20/20

IAEA Secretariat ExerciseWhat kind of IAEA will the world need?How can the IAEA fulfill that need?

Comprised of 3 elementsEnvironmental scanPrioritization of key areas of workConsideration of resource requirements

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20/20 and BeyondReport of Commission of Eminent PersonsEstablished by the IAEA DG

Examined the future role of the IAEASecretariat’s report provided some backgroundReviewed all areas of the IAEA’s Mandate

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20/20 and BeyondSafeguards Considerations

States should provide access to information, sites and people required to provide the necessary level of confidence in the IAEA’s safeguards conclusionsStates should provide the financial, technological and human resources necessary for the IAEA to carry out its missionThe IAEA should strengthen its safeguards culture and adopt new approaches to recruiting, training and retaining highly qualified personnel

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20/20 and BeyondSafeguards Areas of Interest

Fostering greater transparency by States – Additional Protocol PlusSearch for indicators of weaponisationAlignment of safeguards, nonproliferation and physical protection measures – Generation IV, Global Nuclear Energy PartnershipEnhanced role for IAEA in disarmament field – verification of fissile materials cutoff, monitoring excess nuclear materials

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CONCLUSIONS• There are many challenges to address on

several levels• There is recognition of the challenges and

considerable groundwork has been laid• There is a history of working together (IAEA

Secretariat, SAGSI, Member States)

Technical leadership, vision, political commitment and a cooperative spirit will transform challenges into opportunities

moving towards integrated safegaurds · 4 modules 70 tonnes full 60 tonnes empty. 15 into the...

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