MRAP Marketing Military Innovation

Summary

How does government innovate in a crisis?

Do not expect hierarchically organized government agencies to innovate naturally, even in a crisis.

Innovation requires openness to outside ideas, and government executives must know how to be marketed to.

Research question: How to effect innovation in materiel in wartime?

Acquiring new armaments is challenging. Popular perception: costs too much, takes too long, underperforms Sixty years of consistent recommendations, inconsistent results Almost always a process led by the military

Shouldn’t wartime innovation be easier? Budgets and bureaucracy should matter less, right? But three problems: differing military priorities • politicians’ access to information • industrial unpreparedness

Fortunately, military innovation has multiple pathways. civil-military • inter-agency • entrepreneurial • cultural • disguised Oddly, a literature short on attention to industry.

So how can industry, the military, and government work together to bring innovative, wartime solutions to the battlefield?

3

Problem: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq “IEDs are my No. 1 threat. I want… a Manhattan-like Project.”

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Total from IEDs and other explosivesTotal from other causes

Fatalities from hostile causes amongst US troops in IraqMarch 2003–April 2011

The threat was disruptive, and the initial responses were not wholly effective.4

“Left of Boom”a technological effort

Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)disrupt the network • defeat the device •

train the force

“Right of Boom”an initially expedient effort

armoring utility vehicleshillbilly-armored • up-armored • factory-

armored

5

The ultimately dispositive response started slowly: Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles

radical departure in design for armored vehicles—just one over 20 years old high ground clearance • V-shaped hull • wheels • frangible, commercial automotive

parts • steel armor • armored glass • remote mounts • top-opening hatches

The Army and Marines had other priorities. Someone needed to do some marketing. How did this come about?

Methodology

Extensive documentary research Statistical analyses of casualty and procurement patterns

Long series of chain-referral interviews Basic question: кто кого? What’s the pathway?

Document a long timeline and trace a nonlinear process

Through 2003, industry led the effort by modestly preparing the ground for future sales.

7

Rep. Duncan Hunter Sr. (R-CA) and others get angry about Humvees

DepSecDef Wolfwitz creates the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC)

Garth Barrett and Vernon Joynt emigrate from South Africa to South Carolina, establish TSG

Barrett recruits Mike Aldrich to run marketing.

Marine officers Wayne Sinclair, Roy McGriff, Joe Alena, and Gert De Wet write about ‘MRAPs’

TSG sells Buffalo MRAPs to the US Army engineers

Political activities

Industrial activities

Military activities

Aldrich observes USMC’s early enthusiasm for MRAPs

MARPAC urgently requests MRAPs for Iraq

Frank Kavanaugh buys TSG

In 2004, Force Protection’s street-level marketing promoted awareness of the product.

8

Hunter and others stay angry about Humvees

Creates facts on the ground for the US Army and the USMC

Political

Industrial

Military

Convinces Sen. Lindsay Graham

(R-SC) of value of MRAPs

Graham earmarks money for Buffalo MRAPs for the US Army engineers

Renamed FPI targets USMC, sells Cougar MRAPs for engineers

MARPAC has requested

MRAPs urgently

Army orders more RG31s

In 2005, military officers in Iraq urgently requested over 1,000 MRAPs for the infantry, but failed.

FPI sells more Cougar MRAPs to the USMC engineers; GDLS sells more of BAE’s RG31s to the Army engineers

Rep. Gene Taylor (D-MS) becomes alarmed by the IED problem

Political

Industrial

Military

1st MEB staff write MRAP UUNS for infantry

Gen. Hejlik gets UUNS through MARCENT

USMC Safety Board sends to MCCDC at Quantico

UUNS quietly dies at MCCDC

Continued fielding raises awareness

9

In 2006, a mostly-new military team secured a promise and a plan for more MRAPs.

Political

Industrial

MilitaryConsults 1st

MEB staff

Visits factory in South Africa;

rides in MRAP in Afghanistan

Convinces 1st MEB to again

request MRAPs

Iraqi Army gets 1,000 MRAPs from Force Protection with US supplemental wartime funding.

Convinces MARCENT to

bypass QuanticoTakes request directly to the commandant

Navy Dept. establishes

procurement program

Future SecDef serves on ISG, meets Gen. Peter Chiarelli

Susan Alderson sees MRAPs

10

Commandant approves

Effort proceeds

modestly as Navy and OSD look for money

By 2007, politicians had picked up the process, and ordered over 12,000 MRAPs.

11

Political

Industrial

Military

Tom Vanden Brook sees

MRAPs, writes series of articles

in USA Today

General Chiarelli repeatedly briefs SecDef Gates on

MRAP situation (and sends him the

newspaper)

Gates makes MRAPs #1

acquisition priority for the DoD

Money and orders flow to industry

Industry recognizes demand signal, and begins spooling up

for large orders

Congress demands answers, appropriates billions for MRAPs

Interpretation: Industrial, military, and political actors sequentially led the effort in three phases.

12

Activity Phase 1 2003–2004

Phase 2 2005–late 2006

Phase 3 late 2006–2007

Industrial “no landmines in my motor pool” ILAVs alliances &

supply chains

Military “no requirement” lost-and-found requirement joint requirement

Political “Mission Accomplished” Super FOBs An angry Hill &

a new Sec Def

US MRAPs ordered 64 274 12,231

So how to bring innovative solutions in a crisis? Through iterative public and private marketing

• Loosely coordinating industrial, military, and political activities

• Differentiating the product at a manageable price

• Moderating the promotion and the objectives

• Evangelizing for change within the military (promotion)

• Legitimating its placement in a new category—‘MRAP’

• Making use of multiple, non-linear pathways of innovation: entrepreneurial, inter-agency, civil-military, and cultural

• Leveraging leadership on multiple levels

13

Lessons of the MRAP marketing experience

For policy-makers: to find the next MRAP, (1) cultivate public entrepreneurs, and (2) learn how to be marketed to.

For industrialists: to sell the next MRAP, know when to ignore your customers.

For researchers: to hasten the next MRAP, study marketing to the military—in questions of communication, industrial scale, decentralization, and coordination.

14