muep.mau.se web viewinterpretivists reject the notions of theory-neutral observations and the idea...

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Vivek Noel Dinker Munigala840211-5375

EU as Global Actor

A Response to the Syrian Crisis

Bachelor Level Thesis

Malmö University

Supervisor: Vasileois Petsinis

Word Count: 10,727

Spring Semester 2012

Vivek Noel Dinker Munigala

840211-5375

2012-09-20

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Abstract:

The most happening in today’s world is the issue of global warming and the Arab spring.

They both are matters of concern and the term globalization explains their complication. A lot

of aspects in this world are inter-connected, starting from events of climate change to events

of the Arab spring they all require an international response. The happenings in the Arab

spring have jeopardized the common values, mutual interests and the democratic values the

world is building upon. It is a huge hit to the modern society with so many existing

organizations, institutions and rule of law that are contradicting these events. In consideration

with these events, this paper will concentrate on EU and its institutional capability in

resolving the issues of Arab spring. Regardless, that these events have a global influence.

EU’s response will be reflected considering its interests in the region and geo-political

location. The interpretation will have emphasis on preliminary and present EU-Syria relations

in co-ordination with theory and policy conditions. The theory used in this regard will be

Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) and the policy conditions that would be referred to is

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Index

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Index.......................................................................................................................................3

1. Demystifying the Arab Spring (Introduction).........................................................................4

1.1Problem Formulation.........................................................................................................5

1.2Research Questions............................................................................................................5

1.3 Limitations........................................................................................................................6

2. Methodology...........................................................................................................................7

2.1 Ontology...........................................................................................................................7

2.2 Epistemology........................................................................................................................7

2.3 Deductive Approach.........................................................................................................8

2.4 Qualitative Case Study......................................................................................................9

3. Background...........................................................................................................................10

3.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism.........................................................................................10

3.2 Syria................................................................................................................................12

3.3 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)...............................................................13

4. Analysis.................................................................................................................................16

4.1 What are the different patterns of decision-making in the EU influencing Syrian

Situation?..........................................................................................................................16

4.2 How do these patterns of decision-making affect EU’s role as a global actor?.........22

4.3 Why are there contradicting forces for EU in representing itself as a United Front?.29

5. Conclusion............................................................................................................................32

6. Reflections............................................................................................................................33

7. References.............................................................................................................................36

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1. Demystifying the Arab Spring (Introduction)The Arab spring is in the light of the world, a major eruption that has kick started a revolution

among the Arab countries that have faced political distress. A long time suffering by the

citizens of some of the countries has finally reached its end. Considering, Tunisia as an initial

example (Blight, Pulham, and Torpey 2012) and the countries that followed it. In this case

there was certain pattern that followed, revolutions in these countries demanded change of

government or the person in rule. Thereby, creating disturbance in the public sphere and

raising momentum for a civil war.

When these revolutions started a lot of humanitarian related issues were affected and the

whole idea of social norms disappeared. More importantly, these nations that have had these

revolutions as a preliminary condition accepted the essentiality United Nations represents. But

that soon has changed considering the political reaction towards the crisis driven states and

considering the conflicts between the supporters and the rebels. In addition these conflicts

faced a certain imbalance with the government using military intervention to calm them.

Thereby, meaning improper use of force resulting in violation of democratic values of the

international community.

Having this kind of background information, it is therefore interesting to see from a

geographical point of view. On, How EU reacts to these happenings in the Middle East

(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:184). Contextually, there can be considerate amount of research

done that refers to EU as a global actor in this concern. (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:164). But, as

a pre-known outcome, it can be said that EU was not able to represent itself as a united front.

Regardless of the fact that EU already has active cooperation with these nations through the

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (European Commission 2010). Through ENP, EU has

developed and enhanced relationship that is based on respecting mutual interests and

respecting concerns of peace, security. Furthermore, ENP has done a favour in emancipating

relations with its neighbours but matters of security at about now have been jeopardized

considering the functioning of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (European

Commission 2010). In spite of EU emancipation of developing relations that is based on a

normative dimension (Manners 2002:238).

In consideration with both policy tools of ENP, CFSP and due to their propensity of covering

broad aspects and many countries; Syria would be taken as a case.

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Syria’s is significant as the cause of disturbance share similarities with other states in the

Arab spring (Blight, Pulham, and Torpey 2012). It is also vital, as the disturbances in other

countries have somehow reached an end. But in Syria’s they don’t seem to, considering the

duration and the still persisting struggle that initiated on March 15th 2011(The New York

times 2012).

Having this emphasis on the occurring events and considering the requirement for EU to act,

it is therefore interesting to see EU’s response in this regard. The reasons seem to be the

united representation of the EU. And due to this major setback this paper will involve in a

theoretical explanation of the contributing reasons. Theoretical explanation in this regard

refers to Moravcsik and his work on preferences and power. Moravcsik in his work on

preferences and power have been extensively discussed The Liberalist framework and its

implications on international character. In addition Liberal Intergovernmentalism explains the

EU’s character in specific.

Following the introduction the next sub-section will lay emphasis on the problem formulation

in its generality and following it would be a sub-section laying emphasis on different research

questions reflecting the problem formulation.

1.1Problem Formulation

The problem formulation in this section has been formulated to a broader extent due to

essentiality of providing examples and the necessary discussions the analysis requires.

How is the CFSP able to affect the Arab spring?

This question is significant due to EU perceived interests in its neighbours that refer to peace

and security. It vital for EU’s as it believes secure neighbours make secure borders (Shulman

2004:1-2). It is also vital, as EU’s persisting interests involve a lot of development

programmes in the region and funding in regard. As a preliminary measure to develop

relations these funds were targeted towards improving standards and helping them establish a

sustaining society. Finally, all these characteristics imply EU’s intention for prospering

security.

1.2Research Questions

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In accordance with the problem formulation presented above there are three research

questions that simplify and determine the factors that need to be analysed;

What are the different patterns of decision-making in the EU influencing Syrian situation?

How do these patterns of decision-making affect EU’s role as a global actor?

Why are there contradicting forces for EU in representing itself as a united front?

By answering these questions it is possible to have a profound approach on what EU enacts

through policy coordination and in understanding the flaws behind EU’s representation as a

global actor.

As, these questions emancipate aspects of policy provisions and applicable coherency. These

questions also set out EU’s capability if states don’t keep the agreements.

Finally, all these procedures determine EU’s capability and external dimension in terms of

foreign policy.

1.3 LimitationsThe limitations for this research are set forth due to vulnerability and the possibility for the

discussion to elaborate in a broader sense. Thereby I would lay down the conditions for this

research, the research would be in relevance to EU functioning as a global actor and this

would be concerning to Syria. However, there would be examples of other states taken up in

the discussion but they wouldn’t have the same positioning as Syria does in this research.

There would be an internal dimension referring to EU member states (where there

functionality as one) and an external dimension (where EU member states inadequate

functionality).

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2. MethodologyIn this research the method chosen is a case study. Case study as a method gives the

researcher the possibility to analyse different required elements. The elements

accordingly are as follows;

a) Firstly, EU perceived interests that are based on maintaining peace and security

(Manners 2002:238). Contrary to these interests is the recent Syrian behaviour.

Accordingly the methodological stand point would be contemplating EU’s

efficiency in reacting towards Syria.

b) Secondly, it would be to analyse the EU’s internal factors that didn’t relatively

contribute for EU to function as one. Due to which actors being the member states

and their behaviour would be analysed (Biscop, Balfour, and Emerson 2012:3).

2.1 Ontology Organization and culture can be seen as one form of approach to understand the ontological

stand point. This sought of stand point exists due to the relativity between organization and

culture. From a research point of view the organizational requirements are fulfilled by EU and

the cultural dimension by the revolutions.

This sought of understanding can be seen from a constructivist (Bryman 2008:20) ontological

position where the happenings are determined from the external factors of social interaction.

It is also a weak stand point on behalf of the EU, as its intention and the relation that was

based on mutual respect towards a value-based community is jeopardized (Bryman 2008:18).

EU in this regard starts with emphasis on social order (normative dimension) and it expects it

to respect these values. In order to strengthen this position, there are certain benchmarks set

by the EU. Therefore referring to EU as an actor that constraints force that acts and inhibits its

actors.

2.2 Epistemology The epistemological stance that I intend to choose is Interpretivism (Bryman 2008:15) as it

questions the study of social reality and happening. Interpretivism and constructivism are

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related approaches to this research as they have characteristics of particular philosophical

world views.

Proponents of these approaches share the goal of understanding the complex world we

inhabit. This desire is variously spoken of as an abiding concern for the life world, for a point

of view, for understanding meaning, for grasping the actor’s definition of a situation, for

Verstehen(Bryman 2008:17). The world of lived reality and situation-specific meanings that

constitute the general object of investigation is thought to be constructed by social actors.

Many of the ideas in these approaches stem from the German intellectual tradition of

hermeneutics (Bryman 2008:16) and the Verstehen tradition in sociology, from

phenomenology, and from critiques of positivism in the social sciences. Interpretivists reject

the notions of theory-neutral observations and the idea of universal laws as in science.

Therefore Theory in this paradigm takes on a stronger perspective.

Knowledge consists of these constructions where there is a relative consensus among those

competent to interpret the substance of the construction. Multiple ‘knowledge’s’ can thereby

coexist when equally competent interpreters disagree.

2.3 Deductive Approach“Deductive reasoning works from the more general to the more specific. Sometimes

this is informally called a "top-down" approach. We might begin with thinking up

a theory about our topic of interest. We then narrow that down into more

specific hypotheses that we can test. We narrow down even further when we

collect observations to address the hypotheses. This ultimately leads us to be able to

test the hypotheses with specific data -- a confirmation (or not) of our original

theories” (William 2006:1).

This research involves in emancipating deductive reasoning as the theory and outcome is pre-

known. Moreover, a very broad topic of interest has been narrowed down to specifics. The

choice of data also contributes as the functioning factors are appropriately chosen for the

research. In consideration with the chosen method and data selected the research would be

conducted as follows;

In this paper the research conducted is a top down process as the EU has to change his

behaviour or act in terms of its external actors. External actors refer to its neighbours that

have not met the conditions of the agreement. For EU to act in this case can’t be seen as

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legitimate instead it has to adjust and develop or improve the standards of conditionality for

the future. So, here in this case it can be seen as a “bottom up” (Richardson 2006:55)

regardless that a deductive reasoning contributes for a “top down” approach.

Another aspect to the deductive approach is the question of validity and the truth of universal

statements that are based on experience, such as the hypotheses and the use of theory in

empirical evidence. As many people believe that the truth of these universal statements is

‘know by experience’. Yet is clear that an account of an experience – of an observation or the

result of an experiment – can in the first place be only a singular statement that we know its

truth from experience usually means that the truth of this universal statement can somehow be

reduced to the truth of singular ones, and that these singular ones are known by experience to

be true; which amounts to saying that the universal statement is based on deductive inference

and refers to logic of consequence. Logic of consequence creates a certain degree of consent

over the possible outcome and confirms it (McKeon 2010:1-4).

Due to the methodological background, it is possible to interpret the data available in a

periodical manner and conformation. This can be attained by taking the events into account

that are happening in the Arab spring, that demand a regime change and that inhibit a

consequence. These events also indicate the process that is involved and the experience we

get through these events is true knowledge. But a methodological standpoint requires an

adequate theory for deductive reasoning to function properly. Liberal Intergovernmentalism

as a theory has been chosen where it as mentioned before tends to answer the requirements

the method avails. The different dimensions needed, being nation states in power, failed EU

representation as a united front.

2.4 Qualitative Case StudyDeriving from the ontological and epistemological stand points the suitable approach would

be Deductive. A successful qualitative case study (Bryman 2008:22) can be done in

consideration with the methodological choice and profound analytical tools can be used to

analyse the various aspects and now referring to EU’s intervention in the conflict eluded

countries; conflict that is based on social behaviour and reaction.

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3. Background Following the sub-section of qualitative case study, this part of the paper will involve in

laying the background for the research being the theory, some facts about Syria and finally

about the CFSP.

3.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism “The European Community (EC) can be seen as the most successful example of

institutionalized international policy co-ordination in the modern world. Starting with

its initiation from the Treaty of Rome to the Maastricht, the EC has developed through

the process of intergovernmental bargains” (Moravcsik 1993: 473)

An intergovernmental bargain is that determines preferences and power in the EU. As there is

no proper platform found to see EU as a supranational authority. According to Moravcsik, the

intergovernmental regime is designed to manage economic interdependence through policy-

coordination and policy coordination is set forth under intergovernmental negotiations

(preferences).

At the core of Intergovernmentalism they are three elements; the assumption of rational state

behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation and an Intergovernmentalist

analysis of interstate negotiation.

Rational State Behaviour

Under this element; a general framework for analysis is present within which a cost and

benefit of economic interdependence are the primary determinants of national preferences.

This element is often faced by relative intensity of national preferences, existence of

alternative coalitions. That in return gives an opportunity for an intergovernmental analyst of

the resolution of distributional conflicts among governments (Moravcsik 1993: 481)

In distributional conflicts governments with preferences often intend to maximize their utility.

Maximizing utility according to the Intergovernmentalist s follows model of rational state

behaviour. Model of rational state is deprived of domestically-constrained preferences

implying international conflict and co-operation. These preferences are accountable of two

stages; firstly governments define a set of interests. Secondly, these interests are bargained

among themselves before they are actually considered to be interests (Moravcsik 1993:481).

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Regardless of these interests being domestically deprived they constitute for international co-

operation (demand and supply). These interests deprived internally identify the benefits of

policy-coordination (demand) (Moravcsik 1993:481).

This combination of demand and supply on the basis of preferences and, strategic

opportunities shapes the foreign policy behaviour of states.

National Preference Formation

The element of national preference formation is derived from liberal assumptions. It basically

focusses on state-society relations in shaping national preferences. It is assumed that state

priorities and policies are determined by politicians that are heads of the national government.

They are known to embed in domestic and transnational civil society where they receive

constrains regarding their identities and purposes. Therefore the important attribute of

national preference formation is the identity of important societal groups, nature of their

interests and finally their influence on domestic policy (Moravcsik 1993:483).

Yet another attribute under the preference formation is interdependence, externalities and co-

operation. Under this attribute the argument is economically driven where interdependency is

on the basis of ‘international policy externalities’. International policy externalities arise when

policies of one government can create costs and benefits for politically significant social

groups outside its national jurisdiction. Here the achievements of domestic interests are

comprised of foreign counter parts (Moravcsik 1993:485).

However, national governments possess the capability of influencing domestic policy

outcomes and to achieve goals. This is seen when policy coordination affects international

policy externalities negatively (Moravcsik 1993:485).

Yet another attribute under the preference formation is the distributional consequences of

policy co-ordination. Even when agreements can be mutually benefitted governments often

have different preferences concerning the distribution of the benefits in accordance with terms

of co-operation. It is interpreted that costs and benefits of policy co-ordination are often

unevenly distributed among nations resulting in a conflict between winners and losers of

international and, domestic conflict. The conflict is so drastic that they undermine the

harmony of interests. Harmony of interests is mostly driven endogenously, where societal

groups influence an international negotiation. And in case of powerful societal groups the

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influence can sometimes jeopardize beneficiary measures in creating uncertainty and risks

(Moravcsik 1993:487).

In accordance with the EU there is a need for dominant groups in different countries that

share the same preferences as of EU. However, there is no clear line and understanding on

who is the deciding body. As the behaviour of countries are unexplainable due to lack of

clarity and transparency.

Having this background information it can be said that the bargaining options that LI suggests

are very much based on preferences of member states.

Following this section of the theory the next sub-section will lay emphasis on presenting some

facts about Syria.

3.2 Syria As mentioned before Syria has not kept the agreements made with EU. Thereby, this part of

the paper will involve in explaining the factors that have influenced EU’s interests. In terms

of Syria it can be said that the tensions started pretty late and still persists.

The initial disturbance that took initiation on 19th March 2011 was due to human rights

violations by government authorities which received protests in the form of a rally by pro-

government protesters. This rally was a consequence of long suffering Syrian people were

facing and to distort the situation even more the security forces killed four civilians. In this

regard President Assad assured to bring the culprits to justice, However that didn’t happen.

Considering this reaction from government authorities and security forces goes back to 2004.

From 2004 in conflicts between security forces and Syrian Kurds 25 people were killed and,

some 100 were injured (The Guardian 2011).

On the 23rd March 2011 the injustice by the security forces continues as they kill six civilians

in a mosque. These killings are committed due to people revolting for political freedom and to

end corruption (The Guardian 2011).

In accordance with the killings on 24th March mass Syrian protesters marched towards the

cemetery that resulted in security forces opening fire resulting in killing 34 protesters (The

Guardian 2011). Following these dates there were constant protests and they were constant

killings contributing in relatively different numbers.

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On the 26th March the Syrian government faces harsh criticism from the UN and the US

(Marsh, Chulov, and Finn 2011).

In this regard, Assad on 30th March blames “foreign conspirators and satellite television

channels for two weeks of widespread unrest that has challenged his regime” (The Guardian

2011).

Following which, there is a great amount of denial by Assad regarding the seriousity of the

situation and the constant try by the international community to stop this violence is

overlooked. As Assad intends to stay in rule and disregards all democratic procedures.

Considering these events and some facts it can be said that Syria doesn’t lie in the best interest

of either the EU or the international community. It is also interesting to see the minimum and

limited voice of the EU in this regard. Following this section the next sub-section will present

some requirements of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

3.3 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).CFSP will play a prominent role in this paper, as its requirements, procedures and structure

refers to the theory. CFSP as a part of the foreign policy was put in place to address the

security issues and to answer the externalities. CFSP mostly explains the EU’s intentions as a

global actor.

In order to elaborate more on the CFSP this part of the paper will lay emphasis on short

history of its establishment, its policy instruments and procedures that explain its success and

distress.

CFSP as a part of its initiation has faced a lot of challenges and distress. And yet after so

many years of its establishment it still lacks coherency and transparency in the course of its

implementation.

Historical Background

After the initiation of The Treaty of Rome, concerns towards addressing foreign policy were

not preceded. However the importance soon after was acknowledged and EU’s external

relations laid a base for the community to enter into association agreements with third parties.

This act increased the influence of EU representing itself as an international actor in the

absence of a formal foreign policy.

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However, the prominence of external foreign policy was not realized until the 1960’s and lead

to contentious discussion. In this process and in the wake of 1990 from the Intergovernmental

Conferences (IGC) conclusions, foreign policy conditions were laid down and were going to

be signed in 1991 and were intended to come into force in 1993. The considerations that were

made in forming the policy conditions were coherency(Bretherton, Vogler 2012:175), assured

strategic direction and assured access to policy instruments(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:167).

The provisions that were stated at this time were;

“to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence of the Union

in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter,

To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways,

To preserve peace and strengthen international security….

To promote international cooperation,

To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human

rights and fundamental freedoms” (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:167)

However, a major part of these provisions needed some serious consensus (Bretherton, Vogler

2006:187);

- Common Positions: adopted by consensus and binding to all member states.

- Common strategies: adopted by consensus and binding to all member states.

- Joint actions: adopted under qualified majority voting in the council of ministers after

prior unanimous agreement in the European council (Staab 2008:132).

The requirements stated are quite similar to the guiding principles of the European Political

Cooperation (EPC). As these guiding principles drive the Union to protect itself from the

external influences, and to develop, where appropriate, a foreign policy posture distinct from

that of the USA(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:167).

After the end of the Cold War, introducing CFSP was done by the Treaty of the European

Union in 1993 in regard of showing a strategic direction for external policy. In this regard, the

challenges met by the CFSP changed with time considering the 9/11 attacks. After this

incident terrorism was included in the security strategy. And under the 2003 European

Security Strategy it was underlined that A Secure Europe in a Better World was seen as a

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desirable goal. In achieving this goal the EU intended to represent itself as a value-based actor

and elaborate its work with the United Nations. These goals however didn’t serve as a

strategic direction, due to which external activities under the Cooperation and Association

Agreements comprised ‘good governance, human rights and other obligations (Bretherton,

Vogler 2006:167).

Establishment of the CFSP

Within the framework of the TEU’s and in concern with the European Council produced

‘general political guidelines ‘for the Union that determined five initial priority areas for CFSP

action.

1. Relations with Central and East European Countries.

2. Support for the Middle East Peace Process.

3. Conflict resolution.

4. Humanitarian relief efforts in former Yugoslavia.

5. Support for democratic process in South Africa and Russia.

In regard with these principles there can be tremendous amount of examples considered in

explaining the success and distress of conflict resolution by the EU. But in this paper and in

accordance with its requirements the aspects such as ‘support for the middle east process’,

and ‘conflict resolution’ (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:184)will be emphasized. As these aspects

remain the most relevant to this paper, regardless that the other three priorities of the CFSP

remain questionable.

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4. Analysis The analysis chapter is divided into three different parts basing on the three research

questions.

Every sub-chapter in the analysis will start by presenting the question and will follow on by

answering.

4.1 What are the different patterns of decision-making in the EU influencing Syrian

Situation?

It is vital to mention that the decision making patterns of the EU rely on the three pillars. The

three pillars determine the power politics of the EU and CFSP. Because of the CFSP being

placed under the 2nd pillar, all the decisions pertaining CFSP are based on IGC’S. Due to

which there is a tremendous amount of friction between member states and EU institutions

(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:174). If at all the CFSP was placed under the 1st pillar being the

supranational way of decision making, EU might not have faced as many problems in

representing itself as a united front. As, these decisions would receive a unanimity dimension.

This lack of credibility over EU’s decision making can be understood by the theory of Liberal

Intergovernmentalism (LI).

LI explains the flexibility member states possess in affecting a decision and that can in return

contribute for a lame representation of the EU. It is a disappointing outcome considering EU

interests are based on strategic partnership with its neighbours. Accordingly EU’s was not

able to act efficiently in the Syrian issue, as its members represented inactive participation.

This sought of inactive participation is a consequence of intergovernmental style of decision-

making.

A furthermore explanation of decision making patterns can be given by discussing the liberal

Intergovernmentalist framework that emphasizes Qualified Majority Voting (Bretherton,

Vogler 2012:169).

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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Liberal Theories Intergovernmentalist Theories

(International demand (International supply

for outcomes) of outcomes)

NATIONAL configuration

PREFERENCE of state INTERSTATE OUTCOMES

FORMATION preferences NEGOTIATION

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(Moravcsik 1993:482)

Liberal Theories

Liberal theory in its generality demands an outcome from the states. As the participants are

interconnected through the international community, thereby a conflict as of today need

countries to act as one (Syria).Usually the expected responses are universally mutual and

speaks of equal participation and As the international community is bound through

institutions and agreements.

Expectation to react to a crisis according to the liberalist framework puts EU in an

uncomfortable position and questions EU’s capability, and representation. Thus, influencing

EU’s global role and decision making capability.

Underlying societal

factors: pressure from

domestic societal actors

as represented in

political institutions

Underlying political

factors: intensity of

national preferences;

alternative coalitions;

available issue linkages

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When there was a need to act in Iraq crisis, the attribute of national-preference contradicted

EU’s position which is in similar with the present Syrian crisis. (Chari, Cavatorta 2009:25-

27).

According to Moravcsik the decision-making process with influence from national-

preference affects the rational state behaviour of the EU (Moravcsik 1993:483-485). In

correlation to this, there is a lack of policy tools for the CFSP that inhibit coherency (Chari,

Cavatorta 2009:25-27).

Regardless of high end integration between member states that contribute in trans-border flow

of goods and services (Moravcsik 1993:485); it is important to mention that there is extended

need for collaboration; more importantly a need to avail reputation for EU’s institutional

framework in spite of conflict between preferences and power.

Liberalism and State-Society Relations

The element of national preference relies on state-society relations in shaping national

preferences. The assumption is “private individuals and voluntary associations with

autonomous interests, interacting in civil society, are the most fundamental actors in politics”

(Moravcsik 1993:483).Thereby meaning that the demand is from outside. In order to react to

an outward response EU in many occasions has worked along with the UN. This response by

the EU to attend crisis alongside with the UN increases its reputation. An example as such to

explain EU’s role as a global actor is the rebuilding of Iraq. In alignment with these actions,

EU has been widely involved in Syria with over 50 projects that involved development aid

and 210 euros in grants and loans on yearly basis (EU-Syrian Relations). The ability for EU to

incorporate to such an extent is due to geographical location and due to these decisions being

placed under the 1st pillar. The placement under the 1st pillar ordains a certain degree of

unanimity, Whereas CFSP placement under the 2nd pillar requires consent from the member

states (Bretherton, Vogler 2012:175).

National preferences of Syria have a played a prominent role in enriching itself with what EU

has to offer. However, this doesn’t entitle Syria to be in a dominant position as this element

demands for an outcome from both ends. And outcome from both ends in this regard is seen

as dissatisfactory, as Syria responds by denial and EU with lack of united representation.

Regardless, EU possessing a dominant position in terms of involvement (development

programmes) within Syria in comparison with the international community.

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Yet again it is the decision making factor that affects EU’s influence in the region. Thereby, if

decisions pertaining CFSP were placed under the 1st pillar, EU would have had a better

opportunity of reacting to crisis prone regions. Just like in the case of development

programmes where EU’s extensive participation is seen, but due to CFSP being placed under

the 2nd pillar which being LI way of decision making; member states are able to prioritize their

preferences (Moravcsik 1993:473-519).

When the initial sanctions were imposed on Syria, member states had the flexibility of

deciding on how to act. Due to which there was incomplete representation of the union, as

some of the member states didn’t respond as a member of the EU. The recent sanctions that

were imposed on the 24th July 2012 show a much better representation of the EU. As these

sanctions include a major decision and a modification in the CFSP by the “Council

2012/420/CFSP; that emphasized the enforcement of the EU’s existing arms embargo against

Syria”. This by all means explicitly requires active participation from the member states.

(Mancuso, Kraemer, Caspary, and Kapeliou 2012:1-3) (Blockmans 2012:2). Under this

change in the CFSP, the member states are expected to check all to and fro flights into Syria

in their respective countries. This response by the EU increases EU’s reputation and fulfils the

liberal demand for an outcome.

Intergovernmentalist Theories

Intergovernmentalist tends to analyse the EC as a result of strategies pursued on the basis of

rational behaviour of governments. This sought of behaviour is heavily based on preferences

and power (Moravcsik 1993:496).

The major agenda-setting and decision making in this regard can be consistently explained in

terms of interstate bargaining. More explicitly, it is where decisions are made with co-

ordination and distributional consequences that are heavily based on a bargaining game

(Sebenius, 1991; Krasner, 1991).

Having this short background about the decision making that is influenced by bargaining

power. There is a possibility for in text explanation by taking Syria as a case and having an

assumption of member states behaviour in this regard.

As mentioned before national preferences play a prominent role in defining bargaining power

for potentially viable agreements, due to which one or more participants are benefited. As

these agreements have distributional consequences, this is where negotiation plays a

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prominent role. According, to Lax and Sebenius bargaining raised two analytical problems

one being ‘creating’ the other ‘claiming’. There can also be problems of co-ordination and

bargaining aspects of strategic interaction (1986). As of now and considering the Syrian case

there had been problems of consistency and this is very behavioural. As Strategic

intervention by EU didn’t yield results considering the present events.

Regardless of the fact negotiation creates a common ground for interactions, it comes with

“excessive costs of identifying, negotiating and enforcing bargains” (Moravcsik 1993:497)

which might in return obstruct co-operation. Furthermore strategic behaviour has a character

that often keeps the governments in secrecy of beneficial exchanges that might result in being

expensive or impossible. In accordance with EU’s enforcement over arms embargo and

monitoring over Syria is cost thriving. However, it might be unclear on what the costs might

be. The relative costs that continue in this regard would be in the form of refugee camps,

rehabilitation centres and the acceptance of immigration. Due to these reasons the challenges

are upraised to whole new level, which the member states might not be interested. As EU as

whole doesn’t share the same interests.

Bargaining Power as a Mode of Decision

Bargaining power is deeply comprised of distributional outcomes that can further be related to

Syria. as they improvise the possibility for “alternative policies and coalitions, the level and

symmetry of information, the extent of communication, the sequence of moves, the

institutional setting, the potential for strategic misrepresentation of interests, the possibility of

making credible commitments, the importance of reputation, the cost-effectiveness of threats

and side-payments, and the relative preferences, risk-acceptance, expectations, impatience and

skill of the negotiating parties”(Raiffa 1982;Harsanyi 1977).

Having these attributes it is extremely unpredictable on how member states might act and in

order to see these attributes either positive or negative is questionable. As these greatly affect

the EU decision making and often can be seen as priorities set by member states.

The three assumptions that make the EU decision making even harder are as follows;

Intergovernmental co-operation is voluntary, as they won’t face any military coercion

or economic sanctions if they don’t intend to co-operate. As a preference

governments try to avoid interventions that are of high costs (Syria). Moreover, the

21


complications that one might face in an international community are comparably

redundant in the Union.

The need for action by member states is often benefited as they have wide

information in the form of pros and cons regarding the situation. If at all they intend

to participate it would be based on low cost-effectiveness.

Transaction costs of intergovernmental bargaining are low for a certain period. Due to

which member states can propose numerous offers and at the same time reject at a

very low cost.

In order for the EU institutions to attain flexibility in taking and acting in terms of situation

where EU’s reputation is questioned. Either it should emancipate its power factors or provide

member states with better policy options that would encourage them to involve.

With this sought of flexibility available for member states and the presence of CFSP under the

second pillar; being an intergovernmental style. It all comes to a voluntary participation that

deliberately reduces EU’s regional (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:181) presence.

As mentioned before the presence of alternatives is crucial if EU wants its member states

to embrace change and in the bargaining process they are three likely determinants of

interstate bargaining power.

Unilateral policy alternatives (‘threats of non-agreement’).

Alternative coalitions (‘threats of exclusion’).

The potential for compromise and linkage ((Moravcsik 1993:499).

In order to falsify these determinants the EU institutions should possess alternatives. That

would provide the institutions which much better leverage of attaining legitimacy.

Finally, the decision-making in accordance with Syria faces a lot of endogenous factors that

limit EU’s influence due to the policy provisions and power dimension of the CFSP being

intergovernmental. Moreover preference by member states does to wide extent reduce EU’s

expendability.

After this following section on different patterns affecting EU decision making on the Syrian

issue.

The next chapter will involve in answering the second question being;

22


4.2 How do these patterns of decision-making affect EU’s role as a global actor?

“First of all, it seems plausible to define modes of governance in a policy-specific and

a time-dynamic perspective. The CFSP has its own rules and traditions in decision-

making, and has developed forms and modes of governance which are typical for its

path of institutional and procedural evolution; this path is clearly distinct from the

developments observed in the classical community areas of legislation” (Diedrichs

2011:171).

As mentioned before there is lack of coordination between the three pillars and it influences

decision-making tremendously. If the decisions comprising the CFSP are made solely by the

European Commission (EC) it might increase EU’s efficiency. But this is not the case as the

other two pillars are mostly intergovernmental. There is moderate amount of friction between

these pillars that result in inefficient functioning of EU representation (Bretherton, Vogler

2006:168).

Up to date the success of the CFSP can be seen as delusional. Thereby it reflects the singular

character of the Union, whose member states are sceptic of their role in the politically

sensitive areas of foreign and security policy.

Differences in member states and foreign policy priorities reflect a variety of factors,

including pre-existing bilateral ties (or antipathies), geographical location and extent of

support for a policy stance distinct from that of the USA. Successive enlargements of the EU

have tended to exacerbate these differences. Divisions have also long persisted over

approaches to decision-making, broadly speaking large member states prefer

intergovernmental methods and smaller member states advocate a ‘community’ method. Here,

a still unresolved central issue has been the extent to which the European Commission, with

its responsibility for the economic instruments of policy, should be actively involved in

decision-making(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:162).

In the establishment of CFSP problems consistency is of crucial importance considering the

2003 invasion of Iraq. However, this invasion didn’t disrupt the usual functioning of the

Union and the Union functioned as it should. But it lacked collaboration in addressing

security issues from the time of discussions about foreign policy started.

23


Initially when the discussions regarding foreign policy were taking place it was heavily

argued by the Intergovernmentalist that the commission involvement should be limited and

the foreign policy should have an intergovernmental standpoint. The attributes of Liberal

Intergovernmentalism and its tool of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) (Bretherton, Vogler

2006:169).Thereby, it can be said that a successful functioning of the CFSP didn’t achieve its

high ends. The reason for this as mentioned before is the factor of coherency (Bretherton,

Vogler 2012:175). As coherency refers to problems of endemic nature and policy conditions

for CFSP in this regard need to be improved. Regardless of improving the policy conditions

CFSP showed dissatisfaction in practice. This sought of disappointment according to

Bretherton; Vogler is due to the theoretical questions that rose over the years (1999:162). In

this regard, there has been growing number of scholarly contributions on EU’s foreign

political system and a very limited representation of the CFSP. Thereby it has been difficult to

understand the European foreign policy and the factors that inhibit its involvement (Diedrichs

2011:149). And as a contradiction to involvement a major characteristic that was in place

from the beginning was the behaviour of national actors that had the possibility of involving

partly and or in independent sectors(Ginsberg 2001:32).

The extensive institutional framework EU possesses was not able to answer these setbacks

and even the supranational governance in addressing the security and defence matters were

seen as unsatisfying (Diedrichs 2011:150).

But in a thrive to find a solution, discussions took place quite frequently, but results were hard

to be seen instead the term ‘flexibility’ was referred to in a multiple occasions(Bretherton,

Vogler 2006:169). In some cases institutional and procedural patterns were reviewed beyond

the notion of Intergovernmentalism (Diedrichs 2011:150).But this revival didn’t attain

successful results as the notion of unanimity seemed impossible. The CFSP still remains a

national interest and is dominated by bargaining mode of decision-making. Accordingly, it

can also be said that ‘European Foreign Policy’ is a consequence of turned down federalist

aspirations (Diedrichs 2011:151). So the only optimism relies on the functioning of the

European Political Cooperation (EPC) with emphasis on the present Syrian crisis (Diedrichs

2011:151).

The creation of the EPC had a special purpose that underlined the importance;

24


“The growing sense of a common identity among the member states as a result of

dense and intensive interaction within the European Communities” (Diedrichs

2011:151).

“The interest of key member states in using the EC to develop a more global role

between the superpowers and in this way to enhance national influence via Brussels”

(Diedrichs 2011:151).

Well these can be only seen as desirable goals as the EU still lacks the integrity of

representing itself as one voice and as a ‘strong political identity’ (Diedrichs 2011:155). And

yet again this sought of distress leads to the decision-making capability of the EU.

The agreements that were made in the initial stages of establishment of the CFSP were

entirely based on Intergovernmentalism (Diedrichs 2011:157).

It is to say that the decision-making procedures and mode of governance are not coherent. It is

also important to be aware that EU’s lack of representation is very endemic. And the EU’s

governance in this regard relies on member states approval that actually reflects a “degree of

collegiality, informal practice and confidentiality” (Diedrichs 2011:158).

After underlining that EU lacks coherency (Bretherton, Vogler 2012:175) between decision-

making and governance. It directs us towards the cause, regardless of possessing a high

representative for the CFSP and common strategies as a new instrument in the Treaty of

Amsterdam (1997). The CFSP led to a perfection of a “rationalized Intergovernmentalism”

that seemed to improve the mechanism of the CFSP” (Diedrichs 2011:158).

Due to which it can be said that CFSP largely relies on a theoretical standpoint. Furthermore

the theoretical standpoint of LI seems to continue and seems to influence the decisions of

EPC in the future (Pijpers, 1990). In addition other factors that influence EPC decisions such

as legalization, institutionalization and Europeanization wouldn’t be discussed. In

consideration with these factors it can be said that decisions pertaining Syria are endogenous

and not exogenous.

Thereby Underlining that endogenous factors as such show weak representation of the EU

and vulnerability of its institutions (Diedrichs 2011:168).

25


Supranational

Governance

Threshold

Punctuated Equilibrium

Hard inter-Governmentalism

Soft inter- crisis Afghanistan

Governmentalism Balkans Iraq Syria

1973 1980 1989 Nice 2004 2012

Source: (Diedrichs 2011:169) Amsterdam 2002 2006

Figure 1.1CFSP in a theoretical perspective

This graph by Wessel’s is known as the ratchet fusion of the CFSP and it tries to show the

security decisions in terms of hard and soft intergovernmentalism referring to a ‘Punctuated

Equilibrium’. The hard and soft intergovernmentalism as per the graph represents hard and

weak representation of the Union in matters of the CFSP.

The orange dots as per the graph determine the CFSP placement in the issues of crisis

management (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:199). Discussions pertaining crises usually start at an

intermediate level but seem to deprive when there is a need to act. This is also what the

orange dots determine. This sought of behaviour can be seen since 1973 and in order to

complement this behaviour treaty provisions were introduced; but didn’t seem to help.

26


As per the graph, EU institutions intentions of representing as a strong global actor

(decisions) (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:175) were always depriving in a downward direction

and in a very soft inter-governmentalism manner.

Regardless, that EU from initial stages has developed mechanisms to address crisis issues

(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:199,205) necessary improvement hasn’t been seen in the areas of

foreign policy.

In consideration with the past events Syria has been strategically placed in the graph. From an

EU perspective the decision that was made by the “Council 2012/420/CFSP (Blockmans

2012:2), the enforcement of the EU’s existing arms embargo against Syria was further

strengthened” has strategically pushed the CFSP to a supranational level as shown in the

graph. Regardless of CFSP being a complete intergovernmental policy area, “the daily

political and institutional reality of the CFSP is open to innovation ‘beyond

intergovernmentalism’ (Diedrichs 2011:172). This innovation is not relatively new but since

the 1990’s the CFSP is accustomed to diversity and is visible in the legal acts.

As the loose conducting of intergovernmental form of cooperation to more consistent binding

forms is what EU seeks to find (Diedrichs 2011:170) and thereby knows the importance of

governance that requires CFSP decisions taken at dense levels of foreign policy activity

(Diedrichs 2011:170).

But in order to contribute for this requirement, debates on the EU constitution have unveiled

further institutional and procedural reform concerning CFSP; that were taken up in the Lisbon

Treaty. The changes according to Wessel’s (2004) came into force after the initiation of

Lisbon Treaty;

Legal densification of the CFSP;

“Greater consistency between EC and CFSP by opening the possibility of resort to the

EC in the case of economic sanctions as a result of foreign policy decisions”;

Potential for flexibility in the CFSP;

“A differentiation of procedures and mechanisms for decision-making” (Diedrichs

2011:171).

However, these changes can be still seen doubtful as the position of intergovernmentalism

still remains strong. And the possible solution seems to be increasing connections between EC

27


and the CFSP; concerning flexible modes of decision-making and participation (Diedrichs

2011:171).

EU as a Global Actor - a perceived Identity

Regardless of so many years of establishment, EU still is a political system under construction

with constantly evolving internal institutions and practices (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:37).

EU institutions resemble European Identity and the strategic partnership it intends to avail.

However strategic partnership with Syria didn’t exemplify EU’s identity as the violence

persists.

However, in order to reclaim its identity EU has contributed over 90 million euros as

humanitarian fund from the European Commission and more than 27 million euros from its

member states. It is a disappointing and cost thriving factor; but it resembles EU’s strategic

environment in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf (Blockmans 2012:1).

The post- Assad decisions taken that concern EU’s identity are;

“an embargo on exporting arms and equipment for internal repression to

Syria(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:168);

A ban on exports of key equipment and technology to the Syrian oil and gas sectors;

A ban on participation in the construction of new power plants in Syria;

A ban on exports of equipment and software intended for use in the monitoring of

internet and telephone communications by the Syrian regime;

A ban on providing grants, loans, export credit insurance, technical assistance,

insurance and reinsurance for exports of arms and of equipment for internal repression

to Syria;

A ban on trade of gold, precious metals and diamonds with Syrian public bodies and

the central bank;

A freeze on 52 entities ‘assets held within the EU, including the Syrian central bank,

while ensuring that legitimate trade can continue under strict conditions;

An asset freeze and a visa ban on 155 persons associated with the regime and/or

responsible for violent repression or human rights abuses; and

A prohibition on access to EU airports for cargo flights operated by Syrian carriers,

with the exception of mixed passenger and cargo flights” (Blockmans 2012:2).

28


These are very crucial measures taken by the EU but effective performance requires EU to

review and reform its policies; in order to provide “effective humanitarian, political or

military strategy towards Syria on its own and in consideration with Syria’s neighbouring

countries” (Blockmans 2012:4). However, to be optimistic EU is better placed geopolitical

and due to continued relations with Middle Eastern countries on a day-to-day basis, it has an

advantage of dealing with the situation efficiently. But as a starting point EU should revive

its security strategy(European Council 2003:8) for a wider middle east(Bretherton, Vogler

2006:181), such a plan would fetch great efforts in emphasizing European Security Strategy

and Union’s ‘External Action’(Blockmans 2012:4;Bretherton, Vogler 2006:177).

Finally, there is proper reconciliation and plans in place that can increase EU’s reputation on a

global scale but a huge problem is with the endemic factors of influence such as coherency

between the three pillars, consensus among the member states; most importantly the

theoretical role.

From here the paper will involve in exemplifying the last concrete findings on the critical

contradictions EU faces.

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4.3 Why are there contradicting forces for EU in representing itself as a United Front?

In this part of the paper, factors in the establishment of the CFSP will be underlined that have

an impact on EU’s representation as a united front. As mentioned before, it is the security

issue that keeps EU in an uncomfortable position in comparison with the other already

integrated areas of the Union. It is therefore questionable on why EU that is known for its

institutional establishment has credibility issues in terms of security.

The factors could be EU’s capability, the operational structure of CFSP. But these factors can

only be better understood with the use of theory.

EU’s Capability

The establishment of mechanisms to counter crisis has given EU certain credibility. These

mechanisms include military expertise initiating in 1999 with Javier Solana as the new high

representative of the CFSP defining the military role of the Union. It was an incredible start as

it was addressing the global crisis management that includes military and civil assets. In the

course of its establishment the union didn’t face any barriers and approval was shown from its

member states (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:199). Perhaps, it was the hard power member states

were interested (Treverton 2006:40). However, there is lack of information to determine the

actual reason. But due to being able to establish military assistance in approval with member

states, it can be said that member states behaviour is unpredictable and there is lack of loyalty.

It is therefore frustrating in not being able to get a clear distinction between cooperation and

non-cooperation. As EU member states show consent over areas of trade and other matters.

Therefore it is also difficult to comprehend where CFSP faces a problem.

Another determining factor resembling EU’s capability is the project with its neighbours

through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:174).The

intention behind involving in these projects is to attain a ‘Secure Europe’ from an institutional

point of view. This is to say, that the interests of EU institutions and member states differ.

This is also to say that intergovernmental character of the CFSP remained strong as member’s

states still possess the capability to contradict institutional decisions.

CFSP Operational Structure

30


Within the operational structure of the CFSP, the presidency is responsible for agenda setting

and for chairing with the EC for policy prioritization and initiation.

The Presidency is also responsible for all intergovernmental CFSP/ESDP bodies, with the

exception of the military committee. Regardless of possessing the structural advantages of

this role, the Presidency ability to influence a decision remain vague. As it can also be

influenced by the smaller member states decisions in terms of a possible crisis. Another

disadvantage is the short term office of six months that sometimes results in prioritizing

regional issues. Not a satisfactory notion from a member states perspective (Bretherton,

Vogler 2006:171). In terms of security issues they seem to be a lot of prioritization involved

that undermines issues of member states concern. The Presidency inability to solve issues also

makes the member states to pursue the conflict by themselves, not a very complimentary sign

(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:171). As the ability to offer support to issues remain central to a

successful presidency. This is to say, that CFSP position is pretty fluid among the member

states.

In addition, the council meets the Presidency twice during its terms during which it

expertise’s its ‘guiding role’ in restricting operations concerning member states where they

are seen to be consistent(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:171). This measure by the council sets the

priorities for the CFSP. In the context of the guiding principles established by the European

Council, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) constitutes the next

level of CFSP decision-making. This formation was persistent due to other concerns of

external relations meetings that seemed to enhance the efficiency of decision-making and the

coherency of policy. Despite the limited use of ‘Foreign Affairs Council’ by the member

states, creation of the GAERC represents a forward step in EU foreign policy-making.

Matters concerning security have different variations the Council can at times involve

Member State Foreign Ministers or Ministers of Defence depending upon the items on the

agenda. Regardless of the fact that the CFSP depends on intergovernmental mode of decision-

making, the Council should avoid involving member states if possible. This is to say, that EU

pertained goals can be better achieved of being a global actor. At the same time, it would be

complimentary to say that EU is a United Front.

So far we have seen the role of the Council and other organization in matters of the CFSP,

now the concentration diverts towards to lower levels policy process that are conducted by

Political and Security Committee(PSC) (Bretherton, Vogler 2006:172)with Brussels-based

31


member state diplomats. The PSC has a daily responsibility of monitoring the operations of

the CFSP. As the PSC submits reports on proposals to the Council, it is later revived by the

Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) that is comprised of member states

ambassadors. As a starting point COREPER deals with issues pertaining pillar I but at the

same time is responsible for all material discussed by the Council. This can be source of

friction as the COREPER representatives are concerned with the increasing influence of PSC

(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:172). This sought of friction between PSC and COREPER can

contribute to effective discussions between PSC and the Council at the same time create

contradictions.

Considering all these levels of power dynamics in the functioning of CFSP, one thing is set

out clear. That member states influence decisions at various levels. Thereby, it is also

understandable that COREPER (pillar I) is worried with the increasing influence of the PSC

(Bretherton, Vogler 2006:172). As mentioned earlier in the analysis it is a matter of endemic

factors that don’t contribute for a united front.

After this analysis section the following part will involve in emphasizing reflections from a

global point of view.

32


5. ConclusionThe findings in this paper imply that the EU faced problems are very endemic and are due to

lack of coherency. As a starting point, EU doesn’t need to work on its security strategy but

instead should work on general functioning of the union. It should emancipate the factors of

coherency, co-ordination, collaboration and most importantly transparency.

But before emancipating these factors it should focus on establishing better policy instruments

for its member states where they are able to show certain degree of loyalty and respect to the

EU institutions. EU as a starting point shouldn’t focus on powering its institutions, but should

create common grounds for negotiations that determine EU’s responsibility of the union in

providing and establishing a flourishing cooperation. It should also try to create a certain level

of security to its member states so that they value the essence of EU identity and its

representation.

When all these factors are in place EU should then start reviving the available documentation

referring to the three pillars of the union and their functionality.

It is to say that EU has itself complicated the procedures with its institutions and member

states. There was no consideration for details of coherency, national preference and state-

society relations. But with consideration to these factors a lot of things within the union can

be reformed like for instance in this regard the security issue. In addition the EU will gain the

leverage of uncomplicated decision making modes and all the different dense levels of

negotiation will be erased. Moreover, this would save a lot of time and would result in

effective representation of the union.

Regardless, the implications of this paper underline the complications and difficulties EU

possess at the moment.

Finally, once EU deals with its endemic problems, it wouldn’t face any contradictions in

representing itself as a global actor and as a united front.

33


6. Reflections EU in comparison with the international community is better positioned to intervene in Syria

and definitely has better possibilities. As a starting point it has imposed unprecedented

sanctions but its role doesn’t come complimentary as the US is playing an equal role in

conflict resolution. As a matter of fact, the US is the only country that is able to intervene

militarily in any part of the world and EU is far from achieving this position (Blockmans

2012:1, 3).

However, it is essential for the EU to show a certain degree of optimism that can be built

upon a new European Security Strategy (ESS). Would revising the existing document will be

enough as member states hardly refer to it; the answer is ‘relevance requires revision’ (Biscop

2012:1). EU as of now faces other problems such as financial and economic crisis; at this

point revision might be questionable. Regardless, the scarcer the resources are the more

important the strategy. And as a helping tool why not consolidate the European External

Action Service (EEAS) that remains questionable too as EEAS hasn’t been put into action

considering the purpose of its creation.

In the state of modifying ESS, Sweden and Finland proposed a review that was not greatly

appreciated; as the notion of ‘intellectual weight doesn’t equal political power seemed to

persists’. From an international perspective US strategically shifted towards Asia-Pacific

referring to a major geopolitical change availing as competitor and implying power over

security issues. And does the EU have a strategy to cope with it seems to be questionable

(Biscop 2012:2).

This all needs reforming the European strategy and considerate factors would be on not to

write it but written by who. And there is definitely an urgent need for it, as the Arab spring is

happening in spite of EU’s presence and this calls for a serious need of reforming the ESS. As

leverage starts with legitimacy and public opinion through the region sees EU as a status quo

power (Biscop 2012:2).

From a regional perspective the extent of cooperation within each regime is a sensitive one, as

a lot of things can’t be necessarily foreseen. It is thereby a hard to comprehend on what things

to consider, for instance;

34


Working with religiously inspired parties;

Promotion of sectarianism;

Working with existing regimes without consolidating their more authoritarian traits

and in persuading them towards transition with causing chaos.

Being able to involve outside actors in regional arrangements than just supporting one;

in order to avoid regional hegemony (Biscop 2012:2).

The EU in order to improvise these elements doesn’t necessarily need to start from scratch as

it potentially possesses “substance to partnership, in the economic, social, political, and

security field. Large-scale infrastructure projects, e.g. in the energy and transport sector;

university scholarships; training and educating armed forces, police and judiciary; deploying

in theatre to help neighbours secure their borders and combat security challenges emanating

from within the region and further south. These are just few examples of real engagement”

(Biscop 2012:3).

Unlike US, the EU can’t concentrate in projects in the Middle Eastern region as it is well

embedded in bringing a change in its surrounding regions. However it lacks the financial

thrust to do so and as its strategic partnership with its neighbours is seen to be unstable. In

order to reconcile this situation it should concentrate on its periphery that would result in

making it a peripheral power (Biscop 2012:3). Furthermore, Washington expects the EU to

act efficiently in this regard and attain peace & security. It is not illogical as the US in other

terms asking for European strategic autonomy. If the EU seems to be helpless in this regard,

US will pertain to remain a European power. As no country of Europe is capable of

generating such capabilities on its own and the only possible solution is too sound as one; and

yet again this calls for a united front.

From the NATO perspective, the Europeans are seen as internally divided and for NATO to

rely on EU; it needs to reinforce itself (Biscop 2012:3). In order to that it has start with its

European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) that just seems to stand as a pillar in NATO’s

observation. With the entire crisis at the same time a pressure is averted towards EU strategic

engagement and in case of no response; there is huge chance of EU foreign policy inevitably

losing out. Another disappointing feature is the geopolitical implications due to which the

prestige, legitimacy and attractiveness of the EU is being greatly damaged.

35


And yet again this all relies on EU’s decision making capability as it has weakened the Union

and its capability to take resolute action. It also creates a loss of soft power and hard power; as

its relative position in the world continues to decline (Biscop 2012:4).

Therefore it is vital for EU to concentrate on long term interests instead of short term. As the

room for the long terms interests have the tendency to promote European ideology. Most

importantly to come up with a new strategic course in the “priority areas of external action

where member states agree and there is an added value in ‘Collective Action’: Broader

neighbourhood, strategic partnerships, the multilateral architecture; and the EU’s role as a

security provider” and to be one of the poles of the multipolar world (Biscop 2012:6).

36


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