muleskinner report vol. 4 issue 9

actually improve the quality

of the soil rather than just

maintain it, then the process

w o u l d n o t o n l y b e

sustainable, it would tend to

increase crop yields from

one year to the next. In

other words, careful design

of the crop rotation process

would lead to improved soil

q u a l i t y , w h i c h w o u l d

ultimately allow nature to

generate resources in a more

efficient manner.

Unfortunately, many of

the current practices used by

t h e A f g h a n s a r e n o t

sustainable or efficient.

Farmers continue to grow

crops that deplete nitrogen

from the soil resulting in

increasingly smaller yields.

Nomadic herds of sheep

and goats consume grasses

and shrubs fas ter than

n a t u r a l p r o c e s s e s c a n

replace them.

The same is true of trees

that are indiscriminately

stripped of the landscape by

timber smugglers for profit

and villagers for fuel.

The net result of these

practices is that Afghans

(Continued on page 2)

E f f i c i e n t a n d

s u s t a i n a b l e

agricultural and watershed

management practices are

keys to breaking the cycle

of poverty in Afghanistan.

This article provides a

s i m p l e t e c h n i c a l

explanation as to why

e f f i c i e n c y a n d

s u s t a i n a b i l i t y a r e s o

important, identifies some

of the forces working

against the adoption of

efficient and sustainable

p r a c t i c e s h e r e , a n d

discusses what the Afghan

government, Agri-Business

Development Teams, and

other stakeholders must do

to address the problem.

At a fundamental level,

a process is considered

sustainable if the rate of

r e g e n e r a t i o n ,

r e p l e n i s h m e n t , o r

replacement of a resource

is greater than or equal to

the rate of extract ion,

depletion, or failure of that

resource.

If a private Afghan

ve t e r i n a r y c l i n i c c an

produce enough revenues

to replenish its supplies,

maintain its equipment and

facilities, and pay its owner

and employees reasonable

w a g e s , t h e s e r v i c e s

provided to farmers can be

sustained indefinitely.

Similarly, if farmers can

develop a crop rotation

scheme that maintains the

requisite levels of nutrients

in their soil, production

rates are likely to remain

stable over time assuming

other inputs such as rainfall

d o n o t f l u c t u a t e

significantly.

However, the goal is not

just to maintain the status

q u o , b u t t o i m p r o v e

farmers‘ incomes over the

long term.

I f , i n t he p r e v io us

example, a crop rotation

schedule was designed to

Commander ’ s Corner Br e ak i n g t h e c y c l e o f pov e r t y

The Muleskinner Report Mo Agri-Business Development Team IV

F E B R U A R Y 2 8 , 2 0 1 1 V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 9

D R I V I N G

T H E T E A M

Commander

Col. Fortune

Deputy Commander

Lt. Col. Charles

Senior Enlisted

Advisor Senior Master Sgt.

Blankenship

I N S I D E

T H I S I S S U E :

Breaking the

Cycle of Poverty

cont.

2

A Cooperative

Inter-Agency

Approach to

Watershed

Rehabilitation

3

Breaking the

Cycle of Poverty

cont.

5

Staying Focused

in Afghanistan

6

The Current

Status of

Agribusiness in

Nangarhar

8

Media and

community

outreach

10

www.facebook.com/

MONG.ADTIV

Afghan women transport forage for

their sheep, unaware that the lifeless

hillside in the background was once

forested.

Breaking the cycle of poverty

P A G E 2

find themselves with increasingly

fewer resources at their disposal and

a watershed that is no longer capable

of producing those resources

efficiently.

Renewable natural resources –

vegetation and farm animals – have

long been and will continue to be the

primary source of income for the

people of Afghanistan for the

foreseeable future. Therefore,

assuming efficient markets, the

wealth and prosperity of these

people is proportional to the quantity

and qual i ty of the renewable

resources they can produce with

their land.

The bottom line is that, if the

land is managed in such a way that it

produces resources more efficiently

over time, the people become more

prosperous. If the land becomes less

productive over time, the people

become increasingly impoverished.

Nature provides us rainwater and

abundant sunlight at no cost. When

these inputs are captured and

converted to vegetation through the

photosynthesis process, valuable

r e sources a r e c rea t ed . T h i s

obviously does not occur when

sunlight and rainwater fall on barren

land.

The point is that we must help

the Afghans harness Mother Nature.

Allowed to operate efficiently, she

will generate large quantities of

natural resources and enable the

Afghans to prosper and thrive.

In a paper published by the U.S.

Department of Agriculture in 1953

called ―Conquest of the Land

through 7,000 Years,‖ author W. C.

Lowdermilk sums up this concept

very eloquently: ―Food comes from

(Continued from page 1) the earth. The land with its waters

gives us nourishment. The earth

rewards richly the knowing and

diligent but punishes inexorably the

ignorant and slothful.‖

Another critical point is that, when

renewable natural resources are

diminished in an area, their ability to

r e p l e n i s h t h e m s e l v e s i s a l s o

diminished. Good topsoil captures

water and holds it for use by existing

vegetation. Existing vegetation then

uses the water, soil, and sunlight to

produce more vegetation.

However, the existing vegetation is

the key to retaining topsoil so it can

captu re t he water and nur ture

additional plant life. If the vegetation

i s comple te ly removed f rom a

location, the topsoil is quickly eroded

away. Once this happens, the ability

of the land to regenerate vegetation is

g r e a t l y , a n d t o s o m e e x t e n t ,

permanently diminished.

L o w d e r m i l k m a k e s t h i s

observation in his 1953 paper: ―Here

[in Northern Syria], erosion had done

its worst. If the soils had remained,

even though the cities were destroyed

and the populations dispersed, the area

might be re-peopled again and the

cities rebuilt. But now that the soils

are gone, all is gone.‖

Later in his paper he goes so far as

to say: ―Unleashed and uncontrolled

soil erosion is sufficient to undermine

a civilization.‖

Unfortunately, there are forces at

play here in Afghanistan that are

impeding the adoption of sustainable

and efficient land management

practices. As discussed in a previous

Commander‘s Corner article, most

Afghans tend to have a very short

planning horizon and are therefore

unwilling or unable to take risks, defer

gratification, or focus on the future.

Their religion, education level,

current standard of living, and

culture do not facilitate or encourage

this type of thinking.

But, as mentioned earlier, this

lack of foresight has a profoundly

negative impact on the ability of the

Afghans to break their cycle of

poverty. The poorer they get, the

more desperate they become. The

more desperate they become, the

more they demand of nature and the

less time they give her to heal

herself. The less time she has to

heal, the less efficient she becomes at

regenerating renewable natural

resources, and the downward spiral

continues.

At least two U.S. Agency for

I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t

implementing partners – IDEA NEW

(Incentives Driving Economic

Alternatives – North, East, and West)

and AWATT (Afghanistan Water

a n d A gr i c u l t u r e T e c h n o l o g y

Transfer) – are currently sponsoring

projects in Nangarhar province

aimed at either reconstituting the

watershed, making more efficient use


V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 9

A herder watches over his goats as they scour

the barren Afghan landscape foraging for

whatever vegetation they can find.

P A G E 3

W .C. Lowdermilk‘s

1953 study, ―Conquest of

the Land through Seven

Thousand Years,‖ traced

the ability of civilizations

throughout history to

ma in t a in p roduct ive

agriculture systems in the

face of conflict.

When soil is destroyed,

people are condemned to

needless privation and

danger. ―A just relation of

peoples to the earth rests

not on exploitation, but …

on conservation—not on

t h e d i s s i p a t i o n o f

resources, but … on

r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e

productive powers of the

land and on access to food

and raw materials.‖

Restoration of land

p r o d u c t i v i t y i n

Afghanistan begins with

the rehabilitation of the

watershed. However,

success will be achieved

only when large numbers

of individual farmers

understand the importance

of watershed rehabilitation

and begin to work together

w i t h t h e A f g h a n

Government and other

stakeholders to accomplish

this massive undertaking.

A recurrent problem

throughout Afghanistan

since 9/11 has been the

failure to coordinate and

plan activities to ensure

programs are mutually

supportive and do not

duplicate or conflict with

each other.

In early January 2011,

ADT hos ted a water

resource meeting with

representatives from the

N a n g a r h a r V a l l e y

Development Authority,

Nangarhar Director of

Irrigation, Agriculture and

Livestock, Nangarhar

M i n i s t r y o f R u r a l

R e h a b i l i t a t i o n a n d

Development, the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers,

a n d t h e N a n g a r h a r

Provincial Reconstruction

Team to begin identifying

the issues and challenges

o f w a t e r r e s o u r c e

management in Nangarhar

Province.

Recognizing the need to

establish and implement

coordinated watershed

rehabilitation projects,

Robert Smith of the U.S.

Agency for International

Development hos ted

meetings in January and

early February to form a

―Watershed Management

Board of Di rec tor s‖

c o n s i s t i n g o f

representatives from all

stakeholder organizations.

A t t h e F e b r u a r y

meeting, the Nangarhar

D A I L , t h e U S A I D

implementing partner

AWATT (Afghanistan

Water and Agriculture

Technology Transfer), and

the Nangarhar Agr i -

business Development

T e a m s i g n e d a

m e m o r a n d u m o f

understanding to formalize

their expectations and

responsibilities in working

together on rehabilitation

of the lower watershed

through AWATT‘s Farm

Resource Management

project.

The MOU recognizes

that FRM is a DAIL

program and that AWATT

and the ADT perform

support roles. AWATT

provides technical training

to the DAIL‘s Agriculture

Extension Agents and the

t h i r t e e n f a m e r s

participating in the FRM

proof-of-concept so that

Afghans can assume a

strong leadership and

training role in expanding

the program throughout

Nangarhar.

The ADT focuses on

using the project to further

legitimize the government

by preparing training

materials for use by the

AEAs and working with

the DAIL to develop a

media plan for his use.


By Lt. Col. Raymond Legg

T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T

A COOPERATIVE INTER-AGENCY APPROACH TO WATERSHED REHABLITATION

M. Hussein Safi, Nangarhar Director of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock signs a historic memorandum of understanding between the DAIL, ADT, USAID, and AWATT for the implementation of AWATT’s Farm Resource Management Program on Feb. 7 at FOB Finley-Shields.

P A G E 4 V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 9

“The

overarching

intent is to

improve

farmers’

incomes

through more

sustainable

and better

use of

available

resources

rather than

application

of

unsustainable

external

inputs such as

fertilizers and

pesticides.”

The ADT also provides

assistance in filling small scale

funding gaps with our ability

to rapidly accomplish smaller

supporting projects through

the Commander‘s Emergency

Response Program.

While the MOU and the

commitment of the parties

represents a significant step

f o r w a r d i n a d d r e s s i n g

environmental damage caused

by unsustainable subsistence

farming practices, the lower

watershed cannot be addressed

in isolation.

The DAIL, AWATT, ADT,

and PRT have agreed to

develop a similar MOU to

establish an integrated model

upper and lower watershed

rehabil itation project in

northern Nangarhar.

T h e w a t e r s h e d

rehabilitation project is a

DAIL program that utilizes a

scientifically proven approach

to watershed rehabilitation.

USAID, AWATT and ADT

will work together to provide

technical and f inancia l

assistance to ensure the

project‘s sustainability and

viability. The MOU will

allow the development of a

focused and sustainable

project that uti lizes the

strengths of each party and

ensures the DAIL retains

ownership of, and is fully

invested in, the program.

In the upper watershed,

terracing will allow riparian

and upland vegetation to be

restored to control soil erosion.

Check dams will be built to

control water flow and allow

sediment to settle before

reaching the river basin. The

DAIL‘s extension agents and

natural resource officers will

w o r k w i t h t h e l o c a l

community to prescribe

grazing practices and control

the harvest of trees.

In the lower watershed,

AWATT will implement its

FRM program. FRM provides

a comprehensive integrated

farm management approach

utilizing forage crop rotation to

improve soil fertility and

provide a source of on-farm

fodder to control hillside

grazing of sheep and goats.

The program also uses laser

leveling and concrete irrigation

turnouts to reduce erosion and

make more efficient use of

available water resources.

The overarching intent is to

improve farmers‘ incomes

through more sustainable and

be t te r use of ava i lab le

r e s o u r c e s r a t h e r t h a n

application of unsustainable

external inputs such as

fertilizers and pesticides.

E f f e c t i v e w a t e r s h e d

rehabilitation programs must

be supported and implemented

through community based

plans that address the needs of

local inhabitants. Because

these efforts require changes in

land use practices, community

based plans must address the

social framework. This is

e s p e c i a l l y c r i t i c a l i n

Afghanistan because of

longstanding land tenure and

security issues.

Effective planning with the

l o c a l c o m m u n i t y i s

fundamental to the program‘s

success. Community support

reduces conflicts between

local livestock owners over

g r a z i n g a n d r e s o u r c e

m a n a g e m e n t o n t h e

rehabilitated landscape.

AEAs and Department of

Natural Resource officers will

have to work closely with

community members to ensure

t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h e

importance of all aspects of the

program and provide training

that allows the community to

adjust their agr icul ture

p r a c t i c e s t o e n s u r e

sustainabi l i ty and local

ownership of the program.

The DAIL will provide

training and advice in all areas

of agriculture production

relating to forage and fodder

c r o ps , o n - f a r m a n i ma l

h u s b a n d r y p r a c t i c e s ,

watershed rehabil itation

techniques, leadership, and

project management.

Because the project will

serve as a model for future

watershed rehabilitation efforts

in Nangarhar, the DAIL will

monitor and evaluate the

effectiveness of the project‘s

socioeconomic benefits, soil

improvement, water use and

crop yields.

AWATT is the program‘s

primary subject matter expert

for watershed rehabilitation.

AWATT provides technical

and scientific expertise to train

AEAs and DNR officers.

(Continued from page 3)




Breaking the cycle of poverty

P A G E 5

of on-farm resources, or both.

However, for these projects to be successful,

impacted Afghan farmers will not only have to be

trained on how to improve the sustainability and

efficiency of their practices at a fundamental level, their

incomes will have to be supplemented – either through

cash-for-work or some other method – until they start to

see the their standards of living improve. This is

especially true of upper watershed projects which will

take years to produce a return on investment.

In addition to achieving their technical objectives, it

is also critically important that these projects contribute

to legitimizing the Afghan government and thereby

maximize their support to the counterinsurgency effort.

For this to occur, the government must understand

and take ownership of the problem, must be perceived

as taking ownership for the purpose of helping common

people improve their livelihoods, and must take the lead

in educating impacted farmers.

We see the ADT‘s role in this process as

empowering, motivating, training, and inspiring the

Director of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock and

his Agriculture Extension Agents to own the problem,

educate farmers on how and why they must adopt

sustainable and efficient agriculture and watershed

management practices, and inform the masses as to what

their government is doing to increase their long term

prosperity.

Our plan is to work with the DAIL to develop both

training materials for use by the AEAs in training

farmers, and a media plan for use by the DAIL himself

in helping to educate and increase support from the

general public.


AWATT will also fund the construction of five concrete

check dams to control water run-off

and sedimentation. Through its local

Afghan program officers, AWATT

will also provide training and

technica l as s i s tance for the

implementation of the FRM program

in the lower watershed area.

ADT is primarily interested in

defeating the counterinsurgency by

increasing the capacity of the DAIL

to provide agriculture services

through technical, management and

leadership training.

ADT‘s AEA mentoring program

will ensure the DAIL‘s extension and DNR officers

develop and maintain community support for the project.

ADT will also provide limited financial assistance to fill

gaps between AWATT and the DAIL.

In addition, ADT will provide alternative livelihood

training for disadvantaged women to allow them to build

micro-businesses in bee-keeping and poultry farming that

will increase economic activity in the community.

To maximize the impact of the project, the ADT will

also work with the DAIL to develop

a media plan to convey to the public

the government‘s intent to help

farmers increase their incomes.

As the program develops,

additional expertise and resources

will be needed from the PRT. The

PRT can provide maps and weather

data, additional technical advice on

management and inspection of

construction projects, and can get

provincial-level buy-in from the

Nangarhar governor and other high

ranking officials.

Working together toward a common goal, this

comprehensive and effective watershed rehabilitation

project will improve livelihoods of community residents,

increase the capacity of the Afghan government, begin to

reverse the environmental degradation of Afghanistan‘s

countryside, and serve as a model for future watershed

management projects.




Sgt. 1st Class Eisenbacher discusses AWATT’s

upper watershed rehabilitation project in Kuz

Kunar with local villagers.

P A G E 6

forces. The strategic concept

for Afghanistan is to build the

capacity of the government to

deliver basic services, so

nearly every course of action

we take must be fi l tered

through this LOO.

Second, every proposal

m u s t b e s c r e e n e d f o r

sustainability. Those with an

e y e t o w a r d f i s c a l

responsibility would be truly

appalled at the number of

what the Task Force Bastogne

commander calls ―icons of

failure‖ here in Nangarhar.

Statistics are still being

compiled, but the init ia l

assessment suggests that the

percentage of past projects

that are still functioning as

o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d i s

extremely low. For this

reason, we must strictly assess

projects and ideas for their



wi t h c o u n t l e s s ― g r e a t

ideas,‖ usual ly project

proposals of various size

a n d s c o p e f r o m a n

assortment of individuals

and agencies, each with

their own objectives.

B e i n g t h e g o o d

humanitarians that we are,

the temptation to take on

too much is ever-present.

However, the consequence

of allowing this to happen –

what the mili tary calls

―mission creep‖ – is the unit

losing focus; doing a lot,

but accomplishing little to

meet the established end

state.

The ADT has applied

several screening criteria to

avoid this trap. The first

question we ask ourselves

is: does the course of action

s u p p o r t t h e l i n e s o f

operation (LOO) in our

campaign plan? The ADT‘s

five LOOs are agriculture

extension, ag economics, ag

e d u c a t i o n , a g

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n d

information operations.

Notably, the agriculture

extension LOO, which

f o c u s e s p r i m a r i l y o n

empowering the district-

level, GIRoA, Agriculture

Extension Agents, reserves

50% of our effort. This

L O O i s m o s t c l o s e l y

associated with the larger

counterinsurgency objective

of connecting the Afghan

p e o p l e w i t h t h e i r

government while drawing

them away from insurgent

Without

discipline and

strict mission

focus, we run

the risk of, as

our executive

officer, Lt. Col.

North Charles,

put it,

“Chasing every

shiny object in

Afghanistan.”

―Chas ing r abb i t s

down rabbit holes‖ is

the adage referring to

c o n t i n u a l l y p u r s u i n g

d i f fe rent ideas to the

det r iment of coherent

intent and direction.

The ADT is unique in

that there is very little

guidance, doctrinal or from

higher headquarters, on

exactly how to implement

our mission, which reads

as follows: ―The Missouri

ADT coord ina t es and

integrates agri-business

capacity building activities

i n t o e x i s t i n g

c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y

operations in Nangarhar

Province to legitimize the

Government of the Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan

(GIRoA).‖

There are an infinite

number of approaches and

opinions on how to best

e m p l o y a n A D T i n

Afghanistan. The manner

in which we approach this

problem i s to a l a rge

degree only limited by

manpower, which for the

Missouri ADT is currently

eleven agriculture subject

matter experts.

Therefore, of utmost

i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e

commander is the decision

o n h o w t o f o c u s h i s

resources. During our time

here in Afghanistan, the

ADT has been approached

By Capt. Ken Huenink


The Dari Nor slaughter facility, an empty

building which looks to have never been used,

has had the water tank, steel from the holding

pins, and other hardware stolen.

long term, indigenous sustainability

or we are wasting our time and

money here.

Additionally, we should look for

models that self propagate, i.e., if we

start this concept, will the Afghans

take the idea and run with it on their

own? Weaning the Afghan people

off American initiative and aid

should be an underlying theme in

everything we do.

Finally, we ask ourselves if the

project is one the Afghans really

need, and if there are cultural

repercussions. If you ask most

Afghan vi l l agers i f they need

something, they will automatically

say ―yes‖, regardless if they truly

need it or not. The Americans have

endless pockets anyways right? Why

not take whatever you can get?

We must not make mistakes such

as building a solar well that costs six-

figures if the Afghans

c a n n o t a f f o r d t o

maintain it. We must

also be careful to

c o n s i d e r c u l t u r a l

influences such as

c o l l e c t i v i s m a n d

favoritism.

T h e A f g h a n

d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e

greater good may not

coincide with that of

western societ ies .

W i l l t h e p r o j e c t

exacerbate an existing

tribal feud? Will it be used by

someone to leverage power?

Is the project proposal just a front to

skim money? Certainly, there are

many factors to consider before

selecting a course of action, and strict

screening criteria are necessary to

avoid becoming overwhelmed.

As an alternative to simply telling

people ―no‖, the ADT has become

proficient at deflecting proposed

projects which fall outside our

mission focus or capabilities onto

other agencies.

O v e r t h e c o u r s e o f t h e

deployment, the team has learned of

the numerous programs funded and

managed by the U.S. Agency for

International Development and their

implemen t ing pa r tners . Thi s

networking experience has allowed

us to connect project seekers to

pro j ec t implementers wi thout

detracting from our own mission

focus.

An example of this is our fallen

brother Sgt. 1st Class Robert Pharris‘

work in Khogyani District. Local

Afghans approached Pharris about a

large project involving the planting

fruit orchards in each schoolyard in

the district for agriculture education

purposes. Realizing agriculture

education was a secondary focus and

that the project exceeded the ADT

budgetary constraints, Pharris worked

wi th ou r U.S . Depar tmen t o f

Agriculture partners to get the project

funded.

After ten years in Afghanistan,

Coalition Forces have yet to find the

perfect counterinsurgency solution.

With limited internal resources

and a shrinking timeline for results,

the ADT must stay focused on high

payoff courses of action that are

― Af gh a n -g o o d e n o u g h ‖ , i . e . ,

consistent with Afghan cultural and

sustainment capabilities.

To ensure we are staying on track,

the ADT formally assesses our lines

of operation every 75 days. The

assessment allows the

commander to refocus

or adjust the team‘s

effort as necessary to

best accomplish the

mission.

Without discipline

and s tr ict mission

focus, we run the risk

of, as our executive

officer, Lt. Col. North

C h a r l e s , p u t i t ,

―Chasing every shiny

o b j e c t i n

Afghanistan.‖


V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 9 P A G E 7

ADT leaders discuss how and where to focus efforts during a

formal campaign plan assessment.


P A G E 8

“Pushing risk adverse farmers is like pushing a

chain up a hill; it just doesn't’ work.”

The Hasam Poultry

Farm is located in

Behsood District just

outside of

Jalalabad. Capt.

Berendzen and 1st

Lt. Wischmeyer met

the owner of this

farm while at the

Peace Dividend

Trust Eastern Region

Business Conference.

The facility produces

approximately

80,000 eggs per

month and has plans

for expansion to

increase capacity to

1 million eggs per

month .

The current status of agribusiness in Nangarhar

By: CPT Jeremy Berendzen

B e f o r e c o m i n g t o

Afghanistan, the ADT

A g S e c t i o n d i d n o t

i m a g i n e t h e

entrepreneurial boom

t a k i n g p l a c e i n

Nangarhar.

Entrepreneurs are

taking root throughout

the province in spite of

the unfavorable business

climate. Privately owned

businesses are doing

what they must to survive

and in some cases even

grow. Even with these

rays of hope, there is still

much work to be done to

help link people together.

In the past, ADT‘s

have focused mainly on

the agriculture side of

agribusiness by working

directly with farmers and

increasing the capacity of

t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f

Afghanistan through the

Director of Agriculture,

Irrigation and Livestock

to provide services to

these farmers.

ADTs have generally

not directed resources

and effort at the business

side of Agri-business

development.

When speaking with

farmers about increasing

their production, many of

them simply ask, ―why?‖

Like farmers around the

world, Afghan farmers

have asked why they

s h o u l d g r o w m o r e

produce if they cannot

eat or sell it. In their

eyes, that would be a

waste of not only the

food but the farmer‘s

r e so ur ces , t i me an d

effort.

In a society stressed

by years of conflict that

has resulted in stifled

aspirations, risk adverse

farmers are unable or

unwilling to push the

development of markets.

To encourage farmers

t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r

production, and their

incomes, the market must

pull them to grow more.

Pushing risk adverse

farmers is like pushing a

chain up a hill; it just

doesn‘t work. If there is

a pull or a reason to grow

more, farmers will find a

way to do it and all the

links in the chain will

follow suit. It‘s simple

s u p p l y a n d d e ma n d

economics.

With a pull from the

markets, the farmers will

r e a c h o u t f o r m o r e

knowledge. A ready

s o u r c e f o r t h a t

knowledge is the DAIL‘s

Agriculture Extension

Agents.

In order to facilitate

the linkage between the

AEAs and increased

production for market

development, ADT is

training the AEAs so

they can better serve the

farmers in their districts

and attempting to more

closely link the DAIL

with the agriculture and

ve t e r ina r y med ic ine

faculty at Nangarhar

University.

O u r i n t e n t i s t o

increase the capacity of

the DAIL and his staff,

and encourage Nangarhar

Un ive r s i t y t o be t t e r

support the agriculture

community. In doing so,

rural farmers will see a

usefulness and credibility

in their government.

1 s t L t . R i c h a r d

Wischmeyer and I had

the privilege of attending

the Peace Dividend Trust

Eastern Region Business

C o n f e r e n c e a t t h e

Nangarhar Governor‘s

Palace on January 27.

Our mission was to

m e e t w i t h A f g h a n

business owners in order

to make connections that

might lead to private

s e c t o r v a l u e c h a i n

enhancements and to find

Afghan businesses that

produce and conduct

agricultural training.

We also hoped to find

entrepreneurs in the agri-

business field that could

be linked with farmers

that had no idea these

markets were open to

them.

W e d i s c o v e r e d

numerous interesting

businesses that we had no

idea existed.

S o m e e x a m p l e s

include two juicing and


M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T

The current status of agribusiness in Nangarhar

P A G E 9 V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 9

c a n n i n g f a c i l i t i e s i n

Jalalabad, three different

l a r ge p ou l t r y f a r ms i n

Nangarhar province, and a

textile company by the name

of Rodat Textile which is

actually located in the Deh

Bala District. The irony is

that Wischmeyer has been

trying to link the cotton

growers in the Rodat District

with a textile company.

We also discovered there

is a private seed cleaning

facility in northern Behsood

District that has plans to

clean 1,200 to 2,000 metric

tons of wheat, maize, and

rice next year. This is over

ten times more than the 120

metric tons the government-

run seed cleaner in Behsood

cleaned last year.

Representatives of the

E a s t e r n R e g i o n F r u i t

G r o w e r s A s s o c i a t i o n

explained how a variety of

c o mme r c i a l l y -o r i e n t e d

farmer groups in the eastern

region are collaborating to

rehabilitate old orchards and

a r e e x p o r t i n g f r u i t i n

c o m p l i a n c e w i t h

i n t e r n a t i o n a l q u a l i t y

s tandards to high -value

markets.

F a r me r s p a y f e es t o

EFGA and EFGA provides

crates and refrigerated trucks

to transport the produce to

markets. If this process can

work with orchards, it can

work with vegetables and

hopefully can be replicated

throughout Nangarhar and

Afghanistan.

(Continued from page 8) We have begun talks with

these entrepreneurs and are

planning missions in the near

future to visit some of these

companies. We want to find

out how these businessmen

achieved success, how the

ADT can help challenge the

government to facil itate

further business expansion,

and what is the economic

model for entrepreneurship

in Afghanistan.

As we continue to learn

what economic forces are

present in Nangarhar, we can

provide that information to

the AEAs who can become a

c l e a r in g h o u s e f o r t h e

distribution of commercial

a g r i c u l t u r e m a r k e t

information.

While at the conference,

Wischmeyer also spoke with

a r ep resenta t i ve of the

Afghanistan Central Business

Registry. This organization

h e l p s l o c a l b u s i n e s s e s

register with the government

and produces a directory of

all government registered

businesses.

Wischmeyer and I also

spoke with representatives of

the Afghanistan Chamber of

Commerce and Industries.

This organization focuses on

the private sector, lobbying

for the government to be

more business friendly, and

ma k i n g s u g ge s t i o n s t o

Coalition Forces and Non-

Government Organizations

on how to more effectively

u t i l i z e t h e i r f u n d s t o

s t i m u l a t e t h e A f g h a n

economy.

This conference was truly

an eye opening experience

and will hopefully lead to

c o n t i n u e d g r o w t h i n

e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y i n

Nangarhar and throughout

Afghanistan.

With our Commanders

E m e r g e n c y R e s p o n s e

Program budget limited to

$400,000, the days of large

scale project construction by

ADT are gone. The limited

budget will be used to help

the DAIL focus on projects

t h a t w i l l i n c r e a s e h i s

depar tment ‘s ab i l i t y t o

educate and train farmers.

W h i l e o u r b u d g e t f o r

construction may be small,

there is much work that can

be done to improve markets

and value chains at little cost.

Growing the Afgh an

economy by p romot ing

agribusiness development

and helping keep the value

chain within the borders of

Nangarhar Province and

Afghanistan will, we believe,

be a significant impact on

i m p r o v i n g f a r m e r s ‘

livelihoods and helping end

the insurgency.

“We also

discovered a

private seed

cleaning facility in

northern Behsood

District that has

plans to clean

1,200 to 2,000

metric tons of

wheat, maize, and

rice next year.

This is over ten

times more than

the 120 metric

tons the

government seed

cleaner in Behsood

cleaned last year.”

1st Lt. Wischmeyer

exchanges information

with a representative

of a canning

and juicing company

located in Jalalabad.

The ADT was able to

meet many local

businesses while at the

Peace Dividend Trust

Eastern Region

Business Conference.

P A G E 1 0 M e d i a a n d c o m m u n i t y o u t r e a c h :

c o n v e r t i n g n o n - b e l i e v e r s

T h e U n i t e d

States Institute

o f P e a c e

C e n t e r o f

Innovation for Media,

C o n f l i c t , a n d

Peacebuilding published

a report in 2010 which

combined t radit ional

media assessments with

c o n f l i c t a n a l ys i s t o

evaluate the Afghanistan

media.

T h e r e p o r t ,

―Afghan i s t an Media

A s s e s s m e n t ,

O p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d

C h a l l e n g e s f o r

Peacebuilding‖, by Eran

Fraenkel, Ph.D., Emrys

Shoemaker, MA, and

Sheldon Himelfarb, Ph.

D . , o f f e r s u s e f u l

o b s e r v a t i o n s a n d

recommendations which

t h e M i s s o u r i A g r i -

Business Development

T e a m c a n p u t i n t o

practice.

By taking into account

t h e c u l t u r e o f t h e

Afghans, putting together

a p lan wi th speci f ic

goals, and linking media

messages to community

outreach the ADT can

assist the DAIL in using

t h e m e d i a t o b u i l d

farmers‘ t rust in the

government.

The report reflects

optimism that the media

can serve as a peaceful

way to resolve conflicts

in Afghanistan. They

a lso real ize that the

Western world has had

very little impact to the

extremist message from

the successful Taliban

media campaigns during

the past nine years.

These ideas are also

echoed throughout the

m e d i a c o m m u n i t i e s

working in Afghanistan.

Gordon Adam‘s article,

―Could the media save

Afghanistan?‖ Prospect

Magazine (July 7, 2010,

issue 172) states that the

―allies urgently need a

new approach.‖

He also points out,

―The Afghan government

could also gain badly-

n e e d e d l e g i t i m a c y

amongst Afghans by

l istening to peoples‘

views and acting on their

concerns.‖

W h i l e t h e U S I P

assessment recommends

many changes which do

not fall within the scope

of the ADT Campaign

P lan , s evera l of the

suggestions for positive

strategic change can be

applied by the ADT as

t h e y e x e c u t e t h e i r

Information Operations

Line of Operation of their

Campaign Plan.

F o r i n s t a n c e , t h e

assessment states that

―for these contents to be

received as authentic and

c r e d i b l e , t h e y mu s t

reflect the vulnerabilities

a n d p r i o r i t i e s t h a t

Afghans themselves have

identified as vital‖.

T h e A D T c a n

internalize this to read:

Encourage the Director

of Agriculture, Irrigation

and Livestock to identify

vital vulnerabilities and

priorities to the farmers

in Nangarhar.

Another applicable

suggestion states that

―donors should support

media institutions and

infrastructure when that

support would facilitate

t h e p r o d u c t i o n a n d

dissemination of socially

constructive contents;

a n d w i t h o u t t h e

expectation that these

institutions or structures

w i l l b e c o m e s e l f -

sustaining.‖

The ADT, which is

essentially a donor by

virtue of contracts, can

interpret this to mean

t h e y s h o u l d o n l y

f i n a n c i a l l y s u p p o r t

p r o g r a m s t h a t w i l l

achieve a specified goal

a n d w i t h t h e

understanding that upon

the completion of the

c o n t r a c t , t h e me d i a

source may not replicate

or continue the program.

The assessment also

points out that ―as often

and as intensively as

p o s s i b l e , m e d i a

interventions should be

accompanied by face-to-

face community outreach


By Capt. Marie Orlando


“By taking into account the culture of the Afghans, putting together a plan with specific goals, and linking media messages to community outreach, the ADT can assist the DAIL in using the media to build farmers’ trust in the government.”

activities that provide Afghans an

opportunity to put into practice

ideas and options that the media

has brought to their attention.‖

This is a practice the ADT has

already adopted, but this advice is

an important guideline which

should always be considered in

future media campaigns.

To fully understand why these

recommendations have been made,

it is important to understand the

A f g h a n c u l t u r e a n d t h e i r

perceptions. According to the

USIP report, Afghans, both Pasto

and Dari, have a term, amniyat,

referring to ―holistic peace and

security‖. The authors explain that

Afghans want a whole range of

improvement that together make it

possible ―to live a proper or good

Afghan life.‖

One area of their lives which

needs improvement is information

insecurity- they don‘t know who to

trust anymore.

Adam poin ts out tha t the

―strategic messaging‖ carried out

by the ISAF [International Security

Assistance Force] has a limited,

useful role. But he adds, ―Afghans

are canny media users, quick to

s e n s e w h e n t h e y a r e b e i n g

manipulated. They have had 30

years of propaganda by many

shades of governments, from

Communist to Islamic extremist.‖

The USIP assessment says that

the ―major hurdle to constructive

change is that Afghans must make

crucial decisions about the future of

their country, communities, and

families based on information from

sources they do not trust, or on

information from trusted sources

that may not be factual.‖

In their field interviews, the

USIP authors said respondents

stressed they were more likely to

trust who provided the information

rather than the ―veracity of any

specific piece of information‖. In

p r a c t i c e , t h i s m e a n s t h a t

i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m w i t h i n a

community, group, or tribe, would

be perceived as more reliable than

information from outside sources,

including other tribes, central

g o v e r n m e n t , o r f o r e i g n

governments or NGOs, even when

it seemed empirically truthful.

They also found that ―Afghans

especially mistrust information

from military associations‖ They

p o i n t o u t t h e P r o v i n c i a l

Recons t ruc t i on T eam med ia

c o m m u n i c a t i o n e f f o r t s a r e

generally discounted, including

broadcasts from the military Radio-

In -A -Box , wh ich i s u sed i n

Nangarhar.

Yet, Afghans paradoxically

repeatedly express a need for

outside information.

M uc h o f t h e i n f o rma t i o n

provided by donors is related to

reconstruction and development.

Ho we ve r , t h e Af gh a n s f e e l

alienated from the development and

see it as an outcome rather than a

process due to faulty information

from the media.

The reports says, ―Afghan

respondents gave several examples

of informational vulnerability in

this area, such as not knowing

which development plans are

prioritized, where development

funds are going to be spent, or how

a community could qualify for

development assistance.‖

I t i s a l s o i m p o r t a n t t o

understand the role of religious

i n f l u e n c e o n A f g h a n s . I n

Afghanistan, separation of religion

and state will only serve to separate

the government from the people.

The assessment said that in

order to ―gain the trust of the wider

public, which is mostly rural and

highly traditional, media producers

must be sensitive to the ‗basket of

norms‘ that constitute the general

practice of Islam in Afghanistan.‖

But they acknowledge just how to

a c co mp l i s h t h i s i s un c l e a r ,

especially since there are conflicts

internally as to what this actually

means.

Radio is the most pervasive

media outlet in Afghanistan and

Afghans selectively listen to the

stations they trust most or find most

u s e f u l . R a d i o T e l e v i s i o n

Afghanistan (RTA) which is

government owned, has the greatest

reach across the country, but it is

also has the smallest audience

b e c a u s e p e o p l e s e e i t a s

r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e c e n t r a l

government, which they do not

trust.

The challenge for the ADT is to

accept the differences we find in

Afghan culture from our own and

see things from an Afghan point of

view. Despite their inclinations to

distrust most sources, the Afghans

are in agreement that the media can

be a tool for change; we need to

find the means to make believers

out of non-believers.

Overcoming their skepticism

remains a dif f icul t obstacle ,

especially for messages paid for by

the U.S., put out by the DAIL- an

Afghan government official, and

played on a government radio

station. Both the ADT and the

DAIL have a difficult challenge

ahead.

Fortunately for the ADT, the

Nangarhar DAIL actively engages

the press both on a provincial and



Media and community outreach: converting non-believers

V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 9 P A G E 1 1



The Muleskinner Report provides insights and analysis on the Nangarhar Missouri National Guard Development Team’s mission. If you

have questions or comments on the Muleskinner Report, please contact Col. Mike Fortune at [email protected]

The Muleskinner is an unofficial publication authorized by AR 360-1. It is published monthly by the Missouri Agribusiness

Development Team IV to provide important information related to their deployment for the Soldiers and Airmen, their

Families, units and commands, the Army, DOD and the public. Views and opinions expressed in the Muleskinner are not

necessarily those of the Department of the Army or DOD.

MONG

ADT IV Contact Information

national level. In this, he is much

more progressive than many of his

countrymen serving in official

capacities.

One of the goals of the IO LOO

is to build trust in the office of the

DAIL as well as to support efforts

to legitimize GIRoA in the eyes of

the citizens.

The ADT has recognized that

t h e m e s s a g e s , w h e t h e r

informational, educational, or

inspirational must speak to the

needs of the Afghans as identified

by the citizens, not the ADT.

Most Afghans have cellular

phones and t hrough ca l l - i n

programs they can effectively

communicate their concerns to the

DAIL and he in turn can respond

and speak to them about the

process of development.

The ADT can u t i l ize the

recommendation of the assessment

to keep media goals specific and

not open-ended. The ADT will

analyze and support agriculture

media programs that meet the

needs of farmers and change the

k n o w l e d g e , a t t i t u d e s , a n d

behaviors of those involved with

agribusiness activities.

While listeners may believe


RTA pushes propaganda intended

to benefit the politicians rather than

the individual , the DAIL i s

c o n v i n c e d t h a t i t i s m o r e

appropriate for him to participate

on RTA since it is a government

station.

T h e A D T w i l l w o r k t o

incorporate the USIP assessment

recommendation to reinforce the

messages broadcast on the radio

with community outreach. This

concept needs to be applied to all

the messages from the DAIL

office. For the Afghans, it is not

enough to express hopes and ideals

- seeing is believing.

For example, it is one thing to

p romise fa rmer s a ss i s tance .

However, the DAIL has trained and

equipped his Agriculture Extension

Agents to assist the farmers and he

has built classrooms and soil

testing labs within the Agriculture

Extension Centers in a few of the

dis t ricts . When he puts out

m e s s a g e s a b o u t t r a i n i n g

opportunities which will benefit the

farmers, the farmers have tangible

results they can experience first-

hand. This builds the trust of the

people in the messenger– the DAIL

and RTA– both which represent

GIRoA.

To assist the DAIL, the ADT is

working with the DAIL and his

assigned media spokesperson to

develop media campaign plans about

t h e p r o g r a m s t h e D A I L i s

promoting. To continue to forge a

bond of trust , the DAIL must

continually explain to the public the

processes of development and steps

taken to bring about development.

The ADT‘s goal is to mentor the

DAIL media spokesperson to

encourage him to capitalize on

every meeting, training event,

c o n f e r e n c e , a n d p r o g r a m

implemented within the province by

t h e D A I L . T h e A D T w i l l

demonstrate the use of news releases

to provide regular updates on

projects and to speak about the

challenges encountered.

In a memorandum dated Jan. 31

General James N. Matthis tells

commanders, ―We will counter the

adversaries‘ efforts with an effective

communication campaign, linking

our intent and our words with

actions.‖ He says we must be

believed if we‘re to prevail. ―We

must also more fully understand our

envi ronment , and th i s means

listening to the people and having an

appreciation of their history, culture

and concerns.‖

The ADT is already working on it.

Media and community outreach: converting non-believers

V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 9 P A G E 1 2

muleskinner report vol. 4 issue 9

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