murginski, petar. mergers and acquisitions - an economic analysis
TRANSCRIPT
University of Applied Sciences Worms
Faculty of Business Administration
BACHELOR THESIS
Submitted in support of the International Management
Bachelor of Arts degree
TOPIC:
Mergers and Acquisitions: An Economic Analysis
Author: Petar Murginski
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Dirk Schilling
Germany
-2016-
Mergers and Acquisitions:
An Economic Analysis
Attestation
This document is written by student Petar Murginski, matriculation number 670995,
who declares to take full responsibility for the contents of this document.
I declare that the text and the work presented in this document is original and that no
sources other than those mentioned in the text and its references have been used in
creating it.
The University of Applied Sciences Worms is responsible solely for the supervision
of completion of the work, not for the contents.
Contents
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1
2 Background and Historical Trends: Merger Waves.......................................................... 2
3 The Basic Types and Forms of M&A ................................................................................ 6
3.1 Merger or Consolidation ..…………………………………………………………….. 6
3.2 Acquisitions of Shares ..………………………………………………………………. 7
3.3 Acquisition of Assets ..………………………………………………………………... 8
3.4 A Classification Scheme ……………………………………………………………… 8
3.5 Varieties of Takeover .................................................................................................... 10
4 Motives for Mergers and Reasons to Acquire ................................................................. 11
4.1 Economies of Scale and Scope ...................................................................................... 12
4.2 Economies of Vertical Integration …………………………………………………... 14
4.3 Complementary Resources, Expertise and Technology Transfer …………………… 15
4.4 Surplus Funds ……………………………………………………………………….. 16
4.5 Industry Consolidation and Monopoly Gains ……………………………………….. 17
4.6 Eliminating Inefficiences ……………………………………………………………. 17
4.7 Tax Gains from Net Operating Losses .......................................................................... 18
4.8 Diversification ………………………………………………………………………. 18
4.8.1 Risk reduction ......................................................................................................... 18
4.8.2 Debt capacity .......................................................................................................... 19
4.8.3 Liquidity .................................................................................................................. 20
4.9 Increasing Earnings and Lower Financing Costs .......................................................... 20
4.10 Managerial Motives to Merge ..................................................................................... 22
5 The Valuation, The Offer and The Deal Structuring of a Merger .................................. 23
5.1 The Net Present Value of a Merger - Gains and Costs ……………………………... 24
5.2 Right and Wrong Ways to Estimate Benefits ……………………………………….. 26
5.3 Valuation of the Synergies …………………………………………………………... 28
5.4 Stock-Financed Merger and Asymmetric Information – Cash versus Stock ................ 28
5.5 Merger Arbitrage.……………………………………………………………………. 29
6 The Mechanics of a Merger and Post-Integration Issues ................................................ 31
6.1 Mergers, Antitrust Law and Popular Opposition …………………………………… 31
6.1.1 European Commission ............................................................................................ 32
6.1.2 U. S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission ................................. 32
6.2 The Form of Acquisition ………………………………………………………….... 33
6.3 Merger Accounting and Tax Issues ………………………………………………… 34
7 Do Mergers Add Value and Generate Net Benefits – Who Gets them? ......................... 36
7.1 Do Mergers Add Value and Generate Net Benefits? .................................................... 37
7.1.1 A Study of M&A Research Centre at London Business School ……………….. 37
7.1.2 The Managers versus The Shareholders ………………………………………... 39
7.2 Who Gets the Value Added from a Takeover? ............................................................. 40
7.2.1 A Note About Leveraged Buyout ........................................................................... 41
7.2.2 The Freeze-out Merger ........................................................................................... 41
7.2.3 Competition ............................................................................................................ 42
8 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 43
9 Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 44
*The content and structure of the Thesis is based primarily on a mixture of the following
three Corporate Finance books:
1. Brealey, Myers & Allen – ‘Corporate Finance’ 8th Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2006
2. Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’ 2nd Edition, Pearson Education, UK, 2011
3. Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’, EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2013
*All of the sources mentioned in the text and the references used, were accessed
from October 1, 2015 to December 30, 2015.
1
1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are a big part of the finance world. They are major
events of the corporate sector. The process of mergers and acquisitions plays a decisive role
in influencing the trends of the global financial market. In the process, two or more separate
companies are united and a major company is formed. These corporate deals may cost large
amount of money. Sometimes the investment banks are related to the process of merger and
acquisitions. Every day, Wall Street investment bankers arrange M&A transactions, which
bring separate companies together to form larger ones.
Not surprisingly, these actions often appear in the news. Deals can be worth hundreds of
millions, or even billions of dollars. They can dictate the fortunes of the companies involved
for years to come. For a CEO, leading an M&A can represent the highlight of a whole
career.1 Sure, M&A deals grab headlines, but what does this all mean to investors?
To answer this question, this dissertation includes some historical background about the
market for mergers and acquisitions, the basic types and forms of M&A, the motives that
drive companies to acquire or merge with others. Then we review the takeover process itself
and estimate the gains and costs. Next we discuss the mechanics of a merger and potential
post-integration issues. Finally, we address the question of who benefits from the value that
is added when a takeover occurs.
Once we know the different ways in which these deals are executed, we will get a more
transparent image of the takeover process.
1 http://www.investopedia.com/university/mergers/ - The Official Website of Investopedia, an online site for investing education.
2
2 Background and Historical Trends:
Merger Waves
For several decades, mergers and acquisitions have become like a science to
corporations, in terms of buying and selling of firms where one of the participants acquires
the other, respectively the buyer becomes bidder, and the seller is the target firm. Ownership
and control of a company can be changed by either acquiring or merging, but in both
processes of a takeover, some of the following two mechanisms must be accomplished. The
stock and the assets have to be purchased for cash, or something equivalent, such as new
shares in the potential freshly formed company. Usually the first mechanism is preferred by
the target firm, and the second – by the acquirer, due to complex reasons which are going to
be analyzed. Mergers and acquisitions represent a large part of what is known as the
corporate control market.2 They are very popular strategy for the companies which seek a
rapid growth and diversification; or simply just driven by a desire for power and/or
becoming larger.
According to the size of the deals and the numbers of transactions for the last 20 years, M&A
activity has reached its highest point. The global takeover market is highly active with
transaction value of more than $1 trillion average per year.3 Table 1 lists the twenty largest
transactions completed during the ten-year period from the beginning of the century. As the
2 Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’, 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education, UK (2011); Ch. 28 / p. 891 3 Mendenhall, Stahl - ‘Mergers and Acquisitions’, Stanford Business Book, California (2005), p. 3
3
table indicates, takeovers happen between popular companies, and those transactions can
involve large sums of money.
Table 1. Twenty Largest Merger Transactions, 2000-2010 4
The mergers and acquisitions’ history represent us that the worldwide volume of takeovers
remains at a highest level, even though this unknown wave of M&A has drop in the
beginning of the century as the global economy settled down and went into recession after
the dot-com bubble. The largest deal happened the previous year, in 1999, where the acquirer
4 Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances – http://www.imaa-institute.org/statistics-mergers-acquisitions.html#TopMergersAcquisitions_Worldwide for Table 1 and Figure 1
4
was Vodafone AirTouch PLC and the target – Mannesmann AG, for a record value of $202.8
bn. The majority of business observers believe that M&A trend is progressive and the
activity is going to increase even more, so in the long term we should not be surprised by the
implementation of more frequent and larger deals.
Despite the popularity and strategic importance, most of the takeovers did not work. On the
other hand, many bidders have been very successful of managing the acquisitions and in the
integration process. Still the performance of companies is quite subjective, especially the
cross-border mergers, where many external factors are involved, from the sociocultural to the
management approach.
Another possibility to describe the takeover market is by Merger Waves.
Takeovers may result from mistakes in valuation by the stock market. Sometimes the
acquiring firm could think that the value of the target firm is underestimated by the investors,
and/or they will count on deceiving the investor’s assessment and market reaction, hoping
that the value of the combined firm will be overestimated.5 Merger activity is greater during
economic expansions, a period when business activity arise and GDP expands until it reaches
a peak. An expansion is one of the two basic business cycle phases. The other is contraction.
‘Peak’ is the transition from expansion to contraction and the change from contraction to
expansion is a trough. Thus, the same economic activities that drive expansions most likely
also drive peaks in merger activity. Figure 1 describes the takeover activity from 1985 to
2014.
5 Brealey, Myers & Allen – ‘Corporate Finance’, 8th Int. Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2006); Ch. 32 / p. 875
5
Figure 1. Announced M&A6
Figure 1 shows that periods of the greatest takeover activity occurred in the last 20 years
between the 1990s and 2000s. Each merger wave was described by a typical type of deal:7
In the earlier 1960s there was an increase activity of firms which acquired others in unrelated
business, also known as ‘the conglomerate wave’. Next was the era of the unfriendly
mergers, where the bidder bought a bad-performing conglomerate and sold its individual
business price for more than they acquired it - those hostile takeovers were typical for the
1980s. By contrast, the 1990s, were known for its global or strategic deals which were more
likely to be friendly, rather than hostile, and to involve companies in related businesses, not
such from unrelated or conglomerate business. They were designed to create huge economies
of scale, so that they are able to gain competitive advantages and operate globally. The next
jump in the takeover activity began 10 years ago. 2004 was characterized by consolidation in
6 See Reference 4 7 Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’, 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education, UK (2011); Ch. 28 / p. 892
6
many industries such as IT/Software and telecommunications. The world financial crisis in
2008 brought a sudden end to the latest merger wave as the trend since then is almost the
same, without any significant fluctuations.
3 The Basic Types and Forms of M&A
The basic types of mergers and form of acquisitions contain various types of
transactions, depending on the relation between the companies involved, and the payment
method used in the deal.8 The quintessence of the process is to select them, and to find a
significant and meaningful synergy between the companies.
3.1 Mergers or Consolidation
According to the terminology, a merger exists where two or more than two firms are
combining together their liabilities and assets, so that the result is a new firm, under the
identity of one of the firms.9 Usually this is the larger firm, thus the target firm stops to exist
as a separate unit. Although there are mergers of equals (MOE), another subtype. Yet, it is
supposed a brighter contrast to exist, but still one of the companies is “more equal” than the
other (the most typical example is the Daimler-Chrysler MOE in 1998). Those kind of
mergers of similar size-firms almost never work as they are very challenging from
communications perspective. Actually, the practice shows that it is because of the differences
8 Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’ 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education, UK (2011); Ch. 28 / p. 893 9 Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2013); Ch. 29 / p. 784
7
between the internal politics and the fact that nobody believes that such a thing really exists.
Both companies are equal until the contract is signed, therefore it is used more because of
psychological reasons and shareholders mind game, in order to complete the deal.
By contrast, consolidation is similar, where the combination of at least two companies form a
completely new corporation. It is quite the same as a merger, the only difference is that a
new firm is created and both companies end their previous legal existence.10 However, the
process must be approved by the shareholders of both companies, otherwise expensive legal
proceedings could occur, if they cannot agree about the conditions of the deal.
3.2 Acquisitions of Shares
Another type of acquisition is to purchase the firm’s shares in exchange of some of the two
mechanisms mentioned above – cash, or shares of equity and other securities. For this kind
of type, the process is possible to start as a private offer by the management of one firm to
another. The other possibility is to take the offer straight to the target firm’s shareholders by
a tender offer, which is a public offer where the bidder reveals his intensions to purchase
shares of the target. It is communicated to the acquired firm’s shareholders by an
announcements, typically through newspaper advertisement. Sometimes is used a general
mailing, which usually is difficult, because the names and addresses of the shareholders are
often not available. However, there are several different factors, which are involved in
choosing between mergers and acquisitions of shares. In an acquisition of shares
shareholders do not necessary need to arrange meetings or to vote. The acquiring firm can
avoid the target’s board of directors and management, and to contact its shareholders via a
10 Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2013); Ch. 29 / p. 785
8
tender offer, but if they are not interested in the offer, they can simply decline it, so that they
do not need to tender their shares. It is typical for the target managers to resist acquisition as
they are threatened of losing their own and their colleagues’ job. That is the reason why the
acquirer wants to find a way around and tender offer is the most appropriate tool. Because of
that defense and refusal to accept bidder’s offer, the cost of the potential acquisitions by
shares becomes higher than the potential cost by mergers. In contrast, frequently a minority
of shareholders will resist in a tender offer, so that the target firm cannot be fully taken.
Therefore, a merger is required in order to have a complete absorption, and this is why at the
end many acquisitions of shares become formal mergers.11
3.3 Acquisitions of Assets
One company can acquire another by buying all of its assets, if the shareholders approve the
deal through voting. The largest benefit in acquisition of assets compared to the acquisition
of shares is that the acquirer is not left with minority shareholders, but still, includes
transferring ownership to particular assets, which can be very expensive.12
3.4 A Classification Scheme
Financial analysts have classified acquisitions into four types:13
Horizontal Acquisitions is when one firm acquires another firm in the same industry. The
potential benefits, which can be expected from the horizontal type of acquisition are:
economies of scale in production and distribution, and possible increases of market power in
11 See Reference 10 (for References 11 and 12). 13 Gitman, L. & Zutter, C. – ‘Principles of Managerial Finance’ 13th Global Edition, Pearson Education, England (2012); Ch. 18 / p. 720
9
a more concentrated industry, or geographic territory. If a significant percentage of
competition is reduced, the acquisitions could be interpret as creating a monopoly which will
cause antitrust legislation issues.
Vertical Acquisitions gives the opportunity for own supply chain to be integrated, which can
lead to efficiencies improvement and costs savings. This could happen when both the
acquiring and the target companies are in industries with strong supplier-buyer relationships
and the acquired firm is either one of them to the acquiring firm. Acquisition of suppliers
could provide a secure access to materials at any time. In that way levels of demand, and
respectively, market share could be increased, not to mention that the same supplies which
are controlled, can be and usually are important to the competition as well.
Concentric acquisitions are firms which are involved in similar types of business. The
acquirer and target firms can be related through production processes, technologies, or
markets. Benefits could be gained from economies of scale and from entry into a related
market, which will lead to higher returns to the acquirer. The target firm represents an
extension of an existing unit mentioned above, if not all.
Conglomerate acquisitions is an acquisition between firms that are involved in totally
unrelated businesses. They are divided into two types – pure conglomerate, where
acquisitions involve firms of nothing in common, and mixed conglomerate acquisitions,
which involve businesses that are looking for potential product or market extension. The
matter is how the acquired entity can improve the overall performance and generation of
resources.14 15
14 Brealey, Myers & Allen – ‘Corporate Finance’, 8th Int. Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2006); Ch. 32 / p. 871 15 Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’ 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education, UK (2011); Ch. 28 / p.893
10
3.5 Varieties of Takeover
Takeover is a general and not exact term regarding the transfer of ownership and control of a
company from one group of shareholders to another. Takeovers include a wider range of
activities as they can occur by acquisition, proxy contests and going-private transactions:
If a takeover is achieved by acquisition, it will be by merger, tender offer for shares of
equity, or purchase of assets.
Proxy contests can result in takeovers as well. In proxy fights, the acquirer is trying to
persuade as many existing shareholders as possible to vote against the current management,
so that it becomes easier for the deal to succeed.
In going-private transactions a small group of investors purchases all the equity shares of a
public firm. The group usually includes members of the current management and external
investors.16
In conclusion, deals also vary based on the method of payment, whether the target
shareholders receive stock or cash for the shares of their company. The common practice is
the target shareholders to receive stock, cash, or mix of both.
16 Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2013); Ch. 29 / p. 786
11
4 Motives for Mergers and Reasons to Acquire
Companies sometimes use mergers to expand by acquiring control of another
company. The motives for a takeover should be the potential synergies which improve the
firm’s share value, economies of scale, scope or vertical integration, complementary
resources, expertise, technology transfer, the use of the surplus funds and other reasons such
as tax considerations, diversification in terms of risk reduction, debt capacity and lower
financing costs, and increasing liquidity, which are going to be discussed next.
The rational reason for M&A, and some large strategic investments are often explained with
a creation of synergy. This is the additional value that is created by combining two firms,
generating such opportunities that would not been available to these firms operating
independently, without outside support or influence in terms of control. Synergy is what
allows acquirers to pay billions of dollars in premiums in acquisitions. By far, no doubt, this
is the most common explanation that bidders give for the premium they pay for acquiring a
target.
The potential sources of synergy could be categorized in several groups:
Operating synergies affect the operations of the combined firm and include economies of
scale, vertical integration, expertise, and higher growth potential. They generally come up as
cash flows with higher expectations. In vertical integration, combining firms at different
stages of an industry may achieve more efficient coordination of the different levels, because
12
the communication costs, the different forms of bargaining, and the resistant behavior can be
avoided. 17
Financial synergies, on the other hand, are more focused and include tax benefits,
diversification, a higher debt capacity and usage of surplus cash. They sometimes show up as
higher cash flows and sometimes take the form of lower discount rates. Possible financial
synergies involve some unsolved issues of finance theory as well. Nevertheless, empirical
analysis of mergers can help solving the main issues. As a result of a merger, the cost of
capital function may be lowered. The losses and costs may be solid if the cash flow streams
of the two companies are not matching each other.18
Last but not least, there are other motives for a merger besides synergy, as the managers are
likely to view at a potential takeover differently.
4.1 Economies of Scale and Scope
Economies of scale is the decreasing of production costs that the firm is achieving per unit
product in result of increasing scale of output, which means that the average cost of
production falls as the level of production increases. Large companies could achieve
economies of scale by producing goods in high volume that smaller companies could not
afford. This is another reason why managers believe that their own firm would be more
competitive if they are bigger. Figure 2 on the next page illustrates the relation between cost
per unit and size for a typical firm.19
17 See Damodaran, A. – ‘The Value of Synergy’, NYU Stern School of Business, USA (2005), p. 3 - http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/papers/synergy.pdf 18 Rock, Milton L. – ‘The Mergers and Acquisitions Handbook’, McGraw-Hill Book Company (1987); Ch.3 / p. 35 19 Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2013); Ch. 29 / p. 789
13
Figure 2. Economies of scale and the optimal size of the firm (Source: Hiller & Ross, ibid ref. 19)
On Figure 2 is shown that the average cost first falls and then rises, as there is a limit to the
expansion of an organization. It can grow only to a certain period. After reaching that
particular moment, it becomes very expensive to manage such a big organization for a
number of reasons. It becomes complicated and the output is no longer efficient. This
moment is known as "diseconomies of scale"20. On the other hand, economies of scale are
essential benefit of horizontal and conglomerate mergers due to some financial managers,
who can see potential economies of scale in almost any industry, which is quite optimistic. It
is that way, because to buy a good-performing business is always easier, rather than to
integrate it with existing yours on a later stage.
Larger firms can also benefit from economies of scope, which are done through diversity, not
volume increasing. Economies of scope include lowering the average costs per unit by
producing more products. They are more flexible in product design and possess better
20 See http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/diseconomiesofscale.asp - Diseconomies of Scale definition
14
control of the processes. Another business advantage that economies of scope have is the
reduced cost from less waste, and less risk in terms of product line in different countries in
some industries.21
There may be also costs associated with size as larger firms are more difficult to manage
than smaller. In a small firm, the manager is often closer to the operation, the communication
is better and is supposed to have a more transparent perspective as he or she is in contact
with the most important people, and keeps track of every potential issue. They receive
information faster, so that the smaller the company is, the better ability to react in a potential
quick change in the economic environment is achieved.
4.2 Economies of Vertical Integration
Operating economies can be gained from both vertical and horizontal combinations. The
main purpose of vertical acquisitions is to improve closely related businesses or units.
Vertical integration refers to the merger of two companies in the same industry that make
products, needed at different stages of the production cycle.22
Companies believe they can increase their production if they have direct control of the
materials required to make the product. Another reason, if the company is not satisfied by the
way its products are distributed, they can decide to take control of the distributions channels.
The main benefit of vertical integration is coordination. Management can be sure that the
companies are working toward the same goal only by putting them under control and same
governance. 23 However, the larger the company is, the more difficult it is to run it.
21 See vid. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economiesofscope.asp - Economies of Scale v. Scope 22 Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2013); Ch. 29 / p. 788 23 Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’ 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education, UK (2011); Ch. 28 / p. 895
15
4.3 Complementary Resources, Expertise and Technological Transfer
The target company may have resources, expertise or technology that the acquiring
company needs to improve according to its performance, revenue, productivity and costs.
Thus, some of them or a mix, can become a motive for merger.
The targets are desired by the acquirers usually because they can perform better those
particular operations, in which they are specialized as they can improve the usage of the
already existing resources and even to supply the absent components.24 This increases the
firm’s productivity and value, so it make sense for companies to merge if each has what the
other needs, and in many cases it is impossible to be competitive, if separated.
In order to compete more efficiently, companies need expertise in particular areas to gain
competitive advantages. Hiring people with experience and skill is not always the best
solution, as their expertise could be old-fashioned and unappropriated, or even time-wasting
in terms of using new technology which is unfamiliar and difficult to run. A more efficient
solution is to purchase the talent as an already functioning unit by acquiring an existing firm,
which is typical for the high-tech mergers.25
Technology transfer is another reason for merger. To stay innovative, the exploitation of
technological knowledge occupies a top ranking position in terms of motives and objectives
for such transactions. In acquiring technology from external sources, firms aim to promote
innovations that will improve their competitiveness. Thus, M&A transactions give access to
technology as a firm-specific resource. Such technology is otherwise largely immobile due to
24 See Reference 22. 25 ibid.
16
high transaction costs. Generally the plan is to transfer from the target firm to the acquiring
firm, in terms of a technology-motivated transaction.26
There is an important difference between explicit technological know-how, which is found in
documentary form, such as patents, and implicit ‘tacit’ knowledge, which is tied up in a
firm’s personnel and therefore very often hard to identify, record and copy.
The transfers of technological resources aim to create a superior value.
4.4 Surplus Funds
Generating huge amount of cash but having few profitable investment opportunities, is
another reason for mergers. Most of the companies distribute the surplus cash to shareholders
by two mechanisms: by increasing theirs dividend payment or by stock repurchasing.
However, in dividend payment investors should pay higher taxes compared to a stock
repurchase, where investors should pay less taxes. But still, if the only reason is to avoid the
taxes on dividends, the second mechanism is illegal.
Yet, if the management of the company are not willing to purchase its own shares, they can
always invest the cash in purchasing the shares of another company. Other companies which
own surplus funds and do not pay cash back to stockholders, or spread and reinvest the funds
in reliable acquisitions, often end up targeted for a takeover by a larger company, which
propose to do it instead of them.27
26 http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=111&cf=8 – Druid Conference: Journal Industry and Innovation, published by Routledge, p. 3. 27 Brealey, Myers & Allen – ‘Corporate Finance’, 8th Int. Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2006); Ch. 32 / p. 875
17
4.5 Industry Consolidation and Monopoly Gains
The main motive in industry consolidation is to reduce the costs. Although sometimes the
consolidation in some industry might be inevitable, due to different sector crisis and excess
participants in the economy, the takeovers contribute to become faster.28
Yet, merging with a competitor in the industry gives the company a major share in the
market, therefore increases its power and profits compared to the rest participants, which
usually should be controlled and prevented by different antitrust laws and organizations.29
However, we can apply these anti-monopoly strategies only to the developed and modern
countries as the policy is more transparent and visible.
4.6 Eliminating Inefficiencies
Takeovers often take place because the acquirer’s management believe that they can run the
company better. It is supposed that the main reason for an unsuccessful company is the
inefficient management of the target company and that is why it should be replaced. There
are also other assets and liabilities despite cash which could be managed inefficiently, and
companies with unexploited opportunities will always exist. As a result, because of the poor
management, they end up acquired by other companies. Of course the motives and potential
synergies are simply driven by the intension to eliminate the duplication through removing
and replacing the existing management. 30
28 See Reference 27 (and p. 876) 29 Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’ 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education, UK (2011); Ch. 28 / p. 896 30 Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2013); Ch. 29 / p. 789 (See Jensen & Ruback - http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.461.7261&rep=rep1&type=pdf_ The Market for Corporate Control)
18
4.7 Tax Gains from Net Operating Losses
The reduction, respectively the gains can come from the use of tax losses.
A company with both profitable and unprofitable department will have low taxes, as they
compensate each other when they are combined. Conversely, if they are not combined and
are separate businesses, they will not be able to use the benefits mentioned above. Thus, a
merger can lower taxes.
Conglomerate has a tax advantage over a single-product firm, simply because of such
circumstances. Yet, mergers can sometime bring both profits and losses. A firm that has been
profitable but has a loss in the current year may be able to get refunds of income taxes paid
during the last three years, and can carry the loss forward for the next 15 years. Still, in many
countries, tax authorities are likely to prevent an acquisition to happen, if the main reason is
to avoid the tax payment.31 The tax advantages in mergers will differ from one location to
another. In the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)32 is the responsible
government agency for tax collection and tax law enforcement.
4.8 Diversification
Another benefit and reason for a merger is diversification. Those benefits and justifications
come in three major forms, as follows: risk reduction technique, lower cost of debt or
increased debt capacity, and liquidity strategy.
4.8.1 Risk reduction through diversification is a technique which reduces risk by distributing
the amount of the investment among different and various financial industries which are
31 Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2013); Ch. 29 / p. 790 32 https://www.irs.gov/ - The Official Website of US Internal Revenue Service
19
correlated. The main objective is to receive high return and spreading the risk between areas
which react differently to a potential event. However, this could be done by the investor’s
portfolio as well, if it is well-diversified. Usually the larger the investor, the smaller the
possibility is for the company to rely on diversifying through acquisition. It is cheaper for
investors to manage and diversify their own portfolio, rather than doing it by the corporation.
This is a result of the potential agency costs, as in a conglomerate is difficult to measure the
performance of the management, and more precisely their motives.33
4.8.2 Debt capacity involves the assessment of the amount of debt that the company can pay
in a specific period of time. A merger, does not lead only to risk reduction as mentioned, but
it also generates greater tax shield and increased debt capacity. Two major options are
available. One of the possibilities is when the target has too little debt, the acquirer can fill
the target with the missing amount of debt. The other possibility is both companies to have
optimal debt levels.
Unused debt capacity is beneficial as more debt leads to a bigger tax shield, and each
company can borrow a certain amount before the marginal costs factors, as companies with
high risk rates cannot borrow as much as companies with low risk rates.
Some companies have less debt than is optimal. This is because their managers are either
reluctant to take risks, or do not how to evaluate the debt capacity correctly. Having too little
debt is dangerous as it reduces the firm’s value. Moreover, the company becomes a target for
a potential acquisition, as after merging, it will be possible to increase the debt level and
therefore to create a bigger tax shield.34
33 Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’ 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education, UK (2011); Ch. 28 / p. 898 34 Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2013); Ch. 29 / p. 791
20
This is a result of the higher interest payments after the merger, where the tax bill of the
combined firm after the merger are supposed to be less than the sum of the tax of each firm
individually before the merger. Therefore, the increased debt capacity can reduce taxes.
4.8.3 Liquidity can be a valuable and important objective for the target shareholders to agree
to the takeover, as a result of poor-diversified portfolio where they invested unequal part of
their wealth. According to that, acquirers give an opportunity to target shareholders to cash
out their investments from the company and to reinvest them in a well-diversified portfolio.35
4.9 Increasing Earnings and Lower Financing Costs
In spite of the fact that some acquisitions offer no evident economic gains, they are able to
increase earnings per share for several years.
‘The bootstrap game’ refers to a merger that actually has no gains or economic benefits to a
business. Most financial experts claim that the “bootstrap effect” happen when earnings per
share increase while there is no real gain created by the merger, and the combined value of
the two firms is equal to the sum of the separate values.36
Financial manipulators rely on the fact that the market does not understand the deal correct.
A ‘bootstrap game’ generates earnings growth as a result of buying slowly growing firms
with low price-earnings ratios, not because of capital investment or higher profit gains. To
keep deceiving the market and the investors, the firm has to continue to expand by merger of
the same rate. It is obvious that this cannot go on forever. One day expansion must slow
35 See Reference 33. 36 http://www.ehow.com/info_8684608_bootstrap-game-finance.html - ‘Pre and Post Merger P/E Ratios, and the Bootstrapping Game’, Washington University, USA.
21
down or stop, so at this point earnings growth per share and the stock price together fall
dramatically. 37
Nowadays the bootstrap game is not played very frequently, but still there are managers who
would rather acquire firms with low price-earnings ratios. It is false to suggest that mergers
can be evaluated just by looking at their immediate effect on earnings per share.
Lower financing costs is something more than just lower issue and borrowing costs. The
merged company can borrow at lower interest rates than each company individually, which
is normal to be expected, concerning a bond market which is performing well. Until the two
companies are not combined and remain individual, they cannot guarantee each other’s debt.
In other words, if one of the companies fail, the bondholder does not have the option to ask
the other for money, as it can happen if they were merged. Thus, in mergers when one part of
the business fails, the bondholders can still take their money out of the other part. This is the
reason why lenders give money at a lower interest rate to merged entities, as the risk is
guaranteed by more than one participant. Nevertheless, just because the merger received
lower interest rate does not mean that will bring a net gain. They receive this opportunity,
because they gave safer and more reliable protection to the bondholders. As merging
decreases the probability of financial distress, some managers become more confident and
less worried about potential issues, so they begin to borrow money through the increased
value of the combined firm at a lower interest rate, creating a bigger tax shield, and
respectively, a net gain to the merger.38
37 Brealey, Myers & Allen – ‘Corporate Finance’, 8th Int. Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2006); Ch. 32 / p. 878 38 ibid.
22
4.10 Managerial Motives to Merge
By far, the majority of reasons described above were economically motivated and in interest
of the shareholders. However, managers sometimes have their own point of view and reasons
to merge. They are more focused on their own self-interest which most of the time are not in
the best interest of the shareholders. Managers are driven mainly by the financial award
through M&A bonuses or pure personal ambition. They behave selfish, their ego leads them
often to overconfidence as they want to attract the attention of the media in order to gain
better reputation. However, this overestimation of the own abilities and the target’s value can
explain why they fail. To summarize, when a bid is announced, the stock price drops,
especially when the deal is public, and the reason for that can be described by conflicts of
shareholders’ interests or management overconfidence. However, those kind of problems
“lie” on the foundations of the Agency cost theory, as in large corporations is difficult for the
shareholders to control and observe the managers. There are supposed to be methods which
are in support of the anti-agency problems, but still, many observers believe that it is
impossible to deal with it.39
Overconfidence by management is another reason to merge.
Most of them who fail just do not want to realize that they are not as good as they think. The
‘hubris hypothesis’40 describes that overconfident managers lead M&A which have low
chance of creating value because they truly believe that they can deal with the existing
problems, and to succeed managing it better. (“hybris” in ancient Greek means
‘self-confidence’ and ‘extreme pride’; the characteristic of excessive confidence or
39 Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’ 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education, UK (2011); Ch. 28 / p. 900 40 http://pendientedemigracion.ucm.es/info/jmas/doctor/roll.pdf - Roll, R. – ‘The Hubrus Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers’, The Journal of Business 59 (1986), p. 197; (citied Berk & DeMarzo)
23
arrogance, which leads a person to believe that he or she may do no wrong41). The hubris
hypothesis is an advanced explanation of corporate takeovers, explaining why bids are made
and payed too much when the potential target has a negative value.
The key factor between the conflict of interests and overconfidence is actually that when
overconfidence occurs, managers really believe that they are taking the right decision and in
the interest of the shareholders. However, the end result is quite similar and have basically
the same impact, as both actions are increasing the managements’ wealth and decreasing the
shareholders’.
5 The Valuation, The Offer and
The Deal Structuring of a Merger
The takeover process is complex, because the valuation often includes matters like
synergy and control, which go beyond just valuing a target firm. There are valuation methods
that rely on cash flows, which are divided in direct (absolute) or indirect (relative)42
valuations methods, such as discounted cash flow (DCF) or price-to-cash-flow ratio. There
are also valuation methods that rely on a financial variable other than cash flow like
economic income models and value analysis, or other ratios such as price-to-earnings ratio
(P/E), sales and enterprise value multiples. They show the total value of the target.
41 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hubris - Etymology of the term ‘hybris’. 42 See http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2109325&seqNum=6 – Ferris, K. & Pettit, B., ‘Valuation of M&A: An Overview’, Financial Times Press (2013); part 5
24
The most important thing acquirers need to do is to define the advantages and disadvantages
of the potential target, to have clear and transparent motives for taking the right decision.
After that they have to decide the way they will pay for the deal. Finally they have to choose
the tax and accounting considerations, and explore the regulatory approval specifics. 43
After the acquirer has completed the valuation process and decides to do the merger, the
management start a tender offer. This is a public announcement for the intentions of the
bidder, who wants to purchase a large amount of the target’s shares, involving the price of
the deal and the deadline of accepting or rejecting it. Respectively, this determines whether
the takeover will be friendly or hostile.44
5.1 The Net Present Value of a Merger – Gains and Costs
The companies normally prefer the net present value analysis (NPV) when considering a
takeover, especially when they intend to use cash instead of stock - the first option is more
simple, and the second is more complex. The net present value is equal rather to the gains,
than the cost, due to the way of payment. When cash is used, it depends only on the amount
paid and in cash mergers all benefits go only to the acquirer. When stock-for-stock payment
is used, the benefits are shared both by the acquirer and target companies, as the target
receives a fair share percentage from the newly combined firm. However, analysis and
valuation of a target are often quite subjective as it is very hard and challenging to estimate
the accurate benefits. This leads to different ways of identifying the net present value of a
43 See http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/eqnotes/AcqValn.pdf - Damodaran, A., ‘Acquisition Valuation’ Paper, Stern School of Business NYU, USA; p. 3 44 Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’ 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education, UK (2011); Ch. 28 / p. 901
25
merger, but all of them involve similar methods, in which the forecast is based on returns,
risk, and financing the potential deal.45
The most important factor of the process of valuation and analysis is to define whether there
is an economic gain from the merger (Function 1), thus it is necessary for the merger to
achieve effects of synergy and to have higher value when companies are combined than each
individually, which is shown as:
Function 1. Merger Gain formula:46
Gain = PVab – (PVa + PVb) = ΔPVab,
Where the combined firm is PVab, and each individually worth respectively PVa and PVb,
thus only if the results is positive, the merger will be reasonable.
The cost of the acquiring firms is also very important, especially when made in cash
(Function 2). The cost is going to be equal to the cash payment minus the value of the target
as a separate entity, thus:
Function 2. Merger Cost formula:47
Cost = Cash paid – PVb
45 Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2013); Ch. 29 / p. 795 46 For Function 1, 2, 3 and 4 See: Brealey, Myers & Allen – ‘Corporate Finance’, 8th Int. Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2006); Ch. 32 / p. 881 47 See Reference 46.
26
The net present value to the acquiring company of merging with the target (Function 3) is
measured by the difference between the gain and the cost. Therefore, the NPV of the merger
is positive, if:
Function 3. NPV of a Merger48
NPV = Gain – Cost = ΔPVab – (Cash – PVb)
To summarize, the cost is actually the premium that the bidder pays for the target over its
individual value. Thus, a takeover should occur if the acquiring company’s gains are more
compared to the costs.
5.2 Right and Wrong Ways to Estimate Benefits
The process of estimating a business is not simple, it is complex and dangerous. There are no
easy ways to identify good mergers or acquisitions, but the most important thing is to gain
and achieve competitive advantages, compared to the other participants from the same
industry, on a reasonable price. However, acquirers should be careful about the moves and
tactics which the target firm is supposed to do, as it might put itself in an auction where the
bidders compete against each other and give higher price. Often the price is more expensive
than the actual and this must be taken into consideration, if it’s worth or not. Rumors about a
potential bid for the target can also increase its share price up in anticipation of the premium
offer.49
48 Ibid. 49 Ibid, p. 882
27
In analysis, the estimated net gain (Function 4) can become greater because of mistakes of
overestimating the cash-flow, and not that much because of the forecasted benefits and
synergies. Vice-versa, sometimes the opposite happens and the potential is underestimated
by analysists.
Function 4. Estimated Net Gain formula
Estimated = DCF valuation of target, – Cash required
Net Gain including merger benefits for acquisition
Discounted cash-flow technique including the benefits, deducting the payment method, can
be used to determine the potential net gain in the merger. Future cash-flows forecasts and
discounting rates for target’s share price are needed, if the purpose is valuation of a company
as an individual business. After this action, the result should be compared to the actual share
price, but it is quite possible that they do not match and big fluctuations occur instead. Thus,
it should be analyzed deeper as this is the essence of the further consequences in terms of the
takeover benefits and premiums payed. Usually, nobody knows better than the managers
about the situation in their own companies. If the takeover is friendly, not hostile, the target
managers can provide this hidden information also known as asymmetric. This will skip the
potential investigation process and give a better, clearer perspective for the acquirers to act.
However, if the takeover is hostile, not friendly, the lack of such information and potential
gaps in the analysis, can block and fail the valuation process due to inaccuracies.50
50 Ibid.
28
5.3 Valuation of the Synergies
This stage of the takeover valuation process concerns the assessment of the benefits of a
possible merger or acquisition. To do this, first the synergies must be estimated, which could
be quite vague and unclear. Acquirers often fail to bring the promised operation or financial
synergies. Obviously this is the main reason why mergers and acquisitions occur on the first
place, and no doubt, in each takeover a synergy can be created. However, the key is to
estimate the size of the synergy and to decide whether the price is reasonable or not. After
all, M&A worth billions and will not be serious if investment bankers and managers cannot
give systematic explanation why such a big premium is being paid. Some synergies are
easier to predict such as tax benefits due to shields or higher margins due to economies of
scales, but other are harder to be predicted such as cash-flows and future gains or costs. They
are risky and dangerous as well. 51
To conclude considering the valuation process up to now, the M&A should go ahead if the
costs of the takeover, including the bid premium, as well as all transaction costs, are lower
than the combined value of the takeover.
5.4 Stock-Financed Merger and Asymmetric Information – Cash versus Stock
The two methods which an acquirer can use to pay for a target are through cash or stock.
In a cash transaction, the bidder pays for the target, including any premium in cash. In a
stock transaction, the bidder pays for the target by issuing new stock and giving it to the
target shareholders. The choice of payment method depends on the following arguments.
51 See Damodaran, A. – ‘The Value of Synergy’, NYU Stern School of Business, USA (2005), p. 5 - http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/papers/synergy.pdf
29
A stock-for-stock method can be cheaper if the acquiring management believes that the stock
of their own company are overestimated by the market. A cash acquisition is usually
preferred by the shareholders of the target company as they are able to avoid the uncertainty,
and are aware of the potential risks which stock acquisition hides. Also it is more expensive
because it is taxable. However, the use of stock distributes the risk as the combined firm will
share all the profits and losses.52
The other difference between cash and stock financing for mergers is related to the
information which the target managers possess about specific parts of the business or
technological units that only they know. This knowledge is usually unknown by other people
and as mentioned above is referred to ‘asymmetric information’. Sometimes the merger
looks more positive for investors than its actual situation. However, there are some tricks
during the negotiating process which can navigate the managements of the two companies
for potential threats as questions can raise. This specific lack of knowledge and information
can be devastating due to the advantages and benefits which were predicted in first place,
and to destroy them as well.53 Not very moral, but normal as in business happens frequently,
especially when large sums of money are involved.
5.5 Merger Arbitrage
Nothing guarantees that a takeover will exist, even after a tender offer is announced, not at
least for the negotiated price. The target often bargains and raises the price and another
possibility is simply the offer to fail. When an acquirer bids for a target, the target’s firm
52 Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’ 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education, UK (2011); Ch. 28 / p. 902 53 Brealey, Myers & Allen – ‘Corporate Finance’, 8th Int. Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2006); Ch. 32 / p. 885
30
board can reject the bid even if a large premium is offered. The target board is not the only
obstacle for the bidder. Even if they agree, the regulators could disagree and disapprove
when antitrust laws are concerned.
As mentioned above, two principal types of merger are possible: a cash merger, and a stock
merger. In a cash merger, an acquirer proposes to purchase the shares of the target for a
certain price in cash. Until the acquisition is completed, the stock of the target typically
trades or exchanges shares below the purchase price. An arbitrageur buys the stock of the
target and makes a small profit if the acquirer eventually buys the stock, but the arbitrageur
must be aware of each potential move as it is risky and may be fatal for their investment, thus
big losses are possible.54
It is possible for investors to speculate on the outcome of the deal, as uncertainty is involved.
Those arbitrageurs, who believe that they can predict the outcome of a deal, take positions
according to their expectations. However, arbitrageurs are not literally investors, because
they are not usually buying or selling securities, based on their investment value. But still,
they have to participate in the risky part of the deal, not at the risk of the market.
There is a certain and well-known set of order which helps arbitrageurs to take decisions:55
Arbitrageurs have to gather information about the particular deal and then calculate the value
of the securities offered. After that they have to define how much time will the capital be
related in the deal and to estimate the risk opportunities of potential failure of the transaction.
54 Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’ 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education, UK (2011); Ch. 28 / p. 903 55 http://www.fxf1.com/english-books/Wyser-Pratte,%20Guy%20-%20Risk%20Arbitrage.pdf – Wyser-Pratte Guy P. – ‘Risk Arbitrage II’, Salomon Brothers Publishing, Center for the Study of Financial Institutions at the Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University, USA. (p. 22 in the book / p. 34 in the link)
31
Next, an assessment of the various tax consequences, and at the end, a tax strategy is
important to be created according to them.
6 The Mechanics of a Merger and
Post-Integration Issues
Buying a whole company is not that easy as buying a particular business unit or using
specific services. The mechanics in M&A are extremely complex as there are many details
which can reflect the takeover process. Therefore, it is highly recommended to be consulted
and specialists to be hired in the legal, and tax and accounting area.
6.1 Mergers and Antitrust Law and Popular Opposition
Many governments intervene and participate in time of mergers and acquisitions in order to
reduce and control or maintain the monopoly gain. In the majority of the cases, antitrust laws
have rather formally relation or attitude than a potential barrier. However, the process is
unpleasant and time wasting as plenty of bureaucracy is involved, but if the deal does not
raise any serious reasons in terms of reducing competition due to monopoly gains and huge
share in a specific market, there will not be any big troubles and negative consequences.56
56 Brealey, Myers & Allen – ‘Corporate Finance’, 8th Int. Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2006); Ch. 32 / p. 886
32
6.1.1 European Commission
The main legislative texts for merger decisions in Europe is the European Commission (EC)
‘Merger Regulation and the Implementing Regulation’ law. The Merger Regulation contains
the main rules for the assessment of concentrations, whereas the Implementing Regulation
concerns procedural issues, such as notification and deadlines.57
The Commission has also published "Best Practice Guidelines" which concern the
relationship between the commission and the participants during the procedure, such as pre-
notification contacts, meetings, and provision of documents. The Commission has also
published model texts for divestiture commitments and responsibilities in ‘EU Competition
Law – Merger Legislation’58, in order to provide better guidance to the participants in terms
of requirements.
6.1.2 U. S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
In the United States, the responsible legislative authorities for mergers and acquisitions are
the Department of Justice 59 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)60. They track and
observe each significant transaction and approve or take decision to slow down the takeover
process, or even to postpone it. The most important rule is the ‘Clayton Act of 1914’, which
forbids an acquisition whenever “in any line of commerce or any section of the country” the
effect “may be substantially to lessen the competition, or to tend to create a monopoly”61.
Both authorities can regulate and enforce the antitrust laws. Yet, another important
57 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/legislation.html - The Official Website of EC. 58 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/merger_law_2013_web.pdf - Online version of the Legislation and the Guidance Documents, electronic format, 1.07.2013. 59 http://www.justice.gov/ - The Official Website of the U. S. Department of Justice 60 https://www.ftc.gov/ - The Official Website of the Federal Trade Commission. 61 *Cited: Brealey, Myers & Allen – ‘Corporate Finance’, 8th Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2006); p. 886
33
regulation obstacle is The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Act62 of 1976. This requires the
agencies to be informed of all acquisitions of stock amounting to $15 million or 15 percent
of the target’s stock. The risk of unfair transaction to occur is small, as most significant deals
are review in an early stage.
The antitrust laws present serious obstacles in a significant minority of mergers. In those
cases, the EC or the U. S. Department of Justice and the FTC, which share responsibility for
trust enforcement, either may sue to block the deal, or may call for major revision or
restructuring. Private companies also may challenge mergers in the courts, although this
rarely happens except in hostile tender offers, but still is enough to postpone the takeover and
further precautions to be taken by the target against the intensions of the bidder.
As there are plenty of options available to antitrust authorities, the companies have to be
accurate and transparent about their motives in order to obtain government clearance and
fulfill the necessary requirements. This could support the decision of the authorities and lead
to the end result, whether the deal will be allowed and go forward, or blocked.
6.2 The Form of Acquisition
If there are no any evidence that an antitrust issues will occur, the next step is to decide and
choose what will the form of acquisition be. There are three major possibilities to do so. The
first of them is to merge the companies, but at least half of the stockholders’ approval of the
target company is needed, as the acquirer will assume all the assets and the liabilities under
its management and ownership. Another option is to buy the target’s stock in for cash or in
62 Rock, M. – ‘The Paper Chase: Regulation, Communication, and Defenses’, McGraw-Hill Publishing, USA; Ch. 36 Antitrust Guidelines by D. Rosenthal & W. Blumenthal / p. 401
34
exchange of shares and other securities. In the second case the acquirer does not need the
approval of the board or management, and can deal individually with the target’s
shareholders. The third possibility is to purchase most or all of the target’s assets. In result of
that the right of property must be titled, and the stockholders of the target are bypassed
indirectly as the payment is made directly to the company.63
6.3 Merger Accounting and Tax Issues:
After the terms of the deal are chosen, the next step is to decide which tax and accounting
method can be involved and established. The management has to find the most gainful way
to register the purchase in its financial statement. Until 15 years ago (2001) the company had
a choice of which accounting method to be used, but in that year the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) introduced new rules that required to use the purchase method of
merger accounting.64 Many mergers involve companies in two different countries, which
presents many difficulties in estimating the benefits of acquisitions. This is because
accounting and tax rules can be very different across countries.
Two of the most powerful global trade participants – the USA and the European Union have
different accounting systems and standards. However, they are trying to bring the rules into a
common framework as none of them can afford to stay out of the game, no matter how big
their influence or economy is. In Europe, and many other countries, International Financial
Reporting Standards65 (IFRS) govern the accounting transactions of the companies. In the
63 Brealey, Myers & Allen – ‘Corporate Finance’, 8th Int. Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2006); Ch. 32 / p. 887 64 http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum141.shtml - The Official Website of FASB, ‘Summary of Statement No. 141 – ‘The Purchase Method, revised (2007). 65 http://www.ifrs.org/Pages/default.aspx - The Official Website of IFRS.
35
United States, the responsible organization is the Financial Accounting Standards Board66
(FASB). Both of them, the IFRS and FASB, co-operate together and work on developing a
common framework. As an ongoing project, which involves many national standards, the
process is going to be slow but developments continue to improve and will get better in
future.
Both organizations conclude that the accounting treatment of any M&A should involve fair
value of all assets and liabilities. The following merger accounting method, proposed by
IFRS3 Business Combinations67 involves several steps such as: identifying of the acquirer,
through a separate accounting standard - IAS27 Consolidated and Separate Financial
Statements68, which is used to identify the company that has gained control in the merger
transaction. This can be quite difficult, especially when the merger is a merger of
equals; the second step is to determine the acquisition date, which is normally the date of
legal transfer between the companies; next, it is important to recognize and measure the
assets and liabilities; and at the end, to measure the goodwill.
The acquirer’s payment method for the target is in both shareholders’ interests as it affects
the taxes of the companies. The acquisition can be taxable or tax-free, or at least postponed
in time if the new shares are sold. In this sense, cash acquisitions is taxable and stock
acquisition is tax-free. There is another option when the acquirer purchases the target assets
directly, the book value will also increase. This leads to creating a goodwill, which is an
66 http://www.fasb.org/home – The Official Website of FASB. 67 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/consolidated/ifrs3_en.pdf – IFRS3, ‘Business Combinations’, EC, consolidated version (2011). Cited by (Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ p. 812) 68 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/consolidated/ias27_en.pdf – IAS 27, ‘Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements’, (2009).
36
intangible asset that arises through a premium value after an acquisition. It is difficult to
price the goodwill of a company but it makes the company more valuable due to good
customer relations or patents of technology. It is important for the acquirer not to
overestimate the potential goodwill, as the factors involved are quite subjective.
The accounting treatment of M&A is moving toward one basic standard across the world,
and governments are also helping and trying to integrate national tax laws inconveniences.
The taxation of M&A across national border can be extremely complex and can cost a lot,
which discourages many corporations from pursuing cross-border mergers.
Yet, there have been a number of treaties that smooth out the differences, in order to unite
the differences across the world.
7 Do Mergers Add Value and Generate Net
Benefits – Who Gets them?
For years, the value of mergers and acquisitions has been discussed. Do mergers add
value and generate net benefits, and if so, who gets them – as this is an empirical question,
the answer will be given and supported by empirical evidence. Although, there are many
ways to estimate value creation, most academics prefer event studies and a recent one is
going to be briefly summarized next.
37
7.1 Do Mergers Add Value and Generate Net Benefits?
Mergers can create value from different sources of synergies. If the value of the combined
company is greater than the sum of each individually, therefore a synergy occurs, and
respectively value is added. 69
Although most mergers added value, yet, mergers which involve the biggest companies have
lost value. Mergers and acquisitions in Europe are not as popular as in the USA. Takeovers
have been driven by different motives. Usually, the most common motives are the
exploitation of different synergies and expanding into new markets. However, when a crisis
occurs, such as the last in 2008, many companies are forced to merge due to financial
distress and economic necessity. Another barrier which can destroy the value and the
interest in a potential merger, is the different regulatory and legal framework which each
country has.
Today, companies continue to keep making acquisitions so that they can increase their
market share, expand geographically, and diversify into other industries. In a recent report
was confirmed that the generally accepted theory and belief about M&A does not have all
the necessary parts or appropriate tools, and is imperfect. Most of the studies agree that
mergers add value around the date of announcement.
7.1.1 Four years ago, in a study from November 2011, done by researchers at the M&A
Research Centre at Cass Business School in London70, was proven that in the first three years
after the takeover was announced, the majority of deals did not add value according to the
share-price performance. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that successful deals added more
69 Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2013); Ch. 29 / p. 807 70 http://ww2.cfo.com/ma/2012/06/do-mergers-add-value-after-all/ - ‘Do Mergers Add Value After All’, Sawyers, A., CFO Magazine, 2012.
38
value than unsuccessful destroyed in the researching sample of more than three thousand
companies from the United Kingdom during the period 1997-2010.
In the long-term, taking everything into account, 4 months between and 36 month after the
deal was announced (Figure 3), has been found that takeovers add value in the period prior
the deal, and the share prices of the acquirer performed better at a peak of 7.5%, according to
the FTSE71 index, in the first 3 months after the deal. However, after that, the return stars to
get lower and 3 years after the deal, eventually reached 1.2%. In conclusion was suggested
that “the more cash in the mix, the more successful the deal”.
Figure 3. Long-term adjusted total return for acquirers, adjusted to the FTSE All-Share
Index
71 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/prices-and-markets/stocks/indices/summary/summary-indices.html?index=ASX – The FTSE All-Share Index, originally known as the FTSE Actuaries All Share Index, is a capitalization-weighted index, comprising around 3,000 companies traded on the London Stock Exchange. FTSE All-Share is the aggregation of the FTSE 100 Index, FTSE 250 Index and FTSE SmallCap Index.
39
The study was commissioned by The UK government’s Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills. In support, Andrew Sawyers confirms “The Economic Impact of
M&A: Implications for UK Firms”, where not only were not provided any significant
evidence that hostile takeovers are value destroying in the long run, but it also was proven
that actually, acquirers involved in hostile deals generate more shareholder value, compared
with those involved in friendly takeovers.
Although it is obvious that mergers on industry concentration and firm size add value, it is
unlikely the result to be the same for the social welfare.
7.1.2 The Managers versus The Shareholders
Most of the time, takeovers present problem and conflict of interests between management
and shareholders, as acquisition is one possibility for the managers to spend large sum of
money, instead of paying it out to the shareholders. It is typical for managers to take on and
to commit less-beneficial deals and takeover actions, especially if they have a lot of free cash
flow or borrowing power. In such cases, usually managers will gain more than shareholders
due to bonuses, commissions and other motives, described by the Agency theory. Managers
are supposed to look from the perspective of the shareholders, as they are the one who elect
the board and the one who pay, but in practice, this loyalty should not be expected in the
financial world, as everything is up to self-interests and private gains, especially when large
sums of money are involved and still, shareholders cannot control the managers efficiently.
In result of this lack of control by the shareholders, the managers make worse decisions and
work less, but get paid more. Even are stimulated to grow the size of their corporations
through mergers and acquisitions, because of their contracts and payment details. Agency
40
theory, or the overconfidence combined with lack of transparency by the management, could
easily explain why the biggest merger failures have involved large firms.72
On the other hand, a similar problem exists in the relationship between the target
shareholders and the target management. If a merger is inevitable and impossible to prevent,
target management is possible to negotiate for their future or benefits with the acquirer, at the
expense of the target’s shareholders. One potential way to do this, is through cutting the
premium of the deal.
7.2 Who Gets the Value Added from a Takeover?
After it was proven that hostile takeovers add more value than the friendly takeovers, the
main benefit, in terms of paid premium, remains to be generated by the targets’ shareholders,
which premium is always higher than the actual price, according to the market. Because of
the supposed synergies, usually the bidder pays average the target a premium of 40 to 50 per
cent of the current price. However, acquiring shareholders take a risk as they could lose from
the deal, if the premium is more than the estimated synergies. Therefore takeovers generate
safer net benefits to the target shareholders. Even if the bidder shareholders have calculated
the gains and costs correctly, this does not mean that there will not be any further issues in
the long-term.73
72 Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2013); Ch. 29 / p. 811 73 For Reference 75 & 76; See Reference 73: Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’ 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education, UK (2011); Ch. 28 / p. 910
41
7.2.1 A Note About Leveraged Buyout
LBOs and Mergers have much in common. In a leveraged buyout the cash offer price is
financed with large amounts of debt, most of it which is junk. This allows the bidders to meet
the acquisitions costs without using any
significant amount of capital investment, as the rest of the capital is usually supported by
a small group of investors. They could be existing managers of the target company or
indirectly connected with them. Such transactions are also known as management buyouts.
To explain the LBO, two factors are important to be taken into consideration – the additional
tax shield, and efficiency gains. Since the tax shield is simpler to be measured due to the high
debt rates, the second part, according to the increased efficiency remain quite subjective and
harder to evaluate. Without any doubt, the LBO mechanism is again in favor and interest of
the target’s shareholders as they get paid a premium just like in a merger. 74
Nevertheless, the risk is huge, as great leverage is involved. LBO can be compared to a
double-edged knife as this tactic can either make a fortune or cause bankruptcy.
7.2.2 The Freeze-out Merger
Alternative mechanism to the leveraged buyout is the freeze-out merger.
This is an action where the majority of the shareholders of the target forces the minority to
sell their shares. After a tender offer is announced and accepted, the non-tendering holders
lose their shares as the target is already acquired and does not exist anymore. Then, they
receive the right to review the tender offer and as long as the price is fair, in terms of higher
than before the takeover process, there is no possibility for legal consequences to exist.
74 Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’ EU Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing (2013); Ch. 29 / p. 814
42
In a freeze-out merger the acquirer could pay either with cash or debt to the minority of the
target’s shareholders.75
7.2.3 Competition
To summarize, all mentioned above, competition is another reason which can explain the
high cost of the premium, paid by the acquirers to the target’s shareholders, despite of the
availability of the previous mechanisms – LBO and Freeze-out merger. When an acquirer
discovers important and worthy synergy effects and gains, other acquirers could also want to
bid for the target company. This basically leads to an auction, where the target is waiting to
accept the highest price. Therefore, the acquirer has to sacrifice most of the value added in
benefit to the target’s shareholders, and to pay large premium, which purpose is to avoid
potential auction and further inconveniences.76
75 See Reference 73 (and p. 914) 76 Ibid., p. 915
43
8 Conclusion
Most of the companies believe that the best way to become more successful and to
make higher profit, is through mergers and acquisitions. Such a market growth is expected
by the managements, board of directors, shareholders and investors, because of the fact that
M&A can create synergies, economies of scale, expanding operations, increasing earnings
and cutting costs. There are several types and forms of M&A, and it is important to analyze
each of them, the potential gains and costs which they involve, in order to take and choose
the most beneficial deal. The valuation process, the offer and the deal structuring are
complex, as they involve different methods and mechanisms. However, to combine two
firms, is not enough to have the board or shareholder approval, but it is require to have the
antitrust regulators approval as well. Although, the managerial motives behind a takeover are
questionable and dubious, companies continue to keep making acquisitions so that they can
increase their market share, expand geographically, and diversify into other industries.
After all, it is proven that mergers create more value than they destroy, but still, the net
benefits from M&A deals remain to be generated by the target’s shareholders. The majority
of business observers believe that M&A trend is progressive and the activity is going to
increase even more, so in the long term we should not be surprised to see more frequent
and larger deals.
44
9 Bibliography
Berk, J., DeMarzo, P. – ‘Corporate Finance’ 2nd Global Edition, Pearson Education,
UK, 2011.
Brealey, Myers & Allen – Corporate Finance’, 8th Int. Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing 2006
Gitman, L. & Zutter, C. – ‘Principles of Managerial Finance’, 13th Global Edition, Pearson
Education, England, 2012.
Hiller, D. & Ross, S. – ‘Corporate Finance’, European Edition, McGraw-Hill Publishing,
2013.
Mendenhall, Stahl - ‘Mergers and Acquisitions’, Stanford Business Book, California, 2005.
Rock, Milton L. – ‘The Mergers and Acquisitions Handbook’, McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1987.
Damodaran, A., ‘Acquisition Valuation’ Paper, NYU Stern School of Business,
USA - http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/eqnotes/AcqValn.pdf
Damodaran, A. – ‘The Value of Synergy’, NYU Stern School of Business,
USA, 2005 - http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/papers/synergy.pdf
Roll, R., – ‘The Hubrus Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers’, The Journal of
Business 59, 1986 - http://pendientedemigracion.ucm.es/info/jmas/doctor/roll.pdf
Wyser-Pratte Guy P. – ‘Risk Arbitrage II’, Salomon Brothers Publishing, Center for the
Study of Financial Institutions at the Graduate School of Business Administration,
New York University, USA - http://www.fxf1.com/english-books/Wyser-
Pratte,%20Guy%20-%20Risk%20Arbitrage.pdf
45
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/legislation.html - The Official Website of
EC.
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/merger_law_2013_web.pdf - Online
version of the Legislation and the Guidance Documents, electronic format, 1.07.2013.
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/consolidated/ias27_en.pdf – IAS 27,
‘Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements’, 2009.
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/consolidated/ifrs3_en.pdf – IFRS3,
‘Business Combinations’, EC, consolidated version 2011.
http://www.ehow.com/info_8684608_bootstrap-game-finance.html - ‘Pre and Post Merger
P/E Ratios, and the Bootstrapping Game’, Washington University
http://ww2.cfo.com/ma/2012/06/do-mergers-add-value-after-all/ - Sawyers, A., ‘Do Mergers
Add Value After All, A Study of M&A Research Center of Cass Business School in London.
http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=111&cf=8 – Druid Conference:
Journal Industry and Innovation, published by Routledge.
http://www.fasb.org/home – The Official Website of FASB.
http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum141.shtml - The Official Website of FASB, ‘Summary
of Statement No. 141 – ‘The Purchase Method, revised 2007.
https://www.ftc.gov/ - The Official Website of the Federal Trade Commission.
http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2109325&seqNum=6 – Ferris, K. & Pettit,
B., ‘Valuation of M&A: An Overview’, Financial Times Press, 2013.
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/prices-and-
markets/stocks/indices/summary/summary-indices.html?index=ASX – The FTSE All-Share
Index, traded on the London Stock Exchange.
http://www.iasplus.com/en/resources/ifrsf/iasb-ifrs-ic/iasb - The Official Website of IASB.
http://www.ifrs.org/Pages/default.aspx - The Official Website of IFRS.
http://www.investopedia.com/university/mergers/ - The Official Website of Investopedia.
http://www.justice.gov/ - The Official Website of the U. S. Department of Justice
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/RemediesinMergerCases2011.pdf - Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘Remedies in Merger Cases’, 2011.