N O PRACTICE . K N O W L E D G E IS STRENGTH

JH jjO gY A N D PRACTICE » KNQWLCn

THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY2. THE 1922 STRIKE ' T

. In January 1922, less than six months after Tho * •, Q 0 0 6~0 3 • the Communist Party of South Africa white S p r , ? , ? ? 1' 6'1 and ma*y (CPSA) was bom, white miners in the lost then jobs. But the Transvaal came out on strike. They were ! f S ? not give the j°bs to blacks Infighting against a plan by the S S S f ^ e y employed fewer S s to owners to allow black miners to do w S k S T * V he, bIack miners. who had to reserved for whites. K work harder for the same pay

The mine owners did not put forward „ f ! l ,the white workers and’the boersthe plan out of love for the black workers Smm! ? latteland Joined forces to fight They wanted to raise their profits which n 3 general election. The racisthad fallen because the price of gold had ^abour Paity and Hertzog’s National Par-gone down. The easiest way to do this d i d ^ t election. The white workers

• ^as to replace expensive white workers mad °!h°u- Communists, who hadV ith cheaper black ones. S made the bl^ e s t sacrifices in the strike

The white miners strike develoDerf in new 9°vernment passed laws thatto a General Strike of white workers on S K " 16®?1 the P™ leged^ poshTon «the Rand. The strikers raised the Red Flao ^ workers. The laws confirmed theand claimed to be fighting for a Soviet ° f the white w o r k e r s anrepublic. But in reality they were fiohtina an?tocracy of labour’. They had sold ^ e e p their privileges I S e s 9 *°J 3 share in w p S S S t eJ i J h ? PS^ SUPPOrted the strikers, ^though it said the real issue was keeninrr r • i CP^A learned a bitter lesson Ono UP wages, not keeni™ of «s leaders, Ivon Jones w ofe

155 n o y n n m . /■** _ . 1 *10IT0

. ' ACi;> -Dui at me same

pay ,he w hi,e W 0A ers w ereThe strikers made an alliance with the! f mfes,to’ ‘have nothina to lose but

Afnkaner Nationalists. Armed comman i chains . It is the black workers whn dos clashed with the police The strike V 1? y revoIutionary force* able to£sted three months. In March Pnme T T * *** shack]es of white d o ^ i j ? Minister Smuts declared Martial Law rJJu ° n l° b^ d a sociaIist South Africa'( ^ ar 1° a State of Emergency) He ™ J l Snd °-f 1924 CPSA had c S n t

■' boi^ bei;s, tanks and machine guns to Up!?* f?£tl0n‘ Declaring that ‘the pr?-rce the miners back to work. More than solved h i r iworking cIass can only be

250'w orkers died. Two of the strike ffo l ^ edFrom °f all workers irleaders were m urdered by troops and t ^ f ^0 ° f coIour’- it began to organisethree were hanged. P and trade u™ons of black workers

Why did the CPSA support strikers whn , party reaPed a rich reward Trc

'WWteeL US l h^ IU’er CaUing for a who w ereT ob ecom tlead ^ reo fE lu h e

2 2 5 S S L 5 ! — members £ & £ £ * Moses E « Smovement. Ils I, aders and

«

o??he°M ke ,he WiSd0m and aims

TZitDJ H*,AFRICAN C°MMUNIST

39 Goodgm StT,i" S o n WIP^Td^UK

BUILD THE PARTY!---------- IS

NICARAGUA:LESSONS FOR OUR REVOLUTIONThe Nicaraguan Revolution, which the USA is seeking to crush, will survive and advance pus is because it is a truly people’s revolution with a tradition of heroic resistance.

v 0 0 0 6 0

16

f "7Th® A n ,i*,m p er,a ,,s f lig h te rIt is not the first time that Nicaraguan patriotshave had to face US aggression. At the turn of the century American marines landed in Nicaragua and other Central American coun- toes. Military intervention lasted 25 years in Nicaragua until US troops w ere fought to a standstill. Their opponent was Augusto San-

no who led a guerrilla army of workers and peasants. Forced to switch from direct intervention the US sought a local instrument of domination. Sandino was assassinated in 1934 his followers massacred and the Somoza family installed in pow er. For 45 years the people were to suffer under this brutal regim e. Bit bandino s brave resistance gave birth to a tradition of popular revolt. His example inspired the Sandinista National Liberation Front, which was formed in 1961 and took his name.

The Vanguard — How It G rewThe Sandinistas grew from small study circles mto underground cells. Small guerrilla groups began operating in the mountains. The going was slow and hard. Many activists w ere cap- tured imprisoned, m urdered. For years a handful survived in the mountains, keeping alive the spirit of arm ed resistance. Differences of approach arose within the Sandinistas as they struggled to gain the people’s active support. Some w ished to concentrate effort on organising within the urban workers. Others believed that only through protracted war waged by rurally-based guerrillas could

. Somoza be toppled. Conditions for mass struggle, however, w ere ripening. Contradictions within the regime and bold arm ed actions were contributing to a rise in the people’s willingness to act. Strikes, demonstrations and street battles betw een the people and the security forces becam e common. The people showed contem pt for death, displayed the Sandinista flag, becam e skilled in building barricades and arming themselves with homemade bom bs and im provised weapons. The sim ilarity with m any recen t events in our country is striking!

S trategy for InsurrectionLearning from the m asses and their often spontaneous revolts, the Sandinistas came to devise a strategy based on an ‘insurrectionist’ approach. This was in 1977. By July 1979

Augusto Sandino

Somoza was overthrown by a remarkable succession of local and general uprisings. This strategy, which so accelerated the pace of the arm ed struggle, consisted of a meshing of guem lla warfare and the new phenom enon of popular upnsings in the towns. In the past the arm ed activists of town and countryside had been relatively isolated from the people. Military and political work were poles apart. Experience taught the Sandinistas that the mass uprisings could place the actions of the people themselves in the forefront of the armed struggle. The task was to transform the aroused political force into a peop le’s army. What Lenin called transforming the ‘political army of the revolution’ into the ‘Revolutionary Armed Forces’ or ‘the people in arm s’. Taking advantage of the favourable situation the aandimstas grew within one year (1977-78) from a few hundred guerrillas into a fighting force of thousands. They had found the practical way of arming the masses and moulding them mto an effective insurrectionary force. Ihere could be no triumph without the

massive participation of the p eo p le’, stated num berto Ortega, a Sandinista leader ‘We thought m ass action would be a prop to help the guerrillas strike some blows at the National Guard. The reality is that the guerrilla cam paign becam e the prop for the people to overthrow the Somoza regim e through insurrection’.

A further important element of Sandinista strategy was the creation of tactical class alliances. This involved the building of a broad popular from including the middle classes and liberal bourgeoisie which were alienated by f ®™ ?23 s ™le- p e Sandinistas were confident that the radical basis of their platform, together with .the ascendant mass movement, would help guard against the bourgeoisie gaining control of the revolution. The outcome was the isolation and disintegration of the Somoza regim e and the triumph of peop le’s power. It is the same mass force which overthrew bomoza and opened the way for social progress that now defends the Nicaraguan revolution against US-backed bandits and the possibility of direct American invasion. The th ree million peop le of this small but courageous country are enthusiastically constructing a new society, and fired by the example of the legendary Sandino, are ready to defend Nicaragua with their last breath.

u s IMPERIALISM — OUT!

- J i B - U

1986 — A YEAR OF DECISION

The e n e m y m ust be g iven no r e s t . The prospect of b reak in g the back of the race ty ra n n y is no longer a d ream ; it is beginning to loom on the horizon . The p eo p le 's offensive must be sp read to a il fronts! Let all ro a d s lead to people's p o w e r1 Let us m a k e 1986 a Y e a r of Decision!

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?From Ungovernability to an Organised OffensiveThe mass of the oppressed in most of the main urban centres have responded to the call to make the country ungovernable. In place of the collapsed enemy structures let us everywhere create united, organised and disciplined popular organs. These organs can become the seeds of people s power and the mass instruments for raising the community s struggle to even higher levels. From outburst to an organised offensive! From ungovernability to popular

•0 organisation!r t *

From the Towns to the CountrysideiJV The flames of resistance and defiance must be spread to the millions

in the countryside. When the countryside also catches fire the enemy will be on his last legs. Militants from the towns must go among their country brothers and sisters and help spread the message of organisation and revolt. Let the towns surround the countryside!

The Working Class is the KeyOur working class, in alliance with the landless and rural poor, holds the key to victory and to a future of real people’s power. Strengthen the workers vanguard - the South African Commmunist Party! Under the overall leadership of our liberation front the trade union movement of the oppressed must become a stronger and stronger instrument of struggle. We hail the creation of- COSATU as a qian*S e?986! dlreCti0n ° f maSS workers’ unity- Let COSATU grow to a million strong

C ontinued on p a g e fw o .

■; Combine in One FistLet a ll contingents of our revolution act muni ties and the youth must be like

_ unconquerable.Spread the Mass Offensive

fe The time has never been more npe-for the complete destruction of influx control and the hated pass laws. The consumer boycott against white business can further weaken and divide the ruling class. Action in the universities and the schools are a vital part of the social forces

.in our revolutionary upsurge. Teachers, parents and the organised workers must become part of one co-ordinated offensive together with the youth. At the right moment a national general political strike can paralyse the enemy's grip on the economy. Let us shout ‘no’ to higher rents, higher transport costs, taxation without representation and all other methods by which the racists milk the oppressed. The regime must be forced to lift the emergency and release all political prisoners unconditionally^ The spirit of resistance, defiance and civil disobedience must be raised to new heights in 1986.Above all, the spread of mass defiance and revolt must be backed by increasing armed blows against the

as one. The organised workers, tlie^corT^ ^ ^ one clenched fist. Together they are

enemy and by growing contingents of people with arms in hand. Let MK hit out as never before in the Year of the People’s Arm y!

The L ib e ra t io n Fro ntThe popular front for majority rule in one united South Africa must spread its roots to every com er of our land. The ANC stands at the head of this front; only under its umbrella can the struggle for people’s power be led and won.

-The S A C P A V ita l P a r t o f th e A l l ia n c e — S a y s ;

LET US MEET THE CHALLENGE! LET US MAKE 1986 A YEAR OF DECISION!

ORGANISE THE OFFENSIVE!

SV:i •' l .V’tl

DOES INSURRECTION NEED PEOPLE'S WAR?

; People s war. is not the only path to a victorious arid arm ed insurrection- The Great October Socialist Revolution was not preceded b y :a guerrilla war. Therefore, in for-

C mulating strategy, revolutionaries have ' to identify conditions ■ which dictates the approach of people's w a r and possib le insurrection and those which allow for insurrection .w itho u t p r io r p ro tra c te d people's w ar.

For a start, let us look at the question why revolutionaries plan for a protracted war when they and the people want their freedom without delay.

‘7’his strategic approach is adopted in situa- ‘•Jns w here the people are forced to take up arms but find themselves materially weak compared to the enemy. They have to patiently build their forces; confront the enem y in small units and in conditions most suitable to them. In the course of many years, they sap the enemy's strength and create a general crisis allowing for the final armed insurrection and the seizure of power.

For the strategy of an arm ed insurrection that is not p receded by a protracted guerrilla struggle:★ The economy should be so developed that

private ownership of the wealth should have becom e a brake on its further development;

* The clashes) on whom the econom y depends should have a history of mass action as well as a vanguard organisation to lead them;

* Such actions should occasionally lead to great revolts and political crises of the ruling class(esj;The ruling class should not command decisive resources outside the country

i^Bwhich is the theatre of struggle;★ The state machinery should be m ade up

mainly of forces from the classes and strata that are in revolt.

A guerrilla war can be w aged w here all these conditions exist, for example in Cuba and other Latin American countries. In this instance, we should take into account other national conditions (such as the revolutionary traditions of the people) and international fac- j tors (for example, how the country relates to imperialism).

Our situation displays almost all the conditions for a violent revolution that does not have to mature from a guerrilla campaign. The

econom y is over-ripe for revolution. Black workers and the rest of the oppressed people have a tradition of mass struggles including partial uprisings. At their head is an experienced revolutionary movement. The ruling class is based in South Africa; it does not com m and significant resources outside the country.

However, the core of the army and police is m ade up of whites — who have a stake in the colonial system. Though an important element in the defence of white power, black soldiers and police are not the main pillar of the reg im e’s defence structure. Our strategy of protracted people 's war com pensates for this, our material weakness.

But our conduct of people’s war has to take into account the other conditions, especially the ongoing uprisings which have elements of an insurrectionary revolt. For us insurrection is much more than a possibility at the very end of a protracted war. We have to m erge the strategy of protracted war and the science and art of insurrection.Concretely :1. Armed and mass activity should reinforce each other, develop to achieve harmony and to m erge into one. This means we should at all times possess an armed potential that we can put to good use at periods of heightened mass activity — transform ’simple* mass uprisings into armed uprisings. It means also that we must cultivate mass initiative and mass creativity in the acquisition and usage of w eapons, in battle tactics, etc.2 . Physical confrontation with the enemy army and police must be accom panied bv a rigorous organisational and political campaign within these institutions.3 . Combat units should be formed at the w orkplace, in the surburbs and townships.4. Armed action should reinforce and d e fend rudimentary organs of popular power.

1° th is w a y w e sh a ll w o rse n the p o l i t ic a l c r is i s a n d m a k e o u r p e o p le 's w a r the le ss p ro tra c te d .

MASS ACTION CAN DISABLE THE SADF!

-3fk -

A few weeks before his accidental death in

Angola. David Rabkin entered the discussion in

U m sebenzi insurrection. Evht m i

brief contribution underlines what a rare

talent has been lost to the libera ti'on and. comm unist

cause. We wilt tell our readers more about him in a future issue in the 'Pen

Pictures' section.

Here are my views on insurrection and the SADF: i . 'Although defection -ef sections.of the army has often accompanied insurrection, it is not an indispensible factor. In Nicaragua, the National Guard stuck with Somoza, but was defeated by a nation-in-arms. The Sandanistas won by a combination of mass struggle and armed actions that eventually overwhelmed the guard by sh e er w eight of num bers..2 . Although the SADF is a powerful military machine, it needs political direction in order to function. But politics has to consider other factors beside force. We can p ara lyse the political direction behind the SADF so that it becomes unable to act. If one million people took to the streets of Johannesburg, would the government bomb the city centre, slaughtering tens of thousands and devastating its own business offices, communications etc?I doubt it. There is a moral dimension to politics, where we hold the aces. We must play them soon.3. How do we combine these elements?a) We must visibly raise the pitch of MK actions so as to further energise the mass

struggle. ^b) We must weaken the SADF by winning over black soldiers and sowing doubt

and division among whites. Much m ore can be done here.c) We must g reatly increase the num bers on the streets, by mobilising still

inactive sections. The youth are not enough. To mobilise the broad masses on‘ the streets we need concrete and appropriate dem ands and slogans. W e’re

neglecting slogans which Lenin saw as a key-factor in revolutionary situations. ‘Amandla’ is not enough.

d)On the same basis, we must mobilise the organised workers.e) We must mobilise the rural people. Why not ‘green marches’ for jobs and land?

Or against the pass laws, which are already crumbling?f) We must put arms into the hands of the mobilised masses.In a revolutionary situation, audacity and imagination are the keys to victory.

i

IS! 4 *V.:_'.

YOUTH AS AN ORGANISED FORCEWith tlio J J.A-___ • ........................... o c

bra? e determ ined struggle by black youth and studei ts theS e s k c n s I 3; ? : : ii \° ? “

Capitalism Equals Misery!We can all see that something has gone death. n n n / wrong'with the way the South African The way in which the system is failing t9 0 6 1 0 system works. It was always difficult to find work has got even the bosses worried. Mr work, but' never so difficult as now. Gavin Relly, chairman of Anglo Americ an Thousands ofpeople who had jobs a year Corporation, told his shareholders at their oftwdaW^eficJWout^fworkThisaffects last general meeting: ‘-No one should be both whites and blacks, though not to the in any doubt that the next few years will be same degree, Because white workers painful for all of us’. For years he and his have votes but blacks have none, the kind told us that we were all going to be government does what it canto make sure better off and betterwages, better jobs and that what jobs there are go to whites. In more money would solve our problems, spite of these efforts, the number of whites Now he has -to admit he was wrong, without jobs went up from 29 000 in 1984 The truth is that the capitalist system canto 55 000 in 1985. . not give the people a better life. The

What happened to the blacks over the failures that we are seeing now have been same period? There are no exact figures, seen before, in the 1930s. The problems because the government keeps the of South Africa have a lot in common with record of black unemployment. But the those of other capitalist countries. In people need no figures to tell them the America and England people are also out truth. In many towns one in every four of work. In Israel and Brazil they have adults has no work. Everyone who still has money which becomes wonh less and less a job knows somebody who has lost his with every month that goes by. Only the job. The people of the Eastern Cape know socialist countries have learned to solve that whole factories which used to make these problems. There people are not on- cars now stand empty. Only the old cam ly sure of jobs, but also know that their remember the last time that things were so wage will buy as much tomorrow as it does bad — around 1930. today. In the socialist countries it is not the

Lack of jobs is not the only problem that closing of factories but the opening of new the people face. There is also the frighten- factories that makes the headlines, ing rise in prices. This is now growing at The successes of the socialist countries such a rate that at the end of one year, a contrast with all capitalist countries, but rand only buys as much as 84c would buy with nowhere so strongly as with South at the beginning of the year. It takes only Africa. The South African economy is in a five years for a rand to lose half its value, worse mess than that of almost any other What is the use of saving money under country. This is because apartheid is one such'conditions? Even the rich begin to of the causes of our problems. We will feel the effects as their savings are eaten never be better off until we get rid of apart - away. But their sufferings are small next to heid: Let us work for an end to the system the sufferings of the poor. For a person ear- of capitalism which is the foundation of ning a fixed wage, the rise in prices can racism and poverty in our country. Let us make the difference between life and unite to fight for jobs, homes and food!

Theunemployed sit and wait.

DEMAND JOBS, HOMES AND FOOD!____ -_____ • m '. .

THE REFORMIST ROLE OF WORKERISM

Wotfee j r ^ flxe-thpse y h o laJk en d lessly abou t the lead in g ro le o f the w orking class to o v e rc ro w capitalism bu t who, in practice, re je c t all form s of discip lined revolutionary organisation. Instead , they throw about phrases like 'w orker in d ep en d en ce '. wor^Sfr con tro l’, 'w o rk er iden tity ’, and so

on. T hey even say that w e n e e d an 'ind ep en d en t w orkers organisation ', bu t they do not m ean th e C om m unist Party. W hat they have in m ind is a loose organisation of w age w orkers, sep ara te from the liberation m ovem ent and the Com m unist Party, bach an organisation m ust b ase itself on

’ floor’ CaU the d em o cracy of the shop

- It is c lea r that ‘w orkerism ’ is really about w ages and w orking cond itions an d not about the overthrow o f capitalism an d the achievem ent of socialism . B e ca u se the w o rk e rists ta lk such a lot a b o u t the ' p u rity o f the w o rk e rs ' stru g g le , th e y N sound re v o lu tio n a ry . But in fact they a re reform ists w ith m a n y sim ilaritie s to so c ia l d e m o cra cy .

Every b lack w orker know s that the struggles against capital and the conflicts on the shop floor cannot b e sep a ra ted from the s tru g g le ag a in st o p p re s s io n an d for d e m o c ra t ic r ig h ts . T he e m e rg in g dem ocratic trade union m ovem ent in our country has long ago u n d ersto o d the connection b e tw een econom ic and political struggles. This is the lesson w hich has b ee n driven hom e by th e en tire history of the strugg le against o p p ressio n and for socialism., In feal We there is no such thing as p u re

■■ ■ w orking class po litics’. The w orkers’ struggle cannot b e restric ted to the factory floor and to union m em bersh ip . The strug

g l e against racism an d for the destructionOt ThA Panit-ilirt r.. __ __ r i •

00611

: , u ie destructionof the capitalist system of exploitation is not just a trade union strugg le. The struggle of w om en, s tuden ts, youth and com munity organisations a re in separab le from the w orking class. It is not a trad e union m ovem ent bu t ra th e r a w o rk e rs ’ political vanguard Party w hich can lead the fight fo ran en d to o p p ressio n and exploitation

The w orkensts confine their co n cern s to the factory floor. They g ive an alm ost ex clusive p lace to the eco n o m ic strugg le for w ork and w age im provem ents. But we

- know that pure trade union struggles have threa,ened capitalist relations of pro-

^ucl on’ ?.or have they advanced the cause of socialism. The mistake which the w orkensts make is to confuse theS Z T F f ™ ^ 1®8 of trade unions with the political and social struggle led by thewho^jfn clrass' for the destruction of the TrJiv L i I Ksystem‘ Such a stru9gle can wortofg c L sy * POh,iCal Va"guard ot ,he , J h„e " 0J ke™'s 'alk a great deal about

1 rank and fUe to Participate m decision-making, about the ’principles&ol’C T h S ? and about ‘workers con-tra d e ln tn sound Principles for the trade union movement but the struggle toemancipate the whole of society needsmore than these shop floor rulesJ 5 “ ® the middle of a revolutionaryS c p t h lS-l6d by 3 llberation 2 whose most imponant constituents are the Afncan National C ongress and the Communist Party. Workerists spread the false idea that our war of liberation is in some way separate from the workers'o fth lS h r y 6Ven Say that the Baders

I atl°,nuStniggI® wU1 be hostile to * the interests of the workers. Some of themargue that the workers’ struggle is only against capitalist relations of production and not national oppression. This argu- S ,in * * ®nd- serves the interests of capital. Workers who stand behind S hnf d0 not inhabit a different planet

unemployed, women, the youth ^ ra l poor; all of these participate

on different sides of the same struggle The stniggle against racial discrimination is atcaoSTanHTh,3 ?0llU?al confrontation with33? 15 an imp°mm• T ° r̂ erlLsts our movementSACp S pI?16̂ Pu t0 make the ANC and bACP irrelevant to the struggle. They want!° ®pIacf !n*s alliance with a kind of shop stewards federation.thS)®; w° rkteristj claim to be socialists but they in fact undermine all the scientific

° f MaP ism- Workerism has no° rthe social emancipation of the whole of society. That is the pu

and objective goal of the Communist Party

LONG LIVE THE LIBERATION ALLIANCEi

STRENGTHEN THE WORKERS^ VANGUARD!

0 0 0 6 1 2

Pen Pictures o f

South African Communists

Albert Nzula was one of the o.utstandings communists in the 1920-30s. He was bom in Rouxville, in the Orange Free State, in 1905. He qualified as a teacher at

-Lovedale but was drawn into the political arena at a young age. >

After serving as Aliwal North secretary of the Industrial and Commercial Union, he moved to the Transvaal and joined the ANC and tKe Communist Party in 1928. He.was elected assistant secretary of the

' Communist Party in 1929 and acting editor of the Party paper, the SA Worker. In 1931 he was sent to study at the Lenin School in Moscow where he published a number of articles and papers on South Africa. He died of pneumonia in a Moscow hospital in 1934.

Motso Mokgabudi, bom in Orlando in 1952, was popularly known as ‘Obadi’. A member of the ‘Soweto generation’, he studied law at Turfloop but dropped out as a result of student unrest.

He became involved in ANC activity and left the country six months before the 1976 uprising to join MK. After undergoing military training he became a commander in our army.

He was brave, intelligent and skillful and became a dedicated and capable leader, responsible for many daring actions. During this period he became a member of our Party. Together with other comrades he was murdered by the enemy at Matola in January 1981.

R E A D TH E A F R IC A N C O M M U N IS T T h e o r e t i c a l q u a r t e r l y j o u r n a l o f th e

S o u th A f r i c a n C o m m u n is t P a r t y . A v a i l a b l e f r o m In k u l u l e k o P u b l i c a t io n s

3 9 G o o d g e S t r e e t , L o n d o n W 1 P 1FD , U K

IN 1 9 8 6 -LET US O BSERVE THESE HISTORIC EVENTS!

Ju ly 30th the 65th A nn iversa ry of the SACP

August 12th-19th the 40th A nn iversa ry of the

Mine W o rkers Strike Decem ber 16, the 25th A nn iversary

of the Form ation of Um khonto w e S izw e

June 13th, the 40th A nn iversary of the Passive Resistance Cam paignJune 16th, the 10th A nn iversary

of the Soweto Uprisings The 80th A nn iversary of the

Bam batha Rebellion The 200th A nn iversary

of the Birth of M oshoeshoe

SOUTHERN AFRICAN ROUN DUP

BOTHA'S POLICIES—FORCE AND FRAUD

00061

•.*5

Events in Southern Africa prove that the power of Pretoria is still based on the two favourite weapons of the racists — force and fraud. '*

Botha’s first instinct is to grab for his guns. But when that fails he falls back instead on lies and deceit.

Nothing shows this more clearly than the policies of Pretoria in Angola, and the sensational revelations of the Gorongosa papers in Mozambique. In both cases the Botha government made solemn and binding agreements with sovereign sta tes_without the slightest intention of ever stick-

“ ng to its word.The 'simplest morality that every child

learns — that ‘a promise is a promise’ — is totally unknown to this government of liars

Let us look at two examples. In signing the Lusaka Agreement in July 1984, Pretoria promised to pull its troops out of Angola.It never did so. Instead, in September this year, it launched a massive attack to try and save its puppets,' Unita, from defeat at the hands of the Angolan people and their Cuban and Soviet helpers

In March 1984 PW Botha went to the banks of the Nkomati River. There he signed the Nkomati Accord, promising to stop helping the MNR bandits trying to over- throw Mozambique’s Frelimo government.

At that very moment Botha’s generals were plotting^ and planning to pour arms and other aid into Mozambique to help the bandits. And they have been doing so ever since.

; Some people believe the generals were lOing this behind the backs of the politicians. No such thing. Whatever the soldiers

ipld the MNR leaders, the truth is that Botha and Magnus Malan work hand-in-glove with the military. It was Botha and Malan who built up the SADF dogs of war. And everyone knows a dog does not bite the hand that feeds it.

If help for the MNR was a secret plot by the generals, why are the bandits still flourishing today, after the ‘secret’ has been well and truly exposed?

No. Force and fraud are the registered trademarks of the racist regime. The ANC and SACP know this well. That is why both

before and after the Nkomati Accord they stated clearly and boldly: Do not trust the liars and cheats in Pretoria!

What the racists cannot get by force thev try to get by lies. And when their lies are

y go back to usin9 force Why do the men in Pretoria behave in this way? Lerun said that the capitalist ruling class has two methods of clinging to power. One method is the use of force. The other method is trickery and lies. He added that the first method was preferred by dictators and rulers like the Czar of Russia. The second was preferred by the so-called democracies of Western Europe and the United States.

In South Africa the rulers have always relied on force. This is the typical method pf colonial rule. But in South Africa colonialism has taken a special form — the white settler minority has no homeland to retreat to.

So from time to time the racists try to pull the wool over the eyes of the South African

_ PeoPle and the states of the region. They try to fool the neighbouring states that they and the racists can live in peace in Fretona s constellation of states’. And they try to fool South Africans with their constitu- tional frauds and reform lies.

But the racists’ deeds speak louder than their words. After the blatant attacks on Angola and the Gorongosa revelations who can believe Pretoria’s promises9

Certainly not the South African people And certainly not the ANC and SACP Th-y know very well that when Pretoria talks about negotiations and reform they are only trying to get by lies what they can no longer keep by force.

Pretoria’s offer of talks with the ANC if it will only break the alliance with the SACP and give up the armed struggle, is exactly the same hollow promise they made at Nkomati. At that time they were already preparing to boost aid to the MNR bandits Who can doubt that, if the ANC were to agree to talks on these conditions, the racists would at that very moment be preparing to crush the people’s movement and annihilate its disarmed fighters?

STAGES OF OURSouth African communists believe that our revolution will go through a number of stages Our new 1984 Constitution declares that it is our task to lead the working class in a struggle to establish a socialist republic and to achieve 'the more immediate aim of winning the objective of the national democratic revolution whose main content is the 'national liberation of the African people and the

■ clack people in generalFrom time to time this approach has

been questioned, mainly by a few radicals who teach rather than practice Marxism. The so-called ‘two-stage theory is often the subject of attacks against our Party in ultra-left and workenst’ circles. These attacks are, in

tended to influence militant activists (more especially in the trade union movement) who are still in search of a clear strategy in the struggle for socialism. These activists are tempted with revolutionary-sounding phrases And because we are illegal there is no communist spokesperson who can immediately expose these distortions in the legal forums and journals where they are often spread.

According to a document issued by Fosatu, the ‘two stage approach’ which tne Communist Party appeared to adopt1

was amongst the issues debated at its policy seminar in February 1985 The mam question asked was 'whether such a two stage programme was possible’. Before we can answer this question it is important to explain what communists mean when they talk about the stages of our revolution. Such an explanation is all the more necessary because of the distorted way in which our critics present this issue.

W hat Com m unists M eanEvery person who is actually engaged in struggle (and not just in talking about it) will know that ultimate aims are not achieved in one sudden, blinding flash.

Every form of real life - and this includes social struggle — goes th rough phases and stages. Was Lenin betraying the cause when he insisted that the first stage of the Russian revolution will have a bourgeois democratic rather tha~ socialist content? Had Ho Chi Minn sud-iI h V Dg° tten about socialism when he w it mt0 a Patriotic alliance towin the objectives of the national libera- lon stage of the Vietnamese revoution? o we think that Dr Agostinho Neto tum-

ror,af T Sj Marxist beliefs when he concluded that, before they could go anyfurther, Angolan revolutionaries had tocreate a broad people's front to win thenational independence struggle’

mr°re h° neSt of our left'critics would of course admit that in the countries mentioned it was correct to accept two stage perspectives. But they may

argue that, unlike Russia, Vietnam and Angola, South Africa has got a fully developed system of capitalist production and a relatively large and experienced proletariat. Our critics maintain that because of these special features, the correct strategy is to move straight into he socialist revolution. They also argue

that tne long-term interests of the workers will suffer if socialist objectives are postponed’ until after the achieve-t w f fu:Sta? e of national liberation. They fear that the interests of the working class will be drowned or watered down in a liberation alliance which in-hnUeH?S , uSef and 9rouPs which are hostile to the long-term interests of the workers.J ° ° nfe can dispute that every level of social life in our country (including at the point of production) is infected with race aomination. All black workers know that there is no way of separating their exploitation as w orkers from their blackness. Ever since the emergence of a black proletariat early this century they have been separated from the white workers by a wall of colour. And this wall

of colour affects not only the black workers but every other class and group within the black community. The destruction of this colour tyranny is the main immediate task of the working class and its political vanguard. The achievement of this task will provide a foundatio n 'fo r a continuing revolution to achieve a socialist order. - ’

The Stages are Separate but LinkedVe must be on our guard against the

vulgar way in which our critics describe the SACP approach to stages of revolution. They spread the impression that our Party believes that the democratic and socialist stages of our revolution are completely separate from one another and that we will only turn our thoughts to the question of working class power and socialism when we have won a kind of non-racist bourgeois democracy in South Africa.Nothing could be further from the truth.

Our 1984 Constitution reiterates that the strategic aim of establishing a socialist republic is ‘inseparably linked’ to the more immediate aim of winning the objectives of the national democratic? revolution. It m akes crysta l clear that this national dem ocratic revolution must lead to a South Africa of 'people's power in which the work-

' mg class will be the dom inant force A ",d which w ill m ove uninterrupt- £diy tow ards social em ancipation ana the total abolition of the ex* ploitation of man by m an '. In order to ensure such an outcome our Party does all in its power to spread the ideas of Marxism-Leninism among the working people and to mobilise them now as the dominant force in the alliance of classes which make up the liberation front.

Although we correctly talk of stages we do not believe that there is a Chinese wall between them. We are taught by Marxist dialectics that the dominant ingredients of the later stage must already

have begun to mature within the womb of the earlier stage. Lenin expressed thifVfi £ 1 ^ thought when he said: u v> u o I J

‘We all counterpose bourgeois revolution — and socialist revolution; we allinsist on the ’ ~ —

absolute necessity of strictly distinguishing ‘ between them. However, it cannot be denied that in the course of history individual particular elements of the two revolutions become interwoven’.

f 7 V o Tactics o f Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution)

The W orking Class LeadsOur revolution is a continuing process.Its immediate objectives are clear. Our working class is in the front line in the struggle against racial tyranny; a struggle which is at the same time in the interests of the overwhelming majority in our society. If the working class is to gain power it must show that it can be the saviour of all oppressed and exploited groups and strata of our people. The destruction of the racist tyranny demands an alliance of all oppressed classes and groups in which the working class must be the dominant force. Only political infants or armchair revolutionaries reject all political alliances.They make a lot of noise about socialism but do not really understand how to get there. No revolution has ever been made without such alliances. The historic role of the working class must be assured by its independent political vanguard — the South African Communist Party.

A workers' vanguard 'which operates in a bourgeois

society cannot take part in politics without marching, in

certain cases, side by side with bourgeois democracy . . . We intend to guide ... not only the proletariat

organised by the Party, but also the petit bourgeoisie

which is capable of marching side by side with us7

(Lenin: Two Tactics)

Pass On The Message!000616

The following translationso f our last editorial i: "

Peop/e s Pow er No\ Reform ' were widely distributed th ■oughout theC2 f T Yk r r L ^ pread ' ™ * s a 9lo f the SA CP! Pass Umi. benzi on! Discuss the issues raisea with your

friends , family and fellow workers.. ®e i r e f u l . With discipline and

vigilance w e will outwit the enem v!

p s S S S s S S S a x - . _____,________b“ b““ “k"“

kom buso w ezixhw anguxhw angu kuthathe u h u l u m p n n oGatsha sezibulawa ingebhe yokuketulwa

s s a s r * issr-ssaas.^Pfi^S• Ama cow boy anienao Rparran __. . . .u m n nth eylc=leDan,ainJeng° Muzorewa, Banda no Gatsha n a o b a S r f iS r tT ““ P^takomuntu omnyamaS & T & T & S ™ * oGi“ha b‘>!"b"*

1 5 * 5 “ ? ^ ^ ’ £ou,h A“ *- *»««*»«.1. «ntal„kuyibp abaphethe wonke umkhiqizo, umcebo n e n d ^ o l ismtama ngokuba sithole abamhloDhe

2en|ng,j;Ukume1e SncelebMannezakhiwoz^andlululo^^^r*6 3mandla e2epoIitlki - > * «

arA9KSi ^ a- s°kuhJelwa kwezinto, amabhizinisi amanca™ a .^ lnto engenakuvikeleka. aqhubekeru nokusebenza, kepha ayongezwa vonke insSa ° gombela kwesabo ayovunyelwakonke kwenziwe ngentando y e n i n g i 7“^m sUa;yobandlululo,njengoba kusho iFreedom c E

i ^ Z£,Ka,aZO N 9 ezi'kh° ' i , Im pikisw ano ne SACP

ngodlame^ na^* ^^^^o ^k u p h e?e iab u ^an o ^p h ^ca h^i?i^yeka ‘nqubo yakhe y°kyketela A^inh'v0*1̂ 3, naKhongo!ose uma ungenza njalo phakathl kukaKhongolose ne SACP, uzimisele

PHAM BU,

kukhisw a ku 'U m sebenzi No 3 - izwi le SACP A C P -

Collection Number: AK2145 KRUGERSDORP RESIDENTS’ ORGANISATION AND 4 OTHERS v. THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER AND 2 OTHERS 1986 PUBLISHER: Publisher:- Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Location:- Johannesburg ©2012

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