June 30, 2009

Defense Nuclear NonproliferationDefense Nuclear Nonproliferation’’ssNonproliferation Research and Development (NANonproliferation Research and Development (NA--22)22)

Program and R&D OverviewProgram and R&D Overview

Rhys Williams, Ph.D.Deputy Director

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 2

Mission & Vision/Objectives

Reduce the threat to national security posed by nuclear weapons proliferation/detonation or the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through the long-term development of new and novel technology

Mission:

Vision/Objectives:

Develop and demonstrate technologies for detecting the stages of a foreign nuclear weapons programDevelop, demonstrate, and deliver technologies to detect, report, locate, and identify worldwide nuclear detonations Conduct the highest quality, most innovative research and development

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 3

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20)Ken Baker (Acting)

Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20)Ken Baker (Acting)

Global Threat Reduction(NA- 21)

Andrew Bieniawski

Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22)

T. Jan Cerveny

Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24)

Adam Scheinman

International Material Protection and Cooperation (NA-25)

David Huizenga

Fissile MaterialsDisposition (NA-26)

Ken Bromberg

Nuclear Risk Reduction(NA-23)

Trisha Dedik

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 4

Nonproliferation & Verification R&D

Office ofNuclear Detonation Detection

Randy BellDirector

Office of NonproliferationResearch & Development (NA-22)

T. Jan Cerveny, Ph.D.Assistant Deputy Administrator

Rhys Williams, Ph.D.Deputy

Office of Proliferation DetectionEd Watkins, Ph.D.

DirectorCOL Pete Duklis, U.S.A.

Deputy Director

Production of nuclear detonation detection systemsDetonation forensics supporting attribution

Detecting nuclear material production Detecting nuclear weapon and material smugglingDetecting weapon production and testingSafeguards R&D and alt rad sources

Marco Di Capua, Ph.D.Chief Scientist

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 5

Proliferation DetectionFY2009 $199.7M

(6 Feds, 3 Military, 8 M&Os, 2 Technical Support Contractors)

Directly tied to R&D mission for detecting foreign

• HEU production • Pu production • Movement of SNM• Violation of International

Safeguards

Drives long-term research agenda across USG for nuclear nonproliferation R&D

Signatures and Observables

10%

Broad Area Announcement

5%

Mission44%

Enabling Technologies

36%

Other5%

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 6

Proliferation Detection (PD)

Office of Proliferation Detection

Nonproliferation Mission AreasU-235 Production DetectionPu Production DetectionSNM Movement Detection/Radiation SensingDetection of Nuclear Weapons Production and TestingSafeguards and Alternate Radiation Sources

Nonproliferation Enabling TechnologiesAdvanced Materials (radiation detection focus)Simulation, Algorithms and ModelingNuclear Fuel Cycle Remote SensingTools, Techniques, Infrastructure and Demonstrations

Signatures & Observables Identify & characterize relevant proliferation signatures and observables in support of PD mission areas

Uranium gas centrifuge detection

Fuel cycle production signature collection

Neutron detection: gas-filled glass beads

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 7

Micro-Calorimetric Radiation Detectors

Technical Challenges: Fabrication for absorber arraysMultiplexed readout of large arrays Expanding to alpha and neutron spectroscopyRobust, low power refrigeration technology

World-record measurement to distinguish low-energy gamma

emissions of Pu and U for

SNM characterization (~25 eV @ 100 keV)

Example: Characterization of SNM

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 8

Radiochemistry

Automation

Advanced Laboratory Techniques:Radiochemistry Automation

Advanced Laboratory Techniques:Radiochemistry Automation

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 9

Stand-off Sensors: Hyperspectral Remote SensingStand-off Sensors: Hyperspectral Remote Sensing

♦ Data collection in relevant time frame and spectral range

♦ Selection of most effective instrument, sensing location, and image area.

♦Unique identification of effluents from complex real-world HSI images

QUAHSI - Quantifying Uranium Conversion Activities by Hyperspectral Imaging

Portable HyperspectralSensor

Gas detection image

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 10

Collectors / SamplingCollectors / Sampling

Particle Sampler Pod

Airborne Samplers

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 11

Improved Accuracy of Pu AssayImproved Accuracy of Pu Assay

MWDXF experimental breadboard

0 5 10 15 200

10

20

30

40

50

Inte

nsity

(cou

nts)

Energy (keV)

Spectrum of 1 mL deposit of 10 ppm Y (100 second measurement)

Preliminary measurements of Y demonstrate the feasibility of measuring curium with a sub-ppm detection limit.

Challenge: Correct NDA signal for presence of Cm in spent fuel.Goal: Improve Cm/Pu ratio by a factor of 10 in a reprocessing sample.Approach: Monochromatic Wavelength Dispersive X-ray Fluorescence (MWDXF)

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 12

Advanced Enrichment MonitoringAdvanced Enrichment Monitoring

Enrichment Monitor and UF6Static Gaseous Source Experimental Enrichment Results for UF6 Gas

R&D efforts focused on x-ray tube characterization and stabilization, optimization of notch filters, and background suppression of 186 keV peak.

Challenge: Gas centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) enrichment monitoringGoal: Improvements beyond existing Continuous Enrichment Monitor (CEMO)Approach: Quantitative enrichment measurements using x-ray generators

NaI

UF6gas

3.0%

3.1%

3.2%

3.3%

3.4%

3.5%

0 20 40 60 80

UF6 Pressure [torr]

Enrichment [%]

E(p)

Transmission measurement schematic

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 13

Novel Pin Diversion MethodNovel Pin Diversion MethodChallenge: Detect diversion of spent fuel from Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR)Goal: Exceed current IAEA detection threshold of 50% missing pinsApproach: Explore neutron and gamma measurements inside the guide tubes, with assemblies in spent fuel pond

PWR Fuel Assembly Example of a MCNP modeled assembly with Missing Pins (shown in blue)

Blue profile shows a 4.5% diversion case, while the pink profile shows the reference profile for a PWR spent fuel assembly

Monte Carlo simulations show that ratios of neutron and gamma measurements may be a useful indicator of partial defect. Experimental validation are needed. Operator acceptance is still an issue.

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 14

Uranyl Fluoride StudiesUranyl Fluoride Studies

UF6 Environmental EffectsUF6 + 2 H2O → UO2F2 + 4 HF

IrradiatedNon-irradiated

Analysis ProtocolsCollection

2071

6

2016

920

058

1929

7 1919

3

1832

6

1746

9

1660

9

1572

2

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

21000 20000 19000 18000 17000 16000

Arbitrary / Wavenumber (cm-1)

UO2F2 - xH2O (25C)

Spectral Analysis

Isotopic Analysis

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 15

Focus on Signatures from Operational FacilitiesFocus on Signatures from Operational Facilities

Measurements are being made in weapon-complex facilities

(LANL)

Measurements are being made in Reactor Fuel Fabrication

Facility (INL)

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 16

Example: Reactor Monitoring

Reactor Safeguards and Monitoring with Antineutrino Detectors

Date2/28/05 3/7/05 3/14/05 3/21/05 3/28/05

Rea

ctor

Pow

er (%

)

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

Date2/28/05 3/7/05 3/14/05 3/21/05 3/28/05

Cou

nts

per d

ay0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Predicted count rate using reported reactor powerObserved count rate, 24 hour averageReported reactor power

Antineutrino detector located 25 m from reactor core can clearly track reactor state from outside containment

Plutonium Processing Detection

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 17

Nuclear Detonation Detection (NDD)

Office of Nuclear Detonation Detection

Space-Based Systems

Surface & Atmospheric Burst Detection

High Altitude & Space Burst Detection

Ground-Based Systems

Seismic Detection Methods

Trace Radionuclide Detection Methods

Detonation Forensics

Prompt Signatures

Radionuclide Debris Analysis

GPS Constellation

Newest GPS Sensor Package Delivered

3D Seismic Simulation

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 18

Space (GEO)

17%

Other5%Forensics

12%

Space (GPS)

43%

Ground21%

Space (cross-cutting)

7%

FY 2009 ($145.6M) (4 Feds, 2 Military, 4 M&Os, 2 Tech Contractors)

Bulk of program driven by product delivery schedule to meet interagency requirementsR&D crucial to enable design, production, and delivery of Nuclear Detonation Detection systems

Nuclear Detonation Detection

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 19

NUclear DETonation (NUDET) SignaturesNUclear DETonation (NUDET) Signatures

30 km30 km

100 km100 km

30 km30 km

100 km100 km

Nuclear Detonation (NUDET) Signatures

Space• Gamma-Ray• Neutron• X-ray

Transition-Region• Optical*• Gamma-Ray• Neutron

Low-Altitude• Optical• Electromagnetic Pulse• Radionuclide Debris• Infrasound

Sub-Surface• Seismic• Radionuclide Debris• Hydroacoustic• Infrasound

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 20

Combined X-ray Dosimeter (CXD)

EMP Sensor (BDV)

Processor (BDP)NAP - NDS

Analysis Payload (BDA)

Optical Transient Detectors

bhangmeters (BDY) Conventional & Enhanced

Sun Shield for BDY

Block 2F Satellite

Global Burst Detector (GBD)

GPS Instruments

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 21

Ground-Based NUDET Detection

Old Regime – Teleseismic

New Seismic Monitoring Challenge for Low Yield Events

New stations installed by DoD as funds and international agreements allow

Each new station requires about 3 years to select and install (DOE labs)

Station calibration requires 3–5 years of data gathering and mathematical analysis

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 22

Computational Modeling

Coupling source term & propagation models Exceeding current computational capacity

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 23

Nuclear Detonation Detection – Forensics

Prompt & Debris weapons outputs

Modeling to understand source term & propagation– to guide/focus research– for pre-event planning (CONOPS development

& site sensors)– support to post-event evaluation, reconstruction

Collection & Measuring research– how to best collect and rapidly measure

quantities that add value to attribution– looking for significant advances in

radioisotopic measurements, not simplyslight improvements in traditionalradiochemistry practices (e.g., direct sampling bylaser ablation, high-resolution alpha-spec)

Evaluation– reconstruct pre-detonation device design

information – reconstruct pre-detonation material information

High fidelity model of an evolving nuclear fireball in an urban setting

Installed forensics sensors

Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 24

Bottom Line

• R&D/S&T focused on a specific missions

• Connection to user/operators is a given

• Seeking to solve the toughest technical problems

Advancing Nuclear Security CapabilityAdvancing Nuclear Security Capability