nash equilibrium
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Nash Equilibrium. Econ 171. Suggested Viewing. A Student’s Suggestion: Video game theory lecture Open Yale Economics Ben Pollack’s Game Theory Lectures http://oyc.yale.edu/economics/game-theory/. Monte Hall Problem. Let’s Draw a Game Tree. HW Problem 2.11. Perfect Recall?. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Nash Equilibrium
Econ 171
Suggested Viewing
A Student’s Suggestion:Video game theory lectureOpen Yale EconomicsBen Pollack’s Game Theory Lectures
http://oyc.yale.edu/economics/game-theory/
Monte Hall Problem
Let’s Draw a Game Tree
HW Problem 2.11
Perfect Recall?
Clicker Question 1:
6,0 3,2 4,12,3 2,3 2,81,1 2,0 5,2Player 1
Strategy A1
Strategy B1
Strategy C1
Strategy A2 Stategy B2 Strategy C2
Is the outcome where Player 1 plays B1 and Player 2 plays C2 a Nash equilibrium?A) YesB) No
Clicker Question 2:
6,0 3,2 4,12,3 2,3 2,81,1 2,0 5,2Player 1
Strategy A1
Strategy B1
Strategy C1
Strategy A2 Stategy B2 Strategy C2
Is the outcome where Player 1 plays A1 and Player 2 plays B2 a Nash equilibrium?A) YesB) No
Clicker Question 3:
6,0 3,2 4,12,3 2,3 2,81,1 2,0 5,2Player 1
Strategy A1
Strategy B1
Strategy C1
Strategy A2 Stategy B2 Strategy C2
Does this game have more than one Nash equilibrium?A) YesB) No
Definition
A strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium if each player’s strategy maximizes his payoff given the strategies used by the other players.
Best response mapping
Best response for a player is a mapping from actions by the others to the action (or actions) that maximizes the player’s payoffs given the actions of the others.
Battle of Sexes
2,1 0,0
0,0 1,2
Bob
Alice
Movie A
Movie B
Movie A
Movie B
BRA(A)=ABRA(B)=B
BRB(A)=ABRB(B)=B
Prisoners’ Dilemma Game
10, 10 0, 11
11, 0 1, 1
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate
Defect
PLAyER 1
Player 2
Best Responses and Nash Equilibria for this game?
BR2(a)=z BR1(w)=bBR2(b)={w,x,z} BR1(x)=bBR2(c)=y BR1(y)=bBR2(d)={y,z} BR1(z)={a,d}
Find Nash equilibria for these games
• Chicken• Pure coordination (Driving Game)
How many Nash equilibria?
There might be just one.There might be more than one.There might not be any.
Rock, Paper Scissors, Where is Nash equilibrium?
The Romney game?
Textbook example. 3 candidates. Winner takes all. Strategy positive effort +1 for self or negative effort -2 for smeared candidate.Starting point. Candidate 1 has initial score 2, candidates 2 and 3 have initial scores 0. Nash equilibria. All positive. Candidates 2 and 3 both smear 1.Other Nash equilibria?
When is Nash equilibrium “the right answer”?
1. Players are “rational”. Each player’s strategy maximizes his payoff, given his beliefs about the strategies used by the other players.
2. Each player’s beliefs about the other players’ strategies are correct.
When is 2) a reasonable assumption?
3-Hunter Stag Hunt
2,2,2 0,1,0
1,0,0 1,1,0
Hunter 3 does Stag Hunter 3 does Hare
Hunter 2
Stag Hare
Stag
Hare
Hunter 1
0,0,1 0,1,1
1,0,1 1,1,1
Hunter 2
Stag
Hare
Stag Hare
Find the Nash equilibria
Hunter 1
Weakly dominated strategies?
• Nobody will use a strictly dominated strategy in Nash equilibrium.
• If there is a strictly dominant strategy for all players, it is a Nash equilibrium. (example Prisoners’ Dilemma.)
• Nash equilibrium does not exclude possibility of using a weakly dominated strategy. (A voting example with unanimous preferences.)
Nash and domination
Every Nash equilibrium survives the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Not every outcome that satisfies the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is a Nash equilibrium.
Clicker Question:What are the Nash Equilibria for this game?
A) Player 1 plays a and Player 2 plays z.B) Player 1 plays d and Player 2 plays z.C) Player 1 plays b and Player 2 plays y.D) Both outcomes A) and B) are Nash equilibria.E) All three outcomes A), B), and C) are Nash
equilibria.
4,1