NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 1 CLASSIFICATIONS OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982 LAUSANAYOG,BENITOAYOG,DAMASOAYOG,JULIOAYOG,SEGUNDAAYOG,VICENTEABAQUETA,BERNARDINOADORMEO,VIDAL ALBANO,FELICIANOARIAS,ANTONIOBALDOS,MAXIMOBALDOS,ROMEROBINGZON,EMILIOCADAYDAY,FRUCTUOSOCHUA,SR., HERACLEOCHUA,GUILLERMODAGOY,ABDONDEIMOS,NICASIODELEON,JULIANAVDA.DEDIANNA,DEMOCRITODEVERO,ALFREDO DIVINAGRACIA,ESTEBANDIVINAGRACIA,LEODEGARDIODIVINAGRACIA,NELLODIVINAGRACIA,MERQUIADESEMBERADOR,JESUS EMPERADO, PORFERIO ENOC, SOFRONIO ENOC, RAFAEL GAETOS, NICOLAS GARLET, TRINIDAD GARLET, FORTUNATA GEONZON, NICOLADA NAQUILA,TORIBIONAQUILA,EFRENOKAY,ELPIDIOOKAY,SR.,DIEGOONGRIA,ERNESTOPANARES,VICENTEPATULOT,IGNACIARIBAO, JUANO RICO, JESUS ROSALITA, ARMANDO TANTE and ANSELMO VALMORES, petitioners, vs. JUDGEVICENTEN.CUSI,JR.,CourtofFirstInstanceofDavao,BranchI,PROVINCIALSHERIFFOFDAVAO,andBINANDEVELOPMENTCO., INC., respondents. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES and DIRECTOR OF LANDS, intervenors. AQUINO, J.: Thiscaseisabouttheapplicationofsection11,ArticleXIVofthe1973Constitution(disqualifyingaprivatecorporationfrompurchasing public lands) to a 1953 sales award made by the Bureau of Lands, for which a sales patent and Torrens title were issued in 1975, and to the 1964 decision of the trial court, ejecting some of the petitioners from the land purchased, which decision was affirmed in 1975 by the Court of Appeals. That legal question arises under the following facts: OnJanuary21,1953,theDirectorofLands,afterabidding,awardedtoBianDevelopmentCo.,Inc.onthebasisofits1951Sales Application No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of about two hundredfiftyhectares.Someoccupantsofthelotprotestedagainstthesale.TheDirectorofLandsinhisdecisionofAugust30,1957 dismissedtheprotestsandorderedtheoccupantstovacatethelotandremovetheirimprovements.Noappealwasmadefromthat decision. TheDirectorfoundthattheprotestants(defendantsinthe1961ejectmentsuit,someofwhomarenowpetitionersherein)enteredthe land only after it was awarded to the corporation and, therefore, they could not be regarded as bona fide occupants thereof. The Director characterizedthem as squatters. He found that some claimants were fictitious persons (p. 30, Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA). He issued a writ of execution but the protestants defied the writ and refused to vacate the land (p. 28, Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA). ** Becausetheallegedoccupantsrefusedtovacatetheland,thecorporationfiledagainstthemonFebruary27,1961intheCourtofFirst Instance of Davao, Civil Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit (accion publiciana). The forty defendants were Identified as follows: 1. Vicente Abaqueta 21. Eniego Garlic 2. Candido Abella 22. Nicolas Garlic 3. Julio Ayog 23. Rufo Garlic 4. Arcadio Ayong 24. Alfonso Ibales 5. Generoso Bangonan 25. Julian Locacia 6. Lomayong Cabao 26. Filomeno Labantaban 7. Jose Catibring 27. Arcadio Lumantas 8. Teodolfo Chua 28. Santos Militante 9. Guillermo Dagoy 29. Toribio Naquila NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 2 10. Anastacia Vda. de Didal 30. Elpidio Okay 11. Alfredo Divinagracia 31. Guillermo Omac 12. Silverio Divinagracia 32. Emilio Padayday 13. Galina Edsa 33. Marcosa Vda. de Rejoy 14. Jesus Emperado 34. Lorenzo Rutsa 15. Porfirio Enoc 35. Ramon Samsa 16. Benito Ente 36. Rebecca Samsa 17. German Flores 37. Alfeao Sante 18. Ciriaco Fuentes 38. Meliton Sante 19. Pulong Gabao 39. Amil Sidaani 20. Constancio Garlic 40. Cosme Villegas Thatejectmentsuitdelayedtheissuanceofthepatent.Thetrialcourtfoundthattheprotestsoftwentyoftheabovenameddefendants were among those that were dismissed by the Director of Lands in his 1957 decision already mentioned. On July 18, 1961 the purchase price of ten thousand pesos was fully paid by Binan Development Co., Inc. On November 10, 1961, an official of the Bureau of Lands submitted a final investigation report wherein it was stated that the corporation had complied with the cultivation and other requirements under the Public Land Law and had paid the purchase price of the land (p. 248, Rollo). It was only more than thirteen years later or on August 14, 1975 when Sales Patent No. 5681 was issued to the corporation for that lot with a reduced area of 175.3 hectares. The patent was registered. Original Certificate of Title No. P-5176 was issued to the patentee. The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June 29, 1974 for the Secretary of Natural Resources, recommending approval ofthe sales patent, pointed out that the purchaser corporation had complied with the said requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution, thatthelandinquestionwasfreefromclaimsandconflictsandthattheissuanceofthepatentwasinconformitywiththeguidelines prescribed in Opinion No. 64, series of 1973, of Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos and was an exception to the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution (p. 258, Rollo). Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido, Jr., in approving the patent on August 14, 1975, noted that the applicant had acquired a nested right to its issuance (p. 259, Rollo). Beforethatpatentwasissued,therewasatrialintheejectmentsuit.Fifteendefendants(outofforty),namely,JulioAyog,Guillermo Bagoy,GenerosoBangonan,JoseCatibring,PorfirioEnoc,JoseEmperado,ArcadioLomanto,ToribioNaquila,ElpidioOkay,AlfeoSante, Meliton Sante, Ramon Samsa, Rebecca Samsa, Arcadio Sarumines and Felix Tahantahan, testified that they entered the disputed land long before 1951 and that they planted it to coconuts, coffee, jackfruit and other fruit trees. (p. 28, Record on Appeal). The trial court did not give credence to their testimonies. It believed the report of an official of the Bureau of Lands that in 1953 the land was free from private claims and conflicts and it gave much weight to the decision of the Director of Lands dismissing the protests of the defendants against the sales award (p. 30, Record on Appeal). Furthermore, the trial court during its ocular inspection of the land on November 8, 1964 found that the plantings on the land couldnot be more than ten years old, meaning that they were not existing in 1953 when the sales award was made. Hence, the trial court ordered the defendantstovacatethelandandtorestorethepossessionthereoftotilecompany.TheCourtofAppealsaffirmedthatjudgmenton December 5, 1975 in its decision in Binan Development Co., Inc. vs, Sante, CA-G.R. No. 37142- R. The review of the decision was denied by this Court on May 17, 1976 in Elpidio Okay vs. Court of Appeals, L-43505. NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 3 Aftertherecordwasremandedtothetrialcourt,thecorporationfiledamotionforexecution.Thedefendants,someofwhomarenow petitioners herein, opposed the motion. They contended that the adoption of the Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which rendered it legally impossible to execute the lower court's judgment. They invoked the constitutional prohibition, already mentioned, that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area." Thelowercourtsuspendedactiononthemotionforexecutionbecauseofthemanifestationofthedefendantsthattheywouldfilea petitionforprohibitioninthisCourt.OnAugust24,1977,theinstantprohibitionactionwasfiled.Someofthepetitionerswerenot defendants in the ejectment case. WeholdthatthesaidconstitutionalprohibitionhasnoretroactiveapplicationtothesalesapplicationofBianDevelopmentCo.,Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect. Thatvestedrighthastoberespected.ltcouldnotbeabrogatedbythenewConstitution.Section2,ArticleXIIIofthe1935Constitution allowsprivatecorporationstopurchasepublicagriculturallandsnotexceedingonethousandandtwenty-fourhectares.Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law. "Arightisvestedwhentherighttoenjoymenthasbecomethepropertyofsomeparticularpersonorpersonsasapresentinterest"(16 C.J.S.1173).Itis"theprivilegetoenjoypropertylegallyvested,toenforcecontracts,andenjoytherightsofpropertyconferredbythe existing law" (12 C.J. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502). Thedueprocessclauseprohibitstheannihilationofvestedrights."Astatemaynotimpairvestedrightsbylegislativeenactment,bythe enactmentorbythesubsequentrepealofamunicipalordinance,orbyachangeintheconstitutionoftheState,exceptinalegitimate exercise of the police power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78). Ithasbeenobservedthat,generally,theterm"vestedright"expressestheconceptofpresentfixedinterest,whichinrightreasonand natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitivetoinherentandirrefragableindividualrights,cannotdeny(16C.J.S.1174,Note71,No.5,citingPennsylvaniaGreyhoundLines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587). Secretary of Justice Abad Santos in his 1973 opinion ruled that where the applicant, before the Constitution took effect, had fully complied withallhisobligationsunderthePublicLandActinordertoentitlehimtoasalespatent,therewouldseemtobenolegalorequitable justification for refusing to issue or release the sales patent (p. 254, Rollo). In Opinion No. 140, series of 1974, he held that as soon as the applicant had fulfilled the construction or cultivation requirements and has fully paid the purchase price, he should be deemed to have acquired by purchase the particular tract of land and to him the area limitation in the new Constitution would not apply. InOpinionNo.185,seriesof1976,SecretaryAbadSantosheldthatwherethecultivationrequirementswerefulfilledbeforethenew Constitution took effect but the full payment of the price was completed after January 17, 1973, the applicant was, nevertheless, entitled to a sales patent (p. 256, Rollo). Suchacontemporaneousconstructionoftheconstitutionalprohibitionbyahighexecutiveofficialcarriesgreatweightandshouldbe accorded much respect. It is a correct interpretation of section 11 of Article XIV. In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporationto purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy. Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patentfor that land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919). As we cannot review the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we cannot entertain petitioners' contention that many of them by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest have possessed portions of land even before the war. They should have filed homestead or free patent applications. NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 4 Our jurisdiction is limited to the resolution of the legal issue as to whether the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to the implementation of thetrialcourt's1964finalandexecutoryjudgmentejectingthepetitioners.Onthatissue,wehavenochoicebuttosustainits enforceability. Nevertheless, in the interest of social justice, to avoid agrarian unrest and to dispel the notion that the law grinds the faces of the poor, the administrative authorities should find ways and means of accommodating some of the petitioners if they are landless and are really tillers of the soil who in the words of President Magsaysay deserve a little more food in their stomachs, a little more shelter overtheir heads and alittlemoreclothingontheirbacks.TheStateshouldendeavortohelpthepoorwhofinditdifficulttomakebothendsmeetandwho suffer privations in the universal struggle for existence. Atillerofthesoilisentitledtoenjoybasichumanrights,particularlyfreedomfromwant.Thecommonmanshouldbeassistedin possessing and cultivating a piece of land for his sustenance, to give him social security and to enable him to achieve a dignified existence and become an independent, self-reliant and responsible citizen in our democratic society. To guarantee him that right is to discourage him from becoming a subversive or from rebelling against a social order where, as the architect of the French Revolution observed, the rich are choking with the superfluities of life but the famished multitude lack the barest necessities. Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by private corporationsis to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and the economic family- size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had owned social unrest. Petitioners' counsel claims that Bian Development Co., Inc. seeks to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. 3711, the ejectment suit from which this prohibition case arose, against some of the petitioners who were not defendants in that suit (p. 126, Rollo). Those petitioners are not successors-in-interest of the defendants in the ejectment suit. Nor do they derive their right of possession from the said defendants. Those petitioners occupy portions of the disputed land distinct and separate from the portions occupiedby the said defendants. Weholdthatjudgmentcannotbeenforcedagainstthesaidpetitionerswhowerenotdefendantsinthatlitigationorwhowerenot summonedandheardinthatcase.Generally,"itisanaxiomofthelawthatnomanshallbeaffectedbyproceedingstowhichheisa stranger" (Ed. A. Keller & Co. vs Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Co., 38 Phil. 514, 520). Toenforcethejudgmentagainstthosewhowerenotpartiestothecaseandwhooccupyportionsofthedisputedlanddistinctand separatefromtheportionsoccupiedbythedefendantsintheejectmentsuit,wouldbeviolativeofdueprocessoflaw,thelawwhich, according to Daniel Webster in his argument in the Dartmouth College case, is the law of the land, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. "The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection of the general rules which govern society." (Cited in Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32. See Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, L-35615 and Tang Tee vs. Arlegui, L-41360, February 17, 1977, 75 SCRA 234 and Berses vs. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473.) Contemptincident.-Duringthependencyofthiscase,orataboutfouro'clockinthemorningofDecember12,1978,CiriacoTebayan, Domingo Nevasca, Rogelio Duterte and Sofronio Etac, employees of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation, plowed or bulldozed with theirtractorsaportionofthedisputedlandwhichwasoccupiedbyMelquiadesEmberador,oneofthepetitionersherein.Thedisputed land was leased by Bian Development Co., Inc. to the canning corporation. Thefourtractordriversdestroyedtheimprovementsthereonworthaboutfivethousandpesosconsistingofcoffee,coconutand banana plants. Emberador was in the hospital at the time the alleged destruction of the improvements occurred.However, it should be noted that Emberadorwasnotexpresslynamedasadefendantintheejectmentsuit.Apparently,heisnotincludedinthetrialcourt'sdecision although he was joined as a co-petitioner in this prohibition case. ThepetitionersintheirmotionofJanuary11,1979askedthatthefourtractordriversandHonestoGarcia,themanagerofBian DevelopmentCo.,Inc.,bedeclaredincontemptofcourtforhavingdisregardedtherestrainingorderissuedbythisCourtonAugust29, 1977, enjoining specifically Judge Vicente N. Cusi and the provincial sheriff from enforcing the decision in the ejectment suit, Civil Case No. 3711 (pp. 46-47, 138- 141, Rollo). Garcia and the four drivers answered the motion. The incident was assigned for hearing to Judge Antonio M. Martinez of the Court of First InstanceofDavao.JudgeMartinezfoundthattheplowingwasmadeattheinstanceofGarciawhotoldthebarriocaptain,petitioner Lausan Ayog, a Bagobo, that he (Garcia) could not wait anymore for the termination of this case. NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 5 The record shows that on April 30, 1979 or four months after the said incident, Emberador, in consideration of P3,500, as the value of the improvements on his land, executed a quitclaim in favor of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation (Exh. 1, 2 and 3). We hold that no contemptwas committed. The temporary restraining order was not directed to Bian Development Co.,Inc. its officers, agents or privies. Emberador was not named specifically in the trial court's judgment as one of the occupants to be ejected. FortheredressofwhateverwrongordelictwascommittedagainstEmberadorbyreasonofthedestructionofhisimprovements,his remedy is not in a contempt proceeding but in some appropriate civil and criminal actions against the destroyer of the improvements. In resume, we find that there is no merit in the instant prohibition action. The constitutional prohibition relied upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no retroactive application to that case and does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enforce that judgment. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit but with the clarification that the said judgment cannot be enforced against those petitionershereinwhowerenotdefendantsintheejectmentcase,CivilCaseNo.3711,andoverwhomthelowercourtdidnotacquire jurisdiction. The contempt proceeding is also dismissed. No costs. SO ORDERED. Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Escolin, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

VASQUEZ, J., concurring: I concur with the very ably written main opinion. However, I wish to erase any possible erroneous impression that may be derived from the dispositive portion insofar as it declares that the judgment in the ejectment cage may not be enforced against the petitioners who were not defendants in Civil Case No. 3711 and over whom the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction. Thejudgmentinanycaseisbindingandenforceablenotonlyagainstthepartiestheretobutalsoagainst"theirsuccessorsininterestby title subsequent to the commencement of the action" (Sec. 49[b], Rule 39, Rules of Court). We have previously held that the judgment in an ejectmentcasemaybeenforcednotonlyagainstthedefendantsthereinbutalsoagainstthemembersoftheirfamily,theirrelativesor privieswhoderivetheirrightofpossessionfromthedefendants(Ariemvs.DelosAngeles,49SCRA343).Afurtherclarificationofthe dispositive portion is apparently needed to exclude from the effect of the judgment in the ejectment case only the petitioners who do not derive their right of possession from any of the defendants in the ejectment suit. Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Makasiar and De Castro, JJ., concurs. Separate Opinions VASQUEZ, J., concurring: I concur with the very ably written main opinion. However, I wish to erase any possible erroneous impression that may be derived from the dispositive portion insofar as it declares that the judgment in the ejectment cage may not be enforced against the petitioners who were not defendants in Civil Case No. 3711 and over whom the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction. Thejudgmentinanycaseisbindingandenforceablenotonlyagainstthepartiestheretobutalsoagainst"theirsuccessorsininterestby title subsequent to the commencement of the action" (Sec. 49[b], Rule 39, Rules of Court). We have previously held that the judgment in an ejectmentcasemaybeenforcednotonlyagainstthedefendantsthereinbutalsoagainstthemembersoftheirfamily,theirrelativesor privieswhoderivetheirrightofpossessionfromthedefendants(Ariemvs.DelosAngeles,49SCRA343).Afurtherclarificationofthe NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 6 dispositive portion is apparently needed to exclude from the effect of the judgment in the ejectmentcase only the petitioners who do not derive their right of possession from any of the defendants in the ejectment suit. Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Makasiar and De Castro, JJ., concurs. Footnotes *Accordingtorespondentcorporation,someoftheadverseclaimantsorprotestantswerenotlandlessfarmersbutwerewell-educated persons belonging to the middle class. Thus, Elpidio Okay was an elementary school principal. Vicente Rehoy was a landowner and barrio captain.PatriciodeLeonwasacashierandlaterassistantbranchmanagerofthePhilippineNationalBaank.ErnestoPaareswasahigh school teacher and later a college professor. Francisco Mateo was a former college dean (p. 105, Rollo). According to the 44 petitioners, they are tillers of the soil (p. 126, Rollo). Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-55289 June 29, 1982 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner-appellant, vs. JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole, represented by ERAO G. MANALO, as Executive Minister, respondents-appellees.

AQUINO, J.: LikeL-49623,ManilaElectricCompanyvs.JudgeCastro-Bartolome,thiscaseinvolvestheprohibitioninsection11,ArticleXIVofthe Constitution that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease notto exceed one thousand hectares in area". Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313 square meters and an assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by the Iglesia Ni Cristo on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square metersowned by the said church (Exh. D). The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are not included in any military reservation. They are inside an area which was certified as alienable or disposable by the Bureau of Forestry in 1927. The lots are planted to santol and mango trees and banana plants. A chapel exists on the said land. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes. Realty taxes had been paid therefor (Exh. N). On September 13, 1977, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, duly existing under Philippine laws, filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the registration of the two lots. It alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than thirty years. It invoked section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, which provides: Chapter VIII.Judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. xxx xxx xxx SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore, under the Land Register Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 7 (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession andoccupationofagriculturallandsofthepublicdomain,underabonafideclaimofacquisitionofownership,foratleastthirtyyears immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusivelypresumedtohaveperformedalltheconditionsessentialtoaGovernmentgrantandshallbeentitledtoacertificateoftitle under the provisions of this chapter." (As amended by Republic Act No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.) TheRepublicofthePhilippines,throughtheDirect/rofLands,opposedtheapplicationonthegroundsthatapplicant,asaprivate corporation, is disqualified tohold alienablelands of the public domain, that the land applied for is public land not susceptible of private appropriationandthattheapplicantanditspredecessors-in-interesthavenotbeenintheopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945. After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots, as described in Plan Ap-04-001344 (Exh. E), in the name of the Iglesia NiCristo,acorporationsole,representedbyExecutiveMinisterEraoG.Manalo,withofficeatthecornerofCentralandDonMariano Marcos Avenues, Quezon City, From that decision, the Republic of the Philippines appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal should be sustained. As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole or a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or holdalienablelandsofthepublicdomain,likethetwolotsinquestion,becauseoftheconstitutionalprohibitionalreadymentionedand becausethesaidchurchisnotentitledtoavailitselfofthebenefitsofsection48(b)whichappliesonlytoFilipinocitizensornatural persons. A corporation sole (an "unhappy freak of English law") has no nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the Public Land Law). The contention in the comments of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (its lawyer did not file any brief) that the two lots are private lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land in the Susi case was a parceloflandpossessedbya Filipinocitizensincetimeimmemorial,asinCariovs.InsularGovernment,212U.S.449,53L.ed.594,41 Phil.935and7Phil.132.Thelotssoughttoberegisteredinthiscasedonotfallwithinthatcategory.Theyarestillpubliclands.Aland registration proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644). As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interestsincetimeimmemorial,forsuchpossessionwouldjustifythepresumptionthatthelandhadneverbeenpartof the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. " InUy Un vs.Perez,71Phil.508,itwasnotedthattherightofanoccupantofpublicagriculturallandtoobtainaconfirmationof histitle undersection48(b)ofthePublicLandLawisa"derechodominicalincoativo"andthatbeforetheissuanceofthecertificateoftitlethe occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. The lower court's judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of the Iglesia Ni Cristo is dismissedwith costs against said applicant. SO ORDERED. Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave. Plana, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 8 In the result for the same reasons I have already given in Manila Electric Co. vs. Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-49623. DE CASTRO, J., dissenting: JusticeTeehankeecitesinhisdissentingopinionthecaseofHericovs.Dar,1thedecisioninwhichIamtheponente,asreiteratinga supposedlywell-establisheddoctrinethatlandsofthepublicdomainwhich,byreasonofpossessionandcultivationforsuchalengthof time, a grant by the State to the occupant is presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose under the public land laws or statutes. He would thusconsidersaidlandasnolongerpubliclandbut"private"landsandtherefore,notwithintheprohibitionoftheNewConstitution against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares." 2 Icannotsubscribetotheviewthatthelandasabovedescribedhasbecomeprivateland,evenbeforetitlethereto,whichis,asofthis stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title," has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as judicialconfirmationofincompleteorimperfecttitle.3Thisistheonlylegalmethodbywhichfullandabsolutetitletothelandmaybe granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure such judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is limited to another form of disposition of public land, referredtoasadministrativelegalization,resultingintheissuanceoffreepatents,alsobasedonpossession,inwhichcase,asinthe issuance of homestead and sales patents, the land involved in undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public land would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the areadisposabletoacitizen-applicantbytheDirectorofLandsislimitedto24hectares.Thereisnolimittotheareasubjecttojudicial confirmationofincompleteorimperfecttitle,exceptpossiblythelimitfixedforaStategrantunderoldSpanishlawsanddecrees,which certainly is much larger than that set for free patents. It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfecttitlethatsomestatementsarefoundinmanycases,suchasthosecitedbyJusticeTeehankee,totheeffectthatsuchland has ceasedtobepublicland.Whatthesestatements,however,reallymeanisthatthelandreferredtonolongerformspartofthemassof public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. The fact that its disposition is provided for intheaforecitedActwhichdealswith"publicland"givesrisetotheverystrongimplication,ifnotapositiveconclusion,thattheland referredtoisstillpublicland. Onlywhenthecourtadjudicatesthelandtotheapplicantforconfirmationoftitlewouldtheland become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence. The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land is, however, entirely pointless, or an Idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that"saveincasesofhereditarysuccession,noprivatelandsshallbetransferredorconveyedexcepttoindividuals,corporations,or associationsqualifiedtoacquireorholdlandsofthepublicdomain."Aspreviouslystated,byexpressprovisionoftheConstitution,no corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease, not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area. 4 Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by the Meralco or Iglesia whichadmittedlyare"corporationsorassociation"withinthemeaningoftheaforecitedprovisionoftheNewConstitution.This observationshouldendallargumentsontheissueofwhetherthelandinquestionispublicorprivateland.Althoughitmayfurtherbe observedthatsupposingacorporationhasbeeninpossessionofapieceofpubliclandfromtheverybeginning,mayitapplyforjudicial confirmation of the land in question to acquire title to it as owner after possessing the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believedobvious-itmaynot.Ifitspossessionisnotfromthebeginningbuthascommencedonlyuponthetransfertoitbytheprior possessor, may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious with more reason, it may not. ThisseparateopinionshouldhavehadnoneedtobewrittenbecausethemajorityopinionwrittenbyJusticeAquinoisalreadywell-reasoned out and supported by applicable authorities. I as impelled to write it only because in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee, the case of Herico vs. Dar (supra) which is my ponencia was cited in support of his position. This separate opinion then is more to show and explain that whatever has been stated by me in the Dar case should be interpreted in the light of what I have said in his separate opinion, which I believe, does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit. FERNANDO, C.J., dissenting: ItiswithregretthatunlikeinthecaseofMeralcov.JudgeCastro-Bartolome,1whereIhadabriefconcurrenceanddissent,Iam constrainedtodissentintheably-writtenopinionofJusticeAquino.Ijoinhiminaccordingtheutmostrespectanddeferencetothis provision in the Constitution: "No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 9 exceed one thousand hectares in area; ... ." 2 If the matter before us be viewed solely from the standpoint of respondent appellee Iglesia ni Cristobeingacorporationsole,thenIwouldhavenohesitancyinsustainingtheconclusionthatifthelandbeconsideredpublic,its registrationwouldhavetobedenied.Forme,thatisnotthedecisiveconsideration.ItismyviewthattheBillofRightsprovisionon religiousfreedomwhichbanstheenactmentofanylawprohibitingitsfreeexercise,the"enjoymentofreligiousprofessionandworship, without discrimination or preference, [being] forever ... allowed." 3 This is not the first time the Court has occasion to recognize the high estate that freedom of religion occupies in our hierarchy of values. Even as against the fundamental objectives, constitutionally enshrined, of social justice and protection to labor, the claim of such free exercise and enjoyment was recognized in the leading case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. 4 Here the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the registration. The area involvedin the two parcels of land in question is 313 square meters. As admitted in the opinion of the Court, a chapel is therein located. It is that basic consideration that leads me to conclude that the balancing process, which finds application in constitutional law adjudication, equally requires that when two provisions in the Constitution may be relevant to a certain factual situation calls for the affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowingtheregistration.5Thereisformeanotherobstacletoapartialconcurrence.TherightoftheRomanCatholicApostolic Administrator of Davao to register land purchased from a Filipino citizen was recognized in The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration. 6As I view it, therefore, the decision of respondent Judge is equally entitled to affirmance on equal protection grounds. 7 Hence this brief dissent. TEEHANKEE, C.J., dissenting: Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic corporation, in the first case and respondent IglesianiCristo,areligiouscorporationsole,inthesecondcase(bothadmittedlyFilipinocorporationsqualifiedtoholdandownprivate lands), for judicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land, acquiredbythembypurchaseorexchangefromprivatepersonspubliclyrecognizedastheprivateowners(whohavebeenintheopen, continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionandoccupationofthelandsunderabonafideclaimofownershipforatleastthirty[30] years immediately preceding the filing of the applications). This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the 1909 case of Cario and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open, exclusive and unchallengedpossessionofalienablepubliclandforthe statutoryperiod provided bylaw(30yearsnowunderamendatoryRep.Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and" by legal fiction [the land] has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private property." Accordingly, the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act against private corporations holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to them and therefore their applications for confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be duly granted. ThelandcoveredbytheMeralcoapplicationofNovember26,1976consistsoftwo(2)smalllotswithatotalareaof165squaremeters locatedatTanay,RizalwithanassessedvalueofP3,270.00.Thislandwaspossessed byOlimpiaRamosbeforeWorldWarIIwhichbroke outinthePacificin1941.OlimpiaRamossoldthelandonJuly3,1947tothespousesRafaelPiguingandMinervaInocenciowho constructedahousethereon.ButbecausetheMeralcohadinstalledthe"anchorguy"ofitssteelpostsontheland,thePiguingspouses soldthelandtotheMeralcoonAugust13,1976.Thelandhadbeendeclaredforrealtytaxpurposessince1945andrealtytaxeswere regularlypaidthereon.Itisresidentialincharacterasdistinguishedfromstrictlyagriculturalland.Itislikewiseestablishedthatitisnot includedinanymilitaryreservationandthatsince1927ithadbeencertifiedaspartofthealienableordisposableportionofthepublic domain. The Land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2) small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and with an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesia on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters. The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. It had been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. RespondentjudgeintheMeralcocasesustainedtheRepublic'soppositionanddismissedtheapplication,holdingthatunderboththe provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land Act, Meralco, being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply for the registration of title over the public land. On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decisiononthebasisoftheevidencesubmittedbytheapplicant."Respondentjudgeinthecaseaccordinglygrantedtheapplicationfor NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 10 registrationofthelandinthenameoftheIglesia,holdingthatithadbeen"satisfactorilyestablishedthatapplicant[Iglesia]andits predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, public and adverse possession of the land ... under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended. Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both applications for registration should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 caseofHericovs.Dar2thatthelandsinquestionceased,ipsojure,orbyoperationoflaw,tobelandsofthepublicdomainupon completionofthestatutoryperiodofopen,continuous,exclusive,notoriousandunchallengedpossessionthereofbytheapplicants' predecessors-in-interestwhowerequalifiednaturalpersonsandentitledtoregistrationbyrightofacquisitiveprescriptionunderthe provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in the Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application, while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed. The principal issue at bar may thus be stated: Itisexpresslyprovidedinsection48,par.(b)ofthePublicLandAct(CommonwealthActNo.141,asamendedbyRep.ActNo.1942, approvedonJune22,1957)thatcitizensofthePhilippineswhoarenaturalpersonswhohaveoccupiedlandsofthepublicdomainbut whose titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to the corresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims andtheissuanceofthecertificateoftitlethereforundertheLandRegistrationActincaseswherethey"bythemselvesorthroughtheir predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the publicdomain,underabonafideclaimofacquisitionofownership,foratleastthirtyyearsimmediatelyprecedingthefilingofthe applicationforconfirmationoftitleexceptwhenpreventedbywarorforcemajeure.Theseshallbeconclusivelypresumedtohave performedalltheconditionsessentialtoaGovernmentgrantandshallbeentitledtoacertificateoftitleundertheprovisionsofthis chapter."3Insuchcases,isthelandipsojureorbyoperationoflawconvertedintoprivatelanduponcompletionofthe30thyearof continuous and unchallenged occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and owned by privatecorporationsor doessuchland,asheld by respondentjudgeintheMeralcocase,remainpartofthe publicdomainand doesnot becomeprivatelanduntilafteractualjudicialconfirmationproceedingsandtheformalcourtorderfortheissuanceofthecertificateof title? 1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established doctrine as first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided inthePublicLandActprovisioninforceatthetime(fromJuly26,1894inSusiundertheoldlaw)byaprivateindividualpersonallyand through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property. (At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was required "from July 26, 1894" as then provided for in section 45(b) of the old Public Land Act No. 2874, amending Act No.926; whereas at present as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par. (b) of the later and subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957, in force since 1957,theperiodofopenandunchallengedpossessionwasreducedto"atleastthirtyyearsimmediatelyprecedingthefilingofthe application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is admitted in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino,whereinitisstatedthat"(I)ntheSusicase,thisCourtappliedsection45(b)ofActNo.2874whichcorrespondstowhatisnow section48(b).ItwasheldthatthelongpossessionofthelandunderabonafideclaimofownershipsinceJuly26,1894gaverisetothe conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4 The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as amended by Rep. Act 1942 referred to is reproduced verbatim in Mr. JusticeAquino'sopinion5andquotesthereducedstatutoryperiodofopenandunchallengedpossessionof"atleastthirtyyears immediately preceding the filing of the application. ") Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period, acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from the Government, "not only a right to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of Lands ofthesamelandtoanotherpersonwasvoidandofnoeffectandSusiastherightfulpossessorcouldrecoverthelandashisprivate property from the supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the public domain.The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the case, that: ... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure, established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926,that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government werecomplied with, for he has been in actual andphysicalpossession,personallyandthroughhispredecessors,ofanagriculturallandofthepublicdomain,openly,continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant,butagrantoftheGovernment,foritisnotnecessarythatcertificateoftitleshouldbeissuedinorderthatsaidgrantmaybe NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 11 sanctionedbythecourts,anapplicationthereforissufficient,undertheprovisionsofsection47ofActNo.2874.Ifbyalegalfiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6 2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a long unbroken line of cases, as follows: InMesina vs.Vda.deSonza,7theCourtheldthat"(I)nthecaseofSusivs.Razon,etal.,48Phil.424,itwasobservedthatwhereallthe necessaryrequirementsforagrantbytheGovernmentarecompliedwiththroughactualphysicalpossessionopenly,continuously,and publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amendingAct No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right toagrant,butagrantoftheGovernment,foritisnotnecessarythatacertificateoftitlebeissuedinorderthatsaidgrantmaybe sanctionedbythecourtsanapplicationthereforbeingsufficientundertheprovisionsofSection47ofActNo.2874(reproducedas Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141)," and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss onthegroundthatplaintiff'sactionisalreadybarredbythestatuteoflimitations,whichapparentlyispredicatedonthetheorythata decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree,which theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim." InLacastevs.DirectorofLands,8theCourtstressedthatbyforceofpossession,thelandinquestionbecameprivatepropertyonthe strength of the Susi doctrine. In Manarpaac us. Cabanatan, 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus: TheDirectorofLandscontendsthatthelandinquestionbeingofthepublicdomain,theplaintiff-appelleecannotmaintainanactionto recover possession thereof. If,asabovestated,thatland,thepossessionofwhichisindispute,hadalreadybecome,byoperationoflaw,privateproperty,thereis lacking only the judicial sanction of his title Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it. In Miguel us. Court of Appeals, 10the Court again heldthatwhere possession has beencontinuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner, there is a presumption juris et de jure that all necessary condition for a grant by the State have been complied with and he would have been by force of law entitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424). Inthelatest1980caseofHericovs.Dar,11"theCourtoncemorereiteratedtheSusidoctrinethat"(A)notherobviouserrorofthe respondentCourtisinholdingthatafteroneyearfromtheissuanceoftheTorrensTitle,thesamecannolongerbereopenedtobe declared null and void, and has become absolute and indefeasible. ... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No.1942, whichthe respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since1914,byhimselfandbyhispredecessors-in-interest,titleoverthelandhasvestedonpetitionerastosegregatethelandfromthe mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942,whichtookeffectonJune22,1957,amendingSection48-bofCommonwealthActNo.141whichprovides:...Asinterpretedin several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operationoflaw,arighttoagrant,agovernmentgrantwithoutthenecessityofacertificateoftitlebeingissued.Theland,therefore, ceasestobeofthepublicdomain,and beyondtheauthorityoftheDirectorofLandstodisposeof.Theapplicationforconfirmationisa mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent andthe Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent." 3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private property upon as showing of open and unchallenged possession under bona fide claim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for thestatutoryperiodofthirtyyearsimmediatelyprecedingthefilingoftheapplicationand"itisnotnecessarythatacertificateoftitle should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statutethatthe possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant," the applicantMeralcocannotbesaidtobebarredasacorporationfromfilingtheapplicationforregistrationoftheprivatepropertyduly acquired by it. NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 12 4.Itshouldbenotedthatrespondentjudge'sdecisionintheMeralcocaseexpresslyfindsasestablishedfactsthattheMeralco's predecessors-in-interesthadpossessedandoccupiedasownersthelandinquestionforatleastover35years;OlimpiaRamoshaving possessedthesamesincethelastworldwarin1941andthenhavingsoldthesameonJuly3,1947tothePiguingspouseswhobuilta housethereonandcontinuouslypossessedthesameuntiltheysoldthesameinturntotheMeralcoonAugust13,1976,12Meralco's predecessors-in-interesthadthereforeacquiredbyoperationofthePublicLandActaGovernmentgranttotheproperty,aswellas acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land which thereby became private property. The very definition of prescriptionasamodeofacquiringownershipassetforthinArt.1106oftheCivilCodeprovidesthat"Byprescriptiononeacquires ownershipandotherrealrightsthroughlapseoftimeinthemannerandundertheconditionslaiddownbylaw."ThelawdoesInot provide that one acquires ownership of a land by prescription only after his titlethereto isjudicially confirmed. To this same effect isthe ruling in Cario vs. Insular Government, 13 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice Holmes held that:

Itistruethatthelanguageofarticles4and5attributestitletothose'whomayprove'possessionforthenecessarytimeandwedonot overlooktheargumentthatthismeansmayproveinregistrationproceedings.ItmaybethatanEnglishconveyancerwouldhave recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly itwas not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration wasexpectedfromall,butnonesufficienttoshowthat,forwantofit,ownershipactuallygainedwouldbelost.Theeffectoftheproof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. TothesameeffectistheCourt'srulinginLegardaandPrietovs.Saleeby,31Phil.590,that"anownerdoesnotobtaintitlebyvirtueof certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title." 5. Since the public land became private property upon completion of the 30th year of continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no justificationfordenyingtheMeralco'sapplicationforregistrationofitsdulyacquiredtitletotheland.Meralco'spredecessors-in-interest had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. Theland became private property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's application to register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the publicdomaincanbeinvokedanylongerasthelandhadlongceasedtobepubliclandbuthadbecomeprivateproperty.Meralco's application in effect seeks confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession of the land for over thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title beingtransferredtotheMeralcobyrightofpurchaseandtraditioforitisnotclaimedthatthereisanylegalprohibitionagainstthe Piguing spouses transferring the ownership of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco, even before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them. 6.Toupholdrespondentjudge'sdenialofMeralco'sapplicationonthetechnicalitythatthePublicLandActallowsonlyciti zensofthe Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of courtactions.AssumingthattherewasatechnicalerrorinnothavingfiledtheapplicationforregistrationinthenameofthePiguing spousesastheoriginalownersandvendors,stillitisconcededthatthereisnoprohibitionagainsttheirsaleofthelandtotheapplicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners andvendors(assuchnaturalpersons)withtheendresultoftheirapplicationbeinggranted,becauseoftheirindisputableacquisitionof ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao 14 ) Theendsofjusticewouldbestbeserved,therefore,byconsideringtheapplicationsforconfirmationasamendedtoconformtothe evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the titlethattheyhadacquiredbyconclusivepresumptionandmandateofthePublicLandActandwhothereafterdulysoldtotheherein corporations(bothadmittedlyFilipinocorporationsdulyqualifiedtoholdandownprivatelands)andgrantingtheapplicationsfor confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged. 7. All that has been said here applies of course with equal force to the Iglesia case, save that as already stated at the beginning hereof, the Iglesia application was granted because the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition and respondent judge held in effect NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 13 that the property had ceased to be land of the public domain and had become private property, the title to which could be dul y issued in the name of the Iglesia as the transferee of its predecessors-in-interest. 8.Itshouldbearemphasisthatwhatareinvolvedherearesmallparcelsofland,of165squaremetersintheMeralcocaseusedfor installationofan"anchorguy"foritssteelpostsinconnectionwithitstasksasanationalizeddomesticcorporationtofurnishelectrical service to the consumer public, and of 313 square meters in the Iglesia case used as the site of its church built thereon tominister to the religious needs of its members. In no way, may the letter, intent and spirit of the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution against corporations "holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area" (which is beamed against the unduecontrolandexploitationofourpubliclandsandnaturalresourcesbycorporations,Filipinoandforeign-controlled)bedeemed violated or disregarded by the granting of the applications at bar. The two corporations in truth and in fact do not holdthe small parcels of land at bar for their own use or benefit but for the sole use and benefit of the public. 9. With reference to the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice De Castro wherein he would blunt the "supposedly (sic) well-established doctrine" (at page 1) from the 1909 case of Cario and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico (supra, at pages 5 to 11) and support the contrary pronouncement in Mr. Justice Aquino's main opinion that "as between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b) [of the Public Land Act]" (at page 5), suffice it to cite his own pronouncement in Herico (reiterating the well-established and prevailing doctrine which this Court has not overturned, as it cannot overturn the mandate of the statute that the unchallenged possessor for at least 30 years is "conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant") wherein Mr. Justice DeCastro categoricallyreiteratedfortheCourtthat"Asinterpretedinseveralcases.....thepossessorisdeemedtohaveacquired,byoperationof law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. " It only remains to point out, in order to avoid misapprehension or confusion, that Mr. Justice De Castro's seemingly querulous statement that "the discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land, is however, entirely pointless or an Idleexercise,ifWeconsidertheprovisionofSection14,ArticleXIVoftheConstitutionwhichappearstohavebeenlostsightof,which provides that 'save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, orassociations qualifiedtoacquireorholdlandsofthe domain'"(atpage2)that"hence,evenifthelandinvolvedinthepresentcaseis consideredprivateland,thecitedsectionprohibitsitsacquisitionbytheMeralcoorIglesiawhichadmittedlyare'corporations'or associations within the meaning of the aforecited provision of the New Constitution. The observation should end all arguments on the issue ofwhetherthelandinquestionispublicorprivateland"(idem)mightmisleadonetothewrongconclusionthatcorporationswith60% Filipino ownership may not own private lands when the express provisions of Art. XIV, section 9 15 and section 14 as quoted by himself as wellasthecounterpartprovisionsofthe1935ConstitutionhavealwaysexpresslypermittedFilipino-ownedcorporationstoownprivate lands, and the only change effected in the 1973Constitution is section 11which now prohibits even such Filipino corporations to own or hold lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area. ACCORDINGLY,Ivoteforreversalofrespondentcourt'sjudgmentintheMeralcocaseandfortheentryofanewjudgmentgranting Meralco's application and for affirmance of judgment in the second case granting the Iglesia application.

Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: In the result for the same reasons I have already given in Manila Electric Co. vs. Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-49623. DE CASTRO, J., dissenting: JusticeTeehankeecitesinhisdissentingopinionthecaseofHericovs.Dar,1thedecisioninwhichIamtheponente,asreiteratinga supposedlywell-establisheddoctrinethatlandsofthepublicdomainwhich,byreasonofpossessionandcultivationforsuchalengthof time, a grant by the State to the occupantis presumed, and the land thereby ceases to form part of the public domain, but is segregated therefrom as to be no longer subject to the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose under the public land laws or statutes. He would thusconsidersaidlandasnolongerpubliclandbut"private"landsandtherefore,notwithintheprohibitionoftheNewConstitution NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 14 against corporations from acquiring public lands which provides that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares." 2 Icannotsubscribetotheviewthatthelandasabovedescribedhasbecomeprivateland,evenbeforetitlethereto,whichis,asofthis stage, said to be still "an incomplete or imperfect title," has been fully vested on the occupant, through the prescribed procedure known as judicialconfirmationofincompleteorimperfecttitle.3Thisistheonlylegalmethodbywhichfullandabsolutetitletothelandmaybe granted, to convert the land into a truly private land. To secure such judicial title, only the courts can be resorted to. The Director of Lands has lost authority over the land, insofar as its disposition is concerned. His authority is limited to another form of disposition of public land, referredtoasadministrativelegalization,resultingintheissuanceoffreepatents,alsobasedonpossession,inwhichcase,asinthe issuance of homestead and sales patents, the land involved in undoubtedly public land. The possessor of a piece of public land would have the option to acquire title thereto through judicial confirmation or administrative legalization. The difference is that in the latter case, the areadisposabletoacitizen-applicantbytheDirectorofLandsislimitedto24hectares.Thereisnolimittotheareasubjecttojudicial confirmationofincompleteorimperfecttitle,exceptpossiblythelimitfixedforaStategrantunderoldSpanishlawsanddecrees,which certainly is much larger than that set for free patents. It is because of the divestiture of authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of the land subject to judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfecttitlethatsomestatementsarefoundinmanycases,suchasthosecitedbyJusticeTeehankee,totheeffectthatsuchland has ceasedtobepublicland.Whatthesestatements,however,reallymeanisthatthelandreferredtonolongerformspartofthemassof public domain still disposable by the Director of Lands, under the authority granted him by the public land statutes. It, however, would not follow that the land covered by Section 48 of the Public Land Act has itself become private land. The fact that its disposition is provided for intheaforecitedActwhichdealswith"publicland"givesrisetotheverystrongimplication,ifnotapositiveconclusion,thattheland referredtoisstillpublicland. Onlywhenthecourtadjudicatesthelandtotheapplicantforconfirmationoftitlewouldtheland become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence. The discussion of the question of whether the land involved is still public or already private land is, however, entirely pointless, or an Idle exercise, if We consider the provision of Section 14, Article XIV of the Constitution which appears to have been lost sight of, which provides that"saveincasesofhereditarysuccession,noprivatelandsshallbetransferredorconveyedexcepttoindividuals,corporations,or associationsqualifiedtoacquireorholdlandsofthepublicdomain."Aspreviouslystated,byexpressprovisionoftheConstitution,no corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease, not to exceed 1,000 hectares in area. 4 Hence, even if the land involved in the present case is considered private land, the cited section prohibits its acquisition by theMeralco or Iglesia whichadmittedlyare"corporationsorassociation"withinthemeaningoftheaforecitedprovisionoftheNewConstitution.This observationshouldendallargumentsontheissueofwhetherthelandinquestionispublicorprivateland.Althoughitmayfurtherbe observedthatsupposingacorporationhasbeeninpossessionofapieceofpubliclandfromtheverybeginning,mayitapplyforjudicial confirmation of the land in question to acquire title to it as owner after possessing the land for the requisite length of time? The answer is believedobvious-itmaynot.Ifitspossessionisnotfromthebeginningbuthascommencedonlyuponthetransfertoitbytheprior possessor, may the corporation apply? The answer is just as obvious with more reason, it may not. ThisseparateopinionshouldhavehadnoneedtobewrittenbecausethemajorityopinionwrittenbyJusticeAquinoisalreadywell-reasonedoutandsupportedbyapplicableauthorities.IwasimpelledtowriteitonlybecauseinthedissentingopinionofJustice Teehankee, the case of Herico vs. Dar (supra) which is my ponencia was cited in support ofhis position. This separate opinion then is more toshowandexplainthatwhateverhasbeenstatedbymeintheDarcaseshouldbeinterpretedinthelightofwhatIhavesaidinhis separate opinion, which I believe, does not strengthen Justice Teehankee's position a bit. FERNANDO, C.J., dissenting: ItiswithregretthatunlikeinthecaseofMeralcov.JudgeCastro-Bartolome,1whereIhadabriefconcurrenceanddissent,Iam constrainedtodissentintheably-writtenopinionofJusticeAquino.Ijoinhiminaccordingtheutmostrespectanddeferencetothis provision in the Constitution: "No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; ... ." 2 If the matter before us be viewed solely from the standpoint of respondent appellee Iglesia ni Cristobeingacorporationsole,thenIwouldhavenohesitancyinsustainingtheconclusionthatifthelandbeconsideredpublic,its registrationwouldhavetobedenied.Forme,thatisnotthedecisiveconsideration.ItismyviewthattheBillofRightsprovisionon religiousfreedomwhichbanstheenactmentofanylawprohibitingitsfreeexercise,the"enjoymentofreligiousprofessionandworship, without discrimination or preference, [being] forever ... allowed." 3 This is not the first time the Court has occasion to recognize the high estate that freedom of religion occupies in our hierarchy of values. Even as against the fundamental objectives, constitutionally enshrined, of social justice and protection to labor, the claim of such free exercise and enjoyment was recognized in the leading case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. 4 Here the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the registration. The area involved in the two parcels of land in question is 313 square meters. As admitted in the opinion of the Court, a chapel is therein located. It is that basic consideration that leads me to conclude that the balancing process, which finds application in constitutional law adjudication, equally requires that when NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 15 two provisions in the Constitution may be relevant to a certain factual situation calls for the affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowingtheregistration.5Thereisformeanotherobstacletoapartialconcurrence.TherightoftheRomanCatholicApostolic Administrator of Davao to register land purchased from a Filipino citizen was recognized in The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration. 6As I view it, therefore, the decision of respondent Judge is equally entitled to affirmance on equal protection grounds. 7 Hence this brief dissent. TEEHANKEE, C.J., dissenting: Involved in these two cases are the applications of petitioner Meralco, a nationalized domestic corporation, in the first case and respondent IglesianiCristo,areligiouscorporationsole,inthesecondcase(bothadmittedlyFilipinocorporationsqualifiedtoholdandownprivate lands), for judicial confirmation of their titles to small parcels of land, residential in character as distinguished from strictly agricultural land, acquiredbythembypurchaseorexchangefromprivatepersonspubliclyrecognizedastheprivateowners(whohavebeenintheopen, continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionandoccupationofthelandsunderabonafideclaimofownershipforatleastthirty[30] years immediately preceding the filing of the applications). This dissent is based on the failure of the majority to adhere to established doctrine since the 1909 case of Cario and the 1925 case of Susi down to the 1980 case of Herico, infra, pursuant to the Public Land Act, as amended, that where a possessor has held the open, exclusive and unchallengedpossessionofalienablepubliclandforthe statutoryperiod provided bylaw(30yearsnowunderamendatoryRep.Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself mandates that the possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and" by legal fiction [the land]has already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private property." Accordingly, the prohibition of the 1973 Constitution and of the Public Land Act against private corporations holding lands of the public domain has no applicability in the present cases. What Meralco and Iglesia have acquired from their predecessors-in-interest had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at the time of the sale to them and therefore their applications for confirmation of title by virtue of their predecessors-in-interest' vested right and title may be duly granted. ThelandcoveredbytheMeralcoapplicationofNovember26,1976consistsoftwo(2)smalllotswithatotalareaof165squaremeters locatedatTanay,RizalwithanassessedvalueofP3,270.00.Thislandwaspossessed byOlimpiaRamosbeforeWorldWarIIwhichbroke outinthePacificin1941.OlimpiaRamossoldthelandonJuly3,1947tothespousesRafaelPiguingandMinervaInocenciowho constructedahousethereon.ButbecausetheMeralcohadinstalledthe"anchorguy"ofitssteelpostsontheland,thePiguingspouses soldthelandtotheMeralcoonAugust13,1976.Thelandhadbeendeclaredforrealtytaxpurposessince1945andrealtytaxeswere regularlypaidthereon.Itisresidentialincharacterasdistinguishedfromstrictlyagriculturalland.Itislikewiseestablishedthatitisnot includedinanymilitaryreservationandthatsince1927ithadbeencertifiedaspartofthealienableordisposableportionofthepublic domain. The Land covered by the Iglesia application of September 3, 1977 likewise consists of two (2) small lots located in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of 313 square meters and with an assessed value of P1,350.00. The land was acquired by the Iglesiaon January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange fora lot owned by the Iglesia with an area of 247 square meters. The land was already possessed by Perez in 1933. Admittedly also it is not included in any military reservation and is inside an area which was certified since 1927 as part of the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain. A chapel of the Iglesia stands on the said land. It had been duly declared for realty tax purposes in the name of the Iglesia and realty taxes were regularly paid thereon. RespondentjudgeintheMeralcocasesustainedtheRepublic'soppositionanddismissedtheapplication,holdingthatunderboththe provisions of the new Constitution and the Public Land Act, Meralco, being a corporation and not a natural person, is not qualified to apply for the registration of title over the public land. On the other hand, in the Iglesia case, the Republic presented no evidence in support of its opposition but expressly "submitted the case for decisiononthebasisoftheevidencesubmittedbytheapplicant."Respondentjudgeinthecaseaccordinglygrantedtheapplicationfor registrationofthelandinthenameoftheIglesia,holdingthatithadbeen"satisfactorilyestablishedthatapplicant[Iglesia]andits predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, public and adverse possession of the land ... under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application" and is therefore entitled to the registration applied for under the Public Land Act, as amended. Both decisions are now with the Court for review. I hold that both applications for registration should be granted by virtue of the prevailing principle as enunciated since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands 1 and reaffirmed in a long line of cases down to the 1980 caseofHericovs.Dar2thatthelandsinquestionceased,ipsojure,orbyoperationoflaw,tobelandsofthepublicdomainupon completionofthestatutoryperiodofopen,continuous,exclusive,notoriousandunchallengedpossessionthereofbytheapplicants' predecessors-in-interestwhowerequalifiednaturalpersonsandentitledtoregistrationbyrightofacquisitiveprescriptionunderthe NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 16 provisions of the Public Land Act, and that accordingly the judgment in the Meralco case should be reversed and a new judgment entered granting Meralco's application, while the judgment in the Iglesia case should stand affirmed. The principal issue at bar may thus be stated: Itisexpresslyprovidedinsection48,par.(b)ofthePublicLandAct(CommonwealthActNo.141,asamendedbyRep.ActNo.1942, approvedonJune22,1957)thatcitizensofthePhilippineswhoarenaturalpersonswhohaveoccupiedlandsofthepublicdomainbut whose titles have not been perfected or completed may apply to thecorresponding court of first instance for confirmation of their claims andtheissuanceofthecertificateoftitlethereforundertheLandRegistrationActincaseswherethey"bythemselvesorthroughtheir predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the publicdomain,underabonafideclaimofacquisitionofownership,foratleastthirtyyearsimmediatelyprecedingthefilingofthe applicationforconfirmationoftitleexceptwhenpreventedbywarorforcemajeure.Theseshallbeconclusivelypresumedtohave performedalltheconditionsessentialtoaGovernmentgrantandshallbeentitledtoacertificateoftitleundertheprovisionsofthis chapter."3Insuchcases,isthelandipsojureorbyoperationoflawconvertedintoprivatelanduponcompletionofthe30thyearof continuous and unchallenged occupation of the land such that thereafter as such private land, it may be duly transferred to and owned by privatecorporationsor doessuchland,asheld by respondentjudgeintheMeralcocase,remainpartofthe publicdomainand doesnot becomeprivatelanduntilafteractualjudicialconfirmationproceedingsandtheformalcourtorderfortheissuanceofthecertificateof title? 1. This issue has been squarely resolved by this Court since the 1925 case of Susi vs. Razon (and a long line of cases, infra). It is established doctrine as first held therein that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided inthePublicLandActprovisioninforceatthetime(fromJuly26,1894inSusiundertheoldlaw)byaprivateindividualpersonallyand through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property. (At that time in 1925 in the Susi case, such possession was required "from July 26, 1894" as then provided for in section 45(b) of the old Public Land Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926; whereas at present as provided for in the corresponding section 48, par. (b) of the later and subsisting Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942 approved on June 22, 1957, in force since 1957,theperiodofopenandunchallengedpossessionwasreducedto"atleastthirtyyearsimmediatelyprecedingthefilingofthe application for confirmation of title, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription. This is admitted in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino,whereinitisstatedthat"(I)ntheSusicase,thisCourtappliedsection45(b)ofActNo.2874whichcorrespondstowhatisnow section48(b).ItwasheldthatthelongpossessionofthelandunderabonafideclaimofownershipsinceJuly26,1894gaverisetothe conclusive presumption that the occupant had complied with all the conditions essential to a Government grant and was thus entitled to a certificate of title." 4 The text of the corresponding section 48(b), as amendedby Rep. Act 1942 referred to is reproduced verbatim in Mr. JusticeAquino'sopinion5andquotesthereducedstatutoryperiodofopenandunchallengedpossessionof"atleastthirtyyears immediately preceding the filing of the application. ") Accordingly, the Court held that Susi, as the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period, acquired the same by operation of law as a grant from the Government, "not only a right to a grant," and the land thereby "already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property at least by presumption" as expressly provided in the Act. Therefore, any supposed sale by the Director of Lands ofthesamelandtoanotherpersonwasvoidandofnoeffectandSusiastherightfulpossessorcouldrecoverthelandashisprivate property from the supposed vendee who did not acquire any right thereto since it had ceased to be land of the public domain.The Court thus specifically held therein, as applied to the specific facts of the case, that: ... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure, established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926,that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government werecomplied with, for he has been in actual andphysicalpossession,personallyandthroughhispredecessors,ofanagriculturallandofthepublicdomain,openly,continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land underthe provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant,butagrantoftheGovernment,foritisnotnecessarythatcertificateoftitleshouldbeissuedinorderthatsaidgrantmaybe sanctionedbythecourts,anapplicationthereforissufficient,undertheprovisionsofsection47ofActNo.2874.Ifbyalegalfiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question bya grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6 2. The above-quoted ruling in Susi has been affirmed and reaffirmed by this Court in a long unbroken line of cases, as follows: InMesina vs.Vda.deSonza,7theCourtheldthat"(I)nthecaseofSusivs.Razon,etal.,48Phil.424,itwasobservedthatwhereallthe necessaryrequirementsforagrantbytheGovernmentarecompliedwiththroughactualphysicalpossessionopenly,continuously,and NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 17 publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amendingAct No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right toagrant,butagrantoftheGovernment,foritisnotnecessarythatacertificateoftitlebeissuedinorderthatsaidgrantmaybe sanctionedbythecourtsanapplicationthereforbeingsufficientundertheprovisionsofSection47ofActNo.2874(reproducedas Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141)," and "(C)onsidering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss onthegroundthatplaintiff'sactionisalreadybarredbythestatuteoflimitations,whichapparentlyispredicatedonthetheorythata decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree, which theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim." InLacastevs.DirectorofLands,8theCourtstressedthatbyforceofpossession,thelandinquestionbecameprivatepropertyonthe strength of the Susi doctrine. In Manarpaac us. Cabanatan, 9 the Court quoted with favor the text of the above-quoted ruling of Susi, and its ratio decidendi thus: TheDirectorofLandscontendsthatthelandinquestionbeingofthepublicdomain,theplaintiff-appelleecannotmaintainanactionto recover possession thereof. If,asabovestated,thatland,thepossessionofwhichisindispute,hadalreadybecome,byoperationoflaw,privateproperty,thereis lacking only the judicial sanction of his title Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it. In Miguel us. Court of Appeals, 10the Court again heldthatwhere possession has beencontinuous, uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the concept of an owner, there is a presumption juris et de jure that all necessary condition for a grant by the State have been complied with and he would have been by force of law entitled to the registration of his title to the land (citing Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil. 485 and Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424). Inthelatest1980caseofHericovs.Dar,11"theCourtoncemorereiteratedtheSusidoctrinethat"(A)notherobviouserrorofthe respondentCourtisinholdingthatafteroneyearfromtheissuanceoftheTorrensTitle,thesamecannolongerbereopenedtobe declared null and void, and has become absolute and indefeasible. ... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No.1942, whichthe respondent court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since1914,byhimselfandbyhispredecessors-in-interest,titleoverthelandhasvestedonpetitionerastosegregatethelandfromthe mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942,whichtookeffectonJune22,1957,amendingSection48-bofCommonwealthActNo.141whichprovides:...Asinterpretedin several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operationoflaw,arighttoagrant,agovernmentgrantwithoutthenecessityofacertificateoftitlebeingissued.Theland,therefore, ceasestobeofthepublicdomain,and beyondtheauthorityoftheDirectorofLandstodisposeof.Theapplicationforconfirmationisa mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent andthe Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent." 3. In fine, since under the Court's settled doctrine, the acquisitive prescription of alienable or disposable public lands provided for now in section 48, par. (b) of the Public Land Act takes place by operation of law and the public land is converted to and becomes private property upon as showing of open and unchallenged possession under bona fide claim of ownership by the applicants' predecessors-in-interest for thestatutoryperiodofthirtyyearsimmediatelyprecedingthefilingoftheapplicationand"itisnotnecessarythatacertificateoftitle should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court" which right is expressly backed up by the conclusive presumption or presumption juris et de jure of the statutethatthe possessor has "performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant," the applicantMeralcocannotbesaidtobebarredasacorporationfromfilingtheapplicationforregistrationoftheprivatepropertyduly acquired by it. 4.Itshouldbenotedthatrespondentjudge'sdecisionintheMeralcocaseexpresslyfindsasestablishedfactsthattheMeralco's predecessors-in-interesthadpossessedandoccupiedasownersthelandinquestionforatleastover35years;OlimpiaRamoshaving possessedthesamesincethelastworldwarin1941andthenhavingsoldthesameonJuly3,1947tothePiguingspouseswhobuilta housethereonandcontinuouslypossessedthesameuntiltheysoldthesameinturntotheMeralcoonAugust13,1976,12Meralco's predecessors-in-interesthadthereforeacquiredbyoperationofthePublicLandActaGovernmentgranttotheproperty,aswellas acquired ownership thereof by right of acquisitive prescription over the land which thereby became private property. The very definition of prescriptionasamodeofacquiringownershipassetforthinArt.1106oftheCivilCodeprovidesthat"Byprescriptiononeacquires ownershipandotherrealrightsthroughlapseoftimeinthemannerandundertheconditionslaiddownbylaw."ThelawdoesInot provide that one acquires ownership of a land by prescription only after his titlethereto isjudicially confirmed. To this same effect isthe ruling in Cario vs. Insular Government, 13 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Justice Holmes held that: NATURAL RESOURCES 2015 18 Itistruethatthelanguageofarticles4and5attributestitletothose'whomayprove'possessionforthenecessarytimeandwedonot overlooktheargumentthatthismeansmayproveinregistrationproceedings.ItmaybethatanEnglishconveyancerwouldhave recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly itwas not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration wasexpectedfromall,butnonesufficienttoshowthat,forwantofit,ownershipactuallygainedwouldbelost.Theeffectoftheproof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. TothesameeffectistheCourt'srulinginLegardaandPrietovs.Saleeby,31Phil.590,that"anownerdoesnotobtaintitlebyvirtueof certificate but rather obtains his certificate by virtue of the fact that he has a fee simple title." 5. Since the public land became private property upon completionof the 30th year of continuous, exclusive, and unchallenged possession of the applicant Meralco's predecessors-in-interest, particularly the Piguing spouses who sold the private land to the Meralco, there is no justificationfordenyingtheMeralco'sapplicationforregistrationofitsdulyacquiredtitletotheland.Meralco'spredecessors-in-interest had acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription as provided by the Public Land Act and by the Civil Code. Theland became private property and Meralco duly acquired it by right of purchase. To deny Meralco's application to register the property because it is not a natural person is unjustified because neither the new constitutional ban under the 1973 Constitution against private corporations owning lands of the public domain or the Public Land Act's limitation on the right of application for confirmation of imperfect title to lands of the publicdomaincanbeinvokedanylongerasthelandhadlongceasedtobepubliclandbuthadbecomeprivateproperty.Meralco's application in effect seeks confirmation of the acquisition of ownership of the land which had become private property of its predecessors-in-interest, the Piguing spouses who thru their open and unchallenged possession of the land forover thirty years acquired title thereto by acquisitive prescription and by conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act itself. There is no legal nor constitutional obstacle to such title beingtransferredtotheMeralcobyrightofpurchaseandtraditioforitisnotclaimedthatthereisanylegalprohibitionagainstthe Piguing spouses transferring the ownership of the land to others (whether natural persons or corporations) such as the applicant Meralco, even before the formal issuance of the certificate of title to them. 6.Toupholdrespondentjudge'sdenialofMeralco'sapplicationonthetechnicalitythatthePublicLandActallowsonlyciti zensofthe Philippines wh