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Role, Charter & Responsibilities

A Presentation by

Muktesh Chander IPS

Centre Director

NCIIPC

NTRO

Government of India

National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection

Centre (NCIIPC)

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Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) Threats to CII Examples of Cyber attacks to CIIs International Critical Information

Infrastructure Protection Efforts International Information Security Standards Information Security initiatives in India National Critical Information Infrastructure

Protection Centre (NCIIPC)

Outline of Presentation

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Energy

Transportation ( air, surface, rail & water)

Banking & Finance

Telecommunication

Defence

Space

Law enforcement, security & intelligence

Sensitive Government organisations

Public Health

Water supply

Critical manufacturing

E-Governance

…

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In general Critical Infrastructure (CI) can be defined as: “those facilities, systems, or functions, whose incapacity or

destruction would cause a debilitating impact on national security, governance, economy and social well-being of a nation”.

Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) are those ICT infrastructure upon which core functionality of Critical Infrastructure is dependent.

As per Section 70 of IT Act 2000, CII is defined as: “the computer resource, the incapacitation or destruction of

which, shall have debilitating impact on national security, economy, public health or safety.”

Critical Information Infrastructure

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Information Infrastructure

CI CI

CI

CII CII CI CII

Figure: Varying Dependence of CI on Information Infrastructure

Inter-dependence

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Characteristics of CII

Highly Complex

Distributed

Interconnected

Interdependent

Increasing trend in all of the above

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Complexity and Inter-dependence of CII

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Threats to CII are classified as: ◦ Internal Threat

It is defined as “One or more individuals with the access and/or inside knowledge of a company, organization, or enterprise that would allow them to exploit the vulnerabilities of that entity’s security, systems, services, products, or facilities with the intent to cause harm.”

Insider betrayals cause losses due to IT sabotage, Fraud, and Theft of Confidential or proprietary information

This may be intentional or due to ignorance

◦ External Threat

Arise from outside of the organization by individuals, hackers, organizations, terrorists , foreign Government agents, non state actors and pose risk like Crippling CII, Espionage, Cyber/Electronic warfare, Cyber Terrorism etc.

Types of threats to CIIs

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Malware Attacks ( 19,719,262 distinct malware so far)

Email attachments

Smartphones

Removable media

Web Application Attacks

Client Side Attacks, MITM

Social Engineering Attacks

Social network

Wireless attacks

DoS/DDoS

Botnet

SCADA APTs

Embedded systems

Supply Chain contamination

Threat vectors to CII

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Individuals

Disgruntled or ex employee

Rivals (Industrial Espionage)

Hackers, Script kiddies, Crackers

Cyber criminals (organized as well as unorganized)

Hactivists

Cyber Mercenaries

Terrorist groups (CyberJehadis)

Non state actors

Hostile states

Threat actors

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• Damage or destruction of CII

• Disruption or degradation of services

• Loss of sensitive and strategic information

• Widespread damage in short time

• Cascading effects on several CII

Effects of Cyber Attacks on CII

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Example of Cyber Attacks on CII

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Discovered in June 2010

It is first known targeted worm to attack a particular type of Industrial Control Systems (ICS).

It primarily spreads via portable USB drive

It first exploits zero-day vulnerabilities to infect Windows based workstations then attacks associated Programmable Logical Controller (PLC) based SCADA machines and modifies their configuration and behaviour.

Stuxnet, which affected the Nuclear program of Iran is the most sophisticated APT.

Stuxnet Virus: A New weapon of War

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Concentration of infections in Iran.

Stuxnet spread and geographical distribution of infected systems

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Discovered in September 2011.

Affected countries include Iran, France, UK, Hungary, Austria, and Indonesia.

It is a variant of Stuxnet virus.

Unlike Stuxnet Duqu worm does not replicate but is ‘highly targeted’ and uses Trojans to gather sensitive information and passwords and send back to a command and control server.

It does not have a payload like Stuxnet, but instead seems to exist to set up remote access capabilities.

Duqu Virus: A Stuxnet Variant

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20 MB in size

Cause:

◦ Flame can spread to other systems over LAN or USB stick.

◦ Mine computer to record Skype conversation, screenshots, keyboard activity and network traffic, turns infected computers into Bluetooth becons which attempt to download contact information from nearby Bluetooth-enabled devices.

◦ Collected information is sent back to remote control servers.

Effect:

◦ Initially infected 1000 machines, with victims including governmental organizations, financial organizations etc. in Iran, Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Flame Malware

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Targets: ◦ Energy Sector.

◦ Disrupted services of Saudi Aramco and Qatar RasGas.

Effect: ◦ Capable to spread to other offline workstations on

network.

◦ Wipes disks of workstations and overwrites Master Boot Record preventing them from booting.

Motive: ◦ Unlike other Cyber Espionage Malware, Shamoon is a

Cyber Sabotage Weapon.

Shamoon Malware (August 2012)

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From Cyber Skirmishes to

Cyber Warfare

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Cause: ◦ Malicious emails when opened dropped Trojan horse .

◦ Trojan horse connects back to Control Server to download and install Gh0st Rat Trojan.

Effect: ◦ Gh0st Rat allows attackers to gain complete, real time

control of computers running Microsoft windows.

◦ Infiltrated high-value political, economic, and media locations in 103 countries.

◦ Compromised computer systems of embassies, foreign ministries and other government offices, Dalai Lama’s centers in India, London and New York city etc.

GhostNet: Cyber Spying Operation

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Cause: ◦ A malware ecosystem employed by the attackers via

GhostNet etc. ◦ Ecosystem Leveraged multiple redundant cloud

computing systems, social networking platforms, free web hosting services etc to maintain persistent control.

Effect: ◦ Complex cyber espionage network. ◦ Theft of classified and sensitive documents. ◦ Collateral compromise: Visa applications stolen. ◦ Command and control Infrastructure that leverage

cloud based social media services.

Shadow in Cloud: Cyber Espionage

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On 4th December 2011, Iran captured an American Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)

Iranian Government claimed that drone was brought down by its cyber warfare unit stationed near Kashmar.

An Iranian engineer claimed that the drone was captured by jamming both satellite and land-originated control signals to the UAV, followed up by a spoofing attack, feeding the UAV false GPS data to make it land in Iran at what the drone thought was its home base in Afghanistan

Cyber Attack brought down US Drone RQ-170

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Incident Time Frame ◦ Start 27 April 2007, End 18 May 2007, Duration 3 weeks

Methods ◦ DoS and DDoS; Website defacement; Attacking DNS servers; ◦ Mass e-mail and comment spam.

Targets ◦ Servers of institutions responsible for the Estonian Internet

infrastructure; ◦ Governmental and political

targets (parliament, president, ministries, state agencies, etc);

◦ Services provided by the private sector (ebanking, news organisations etc);

◦ Personal and random targets.

Estonia 2007 Cyber Conflict

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Incident Time Frame ◦ Start 8 August 2008; End 28 August 2008; Duration 3 weeks

Methods ◦ DoS and DDoS attacks;Distribution of malicious software

together with attack instructions; exploiting SQL vulnerability; ◦ Defacement; Using e-mail addresses for spamming and

targeted attacks.

Targets ◦ Government sites (President, Parliament, ministries; local

government of Abkhazia); News and media sites, online Discussion forums, Financial institutions etc.

Georgia 2008 Cyber Conflict

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Incident Time Frame ◦ Start 28 June 2008; End 2 July 2008; Duration 4 days.

Methods ◦ Defacement. Pro-Soviet and communist symbols as well as

profane anti-Lithuanian slogans posted on websites. ◦ Some e-mail spam.

Targets ◦ Over 3oo private sector (95%) and governmental (5%)

websites; ◦ Damage largely

avoided to the public sector due to timely warning;

◦ Private sector suffered most.

Lithuanian 2008 Cyber Conflict

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Cyber attacks on Indian Government Infrastructure

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As reported by Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) a total no. of 90, 119, 252 and 219 Government websites were defaced by various hacker groups in the year 2008, 2009, 2010 and January – October 2011 respectively

13000 incidents handled by CERT in in 2011

Cyber attacks on Indian Government Websites

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Loss of confidential information from sensitive organisations

Email Compromises

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International efforts for Protection Of Critical Information

Infrastructure

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UN Resolution 58/199

ITU, G8

Agencies for protection of Critical Infrastructure: ◦ Europe: European program for Critical Information

Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)

◦ United Kingdom: Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)

◦ United States: Responsibility of Critical Infrastructure protection falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security.

◦ Australia: National Security agency

◦ South Korea: National Intelligence Service

International CIIP initiatives

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Information Security Management

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Some Information Security facts

◦ It is a multidisciplinary subject

◦ Security depends on people, process more than technology;

◦ Internal employees are a far bigger threat to information security than any outside threat;

◦ Security is not static entity but a running process; it should flow through the organization.

◦ Moving from technical, managerial, standardization & certification to the Forth wave of Information security

Governance (B. Von Solms )

Information Security Management

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◦ ISO/IEC 27000 family;

◦ ISO 31000: Risk Management;

◦ ISO 22301: Business continuity Management etc .

Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Control Objective for Information and Related

Technologies (COBIT) Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) Payment Card Industry Information Security Standard

(PCIDSS) Data Security Council of India Security Framework (DSF)

International Standards

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Specifies the requirements for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining and improving a documented Information Security Management System (ISMS) within an organisation.

It is usually applicable to all types of organisations, including business enterprises, government agencies, and so on.

It is a normative standard against which certification is obtained.

Adopts Plan-DO-Check-Act (PDCA) model and is applied to structure all ISMS processes.

ISO/IEC 27001

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Establish the

ISMS

Implement

and operate

the ISMS

Monitor and

Review the

ISMS

Maintain and

Improve the

ISMS

Plan

Do

Check

Act

Information security

Requirements and Expectations

Managed Information Security and Operations

PDCA Model

ISO/IEC 27001 Standard (contd..)

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ISO/IEC 27001 ISMS Requirements

◦ General requirements

Establishing and managing the ISMS

Establish the ISMS, Implement and operate the ISMS

Monitor and review the ISMS, Maintain and improve the ISMS

◦ Documentation requirements

General, Control of documents, Control of records

◦ Management responsibility Management commitment

Resource management Provision of resources

Training, awareness and competence

◦ Internal ISMS audits

◦ Management review of the ISMS

General, Review input, Review output

◦ ISMS improvement

Continual improvement, Corrective action, Preventive action

ISO/IEC 27001 Standard (contd..)

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Criminal Offences Subsection

Sending offensive messages, including attachments, through communications service 66A

Dishonestly receiving stolen computer resource or communication device 66B

Identity theft 66C

Cheating by personating 66D

Violation of privacy 66E

Cyber terrorism: defined as causing denial of service, illegal access, introducing a virus in any of

the critical information infrastructure of the country defined u/s 70 with the intent to threaten

the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or strike terror in the people or any section of

the people; or gaining illegal access to data or database that is restricted for reasons of the

security of state or friendly relations with foreign states.

66F

Publishing or transmitting of material containing sexually explicit act in electronic form 67A

Publishing or transmitting of material depicting children in sexually explicit act 67B

Preservation and retention of information by intermediaries as may be specified for such

duration and in such manner and format as the central government may prescribe.

67C

IT Act 2000

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Section 70 deals with declaration of protected systems as any computer resource which directly or indirectly affects the facility of critical information infrastructure (CII)

Protected Systems

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Sec 66 F: Punishment for Cyber Terrorism- (1) Whoever,-

(A) with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or strike error in the people or any section of the people by-

(i) deny or cause the denial of access to any person authorized to access computer resources; or

(ii) attempting to penetrate or access a computer resource without authorization or exceeding authorised access; or

(iii) introducing or causing to introduce any computer contaminant; or and by any means of such conduct causes or is likely to cause death or injuries to person or damage to or destruction of property or disrupts or knowing that it is likely to cause damage or disruption of supplies or services essential to the life of the community or adversely affect the critical information infrastructure specified under section 70.

Cyber Terrorism

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Under Section 70A NCIIPC, under NTRO is being declared as the nodal agency for the protection of Critical Information Infrastructure of India.

Gazette notification for NCIIPC under section 70A (1) is underway.

NCIIPC under its mandate from section 70A(2) of IT Act is responsible for all measures including R&D for protection of Critical Information Infrastructure

Rules under section 70A being notified.

National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC)

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NCIIPC Vision

“To facilitate safe, secure and

resilient Information Infrastructure

for Critical Sectors of the Nation”

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“To take all necessary measures to facilitate protection of Critical Information Infrastructure from unauthorized access, modification, use, disclosure, disruption,

incapacitation or destruction through coherent coordination, synergy and

raising information Security awareness among all stakeholders.”

NCIIPC Mission

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CERT-IN

NCIIPC

Organizational

Security

Department

LEAs

LOW Criticality HIGH

HIGH

Dependency

Dependency and Criticality Matrix for NCIIPC

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Prevention and early warning

Detection

Mitigation

Response

Recovery

Resilience

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Identification of Critical Sub-sectors Study of Information Infrastructure of identified

critical sub-sectors Issue of Daily / Monthly cyber alerts / advisories Malware Analysis Tracking zombies and Malware spreading IPs Cyber Forensics activities Research and Development for Smart and Secure

Environment. Facilitate CII owners in adoption of appropriate

policies, standards, best practices for protection of CII.

Annual CISO Conference for Critical Sectors. Awareness and training 24X7 operation and helpdesk

NCIIPC Activities

NTRO has identified 17 sub-sectors initially and has started activities for 7 sub-sectors named below:

•Air Traffic Management (ATM), Civil Aviation (Transportation) •Power grid (Energy) •MTNL •NSEI •BSNL •Railways •SBI

Sl No.

SECTOR as identified in crisis management plan 2010

Sub- sector Dept./Agency Organization

Specific Area Remarks

1. Transportation Civil aviation AAI ATC Work under progress

2. Transportation Railways IRCTC RAILTEL Passenger reservation system, communication

Work under progress

3. Transportation Shipping Port Port management

4. Energy Power Powergrid corporation

POSOCO Work under progress

5. Energy Nuclear BAARC, NPCL

6. Energy Oil & Gas ONGC

7. Finance/Banking Finance NSE, BSE, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau (CEIB)

SIEN network (CEIB) NFS(National Financial Switches)

Work under progress

8. Finance/Banking Banking SBI, RBI INFINET, NEFT, SIEN

Work under progress

9. ICT Communication MTNL, BSNL Work under progress

Sl No.

SECTOR as identified in crisis management plan 2010

Sub- sector Dept./Agency Organization

Specific Area Remarks

10. ICT IT NIC NKN, SWAN

11. Law Enforcement, Security & intelligence

Law Enforcement & Security

ITBP, SSB, CRPF, Assam Rifles, BSF, CISF

12. Law Enforcement, Security & intelligence

Law Enforcement & Security

MHA CCTNS

13. Law Enforcement, Security & intelligence

Intelligence Agencies

R&AW, IB, NTRO, CBI, NIA

NATGRID, FRRO Networks Cobweb

Work under progress

14. Space -- ISRO Spacenet, Remote sensing, spacebased Programme

15. Defence Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast guard, Strategic Forces Command

16. MEA -- -- Passport Database/Visa

OTHERS

17. Sensitive Govt. Organisations PMO, NSCS, Planning Commission, Cabinet Sectt., MHS, Registrar General Doordarshan & AIR

AADHAAR

Network from any of these areas which go through NIC

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Each Organisation/Ministry in Critical Sector should nominate a Nodal Officer (CISO) for interaction with NCIIPC.

CISO will be the point of contact for NCIIPC.

Nodal Officer/CISO

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CISO responsibilities include, but not limited to: ◦ Build an Information security culture

◦ Assist senior management in the development, implementation and maintenance of an information security infrastructure.

◦ Develop, communicate and ensure compliance with organizational information security policy, standards and guidelines

◦ Ensure regulatory and Standards compliance

◦ Develop a security awareness and training program

◦ Periodically conduct internal audit to check compliance with organizational security policy, standard and guidelines

◦ Risk Management

◦ Incident Management

◦ Business Continuity Management

◦ Assist senior management in acquisition of products, tools and services related to information & related technology.

CISO Roles & Responsibilities

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Guidelines for Protecting Critical Information Infrastructure

Under preparation with the help of Academia and Industry

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We understand several Ministries/Departments have identified organisations under their administrative control as a Sectoral CERT for their respective Ministries/Departments

We would expect these Sectoral CERTS henceforth workout an institutional mechanism to synergistically work with NCIIPC towards providing effective protection to the CII in these Ministries/Departments.

NCIIPC Expectations

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Take some time to fill questionnaire

Provide details of information security measures being taken in your organisation

Leave above documents when you go for lunch.

Feedback

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Marching towards building

a culture of cyber security

NCIIPC at your Service

Thank you