national identities in ukraine and in euromaidan

5/24/2018 National Identities in Ukraine and in Euromaidan

National Identities in Ukraine and in Euromaidan

Antony Penaud

June 21, 2014

1 Introduction

In this essay, we are going to document and highlight the different identities inUkraine.Much has already been said on language (Russophones in Ukraine), and herewe are going to focus on historical narrative.We are going to show that the different identities can be seen geographically,and on the electoral map.We are going to focus particularly on Western Ukraine (where Ukrainian na-tionalism is the strongest).We will also highlight the role of nationalism in Euromaidan, and its represen-tation in the post Yanukovich government.

The plan for our essay is the following:2. Political and identical map in short3. Historical narratives4. Svaboda5. Euromaidan6. What came out of Euromaidan7. Conclusions

2 Political and identical map in short

Main political parties The two main political parties in recent Ukrainianhistory have been- the Party of Regions: it was led by Yanukovich who is from the Donetsk re-gion (Donbass, part of Eastern Ukraine), and in short it is seen as the party

protecting Russophones and willing closer ties with Russia.- Fatherland: Yushchenko was president of Ukraine before 2010 and memberof the Our Ukraine party which was ideollogicaly close to Fatherland. OurUkraine is now dissolved. Tymoshchenko is Fatherlands leader and was PM

[email protected]

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under Yushchenko. Yatseniuk belongs to this party and supported Yushchenkoin the past. In short, Fatherland can be seen as the opposite as the Party of

Regions.

Extremes Because we want to focus national identities, we introduce the farright and the far left:- Svaboda (far right nationalist party, electoral base in Western Ukraine - wehave a full section about it later).- The Communist Party (Soviet identity and anti nationalist in short, strongestscores in the South and in the East).Again, to summarise: in a second round of presidential elections between theParty of Region and Fatherland, Svaboda sympathisers would vote for Father-land and Communist Party sympathisers would vote for the Party of Regions.

We have included electoral maps of different elections at the end of this essay.

2nd round of the 2010 presidential elections The electoral map of the2010 presidential elections shows a clear and strong separation: in the Southand the East (where there are more Russophones and people who want closerties with Russia), Yanukovich had more votes in every region. In particular, inthe Donbass (Lugansk region and Donetsk region) Yanukovich had more than80%, and in some parts more than 90%.On the other hand, Tymoshenko had her best scores (near 90%) in the West ofUkraine, in particular in the Lviv region.These patterns can be found in previous presidential elections too (see electoralmaps at the end).

Svaboda and the Communist Party In the first round of the 2010 elec-tions both parties did not do well:- Svabodas score was 1.43% nationally (its highest score was 5.35% in the Lvivregion, but interestingly it did 34.98% in another Western Ukraine region in thelocal elections later that year, which might mean that Svaboda sympathisersvote for the Fatherland party in presidential elections).- The Communists Partys score was 3.5% nationally.

In the 2012 parliamentary elections both parties made much higher scores:- Svabodas national score was 10.44%. In the Lviv region (Lviv is the largestcity in Western Ukraine) it did 38.01%. It made a breakthrough in Kiev with

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33%. Its lowest scores were in Crimea (1.

05%), and in the Donbass (around1.25%).- The Communist Partys national score was 13.2%. It was 25.14% in theLugansk region (one of the two regions of the Donbass, Eastern Ukraine) and29.46% in Sevastopol (home to the Russian naval base in Crimea). Its lowestscore was in one region of West Ukraine (1.78%).

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Summary To summarise, Western Ukraine and the Donbass region (EasternUkraine) are at the two extremes in terms of Ukrainian politics. The Centre of

Ukraine is closer to Western Ukraine while the remaining of the East and theSouth are closer to the Donbass region.Finally, the extreme South of Western Ukraine is different from Western Ukraine(it was not part of Poland before 1939), and Crimea was part of Russia until1954 and the majority of Crimean people identify themselves as Russians.

3 Historical narratives

In this section we are going to tell the different historical narratives, with afocus on Western Ukraines historical narrative.

Western Ukraines different history in short Western Ukraine only be-

came part of the USSR in 1939 following the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (it wasoccupied by Germany after Operation Barbarossa in June 1941). Before 1939it was part of Poland, and before WW1 part of the Austro Hungarian Empire.Unlike the rest of Ukraine, it is not Orthodox.In other words, Western Ukraine was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1939.Many people from Western Ukraine fought against the Red Army during theWW2 (and alongside Nazi Germany), as opposed to other Ukrainians (seeKatchanovski1, Ottawa University) .

3.1 Bandera and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

According to Katchanovski, in independent Ukraine, particularly since theOrange Revolution of 2004, WW2 has become a major political battleground.There are significant divisions concerning policies, views, definitions, and com-memoration of this conflict in comtemporary Ukraine.

3.1.1 Why the revival of national myths in Ukraine should alarm us

Below, we cite extracts of the 19 May 2014 article Why the Revival of NationalMyths in Ukraine Should Alarm Us2 by Amar (Assistant Professor in Historyat Columbia University) and Rudling (Associate Professor in History at LundUniversity, Sweden):

Historian Omer Bartov has long pointed out a fundamental problem whichsubstantial parts of Ukrainian society, in and outside Ukraine, still find hard toacknowledge: it is not possible to glorify ethnic nationalists as freedom-fightingheroes and examples for today and, at the same time, to be honest about theiranti-Semitism, ethnic and political mass violence, and collaboration with NaziGermany. It is true that this collaboration was less extensive than what it could

1See The Politics of WW2 in Contemporary Ukraine, available on the internet.2See http://hnn.us/article/155618

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have been, had Nazi Germany accepted the Ukrainian nationalists as allies theway it did with Slovakian and Croatian ones. Moreover, some Ukrainian nation-

alists also periodically clashed with the Germans and were persecuted by them.Yet there is no doubt or room for argument about a simple fact: the record ofUkrainian WW2 nationalism includes massive, politically motivated, and delib-erate violence against civilians, including participation in the Holocaust and themass-murderous ethnic cleansing of tens of thousands of Poles.(...)

Seeking ideological hegemony for this mythical version of history in todaysUkraine, it was, in fact, Yushchenko who, ironically, also helped spread a stereo-type equating Ukrainians with Ukrainian nationalists. In reality, the Organiza-tion of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA),controlled by the Bandera wing of the OUN, were within the context of WW2comparatively small and strongly regional organizations. Their massive, brutal

effects during the war did not reflect popular support throughout Ukraine butthe opportunities offered by the war and the nationalists ruthless, premedi-tated will to capitalize on them. In fact, far more Ukrainians fought againstNazi Germany as part of Soviet forces than for Ukrainian ethnic nationalism.By equating ethnic nationalists with the nation Yushchenko not only acceptedthe nationalists own unfounded claims at face value. He also contributed tothe polarization of Ukraine. Moreover, for observers at home and abroad, heburdened the image and substance of pro-western policies with a legacy of au-thoritarianism and mass murder that is, in fact, irreconcilable with them. Inparticular, his policies complicated Ukraines relationship with Poland; it wasa Polish initiative, led by Members of the European Parliament from the oth-erwise pro-Ukrainian Platforma Obywatelska party that finally led to an EUprotest against Yushchenkos most egregious provocations. Only larger geopo-

litical interests ultimately outweighed these concerns: the glorification of theviolent legacy of ethnic nationalism went largely unchallenged during the nego-tiations for the EU Association Agreement.(...)

While Yushchenko no longer matters, his legacy of state glorification of eth-nic nationalists has left Ukraine with one more burden to carry or, perhaps, shed.

Volodymyr Viatrovych, under Yushchenko director of the archives of theformer KGB, is now the head of Ukraines Institute of National Memory. He haslong been a key proponent of an uncritical and glorifying interpretation of theOUN and UPA. His publications, often written for a broad audience and littleknown in the West but influential in Ukraine have consistently downplayed theOUNs anti-Semitism and the UPAs anti-Polish massacres. Viatrovych has also

publicly belittled the murder of civilians in Belarus by Ukrainian nationalistsserving there as German auxiliaries.

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3.1.2 Geographical divide

A poll In a 2009 survey from the Kiev Interrnational Institute of Sociol-ogy (KIIS), in Galicia (the part of Western Ukraine with Lviv, Ternopil andIvanFrankivsk), 63% of Ukrainians had a positive attitude towards Bandera(of which 37% very positive), 12% had a negative attitude (of which 6% verynegative).In the Centre of Ukraine, 13% had a positive attitude towards Bandera (ofwhich 3% was very positive) , and 38% a negative attitude (of which 21% wasvery negative).In Eastern Ukraine (Donetsk, Lugansk but also Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk andZaporizhia), 2% had a positive attitude towards Bandera (of which 1% was verypositive) , and 59% a negative attitude (of which 46% was very negative).In the South of Ukraine, 1% had a positive attitude towards Bandera, and 45%a negative attitude (of which 30% was very negative).

The view of a Donbass resident The following 11 April 2014 interview(inLe Courrier de Russie) of a Donetsk (Donbass, Eastern Ukraine) policemansummarises it all: Here in the Donbass, we have nothing in common with Lviv -the only thing that still unites us, is the country. It was Vatunin [Soviet generalin WW2] who liberated my city. And six months later, he was assassinated bythe soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Over there, in Lviv, their heroesare the people from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army; but for me, it is Vatuninthe hero. That man who led the Red Army and who freed my city from thefascists. What do we have in common with Lviv people? We have a differentHistory and a different culture.

3.2 Holodomor3.2.1 Yushchenko

Amar and Rudling wrote:During Viatrovych first tenure as head of the SBU, he allied himself publiclywith Yushchenkos memory politics. The SBU presented an absurdly selectivelist of the 19 people responsible for the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine. Twofifths of the names on it were presented in the classically anti-Semitic fashionof decoding family names by adding the real Jewish name in parenthesis.Under his tenure, the SBU also produced an official number of 10,063,000 millionvictims of the 1932-33 famine in the Ukrainian SSR, a tripling of the consensusnumber by historical demographers. Such manipulation of what are terriblefigures anyhow is not a minor issue but reflects a long-standing tendency to

compete with the Holocaust..

3.2.2 Solzhenitsyn

A few months before his death in August 2008, Alexander Solzhenitsyn (whosemother was Ukrainian) wrote:

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The great famine of 1921 shook our country, from the Urals, across the Volga,and deep into European Russia. It cut down millions of our people. But the

word Holodomor [meaning murder by hunger] was not used at that time. TheCommunist leadership deemed it sufficient to blame the famine on a naturaldrought, while failing to mention at all the grain requisitioning that cruellyrobbed the peasantry.

And in 1932-33, when a similar great famine hit Ukraine and the Kubanregion, the Communist Party bosses (including quite a few Ukrainians) treatedit with the same silence and concealment. And it did not occur to anyone tosuggest to the zealous activists of the Communist Party and Young CommunistLeague that what was happening was the planned annihilation of precisely theUkrainians. The provocative outcry about genocide only began to take shapedecades later at first quietly, inside spiteful, anti-Russian, chauvinistic minds

and now it has spun off into the government circles of modern-day Ukraine,who have thus outdone even the wild inventions of Bolshevik agitprop.

To the parliaments of the world: This vicious defamation is easy to insinuateinto Western minds. They have never understood our history: You can sell themany old fairy tale, even one as mindless as this.

3.3 Memory politics (memory wars?)

3.3.1 Bandera

Hero of Ukraine Shortly before the 2010 presidential elections, Yushchenkoawarded to Bandera the title of Hero of Ukraine. Later that year, underYanukovich, a Donetsk court declared unlawful that decree3 (they argued Ban-

dera only lived in the USSR, not in the Ukrainian independent state).

Monuments In 2010 and 2011, many Western Ukrainian cities named Ban-dera honorary citizen of their city.As far as we know, there are 25 Bandera statues, 5 Bandera museums, and 14Bandera streets in Ukraine: all are recent, and all are in Western Ukraine.The first monument for the victims of the UIA and nationalists was erectedin Simferopol (Crimea) in 2007. In May 2010 in Lugansk (Eastern Ukraine),another monument for the victims of the UIA and nationalists was erected4.There is another monument in Kharkiv (Eastern Ukraine).Outside Ukraine, there are monuments to the victims of the UIA in Poland(tens of thousands of thousands of Poles were ethnicaly cleansed by the UIA).

In Canada and the US, there are monuments honouring the UIA in cemeteries.3See http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/donetsk-court-deprives-shukhevych-of-

ukrainian-her-64630.html4See http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/luhansk-unveils-monument-to-victims-

of-oun-upa-66171.html

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9 May On 9 May 2011, for the celebration of the end of WW2 (because ofthe time difference it is not celebrated on 8 May in post Soviet countries), a

group of people including WW2 veterans was attacked in Lviv by nationalists5.That day Svaboda members stormed the office of the regional administration(Mikhailo Tsymbaliouk) and forced him to sign a resignation letter.

3.3.2 Holodomor

Yushchenko Since 2006, Ukraine have a Holomodor memorial day (on 25November). In 2007, there was a 3-day commemoration in Kiev, and in 2008 amemorial was erected in Kiev.In 2009, Ukrainian schoolchildren took a more extensive course on the Historyof the Holodomor, as well as on the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists andUkrainian Insurgent Army (UIA)6.

Yanukovich In 2010, the new president Yanukovich visited the Holodomormemorial.Earlier that year he had stated in Strasbourg: The Holodomor was in Ukraine,Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. It was the result of Stalins totalitarian regime.But it would be wrong and unfair to recognize the Holodomor as an act ofgenocide against one nation.The Fatherland party reacted by stating By his statement, Yanukovych directlyviolated the norms of the Ukrainian law of November 28, 2006 on the Holodomorof 1932-1933 in Ukraine, the first article of which clearly states: The Holodomorof 1932-1933 in Ukraine is genocide against the Ukrainian people.7.

Summary While both main parties want to remember the Holodomor, they

disagree on how to remember it. Fatherland have exaggerated the number ofvictims and see it as a genocide directed by Russians against Ukrainians, whilethe Party of Regions insist the famine happened in other parts of the SovietUnion too.

3.4 Comments

Causality? One should note that Bandera and the UIA were essentially fromthe West of Ukraine, and that in 1932-33 what we now call Western Ukrainewas in Poland, and there was therefore no famine there. Therefore, the UIAwas not a consequence of the famine, there was no causal relationship - theywere unrelated. The East and Centre of Ukraine were the most affected part ofUkraine.

5See for example https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/lviv-nationalists-clash-with-police-103942.html

6See http://zik.ua/en/news/2009/06/11/1843287See http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/our-ukraine-party-yanukovych-violated-

law-on-holod.html

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Ukraine unity Beyond the fact that the glorification of Bandera is morallyquestionable, many Ukrainians in the South and the East of Ukraine do not see

Bandera as a hero, and on the contrary see him as a nazi collaborator. It seemslogical that such a choice for a national hero would not unify Ukrainians, but onthe contrary divide them. Bandera is quite simply a divisive figure in Ukraine.

Anti Russian There is however a common factor between the UIA and theHolodomor. In both cases, the ennemy (from contemporary Ukrainian nation-alists point of view) is the Russians. This is in fact historically not that simple:the UIA hated more the Poles than the Russians (they have an almost religiousworship of their nation and distrust anything foreign: first and foremost, Polish,then Russian; then German8), and Stalin was Georgian.

The role of the EU (and the US)? Also, we think it worth pondering

on the following sentence in the Amar and Rudling article: the glorificationof the violent legacy of ethnic nationalism went largely unchallenged during thenegotiations for the EU Association Agreement. Indeed, it is possible that theEU (and the US) judged that it was in their interest to encourage (or at leasttolerate) strong nationalistic anti Russian sentiment in Ukrainian politics.

3.5 The CIAs assessment on Bandera

Just after the end of WW2, the US made a bond with Ukrainian nationalists:a CIA declassified (under the Nazi war crimes disclosure act) document reads9:

As relations between the US and the Soviet Unions deteriorated, the CIAexpanded its ties with these emigres(...).

many Ukrainians despised Poles and Jews as well as Soviet Communists. Ukraini-ans served in the German army and had been linked to Nazy atrocities on theEastern Front(...)Bandera led the largest faction of the OUN (which split when the war broke out),and Melnik led the smaller one. Both factions participated in terrorist activitiesagainst Polish officials before the war, and Ukrainian nationalists allied them-selves with their Nazi liberators during the first days of Operation Barbarossain 1941. Even though OUNs enthusiasm diminished after the Nazis failed tosupport Ukrainian statehood, many Ukrainians continued to fight alongside theGermans until the end of the war.(...)The Soviet Unions demand for repatriating all its citizens suspected of warcrimes and collaboration with the Nazis complicated Aradis and Holtmanswork with the Ukrainians while they established initial contacts with OUN and

ZPUHVR. American acquiescence with Soviet demand would damage relationswith the Ukrainians. At the same time, Nazis rounded up OUN members and

8See Cold War Allies: the origins of CIAs relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists, CIAdeclassified document.

9See Cold War Allies: the origins of CIAs relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists, CIAdeclassified document.

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placed them in concentration camps(...)The Soviets wanted Stefan Bandera. American intelligence officials recognised

that his arrest would have quick and adverse effects of US operations with theUkrainians.(...)The CIA recognised that Banderas extradition would be a blow to the un-derground movement, but noted that his organisation is, as the field agrees,primarily [original emphasis] a terrorist irgnisation.

Note that the original CIA document reads primarily[original emphasis] .

4 Svaboda

In this section we focus on the Ukrainian nationalist party, with its electoralbase in Western Ukraine.

4.1 Party history

Social National Party Svaboda was founded in 1991 in Lviv (Western Ukraine)as the Social-National Party of Ukraine. According to Olszanski10, its symbolwas the letters I+N (Idea of the Nation), that is graphically identical with theWolfsangel rune one of the symbols of European neo-Nazi organisations.It established in 1999 in Lviv a paramilitary organisation called Patriot ofUkraine.

Svaboda The Social-National Party changed name to Svaboda in February2004 and dropped the Wolfsangel logo when Oleh Tyahnibok became its leader.According to Olszansk, The radical neo-Nazi and racist groups were pushedout from the party. However, Tyahnybok never concealed that these changeswere made primarily for image purposes. The party remains associated withthe wide social nationalist movement comprised of numerous organisations (andwebsites) and gathered around the Social- Nationalist Assembly which was setup in 2008.

Tyahnibok Tyahnibok (who was born in Lviv, West Ukraine) became mem-ber of the Social-National Party in 1991 and became an MP in 1998. In 2002 hewas reelected as part of the coalition led by Yushchenko (Yushchenko becamepresident in 2005). He was expelled from that coalition after a speech in thesummer of 2004 in which he talked of: the Moscow-Jewish mafia rulling ourUkraine and celebrated the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists for having

fought Moscovites, Germans, Jews and other scum who wanted to take awayour Ukrainian state.

10Svoboda party - the new phenomenon on the Ukrainian right-wing scene by TadeuszOlszanski in issue 56 of the Centre for Eastern Studies (04 July 2011).

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Paramilitary The relationship between Patriot of Ukraine and Svaboda wasofficially ended in 2007. At the end of 2013, Patriot of Ukraine joined forces with

other nationalist groups to form the Right Sector (Pravi Sector). University ofOttawas Ostriitchouk11 wrote that Svaboda retains close links with far rightparamilitary organisations trained to fighting, that we will see on the front atthe Maidan.

4.2 Policies

Policies In terms of policies, Svaboda opposes abortion and gay rights (theKievpost dated 11 December 2011 reads The ultra-nationalist Svoboda Partyhas admitted that their activists attacked gay community and human rights ac-tivists who were holding a protest in central Kyiv on 8 December to commem-orate international Human Rights Day)12, keeping and bearing arms should beallowed, Ukrainian children should not be adopted by non-Ukrainians, ethnicorigins should be specified on passports.

Historical narrative Svaboda has organised commemorations of Stepan Ban-dera and of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA). They have organised marches(in Lviv) to celebrate the Waffen SS Galicia division.According to Ostriitchouk, most of the UPA momunents have been erected bySvabodas inititiative or by Svaboda funding, and often organise the removalof Soviet monuments (Lenin statues in particular are the object of anothermemorial war: Svaboda sympathisers try to topple them and Communist Partysympathisers get organised to guard them).

4.3 Views on Svaboda

4.3.1 Jewish organisations and Israel MPs

Wiesenthal Centre In 2012, the Simon Wiesenthal Centre ranked Svabodanumber 5 in its top 10 anti-semitic list, just ahead of Greeces Golden DawnParty.

World Jewish Congress In 2013 the World Jewish Congress labelled theparty as neo-nazi.

11Dr Ostriitchouk is originally from Ternopil, [Western] Ukraine and worked ansstudied in Kiev. Dr Ostriitchouk is now at the University of Ottawa with theChair of Ukrainian Studies. Her main area of research focuses on identities issues inUkraine. (from http://ukrainiangenealogygroup-ncr.org/feb14news.pdf). Ostriitchouks ar-ticle Dune contestation civique a une guerre identitaire is in French and available on

http://www.cairn.info/revue-le-debat-2014-3-page-3.htm12see http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/sabbath-of-perverts-svoboda-boasts-of-

attacking-gay-demonstration-317463.html

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Kneesset In 2013 too, thirty MPs of the Israeli Knesset (there are 120 MPsin total) sent the following letter to the president of the EU parliament:

Dear Mr. President!

First of all, let us thank you for your activities to strengthen the values ofjustice and democracy in Europe and the whole world. We want to note thatEurope is a more welcoming and tolerant place now, thanks to your initiativesand to the spirit you bring to the continent.

However, it has been more than half a year we receive alarming reportson the new nationalistic trend in Ukraine stirred up by the Neo-Nazi SvobodaParty, which won more than ten percent of votes in the last parliamentary elec-tions. We are aware of the threats and slander hurled by members of that partyagainst the Jews, the Russians, and others. These are the people who draw

their inspiration from the Nazis and openly glorify the mass murderers of theSS Ukrainian Divisions.

We were also shocked by the fact, that this party is not isolated at all butenjoys full cooperation of the two main opposition parties in Ukraine. Unfor-tunately, these parties did not protest at all against the actions and statementsof their extreme partner, but even have compromised themselves by their ownpublic glorification of Ukrainian Nazi war criminals.

We can not stand idly by the phenomenon of neo Nazism in any part ofthe world. Our duty is to speak out and to contact our colleagues aroundthe world to join the efforts and to eliminate the symptoms which take us tothe darkest times of humanity. We appreciate the strong position which the

European Parliament expressed on this issue in December last year. We alsowant to thank you for the refusal of the EP to have any working relations withthe Svoboda party and for the clarification to all forces operating in Ukraine,that no attempt of Nazism glorification will be tolerated by Europe. We hope towork together for the better and safer future of Europe and the whole world.

4.3.2 The EU U-turn

Racist, anti-semite and xenophobic On 13 December 2012 the Euro-pean Parliament adopted a text in which one paragraph readParliament goes on to express concern about the rising nationalistic sentimentin Ukraine, expressed in support for the Svoboda Party, which, as a result, isone of the two new parties to enter the Verkhovna Rada [The Ukrainian parlia-

ment]. It recalls that racist, anti-Semitic and xenophobic views go against theEUs fundamental values and principles and thereforeappeals to pro-democraticparties in the Verkhovna Rada not to associate with, endorse or form coalitionswith this party..

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U-turn Just over a year later, the EU associated with Svaboda in the topplingof the democraticaly elected government, and then backed the new coalition, of

which Svaboda was the second most important political party. When the EUsigned the trade agreement with Ukraine, Svaboda was part of the Ukrainiangovernment.

4.4 Introducing some Svaboda MPs

Igor Miroshnichenko Svaboda MP Igor Miroshnichenko is Deputy Headof the Parliamentary Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information. Hehad made news in the West in 2012 by calling Ukrainian actress Mila Kunis adirty jewess.

On 19 March 2014 he made news again by storming with four others theoffice of the head of National TV, Oleksandr Panteleymonov13. They assaultedPanteleymonov, forced him to sign a resignation letter, and abducted him forseveral hours. Astonishingly, Miroshenko then posted online the video of theassault. The message he wanted to send was clear. We do not know whathappened after this assault. On Panteleymonov wikipedia page, it says ActingCEO of National Television Company of Ukraine from 20 February 2013 to 25March 2014).14.

Olha Ostriitchouk reported Tyanhiboks reaction: If yesterday such meth-ods were justified (for example the take over of regional administrations andpeoples pressure on high officials to sign resignation letters), today we dontneed them (other methods, legal, can be used).

Oleg Pankevich From the Nation and Foreign Policy in Focus: Svobodahas always had a soft spot for the [Waffen SS] Galicia Division, and one ofits parliament members, Oleg Pankevich, took part in a ceremony last Aprilhonoring the unit. Pankevich joined with a priest of the Ukrainian OrthodoxChurch near Lviv to celebrate the units seventieth anniversary and rebury someof the divisions dead.15.

Yuriy Mykhalchyshyn He was number one of the Svaboda list for the 2010Lvivs municipal elections. In 2005 he established a Joseph Goebbels PoliticalResearch Centre (he changed the name in 2008). The url washttp://nachtigall88.livejournal.com

13Apparently, following a mistake by a releasing editor, the Crimea Red Square concert hadbeen broadcasted during 5 minutes, see http://euromaidanpr.com/tag/panteleymonov/

14On 28 April 2014, the mayor of Kharkov Gennady Kernes was shot while cycling. The

Guardians Luke Harding wrote Kharkiv journalist Zurab Alasania blamed Russia for Mon-days shooting. He noted in a Facebook post that the mayor had not changed his routine ofgoing for a morning lake swim, despite the deteriorating security situation in the East. TheRussian Federation is identifying and liquidating key centres of resistance, Alasania said..The reader was led to think that Zurab Alasania was an independent local journalist. In facthe was the pro-Maiden journalist who replaced Panteleymonov as head of National Television.

15See http://www.thenation.com/blog/178716/dark-side-ukraine-revolt

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(see Olszanskis article). The number 88 refers to Heil Hitler in neonazi termi-nology (H is the 8th letter in the alphabet), and the Nachtigal battalion was the

name of one of the two Ukrainian SS divisions that sided with Nazi Germanyprior and during the June 1941 attack on the Soviet Union.Mykhalchyshyn has referred to the Holocaust as a period of Light in history.

Iryna Farion After the 2 May 2014 Odessa massacre in which about 40 peopledied after a building was set on fire, she wrote on her website Bravo, Odessa.Pearl of Ukrainian spirit. City of the great nationalists Ivan and Youri Lipa.Let the demons burn in hell. Football fans are the best. Bravo.

4.5 Comments

Crimea It is important to realise that the presence of Svaboda in the post

Yanukovich government happened beforethe Russian intervention in Crimea.Given that before February 2014 Russia had shown no sign of their intention toreunite with Crimea, we can deduce that it is the February 2014 regime changeand its new government (we will look in more details at its composition in thenext section) that triggered Russias decision.

The radicalisation of the Fatherland party Svaboda is often presentedas the ultra-nationalist party, as opposed to Fatherland. But, as said by Amarand Rudling in their article, While Yushchenko no longer matters, his legacy ofstate glorification of ethnic nationalists has left Ukraine with one more burdento carry , he helped spread a stereotype equating Ukrainians with Ukrainiannationalists, and he contributed to the polarization of Ukraine.- Until 2004 and his speech, the Svaboda leader was part of the Fatherland

parliamentary faction.- MPs from the Timoshenko party supported the 1 January torch procession inKiev, marking the 103rd anniversary of Bandera16.- Andry Paruby (former member of the Social Nationalist Party and commanderof the Maiden armed protesters) is now a member of Fatherland.- On 3 May 2014, the day after the Odessa massacre, MP Lesya Orobets posedpictures of herself on facebook and twitter. She was posing with a rifle andcharacterised the massacre as a great victory and an adequate response tothe pro-Russian demonstrations.- In a March 2014 leaked conversation17, Tymoshenkos interlocutor said Heasked What should we do now with the 8 million Russians that stayed inUkraine? They are outcasts!, she allegedly replied They must be killed withnuclear weapons.. When the conversation was revealed, Tymoshenko said The

conversation took place, but the 8 million Russians in Ukraine piece is an edit.In fact, I said Russians in Ukraine are Ukrainians.. However, given that her

16http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/mp-euromaidan-exposed-to-neo-nazi-trends-334612.html

17See http://rt.com/news/tymoshenko-calls-destroy-russia-917/

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interlocutor replied I wont argue with you here, because what happened is ab-solutely unacceptable, Tymoshenkos version just does not work. This shows

what the leader of the Fatherland party thinks of the population in EasternUkraine.- In June 2014, Yatseniuk (Ukrainian PM) called separatists backers subhu-mans18.

EU nationalist political parties Some Western commentators have down-played Ukrainian nationalism, comparing it to EU far right parties such as UKIP(Farage, UK) and FN (Le Pen, France). We think the reader of this essay willagree that Ukrainian nationalism is of a totally different nature. Passmore19

argues that Le Pen is not fascist (but national-populist): Le Pen has not at-tempted to use violence to lever himself into power, The FN does not possessa mass paramilitary wing comparable to historical fascists.

5 Euromaidan

5.1 Direct cause of Euromaidan: the trade agreement

Here we step back from our focus on national identities in order to introducesome background on the trade agreement negociations.

5.1.1 Trade agreement

Negociations On 21 November 2013, Yanukovich announced that he wouldpostpone a trade agreement with the EU. This triggered the start of the protests.On 17 December, Yanukovich signed the trade agreement with Russia, Belarus

and Kazakhstan.During the long negociation process, Yanukovich had been talking to both or-ganisations (EU and the Russia union). Jose-Manuel Barroso said in February2013: one country cannot at the same time be a member of a customs unionand be in a deep common free-trade area with the European Union.After his 21 November decision to postpone the EU deal, Yanukovich still saidhe wanted a deal that would include both the EU and Russia: on 29 Novem-ber 2013 the Daily Telegraph reported: Yanukovych said he was now seekinga trilateral deal which would also include Russia as a player, a notion imme-diately dismissed. When we make a bilateral deal, we dont need a trilateralagreement, said Barroso.

The trade agreements Lets have a closer look at the the two different offersUkraine had to choose from. The EU option offered Ukraine a USD 838m loan and (together with the

18He said killed by invaders and sponsored by subhumans, seehttp://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/?hpt=hp t1

19Fascism, a very short introduction

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IMF) asked the Ukrainian government to increase gas bills by 40% and makebig budget cuts (austerity).The Russia option offered Ukraine a loan 18 times that size (USD 15bn) plus33% discounts on gas prices (Ukraine imports gas from Russia).

Given the better Russia offer, and that Yanukovich had been elected as apro-Russia candidate (his party claims to defend the rights of ethnic Russiansand speakers of the Russian language in Ukraine), it is not surprising that hedecided for the Russia option.

5.1.2 Public opinion and East-West divide on the trade agreement

A 04-09 December 2013 KIIS poll20 said that 48% of Ukrainians thought Yanukovichhad been right not to sign the EU trade agreement. 35% thought he had been

wrong.82% of Western Ukrainians were in favour of signing the EU trade agreement,and 18% of Eastern Ukrainans supported the EU agreement.

5.2 A Western backed revolution

5.2.1 EU and US leaders

Since our focus is on national identities, we do not want to spend too much timeon Western support for the Euromaidan and the government that came out ofit.John McCain, Victoria Nuland, Cathryn Ashton and others went to Kiev andbasically participated in the revolution.

One could debate about their exact responsibility in the revolution, we do notwant to discuss this here. It is sufficient to say that they actively supported it.

5.2.2 The Ukrainian diaspora

Amar and Rudling wrote:Last but not least, a significant section of the Ukrainian diaspora abroad, havetoo often reflexively taken a right-or-wrong-our-freedom-fighters approach towartime and postwar ethnic nationalists.(...)

Some emigre scholars selectively omitted compromising statements from na-tionalist pronouncements. In some cases the OUNs deliberate forgeries havebeen circulated as authentic evidence to refute allegations of anti-Semitism.

One of these consisted of an autobiography of a fictitious Jewish woman, StellaKrentsbakh or Kreutzbach, titled I am Alive thanks to the Ukrainian Insur-gent Army, presented as evidence to disprove any and all genuine survivor

20For example http://www.bne.eu/content/ukraine-land-two-halves-euromaidan-moves-third-week

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testimony to nationalist anti-Semitism.A similar tactic has been used, withYushchenkos direct involvement, to deny nationalist involvement in pogroms

in 1941. A popular rhetorical strategy to counter scholars querying nationalistnarratives has been to implicitly or explicitly, publicly or more quietly denouncethem as neo-Soviet, deceived by or pandering to former Soviet or current Rus-sian propaganda.(...)

Ostriitchouk wrote:The Ukrainian diaspora is an actor too important to be ignored, as is shownby the many pro-Maidian actions (including financial backing), the debates itstarted in Canada and the US, the way it influences their foreign policies andwatches all public interventions.This direct and long dated implication on Ukrainian politics is explained, amongstother things, by the fact that the most active part of the diaspora comes from

the third wave of immigration of the 1950s, which was essentially made of West-ern Ukrainians and actors of the nationalist struggle, strongly opposed to thecommunist regime.

5.3 A West Ukrainian revolution

Because of our focus on national identities, we are not going to document theviolence. We still should say that according to Ostriitchouk, violence took placeon both sides. Also, it is far from sure that Yanukovich gave the orders to thesnipers (see Paet Ashton leaked conversation, and the investigation by the Ger-man TV channel ARD).

Right Sector The paramilitary organisation Right Sector was founded inNovember 2013 (note that it was formed early in the Euromaidan timeline) asa coalition of different ultranationalist groups and was one of the main actorsof the violent stages. Many people had come to Kiev from the Lviv region (andother regions, mainly from the West) in December or January.On 21 January, Alec Luhn21 wrote in The Nation22 Spearheading the clasheswith police was Right Sector, a group with ties to far-right parties includingthe Patriots of Ukraine and Trident, which BBC Ukraine reported is largelycomprised of nationalist football fans. In a statement the next day, the groupclaimed credit for Sundays unrest and promised to continue fighting until Pres-ident Viktor Yanukovich stepped down.

Ukraine above all Alec Luhn: Svoboda is the most visible party on the

square, it has essentially taken over Kiev City Hall as its base of operations,and it has a large influence in the protestors security forces.

21Young American journalist Alec Luhn writes mainly for The Guardian and The Nation.He is based in Moscow but has spent many of the last few months in Ukraine.

22http://www.thenation.com/article/178013/ukrainian-nationalism-heart-euromaidan

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It also has revived three slogans originating in the Ukrainian nationalist move-ment of the 1930s [the UIA] that have become the most popular chants at

Euromaidan. Almost all speakers on Independence Squareeven boxer-turned-opposition-leader Vitaly Klitschko, who has lived mostly in Germany and has aUS residence permitstart and end with the slogan, Glory to Ukraine!, to whichthe crowd responds To heroes glory! Two other nationalist call-and-responseslogans often heard on the square are Glory to the nation! Death to enemies!and Ukraine above all!.

Other nationalist symbolic Ostriitchouk: For those who wanted to seeand listen, the ultranationalist symbolic of Maidan had quickly supplanted andmarginilised the EUs symbolic. At the beginning of the rallyes, the red andblack flags of Bandera were on Maidan next to other flags of the far right like theones of Svaboda, KUN, UNA-UNSO, Banderas trident and Patriot of Ukraine.

The large poster of Bandera was put at Kievs city hall as soon as the protesterstook control of it. Later, the funerals of the first deads took place among thoseflags.

Memorial dates Ostriitchouk: All commemorial dates going in that direc-tion [threat of Russian imperialism, or indeed Soviet] and falling during Euro-maidan were exploited to feed popular anger, starting with the 80th anniversaryof Holodomor, followed closely by the celebration of the Orange revolution, tothe 200th anniversary of Taras Chevtchenko, but with also the 105th anniversaryof Bandera, the memorial pilgrimage on the battlefield of the heroes of Krutywho died in the struggle against the bolsheviks defending the young Ukrainiannation on 29 January 1918.

Pro EU or anti-Russian? In the same article, Alec Luhn describes Sv-abodas tactics: How can the slogan Ukraine above all! sound on Indepen-dence Square alongside the slogan Ukraine in the EU!, Ukrainian progressiveactivist Olga Papash asked in a recent piece on the politics and culture websiteKorydor. (...) Even Yury Noyevy, a member of Svobodas political council,admitted that the party is only pro-EU because it is anti-Russia.

5.3.1 Public opinion and East-West divide on EuroMaidan

A 04-09 December 2013 poll23 said 49% supported Euromaidan, and 45% didntsupport it.But what was interesting was that the country was geographically divided: 84%in the West of Ukraine supported it (against 11%), 66% in the Centre supported

it (against 27%), 33% in the South supported it (against 60%), and only 13%in the East supported it (against 81%).

23See http://rb.com.ua/eng/projects/omnibus/8840/

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6 What came out of Euromaidan

6.1 The post Yanukovich government

Lets move on to the coalition government, after Yanukovich fled Kiev. ThePM was Fatherlands Yatseniuk (he had done 6.96% in the 2010 presidentialelections), and the rest of the government was made of: 6 members of Fatherland. 4 members of Svaboda (Oleksandr Sych as vice PM, Ihor Tenyukh, AndreiMokhnyk, Ihor Shvaika, ). 1 (Serhiy Kvit, Minister of Education and Science) member of the far-rightUkrainian paramilitary organisation the Stepan Bandera Tryzub (this organi-sation is one of the founding organisations of Right Sector). 4 people from Lviv with unclear affiliation (the Minister of Foreign Affairs,Finance, Health, Economy). 2 Euromaiden activists (the Euromaiden podium presenter became Ministerof Culture, another one became Minister of Youth and Sports) 1 former minister under the former Timoshenko government (before 2010).

6.2 Focus on Kvit, the new Minister of Education andScience

Lets quote Amar and Rudling: What is worrying at this moment and has, unfortunately, come to be linkedto the Maidan Revolution is that several key promoters of nationalist memorypolitics have come into high office. Thus, Serhy Kvit, head of Kyiv MohylaAcademy, Ukraines most prestigious university, is now the Minister of Edu-cation. Kvit insists that the nationalists of WW2 can serve as examples fortodays Ukraine, demanding that this should be strictly separated from whathe considers Russian propaganda. He is the author of an admiring biography ofDmytro Dontsov, one of the key theoreticians of Ukrainian ethnic nationalism.It denies and rationalizes Dontsovs anti-Semitism and marginalizes his enthu-siasm for Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. It also denounces John-Paul Himkaas one of the leaders of an academic Internationale of Ukrainophobes. Suchstatements show that nationalist memory production deliberately cuts itself offfrom up-to-date international scholarship, in particular on the role of Ukrainianethnic nationalism in the Holocaust.(...)

Kvit has also participated in robustly nationalist public activism, promotingDontsovian ideology through the Dmytro Dontsov Research-Ideological Cen-

ter. In the 1990s Kvit was a member of the Presidium of the Congress ofUkrainian Nationalists and the organization Tryzub imeni Bandery, a wingof KUN which split from the party in 2000. He is open about the fact that hedoes not regard Dmytro Yarosh, leader of the Right Sector as an extremist.

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6.3 Lets have a look at other nominations that took place

Oleh Mahnitsky (Svaboda MP) was named General Prosecutor.Tetiana Chornovol (member since aged 17 of the UNA-UNS organisation, a farright organisation of which the political wing merged with Right Sector in May2014) was appointed head of Ukrainian governments National Anti-CorruptionCommittee on 5 March 2014.Andry Paruby (former member of the Social Nationalist Party and commanderof the Maiden armed protesters) became head of the National Security andDefense Council on 27 February 2014. Egor Sobolev became head of the new lustration committee. He said ininterviews that the goal of the lustration la will be to ban Yanukovich and hisclosest allies from politic for life24. The Svaboda bill mentioned in the articlethat public servants at all levels, as well as applicants for state jobs will have toundergo a screening procedure. Those who fail the screening will be dismissed

from their positions.. We dont know if the bill pas passed. On 2 March 2014, new governors were named in the following regions: in theDnieproptrovsk region the olligarch Ihor Kolomoisky (second or third richestman in Ukraine, 337th richest person in the world according to Forbes 2011),in the Donetsk region the olligarch Sergei Taruta (billionaire in dollars too).

6.4 Comments

The new government in short The new government had no representant ofthe Party of Regions, it was a coalition Fatherland+Svaboda+people from Lviv+Euromaidan activists. There was no representent from the East of Ukraine.

The first day of the new government On 23 February 2014, only theday after Yanukovich fled Kiev, with no debate, the parliament voted to removeRussian as a second official language (a week later, probably because of Westernadvice, the interim president vetoed it).We ask the reader to step back and reflect. Even if the law was later vetoed,the fact that on the very first day it is this that they wanted to do is enough tounderstand the nature of this government.

6.5 Elections

Polls at the end of January 2014 The last polls that were made withYanukovich in them were made in the period 24 January - 1 February 2014 25.He was top of the polls with 29.2%. Second was boxer turned politican Klitschko(22.8%), then Tymoshenko (19.1%) and Poroshenkos rise had already started(15

.9%).

24See http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/09/what-is-lustration-and-is-it-a-good-idea-for-ukraine-to-adopt-it/

25See wikipedia, 2014 Ukraine presidential elections.

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After Yanukovichs ousting, the Party of Regions, representing the South andthe East of Ukraine, desintegrated.

6.5.1 Election of Poroshenko

Poroshenko The olligarch Poroshenko was elected in the first round of theelections with 54.7%.

Svaboda Svaboda did a low national score, but as we saw before (low scoreat 2010 presidential elections followed by very high scores at the 2010 localelections), it seems that Svaboda sympathisers prefer to vote for the closestpopular candidate at presidential elections.It is also crucial to notice that Poroshenko has kept the same government. Allthe new jobs (in government and outside goverbment) gained by Svaboda at theend of February 2014 were kept. The presence of Svaboda in the government wasnot temporary. Its presence in the government is based on a coaltion betweenclose political parties.

Lyashko It is also worth mentioning the relatively high score (8.32%) of OlehLyashko, the candidate for the Radical Party. During the Crimea crisis he triedpass (but failed) to pass a bill in parliament that would give death penalty toseparatists. Later he took matters into his own hands. On 23 May the KievPostreported Paramilitaries from a group organized by presidential candidate OlehLyashko stormed a local government building in a sleepy eastern Ukrainianmining city and killed a pro-Russian separatist while maiming another in agangland-style shooting on May 23. One man was shot in the head and ab-domen, while a second man sustained three gunshot wounds to his neck and

abdomen and was fighting for his life in a nearby hospital after the attack.26

.

6.5.2 Ukraine still divided

Poroshenkos totall number of votes was 9,857,308. In the 2nd round of the 2010elections, Yanukovichs number of votes was 12,481,266, and Tymoshenkos was11,593,357.

Turnout The turnout was much higher in the West of Ukraine (and in theCentre), than in the South and in the East (see turnout electoral map at theend, as well as the map of turnout differences between 2014 and 2010). In theDonbass most people just couldnt vote.

Odessa 2010 and 2014 We have picked a random disctrict of Odessa (thefirst Odessa district, district 135)27. In the first round of the 2010 elections,

26http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/militia-backed-by-presidential-candidate-lyashko-takes-credit-for-murder-of-russian-backed-separatists-349093.html

27See http://electionresources.org/ua/president.php?election=2010&district=135

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there were 65.7% valid ballots. Yanukovich got 44.6% in the first round, i.e.53,978 votes. In the 2010 elections, there were only 48.9% valid ballots. The

42.

8% obtained by Poroshenko represented 36,563 votes.Now, in the 2nd round of the 2010 elections, participation was stable andYanukovich got 87,807 votes (74.4%), which is more than the total numberof people who (validly) voted in 2010! (the total number of valid votes was85,372)

Earlier referendums Here we should also mention the other referendumsthat took place after Euromaidan:- Crimeans voted for joining Russia in March 2014 . The referendum was organ-ised by Crimeans and Russians against the will of the Ukrainian government.While some contest the figures, we are not aware of anybody contesting that amajority of Crimeans wanted to be part of Russia. A Pew Research poll (April

2014) showed that 92% of Crimeans think that Russia is playing a positive rolein Crimea, and 2% think that the US are having a good influence on the waythings are going in Crimea.- People in the Donbass voted for independence in early May 2014. This referen-dum was organised by separatists. Polls organised on the day of the referendumby Western journalists, as well as the reporting of journalists on the groundtend to show that a large majority wanted separation (for completion: accord-ing to a LA Times article Opinion polls conducted in April by both foreign anddomestic agencies showed a sizable majority - at least 70% even in the easternregions - opposed to secession from Ukraine or union with Russia. But the re-cent violence has turned many against the Kiev government, Scores of deathsduring confrontations in Odessa on May 2 and in Mariupol on Friday appear tohave spurred the massive turnout Sunday, there were huge queues of people,

almost all of whom said they were voting yes to separatism. 28

, note also thatin the Donbass people are more likely to be for separation than in other partsof Eastern Ukraine, and that the Pew April poll also showed that 67% of EastUkrainians had a negative opinon of the new coalition).

Again, to those who sympathised with Ukrainians who went to the streetduring Euromaidan because they were fed up with corruption, with bad gov-ernance, or who wanted closer ties with the EU, we ask them to look at thecomposition of the government, to the first thing they tried to do as they cameinto power, and to the nominations that were made shortly after the formationof the Yatsenyuk government.

28http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-80173097/,http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/separatisten-verkuenden-grosse-mehrheit-fuer-abspaltung-von-ukraine-12934681.html, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/11/eastern-ukraine-referendum-donetsk-luhansk

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7 Conclusions

National identities We have highlighted and documented the strong correla-tion between: geographical location in Ukraine, political support, and nationalidentity. In particular we have highlighted the two poles: Western Ukraine(Ukrainian nationalism, strong popularity of Bandera, anti Soviet and anti Rus-sian feelings), and the Donbass region (Soviet identity, sympathy for Russia,Bandera seen as an ennemy). The South and the rest of the East are closer tothe Donbass, while the Centre is closer to Western Ukraine.

Polarisation As Amar and Rudling wrote, Yushchenkos legacy of state glo-rification of ethnic nationalists has left Ukraine with one more burden to carry,he helped spread a stereotype equating Ukrainians with Ukrainian national-ists, and he contributed to the polarization of Ukraine.

Euromaidan As Ostriitchouk wrote, The Maidan revolution is firstly a prod-uct of Western Ukraine, of a nationalist Ukrainianian West and of its Westernbackers, among which the Ukrainian diaspora is too important a factor to beignored..

Poroshenko election By looking in details at the 2014 election results, wehave seen that Proshenkos election in the first round was not due to him beinga unifying figure, but to the fact that many Ukrainians in the South and inthe East stayed home (the Party of Regions had desintegrated). We looked indetails at the Odessa results (district 135) and found that the total number ofpeople who went to vote in 2014 was smaller than the number of people whovoted for Yanukovich in 2010.

Ukraine We have shown that the new government represents West Ukrainenationalism, and that this nationalism is a strong divisive factor in Ukraine.Given the disintegration of the political party representing South and EastUkrainians, and the measures taken by the new government (eg the new lustra-tion committee), we are pessimistic for Ukraine, and non nationalist Ukrainians.Ostriitchouk talks of a witchhunt against those who were connected (closelyor remotely) to Yanukovich (how far would it be extended to East and SouthUkrainians?) and of a will to ban political opposition (Svaboda want to banthe Communist Party).

EU and US The reason why the EU and the US have backed this revolution

and this new government (part of it described by the EU as xenophobic in 2012)cannot be known for sure - we can only speculate. It is of course not impossiblethat the support given by the US and the EU to the new Ukrainian governmentis due to blindness.Emmanuel Todds original hypothesis is that the US have lost control of Ger-many, and that it is Germany that led the West into this (the US didnt want

22


to show public disagreements with Germany).We think it is more likely that the Wests decision to support Ukrainian nation-

alists was US led, and that it was based on what they thought was in their bestinterest, which they think has to be (because of old cold war thinking?) oppo-site to Russias interest. As Hudson wrote the aim of a Ukrainian anti-Russianturn thus is not to help Ukraine, but to use that unfortunate country as a pawnin the New Cold War.29.

Historical parallel 1 We cannot help but remember the Soviet-Afghan war,in which the US supported Mujahideens, and in the process created Al Qaeda.In the Ukrainian situation there was no war though.

Historical parallel 2 Fom the Ukrainian nationalists point of view, a parallcan be drawn with their predecessors in WW2. In WW2 they sided with Ger-

many in order to fight against the Soviets (and the Poles). Todays nationalistshave sided with the EU and the US to make sure Ukraine has no link with Rus-sia economically, to drive away East Ukrainians from power, and to put in placetheir nationalist agenda. Again, in the 2014 situation, there was no occupation,Ukraine was an independent state.

Historical parallel 3 The last parallel is simply between the US and Ukrainiannationalists just after WW2, as mentioned earlier in our essay. The CIA de-scribed then Banderas organisation as terrorist. Less than seventy yearslater, the US (and the EU) had no moral issue backing their heirs . And had nomoral issue eithers when these heirs called terrorists30 East Ukrainians whorefused to be part of the new nationalist Ukraine, or when the Ukrainian PMcalled people supporting the separatists subhumans31.

29See Michael Hudson, The New Cold Wars Ukraine Gambit.30The Ukrainian government call ATO (anti terrorist operation) the civil war in the Donbass.31See http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/?hpt=hp t1

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Figure 1: 1994 presidential elections.

Figure 2: 2004 (2005?) presidential elections.

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Figure 3: 2010 presidential elections (Yanukovichs score).

Figure 4: 7 February 2010 presidential elections. Yanukovich (Party of Regions)won in the 2nd round with 51.84%.

25


Figure 5: 2012 parliamentary elections (Svaboda).

Figure 6: 2012 parliamentary elections (Communist Party).

Figure 7: TurnOut in the 2014 presidential elections.

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Figure 8: TurnOut difference between the 2014 and 2010 presidential elections.

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national identities in ukraine and in euromaidan

Documents

ukraine party

western ukraine region

nationalist party

eastern ukraine

president of ukraine

party of regions

party ofregions

western ukraine wehave