national reconnaissance office: a history of satellite
TRANSCRIPT
Description of document: National Reconnaissance Office: A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Vol. IIIA, Robert Perry, January 1974
Released date: 11-January-2008 Posted date: 06-February-2008 Source of document: National Reconnaissance Office
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G NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE14675 Lee Road
Chantilly, VA 20151-1715
11 January 2008
Case Number E01-0001
Per your of 1 January 2008, you have withdrawn your appealto the ISCAP for the Perry History Volumes III a and b. TheNational Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has reviewed the encloseddocument under the provisions of Executive Order 12958. Thedeleted portions of the text remain classified per ExecutiveOrder 12958, section 1.5 (c).
If you have any questions, please call me at(703) 227-9128 and reference NRO case number E01-0001.
Linda S. HathawayChief, Information Access and
Release Team
Enclosure:Perry History Volumes III 3 A&B
."
"t"!
-..---
.......i'
A HJSTOltY OF SATELLlTEB.J:CONNAISSANCE
VOL~JIIA__
by
.Robel't PeI'l'y
Jaauary 1974
s
o-t.slll'll'fEMMo 1£ -.,.....~" £ o.r11182£-.-c.It9D'," 111(2)1
~""f"'"..."" f TO DE1C!!M
eow¥-of 5 cople!
ADDSY PROCES8ED
Date •••••••• Initials •••• _•••
m 11011.'4 .
PJlEFACE TO VOLUME IlIA
.-... cODeei.e. while Dw1&ht David .a.eiahoWer ....
Pre.idellt of the UDlted State•• Thi.rte_ year•.later, __ thi.
preface .... writte.,
.~ fl'OlD tbatfiritt propo.ecl.bortly .fter Gary Power.' U-~ rill
afoul of a Soviet UItlaircraft mlI'ue Ua May 1960. At the time of
that iDci.deat, the Ual~State. bacl DO operati.OD&lrecoDDaial&Dce
••teUite. aDd of th.two deYelopmeatal .yatema with appal'e. DeC-
time poteDtial, Suno. £-1 we. coaceptu.a11y flawed a.acl tbe other,
CoroD&, had expel'ieaced a fruauatm. IUCC•• lion of oper~t1OD&1
.failur... 1'0111'. adcUtloD&lpboto-.ate1lite•.(Samol E-l,E-3, E-".
and E-5) were at .ome 8t..e betweeJl Uw.z.uon and firet lawach. IIOIIe
wa. ever to return a 'iDlle photolrapa of Soviet territory to .AftaeriC&ll
photo iAterpreterl. altboqh that prepoeteroue outcome could DOt
then have been 10re••el1 by.aDy ratlOJl&1. participam.
u-z pelleuadollS had provided 80me uee.ful iuilht. bao the.
re••arch aDddeve10pmeJlt .tatue of Soriet mi••Ue and aircraft
prolraml by 19bO. but the Ullited Statel delperately needed iDformation
about the character-illicl, numbere. aDd placemeilt of operatioD&l
8D ttot,-,.Handle~ Byemanl Talent . Key".C~nrrDII Only
IIIII·IIIIII~
u ....se·
of that ...&I, Preaideat E18eDbolNlr cuae to diaappron p1aD8 for
further U-2 GperadOll8 over "uaata ratherthaa chaDce a Duc1ear. .
aU too aPJt&rUlt. LacJrq crediWe bIformatioa about Soviet capabili
tie., the Uldted Statea Jaad la. 1958 ....I"tak.. all UlOI'DlOU expauiOD
be a aublt:aDtial Bonet uYaIltale la. Duclear weapou delivery capa.bllity.
No Corolla ••tel1lte bad. yet fwlctiODed correctly; in ml4-1960 that
pay10acll to a relamptioD of-..erlaa telt fllahu, ...... cameru.
1D the Dear paDic that followed tlse 4iacowry that U-2 aircraft
could DO 10D1er lafely over4y the SoYiet UalOIa, ime1li.eace apecial-
iata cleviaed three major DeW pboto-recozmaiu&Ace pl'0Faml: Oxcart
aircraft that became better kDOWD
al the A-ll "Blackbird" &lUi later fathered the SR-71 and F-ll prolraml).
Samoa E-6 (de.iallecl oripDal1y to replace the laDpiahiDI CorODa
.atellite). Political CODlUaiDU fiDally kept Oxcart from
{nIOIBDI its co~iderablepromile &Ad Samol E-6 .... technically
iii BU 17011-'4
Handle ~ B"err.an!Talent· Ke~"cle':;r'lrc'~ Oniy
Dotwith.taD,u"l the p8rioclic appearaDCe of prolrama IUUI propoaal.
other volume. in t1lia .erie., 1t La de.i,ned to .taDd &loDe iD beiDa.'I1
II'IIII,I
III
l..lke
'~
Thia'volume .cODtaiu tbehietOry of tile
for prolr&1D8 to eupplemeDt 01' .upplaDt
mo.dy laollow blu.ter.
cleficiQt. like ita 8... $&l1li0' preclece..or.. Stu,bbom CIA ... Ail'
Force, prOlraJD maD&aer. workUla with IWk, Lockheed, aDd Oe_ral
Electric ealiDeera re.cud CorODa aDd 'by late 1960 had collected
the evidence Deeded to demoutrate that Sone' mlaene rattliDl ..., , '
fully comprehe.ible without refereDce to other .0urCe., but becauae
the .everal eli.crete elemeDtI of the NatioDalRecODD&1a'&Dce Prolram'
are inextricably interre1ated., the reader may find it un.able to
CORliult ODe or another of tlao.e vo111Dl•• for detailed iDformatioD
about evelltl that impacted o~withoutbeiDa iDte.ral. of the
pro.ram.
BD 1m,·,.HIndle '111 Byeman!Telenl o Ke~hoIe
Con:rois Only
iv
Thi. hb~wu prepareel UDder tenD8 of • contract between
the Director, Special Projecta, Natlollllllecomaai••UU:. Office
(Director, Propam A), uad
emplo,.eel fU.t by the UD1teel State. Ail' Force I.Dcllater by The RUId
Corporation. Se 1IIlCIertocak reriaioD ad expansion of thoae aectiou
At varloua time., part. of the manU8cript have been
re"jeweel by member. of the .tall of 'the Natiow llecoDDaiaauac:e '
Office aDd of PrOiram A. The revie.er. aacl .uppUer. of both data
aDd clocumenta are.o namerou that ~t ta DOt practical to llat them
here. Moet are mentioneelin .ource Dote. foUowiDl the bu:lividual
chapter•• To ac:bo.ledaetbe~rlDvaluable .aeietaDce in thi....y ia
. plaiDl"I aD inadequate reepoue, ~ there ie no fe••ible alternative.
In any c.ee, for .a.ch errore I.Dcl over.ilhta a. may have .urviveel
the ecrudAy of cQlltributore and. reviewere, the author ia eDth-e1y
r eepon.ible.
'V 8ft 1'011-14
Handi& ~8 B'fItrUln/Ta'~",:·. ~y-~.;C:-!r:;s C- .
lllu.traticma ha.... beell .eparate1y bouacl ill an AppeDdix volume.
II·III·1IIII
li
320 .
97
106
188
183
• •
. . . .
• • •
. . . . .
• • • • • •
• •
• •
. . . .
• • • • •
• • • •
. . . . . . . . . . .... .
. •. . . . . .. . . . .•• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
. CONTENTS, VOLUME nIA
OPERATIOMi
Note. Oil Source. • • •.•
Note. Oil Source.
No•• On SOurce••••••
XIV TIlE DEVELOPMENT AND "OPERATION"
XU_ ORIOINS AND DEVELOPMENT. • • • •• 1
Prefa.c. . • • • • • • • . . • •
xm
•J
BD 1701'.'4
Hanclle 'Ill Byeman/ra.."t· Key"oIeCor.!roIS Only
vi
Ott
Like much of the NatioD-.l ~ec:oDDaia"nce proaram._
wa. the procluct of tecbDlcalaDdpolitlcal ferm8llt aacI iaterDatioD&1. . . . .
teuiou tbat peaked claariIta the SPriDI aad Slimmer of 1960. The
. had become cridc:al in the aftel'lDlltla of the U-1 affair' aDd with the
elllorced .uapeuloD 01 U-2 operatloD. 0".1' the Soriet UIIioD. Geaer
ally, polley-maId". official. ill the Departme.·ofthe Air Force aDd
what they bad· .eell of the u1etlDa Samo. prOiram. CODtlDuecl
emphael. on "coDCurreDeY" .. a pro,ram mode aDd a etubborn Air
prejUdiced the Air Force ca••, .lDce both approache. w.reUDaccept-
able to mo.t official. abo"e the level of the Air Staff. The pre..urel
of iAterutlooaJ politic. had made it qalte difficult for the £i.enhower
adminiltration to openly ',o..or a DeW or .ccel~rated late11ite
recoDD&ie.&Dce deve1opmeDt. FbuIlly, attractive ·pro,oI. for new
orbital recmmab.aDCe .ystema had appeared duriD& the eummer of
•Tbe relUDie that follo.. ia lar,elyaD eDCapilulatioll of Cbapter VI
of Volume UA. For that realOIl, lource citation1 have been .edonly when new material ..1 employed.
1 8ft 1'01'-7.
t1IfICIIe VII~n/T_r:t . tWyhQc,.
Cc":~o·s 0rI..
1960. Addiaa body to tbe m1xcve ...~e 1M facta. tbat 1IIdU mld-Auauat
-tlaeCoroaa bad DOt retunae4 _, phololraplla what....~. while the
oaly oth.r cap.a1e~recoverya,.t'.em then ....r d..ft1opmeDt. Samoa
£-5. wu relucled. With .ouietJUaa le.. thaD UIldi1uted ellt1luawm 'by
much of th. tec:hJd,cal commUDlty.
the ~y iDGuab"y autborid.e. ill the recoDDai.auce prOirUDe. penoDally
'brouPt~opo.alto the atteatiOll of Ail' Force UII4er-
.ecr.tary J. V. Charyk. who was rapidlybecomiD& the elaminant
fiaure in the P.Dtalon strualle for CODtrol of the Ail' Force .atellite
recoDDai"&IlCe effort. Charyk opezaecl mect contact
BYE 1101'·'4
HIndle Via Bftmen/.ler.t. KeyhcleCcr.~rQ:S Oniy
I·IIIIIIIIII
,.
I,
IJ'OP '.Cllft
_Ihortly thereafter. He wal ~rticulU'lyiDteresteel in the
Eastman approach because it emboclied two major elemeutl towarel
In the meantime. reconnaiu&nce specialist. of The Rand
Corporation had renewed their effortl to ineluce the Balllatic MislUe
Division (BMD). immediate IpoMor of the Samol program. to
elevelop a lpin-ltabilized reconnaillance Iyltem along the linel of
a 1957 Rand. proposal. In relponee to a reque.t from B1I4O. Rand in
June 1960 belan workina with Space Technology Laboratorie. (STL)
on a plan to develop a system which by taking maximum advantale
of available technology could be made operational in the near term.
BMD interelt .temmed largely from Charykl.earlier ,poMor.hip
of such an approach.
On 7 July 1960, a group of Rand and STL specialists quietly
assembleel at the invitation of Colonel Paul Worthman of BMD, the
sub-ro.a Air Force manager of the Corona activity. to elisCUIs
detail. of a newly conceived variant of the original spin-stabUized
.satellite. Rand had concluded that it would be perfectly fealible to
orbit a reconnaU.ance .ateWte
3
TU.I.CIIT
BYE li017-14
Handlt v:. Byemar:/ T'.I''!'" ....e·I.. ~;o!
::~··:;s O"if
-
covered a lSOO-poaaclaate1lite c&l'rybaa a'36-iDch (focalleqth)
..-
II,I
IIIIIIIIJ
1l&Dd'. recommeJuladoD to STL
the .premi.e of operatioaa
bIt:o a aemi-formal pl'opoaal. It differed fl'OID the earlier acheme
in beina baaed on a camera with a 24-iDch 10callelJlth aDd ill certaia
other -miDor detalla.Apart fr'om' re~iat:r04lQCtloD of the apia atabW
..doD mode after a'lapae of two "&I'a, lb chief attraction lay 1D
cover..e at a Ir01md reaolutioa of &boat 17 feet. If the .atel,Ute
were OI'leated ao ".a to haft ita leu poIndal d1I'ectly clOWDWard
whUe onl'1a~ 55 North it: woulcl ~ovide uaeful cover..e of
aU of the aortMrD bemlapbel'e lylDl between 40 uul 70 _Ireea. 1
By early Aupat 1960, STL badahaped the earUel' achem.'
. . .':1, • , • I • •• ;.. •
e
BYE 1'1OJ'.14
He,. llI~man/Talent·KeyheleCtflt'olsOftly
4
'I'D' •••...--By as Aqut 1960. wIl.. tile Pre.Wat approvecl tIM ••tabll.ll-
meAt of a tilhtly coDtroll.cl ••cretarlat-leye1 aateUite recoDDala.ance
5 BYE 1101'.'"
111_ VII Byeman/T"llt· t\eyhOltc",·" \1 1/1, Qroty
• On 10 September 1960, vea-y.hol"tly after the Seca-etary of
the Au Foa-ce Samoa Project Office (SAI'SP) .haclle.a1ly come into
beiDa at BMD, Charyk met 1IIrith Bri.adier General R.obert E. Greer
(the proaram'. new mlllta;ry director), Colonel Paul E. Beran
(cha.irmaD of the £-6 .ource .election board), and LieuteDADt
Colaw Jame. Sea, (Greer'a procurement aaviaor). After coulderq
"'of'.. --.Ii.
II'IIIIIIIIII1
••
BU t'fOt'J.,.
....... ...a BlI8men/ TMnI· KeyNlleCcr:r......s Only
all the optto..... tbey ..reed tbat thebe.tcour.e wa
•
-----
BYE 1'1Ol'·'4I'1aIldl! VIa ~fNU\/ TaIe"t· l'l;tyl'Ole
C:":ro.s ONy .
..so••aeIii
Iulde Ge-Jru Gr••r'. or.__tIo.......1'.
r.tlftly few people iDlt'al1y kaew~ DOrmAllwm .. pr...
occapatloD with the tub of the mOmellt pro..d.. hi""" .ucc••dul
lDaulator ••aWl r.ndom curio.itj. Mon of the Air Force ebu.d
mod.ate effective laterw .ecrecy" that becauaeFocuremuat aDd
.ort of club to wJlic:h mo.t cl.areel All' Forc. pez:.0111181 were admi.tt..cl
without qvauflcatioa--DO lar••••cal. developm.at .ffort coalcl
po••1bl,. be cont°ea1ed.
III~
·1I·IIIIIIJ
BYE 1'01'.'"
HaNle 'J118yeman/Talent· Keyl\OleCr,r.:r~IS Onl1
10
~'I
him for .e..r&1 mo... Amoq a1l1he .pace Fop-una be1ll&
coaclucted by NASA UMl tIM All' "oree. cmly tboae coat,I_d. wlthiD
the recomaai••aDCe effort were .ilJdficutly cOIICealecL lloutiDe
.ecudty ,cre..d ••vera! of the ......ll.tary .ateUite•• " but aped.DCe
had demcmatl'ated that fora recOllDaiaA.DCe ·prOlram· "l'oudDe .ecurlty"
WU DOt eeouaJa. The apparent luceptlbUity of aa.y acJmowle.ed.
••telllte recoDDai.luac. pr0p'am to cuceUatiOD Oil paliticallroUll"
wu particularly acute bll960-l961
.... - .... ell.. ..
•It may be araued. that the CIA bad. done all thol. thiDI. in CoroDa
without arouq luapicioltt· but in fact Corou ...1 Ulhtly cOIICealeclwader "Di.coverer" for itl flrlt four yearl, aDd ill aDy ca.e CIAexpelldi record. ..... the ca.efor
11
..w•••tift
8D I'1D17-'I4
Hencr.e till B,lemen/Ta.nt· "'''Yl'1Clle:~~!I'(I': Oniy
........,••r
Ia ew:h cucametaac•• th. academic CODeerD C••ral Cr.er had.
YOlced. .iz mcmtbe e&l'ller became. a real problem. Not 0111' .... &bere
IIIIIIII'.J
JI,J
,-
BU 1101'·1.4
He,. VII B,eman/Talt"t· Key<loleCcr.trQIS ()Ily .
12
MP ••••"-
to uayddDa thataillt iIlYitAi doe. ecntiny of Dlacoyerer uui tlau
.threatea compromiae of CorODa)
pQadbilltiee, Gellerd Greer coaceived All approach baaed in part
oa hia earller ual.,.1e 01 the problem of covert procuremeat. In
November 1960 he bad be.Un ''black'' cODtl'actiDa wuler the pbiloaopDy
that aiDce uev.r~dy" kDew it ... impoaalble for the Air Force to
approval cbazmeb, one mipt do qUite a lot of uuupectecl buyiDg
aAd cOlltractiDa by merely obtaintn•• direct authorisation. It
occurred to him that the ao1moll t
fomul in the aame theaia. Se thereby ilweDted the concept of the
"null pro,ram, " a deve10pmeat with DO kDoWll oriain aDd 110 apecifiecl
,oal. U auch a pro.ram were collCiucted UDder the ae.ia of a bi.hly
ciaaamed payload. it ahould be elltirely pouible to purcha.e boCMtera,
"everybody" blew that the entire reconnabaance aatallite proaram
13
.lOP IICift
811: 1'01'.'4
Handle '''I B".me"/Tele"~· Kt,-: ..CCr",rois C-,
woald
a.l'V. toc~.moat oba.rvera tbat it bad to haft aome obJectlve'
PatdDa .acb a coy.r iDto .s.ct r d deYiou ac:bembaa
aDd a IUp '.11'•• of iA.eDUity. b.at br 1 1961 the plaa Iwl been
redUCM toa,.d&.ca~ 1~..ra11y approved by UDUraecretary Charyk. 3
au I'll'."t1efldIe ".~n/Taient· Ke.,hdeCCl'ltrots Only
IIIIIIIIIIIIJJi
o . ' • ~
occurred th. phI'... a~t '!DOt ....aecl to a particul~ .pace project. "
Ap.-reatl.y the mattar •••m.d .0 mqpdane to the Air Staff that
the autborbbla teletype maD&led to let lo.t .omewhere in the Peiltalon-
AI'SC headqu.rten ma... Nearl., two we.b -'1'•. Deeded to atzoailhtell
out the l'e.a1tb1a co••loll. &JIll ne. tbaD. it pl'oyed Mca••U'y to applyo 5
cODaiderable pre"1Il'e be1ol'e ol'.am..Uoaal iD.ertia coa1el be overcome.
Ina further uehara,. of teletype., all written ..u ill aclvallce
in General Greer'. eomplellt t the .pecial project. office ••taWbhed
15 8D: 17017.'4
Handle M 8yemanl TelBnlo Keyner':
CorlHOIS QrI. 0'
•• • •A Corona capaulf! dieS aurvive an UDPlarmed reentry. in Venezuela.aever&! yeara later--and nobody noticecl.
BYE 1'01'·'4 Z6He,. VII B.,.man/lallnt· Kayrlllll
C~trOl$ Only .JOllieR.!
IIIIIIIIIII]
A aet of four rocket .Dp., each capable of procluciDl SO
pOUDds of thruat, would provicle lor orbit maiDteDPce. Six more
such rockets were located in the aft aection of the reeDtry vehicle.
After reorieDtation of the a.teWte by 180 delrees ud a 60-delree
pitchdown had been completed. the reeDtry vehicle would be separated
from the vehicle miclsectiOll aDd the eDliDe. fired. A velocity meter
sipaled,shutdOWD. 14
27
~t'1andkr VII B'I'8rr.n/Ta~p·· Ke~"o~
':,' :'(11$ :On.!
....it...r
CorGaa wa. ill ODe 01 it. periodic apaama of operatioaal difficulty.
and the propo.alfor a Lanyard development waa receivilla .enerally
friendly attention. (Lanyard wu a re-e.ilUterec!. einlle-camera
E-S .y.tem ill Corona vehicle•• )
Z9 au 11011-14l"'t.~ 'I-e Byemln/Taie-t . K.l'"o; ..
C:~:'Q'S C.. !
rneeliDa acheelule. aDd periOI'lDUlC. l'8quizoernellt••bowel the pl'imary
d.v.1QpmeDt aY8tem. eDcOUDter ful'tber difficulty. There waa leDera!
He DOted that the performaDCe requa-emeDu of the a ,.tem
pubecl the .tate of the .atellite art. in three I pacific area.:
13 aD 1101'.'4
Handle '1:1 Byernan/ T8I!'" . ~ey"'~::~:.~ : Or:i i"
.•.__..-.....i.
Charykl. I'epoz't wa. relatl.el., optimiatic. altho." he refrained.
trOlD uy predlcUQU of complete auec"a la meetiDI either echeGule.
01' l'e.o1atioD re,uh-eme.ta. Helol'eeaat a az.at m.htda~
35
~
BYE 1'1017-'4Handle VI! 6~men/T!""~, Key"Ole
l:e~~·')IS Only
MOTU ON .one.
1. Notea br A.H. Kata, .ud.Cozp. 7.Tal 60.· OIl •••dq withsT~ r.p•••••ti.... Ja .... (Sam) m.a •.
2.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
97
-.... lit.IEY
an lT01'.'4Halldle "IA B,eman/ TeIent •KeyIlOle
CO,"roas QrlI,
IIIIIIIIIIIIII
OPERATIOlGxU!
ered intere.tiDa
d.epartur~. from the ttaormal" cycle of r ••••rch. cl.velopa. ntud
oper.tioll. ob••rved by moat DoD developnll Ilt ....de.. It owed
much in th.t re.ped to the preced•• of the Corcmaprolr.m. the
oDJ.y e.rlier ••temte nco.ab.ece .ctivity that could ."ea ca8UaUy
BU lT01'r·Tt
HI,. vt& 8yeman/ relent· KeyhQle
COf'Itr'Dil ONy
WkUe tecbDical developmeatl iJlc:ludiDa the refblemeat of
bardware aDd the iIltroductloa 01 ilew IllAlNfactvml tecbDlqu•• were
~roj.c:tbad ,reater poteatialloaa-term val~. They
were monly 01 a pro,ram maaa,emeat eort.
apace ucoaaaieeuce pro,ram hacl faUn almoat eatlrely from the
wei.ht of overly ambitious early fli,ht objectivea. The result. with
uncommon re,warity, bad beea cataatrophic fallure anel cOllaequent
107
~
au 1'101'1-'14
Hanelle VIa B,emllr.! T...~:. Ko!""~1Ij
.: :-: ..:', C;~ !
abaaclcmmeDt of the pro,ram. Wlaatever b-.! beeDlDv..ted ... loat.
(ireer l • forte bael be. that of a mlclwifeto the De. project--cweneeiDl
and. IU&ruteeq a .uce...ful birth a1ld infancy. Hi••uce•••or.
Bri.acti.er CieDeral Joim L. Wartia.. Jr~•• proved to be particularly
adept at rahbal Ibe chileS to maturity. MartlD l • budliD. of a mid-
re-or1ea=1 contractual iDeezadv•••erftd a.
a model for fatuI'. cODuacUq practlc.. a. wall a••olvin, the problem
of the momeDto The elemeDu of the iDcentive pr08ram .ere probably
of le.. iiDportaDce tbaniu conceptual ba.i.. It repre.eDted aD
acknowleci,.meDt tbat the ,oall of a project cbaftled a. it out,rew
iu developmental cGD.traUlt•• uad that inceDtive••ultable for one
I
IIIIIIIIIII1
.,
an 1'01.,-,.Handle VII e..m.n/'WInt· Keptde
ConuOla OnIt
108
..... IAlfi-
·.....a'dama•••• pro,r.ea:- jut.1 lIIucb .... QIlftCe.e.t.l fll'at flipt.
PUadoxleall,•.'the ~.r, e~c... of tile fll'lt IUaht rai.ed apeetatlODI
for eubeequeat mpte &ad could be _peeted to malt. later fall.,.••
•~_ mora aa••tt1lD. to tIao•• who altimatal, CCllltI'oUad pl'oJect
fuadlq. If aDOQlh .uce••e cowd b. tucked .wa, 1D .a1l1,lat ldetory
of the ba.le bar....n •. tJa_ ~tI'.amfaUar.. coalcl be treated .e
local proW... ralll.1' t:hu iDdieatlou 01. flawed emsc:eptlOll. WIdle
no ona bew laow man, eucc...fu1 m.~tI or laow IDIIQ ,ood output
w.e 1'..... to eraate tlall aurae_craar ..~a bolla quite
po.Uba 1Iaat at l.et til•••cOlMl 8ipt would Uft to 'be • prollcnmceable
nee••••
109
..%0' ••C.i~He,... vIa Bwem.n/~~-~. K."I";"t
c:!'" ~ ·ois Cr.:.'
IIIIIIIIII"JJ1
IIYK 1'01'.'.Hindle VII ~n/Taaent· Keytlclle
Cantrols Only
110
..JM saciii"'"
_....~tJDd.re.tlmatlq may han .eD th. lH.t bDportaDt of ••Yer&1
1Dl1u.8DC~ •• Ia dae .uly .ta••• of tile propalll. It. maDa.ere were
j ...t1Aably worried tbat it mlPt be caDCellecl.· The r.cord of earUezo
ten. to abaac. lb. probablll&J of pr~amnee••• eYeA at 6. co.t
of.cudal••Uppa•••• S. hY ..... & 1.. way toward hedalDl hi. bet
_ WIt.lle lack of adequate teat data contillued to trOllble the pro.ram
for .GIIl. 1Il0lldL8. it wa. clear lD retro.ped that Creer made the
rlpt tradeoff.. 'they were clearly zoe.paD.lble for the r.par .uee...
aDd .1I100tb pro,re.. wblc:la aaark.d the pro,ram for aU but the micld1e
portion of Ita lU.~
111 BYE 1'017-14
I-!,!"~.IO6,emol'l/ Taltr.t· Key-: ~Ce"~~:Iis C' .
_ ....r-
Aaother c1a•• 01. problem.
iDc1uded oDe-time faUue., -tllch ODe. corrected c1id DOt reappear.
The tbircl ct... or problem wU lDteUectually lIle mo.t blten.tiD..
.Dd operuioDally the Dl08t frutr.dD..Throuahout the prOp.1Il iD.t.ance.
of .e..inaly rUidom failure occurrecl ia compoaeDta ftich had faDe.
tioDed correctly for m.&Dy 4ipu. n.e proWe......eI ptll'8i.t throuP
three 01' four Ai.hu. DotwithituldlD, .&r_aou. correctioD effort.,
before .1ICc:umbiDa. While ~.r..... DOtI:Ii"Ilfty8teriO... about the
recurrence of • pven f.Uure. the 8WIcleD .ppe.raDce of ODe _ere
DOlle bad exbtecl.earUel'''. waueuallor .pace vehicle., ueel only
once &Del Dormally immune to ""1'0111 •••ch. No Wly N&hfactory
explaDatlon of the phenomeDOD ever .ppe.red., altho. uuaeieDt
quality control and t..t pro,ram I.ulu ••re .uually blamed.
III·I'1IIIII·1II..
BYE 1'01'·'4
Handle VII B,.rnan/Tallnt· KeyhOle
ecfttrols 0nI,
114
.JD."-
........r
_ Firat. COI'OD& had I'.tuna_ coyera.e of ar.a moat U-2'a
CoWd Dot reach 01' could !lot aafely cwedly,
11.5
.%np'E~Ht"llle VIII 6"",,1"I Te-t- ~. Ke I"':"
::- ~":'I$ Vr'o,
..JIOP.I=.a:r
Neuly two moDth. earlier,prolram officers bad. advi8ed
Lockheed W ..U•• 8d Space Company of their iIlcreuiD, dbtute
for the hiah pric... "reflected in Lockheed bid. OIl new AleDa vehicles.
IIIIIIIIIII)
1M
au1'o1'-UHendIe VIa &renn/ Telent· KeyhOleCOl'Itrots Only
160
JD•••r.:..r
·.-%D'I=.'"
C~ta ..~••ada JdI1a.~ thaa fo~ .U"11e~ uu..rl.a of appraDmately
the .... equlpmal. ProcUl'..~t ome.ra coDClwleclthat Lockheed
waa "'lotlat:lDi to p1'Oteet a poaltlcm ~athe1' tIaaD ilia 1004 faith. II
-£"'.lDO%e·tbu waa ueaally til. eaa.
for a aol.-aoarce aapplier to tile I-.nament. Lockh••d ..a - a .
".~ fa'\'OraW. altuatlon for ulo1tatiDa follow-on pl'OCUeIIl.t.
'Alema production had eaatiDued at a I'eplar rate for yeara Uul bid
fall' to ecmdDue lor aev.~almore. DQ people had loal aiDe. ezplored
aDd diaearded u w-a.ible t:be po••lb1llty of ••tabUa~ aD a1ta"uti",.
p~oductkm aourc:e. Il promia.d to be u estremely eo.tlyeo.ae, alld
. ODe mvolviD& couiderable teellllieal rialt. Nor, in I ..eral, caald
'luaUty ccmtrol problem. had ocea.icmally appeared, the AleDa ...
~ly reaarded, at the time. aa a reliable vebide-
161 BYE 1101'1·'4
HatlC~ l1116yeman!1IJer.l· K.y"";':
.taff bad b.elllDvolved ill ba.tlmdOlial bickerlD. betw,eD the PeDtaIOD
&lid. the CIA wIalch ill September ·1'65 lecl· to the departure of Brockway
WcMWua. for more thaD two ,.au the.Dil'ect9r of the DO. Although
tile po..lbl1ity that the NRc) IIlilht be eDtirely abaDdoDed a. Ul baatru
meat of utloaal 1'ecoDDai••ue:e poUcy WU eIi.peUed by tile appolDtD1ent
of a .uce...o1' to MeMUlaD (Dr • .AlexaDde1' nul and by tile i ..uance
of a DeW no chaner, the whole of the r.cODDai••aDCe pr~am wa.
ia .DIIle eIi.order. CorODa operatlCllDa bad beell rea.oaably aacce.aM
during that .ummer, OIl1y ODe major miaaion failure baYiDg occurred
ill three fliPta, but CoroDa did DOt retu1'll the detaU that iIlte111le1lce
16) BYll'OlT.'"Haroc$. 1'8 B.lemar/';'-'~'l!' t':1!"-: '=
.: :": ...: : ~ ...
.peet t1aM appeared to be no more tbaJl a IIUDoI' p0l8ibUity. it cODtri-
GeeaaloAM,by dbaareemeDt over tbe maD&.em_t of the Corou
' .
..
III'IIIIIIIII1-
prOiram aDd. aame of the Cor.. project people Oil the We.t Co_t
were eOllviDcecl tbat a ..rio..- {allure 01. Cor.. operatiOol coUld
butecl to .....iIae•• OD both eoa.a. ADd filially, all extaeleel colltrover.y
about die Dature alUi timiDa of a replacement, ',Item IDI' CorOMI
al compUcaWlI plana for dae COl1
tiauadoll AIld Jmproveaumt of both .,.~m..
I'lu had to turD. hiS attention to .evera! of the.e i'.uI alm~lt
limultaMou.ly;
re.lIlt if tile uat1aority for teduw:al uul operatloaal cODtzool of that
bUurcatecl.actiYity Wu DOt promptly .orteel out. Altlaouab ill retro-
hacl became heavily dapeNleDt OIl u=rmatio
pbotoarap1l,. ,Some part of the lutltutlOD&l iDGIbtlDl of 1965 wa.
analyat. Iaa.cl "Iuato expect .. laterpreta tUm,of Soviet force .tatu
8ft 1711'-'4
t1INlII ¥II e,.manlTalent ' tc.ayl'lOleContrOl$ Only
164
-
165
!JIII-HCiftBY! 17017·7.
I'1ancfIe lIlI8¥eman/ Ta"r.~!":ey"!tu:::r": ~ Vn"
eDoulh to be contiAueci thereUter. other. were exuaordinary mea.ure.
adopted temporarUy iD re.poD8e to what ... widely relarded u a
tran.ltory crlele. The Air Force lacked the re.ource. toalppon
.uch a complex prOc." of te.t ad checkout throUlh the life of an
operatioD&l prolr&Jn. aecolwiDl that circ.-U!D.tance. General Martin
bel.U to plan for the adoption of a novel contract inc::entive .cheme he
bad oZ'iIUlated earlier••hUe .ervma .. Cireer'. deputy. It ...
~~~ ~fu~
IIIIIIIIIIIII~
au 1""-It
...,.VII ~n/"nt·Keyhole
CentralS Only
166
~
Nuda-. pow.of attaok .... the iDe_dve f.e cOIltract. . . .
_ Hl••tady of the eziltat cOIltI'act mC8lld.e provl8lou led
him tID caec1ude tbat th.,. wen mo8t appropriate for the de.elopmellt .. . .
• tale. of eM pr0Il'&IIl uu1decUled1,. ~equate for the operatloaal
pba.
TIl. lac:eIltl•••tructure .ai-lier iD8tal1ed empha.bed. th.
1...t m part. pl'OIIlpted b,.lo8t cOIIb'ol problem. characterutic of
167
~••T
BYE 11011-14
II.1'1IIIIIIIII
th. coatractor., aa a matt.r of cour•••.
The p.erioftDuace lDcenti.ve. unlike the co.t iDcealive. ....
r.tu.n to capital i. computed by clivl.d.1Da lee by ,ro.. coat. that .
arranaement m8&1lt that the rate of retarD on ,roil coata ... a variable
aharply for. unclernui••
pletely, aDd would proAt at a ZO-perc_t rate for UDcler1'Wl.. SiDce tile
A. ••ecmd Point ••ems to have beeD the apectatioJl that al the
COD.Werad_ .... iD fact a cli.iac8Dti.. for late cleli..ryaf th. vehicle.
The maximum peualty for late cleli"r~wi.tIla ceUiDl
OIl the other haM. a co.t overrun of ~3 percent carried
fee paaltlea of more~_bepeaalbedat a
ZO-percent-of-fee rate for overrau ..til the fee wa. wiped out com-
d •••• coat mcatl... aDd pedormuu:e lDceatl.... ne .che4ule
woalcl .bin to ••1'Il th. bulk of the perioftllADce iDcuti".' fee. The
oriaiBal coDtract mc_tt•• pro.ram pufectly reflected .'lcA caa.icler-
linear. beilla UD.I'elated to the lroa. outlay for _ livea vehicle. A ,I-.coriA& ay.tem ... cleviaed Oil a .cale from aero to 100. The critical
relion iDitia1ly fen betweliD 65 aDd 95. but the.e numbera iIlcreaaed ..
8U I'Dl'·'"Handle .. e,.man/Talent· KeyhOleControls Only
168
til. a~t.m beCUD8 11I01'. fWly operatioDal. A acoreof 80 waa til.
brealur9.. polat 1'. DO bu:eatlft f••• "'1'••ith.r p.lDed 01' 10at.
Fol' acon or belD. 80, tU fee c.....d bl pl'opol'tiCID to the
daaq. ba .. KOl'e. The ...xl'D1lll1 .. 01' loa. la. fee that ....
po.dbl.....1' .ucla a .,.tem ... OD the OI'del' of U1f the amoaat that
coal. be lame. or 10.t via the coat lDcatl... To any I'atlcmal cClDtractol',
about pel'fonDUlce.
OIl. I'~ault of theblu--'. motivat.d to delete
a • .-, cODtrol aDd t ••t pl'oce4U'.... po.albie m OI'Clel' to aave
mOD.y bl th. ~oclucttCIDof the ..lel.. If, 101' lutaDc., 6. del.dOD
of a livea te.t pl'ocedu. had til..... effect OIlr.ducllll coat aa Oil
deCI'........ ·th. Pl'obabWty of a faUv., it WClIU1d I'atiemauy be del.teel.
.mce half of the aaYbaJ. would be l'etunIeCl a. aD lac_be fee Oil co.t--
OftI' and abcw. oy pellalty fol' _.riOI' pel'fol'maDCe. Becaa..e that
accommod.adoll al.o reduced &be capttal. outlay of the colltl'actor. the
l'eau1t:bl1 fee mcreeae would be Pl'opol'tloaately lal'lel' than the fee
diff.rence. ad.iDa from atpt perfcmll&llC. boIlU••• or pezaaltie••
Taka toitll 10llcal eztI'em., .. formula could nault ill the
delivery of a _"'mum-coat v.blele (23 perc.Dt le•• than Deaotiat.d
pzoice) which failed cetaatl'opbically, but 118vel"thele.a earlled a pl'ellllium
169
~Ytier-co;, II B¥eman/Ta'e'l!' t\e:J"'Ol'O
:;"1ro'~ ()ft! ~
. badlt .t dlat relatively lat••ta,e ill til. pro,ram coalcl be ••tlmated
overl'UD of mor. thaD 2S percent. perfect penonDIDCe lIle_t a fee
IIIIIIIIIIIIJ
Th. lIlajor
a much more rapt.cl rate tbaD. b.fore. FunherlDore, eyeD with aD
DO iDceDd..e tee, while ,..rfol'lllaace aortfall. would re4uce1b.e f.e at
r.ther prect.e1y. ne IIllxhllum peu1ty that cOulcl be iIlcurrecl for
COlt OYerrma. ·...iI .boat wbat It bact beeD-
CDit ad penOI'lllDCe lDc:eati.... Th. liew • .,..111 paid DO boDuI.for
chaD.. "I.m Gae puformuce iDceative. 1'I'0m a m8lm1llll. or mial
mum~lUIderthe old .,.tem. it became a mabnum or
miDi~ It.DO loa,er made IlD8e to lacrlfice pel'
form_ce for COlt laviDel bec.ale C..tl below De,odated price brouaht
• co., UIIIIlarraD. .a n!lectlcua 01 the beI1et tbat the COlt o1a vUlc1e
OIl iIl...tecl c.pI..... ill daat cu. woalct be p.ater tbaIl33 perceDt-
about ~ce the llOnDally accepta1)1e retuna GIl faaly rl.ky bare.tmata
by private AnD••
OeMral Martia'. an-,..lIlt left the ICMdale lac_tive
••••Ddally uaclaUCecl, _t radically alterect the re1atlouldp betwe_ .
beaulof dol1&l'l. MOlt m.iUta.ry procvelDeau of tile
period .er••uff_riJtI from 0¥erraD8 at l...t a. lar,_ u ZS percent,
10 DO ratloD&l contractor would quarr.l ,nth tile CODjuDCtlOD of • "
-au 1701'-'.HI,. VII ~n/1iaIInt.KeyhClle
Contrail Only
170
~I'
.·.e..~lar,. price iDcl'.... coupled wltb an .eDd•• fe••
Ia r.tI'08p8ct. aeaera! MaJ1ba'. iaceati•••y.t... r.pl'....tecI
pl'obabl,. the aaoat aipJflcaAt AOD-te.clmlcal ·accompliahm.~·-"'OFam. It recopabed tile lac' that cOAtracto~periormuace
could. ba .GIIle baa&aace.. be "fiD. maecltI to til. obJ.ctive. 01 the
.)lIt... fI'o....elOpID_t to opel'atloDihad pl'eci.aly It. lDteD!ded
effect.
- HbadalP' Waaabaa'•• wIaat OUeral "aniD .aw:the colltract
p.rformUlc'-l'6S .teadll,. det.riol'ated. whUe f.e. cUd
Bot. It ••em. cle&l'~eactlDatoaD baappl'opriate iDceDave
.tructul'e. Pel'hap. the chuae could haft been made earller. But
the upe tlaat a.emed to atallCl oa;t clearl,. after the fact.--workmaaahip
cletel'iol'ati-. faulty in.paction. lDadeqaate te.ttq. and cata.tI'ophic
faU1U'e. re.ultia,fzoOll1 .uch caue. rather t1laD frOll1 ba.lc eDaineerm,
de.lan problem••-were not readUy detectable in the DOI'IDU evente of
th_proaram•_make the ideJatlflcation of the.e problem. uay ea.ieri whenSZ
a11,08. re..oaably well, propheu of doom baft .mall voicea.
171 BYE 1'101'J.""
• Somewhat wtchy hi.torical accoama 01 the early Samo. pro,ramappeared ID. the All' Force hUtorie. prepared at Wrlaht Air DeYeJopmetC.-er (later tbe Ael'o-watical S,.tem. DiYiaiOll of the Ail' ForceS.,.t..a Commud) In the mid-19Sh 1Nt eYeD then acc..a to proaramdet&U.waa difficult to acquire. StW. "etcbier recorda appearecllD.early cbroDOlopcal .ummarle. of activity at the Balldtic MiaaileaDivbioll (later the Space aad Muane. Sratem. Or,aalaatioll of theAir Force Syatem. COauDUUI) hom about 1956 v.ndl early 1960. The
179
.~an 1.,017.'..
Ha~ VII 8yeman/ TIl..,,,, . K.Y"'='~'::"Iro:s cr·,.
"coDli_d) fk.t ••doa attempt to write a bbtory of aDJ' .w:h prolramwu .poMorecl by Major GeMr&! (dlea BrA,adler Ciueral) Robert E.Gr.er ill 1962. He al'rUllecl to ba.. Robert P.rry. at that time lb. All'Fol'c. hlatoriaa for the Air Forc. Spac. Sy.tame Diu., •••iped to
.Iai. ol',am -&don. tb. Special Projec:te 0ff1c:.. OIl aD bafcmDa1. part-time••1.8. Greer'. apr••••d p\J.l"P08. wae to ia.ur.tlaat accoUllta of th.iDcr_.ially c:ompl_ Air I'orc. rec:0smai8.aac:••&telli. prop&m wereprepared before the vi'&! recora dieappeared. Hi8 .upport wae CODtiDu.ed UMl.ular,ed by Id••uec:•••ora (0...1'&1. 1. L. ....rtUa. w. Ci.Ea.. Lew A11ea, aDd D. D. BraclbvD). The activity to be conred bytile W.tory a1a~ apandecl .ubetad.lly, !arlelyat the UI'IiDI of ColOllelPaul E. Worthman, aD early Coro_ prop... JD&D&I.r and aGbaequeDtlytil. lOllI-term c:bl., of pi... for a\ICc•••l.. 1M•. of lb. NatiOlla1RecoDD&iaa_ce 0fflC. atalf lD th. Peatal-. Perry cDJltiDued to work towardacompr....l". _teUlte ,rec:OJmabaaac:. prolram h18tory after 1.aviDlW. Air Fol'c. poe1tloD to jolla tM r ••arch .ta1f of the Rand Cot'poratiOllIII 196«, &lid became a cDDtract hbtorlaD aft.1' tl'aD.f.rrq from Randto Tecm.alOlY Seme. Corporation in 1972. He wu br1e1lya..btedby W. D. P1atDam, aotber fOrlllel" All' I'o:rc. bl.toriaa employed byIlaad, in 1969-70. Bureaucratic cCID.ideratioa.(the "blue .u1t" AirForce wcu1d _t "1''' to the apeD4ltare of Proj.ct RUId contract funclaOJ! .uc:h work) latarraptecl the prepuatioD of the hi.tory betw.eD 1'69and 1973. ad re1aUnly littl.... doN.la the year. 1967-69 bec.u.e ofPerry'. primary commltmeDt to the Rand Corporation ".ipmell.t.. Thework ... takeD up ..ala. lat. la 197Z aDder CD Dtrac:t HtweeD the SpedalProjee:u Office aDd T.cbDol0lyS.mc. Corporatioa., at whic:h tim.Robert A. Butl.r. a COD.altant with that fil'lD, became a collaborator.Tbe procbactof that .pa.modlc work ov.r a period of ten year. '(to thedme of till. DOce) i. thb maaucript--_ic:h iDc:1ude. cover.le of theback,roUDd of Samo., tbe ••vera! E-..rl•• samo. prolr.... Corcmaand Ita de.c.DdaIIta'--"eY0111ti0ll of the NaUonalllec:OIlUi..anc. Offic.' &adit.~e•• aDd related L••lIe. and prolram••To the be.t bowl.d.. 01 the prHent author. aDd pre.ent aDd ,..tmember. of the NRO .taff. there ia nO formal h18tory of any otherr.collDai...ce propam "er c0D4acted 'by the, UDited State.. Ie CIA.pollaored Iao.tory of CorOlla ... ,nominally ill. preparaUOD l.te in 1972..aDd apparentlY.DIIle effort witbiD CIA baa be.n d."oted to pr•••rviDIrecorcU of the ld••lbt (U-2.) uad Oxcart (A-l2.) airc:raft prOlram•• blltthat repres....ta the .tam of .ucb hi.tory. Th. aIlc:••tor of all .uch prolr&lld.the balloon-carried recOlUl&ie.ance camera .,.tem of the mld-1950•• appear.to u"e eIi.appeared from the recoru.' Cil"en the volume of documentationof rec:oDD&i..aa.c:e prolram ac:tivtty by 1970. that i. unUkely to happen alain--
IIIIII,IIIIII)"
.,
8D 1'J01'-'4
Handle .,..'B~men/ Talent· Ke1hde
(:(.ntrOO5 Only
180
~"
~a·
• (cOlitimaed.) but d.etail.d aOVee material of the k1ad ava11a1a1e illthe early year. ofIQUlilDt !D8I CorQD& had became a eaaua1tyof therecorda cleatruetiO.ll prac••• by 1970. '0 .er. ia JIG ..auraae. thatall of the importaat eYeDte can eYer be captured for bietoriula.(ap, March 1973) .
181 au 11011-14
Hendle VII e,.".n/Tallnt· Keyhol.
CmtrolS Onl)
NOTES ON souaCI:lI
1.
z.
3.
4.
5.
6. For d.tail., ••• VolVtJda hlatDl'J' P m~ et •.,.
7.
8.
'.Mal- SAJV-F-13-'-936, MOe.a. E. 01'••1'. Dlz/sp.to B.....n ..... DN1lO; 13 S.p 63. M... 'SAJ"SS-I-M01'6. WeNt"_ mereu. 17 Sep 63: lUI. tBl:achJ M6Z,Creer to MeMiU... 18 Sep 63.
10. Mal- 0698, B. MeUm.... DNRO, to Moe.ll. E. Oreer,DirliP. z. Oct 63.
11.
183
~~BU 1101'-'4
111.. "Ill 8ftmelll Teienr· K9y"D!tC!:"I'OlS Or-Il
NllP Status. 29 Jail 6., p 3.
,"..
IIIIIIIIIIIII
~ pp 5-18 to 5-21.
Ma,_918. McMillan to Greer. II Feb 64.
Rpt. National aecOl1l1ainuce Program Status, 29 Jail 64.SP-3 filea pp 4.2.2 aDd 4-25.
M••_0918. B. YcMUlaa, DNRO. to MGen R. E.Gree~P. 12 reb 64.
Ibid; NRP Status. 2.9 Ju 64.- .
See Quarterly Prolram Review. December 31. 1965(hereafter cited.a QPR) for detailThe acoriD, ayatem had changed aand waa overhauled completely ill December.
M.~67. SAFSP to SAFSS. 18 Feb 64.
_4357. SAFSP to SAFSS. 3 Mar 64.
2.5.
2.3.
2,·4.
2.2..
2.0.
19.
Zl.
18.
17.
16.
15.
14.
12..
13.
BY!: 11011·'1.
Handle lie Bveman/Talent· Keyhole
Cor.lrols Only
184
'I'OP ••ea....
28.
"'''-'362, BOea R.I:. GS'HI', DIz/SP. to •• .ucMUI...DNi~6ti ,,'-1030, JIGea I. L. Maftba.DlI'/DO Staff, to GI'••I',· 17 Mal' 64•
.....-'562, MOe••• E. GI'••S', Db/BP, to 1ICieDJ. 1.. Mal'tia,DNllO Staff, ·25 Mal' W.
. .31. MaDlO, J. C). a.HI', .a-, COYOIt., toDDO, 26 ..... "'
nbJ: ......t loS' Eplaebul'la Data 101' N..t 0-7 Ula.toa.baSS Ill•••
32.11.-0, BQeIa·l. 1.. Mutba. 31', DlZ'/~OS~, to CbmCOUOIl, 27 MaS' 64, .1lbJ: Tar••t PS'loriti.e., ill SAJ'SS fil•••
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38-.
185
~
8U 11017.'4
~_!Mman/""'. KeY~eIE. Cc"trols Only
·~ I.... I
I41. aAnP, Quanerly Pr'l'am amew, 31 Dec 606. I·
.4,1•. II
43. lllteniew,· YOu a. E. Or..1' by Il. P.rI'Y. 20 Nov 64. I"'.45. 1W4l. I-46. I47• aP", 30 JUDe 65. I• 8.
• 9. cpa. 30 J1III65, PrOC1ll'emeAt SectioA• I50. OP" 30 Se, 65; 31 Dec 65i ••• ago ChV of Vol V, tid. IIll... aDd putieu1ul, pp Zil .t • .,.
Sl~ cpa. 31 Dec 65. 152.. Wemo, . Ba.D J. L. :War
.•ubJ: S1IIDIIl&I'y AD&lyai ",lD&en1ew, Martial by R. !:
au 1"01'-'.......... ~n/1aIInt·KtpnoIe
Centrals 0Ny
.186~
~ur
5S.
54. aPR, Sep 65.
55. aPa. 31 D.c 66.
56.
57. gpll of 31 MV 67;30.7_ 67.
58.
59~
187
~rn: 1'017-'4
HIndle VII ~n/Ta~··~
C~":~GOn:y
.~
A. DOted ei..where, the abortive Samos E-3, E-S, E-6, aDe1LaDyard.,..tem. were iateDdecl to perform .urvei1laDc:e fuactlona of one son oranother, but DODeeyer hec&IIle operaticmal aDd cmlY°LaDyard producedsatellite pboto.raphy.
II-IIIIIIIIIII-J..
lID 1'11'-'.Handle ¥It &fImIn/lilent·~CGIltroll 0nI,
111
~
•
.;
fIIIIIII'IIII1
Apart fl'OD1 Coro-.whicia 1wI .... operatioD&lfcw three yean,ODe LaDyud I11pt of May 1963 wIW:h produced a few J*Dkalraph.of DO peat IIltelli.eDC. wonh &lid t:b8 ~etm'... hom OM Samo. £ ..1mi••• (with re.o1utloll limited to Uoat 100 fe.t), repre••tecltheOJI1y prevlcn. .ucc••••• at a .atel1it. reccnmala.anc••ffDn tlIat hadbeell ill aiatnc. for 111M yeara &lid bad been heavily fuDde4 for fiYe.Coro....poDaGred by the CIA,· ... DOt coll.ider_ all e1eme1ltofthe "Air Force" .ate1l1te recODlla1aa~epro.ram, beiDa da••lIieda. an litaterimll capability .,.te. nell tbo. denloped, III8Il&lecl,and operated moatly by Air Force people. Both tbe Samoa E-5ADel Samoa E ..6 proarama bad falled &Ild had be_ caaceued by the elldof 19~·. after eipt cODaecattYe mi••loll faUue. (Dille. if the fUat1. «I were cOUlllted). An effo1't that .,ery proballly co.t more than
had yet to produce ua.fu1 photoara~.
an: tton·'4
Hencle we ev-n.n/"'nt· t<e,hclIeControl$ Only
19~
~IT
..-em'
m_tII. A maJDr cDIltri~tor ... a bureaucratic CDDlpetluOD for
cGIltrol ol tile .ate1llte reconnai 88aace prDpoam. But fDr the mo.t
193
.,~
8U 1101'.'4
Handle VII B~n/Talr.tt· KeyPld9 .
Cer:t"OIS Only
•Director of til. Natioa.al llecOIUlweuace Of1lce from February
1963 to October 1965.
195 BYllTDlT-lf
He,. "0 B,emen/Ttlfftt- ~y!l1Ji.e
:':r-~rOll Oo1Iy
~ IIIIII·IIIIIIJ. ,.
Flu aer.ecl .. Actiaa Director at vviou tim•• between July Iiancl September 1965. clvq McMmaD'a temporary abaeace.. McMillan'.plana were mcnm to the DO.taff ill July.
ir.
aD: uo".,,,Handle 'Ill 8feman/Telent· I'f.eyhole
CCfltrOis Only
~16
J«)TJ:S ON SOUReD
·•••.eiD
,•
IIIII'1IIIIIII
8.
6. W..._3951. MOe. R.. E. Oreei-, DidSP to BOe. J. 10.Wim.lD, Dir/NRO Staff. 27 Dec 63. .
5.
3. wnt, .wo. a. E. OI'Hr, Diz/SP,-15 AlII 63, ._j: Plaulor ~cra=1ftI1I•••atatt.sat8lltlli ••e·w.i*'wA&•• '
7.
4.
1. llpt. SAJ"SP QQutel'lyProp-am a.... 101111,19"(bereafter cited u OPa. wlda date).
1. Memo, E. M. PU'ceu. Qma, lleCCWY'i8.ace Paae1e toDCl, 1u1 Mi8abJ: Paae1lo~ I'utve Sate1Jlte lleC'O'U'·'.'aDCeOpU'atioDe: m o. B. Ud..,I1·". »_0. to D1r CIA. 11 Sep63, .1I1tj: Jaapl tloa of Pvc.u P-.lllecom.-dat1aae.botIlla SAl'll me••
9.
8U 1101'·14
Hancle __ a.eman/8Ient - t<eyllGleCentro;, Only
320
'lD"laedi
10.
: 11.
12. 0Pa. 10 J1ID M.
u.
It. 1.4.,."311, BCea 1. L. MudD. Dh-/NIlO Staff, toMQea~.01'.'1'. Dh SPt Z~aa 6.; .... _5002.Gz••1' to Dr. ·B. YcMUI... DIUtO. 3 1a64;~1319. WartID to (k••I'•• J- 64, Ia SP m•••
. 15.
16.
11.
QPll. )OS.p "'.
OPll. 31 Dee 6t; lIleDlO BOeIl W. G. 1tbaI. Piz/SP.. to DrJ. L. McLuca.. DBO, 28 AF 70, aubj:
18. ......-'158, MGe a. E. Or~I'/SP. to D1'. B."'e~Na9,22Oct "'; ....~209. MeNUJan to01'••1'. )0 Dec 64. .
DDO. to DepSecDef. t Je 65. .ubJ:lB DNRO m••• ·
~~!.'_.UQ. BCiea J. T. Stewart. Dil'/NIlO Staff. to_. Gre,r. Dir/SP. 8 Jaa 65;
20.
19.
\
321
r~
BD 1'101'."
t1IllCIIe Wi Dyemen/~~'\~ .I\e~~';~
~~:- ~ rois Cr.. f
8YE 1701'1·'.
Handle VII a-m."/Talent . t\eytlaleeonlrols Only
/-
j(
36. QPI\, SI.Dec 65.
31.
38. QPJl, SI Mu 66.
39.
40. OPa,' SOI. 66.· 8_ opt.bDl~ a c••latat pnblamlo~ ....n1 yean, ...._~.U 1D1IC1l'u "..CeDioff &am .zo.... actuall, addeY.. S.. memo,
41.
, ...~ : •. r . r.'l..... .• r .. . ..
daJllPt .a~. tba. 18 la e&c:t. ...~. are .....bo.a.d1ffeZ'eDC. be__• carr ... Paclfic TilDe; __.., til."'~eIIC. la etpt 1MIu••
43.
45.
46.
41.
M,,~591.Dr. A. H. nax. DNRO to lICe_ J. L.Mar~JSP, 10 Aq 66. .
Mba, DO ExCom Mta. 17 Aua 66.
B'D 1'1011.1e
HI_ VIa ~r./Tair.t~. Ke~C~~roil Onl,
.,..
.BU 1'11'-'4
Hardt VII BYemanl Talent· KeyndlCcntl'CllS 0ftI,
'(
63.
•'.... 1( r. ... .. r t. ."'
.... 'l,. ; T .
Oea.WariD.
64.
65. QPa. SOJ_ 61. tine c-aactDr appeua to ban atp.lflcaatly IiDpow41da COIDpODlDt aDd nwmtaeturilll CJ1I8lityCOIa"ol, ..... tIM pI'OJect of8.ce eftI.aa!l_•
. 6'7. MFll. a.l'l. a3 Mal' 61.
69.
70. an.' 30 J_ 61i
11. .M.,••9644. 3 J'm 67.
7Z.
68.
8ft 11011-14
Handle VlI Byemar./Tn!\~· Keyr:~
Centl'Oil ~;y
(
lIB l'rOl,-tt
HIndle YIl ~ft/Talent·KeyholeControlS Only .
'1.
a8. Memo. BOa B.. A. Bel'" DU f MaO Staff. to A. H. Flu.DNaO. llep 67. JIO'adJ. .
a,. QPa. 30 I. 67.
90, "'...0. A. H. naa. DlGO. to C. VUlee, Depteco.f,6 Jal 67, - a_J. .
91.
91. ual.~913. l6 Oct 67.
'3. QPR, 31 Mar 67. aDd '3l Dec 61.
(\ '5.
96. Lv. Cilia, USIB.to Sec:Def. 4'AF6I,.1da atell. NewCOftl"a,...eqalrem.... 11 Mar 61.
98.
91. 10 Apr 68
99.
100. Wa&~l", 16 A-.67.
101.
3Z7 au 1'01'.'4Handle ¥la e...man/Ta....! . Ktyl'l/;;,.
c.=~t '=l-I \JrI .t
(IfOP ••C••" I
10l. IIII
103.
I104. I105. I
(MS.~U1. II Oct 67~897. 15 Oct 67.
I106.
I107.
I108. Min. of NRP ExCom Mta. 11 Nov 67.
109. Memo. MOen:r. M. aeynolda. tJSAr (R.et'. Office of the IDir. CIA. to BCien R. A. Berl. Dir. NRO etaff, IS Sep67; aubJ: Utilisation of the KH-7_Recoanaiuance ISyetema lor Mapping. CbartiDg aDd Oeodeey R.equirementa.in DNRO fUea.
110. Memo. BCieD R. A. Ber•• Dir/NR.O Staff. to A. H. Flax, !DNRO. Z6 Sep 67. DO eubj. (FLu's mu,uw DOte in :reply
I~
ie quoted here ; memo. J. J. Schade
--
an .,0.,·'4Handle VII 8YemanlTalent· Keyl\oleCcntroll Only
3Z8
I'OP ••C••.,
.- ...........-..
111.
112.
113. QPa. )1 Dec 67.
114.
.1. SO.TUI 61;
M_'~Z', 18 Ju 68.
lib .M 2' "'u 61: .1 •
ItO.
1~1.
117.
UI. U".U''''UMar 68.
119.
116.
115.
(,
121. M-a••IIOO,', Apr 68.
123.
u.. M~I,_7756, 6 .1'-. 68.
us.
329 11ft 1'01'.,.Hendlt VII B,emanjlll(,.rtt· Key-: ~
. C':"'trDoS C- ..
:1
(' _,JP-..a;; IU6. I
I1~1. M.~U. 17 J~ 'I. I121.
Ill9. Lu. BCieI' a. A•••••• Dbt/IlRO stall. too~. A. H. J'lax.
DNIlO.- 14110y 'Ii -eabJ. I1JO~
I131.
I( 13l. -I
I-I
113.
I134. I
In..
B'D 1'101'.'4
.....". ~n/lIIent·Keyhclle
Contrcls Only
3)0
( ......n·
M... BOeaL. AU... Db, SAnP. to Dr. J. UcLacu.mulO. 7 OCt 70. .
M..o. 1. 1... Ucl.ucu.· D_O•. to SecDel, 18 Dec n ••ubJ: T~ Stock 01.. NadoDe1 aecGllllaleeuc:e Pr.l'am;....... Mc1.ucu to S.cDef, 21 Dec 12. eabj:T.JWtaStoc:k.both ill SAns me•.
'. aP&. SO.J. 70.
136. . .M-o, LCol r. L. aaim.-••MeL D_O~ alOc:tn••UJ_ B. C.... sAJ'8p tIP.) to •iIltanl_. H. C"il~ B.. ·Peny•. at Dec n.
0Pa. 30.J1a~.
131.
137.
U8•
. U9.
140.
1·61.
( 1.g.
l-U.
1"".
• : _0 ..... '., ': = - • 1.1 I'
145. Memo, BOa D. D. Braclbu... Dtr/SP, to·Dr. J. KcLueu,D_o. ao Mar 1S, .
146. Memo, BO_ D.DlIRo. 23 lu1 73,
331
~Bft 1'101'-14
Handle vaa Byeman/tallftt· Kero: ~Ulnlrols V: -
"'.