BUENO, JAYCEL P. September 11, 2015LLB 2-E

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASES 2

CALUB VS. COURT OF APPELASGR NO. 115634, April 27, 2000Quisumbing, J.:

FACTS:The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the

Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two vehicles on January 28, 1992. Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon were the drivers of the vehicles and they failed to present proper documents and licenses. The apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR Office in Catbalogan. The drivers refused to accept the seizure receipts which was issued to them. Thus, Felipe Calub, PENR Officer, filed a criminal complaint againt Abuganda for violation of Sec. 68 (78) of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.

The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by the drivers from the custody of the DENR. On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles was again apprehended by a team of the DENR-CENR Catbalogan and Philippine Army Elements. It was again loaded with forest products. Calub then filed a criminal complaint for violation of Sec. 68 (78) of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.

Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles with an application for replevin against the petitioners. CA ruled in favor of the private respondents. Petitioners then filed with the SC.

ISSUES:1. Whether the private respondents violated Sec. 68 (78) of

Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.

2. Whether the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.

HELD:

In the first issue, yes, the private respondents violated Sec. 68 (78) of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.

This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.

In the second issue, yes, the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.

Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.

Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.

LALICAN VS. VERGARAGR NO, 108619, July 31, 1997Romero, J.:

FACTS:An information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as

amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican,[1]Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city.

Petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams,

planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations.

ISSUE:Whether the charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is

excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended.

HELD:No, the charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is not

excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines).

In the recent case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:

"The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of 'Processing plant,' which reads:(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood product.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for the market.' Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law

To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law. After all, the phrase "forest

products" is broad enough to encompass lumbers which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber.

PALLADA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESGR NO. 131270, March 17, 2000Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice milling and trading. DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipts considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator. The seizure order[4] was served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general manager of the company, but he refused to acknowledge it.

On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of 68 of P.D .No. 705, as amended.

Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered in establishing the legality of the company's possession of the lumber. In support of his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:Whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for

lumber and timber.

HELD:

Yes, separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber.

The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase "possess timber or other forest products" in 68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who possess timber and forest products without the documents required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products. As already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."

Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter.

These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same.

What render these documents without legal effect are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may not have any responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and he should have taken steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as he is concerned, the documents are regular and complete.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DATORGR NO. 136142, October 24, 2000De Leon, Jr, J.:

FACTS:Pastor Telen and his co-accused, Alfonso Dator and Benito

Genol, were charged with the crime of violation of Section 68[2] of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.

The defense denied any liability for the crime charged in the Information. Pastor Telen, a utility worker at the Integrated Provincial Health Office, Southern Leyte for nineteen (19) years, testified that he needed lumber to be used in renovating the house of his grandparents in Barangay Abgao, Maasin, Southern Leyte where he maintained residence. Knowing that it was prohibited by law to cut trees without appropriate permit from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Telen sought the assistance of a certain Lando dela Pena who was an employee at the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. Dela Pena accompanied Telen to the office of a certain Boy Leonor, who was the Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte. Leonor did not approve of the plan of Telen to cut teak or hard lumber from his (Telen) mothers track of land in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. However, Leonor allegedly allowed Telen to cut the aging Dita trees only. According to Telen, Leonor assured him that a written permit was not anymore necessary before he could cut the Dita trees, which are considered soft lumber, from the private land of his mother, provided the same would be used exclusively for the renovation of his house and that he shall plant trees as replacement thereof, which he did by planting Gemelina seedlings.

On September 15, 1993, Telen requested his cousin, Vicente Sabalo, to hire for him a cargo truck in order to haul the sawn lumber from the land of his mother in Tabunan, San Jose, Maasin, Southern Leyte. His cousin obliged after Telen assured him that he had already secured verbal permission from Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of CENRO in Maasin, Southern Leyte, before cutting the said lumber.

Telen learned from his daughter that the sawn lumbers were confiscated by the police in Barangay Soro-soro, Maasin, Southern Leyte.

ISSUE:Whether Pastor Telen violated Sec. 68 (78) of the Revised

Forestry Code, P.D. 705, as amended.

HELD:Yes, Pastor Telen violated Sec. 68 (78) of the Revised

Forestry Code, P.D. 705.

The fact of possession by the appellant of the subject fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Antipolo and Dita lumber, as well as his subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise

known as the Revised Forestry Code. Section 68 of the code provides: Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

The mere allegation of the appellant regarding the verbal permission given by Boy Leonor, Officer in Charge of DENR-CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte, is not sufficient to overturn the established fact that he had no legal documents to support valid possession of the confiscated pieces of lumber. It does not appear from the record of this case that appellant exerted any effort during the trial to avail of the testimony of Boy Leonor to corroborate his allegation. Absent such corroborative evidence, the trial court did not commit an error in disregarding the bare testimony of the appellant on this point which is, at best, self-serving.

PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO et al.,G.R. No. 161798, October 20, 2004Tinga, J.:

FACTS:PICOP owns and operates a multi-billion peso pulp and paper

manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds government-issued Pulpwood and Timber License Agreement and Integrated Forest Management Agreement which gave PICOP the exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost 130,000 hectares of forest land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.

DENR rendered three Memoranda by virtue of which PICOP was designated a DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and conveyances within its concession. In the course of the enforcement of the Memoranda, PICOP apprehended within its concession and tree plantation area, violators who loaded the illegally cut trees in trucks and other forms of conveyance, such as carabaos, for transport out of the plantation area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were kept in PICOPs impounding area.

On June 18, 2001, Private Respondents Casia and others, by way of a class suit, of the members of the UNITED FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF BISLIG filed a complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the RTC against the DENR. Casia and others were the people apprehended transporting without any permit several hundred meters of falcata logs allegedly grown in PICOP’s plantation.

On September 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Casia and others.

Petitioner contends that Casia’s intrusion was in violation of petitioners PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. These license agreements gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop forest lands, and recognized petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in the concession area. In filing this petition, petitioner is merely defending its subsisting proprietary interest pursuant to these license agreements.

ISSUE:Whether the PICOP has the obligation to keep custody of the

apprehended forest products, tools and conveyances.

HELD: No, the PICOP has no obligation to keep custody of the

apprehended forest products, tools and conveyances.PICOP cannot claim the right to retain custody of the

apprehended logs and conveyances by virtue of its being designated a depository of the DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner merely holds the confiscated products and conveyances in custody for the DENR while the administrative or criminal proceedings regarding said products are pending.

It is clear that PICOP has no material interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and conveyances. It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing agreements, which need to be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued by the trial court. As observed by the Court of Appeals, any interest PICOP has in the confiscated properties is dependent on the outcome of the proceedings before the CENRO-Bislig and the Office of the Government Prosecution-Surigao del

Sur. The issue of ownership and possession of the confiscated products still has to be determined in those proceedings. Petitioner had not refuted this.

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARYG.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990

COURTS, J.:

FACTS:Petitioner entered into a timber license agreement

designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya.

On August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, Director Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession. After the cancellation, petitioner sent a letter to President Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau’s directive. Barely one year after the cancellation, 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by the TLA was re awarded to Twin Peaks Development while the other half was to be logged by Filipinas Loggers Inc., Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the order but it was denied. Felipe Ysmael sought reconsideration to the Office of the President, however, it was likewise denied.

ISSUE:Whether the petitioner has the right to seek the nullification

of the Bureau’s orders cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting of TLA to Twin Peaks.

HELD: No, the petitioner has no right to seek the nullification of the

Bureau’s orders cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting of TLA to Twin Peaks.

Felipe Ysmael Jr. and Co. Inc., failde to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents, thus the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought.

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent administration are presently taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands and developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation and rehabilitation.

Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution

VIRGILIO BON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 152160             January 13, 2004PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for

violating Section 68 of PD 705. Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza owns a titled agricultural land located in Sorsogon, administered by Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut and sawed into lumber, she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to investigate the report. Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain Labayane, and investigated Teresita complaint of Illegal Cutting of Trees. Together with Lascano,

Dangalan, Bon and others repaired to the land of Teresita and the group discovered 6 stumps of trees; 4 Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one am[u]gis tree. Bon admitted ordering the cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. Bon contended that he was the tenant of the land of Teresita and he developed the land. He alleged that it was Teresita herself who ordered the cutting of the trees.The RTC found Bon and Jeniebre guilty of the crime charged which the CA sustained.

ISSUE:Whether Bon and Jeniebre were guilty for violation of Section

68 of PD 705.

HELD: Yes, Bon and Jeniebre were guilty for violation of Section 68

of PD 705.

Punishable under Sec. 68 of PD 705 are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents. Bon was charged with the first offense. Bon’s guilt was proven even though the conviction was based on circumstantial evidence. In the RTC, he admitted, before the presence of a barangay tanod, that he ordered the cutting and sawing of the disputed trees.

A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the the photographs of tree stumps, the investigation report of an officer of the CENRO that no permit was secured for the cutting of the trees, and the CENRO’s computation of the value of the timber generated from the felled trees. This fact, together with the circumstantial evidence, indubitably points to no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as charged.

CHU VS. TAMINAM NO. RTJ-03-1786, August 28, 2003Carpio, J.:

FACTS:

Complainant alleged that on 9 September 1999, Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer Michael F. dela Cruz (CENRO dela Cruz) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region IX, applied for a search warrant with respondent judge. CENRO dela Cruz claimed that complainant was in possession of forest products of dubious origin in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705), as amended. On the same day, respondent judge issued Search Warrant No. 364 ordering the seizure of several pieces of mangrove lumber from complainants fishpond in Bulawan, Payao, Zamboanga del Sur. On the strength of the warrant, CENRO dela Cruz, assisted by law enforcement agents, seized from complainant 576 pieces of pagatpat lumber (mangrove specie) with an estimated value of P183,790.

Complainant pointed out that this was the fifth time that respondent judge issued, under questionable procedure, search warrants against him for violation of PD 705. Complainant recalled that on 10 November 1998, respondent judge issued four search warrants against him (Search Warrant Nos. 281 to 284), authorizing the seizure from his compound of pagatpat lumber worth more than P1.5 million. Complainant alleged that the records of the four warrants did not also contain any transcript of the required examination of witnesses. Complainant therefore moved to quash the four warrants. Respondent judge, however, denied the motion on the ground that he had in fact conducted such examination but the record of the deposition was misfiled in another case folder through inadvertence.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law.HELD:

Yes, the respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law.

Section 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

This provision implements the proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures found in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Respondent judge explained that in issuing Search Warrant No. 364, he complied with the rule that he must personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses. Respondent judge stated, however, that the certified copies of the records obtained by complainant did not include the transcript of his examination because the clerical staff in his office who prepared the certified copies inadvertently failed to do so.

The respondent judge, who had earlier professed ignorance of the rule in question, failed either to examine any witness before issuing Search Warrant No. 364 or to reduce the examination in writing. His omission renders him liable for gross ignorance of the law. When the law is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court on search warrant issuance, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

OPOSA, ET. AL VS. FACTORANG.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:

This case is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of their generation as well as those generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children invoked

their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was contrary to the highest law of humankind which is the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation. The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the children have the legal standing to file the case.

HELD:

Yes, the children have the legal standing to file the case.The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the

children had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS FLORESG.R. No. L-46772 February 13, 1992Medialdea, J.:

FACTS:

Arrozal and Flores were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705. They, together with twenty (20) other John Does whose identities are still unknown, entered the privately-owned land of Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father, Macario Prudente on the 28th, 29th and 30th days of July 1976, at Barangay Mahabang Lalim, General Nakar, Quezon. Once inside, they illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit, sixty logs of different species, consisting of about 541.48 cubic meters, with

total value of P50,205.52. Arrozal is the administrator of the Infanta Logging Corporation.

On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.

On April 13, 1977, the trial court dismissed the information on the grounds invoked. The reconsideration sought was denied on August 9, 1977.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the information charged an offense(2) Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the case

HELD:

1. Yes. The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands.

While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.

2. Yes. The trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because the information was filed not pursuant to the

complaint of any forest officer as prescribed in Section 80 of P.D. 705.

The circumstances in the instant case do not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither was the alleged commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private land and the complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal.

Likewise, the Solicitor General was correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative Code giving authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against persons charged with the commission of the crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILSON B. QUEG.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996Puno, J.:

FACTS:

Two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. 

On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge. 

There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused- appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo. 

SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs. He asked accused-appellant for the cargo's

supporting documents, specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents. All he could show was a certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. 

SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the provincial capitol. When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50. 

On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa and Elpidio Sabal. The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the PLTP's of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services. 

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether it was an error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by EO 277

HELD:

No. Accused-appellant's possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.

DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. There shall be Certificates of Origin issued by authorized DENR officials. The transport of lumber shall be accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.

When apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber.

ROLDAN, JR. vs. HON. MADRONA, et al.G.R. No. 152989.September 4, 2002

FACTS:

Manuel Jorge Roldan, Jr. is the owner of 60,000 square meters of land which he bought from a certain Ildefonso O. Maglasang. On August 9, 2001, he applied for a Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP) from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for him to cut some trees for a proposed road and poultry farm in his property. He also paid all the fees required by the various government agencies. While waiting for the permit to be issued, he was allegedly informed by some employees from the DENR that he could proceed with the cutting of trees even though his application was still awaiting approval. Consequently, he proceeded with the cutting of trees and bulldozing of the roadway.

About three weeks later, representatives of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and personnel from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) of Tacloban City raided petitioner's place, allegedly without a search warrant. An inventory of the cut trees was conducted. The logs were not confiscated but were entrusted to a barangay kagawad since there was allegedly no search warrant at that time.

About two days later, the CENRO representatives came back with members of the media and ISAFP charging illegal logging but they failed to get the logs, again for alleged lack of search warrant. The CENRO group and ISAFP returned, this time armed with a search warrant and proceeded to confiscate 872 pieces of sawn lumber/flitches (8,506 board feet) and three felled timber logs with a total market value of P235,454.68 at P27.00 per board foot.

A complaint for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as amended was filed against herein petitioner by CENRO before the City Prosecutor of Ormoc City. Thereafter, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause to convict him. A motion for reconsideration proved futile for, as it turned out, the information had already been filed in court. Jurisdiction over the case was transferred to the regional trial court, also a public respondent in this case.

A warrant for the arrest of petitioner was then issued by the court a quo. In view thereof, herein petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and the recall of his warrant of arrest. After hearing the said motion, public respondent Judge Fortunito L. Madrona denied the motion but reduced the recommended bail of petitioner.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the owner of a private land may be criminally liable under Section 68 of PD 705 for cutting trees within his own property

(2) Whether the owner of the private property may be administratively liable under Sec. 14 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21 despite the fact that he did not transport the logs out of his property and just used them for his own agricultural purposes therein

HELD:

1. Yes. It must be stressed that petitioner is not being charged for qualified theft but for violation of Section 68, PD 705 hence his ownership of the land is of no moment. The said law does not even distinguish whether or not the person who commits the punishable acts under the aforementioned law is the owner of the property, for what is material in determining the culpability of a person is whether or not the person or entity involved or charged with its violation possesses the required permit,

license or authorization from DENR at the time he or it cuts, gathers or collects timber or other forest products.

Under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, it is clear that the violators of the said law are not declared as being guilty of qualified theft. Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code were referred to only for the purpose of determining the imposable penalties and not to define acts which constitute qualified theft.

2. Yes. The rule is clear. Section 14 of Administrative Order No. 2000-21, the "Revised Guidelines in the Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber Permit," provides:

SEC. 14. Penal Provisions. - Any log/timber or finished-wood products covered by these regulations which are transported without the prescribed documents shall be considered illegal and, therefore, subject to confiscation in favor of the government and shall be disposed in accordance with laws, rules and regulations governing the matter.

The order considers the mere act of transporting any wood product or timber without the prescribed documents as an offense which is subject to the penalties provided for by law.

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAND NATURAL RESOURCES, et al vs MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, et alG.R. No. 167707, October 8, 2008

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DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST vs THE SECRETARY, et alG.R. No. 173775, October 8, 2008Reyes, R.T., J.:

FACTS:

The then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 on November 10, 1978 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).  President Marcos later approved the

issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor .  Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.  They declared that they, themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial.  They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man.  Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership.  Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief.  The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain.  It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced.  Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended.  Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, declaring that, “PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land (alienable and disposable).

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay.  They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.

ISSUE: 

Whether the present occupants of Boracay Island has the right to secure titles over their occupied lands.

HELD: 

No. Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.  Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of  the public domain as public forest.  Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as “a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not.”  Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests.  PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions.  Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.  In keeping with the presumption of State ownership,

the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court.  The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.

Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land.  If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.