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Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007 QuickTime™ and a TIFF (Uncompressed) decomp are needed to see this p QuickTime™ and a TIFF (Uncompressed) decomp are needed to see this p

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Page 1: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science

Ron Chrisley

COGS/Informatics

University of Sussex

Yale Divinity School

November 13th, 2007

QuickTime™ and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.QuickTime™ and a

TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressorare needed to see this picture.

Page 2: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Tease: Artificial intelligence & spirituality• Creating minds: artificial intelligence (AI) as

Blasphemy?• Designing for autonomy: Can theodicy help

AI? Vice versa?• External naturalization of spirituality: Will

robots believe in God?

Will discuss these at end, if time permitsFirst: Topic as given in title

Page 3: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Terms: Cognitive science

• One can define cognitive science to be any scientifically-based attempt to naturalize the mind: show how it is possible for the mental to be part of the natural world

• Can we use same techniques to investigate whether the spiritual is also?

Page 4: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Naturalizing the mind

• Mental states and processes seem to be very different from physical ones: e.g., thoughts can be true or false, atoms can't

• How can it be that a physical thing can also be a thing with a mental life?

• Or, conversely, why is it that my physical body behaves in a way which matches up with my intentions? (cf "The Miraculous Coincidence Thought Experiment", Cussins 1987)

Page 5: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Terms: Naturalization

• Making it intelligible how multiple views of the world:– Can be of the same world– Can each give understanding of that same world

• Need not give any one view special authority– Though some approaches (asymmetric ones) do

• cf "The Limitations of Pluralism" (Cussins 1992)

Page 6: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

External vs. internal naturalization1. External naturalization of spirituality: E.g.,

why do people have spiritual beliefs? How could this have evolved?

• spiritual anthropology (van Pelt)• cognitive science of religion (Bloom)

2. Internal naturalization of spirituality: How can spiritual views be reconciled with, e.g., scientifically physical views?

This evening, only discussing number 2

Page 7: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

When (internal) naturalization failsEither:

• Elimination (of the exotic)

• Relativism (e.g., post-modernism, quietism)

Page 8: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Terms: The spiritual

Which notion of the spiritual? Any suggestions?

Fortunately, a definition is not needed for my purposes Proposed naturalization strategies should work for

most or all notions of the spiritual Am not assuming that the spiritual is necessarily

supernatural Begs the question Makes naturalizing the spiritual impossible by

definition

Page 9: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Methods of naturalization

1. Interactive dualism

2. Reduction

3. Supervenience

4. Interpretation

5. Intelligible construction

6. Conceptual change

Page 10: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

What are the things to be naturalized?• Two or more ways of understanding the world

– Here we will only consider two at a time (P and Q in the case of symmetric naturalization)

• Call these "discourses", although need not be linguistically expressed (or even be expressible)

• Some means of naturalization are asymmetric:– One discourse is deemed privileged or familiar (F)– The other is unfamiliar or exotic (E)– E is naturalized to F, not the other way around

Page 11: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Interactive dualism

• Symmetric: P and Q are "discourse peers"• The states, processes, etc. of P and Q are incommensurable

– e.g., non-extended vs. extended substances (Descartes)

• But there are non-explanatory (usually causal) relations between P and Q– e.g., perception and action

• Many famous problems, e.g.:– If P or Q (e.g. physics) is causally closed, no room for the other to

have any effect on it– Epiphenomenalism is no solution: Denying causal links in one

direction (e.g., mental to physical) prevents knowledge (e.g. of the mental)

– Same problems apply if P or Q is spiritual discourse

Page 12: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Reduction

• Asymmetric: Reduction of E to F• Requires being able to define each of the concepts in

E in terms of the concepts of F– E.g. The temperature of a substance is the mean kinetic

energy of its molecules

• Many problems, e.g.:– Such reductions can be hard to find– If E (e.g. mind) is multiply realizable, reduction appears

impossible– If reduction of E to F is achieved, eliminativism threatens: no

causal work left for E to do– Same problems apply if E is spiritual discourse

Page 13: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Supervenience

• Asymmetric: Supervenience of E on F • Weaker than reduction: Only requires that F

fixes E; a change in E implies a change in F• So avoids the problems of reduction (e.g.,

Kim 1990)• But too weak: can't explain, e.g., the causal

efficacy of the mental• Same applies if E is spiritual discourse

Page 14: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Interpretation

• Asymmetric: interpretation of F in terms of E• E.g. for E = the mental, the "Intentional Stance"

(Dennett 1984): A system S has mental states B and D if the non-mentally construed behaviour of S can be explained by:– Ascribing to S the beliefs B and desires D S should have,

given S's interactions with the world– Assuming that S will behave in a way that would achieve D if

B were true

• Not all systems will be explicable this way; those that are are the ones with mental states

Page 15: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Interpretation: Problems

• Merely re-states what we want to explain– We know that our bodies can be interpreted as intentional

systems, but why?

• Doesn't explain the source of mentality of the interpreter– Presupposes an ur-interpreter that grounds everything?

• Relative, and therefore non-deterministic– Whether I am interpretable depends on who is doing the

interpreting; there is no fact of the matter– But surely the contents of my mind (and that I have one at

all!) are independent of who is interpreting me

Page 16: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Interpretation: Problems

• These problems might also apply when E = spiritual discourse– But not clear how to modify Dennett's

proposal to yield the "Spiritual Stance"– (Would be ironic if one could do so, given

Dennett's views on, e.g., theism!)

Page 17: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Intelligible construction

• Perhaps similar to interpretation, but with some key differences

• In particular, symmetric: intelligible construction between E and F

• Naturalization is achieved when one has a practical capacity to act in terms of P in a manner appropriate for achieving one's goals in Q, and vice versa (cf Cussins 1990)– E.g., an architect with respect to blueprints vs. construction

materials

Page 18: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Intelligible construction

• In the case of the mental, this practical capacity is the result of :– Possessing set of practical capacities to negotiate

a number of discourses– These discourses together constitute an intelligible

construction from P to Q, and vice versa– No longer a mystery why something with these

physical properties is also something with these mental properties, and vice versa

– The intermediate discourses are, in the main, computational

Page 19: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Naturalizing the mind

Mental description

Physical description

?Computational description

Mental description

intelligibility (skill mediated)

intelligibility (skill mediated)

Page 20: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Analogy: Chess computers

• Interpretable as having beliefs, desires, goals, etc.

• But also understandable as a physical system• But no mystery; Why not?• Answer: Analysis in terms of representations,

and computations over them• Computational properties are not reducible to

physical ones: multiple realizability• So: Naturalistic explanation without reduction

Page 21: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Naturalizing the mind via intelligible construction• AI/Cognitive Science: What goes for the

chess computer goes for us

• We can naturalize our mental states without reducing them

• Do so by finding a level of description/explanation in between the mental and physical: computational

Page 22: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Naturalizing the spiritual via intelligible construction?• Does this suggest a way for naturalizing the

spiritual?• Suppose (as seems likely) that spiritual

events, properties, entities, etc. cannot be reduced to physics

• Does this mean naturalists have to abandon or eliminate the spiritual?

• No; not if some other means of naturalization (e.g., intelligible construction) can be achieved

Page 23: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Naturalizing the spiritual

• E.g., need not eliminate the spiritual if one can find an intermediate level of description that allows one to non-reductively naturalize the spiritual

• But what is this level?– A new kind of discourse/conceptual

scheme?– Or perhaps computation again?!

Page 24: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Naturalizing the spiritual

Spiritual description

Physical description

?intelligibility (skill mediated)

intelligibility (skill mediated)

Page 25: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Conceptual change

• All preceding naturalization methods assumed that the discourses to be related are fixed in advance

• But there can be change in the concepts one employs without changing the topic– I.e., same reference, different sense

• This may be a way to remove some conceptual obstacles to naturalization (Chrisley 2007)– E.g., the apparent possibility of zombies: creatures that

behave just like us but with no phenomenal consciousness– A change in our concept of mind/consciousness might

reveal this apparent possibility to be an illusion

• So also for naturalizing the spiritual?

Page 26: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Changes to our conception of the spiritual?• E.g., must God be finite to be naturalized?

– No: there are infinite idealizations in many discourses: e.g., the Turing machine (computation)

• But perhaps other changes are required, and can be made, while still being concepts of the spiritual

• A case where lack of precision ("slippage") in the concept of spirituality may be an advantage

Page 27: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Could there be a science of spirituality?• Not asking about an external science (e.g.,

evolutionary account of why people have spiritual views)

• But internal: a science that tests hypotheses about the relation between spiritual events, provides explanatory, even predictive theories of them, etc.

• Perhaps required for naturalization?• Just as a science of mind requires familiarity with

experience, a science of the spiritual would require a familiarity with the spiritual

Page 28: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Coda: AI and God

Page 29: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

The artificial/natural distinction

• What do we mean by "artificial"?• Made by humans?

– No, because then making babies would be a case of doing artificial intelligence

• Made by humans, by design?– Better, but rules out possibility of other

species making artefacts

• Rather: Made by an agent, by design

Page 30: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Adam: The first AI?

• Consider: Judeo-Christian creation story

• Adam was made by an agent, by design– In particular, he was "made, not begotten"

• So Adam was artificial: The first AI!• But then everything is artificial?!• Yes, but some artefacts are also

natural; natural = made by God

Page 31: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Is AI an oxymoron?

• Intelligence implies autonomy

• Autonomy implies responsibility

• So for something to be intelligent, it must be responsible for its actions

• Artificiality implies having been designed

• X having been designed implies the responsibility for X's behaviour lies with the designer

• So for something to be an artefact, it must not be responsible for its actions

Page 32: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Responsibility in the case of design

Designer Artefact

Behaviour

is responsible for

designs

generates

Page 33: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Responsibility in the case of no design

Agent 1 Agent 2

Actions

is responsible for

brings into being

Page 34: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Design and theodicy

• How can God be good, and yet be responsible for evil?

• Traditional answer: God is not responsible for evil, we are

• That implies that we were not designed by God (see preceding diagrams)

• But traditional theology sees us as products of God's design ("made, not begotten")

• If AI is a contradiction is terms, so also is the notion of God as creator?

Page 35: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

AI and theodicy

• To make systems more intelligent, AI researchers elaborate their design

• But the more they do this, the more they limit the autonomy of the systems they build

• How can AI researchers create an artefact, through design, without thereby usurping its responsibility, autonomy and intelligence?

• In other words:– Can AI show how to resolve the problem of evil?– Or: can proposed solutions to the problem of evil suggest a

way to do AI?

Page 36: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

A middle way: evolution/learning/adaptivity

Evolver Evolved

Actions

is responsible for

nurtures/structures/guides

Page 37: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

A twist in the debate

• If this is right, then not only is Darwinism compatible with the view of God as creator…

• …but is in fact required for it!– Any other means of divine creating would make

our actions too closely related to God's intentions– This would render them his actions, not ours– That would be not only a blow to our freedom, but

a blow against the omnibenevolence of God

Page 38: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Is attempting AI blasphemy?

Isn’t doing AI "playing God", and therefore blasphemy? Perhaps, but consider:

• On the Judeo-Christian view, God created us in his/her image

• It follows immediately that part of that image is being a designer of intelligent life

• So by striving to do such, we are only trying to fulfil the divine potential God instilled in us

• Compare: Are we "playing God" when we strive to be like God in other ways?

• On this view, we are only "playing God" when doing AI in the same sense that we are "playing God" when we try to do good, and to love

Page 39: Naturalizing the Spiritual: Lessons from Cognitive Science Ron Chrisley COGS/Informatics University of Sussex Yale Divinity School November 13th, 2007

Thank you!

This lecture will be available soon, in video ("PodSlides"), audio and PowerPoint format, at:

http://e-asterisk.blogspot.com

Comments welcome: [email protected]