navy smartshorepilot - energy exchange

Rhode Island Convention Center • Providence, Rhode Island

NAVY SmartShore Pilot

Track 4 Session 5

Jeff JohnsonNaval District Washington

August 10 2016

Energy Exchange: Federal Sustainability for the Next Decade

Session Agenda

– US Navy, Initial Energy Strategy– NDW Goals– The new cyber threat landscape ‐ hacker trends, techniques and

technologies– Common critical network vulnerabilities– NDW approach to cyber security– System Capabilities– Summary and conclusions

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NDW Footprint*– Joint Base Anacostia Bolling (DC)– NAS Patuxent River (MD)– NSA Annapolis (MD)– NSA Bethesda (MD)– NSA South Potomac (VA)– NSA Washington (DC)

– Total Plant Replacement Value (PRV): $14B– Operations & Maintenance Budget: $500M/yr– Reimbursable Budget: $15M/yr

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Naval District Washington

Geographically located in multiple states to address interstate utility regulatory issues

25,652 acres 3,129 buildings 2,822 non‐building structures 1,029 utilities locations 10 runways

6 hangers 44 piers‐wharfs 3 small arms training 21 small boats

Energy Exchange: Federal Sustainability for the Next Decade4

Navy Smart Energy Strategy 2012


• Aging infrastructure with deferred and declining investments for facilities sustainment & emergency management operations

– Deferred maintenance of buildings and building systems – Lack of resources to collect and maintain authoritative data– Reduced funding for programs and projects

• Increased risk from:– Commercial grid and perimeter vulnerabilities– Threats of cyber attacks (internal and external)– Growing incidence of natural and manmade disasters

• Increased pressure to reduce– Cuts to national defense budget– Aggressive Federal and DoD mandates

What is the Shore Baseline?

Compelling Need for Change

Pressure to reduce costs

Increased Risk

Aging Infrastructure

How will shore installation management be maintained & funded over their lifecycle to achieve intended benefits?


Establishing a secure critical infrastructure environment for efficient shore operations

REQUIREMENTS– Compliance with DoD and Federal mandates

– Efficiency savings through automation

– Optimization of operations and processes

– Safe & Reliable operations

– Share information between stakeholders

– Connect equipment over an IP network

– Utilize Standards Based (and Legacy) protocols

– Enhance Public Safety operations

– Protect Critical infrastructure

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CONCERNS– Unauthorized external access to networks

and systems– Loss of command & control or data integrity– Loss or degradation of system availability– Malware infection manipulating operations– Cyber‐attack causing physical impact– Reputation loss due to publicized vulnerabilities or attacks– Intentional misuse of systems or control causing physical

impacts– Cyber security attacks impacting normal operations

NDW Operational Goals


NDW Technology Insertion

Dahlgren Ops Investments

ATFP Program

AMI Program

OPNAV NDW Smart Grid Pilot Program

CNIC Energy

ProgramESTCP* Program

NDW Utilities Ops Investments

• Availability of Data for Facility and Utility Mgmt

• Establish basewide DDC system

• Command and Control (C2)

• Virtual Perimeter Monitoring System (VPMS)

• RDC• Gates• PSNet

• Measure Energy Consumption (2200 of 3129 bldgs in NDW)

• Business Process Re-engineering: People, Processes , Technology

• Accredited Architecture

• Benchmark • MAXIMO Pilot

• 40 FY12 eSRMprojects including:• Connect locations

with existing DDC/SCADA

• Re-commissioning• Building Envelope• HVAC, etc.

• Cognitive Energy Mgmt System

• Steam Trap Monitoring

• Chiller Optimization

• Adv. Demand Response

• First Fuels

•Plant Consolidation (Networking) –FY14•DDC & SCADA Projects –FY13&14•SteamDecentralization MILCON

Reduced FTE and improvedcustomer service; trend analysis and maintenance mitigations

Initial architecture established for secure command and control enabling mission assurance. Ability to reduce FTE and utilize data-based decisions

Smart metersallow multiple commodity consumption data at 15 min intervals; power factor and wave capture data allows improved quality

Capabilitytemplates & roadmap; Industry products meeting DoD technology gaps; Cyber security & mission assurance; Lessons learned for enterprise solutions

Cyber compliance;Integrated systems deployment for optimal C2 and active facility and utility mgmt

NDW Pilot has been identified as ideal testbed for private industry partnerships due foundational approach leading to data availability

Currently benchmarked at serveral sites; projects allow region wide deployment with proven ROI


Disgruntled ex-employee hacks into the water system and floods the community of sewage.

INSIDER ATTACKMaroochy Water System - 2010

The Conficker worm infected the control network causing an instability in the communications.

ENTERPRISE INFECTION“Unnamed” Steel Mill - 2011

Hackers disrupted networks to access automation equipment resulted in massive damage.

INSIDER ATTACK“Unnamed” Steel Mill, Germany - 2014

SHODAN discovered over 21,000 miss-configured building automation systems.

MISS-CONFIGUREGoogle HQ, Wharf - 2013

The attackers backed their way into network by compromising a 3rd-party vendor to steal data.

BACKDOOR ATTACKTarget Retail Stores - 2013

Stuxnet infected the air-gapped control network bypassing causing damage to centrifuge.

.

SCADA MALWARENatanz Nuclear Facility ‐ 2010

WHAT’S NEXT?

Networks infected with the Shamoon virus erased information causing enterprise network outages.

ENTERPRISE ATTACKSaudi Aramco & RasGas - 2012

A team used a penetration test on PLCs to realize how badly vulnerable their SCADA/ICS were .

PLC ATTACKProject Basecamp - 2012

Iranian hackers tried to open flood gates. Was this a dress rehearsal for something bigger?

BACKDOOR ATTACKNew York Dam - 2013

Left 225,000 customers in the dark. 1st successful cyber attack to knock a power grid offline.

.

SCADA ATTACKUkraine Utilities - 2015

Hack accessed hundreds of PLCs used to manipulate control applications altering chemicals.

PLC ATTACKKemuri Water Company - 2016

What are the Threat Vectors?


• Nation states• Criminals• Activists• Employees• Children!

A World Full of Hackers Various Motivations• Money• Political protest• Environmental activism

• Espionage• Retaliation• Job security• Fun

Unintentional DisastersAn attacker/ user doesn’t even know what they are doing to cause a huge impact

Admiral Michael Rogers, Director NSA & US Cyber Command

“… China along with ‘one or two’ other countries have the capability to successfully launch a cyber‐attack that could shut down the electric grid in parts of the United States”.

NSA Director testimony to Congress, Nov. 2014

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Who are the Actors?


Boundary Protections• Firewalls• Network Intrusion Detection• DMZ/Proxy Servers

Endpoint Protections Host intrusion detection/prevention

(anti‐virus/firewall/application white‐listing)

Policy enforcement Configuration management Device connection management Data transfer management External alerting & reporting

Pre‐Stuxnet Protection• Firewalls• DMZ/Proxy Servers• Air Gaps

Post‐Stuxnet Protections: Anti‐virus on PCs & Servers Firewalls / data‐diodes Configuration/patch management Secure Middleware Panels

(Energyguard and NAE(S)

Protocol monitoring capability for ICS systems via endpoint protection for legacy devices

I.T. vs. O.T. Approaches to Cyber Security

NDW Technical Approach


• An enterprise‐grade industrial control system– Integrates disparate multi‐vendor systems into a local, regional and national

system– Provides a secure enclave for ICS management while ensuring no access to

legacy unsecure PLC devices

• Improved base operations– Remote monitoring and control of HVAC, lighting, building access, water, waste

water, steam and power systems– Consolidated regional energy performance data for analysis and demand

response

• Enhanced critical infrastructure protection– Virtual Monitoring System ‐ A “virtual” fence that detects and alerts when

intruders enter restricted areas – Enhanced monitoring providing real‐time access to deployed sensors for

command & control / assessment– Secure wireless network for mobile and fixed sites

• Solutions validated by Independent Agencies

• NAVY Utility Management Control System (NUMCS )– Maintain the Pilot Edge based security capabilities while migrating from SSSPN

• NAVFAC SMARTGRID RFP will provide Advanced Analytics Capabilities

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ICS Solution Overview


Shore Operations Center (ShOC)

Alarms / Alerts on Emergencies Regional Dispatch Center (RDC)

Alarms / Alerts on Building & Utility Operations Public Works Department (PWD)

Quality Assurance on Shore Operations: Contract Execution, Maintenance Support; Event Close-out, etc. Public Works Department, Regional Dispatch Center

Trouble Calls and Service Requests from Installation personnel to the Regional Desk Public Works Department

Shore Integrator

Shore Facilities Engineering Command

Shore Operations Center


Trouble Call Reported

Maximo Ticket Created

ICS Alarm on Building System

Coordinates with Operator

System Requires Service

If HVAC related

QA/QC forTicket Closeout

Active Facility Management Workflow

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Facilities and Energy Operations Center (FEOC)


Sensor Management Suite (SMS Team)

Emergency Call or Fire Alarm Received in Regional Dispatch Center (RDC)

Dispatch First Responders

orCreate Remedy

Ticket

Notify Regional Operation Center (ROC) and Installation Emergency Operations Center

(EOC) per CONOPS

Virtual Perimeter Monitoring System

Emergency Management Workflow

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Sensor Management and Emergency Dispatch


Occupancy ModeStatic PressureSupply Fan SpeedZone Temp

Re-Programming Date – 24 Dec 2014

Re-tuning via controls programming reduced AHU Run Time by 12 hours on weekdays and 16 hours on weekends

Re-tuning Building extends lifecycle of building equipment

Service Area:• West Side• Floors 1,2,&3

Unit:• 12k CFM• 7.5 HP Supply• 15 HP Return

Sustainment Improvement ExampleAir Handler Unit #1

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NDW Technology Insertion


0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

Meter Data (kWh) Average Weekends_Holidays

Daily Meter Data (kWh)Daily Average 1,975

New Daily Average 1,284 ∆‐691 kWhAverage Daily

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Energy Analysis ExampleBuilding Electrical Meter Data

Re-tuning Buildings saves Energy


• Projects Execution for Cyber and Operations is “Easier” than continuous monitoring of deployed systems

• Loss of funding for Public Works funds impacts the ability to repair systems (ROI is predicated on fixing systems)

• Cyber Security and Continuous Monitoring provides a opportunity for additional continuous monitoring and operations of Facility and Utility Infrastructure

• NAVFAC FEOC CONOPS development is an move towards active facility management

• Network and System continuous monitoring helps with system reliability and reduces Operational and Cyber Risk

• NAVFAC RFP addresses the “big data” advanced analytics gap and provides additional tools for system operation and energy savings.

Lessons Learned


Present and Future

Wired/ Wireless InfrastuctureNetwork AssetsVideo Cameras

Direct Digital ControlsAlarm Systems

ELMR

Quick Reaction Force SecuritySensor Based Enclaving

Demand response every 15 minutes based Market Conditions

Condition Based Recurring MaintenanceDynamic Equipment/Fire Response Integration

Instantaneous Access Restrictions

Smart Shore 1.0Systems consolidated onto the same platform

Smart Shore X.0Advanced applications and operating procedures

leveraging integrated system data

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Integrated Systems and CONOPS for the SHORE

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