nbc(p) business continuity management plan...

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NBC(P) Business Continuity Master Plan Issue No: 3 Dated: 31 Dec 2009

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Amendment Record When an amendment is incorporated into this NBC(P) BCMP, the brief details required below are to be inserted

Issue No Brief Summary of Amendment Date

1 Primary document, parts 1 to 3 promulgated 31 March 2009

2 Part 4 – NBC(P) Pandemic Influenza Plan 31 July 2009

3 Update front page logo’s; update contacts; update BAE; re-format document

31 December 2009

Note 1: The Sponsor for this publication is the Captain of the Base (COB). Note 2: All proposed amendments are to be forwarded to DBSyO in the first instance. Note 3: Any changes to contact details are to be forwarded to the EPO soonest.

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Distribution

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Contents Page

Amendment Record i Distribution ii Contents iii Foreword viii

Part 1 – NBC(P) Business Continuity Master Plan 1. Introduction 1 2. Terms and Definitions 2 3. General 2 4. Plan Sponsor / Maintenance 3 5. Responsibilities 3 6. Business Impact Analysis 5 7. Critical Business Outputs and Restoration Priorities 6 8. Critical Business Outputs and Time-Frame Recovery 8 9. Lodger Units and Resident Contractors 8

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Contents Contd

Page Part 2 – NBC(P) Critical Business Recovery 1. Introduction 9 2. Command and Control 9 3. Major Disaster – Initiating NBC(P) BC Master Plan 9 4. Implementation – NBC(P) BC Master Plan 10 5. Financial Arrangements 12 6. Minor Business Continuity Incident 13 7. Outline Strategy 13 8. Threats 13 9. Recovery of Business Options 13 10. Communication Process 15 11. IT Dependency 15 12. Data Stores 16 13. Battle Box 16 14. Mail 16 15. Media Handling 16 16. Direction to Staff 16 17. Training 17 18. Testing 17 19. Documentation Review 17

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Contents Contd Page Part 3 – NBC(P) BCM RISK ASSESSMENTS 1. Introduction 18 2. The National Risk Register 18 Part 4 NBC(P) Pandemic Influenza Plan 1. Introduction 19 2. Aim 19 3. Planning Concept 20 4. Background 21 5. UK National Pandemic Influenza Framework 21 6. MoD Pandemic Influenza Framework 22 7. Planning Guidance 23 8. MoD-defined Response Phases and Invocation 25 9. Business Continuity Issues 27 10. Pandemic Review and Learning 28

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Contents Contd Page Annexes A. Business Continuity Departmental Representatives A1 B. Crisis Management Working Group Members B1 C. List of Lodger Units and Resident Contractors C1 D. Joint Operations Board Members D1 E. Government Procurement Card Holders E1 F. Base Emergencies – What To Do F1 G. Incident Timeline G1 H. Major Incident Orders H1 I. Crisis Management Command and Control I1 J. DE&S Business Continuity Policy Statement J1 K. Business Continuity Incident Flowchart K1 L. Communications – Cascade Call-Out System L1 M. Business Continuity -Terms and Definitions M1 N. Business Continuity – Glossary of Acronyms N1 O. Team Portsmouth – Critical Business Continuity Plans (BIAs) O1 P. Lodger Units Business Continuity Plans P1 Q. MoD Pandemic Planning Assumptions Q1

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Contents Contd Page Annexes Contd. R. DE&S Pandemic Planning Assumptions R1 S. Defence Policy Guidance on Pandemic Specific Issues S1 T. Portsmouth Naval Base Pandemic Communications Policy T1 U. Government Interface and Contacts U1 V. Mod Civilian HR Pandemic Policy Guidance V1 W. Pandemic Response W1 X. Pandemic Recovery X1

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Foreword by Commodore R J Thompson Royal Navy

BSc, C Eng, FIMarEST

1. Robust Business Continuity Management (BCM) arrangements have never been more important. At both HMNB Portsmouth and SMC Marchwood, we need to have the resilience and capability to deal with a wide variety of disruptive challenges. 2. So much of what we do at both locations feeds directly into Military Capability, it is therefore of the utmost importance for all of us, whether working for the MoD, BAE or any of the resident contractors, to practice Business Continuity (BC) well. 3. This Business Continuity Master Plan is an integral part of our ‘Partnering in Portsmouth’ strategy, to ensure that essential critical functions and services in support of Fleet and 2SL are either maintained or quickly restored in the event of an emergency or disaster. It provides general guidance with the minimum of management complexity. To this end, it is most important that key personnel are fully conversant with their responsibilities to facilitate an immediate response in accordance with this plan. It is to be read by all staff. 4. Business Continuity (BC) Department Representatives are responsible for ensuring that precautionary measures are implemented. The key to effective BC lays in the maintenance of local BC Plans which must be up to date, relevant to local conditions, and regularly exercised. Any suggested additions, alterations or amendments, in particular to the telephone contact numbers, are to be passed to DBSyO. I urge you all to play your part in developing and maintaining an effective BC culture within your respective areas.

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Part 1 - NBC(P) Business Continuity Master Plan 1. Introduction 1.1 It is vital for the maintenance of effective national defence forces and structures that critical business functions are identified, and measures put in place to recover them within an acceptable timeframe should a disruptive event or events occur. 1.2 NBC(P) Business Continuity Master Plan (BCMP) is a business owned and driven process that establishes a fit-for-purpose strategic and operational framework that proactively improves NBC(P)s resilience against the disruption of its ability to achieve its key output objectives. This plan is intended to lay down a set of instructions, processes and procedures to be followed in the event of a major incident occurring within HMNB Portsmouth and/or SMC Marchwood, adopting the 3-phase approach. 1.3 During a major incident there are 3 key phases, which require differing stage levels of response, see Incident Timeline diagram Annex G.

a. Phase 1 – Incident Control and Emergency Response. NBC(P) Major Incident Orders detail the immediate responses to controlling an incident, a set of procedures covering Incident Control and Emergency Response that form the basis for managing the incident and provide an interface between MoD and civil emergency authorities.

b. Phase 2 – Crisis Management - Critical Business Recovery. Processes and procedures for restoring business functions and ensuring key staff can, where necessary, be relocated in support of the critical outputs as identified in the relevant Business Unit (BU) Business Continuity (BC) Plans.

c. Phase 3 – Site Recovery. Plans to restore normal business at the affected location.

1.4 NBC(P) BCMP is produced in accordance with DE&S BC strategy, in line with both the DE&S Mission1 and Strategic Objectives2. NBC(P) BCMP is a joint ‘Team Portsmouth’ BC plan, where we must have the agility to respond quickly to the emerging needs to cover possible emergencies and disasters and to focus on ensuring both our own and industries resources are in the right place, in accordance with References3. 1.5 Business Continuity Management (BCM) is a core management function and is embedded into any form of good management. It is an integral part of Corporate 1 The DE&S Mission is “To equip and support our Armed Forces for operations now and in the future”. 2 DE&S Strategic Objective 1 requires us to focus on the needs of FLEET and to ensure we are delivering genuine end-to-end solutions that meet the needs of the operational commander. 3 References:

a. JSP 503 (Business Continuity Management). b. British Standard Institute’s BS 25999 (Business Continuity). c. Extant DE&S Business Continuity Management (BCM) Strategy Document. d. DE&S Policy Statement (see Annex J). e. DE&S Standing Instruction No 5 – Business Continuity. f. DE&S Standing Instruction No 17 – Out of hours Contacts.

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Governance and, must be maintained and reviewed regularly; it cannot succeed without the involvement and commitment of staff within the business areas. BCM is defined in JSP 503 as, “A holistic management process that identifies potential threats to critical defence outputs and the impacts that those threats, if realised, might cause. It provides a framework for building organizational resilience with the capability to support an effective response that safeguards those critical defence outputs and the interests of its key stakeholders and reputation.” 1.6 All personnel should be aware of their own roles and responsibilities within the NBC(P) BCMP with regards to their criticality status. Confusion on the day will be reduced if all staff know where they and others stand in terms of business criticality. Each NBC(P) Directorate/ BAE BU has assigned Business Continuity Departmental Representatives (BCDRs). The list is at Annex A which details the key contacts and critical staff. 2. Terms and Definitions 2.1 For the purpose of this BCMP, the list of definitions at Annex M applies. 3. General 3.1 Due to the complex and diverse nature of the work performed at HMS NELSON, HMNB Portsmouth, this plan contains references to the Portsmouth Major Incident Orders. These overarching emergency response instructions are already in place to cover incidents that are deemed essential to the safety of Personnel and the integrity of HMNB Portsmouth and the Dockyard Port of Portsmouth, which includes that area of The Solent designated under the operational control of the Queen’s Harbour Master (QHM) as well as the sea area outside this in support of SOLFIRE or Oil Pollution Response Plan (OPRP) operations. The procedures contained therein include reference to the initiation of the recovery process to allow the continuation of the Base Business Critical Outputs, Phase 1 of a major incident (Emergency Response), for details see Annex F, Annex G and Annex H. 3.2 NBC(P) BCMP focuses on Phase 2 of a major incident/disaster (Crises Management – Critical Business Recovery), in response to an event, the processes/procedures necessary to endorse and set in motion the temporary measures required to keep the critical business functions going whilst sequentially recovering as many of the other business functions as possible, within the resources available. This phase will commence as soon after the actual incident has occurred, as is safe and practical. The criteria for which a disaster will be declared is: “An event which disrupts business-critical operations for more than 24 hours” 3.3 As with all BU Plans, this document is written to meet the requirements of NBC(P) Base, Port and Maritime capability in order to support the overarching FLEET Critical Outputs4.

4 Critical Outputs are those contained within the still extent Joint Business Agreement (JBA) between C-in-C FLEET and the Chief of Defence Materiel, dated 1 Aug 2008.

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3.4 It should be noted that some corporate ‘Core Outputs’ may not be “Critical”; although to the individual BU they may have been originally considered important and/ or urgent. However, due to current circumstances they may have to be set aside for up 2 to 3 weeks, during this period while alternative arrangements are made. 4. Plan Sponsor / Maintenance 4.1 The Captain of the Base is the sponsor of NBC(P) BCMP, DCOB is the Site Recovery Planner (SRP), focal point coordinator responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of this plan, which will be reviewed annually and tested 6 monthly by DBSyO. It will also be reviewed whenever there is a significant change to the business or as a result of any lessons identified from either exercises or events. 5. Responsibilities 5.1 The SRP (DCOB) ensures that in the event of an emergency, NBC(P) business continues with minimal disruption. SRP is the focal point for all matters relating to BC with the following main responsibilities:

• Chairman – Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG). • Initiate the out of hours cascade process. • Review, test and maintain the NBC(P) BCMP. • Promote greater awareness of Business Continuity Management. • Liaise with DE&S BC focal point. • Provide advice on BC procedures. • In the event of a major disaster identify key critical CMWG members.

5.2 The SRP is assisted in his/her duties by the BC Co-ordinator (DBSyO) whose main responsibilities are to:

• Assist SRP to promote BC awareness. • Authorize HRMS BC reports to be extracted from HRMS. • Assist SRP to review, test and maintain NBC(P) BCMP. • Take the BCMP to CMWG in the event of a major disaster. • Assist to identify critical staff.

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5.3 BC Departmental Representatives (BCDR), these are BU key personnel that take the lead role in preparing for an emergency and establishing normal business after a major disruption to normal working, see Annex A. They are responsible for:

• Reviewing their BU BC Plan (BIAs). • Ensuring their staff keep their contact and next of kin details up to date on

HRMS. • Ensuring that their BU BC Plan (BIAs) and contact details are taken from the

building on evacuation. • Initiating the Cascade Process for their teams and keeping staff informed. • Ensuring their BU staff are aware of BC procedures. • Identifying critical and non-critical staff in the event of a major disruption to

normal working. • Implementing the recovery plan.

5.4 Line Managers. All line managers have the following responsibilities for BC:

• Working with their BU BCDR review/ update BU BC Plan (BIAs). • Review your BU BC risk and mitigation procedures and update accordingly. • Ensure they have the out of hours contact numbers for their staff (MoD

personnel accessible via HRMS). • Ensure their staff understand their responsibilities in supporting the business

should there be a major disruption to normal working. • Proactively promote BC to their staff. • Keep their staff informed of an emergency using the cascade process. • Provide BC Induction for new entrants. • Ensure their staff have completed the necessary BC training.

5.5 All Staff have the following responsibilities for BC:

• Ensure the back-up of essential data. • To be familiar with both, NBC(P) BCMP and your BU BC Plan (BIAs). • To keep a copy of the NBC(P) BCMP at home for reference. • Ensure their line manager is aware of any absences from the office eg.

detached duty, training and home working etc. • Ensuring their emergency contact details are correct and up to date on either

HRMS or BAE HR system. • To carry their keys and other necessities with them at all times to enable to

get home in the event of an emergency. • To read and understand Building Officers site evacuation and emergency

procedures. • To know where their assembly point is, and the identity of both their Reporting

and Building Officers.

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6. Business Impact Analysis (BIA) 6.1 Major incidents by their nature will be different with regard to what we need to do before normal services can be restored. However, there will be some functions within individual business areas that will require certain business functions to be provided in shorter timeframes to support certain aspects of your business. All BU Managers (NBC(P) technical/ subject experts) have completed the BIAs, the aim of this Impact Assessment is to identify essential business functions and recovery plans to be addressed within the BCMP. Business Unit BIAs are attached at Annex O. 6.2 The information will also be used to inform “service providers” of the critical services, equipment, applications etc together with the required recovery time scales. Although every endeavour will be made, there are no guarantees that the level of service and time scales anticipated will be met. The extent of the incident and / or business priorities at the time may impact on the recovery process. 6.3 BIA Phase 1 identifies the main output functions and the time available for their restoration, following a major disruptive challenge, before their loss impacts unacceptably on our customers. 6.4 Critical Business Function. The term “critical” can be interpreted in many ways, the BIA attempts to try and keep the process of identifying “critical” as simple as possible. A critical business function is one which is essential if the business is to continue to operate and normally has to be restored over a short period of time. Criticality Codes: 1. Critical must be restored within 1 week 2. High 2 weeks 3. Medium 3 weeks 4. Low 22 days and beyond. 6.5 Criticality5 has nothing to do with importance, grade or rank. Whilst an effective management structure is an important element in recovering from a disruptive event, BC planners should avoid the temptation of recovering the organisation from the top down. It may prove necessary to tell a very senior person that they are not critical in the first few weeks; this does not detract from their importance during normal operations. 6.6 BIA phase 2 is a more in depth analysis conducted on the critical functions ie those that must be restored within 1 week. It is felt that functions that can be recovered in 2 or more weeks should be recoverable by the Crisis Management Working Group working together to find solutions when the detailed scenario is actually known. In certain instances BU Managers have also included BIA returns for additional output functions that would not be recoverable in the required timeframe without having a pre-developed plan in place. 6.7 The aim of the phase 2 analysis is to identify the critical dependencies for each function, assess whether or not they could be vulnerable in the event of a disruptive challenge and if they are to identify measures that could be adopted at the

5 Extract from JSP503 - 2nd Edition - Chapter 4, paragraph 0422.

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time to restore the dependency and any measures that need to be put in place in advance to enable this to happen or to reduce the vulnerability. 6.8 Minimise Procedures. Each BIA identifies the bare minimum levels of each dependency necessary for the function to continue. All functions are dependent on certain resource/ enablers. Note this almost certainly will not allow normal service to continue, but should enable an adequate service to be provided once demand has been prioritised. 6.9 Having taken into account the needs of stakeholders, BU BIAs identify the minimum resources (dependencies) that each critical activity will require on resumption. These include:

• Staff resources, including numbers, skills/ qualifications. • The premises/ work site and facilities required. • Supporting technology, plant and equipment. • Provision of information (electronic or paper based). • Internal/ external services and suppliers.

6.10 Determining Choices and Devise BU BC Plans. For each dependency or group of dependencies realistic but worst case planning assumptions are applied and BU BC plans devised (precautionary and reactive measures as appropriate to restore the function should the planning assumption occur). As a direct result of the BIA and risk assessment precautionary measures are identified that:

• reduce the likelihood of a disruption; • shorten the period of disruption and • limit the impact of a disruption on the key critical outputs and services.

7. Critical Business Outputs and Restoration Priorities 7.1 Critical Outputs identified should be limited in numbers but may include:

• Reduction in operational capability. • Inability/failure to deliver a critical Departmental output. • Financial penalty. • Political embarrassment (ie impacting upon the Government’s credibility). • Failure to meet contractual / legal / statutory obligations. • Compromise of Security.

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The following acronym focuses on the priority areas worthy of consideration:

Political / Performance Economic Societal / Security Technological Legal Environmental 7.2 NBC(P) Critical Outputs and Restoration Priorities, as endorsed by the Joint Operations Board (JOB), February 2009, are detailed on the next page.

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Business outputs identified by criticality and restoration priority. 8. Critical Business Outputs and Time Frame Recovery: NBC(P) business outputs are not shown as the content exceeds the protective marking of this document. 9. Lodger Units and Resident Contractors 9.1 As stated in DE&S BC policy at Annex J under “Lodgers, Contractors & Visitors” “All non-DE&S staff and visitors are expected to comply with the requirements of this policy, and in particular, to ensure that their activities do not affect existing BC preparations and arrangements”. 9.2 Lodger Units (identified as BUs within the boundary of NBC(P) real-estate, but whose outputs are not controlled by the JOB) are required to have their own BC plans, within which critical outputs and dependencies are identified. These plans should follow formats and guidance produced by their own parent organizations. Where provided these are held at Annex P. 9.3 At a time of crisis good communications are vital, appropriate Lodger Units and Resident Contractor contact details are at Annex C. These nominated Business Managers will represent their BU interests in the event of an incident impacting on the conduct of their business.

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PART 2 – NBC(P) Critical Business Recovery (CBR) 1. Introduction 1.1 Critical Business Recovery (BC - Phase 2 of a major incident/ disaster), the process and procedures for restoring business functions and ensuring key staff are relocated in support of the critical outputs. The framework and responsibilities of CBR will be centrally co-ordinated by NBC(P) Crisis Management Command and Control organisation following an incident, emergency, or disaster to ensure that the resources necessary to recover are correctly prioritised. It also provides timeframes and geographic planning and is linked to each NBC(P) Directorates’/ BAE BU Business Continuity Plans (BIAs), see Annex O. 2. Command and Control 2.1 NBC(P) Command and Control structure is shown below:

CMSG(JOB)

BCDRs

External Agencies

SRP CMWG

NBC(P) SPO MDP / SRO QHM

For details of both the Crisis Management Steering Group (CMSG) and the Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG) see Annex I. 3. Major Disaster – Initiating NBC(P) Business Continuity Master Plan 3.1 NBC(P) is ultimately responsible for all emergency arrangements, for areas under his command, these Incident Control (IC) responsibilities are sub-delegated to SPO MDP/SRO QHM (Land Based/ Maritime incidents). In the event of a major Emergency or Disaster being declared by either SPO MDP or SRO QHM the Site Recovery Planner (SRP) will be called out. SRP (DCOB), in turn, will convene an inaugural meeting of the CMWG; the preferred venue for such a meeting being Semaphore Tower, 3rd floor Conference Room (subject to availability and dependant upon the nature of the disruptive event). The membership of the CMWG is detailed at Annex B. Those nominated are expected to be fully empowered to operate on behalf of their respective Directors/Business Units.

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3.2 If access to Semaphore Tower is denied, then the CMWG will assemble in one of the following alternative locations, where suitable office accommodation will be made available:

• MoD Police SE Division Unicorn Gate Police Station. • HMNB Portsmouth Headquarters.

3.3 If the disruption to business is assessed as likely to last for a prolonged period, a more suitable location may be required. This will need to be identified from resources available at the time, quite possibly with the assistance of either BAE, Defence Estates, or Atlas Consortium. 3.4 The CMWG will then call out the appropriate BCDRs for the affected areas, see Annex A. 3.5 Pandemic influenza is one among many threats to business continuity, a threat where advance warning is provided via the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UK Health Protection Agency (HPA). NBC(P)/ DES follow the three interrelated alert levels; WHO, UK government and MoD. Primary invocation of the Pandemic Influenza Plan (PIP)6 will be controlled on a corporate level, and should be in line with Government guidelines/ advice. Secondary (or local) invocation will be controlled regionally, and will more than likely be site based. At MoD Stage 1 Preliminary, SRP (DCOB) will convene an inaugural meeting of the Pandemic CMWG, in line with Pandemic Response. 4. Implementation - NBC(P) Business Continuity Master Plan 4.1 CMWG Chairman. On being informed of a major incident/ disaster called by either SPO MDP or SRO QHM, SRP the CMWG Chairman (who is also the lead on Site Recovery) will be empowered with the authority to enable the CMWG to act quickly and decisively in the best interests of HMNB Portsmouth and SMC Marchwood. NBC(P) policy is that the level of BCM planning that should be applied should be proportionate to the threats to BC. Specifically SPR will have the following tasks: a. Establish CMWG membership dependent on the nature and gravity of the disaster. b. Fully brief the CMWG on the nature/ gravity of the disaster, at the inaugural meeting. c. Direct and control the BC Recovery Teams, through the CMWG. d. Damage Assessment. Assess the impact to the business to inform recommendations, assist in the making of decisions and establish immediate actions to be taken. e. Develop a tailored Recovery Plan with the Senior Responsible Officer. f. Activate the Business Continuity Plans.

6 Full details of NBC(P) Pandemic Influenza Plan are at Part 4 of this BCMP.

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g. Ensure core tasks are maintained/ restored in priority, to support defined critical business outputs. h. Initiate Minimise Procedures (Part 1 Section 6) and inform/update CMSG and MoD UK. i. Relocate key business functions if appropriate. j. Run business recovery/continuity until normal conduct can be resumed. 4.2 Minimum Resources and Critical Staff. The indicated resource requirements are tabled below (BU Key Points of Contact being listed separately). Minimum Resources Critical Staff Recall list of critical staff and deputies. Access to an office with at least one computer and a printer plus stationery. Battle Box with key data and equipment. Electricity. Fresh Water.

All NBC(P)/ BAE CMWG have been identified and issued with Emergency/ “CMWG” passes and mobile telephones.

4.3 Call out of CMWG. Once the SRP (CMWG Chairman) has been notified of a major incident/ disaster, SRP will call out CMWG Members and additional key personnel as required. Contact details are at Annexes A, B and C. The CMWG consists of senior BU managers who have the responsibility for delivering the critical key outputs and enablers. Ultimately these senior managers are also responsible for maintaining and recovering NBC(P) critical outputs and services. 4.4 CMWG Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the CMWG are: a. As directed by SRP (DCOB), respond to damage/ disaster declarations issued by either SPO MDP or SRO QHM and invoke the appropriate standby/ recovery arrangements to maintain critical activities. In the event of a Pandemic Crisis advanced warning is provide via the WHO/ HPA. b. Decide on fundamental issues of strategy and policy and manage NBC(P) business priorities, starting as soon after the actual incident has occurred and is safe and, continuing through a period when the Base is in a “distressed but stable state” and then throughout the period of disruption, using appropriate BU Plans (BIAs). c. Upon revocation of disaster declaration and the site restores towards normal business at the affected locations, suspend escalation procedure and end CMWG operations at the appropriate time. d. Collect data and recording logs and undertake a Lessons Identified / Review exercise before fully standing down. 4.5 SRP Responsibilities. Damage assessment, salvage, and asset recovery is the responsibility of the SRP. He/she will control the various teams, and dependant on the nature of the incident, will in the first instance estimate the damage and brief NBC(P)/ Duty NBC and MD BAE (through NBDO during silent hours). Should the CMWG be instigated then the SRP will form various subordinate teams including that

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of Site Facilities, which can be expected to have primacy regarding the reconstitution of buildings and utilities. All Recovery Teams will operate under the direction of the CMWG. 4.6 Site Recovery Teams. The CMWG may set up Recovery Teams with the relevant Subject Matter Experts along the lines of:

a. Overall Control/Management of the Recovery Personnel. b. Personnel and Welfare c. Security d. Damage Assessment e. Facilities Management f. Finance g. IT and Communications h. Logistics i. Press, stakeholders and other disaster-related liaison.

5. Financial Arrangements 5.1 All expenditure incurred, to recover and maintain vital business outputs following a major disruptive event, must be authorised at a suitable delegated senior level, recoded in writing and reported to Financial Controller (FC) or Deputy Financial Controller (DFC). Receipts are to be kept to ensure an audit trail is maintained, and all costs are to be attributed to the incident in subsequent accounting. 5.2 Use of Government Procurement Cards (GPC). To facilitate such expenditure the GPC is the suggested method of purchase. There are already a number of GPC cardholders in place across the organisation. A list of current GPC holders is at Annex E.

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6. Minor Business Continuity Incident 6.1 In the event of a minor BC incident, where only one area is affected and it does not have any detrimental impact on the defined NBC(P) Critical Outputs (see Part 1 Section 7), then the respective BCDRs for that area will deal with the incident as necessary. 7. Outline Strategy 7.1 Assumption. No one major event or incident will result in the total closure of HMNB Portsmouth. Relocation and re-establishment of essential critical outputs and services will always be possible within the Naval Base estate. The one exception to this is the weather, when access to and operation of critical outputs and services may be severely curtailed. However, in this circumstance the effect should be temporary. 7.2 If only parts of the site cannot be used, the short-term plan is to provide office facilities for a limited number of key staff in the critical priority outputs within the areas that can be occupied. If however, HMNB Portsmouth has to be wholly or largely closed, the CMWG will orchestrate the movement of Directorates to pre determined locations based on their respective BCPs (BIAs). If necessary, Defence Estates will be asked to identify additional office space. 7.3 The total denial of SMC Marchwood, particularly during surge, is out the scope of these plans due to the strategic impact of such an event. In the event of total denial of the port, PJHQ would direct DSCOM to identify alternative port facilities. 8. Threats 8.1 The main threats to HMNB Portsmouth and SMC Marchwood have been considered in the Business Impact Analysis (BIA) and Risk Assessments (RA) in accordance with JSP 503. 9. Recovery of Business Functions 9.1 Recovery Policy. If the scale of the incident permits, all displaced staff will be found workplaces elsewhere within HMNB Portsmouth and/or SMC Marchwood. If this is not possible, recovery will be prioritised, based on the requirements and locations listed in individual BU BC Plans. Under no circumstances is relocation to take place without clearance from the CMWG. 9.2 Recovery Options. It is probable that, following an incident, Recovery will include a significant temporary phase before permanent solutions are adopted. 9.3 Temporary Recovery. The following temporary recovery options have been identified as a means of building resilience into NBC(P)’s business. Aside from cross-training staff to provide increased “Personal Resilience”, potential measures include:

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a. Reciprocal Arrangements. Essential staffs displace non-essential personnel at the same site or other MoD buildings or sites. Time-sharing should be considered in order to limit damage to the host business. Some departments may find it more practical to collocate with their external business partners. b. Hot Desking / Workstation Sharing. Statistical evidence shows that some 10% of workstations are unused on any day. Though not necessarily contiguous, these “free” work stations would provide immediate access to a workplace for some, if not all, of the staff displaced. c. Working from Home. It may be practical and convenient for some staff to work at home. However, Security, Health and Safety (e.g. Lone Working, Risk Assessments etc.), Insurance, limitations on the availability of IT support and the potential erosion of detached duty allowances will need to be considered. Additional funding arrangements may need to be in place for purchase of additional hardware and uplift to third party support arrangement if this option is implemented on a broad scale.

d. Utilise Non Office Areas. Consideration should be given to using conference/meeting rooms, canteen and recreational areas. Pre-installation of limited infrastructure in large conference rooms and recreational areas is also an advantage. This would provide the capability to rapidly deploy a limited number of essential staff, dependent on room size, within hours of a major incident or disruptive event. e. Increasing Utilisation of Existing Office Accommodation. Identify and use space or workstations allocated to ‘gapped’ posts outside of the affected area. This would provide immediate accommodation, though workstations may not be loaded with all the software required. f. Transfer of Critical Work / Functions. Rather than trying to deliver Critical Outputs locally, it may be practicable for BUs to agree to transfer such responsibility to another external BU.

g. Short Term Leasing. Identify and use vacant, private sector accommodation, assuming that accommodation is of an acceptable standard and meets with security constraints. This option would be appropriate if accommodation were required for long-term temporary use (i.e. more than 6 months). Additional funding would be required for lease, fitting and security. It should be noted that any active equipment purchased for the temporary site could be re-deployed and re-commissioned at the permanent site when refurbishment has been completed.

h. Mobile Temporary Accommodation (eg Portakabins). Would only be used when more permanent accommodation is unlikely to be available within restoration periods and when the suitability of other options has been considered. Provision of temporary accommodation would include the installation of IT and related support infrastructure services.

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10. Communication Process 10.1 Communications Out of Hours7. Should a major incident/disaster occur out of hours, a two way cascade is in place to enable staff to be contacted as quickly as possible. Either SPO MDP or SRO QHM will start the cascade process by contacting the Site Recovery Planner (SRP). The flow of information will then cascade through to individuals via the Line Management chain. Once all staff have been notified, the cascade process is reversed. Line Managers should report through the chain so that SRP is aware that all staffs have been contacted. Names of any staff not contacted should be notified to the SRP who will annotate the contact list from HRMS. See Annex L. 10.2 Once initial contact has been made, staff must resist phoning their colleagues in order to keep the lines free for further communications. Staff should not contact either the Major Incident Planning Unit or the CMWG during the first 48 hours of the incident. 10.3 Business Continuity Reports will only be run off HRMS/ JPA in the event of an emergency and only by nominated personnel with special permission or by the PPPA. 10.4 In the event of a major incident, there may be information broadcast via the media, either radio or TV, also check the Royal Navy Website for additional information (www.royalnavy.mod.uk). 10.5 Communications During Office Hours. In the event of an incident occurring during working hours staff will be informed via the Tannoy or Fire Alarm. Should it be necessary to evacuate a building or part of the site, evacuation will be in accordance with Naval Base Orders as applied to Fire or Bomb alert procedures. When necessary, HRMS reports will be run, in order to contact any staff absent from work, as described above. 11. IT Dependency 11.1 During recent years the advancements in IT hardware (H) and Software (S) have multiplied the organizations IT dependency. In the event of a major incident, in addition to the possibility of IT H/S replacement, the priority will be the recovery of shared data areas based upon effective data back-up policies. The nature of the incident will determine the method to be used for this recovery and the location where recovery will take place. 11.2 NBC(P) is currently in the latter stages of transfer to DII(F), delivery of all major elements October 2009, with remaining remedial action and final completion early 2010. ATLAS Consortium is the service provider of DII(F) and responsible for MoD DII(F) Business Service Continuity (BSC)8. Where site DII(F) connectivity is unavailable for more than 24 hrs, alternative arrangements to work at other DE&S sites will be invoked, (South UK DE&S alternative sites include; Abbey Wood, Andover and HMNB

7 DE&S Standing Instruction No 17 – Out of Hours Contacts. This SI sets out the contacts to be used, which will ensure that DE&S Board Members who need to be, are alerted to an incident in a timely manner. 8 ATLAS BSC Plan for both HMNB Portsmouth and SMC Marchwood sites is currently being produced and will be included within NBC(P) BCMP when published.

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Devonport). Where the use of approved MoD laptops on existing sites or at home is authorised, use CDROM backup until DII(F) connectivity is restored. 11.3 Due to the additional risk of DII(F) associated with the loss of site connectivity and backup facilities, alternative system contingency plans may be prudent, paper copy should be considered for immediate essential data backup. Any workarounds developed need to be regularly tested, not only to ensure they work but also to give staff the chance to practice their implementation and get used to working in this different way. 12. Data Stores 12.1 Access to key data, paper or electronic, may be a key element to some BUs ability to continue critical business activity following a major disruption. BUs should consider storing a certain amount of key data, either in another building or off-site, so that it is accessible should a local disaster occur. 13. Battle Box 13.1 In the event of an emergency and the evacuation of a building or facility, reoccupation may not be possible for some time. Battle Box (a small man-portable store of key data and/or equipment (perhaps a laptop)) should be available. Then BU BCDRs will automatically have the necessary access to key material to allow critical activity to continue elsewhere. 14. Mail 14.1 The redistribution of mail for affected BU is a function of the Mail Office. If necessary the Mail Office will be relocated in accordance with SRPs Business Continuity Plan (BCP). SRP BCP will also address any action planning regarding mail from Royal Mail and Parcel Force. 15. Media Handling 15.1 The Staff Public Relations Officer (SPRO), a member of the CMWG, is responsible for all liaison between the Naval Base and the media. In the event of a major incident, SPRO will implement the HMS NELSON, HM Naval Base Portsmouth Major Incident Media Plan. He is responsible for the co-ordination of Public Relations and for passing media statements and information to the Media. No other individual is to communicate information relating to the incident either to news media, the general public or external military/government agencies. Any approach for information should be referred through the Chain of Command to SPRO or his nominated representative. 16. Direction to Staff 16.1 NBC(P) Directorates/ BAE Business Units are responsible for ensuring that contact details for staff are readily available. In the event of a major incident within HMNB Portsmouth and/or SMC Marchwood it is the responsibility of all BU managers to keep their staff informed.

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17. Training 17.1 All BCDRs shall undergo the two-day BC Practitioner course. Command and Control (C2) Training will be provided for CMWG members. It is current DE&S policy that all staff are to undertake the interactive (45 min) e-learning BC module. 18. Testing 18.1 Six monthly testing exercises will probe the robustness of NBC(P) BCMP and BU BC Plans (BIAs). This will involve the CMWG and BCDRs, and may be achieved by a traditional Table Top Exercise (TTX) or by a more dynamic Base-wide test. 19. Documentation Review 19.1 NBC(P) BCMP and other relevant associated documentation shall be reviewed annually, or as and when staff lists are amended and routinely on completion of testing, whether or not that be achieved by Base wide Table Top Exercises (TTXs) or a dynamic test.

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PART 3 – NBC(P) BCM Risk Assessments 1. Introduction 1.1 In a BCM context, the level of risk should be understood specifically in respect to our Partnering critical output activities and the risk of a disruption to these. Critical activities are underpinned by resources such as people, premises, technology, supplies and stakeholders. We must understand the threats to these resources, the vulnerabilities of each resource, and the impact that would arise if the threat became an incident and caused a major disruption. 1.2 Review the BC risks and, if possible, practicable and affordable, any obvious mitigation work to reduce or remove these risks must be investigated. The Business Impact Analysis (BIA) can help gain a more thorough understanding of how different effects impact on the critical business functions and aid planning. Each NBC(P) BU is to maintain a detailed Business Impact Analysis in their areas in the development of their BC documentation. 2. The National Risk Register (NRR) 2.1 The NRR is intended to capture the range of emergencies that might have a major impact on all, or significant parts of, the UK. It provides a national picture of the risks we face, and is designed to complement Community/ Organisational Risk Registers, already produced and published by emergency planners. The driver for this work is the Civil Contingencies Act 20049. 2.2 Incidents described in the NRR, whether natural, accidental or deliberate, can cause significant disruption to NBC(P) critical outputs. Once a risk is identified and analysed, BU Managers must decide how to respond to the risk. Note, that the desire is not to have zero risk; risk response should be proportional to the risk and risks are to be managed only to a tolerable level, this ensures the response offers value for money. 2.3 The risk response process involves identifying and evaluating a range of options for treating risks. Risk responses themselves should be investigated to see if they create an opportunity or pose a threat to other areas of activity, such linkages should be recorded and other stakeholders engaged. Included overleaf are a number of high level assessments that may affect HMNB Portsmouth and/ or SMC Marchwood Site-wide operations.

9 Further information about the Act can be found on the UK Resilience website: www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience.aspx

http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience.aspx

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Part 4 - NBC(P) Pandemic Influenza Plan 1. Introduction 1.1 Pandemic influenza is one among many threats to business continuity; albeit a significant threat. Managing the Pandemic threat is an integral aspect of business continuity. Accordingly:

a. this Pandemic Influenza Plan (PIP) is subordinate to the NBC(P) Business Continuity Master Plan (BCMP) – the PIP does not set out to replicate the material set out in the BCMP and relies upon the provisions specified in the BCMP being applied;

b. it is not the intention to establish Pandemic measures that stand alone from the business continuity approach: this plan provides “pointers” into the NBC(P) BC Management (BCM) system to highlight the Pandemic provision;

c. the current PIP has been produced in separate form10 in order that the business can understand what measures are in place to address the specific Pandemic threat.

1.2 It is noted that a Pandemic has the potential to affect virtually all ‘Team Portsmouth’ (MoD/ BAE) key business processes; expertise, workforce, customers, suppliers, services, utilities etc. therefore Pandemic Planning needs to be seamlessly integrated into the general BCM process so that a Pandemic can be treated in a manner consistent with the treatment of other threats. 1.3 In the event of a pandemic influenza the MoD planning priorities will need to balance the requirements to enable it to deliver critical business and operational outputs with the provision of necessary support (duty of care) to service and civilian personnel wherever they are serving. In terms of MoD contingency planning, three broad issues need to be addressed: the impact on Defence Outputs, service and civilian employees contracting a pandemic virus and Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities (MACA) Obligations. 1.4 The NBC(P) PIP has been founded on a number of MoD and DE&S assumptions (at Annexes Q and R respectively). If any of the DE&S assumptions are not true-to-fact then they need to be made so, if possible, or the actual position reported to the Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG)11. 2. Aim 2.1 This PIP details the necessary planning data to support operational resilience planning across NBC(P) and confirms the actions to be taken by Business Units (BUs) in the run up to, during and after a potential outbreak of pandemic influenza. 2.2 Our intent is to protect the core operational outputs of the RN, whilst protecting the wider ‘Team Portsmouth’ business outputs wherever possible, and meet our “duty of care” obligations to civilian and military personnel. This will be achieved through detail adherence to hygiene measures, and an agile responsive command chain fed with timely reporting from BUs.

10 PIP produced as Part 4 to NBC(P) BCMP. 11 For details of NBC(P) Command and Control structure see BCMP Part 2 Para 2 and Annex I.

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2.3 By its very nature pandemic will affect staff and personnel directly and indirectly, at unpredictable points in time and in a random manner. Planning therefore needs to concentrate on making sure the right staff, with the right skills, knowledge, experience, tools and information, are in the right places at the right time and doing the right things. 3. Planning Concept 3.1 There is no single approach or measure that can be taken to reduce the spread of pandemic flu. Prompt self-isolation together with proper respiratory etiquette and effective hand hygiene should be actively promoted, encouraged and applied. An approach where environmental, organizational and individual actions are combined and applied will help to reduce the spread of the flu virus within the workplace. 3.2 To assess the practicality/ practicability of possible mitigation measures; a full risk assessment should be undertaken, to reduce both, the transmission of the infection and the risk that susceptible employees might become infected, with emphasis on the three main levels of intervention: environmental, organizational and individual. 3.3 When planning, there is a real risk of over-focus on a single identified threat. Over-focus can lead to the development of plans and arrangements that are not entirely useful if a similar but different threat materializes. Contingency core planning should therefore be generic, rather than specific; specific issues are addressed in Business Unit planning Business Impact Analysis (BIAs) at Annex O. In this context, a UK-only epidemic (see BC terms and definitions Annex M) would have many of the effects and impacts of a pandemic, noting that the triggers for escalation may well come from sources other than the World Health Organization (WHO), such as the UK Health Protection Agency (HPA). 3.4 Thus NBC(P) PIP arrangements are:

a. Coherent with both MoD framework and Government planning. b. Coherent with Front Line Command (FLC) plans. c. Flexible and non-prescriptive. d. Adequate. e. Responsive yet robust. f. Communicable with DE&S (and to suppliers and contractors) . g. Compliant with MoD policy and UK (and EU) legislation.

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4. Background 4.1 Pandemics are caused by a new form of Influenza virus to which individuals have either no immunity whatsoever or, possibly, and usually in the elderly, who have a small degree of immunity. This global lack of immunity means that the virus spreads widely and easily, a pandemic is a global disease outbreak. 4.2 The WHO has developed an alert system to help inform the world about the threat of a flu pandemic emerging. The alert system has six phases. Phase 1 and 2 are the inter-pandemic period with little if any risk of a pandemic virus emerging; Phases 3, 4 and 5 are the pandemic alert phases indicating an increasing risk from a new flu virus; and Phase 6 is pandemic confirmed. 4.3 Pandemic flu is likely to cause the same symptoms as ordinary flu but the symptoms may be more severe because nobody will have any immunity or protection against that particular virus. In previous pandemics, 25 to 35% of the UK population became ill (clinical attack rate), compared to 5 to 15% of the UK population in normal seasonal flu. Excess mortality in previous pandemics has been much higher than for normal seasonal flu when 12,000 flu-related excess deaths are estimated to occur each year. 4.4 There have been three pandemics in the last century, the longest of which was in 1918 when approximately 50 million people died worldwide. Similar pandemics occurred in 1957 and 1968 with approximately 30,000 and 25,000 deaths in the UK respectively. It is currently too early to predict with any accuracy the scale of the 2009 pandemic. 5. UK National Pandemic Influenza Framework 5.1 The UK’s national Framework for responding to an Influenza Pandemic12 was developed in response to the threat posed by a world wide influenza epidemic (a pandemic). The UK National Framework aligns with the six-phase Global Pandemic Alert System used by the WHO. Once WHO Alert Level 6 (Pandemic) has been declared, the UK Framework follows a four-level alert system, relating to the nature and status of the disease from a UK perspective. 5.2 Defence’s role and responsibilities under the UK Framework are13: “During a pandemic, the Armed Forces’ priority will continue to be to maintain critical military operations. As with guidance for other major emergencies, planners should not assume that MACA will be available. Such assistance might be available in exceptional circumstances if life and property are in immediate danger, but planning for an influenza pandemic should take into account that support may not be available if local units are deployed on operations, that they may not have personnel available with either the requisite skills or equipment to undertake special tasks and that military personnel will themselves be vulnerable to the illness”.

12 Published by the Cabinet Office and the Department of Health in 2007, available through the Pandemic Influenza Planning page on the Defence Intranet. 13 While the current priority lies with the delivery of Defence outputs this could be changed as a result of a change in Government Policy.

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5.3 Containment. In the first instance the UK approach to a pandemic is one of containment, whereby those in contact with confirmed cases at home and in the workplace, are prescribed anti-virals (such as Tamiflu) to try and prevent the development of illness, reduce its severity, and limit its spread. The national policy is aimed at delaying the spread of the virus as far as possible, managing UK anti-viral stockpiles responsibly whilst also reassuring the public and providing treatment to all those who need it. This is the normal policy employed by the RN medical services in liaison with local Health Protection Services. 5.4 Mitigation. If the containment strategy is overtaken by the virus there will be a move to a policy of mitigation. Mitigation aims to treat all those who need it, manage antiviral stockpiles responsibly and gather information to inform future strategy. Advice, in accordance with national policy and guidance, will be disseminated to COs and Medical Centre’s if or when this becomes the case. 6. MOD Pandemic Influenza Framework 6.1 Working within the UK National Framework, MoD has developed its own Pandemic Influenza Framework and supporting guidance documents14. They are based on the same worst-case scenario used in the National Framework: a highly pathogenic influenza virus spreading from Asia rapidly across the Globe. Given MoD’s worldwide footprint and the nature and complexity of Defence operations, however, the MoD Framework consolidates the 6-phases of the WHO Alert System into four stages called Preliminary, Prepare, Absorb and Recover. 6.2 NBC(P)/ DE&S follow three interrelated alert levels: the WHO leading on international monitoring, the UK Government measurement setting the national level and the four Phase MoD framework, see table below.

WHO Global Pandemic Alert System

Pandemic Phase Human-Human Risk Alert Level

MOD Flu Framework

Stage

UK Govt Alert Levels

Low risk of human cases.

1 Inter-Pandemic Phase New virus in animals, no human cases.

Higher risk of human cases.

2

Human infections reported but little or no human-to-human spread.

3

Stage 1

Preliminary

Evidence of increased human-to-human transmission.

4 Stage 2

Prepare

Pandemic Alert New virus causes human cases.

Evidence of significant human-to-human transmission.

5

Stage 3 Absorb

Level 1 – Cases only outside the UK

Pandemic Efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission

6 Stage 3

Absorb Level 2 – New virus isolated in the UK

14 These are published on the Defence Intranet.

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WHO Global Pandemic Alert System

Pandemic Phase Human-Human Risk Alert Level

MOD Flu Framework

Stage

UK Govt Alert Levels

Level 3 – Outbreak(s) in the UK Level 4 – Widespread activity across the UK

Post Pandemic Period End of pandemic – return to inter pandemic period

Stage 4

Recovery

7. Planning Guidance 7.1 Pandemic influenza poses a number of challenges which need to be recognized when planning responses:

a. All response planning phases need to be completed, agreed and in place prior to the arrival of the pandemic. Once the World Health Organisation (WHO) and Department of Health (DoH) announce that a pandemic is imminent, its arrival time from source country to the UK could be as little as 14 days, leaving no time for working up new plans.

b. For planning purposes planners must assume that the duration of the next influenza will be anything up to a period of twenty-four months, and could be even longer. Extrapolating from documented influenza pandemics, there may be as many as three infection waves, with each likely to last up to fifteen weeks. According to planning phases of the MoD Pandemic Influenza Framework, the duration of these for planning purposes is as follows:

(1). Phase 1 (Preliminary): Indeterminate duration, up to the point where the WHO and DoH declare that a worldwide influenza pandemic is imminent.

(2). Phase 2 (Prepare): the duration of this phase may be a little as fourteen days (for planning purposes) but may extend to eight weeks.

(3). Phase 3 (Absorb): once MoD moves to this phase planners must assume a period of at least eighteen months given the need to sustain business outputs during at least three waves of the pandemic. (4). Phase 4 (Recovery): this phase is only initiated once the WHO and DoH declare that the pandemic is over. Planners should assume that the recovery process will take many months and may extend into a year or two before all business outputs are restored and staff return to work.

7.2 The reason the recovery process is likely to be prolonged is because of the impact the pandemic will have had across the Top Level Budget-holder (TLB), the MoD and UK, perhaps global, society.

a. During the pandemic non-essential establishments may close and others may have been reduced to supporting only critical outputs in support

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of current operations. Once the pandemic is declared over there is likely to be a period of re-activation activities at such establishments. Given that many such establishments are dependent on service providers; this process is likely to take weeks rather than days so that MoD can meet its legal liability of guaranteeing a safe working environment.

b. During the peak period of the pandemic the department could have

experienced very high absenteeism (the HPA estimates about two-thirds of staff) due to being sick (and unable to work); caring for the sick; in quarantined areas (but willing to work); having suffered family bereavement; caring for children and the elderly; being unable to get to work; or being just the “worried well” (including those unwilling to travel). Once the pandemic is over staff may be unlikely to return en mass but rather in a staggered and controlled manner once their working environment has been declared safe to return to work and all the necessary supporting infrastructure is properly up and running.

c. There may be many staff and personnel who will not be returning to work, either through death, incapacity or because the pandemic has forced a life changing situation (i.e. death of a partner, parental responsibilities, care for a member of family who has been permanently disabled as a result of contracting the flu influenza). Whatever the reason for not returning to work, the net result will be a demand for welfare, counselling and aftercare services that could run for up to a couple of years after the pandemic is over. In addition, there may be increased demand from staff wanting to work from home, driven either by working experiences during the pandemic itself or through changed personal circumstances as a result of the pandemic. This post-recovery activity to be the most important aspect by which the Naval Base is judged as to how it handled the pandemic and met its “duty of care” obligations to its civilian and military personnel.

d. Staff and personnel who do not return to work may have to be

replaced. This may be difficult as there may be significant competition for recruits from many other organisations as they also seek to fill pandemic-related vacancies. The time for recruitment, induction, training and education should be considered when making plans.

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8. MoD-defined Response Phases and Invocation15

8.1 Primary invocation will most certainly be controlled on a corporate level, and should be in line with Government guidelines/ advice. Secondary (or local) invocation will be controlled regionally, and will more than likely be site based. 8.2 Preliminary - Stage 1. This phase exists to the point where global warnings indicate that an influenza pandemic is likely with a time domain. During this phase emphasis is placed on:

a. Assessing the possible impact of a pandemic. b. Developing resilience options for critical areas. c. Planning isolation capability whilst positioning medical treatments as appropriate. d. Developing Business Continuity Plans and maintaining Business Impact Analysis (BIAs). e. Preparing our communications strategies.

8.3 Prepare - Stage 2. This stage starts with the first reports of human-to-human transmissions of Flu influenza (at WHO Alert Phase 4), where the situation is characterised by steps being taken to contain the spread of human infection and to assess the risk of escalation into a pandemic. This is the stage between the identification of a specific likelihood of the outbreak of a pandemic and its impact on the UK or defence activity overseas. Now that a pandemic is imminent, MoD will invoke the following:

a. Health/ safety/ welfare of staff. Maintenance of a secure and safe working environment (with emphasis on nuclear safety as always).

b. Maintenance of operational and critical outputs. c. Isolation and medical treatments within BIAs would be invoked at this point. d. Abandonment of non-essential activities to allow enhancement of operational critical outputs.

e. Good communications with military and civilian personnel16.

15 Strategic Defence policy guidance on specific issues including Medical is at Annex S. 16 Pandemic Communications Policy is at Annex T.

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8.4 Government Interface and Contacts. The interface with Government Agencies will be key in a Pandemic, as NBC(P)/ BAE will need to take its lead from Government policy directives and may require support from the authorities concerned. The relevant authorities are detailed at Annex U. 8.5 Command and Control in Pandemic. It is essential that robust command and control be maintained including under the stresses of a Pandemic; noting that a Pandemic may infect key personnel or lead to them becoming unavailable to the business (due to communications, travel/ location or social constraints)17. For this reason BU BC plans (BIAs) should provide for deputies in all critical posts. A NBC(P) Pandemic CMWG will be convened, see BCMP Part 2 for details. 8.6 Testing NBC(P) Pandemic Influenza Plan. NBC(P) Business Continuity arrangements cannot be considered reliable or robust until tested. A formal NBC(P) BCM testing process will involve the Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG) and Business Continuity Department Representatives (BCDRs), and may be achieved by traditional Table Top Exercise (TTX) or by a more dynamic Base-wide test. 8.7 Absorb – Stage 3. This stage occurs at the point where WHO Alert level 5 is declared, where steps are taken to mitigate as far as possible the full effects of the human pandemic.

a. This continues into WHO Alert level 6, the period of the full pandemic where there is widespread infection and when it affects Defence business or where the Defence fingerprint exists and where non-essential tasks and activities are suspended and pandemic contingency plans are invoked across Defence to ensure that essential outputs are maintained. At this point:

(1). Military operational activity may need to be reduced, with priority given to defending our own forces. (2). During this phase it will be essential to monitor the spread of the pandemic so that demands on re-supply chains, defence medical facilities and support capabilities can be adjusted to cope with changing priorities.

b. Portsmouth Naval Base (PNB) must be prepared to meet moderate to

significant disruption, as the pandemic waves hit in intermittent strength across the UK. Our people will be affected and at times will need clear guidance and firm direction. This will be a dynamic situation as updates and signals are received. c. At this stage of the proceeding in addition to meeting our “duty of care” obligations to civilian and military personnel, the emphasis will also focus towards Business Continuity18 and critical business recovery. The processes and procedures for restoring our business functions and ensuring key staff can, where necessary, be contacted and rescheduled in support of the critical outputs as identified in the relevant BU BC plans and (BIAs).

17 MoD Civilian HR Pandemic Policy Guidance is at Annex V.18 Full details of NBC(P) Business Continuity are at Part 1 and Part 2 of this BCMP.

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8.8 Pandemic Response. This section of the pandemic plan prescribes the different areas of response in the context of WHO Pandemic Phase (Alert level 6), and then addresses the practical issues likely to arise as the phases of response progress. Annex W details the response to be considered per activity.

8.9 Recovery - Stage 4. This is the phase after the pandemic and continues until Defence outputs are no longer actually or by means of residual impact affected by the pandemic influenza. The gradual return to normality will include:

a. Re-establishment of training priorities. b. Recovery of battle rhythm, leave and rest and recuperation (R&R) cycles, operational support, contingent capability and full business outputs. c. The provisions of NBC(P) BCMP Recovery of Business Functions19 apply to Pandemic as to other Business incidents. Additional details relevant to post-pandemic scenarios, worthy of consideration are at Annex X.

9. Business Continuity Issues 9.1 Pre-Incident Issues. NBC(P)/ BAE (Team Portsmouth) as a business partner should continue to develop their BCM infrastructure and methodology , including:

a. Review. Business Unit Business Continuity Departmental Representatives (BCDRs) are advised to review their Business Continuity (BC) plans (BIAs) as part of a table top exercise. This will ensure all levels of local command are alert to the BUs critical outputs, which need to be maintained or restored within 24 to 48 hours.

b. Trip Wires. Ensure that those areas, which rely on your business outputs, understand these may be reduced to critical outputs if a flu pandemic worsens. The scale of impact is impossible to judge, but it should be possible to quantify trip wires at which business outputs will be reduced or cease.

c. Key Personnel. It is important to ensure that those personnel who are essential to critical outputs are identified and briefed on the importance of their roles. Consideration should be given to how these personnel are supported, with alternate staff able to fulfil their function identified and briefed. Identification of key personnel, particularly in the case of nationally sensitive capabilities, may in course attract priority for vaccination.

d. Non-Essential Staff. Equally it is important to ensure that those who aren’t essential to critical business outputs know who they are. In the event of pandemic influenza spreading rapidly it may be appropriate to instruct non-essential staff to remain at home. However, it is important that their contact details are recorded and that it is clear that such action is not taken unilaterally. e. Adjust Working Practices. To minimize spread of the infection, preventative ways of working should be considered and modified if appropriate; increased use of Video Telephone Conferences (VTC) and

19 For NBC(P) BCMP Recovery of Business Functions see Part 2 Para 9.

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Information Technology (IT) and the subsequent reduction in the need to travel or attend meetings will help prevent the wider spread of infection and reduce the risk to your own area of introducing the virus.

f. Interdependence. Identify interdependence between organizations and ensure they are resilient, (for example ensuring contractual suppliers relationships are adequately covered off).

9.2 Incident Issues. NBC(P)/ BAE must take all reasonable steps to support both the Government and Local Government in managing the emerging issues.

a. Stay at Home. It will be important to ensure that all employees who are ill because they have flu like symptoms during a pandemic, stay at home, call their GP or NHS Direct and be assessed and receive treatment if necessary. When advised by health professionals (including NHS Direct) that their symptoms relate to influenza they must inform their line managers. All Military personnel (at home or living in Single Living Accommodation (SLA) will telephone their Medical Centre, as a result of this contact may be visited (at home or SLA) either by military medical staff or NHS staff. If absent from duty, ensure that your Divisional Officer is immediately notified.

b. Hygiene Message. Ensuring that all employees are made aware of

Government advice on how to reduce the risk of infection during a pandemic. The most important message, is to maintain good hygiene practices by following the Health Protection Agency’s ‘catch it, bin it, kill it’, advice.

c. Hygiene Facilities. Ensure that Government hygiene directives are

followed. d. Health and Safety. Ensure that Health and Safety responsibilities to

employees are continuously discharged. e. Limited Travel. It is also reasonable to assume that national travel

arrangements will be subject to modification in some way. This could mean limited inter-site travel, and perhaps a degree of home working in areas which permit.

10. Pandemic – Review and Learning

10.1 After the crisis has subsided a review is required of how well the Business Continuity arrangements and (specifically) the PIP performed. It will be important to gather Lessons Identified as they occur, to ensure they can be relayed to BUs where the pandemic has yet to impact.

a. The “lessons learned” review should be led by the CMWG Chairman. Include the participation of all major stakeholders within NBC(P)/ BAE; also seeking input from the all major external stakeholders.

10.2 Further Waves. A feature of Pandemic is that it is predicted to come in waves; potentially three waves, each lasting up to fifteen weeks. Second and subsequent waves may be more or less severe than the first.

10.3 The plan for a second or subsequent wave is unchanged from that set out above except in that:-

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a. Lessons learned urgently from the first wave (as above).

b. Whilst the priority at the end of the first wave will be to further develop recovery plans and gradually restore supplies, services and activities depleted or curtailed during the Pandemic, regrouping should also be considered in anticipation of a future wave.

c. Heightened monitoring and surveillance will be required for some time beyond the first wave. In particular, there are likely to be ongoing constraints on supplies and services, perhaps combined with the loss of key staff.

d. Updated information on the epidemiology of the virus, effectiveness of treatment, availability of countermeasures and lessons should be available to be learned from the first wave: this will help inform and shape the response measures that may need to be maintained or implemented for second and subsequent waves. This information will help in informing transition between the Alert Levels.

10.4 Lessons Identified Format

Issue (a)

Comment/ Proposed Solution/ Good Practice

(b)

Action (c)

Returns should be made to DBSyO.

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A - 1 UNCLASSIFIED

Annex A

To: NBC(P) BCMP BC Departmental Representatives (BCDR) NOTE: In accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 98), this information is provided exclusively for use in the event of the BC Plan being invoked. Authority is not given for these details to be stored or used for any other purpose. Department Post Name Work Tel.

Ext. Mobile No.

NBC(P) EA/NBC NBC(P)/HR HRBP COB/BSyO BSyO COB/BSyO DBSyO COB/EST Est Mgr COB/BSM BSM COB/BSM SFC COB/BSM PMNUC COB/BSM MSS 2 COB/BSM DRSO COB/NMOH NMOH COB/Medical Centre

MAO

COB/QHM QHM COB/BXO BXO COB/BXO 1st Lt COB/BXO MAA COB/BXO RC OIC COB/BXO AONPFS (EO) COB/BXO CTL COB/BXO PMO COB/BXO SDS COB/BXO AFO COB/BLM BLC COB/BLM LOCA COB/BLM COB LO COB/BLM DBLC(PCS) COB/BLM DBLC(OC) SFM/DSFM DSFM SFM/SC SFM SC SFM/DFTE DFTE SFM/APM APM FC/DFC

DFC

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A - 2 UNCLASSIFIED

Department Post Name Work Tel. Ext.

Mobile No.

FC/IT IT SP NBC(P) COMM DepHd

NBC(P) CB1A

Transformation NB Trans Prog

Man

DSMC SO2 Port Ops DSMC SO2 Bus Dev DSMC SO3 Port Ops DSMC PMCC MCWO DSMC Quay Foreman DSMC DRCS Railway

Ops

DSMC SER DSMC DFRS DSMC RFA DSMC DHL BAE/PNB BC BAE/SF/EST C Eng BAE/SF/BEPO HoSy BAE/SF/LOG Ho Log/SCS BAE/SF/LOG Fre Man BAE/SF/Eng P Eng Ex BAE/SF/Eng Eng Delivery

(Sp)

BAE/SF/Eng Mech Man (Sp) BAE/SF/Eng HoFS BAE/SF/PBS SM Man BAE/SF/SHE SHE Man MGS/HMNB(P) CS02 MGS/SMC(M) CS03 MDP/HMNB(P) OS MDP Marine Unit

Inspr MU

MDP/SMC(M) PS

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Annex B To: NBC(P) BCMP

NBC(P) Business Continuity Master Plan Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG) NOTE: In accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 98), this information is provided exclusively for use in the event of the BC Plan being invoked. Authority is not given for these details to be stored or used for any other purpose. Department Post Name Work Tel

Ext. Mobile No.

COB SRP (Chairman) BSyO D/SRP NBC EA NBC Key Output Areas COB/ BSM BSM COB/ BSM SFC COB/ BSM PMNUC COB/ QHM QHM COB/ QHM DQHM COB/ BXO BXO COB/ BXO 1st Lt COB/ BLM BLC COB/ BLM Logs O BAE(FSL)/ LOG Ho Log/ SCS BAE(FSL)/ LOG Fre Man SFM/ DSFM DSFM SFM/ DFTE DFTE BAE SF/ ENG P Eng Ex BAE SF/ ENG T S Dir BAE SF/ ENG M Man BAE SF/ ENG HoFS DSMC SO2 Port Ops DSMC SO1 Port Ops Key Enablers COB/ BSyO BSyO BAE SF/ BEPO HoSy NBCP/HRBP HRBP BAE SF/HR HoHR FC/ DFC DFC FC/ IT IT SP COB/NMOH NMOH Cob/Medical Centre MAO BAE SF/ SHEF SHEF Man COB/AD EST AD Est BAE SF/ EST C Eng BAE SF/ BEPO HoSy MGS/ HMNB(P) CS02 MGS/ SMC(M) CS03 MDP / HMNB(P) OS MDP / HMNB(P) Ch Insp Ops MDP/ SMC(M) PS NBCP/ SPRO SPRO BAE/NBC Team Portsmouth

Corporate Comms

NBCP/ HRBP Non Ind TU Rep

UNCLASSIFIED


B - 2 UNCLASSIFIED

Lodgers20

20 Lodger Unit BC representatives will attend the CMWG if the disruptive event impacts on the site services they need.

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Annex C To: NBC(P) BCMP

List of Lodger Units and Resident Contractors NOTE: In accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 98), this information is provided exclusively for use in the event of the BC Plan being invoked. Authority is not given for these details to be stored or used for any other purpose. 1. Lodger Units and Resident Contractors Department/ Company

Post Name Communication Details Location

Action Stations Manager Building 1/023, 19 College Road, HM Naval Base Portsmouth.

Adams Poole Manager Building 1/007, Porters Lodge, College Road, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth, PO1 3LJ.

Antiques Storehouse

Manager Storehouse 9, Main Road, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Aramark Catering Manager

Aramark, HMS Nelson, Queen Street, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Atlas Project Manager Building 1/079, Jago Road, HM Naval Base Portsmouth.

BAE Head of Security Building 2/166, Daring Building, Victoria Road, HM Naval Base Portsmouth PO1 3NB.

Central Archive Facility

Administrator Top Floor, 123 Store, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Costa Coffee Site Manager Building 1/003, Main Road, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

DE&S ISS (South) CIS(S)ABM2 Building 1/150, Murray’s Lane, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth, PO1 3NH.

Denholms Resident Director

12 Dock, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Flagship Portsmouth Trust

Manager Building 1/007, Porters Lodge, College Road, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth, PO1 3LJ.

Greenstar Depot Manager Transfer Station, East Gate, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

HMS Victory Officer of the Day

Dock No2, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

HMS Warrior 1860 Executive Officer

Heritage Area, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

DES DMS Business Manager

Room 134, Victory Building, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth. PO1 3LT

Mary Rose Curator Dock No3 and Building

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C - 2 UNCLASSIFIED

Department/ Company

Post Name Communication Details Location

1/028, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Maritime Trails & Commissioning Agency

Staff Officer Room 23, HM Naval Base HQ (Victory Building).

MOD Police Operations Support

Room 223, 1st Floor, MDP Unicorn Gate Police Station, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

MOPDOCS Barbers Manager Building 2/19A, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Nauticalia Manager Heritage Area, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Naval Christian Fellowship

Executive Secretary

Building 1/007, Porters Lodge, College Road, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth, PO1 3LJ.

Navy News Business Manager

Room 1, Leviathan Block, HMS Nelson, Portsmouth.

Portsmouth Naval Base Property Trust

Property Manager

Building 1/8, College Road, PP26, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

RN Historic Branch Naval Historic Branch

Rm GF16, 24 Store, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Royal Naval Museum

Curator Building 1/059, Mani Road, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Sea Cadet Stores Head of Stores Building 1/049 South Railway Jetty, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

SERCO Operations Manager

Serco Denholm Ltd, Round Tower Complex, PP53, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Sodexo Clearning

Site Manager Building 1/73, Short Row, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Sodexo Land Technology

Site Manager Gardener’s Hut, Wardroom, HMS Nelson, Portsmouth.

Southern Area Sea Cadets

Area Officer Building 34, NELSON Personnel Centre, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth

Speedy Hire Department Manager

Building 2/020A, Victoria Road, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Tighes Site Manager D Lock Complex, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Tourist Information Centre

Branch Manager Building 1/002, Victory Gate, HM Naval Base, Portsmouth.

Welfare Garage Manager Building 11/12, HMS Nelson, Portsmouth.

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Annex D To: NBC(P) BCMP

Joint Operations Board (JOB) Members NOTE: In accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 98), this information is provided exclusively for use in the event of the BC Plan being invoked. Authority is not given for these details to be stored or used for any other purpose.

NBC BAE Post Name Work Tel.

Ext. Mobile No. Name Work Tel.

Ext. Mobile No.

Chairman Engineering & Ship Support

Support Services Personnel Communications Supply Chain Partnering/Commercial Finance Business Development

Marchwood SMC Transformation

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Annex E To: NBC(P) BCMP Government Procurement Card Holders NOTE: In accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 98), this information is provided exclusively for use in the event of the BC Plan being invoked. Authority is not given for these details to be stored or used for any other purpose. Department Name UIN Trans Limit COB/PM (ORP) COB/DRSO COB/Un Cloth St COB/CXP Med Centre COB/ COB/PNBHS&EG COB/LOGS PMYF SFM SFM SFM/FSU02 SFM/FSU02 SFM/FSUO1 SFM SFM/FSUO1 SFM/NP1600 SFM/FSU01 SFM/FSU02 SFM/FSU02 SFM/FSU02 SFM/FSU01 SFM/FSU01 SFM DPGM SFM DPGM SFM SFM FLAGO SFM/FSU02 FC/ITIC(CC) FC/FA FC/ICG IT Spithead House Manager DFIN DFIN SMC SMC/Chief Clerk

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Annex F To: NBC(P) BCMP

Detain any person unable to identify themselves and inform NBDO 07802 654820 or MOD POLICE 22707.

If you suspect somebody of being an intruder without an alarm having been sounded, detain the person if possible using minimum force and inform NBDO 07802 654820 or MOD POLICE 22707.

Evacuate the building/ clear the area- senior person to take charge. Inform MOD POLICE 22707 when head-count completed.

Telephone MOD POLICE 22707 give description and location of device. Give your name etc.

1. Remain at place of duty. 2. Senior person present to organise search of the building or area. 3. Secure or man access doors. 4. Switch on all internal and external lighting. Close and secure all windows. 5. Check all personnel present. 6. Inform NBDO 07802 654820 when completed.

Inform MOD POLICE 22707 immediately pass on all information, give details of yourself, your location and telephone number.

1. Take appropriate first aid action. 2. Obtain medical assistance dial 2222.

WEAPON INCIDENT: Remain where you are. If outside go to the nearest building. REACTOR INCIDENT:

F - 1 UNCLASSIFIED

If in the vicinity of accident submarine go to shelter station at Watchkeepers (B3/068) or Neptune Block (B0/43) or general services building following evacuation arrows (white on green). Obey orders given by MOD POLICE.

IN ALL CASES USE 023 92722228 WHEN USING A MOBILE/NON-MOD PHONE

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Annex G To: NBC(P) BCMP

G - 1

Incident

Overall Recovery objective: Back to “normal” as quickly as possible

Recovery/Resumption – back to normal

Business Continuity Incident response

Minutes to hours: damage containment/limitation and assessment

Hours to days: invoke BC Plans, recovery or maintenance of critical business processes

Weeks to months: damage repair / replacement, relocation to permanent place of work

Incident Timeline Timeline Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3

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Annex H To: NBC(P) BCMP Major Incident Orders 1. Introduction 1.1 Major Incident orders (MIO) are issued for the guidance of Service and Civilian officers and other key personnel, and are to be complied with in the event of a major incident occurring within HMS NELSON, HM Naval Base Portsmouth or the Dockyard port of Portsmouth. These are key plans to be invoked during the early stages of managing an incident (Phase 1 Emergency Response). These are generally owned and maintained by the Emergency Planning Officer on behalf of the Base Security Officer (BSyO). 1.2 In any major incident situation which invariably has the potential to cause serious injury or loss of life, the priority of all personnel is to care for survivors, prevent further casualties and to ensure the affected area is secure and safe. In order to successfully deal with such a situation it is important to remember that the lives of those involved in the rescue plan are also to be considered. The MIO include the following:

• Incident Management Policy o Introduction o Phases of Activity o Scope o Principles of Command and Control o Relationship with Civil Emergency Services o Alerting Procedures o Debriefing, Inquires and Lessons to be Learned o Incident Management Organisation

• Incident Ashore

o Introduction o Command and Control o General Emergency Procedures o Naval base Support o Alerting and Call-Out Arrangements o Media o Incident Actions – Aide-Memoire o Alerting and Call-out Plan o NBC Emergency Control Centre Manning Roster o NBC Emergency Control Centre Tasks and

responsibilities o Incident Management Aide-Memoire

• Incident Afloat

o Introduction o Classified of Marine Emergency o Command and Control o General Emergency Procedures o Alerting and Call-Out Arrangements o Marine Response Centre Manning Arrangements o Submarine Search and rescue Operations

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o Media o SOLFIRE Command Areas o SOLFIRE Command Structure Diagrams o SOLFIRE Notification Cascade

• Marine Pollution Incidents

o Introduction o Classification of Oil Pollution Incident o Command and Control o General Emergency Procedures o Alerting and Call-Out Arrangements o Marine Response Centre Manning Arrangements o Spillages on Land and in Non-tidal Waters o Media

• Requests for Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC)

o Introduction o Command and Control o Naval Base Procedures o Media o Points for Consideration by Incident Commander o Details of request for Emergency (MACC Category A)

Assistance o Indemnity Form for MACC Tasks o Formal Application Form for MACC Assistance

• Resources and Resources Management

o Resources Available o Resources Management o Financial Arrangements

• Recovery and Return to Normality

o Introduction o Initiation of the Business Continuity Plan o Site Recovery Phase.

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Annex I To: NBC(P) BCMP

Crisis Management Steering Group

(Slimmed down JOB)

Port and Base Services

Engineering Support

Logistics Services

Personnel Support

SMC Marchwood

Security IT Services Estates

Crisis Management Working Group Chairman – Site Recovery Planner (SRP)

Key Output Areas

Key Enablers

Issues which cannot be resolved at working group

level.

Strategic Direction and Updated Priorities.

Lodger Units

H&S

Crisis Management Command and Control

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I - 2 UNCLASSIFIED

1. Crisis Management Steering Group (CMSG)

1.1 Purpose. To provide strategic direction to the Crisis Management Working Group. 1.2 Roles.

a. The BCMP takes an output based approach as this is seen to be the most important aspect of NBC(P) business, one of the key roles of the Steering Group will be to ensure other aspects of the business are not overlooked.

b. The Working Group’s focus will be extremely short term, another key role will be to initiate the longer term recovery process.

c. The final key role will be the provision of adequate resources to achieve both the short term objection of maintaining key outputs and the longer term rebuilding/restoration to recover the site.

2. Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG)

2.1 Stood up as soon after the disruptive event as is safe and practical. For pre-warned disruptive events eg pandemic flu the group will be stood up in advance. The group will be responsible for the day to day management and planning throughout Phase 2 Crisis Management period.

2.2 Aim. To ensure that the most important Naval Base outputs are maintained/restored in an appropriate timescale.

2.3 Membership. To include Team Portsmouth BUs managers’ responsible for BC from both the key output areas and key enablers, and Lodger Units BC representatives. Note, Lodger Unit BC representatives will attend if the disruptive event impacts on the site services they need.

2.4 Authorised to

a. Enact the relevant aspects of the BCMP. Redirect resources, from within the existing resource allocation, to meet the established priority outputs.

b. Will refer the following types of issues to the CMSG: Conflicts of priority, issues which need additional resources and issues which will need long-term action.

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Annex J To: NBC(P) BCMP

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Annex K To: NBC(P) BCMP Business Continuity Incident Flowchart

Major Incident / Disaster Occurs YES NO

NO YES

YES NO

Are staff at work? Staff Return to work, incident being managed

Are Staff Business Critical? Staff should

contact their Line Manager for SITREP

Is work area accessible and safe?

Staff where possible should either remain at home or make their way home and await further instruction through the Call Cascade System, local radio and check updates on www.teamportsmouth.co.uk

Staff where possible should either remain at home or make their way home and await further instruction through the local radio and check updates on www.teamportsmouth.co.uk

http://www.teamportsmouth.co.uk/


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Annex L To: NBC(P) BCMP Communications – Cascade Call-Out System 1. To ensure that the cascade of information is effective in a disaster, all managers must keep at home an up-to-date list of the home and mobile telephone numbers of all staff who report to them and all staff must ensure details remain current for their line managers. Each must inform the others immediately of any changes to their contact details. 2. The cascade will operate as follows: A cascade of telephone calls will begin from SPO MDP or SRO QHM to SRP, who in turn will call out the relevant CMWG members. They will then agree a message and then call line managers in their chain of command and pass the message on. The message should be cascaded until all staff have been contacted. The diagram below illustrates the NBC(P) BC Call Cascade chain:

Care and sensitivity must be used when using call cascades. They must not be used as a tool to establish the whereabouts of staff who are unaccounted for, as this may cause undue distress to relatives and friends. If you are unable, after several attempts, you must report that back via the cascade process, see below.

SPO MDP or SRO QHM Site Recovery Planner (SRP)

SRP will record the returns on the contact list from HRMS and confirms to Site Officer when the process completed.

Crises Management Working Group (CMWG)

All CMWG Members contact the staff that they manage who in turn contact their staff to cascade the information down.

Site Recovery Planner (SRP)

Crises Management Working Group (CMWG)

CMWG Members confirm to SRP when they have contacted all their staff, plus any staff not contacted.

All Staff

All Line Managers All Line Managers Line Managers confirm to CMWG when they have contacted all their staff, plus any staff not contacted.

All Line Managers

All Staff

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Annex M To: NBC(P) BCMP Business Continuity – Terms and Definitions

1. For the purposes of NBC(P) BCMP the following terms and definitions apply:

• Activity. Process or set of processes undertaken by an organization (or on its behalf) that produces or supports one or more products or services

• Business Continuity. Strategic and tactical capability of the organization to plan for

and respond to incidents and business disruptions in order to continue business operations at an acceptable pre-defined level.

• Business Continuity Management (BCM). Holistic management process that

identifies potential threats to an organization and the impacts to business operations that those threats, if realized, might cause, and which provides a framework for building organizational resilience with the capability for an effective response that safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders.

• Business Continuity Management Programme. Ongoing management and

governance process supported by top management and appropriately resourced to ensure that the necessary steps are taken to identify the impact of potential losses, maintain viable recovery strategies and plans, and ensure continuity of services through training, exercising, maintenance and review.

• Business Continuity Plan (BCP). Documented collection of procedures and

information that is developed, compiled and maintained in readiness for use in an incident to enable an organization to continue to deliver its critical activities at an acceptable pre-defined level.

• Business Continuity Strategy. Approach by an organization that will ensure its

recovery and continuity in the face of a disaster or other major incident or business disruption.

• Business Impact Analysis. This is an exercise to identify the impact resulting from

disruption and disaster scenarios. It should establish the critical functions of a business, its recovery priorities and its support requirements.

• Civil Emergency. Event or situation which threatens serious damage to human

welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or the security of the UK or of a place in the UK (UK Civil Contingencies Act 2004).

• Critical Activities. Those activities which have to be performed in order to deliver

the key outputs and services which enable an organization to meet it’s most important and time-sensitive objectives.

• Denial of Access. Any disturbance within the area around a site that results in the

loss of access to the site. The site itself may be undamaged (ie closed off by police as a ‘scene of crime’.

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• Disaster. A disaster is the escalation of an emergency to the point where normal conditions are not expected to be recovered for at least 24 hours. It is an event that has caused, or is expected to cause, significant disruption to MOD’s business operations.

• Disruption. Event, whether anticipated (e.g. a labour strike or hurricane) or

unanticipated (e.g. a blackout or earthquake), which causes an unplanned, negative deviation from the expected delivery of outputs or services according to the organization’s objectives.

• Emergency. An emergency is any event that causes, or has the potential to cause,

injury, loss of life, damage to property or significant business disruption.

• Emergency Planning. Development and maintenance of agreed procedures to prevent, reduce, control, mitigate and take other actions in the event of a civil emergency.

• Emergency Response. Actions taken to stabilise an emergency and allow transition

to the recovery phase.

• Epidemic. A disease that spreads rapidly through a demographic segment of the human population, such as everyone in a given geographic area, a community, a military base, or similar population unit, or everyone of a certain age or sex, such as the children or women of a region.

• Exercise. Activity in which the business continuity plan(s) is rehearsed in part or in

whole to ensure that the plan(s) contains the appropriate information and produces the desired result when put into effect.

• Flu Friend. A friend or colleague used to support an individuals welfare needs whilst

they remain under self isolation. If this is not possible a welfare warden would care for several individuals.

• Incident. An event that has caused or has potential to cause damage to an

organization’s business systems, facilities, or personnel and could lead to, a business disruption, loss, emergency or crisis.

• Incident Management Plan. Clearly defined and documented plan of action for use

at the time of an incident, typically covering the key personnel, resources, services and actions needed to implement the incident management process.

• Invocation. Act of declaring that an organization’s business continuity plan needs to

be put into effect in order to continue delivery of key outputs or services.

• Likelihood. Chance of something happening, whether defined, measured or estimated objectively or subjectively, or in terms of general descriptors.

• Pandemic. Describing an epidemic covering a widespread area such as a large

country, region or continent. It can describe a global epidemic.

• Recovery Time. Target time set for: o resumption of product or service delivery after an incident; or

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M - 3 UNCLASSIFIED

o resumption of performance of an activity after an incident; or o recovery of an IT system or application after an incident.

• Resilience. Ability of an organization to resist being affected by an incident.

• Risk. Something that might happen and its effect(s) on the achievement.

• Risk Assessment. Overall process of risk identification, analysis and evaluation

• Risk Management. Structured development and application of management culture,

policy, procedures and practices to the tasks of identifying, analysing, evaluating, and controlling responding to risk.

• Service Provider. Those who provide the supporting services to the organization.

• Stakeholders. Those with a vested interest in an organization’s achievements.

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Annex N To: NBC(P) BCMP Business Continuity – Glossary of Acronyms

BC Business Continuity BCDR Business Continuity Departmental Representative BCM Business Continuity Management BCMP Business Continuity Master Plan BCP Business Continuity Planner BIA Business Impact Analysis BLC Base Logistics Commander BSC Business Service Continuity BSM Base Services Manager BSYO Base Security Officer BU Business Unit BXO Base Executive Officer CD ROM Compact Disc Read Only Memory C Eng Chief Engineer CMSG Crisis Management Steering Group CMWG Crisis Management Working Group COB Captain of the Base CSA Customer Supplier Agreements CTL Chaplaincy Team Leader DBLC Deputy Base Logistics Commander DBSyO Deputy Base Security Officer DCOB Deputy Captain of the Base DE&S Defence Equipment & Support DFC Deputy Financial Controller DFG Defence Fuel Group DGHR&CS Director General Human Resources and Corporate Services DII(F) Defence Information Infrastructure (Future) DoH Department of Health DQHM Deputy Queens Harbour Master DSCOM Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements EU European Union FC Financial Controller FLC Front Line Command F,Q&A Facts, Questions and Answers GPC Government Purchase Card HMNB Her Majesty’s Naval Base HofE Head of Establishment HPA Health Protection Agency HR Human Resource HRMS Human Resources Management System IC Incident Control IT Information Technology JOB Joint Operations Board JPA Joint Personnel Administration JRLO Joint Regional Liaison Officer LM Line Managers MAA Master-At-Arms

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N - 2 UNCLASSIFIED

MACA Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities MDPGA Ministry of Defence Police Guarding Agency MoD Ministry of Defence MSJ (N) Middle Slip Jetty (North) NHS National Health Service NBC(P) Naval Base Commander (Portsmouth) NCHQ Naval Command Headquarters NBAM Naval Base Assurance Manager NBDO(P) Naval Base Duty Officer (Portsmouth) NBTM Naval Base Temporary Memorandums NMOH Naval Medical Officer and Health & Safety NPFS National Pandemic Flu Service NRR National Risk Register OPRP Oil Pollution Response Plan PIP Pandemic Influenza Plan PMO Principle Medical Officer PMNUC Project Manager Nuclear PNB Portsmouth Naval Base PPPA People, Pay and Pensions Agency PS Police Sergeant. QHM Queens Harbour Master RFA Royal Fleet Auxiliary R&R Rest and Recuperation RLO Regional Liaison Officer RN Royal Navy SDS Senior Dental Surgeon SFC Ship Facilities Co-ordinator SFM Superintendent Fleet Maintenance SG Surgeon General’s SGD Surgeon General’s Department SLA Service Level Agreements or Single Living Accommodation SMC Sea Mounting Centre SPL Special Paid Leave SPRO Senior Press Relations Officer SPO MDP Senior Police Officer MoD Police SRO QHM Senior Responsible Officer Queens Harbour Master SRP Site Recovery Plan/Planner TORs Terms of Reference TLB Top Level Budget-holder TTX Table Top Exercise UK United Kingdom VHS Vessel Harbour System VTC Video Telephone Conferences WHO World Health Organization

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O-1 UNCLASSIFIED

Annex O To: NBC(P) BCMP Team Portsmouth – Critical Business Continuity Plans (BIAs)

Contents

Appendix 1 - BXO - BIA1 – Executive / Personnel. Appendix 2 – PMO – BIA1&2 - HMS NELSON Medical Centre. Appendix 3 – SDS – BIA1&2 - Delivering Dental Treatment. Appendix 4 – BSM – BIA1 - Port and Base Services. Appendix 5 – BAE / EST – BIA1 – Estates Utilities/ Processes. Appendix 6 – SFM – BIA1 – Surface Fleet Maintenance. Appendix 7 – BLC – BIA1 – Logistics. Appendix 8 – QHM – BIA1 – Queens Harbour Master. Appendix 9 – BSyO – BIA1 – Security. Appendix 10 – DFin – BIA1 – Finance, Governance and IT. Appendix 11 – DCOMM(P) - BIA1 – Commercial. Appendix 12 – NMOH – BIA1 – PNB Health, Safety and Environmental Group. Appendix 13 – AD Est – BIA1 – Estates Development, Future Capability and ICG. Appendix 14 – D Transformation – BIA1 – Transformation. Appendix 15 – DMS – BIA1 – Marine Services Integrated Business Team

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Annex P To: NBC(P) BCMP Lodger Units Business Continuity Plans

1. ARAMARK. 2. ATLAS Consortium. 3. BAE (BAE Systems). 4. BAE (VT). 5. Hampshire Constabulary – Central Archive Facility. 6. Messaging (NSTN) UK. 7. MOD – Guard Service. 8. MOD - Maritime Commissioning Trials and Assessment (MCTA). 9. MOD – Police. 10. PNB Property Trust. 11. SMC Marchwood.

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Annex Q To: NBC(P) BCMP MoD Pandemic Planning Assumptions 1. The following assumptions are taken from the UK National Framework, and are also contained in the MoD Flu Framework and supporting documents. 1.1 Pandemic Duration. A pandemic is likely to come in waves (most often 3, but possibly up to 4) of up to 15 weeks duration for each wave. The pandemic could, therefore, last for between 18-24 months depending on the number of waves and the gaps between them.

1.2 Clinical Attack Rate. Between 25% and 50% of the population may be infected (as compared to seasonal flu rate of 5-15%).

1.3 Pandemic Wave. In a 15 week wave, the peak infection rate is likely to occur at the 6-8 week point. Absence rates at the peak point could be between 20-25%, with those in small teams and those in close contact groups suffering higher levels of absence (30-35% at the peak point).

1.4 Sickness Absence. For a virus which produces milder symptoms, staff may be absent from work 7-10 days. A virus which produces more severe symptoms may mean staff being absent for 15 days (or more).

1.5 Additional Absences. Planning will need to consider additional absences due to other illnesses, caring for dependents, family bereavement, stress and fear of infection (the “worried well”), school and group child care closures and potential difficulties in getting to work. For planning purposes, additional absences of 10-15% should be considered.

1.6 Virus Incubation Period. Usually between 1-4 days, but could be up to 7 days.

1.7 Case Fatality Rate. The UK fatality rate in previous pandemics has been between 0.2% and 2%. For a reasonable worst case scenario, the Department of Health has presumed a maximum case fatality of 2.5% for planning purposes.

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Annex R To: NBC(P) BCMP DE&S Pandemic Planning Assumptions

Area Item Rationale/Issue DE&S Board There are clear and well-communicated

priorities e.g. nomination of essential outputs.

To meet the requirements of the key ‘customers’ it may be necessary to suspend ‘discretionary’ and ‘non-essential’ efforts at times. To do so, DE&S as a whole must know and understand what its essential outputs are so that it may prepare plans to sustain them.

Managers Key staff have been identified and their post criticality and skills profiles are recorded on HRMS and are current and accurate.

HRMS and DE&S Flexible Resourcing Tool provide a means of identifying potential replacements for key staff that are absent, to meet essential outputs. HRMS also provides essential data for contingency planning at all levels.

All staff Home address, Next of Kin and Emergency Contact details are up to date and accurate. For civilian staff on HRMS, for military staff on JPA.

For business communication with staff working from home and in case of falling seriously ill on duty, or unexpected and unreported absence.

HR Policy HRMS to automatically discount all ‘flu related sick absence (and so not issue warnings or letters to LM) for the duration of the pandemic.

Staff show a natural reluctance to risk ‘punishment’ by exceeding the arbitrary ‘sick-leave limit’ imposed by HR and implemented on HRMS. This already causes staff to attend even when they are ill which is very strongly counter-indicated during an epidemic.

HR Policy Line managers to send staff who are showing ‘flu-like symptoms home immediately.

At present, LM of civilian staff have no formal authority to insist that staff go home in these circumstances.

HR Policy Relief on the 24 hour rule for death-in-service condolence letters.

Make it ‘best efforts’ rather than mandatory; there are many reasons why LM may be unable to comply, including illness, stress, over-work.

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HR HRMS and JPA will be capable of recording pandemic as a separate illness.

Monitoring the spread of the pandemic is mentioned in the Mod framework. Rather than create a whole new bureaucracy and work for LM in the midst of what may be a crisis, it seems best to modify extant HR systems in advance.

Security People wearing surgical masks and other devices that cover their faces will be required to remove them for identification purposes.

People have to ‘identify themselves’ at the entrances to MoD sites for the greater good of the majority. To relax this rule would be to create opportunity to further disrupt business areas that may already be struggling. N.B. This may cause fear or offence to many, irrespective of religion or ethnicity21, so is likely to cause absenteeism of those who refuse to comply.

H&S Workstation (phone, keyboard, desk etc) cleaning materials will be provided for all staff that request them.

To reduce absenteeism and maintain performance by making staff less anxious in the workplace, especially where ‘flexible working’ is in force and on large open floorplates.

IT Effective working from home solutions are in place for key staff.

To reduce the impact of travel disruptions, social distancing measures, personal commitments and other issues that would prevent staff travelling to work

Infrastructure Will increase general cleaning levels and have in depth ‘spot cleaning’ capability.

To control spread, reduce absenteeism and maintain performance by making staff less anxious in the workplace, especially where ‘flexible working’ is in force and on large open floorplates.

Infrastrucure/HofE Will have established a relationship with the local health authority/HPA as appropriate

Not necessarily applicable on sites where DE&S staff are ‘lodgers’, but encouraged.

HM Forces All military staff will be ‘recalled to base’ at some point.

To preserve control, to maintain war-fighting capability, to support MACA, to simplify prophylaxis and treatment.

Schools Schools will close. Staff will have to stay home. Major issue for staff abroad with children in schools in the UK, if international travel is suspended.

Supply Re-order levels will be increased immediately and orders placed to bring ‘stocks’ up to the new levels.

Potential disruption of materiel supply chains as suppliers and transport firms are affected would cause serious disruption if stock levels are not maintained. There are clear implications for funding, storage space etc.

21 This requirement may be considered unlawful under UK Equality and Diversity legislation, in respect of e.g the burkah.

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Supply ‘Forward loading’ of the supply chain will begin no later than declaration of WHO alert phase 4.

‘Stocks’ need to be held nearer the ‘consumer’ to reduce the impact of transport (e.g. air-bridge) disruption (e.g. by ATC failure, national or international restrictions on personnel or freight movement).

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Annex S To: NBC(P) BCMP Defence Policy Guidance on Pandemic Specific Issues 1. Potential Closure of Defence Establishments 1.1 Heads of Establishment / Commanding Officers must seek advice via the military and civilian chains of command to the relevant Top Level Budget (TLB) holder regarding any proposal to close an establishment. Such a decision needs to be proportionate to the health risk, taking into account the impact of closure on the delivery of defence critical outputs. In judging the health risk, the Navy Command Public Health Consultant and the local Health Protection Agency official are to be consulted. The Duty Fleet Controller is also to be included in any briefing of a potential closure to ensure key principals within Naval Command HQ (NCHQ) are alerted (incl. DCINC, 2SL and Comd Sec). Additionally, NCHQ will inform MoD ahead of any closure and support the development of internal and external media lines. 2. Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) 2.1 The National Framework makes it clear that planners should not assume that military support will be available during a pandemic. It is possible, however, that requests for assistance may arise if the outbreak were to become more widespread and severe, such as support to essential services. 2.2 MACA requests should continue to be handled in accordance with current policy, that is to say:

• While there is currently no expectation on Defence to provide MACA, Defence remains engaged in liaison and is part of the response.

• Any request for support should be judged on its merits. • All MACA requests should be scoped by Joint Regional Liaison Officers

(JRLOs) keeping the chain of command informed – this should ascertain whether civil authorities lack either capability or capacity.

• Requests received by Front Line Commands should be staffed by Single

Service RLOs to the JRLOs. • MACA will only be authorised through a request from the civil authorities to

the appropriate Department of State. Central direction is essential to ensure consistency nationwide.

3. Temporary Relaxation of Civilian HR Policies 3.1 Some easement of civilian HR policy may be required in the event of a pandemic and guidance has been prepared to cover a range of circumstances, in line with Cabinet Office requirements. Although circulated to TLBs in draft, this guidance will be issued formally when deemed appropriate (in accordance with the MOD Flu Framework Stage 3 – Absorb). A decision will be taken at Departmental level to

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invoke and revoke any easements, either individually or collectively. Line Managers of civilian personnel should not apply this guidance until permission is granted by Director General Human Resources and Corporate Services (DGHR&CS). Advice on the use of civilian HR easements will be available through the People Pay and Pensions Agency (PPPA). 4. Travel 4.1 Defence travel is to comply with the advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Where travel is planned counter to that advice, NCHQ is to be informed via the chain of command. 5. Medical Direction 5.1 The PNB medical response will align with the Surgeon General’s (SG) for military personnel and Department of Health (DoH)/ Health Protection Agency (HPA) polices for civilians. Strategic direction for Defence personnel is set out below: 5.2 Policy and Plans. Pandemic Influenza policy and plans must be developed in accordance with the MoD Framework and supporting documents. They adhere to the HPA guidance and practical arrangements for case management, and are closely aligned with plans produced by the DoH. 5.3 The Key Hygiene Message. At both the organizational and individual level, the most important proactive preparation/ response to Pandemic Flu is to maintain good hygiene practices by following the HPA ‘catch it, bin it, kill it,’ advice. It is each individual’s responsibility to follow good basic respiratory and hand hygiene practices such as:

• Covering your nose and mouth when coughing or sneezing, using tissues when possible.

• Dispose of dirty tissues promptly and carefully.

• Maintain good basic hygiene; washing hands frequently with soap and

water to reduce the spread of the virus, from your hands to face or other people.

• Cleaning hard surfaces frequently using normal cleaning products.

• Cleaning workstations at both the start and end of each day, on the

‘leave it as you wish to find it’ principle. 5.4 Reporting and Surveillance. Case definitions are set by the HPA. All probable cases arising in Service personnel are notified via the Service Medical Central Staff directly to the HPA and through the medical chain of command to the Surgeon General’s Department (SGD). Civilian personnel (not covered by military medical arrangements) who believe they may have contracted flu influenza should seek advice from the NHS (by calling their local GP or NHS Direct)22, who will notify the HPA. Both Military or Civilian personnel confirmed with flu influenza should notify

22 And equivalents in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

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either their Commanding Officer or Line Manager respectively, and their absence is to be reported on HRMS.23

5.5 The National Pandemic Flu Service (NPFS). As and when the number of cases of Pandemic Flu continues to rise rapidly, the NPFS will be activated to give patients access to information and antivirals as quickly as possible. It will free up GPs so they can focus their efforts on helping those in risk groups and patients with other illnesses. The NPFS is made up of a dedicated website and a central call centre and is able to quickly tell people if they have Pandemic Flu. If diagnosed with the Pandemic Flu symptoms, the patient will be given an authorised number that a ‘flu friend’ can pick up their antivirals from one of their local antiviral collection points. 5.6 Higher Risk Groups. It is particularly important for people with chronic lung, kidney or heart disease, under fives, over 65s, and pregnant women to use the NPFS as soon as they have flu symptoms and keep in touch with their GP. 5.7 Screening. Personnel deploying to overseas operations (including civilians on Support to Operations) are instructed to report influenza-like symptoms and those meeting the clinical case definition for flu influenza are not permitted to travel until further assessed. 5.8 Laboratory Testing. Arrangements have been made for virology samples to be sent to the UK if a suspected case arises in an overseas location where local specialist laboratory services are unavailable. The necessary specimen collection equipment and packaging will be ordered and delivered to medical facilities where required. 5.9 Anti-viral Provision. UK-based personnel will be supplied with antiviral treatment in accordance with DoH policy through local arrangements made with the NHS Primary Care Organisations. 5.10 Service personnel and entitled civilians based overseas will be supplied with antiviral drugs through Service arrangements. Sufficient stocks of Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) are normally maintained for 25% of the population at risk, and further stock, as assessed by the DoH, will be supplied to equate to the UK coverage of 50%. Defence stocks due to go out of date will also be replaced.

23 In accordance with the Policy Rules & Guidance on reporting and certifying sick absence.

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Annex T To: NBC(P) BCMP Portsmouth Naval Base Pandemic Communications Policy 1. Introduction 1.1 Good communications is essential throughout all stages of NBC(P) Pandemic Influenza Plan (PIP). This is a joint ‘Team Portsmouth’ NBC(P)/ BAE communications plan. A consistent, unified approach across the entire PNB to the mixed Portsmouth workforce of MoD, Industry, Fleet and other lodger units. 1.2 NBC(P)/ BAE will deploy a joint-up process of communications to all PNB employees and lodger units on the Portsmouth footprint. Follow-up specific process and instructions regarding the Pandemic will then be owned by each organization. The joint communications standard operating procedure is at the end of this Annex. 2. Communication to and Education of Employees and Lodger Units 2.1 Everyone will be involved in the fight against pandemic influenza, timely accurate information is essential in terms of both education and managing the impact it will have on society and preventing further spread of the infection. Ensure that DoH, HPA, WHO, and MoD/ NCHQ websites are the sources for pandemic information (domestic and international). Disseminate information about the pandemic flu which is appropriate to the stage of alert (signs and symptoms of the influenza, modes of transmission); personal and family protection and response strategies (hand hygiene, coughing/ sneezing etiquette, contingency plans). Inform employees and stakeholders about NBC(P) PIP, including their role. Develop platforms (posters, NBTM’s, hotlines, bulletin’s, websites etc) for communicating. 2.2 The NBC(P) defence intranet page is deployed as the prime communication tool from within the MoD. It has a summary of pandemic advice/ instructions, latest updates, questions and answers and web links to the main sources of information, as mentioned above. For communication from outside the Naval Base, the new ‘Team Portsmouth’ NBC(P)/ BAE internet page can be found at: (www.teamportsmouth.co.uk) 2.3 Leaflets and Posters. NHS produces pandemic media available from the HPA website. These should be widely promulgated at all entrances to PNB, on notice boards and in accommodation blocks and places of work to ensure all personnel understand that Pandemic Flu is a real threat to themselves and their colleagues. Routine orders should also remind personnel as to the precautionary measures to be taken. 2.4 Corporate Communications. Effective and rapid bi-directional communication channels are essential, at all levels, to protect both the core operational outputs of the RN and the wider ‘Team Portsmouth’ business outputs. From the internal timely reporting by Business Unit managers of all staff pandemic flu related absences (including domestic emergency, compassionate and/or bereavement) to Deputy Base Security Officer (DBSyO) to collate and report the corporate overview; or the Cascade Call-Out System24; to external suppliers, 24 See NBC(P) BCMP, Part 2 Para 10 and Annex L.


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contractors, Front Line Command (FLC), Naval Command HQ (NCHQ), DE&S HQ and higher organisations (UK Ops, MoD HO, Cabinet Office etc). 3. Media Handling 3.1 The Senior Press Relations Officer (SPRO), a member of the Pandemic Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG), is responsible for all liaison between the Naval Base and the media. No other individual is to communicate information relating to the pandemic either to news media, the general public or external military/ government agencies. Any approach for information should be referred through the Chain of Command to SPRO or his nominated representative.

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PNB Workforce Communications Process For any Pandemic announcements/ communications that affect all base units/ lodgers Communications to the Workforce Follow-on PNB Naval Medical Officer of Health (NMOH) drafts internal communication/ notice and circulates to applicable stake holders for approval.

Decision is made re: audiences appropriate for the message by NBC and BAE comms.

External communication prepared if necessary by NBC SPRO and BAE external comms. All notices aligned.

Timing of the delivery to PNB and/ or external jointly decided by NBC and BAE comms.

Communication distributed using various appropriate media: • Intranet • Bulletin • Email • Notice boards • NBDTM's • Toolbox talks etc.

Dedicated information sites/ advice provided for NBC and BAE employees with some jointly provided information on a shared area.

Simultaneously email/ communicate the approved notice to all other PNB lodgers on our lodger email list (Aramark, Greenstar and Serco etc), held by the Team Portsmouth comms team.

Additional information/ advice provided for other lodger unit employees by their own Business Units.

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NBC s ntinuity Master Plan Issue No: 3 Dated: 31 Dec 2009(P) Busine s Co

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Annex U To: NBC(P) BCMP

terface and Contacts

Government In

rnment Agencies will be key in a Pandemic, as the business will need to take its lead from Government policy directives and may require support from the authorities concerned. The relevant authorities are:

Civil Contingencies Committee, which provides national-level direction and ay ma o hibit specific activity

t ce contact: 70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS – 34 – http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/

1. The interface with Gove

• m ndate r pro

o Cabine Offi020.7276.12

cal Health Authorities/Trusts, who offer medical advice nding to specific questions, in respect of such matters ures, infection control and virus management) and pport with material/service requirements (advice

documents, PPE and medical needs)

o Dept of Health contact: Richmond House, 79 Whitehall, London SW1A 2NS – 020.7210.4850 - http://www.dh.gov.uk/

• Dept of Health & Lo(proactively and respoas precautionary measmay be a source of su

o At a key juncture the Portsmouth Pan-Silver Leader (at his discretion) will nominate a Pandemic Liaison Officer to ensure sufficient contact is maintained.

• NHS Choices, the primary public-facing health information and advice service - http:/www.nhs.uk/

• Local Authorities/Emergency Services, who will be involved with policing (re any security implications) and with the local physical infrastructure including transport and with utility supply (via the Local Utility companies)

o Local Authorities contacts - http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Dl1/Directories/Localcouncils/AToZOfLocalCouncils/index.htm

• Local Health Trusts/ Local Hospitals/ Local Doctors, to whom suspected cases of infection will be directed

o Contact the Naval Base Medical Officer (NMOH) for local medical advice or information PNB22955, for Medical Emergency within PNB phone ext 24100.

• Business Link , the home of business-related information –

http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/

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idance

Annex V To: NBC(P) BCMP MoD Civilian HR Pandemic Policy Gu

asements in civi disr t 1.2 A d i voke the easements ou

1. Introduction 1.1 This guidance highlights how staff and managers should use e

lian personnel policies to increase workforce flexibility and manage the effects ofup ion caused by flu influenza should a pandemic be declared.

ec sion will be taken at Departmental level to invoke and retlined here. Managers should not apply this guidance until

per s 1.3 o ensure nza event. of the local a cluding the arrangements for obtaining anti-viral m ireporting re ui 2. Sic e 2.1 Reporting cases of Influenza. If an employee has been advised by health pro smay be they must tell their line manager as soon as possible. Thi x 2.2 absencdays25). Th m pread of infection and lighten GPs’ workload. It pother condition 2.3 they m res to deal with the matter (see Related Document – M

mi sion is granted by DGHR&CS.

Special consideration will need to be given to staff working overseas t that they are in possession of all relevant information during the flu influeIndividual members of staff and their dependants must be made awarerrangements for obtaining healthcare in

ed cation, where appropriate, in their overseas location and any local q rements.

kn ss Absence and Sick Pay

fes ionals (including NHS Direct and NHS 24 in Scotland) that their symptoms related to influenza

s e tends the current requirement to report Mumps or German Measles (rubella).

Certification. Line Managers should accept self-certificates for sickness e that would normally be covered by a GP’s certificate (for up to 14 calendar

is easure will help reduce the sa plies, therefore, to all absences whether they are caused by flu or any

.

If line managers have evidence that a sickness absence was not genuine ust invoke the disciplinary procedu

ajor Discipline Offences) 2.4 Recor e Managers must record the sickness absences on HR es over 7 days are te

.5 When People Become Ill in the Workplace. Staff who become ill in the workplace should be sent home immediately and advised to telephone either their GP or NHS Direct and to let their line manager know the outcome. Staff showing symptoms must not attend work until they feel well enough to return. 2.6 Pay Entitlement. Up to 14 calendar days (to match the certification easement) of flu-related sick absences will be excluded from any calculation of contractual sick pay. In effect this means that employees will not tip into the half- and nil-pay categories specifically as a result of flu-related sickness absence during this

ding Absences. LinMS at the earliest opportunity. HRMS issues a warning if absenc en red as self-certified, but this warning can be overridden.

2

25 Medical Certification is currently required for sickness absences over 7 days.

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eriod of temporary easement. Situations where a complication of either an existing ondition or one aggravated by flu influenza leads to sickness absence longer

ation of occupational ick pay, but may be considered under the additional sickness absence rules.

.7 . There is no need to conduct formal Welcome

.8 The Longer Term Consequences of Influenza. Line Managers will be

a s, it might take some time for an individual to

nt; part time working on medical grounds

ickness absence was causing concern before the flu andemic, you should remind them about the Department’s attendance standards at

e

pc than 14 days should not be automatically excluded from the calculs

Welcome Back Discussions2Back Discussions. An informal welcome and update on important developments, work priorities, etc. will suffice. 2expected to treat each case sensitively on its merits. Reasonable adjustments must be considered if it would assist in the return to work including home working forshort period if appropriate. In some case

lly re-adjust to the working environmefumight be an option. 2.9 Attendance Management. Sickness absences up to a limit of 14 days as a result of flu should be treated as a one-off and therefore discounted for restoring efficiency purposes. They will not lead to a warning, dismissal or failure of probation. Where the employee’s span appropriate moment. 2.10 Cases should not be referred to the occupational health adviser except wherit is absolutely necessary. Criteria for referring cases for advice will be published onthe Occupational Health page of the Intranet. 3. Business Hours

Patterns

be

siness need and conform to this guidance.

lly

s whose

djusted working patterns are written into their contracts of employment. In such

3.1 Line Managers may need to consider changing working hours or moving workto ensure business delivery. 4. Working 4.1 Please note: as far as possible changes to normal working patterns shouldmade with the employee’s consent. Decisions to direct employees to change their working patterns must have a justifiable bu 4.2 Start and end routines. In order to deliver the business, line managers can request that employees start or finish work at times that differ from their normal working patterns with their agreement. 4.3 Flexible Working Patterns. Where essential, line managers can vary locaagreed flexible working pattern agreements if it is necessary to deliver business. Examples of local working pattern agreements include intermittent home working;late start times, breaks in the day. The exceptions to this are employeeacases any changes must be agreed with the employees. 4.4 Where it helps the employee’s caring responsibilities you should be as flexible as the business allows when varying working patterns.

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.6 Home working. Subject to security and health & safety constraints, line

k ome or if schools are closed. If line managers grant

ermission for home working, they must make arrangements for telephone or receive

e.

n also require employees to work on another task providing ppropriate support and guidance, provided the journey required comes within the

les apply.

.1 If line managers grant annual or flexi leave inform the employee that it is being able to support the absence at the time.

to

ver or being paid for leave they were unable to take by the end of their leave year

ees to duty who are currently absent on nnual leave, or have made firm commitments. If they take this action they should

. For all other absences e managers should consider awarding special leave.

ement to match ertification) working days for domestic distress. Employees may also take parental

4.5 Contractual part-time working. Line managers can ask employees who arecontracted to work part-time to change their working patterns but their agreement is required. 4managers can allow employees to work at home if this enables them to continue working and it supports business delivery. For example, this may be relevant if sicrelatives are being cared for at hpan e-mail communication from the employee every day. 4.7 Workstation Sharing. Business areas should undertake local risk assessments on ‘hot desking’ and workstation sharing arrangements and where appropriate [subject to confirmation of supply arrangements] provide antibacterialmaterials for staff us 5. Detached Duty 5.1 Line managers can terminate or suspend detached duty if the employee is required to attend their main place of duty to help deliver business. 5.2 Line managers caascope of the normal mobility rules. 6. Mobility 6.1 Normal mobility ru 7. Annual & Flexi Leave 7conditional on the business 7.2 Line managers can require employees to cancel or postpone annual leave or flexi leave if it is necessary to deliver business, although they must be sympathetic firm holiday or domestic commitments. They may also agree to employees carrying odue to these special circumstances. 7.3 Line managers may recall employaconsider claims for expenses of any costs incurred as a result of the recall. 8. Special Leave 8.1 If an employee is unable to attend work because they are ill with flu, the absence must be recorded on HRMS as sickness absencelin 8.2 The policy on Special Leave allows up to 5 (possible easc

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.3 The majority of special leave applications are likely to be made under the nt

l

cted

ave – relevant in the event of the death of a close family ember, partner or close friend.

.7 Employees may also be advised by medical authorities to stay away from

dvice should be llowed, although isolation is unlikely to be more than five days.

.1 In the event of surgeries/clinics being inundated with callers, staff may not be e to ertificate of expected confinement. Employees should therefore be

sked for an application for Maternity leave with the expected date of confinement

ities. Employees with school-age children whose chool or nursery closes as a result of swine flu may be allowed to work at home.

lth t home is

ot appropriate or possible, staff may request Special Paid Leave (SPL) which

e.

n

ir

t may grant Special Paid eave (SPL) provided they are satisfied that it was genuinely impossible for the

establishments (if appropriate).

leave where appropriate. Line managers should be flexible and exercise discretion, treating each case sensitively and on its merits. 8categories of Compassionate Leave, Domestic Emergency Leave or BereavemeLeave. 8.4 Compassionate leave – may be relevant if employees have serious personaor family problems for example in situations where transport is severely disrupted or where the public are advised not to travel. 8.5 Domestic Emergency – relevant if an employee suffers an unexpedomestic emergency that requires immediate attention. 8.6 Bereavement lem 8work because they have come in to contact with the influenza virus. Special leave, and not sickness absence, should be given in such cases. Medical afo 9. Maternity Leave 9abl obtain a cabeing accepted. 9.2 Childcare ResponsibilsThis does not require a formal agreement but must be subject to security and heaand safety regulations that apply to formal home workers. Where working anshould not normally exceed 5 days. If additional SPL is required line managers will be expected to treat each case sensitively on its merits so that satisfactory longer term arrangements can be made. 10. Unauthorised Absence 10.1 Line managers must try to contact any employee who does not turn up for work when expected. Flu-related absences should be dealt with under this guidancAll other absences should be dealt with normally as unauthorised absence. 11. Travel Disruptio 11.1 Fit employees should continue to make every effort to attend work as thepresence may be essential at this time. If an employee experiences significant difficulties due to travel disruption your line managemenLindividual to get to work. Individuals may also be allowed to work at home. Line managers should encourage individuals to consider working at alternative MOD

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ent & Bullying/Grievance

es for dealing with these cases may have to be relaxed. Revised timescales hould be agreed with all parties.

3.1 Businesses may find it appropriate to suspend permanent recruitment in taff

e core business is delivered.

4.1 Advice and support on HR policy easements and individual circumstances is

12. Restoring Efficiency/Discipline/Harassm 12.1 Where the employee, their representative, hearing officer, or line managerare not available to deal with a case brought under any of these policies, then the timescals 13. Recruitment 1favour of carrying out the Department's core business. If necessary, temporary scould be recruited to meet immediate needs to ensure th 14. Advice and Support 1available to both employees and line managers from the People Services Centre. Welfare support may be obtained via the Occupational Welfare Service Helpline.

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Annex W To: NBC(P) BCMP

andemic Response

P

mouth) response26 to a Pandemic follows the lines f response to any Business Continuity Management (BCM) incident, implementing

ent Plan (which forms part of the Business Continuity Plan) nd the resources this invokes.

ifferen ntext of each WHO Pandemic Phase, and then likely to arise as the phases of response progress.

o information release o identifying/ containing infection/ transmission o control of human presence o control of travel o control of inanimate threats o protection of key human assets o internal/ external communication o business decisions o contingent authority.

The table at the end of this Annex details the response to be considered per activity at each WHO Phase. Decisions on the likely response should be informed by a current risk assessment; environmental, organisational and individual. 3. Information Release 3.1 It is important to keep the workforce informed in order to:

a. Quell unnecessary panic by explaining the situation – whilst being open about the extent to which the threat is real, in order to maintain trust. b. Ensure the workforce acts appropriately to protect themselves and the MoDs interests. c. Ensure the maximum benefit is gained from the preparations that NBC(P)/ BAE has made (as above).

3.2 All normal channels of communication with the workforce should remain open unless and until the Pandemic reaches an advanced stage (ie Phase 5 or 6). If normal channels of communication are denied by Pandemic effects, and personnel

1. Response Overview 1.1 NBC(P)/ BAE (Team Portsothe Incident Managema 1.2 The NBC(P)/ BAE response will align with the Pandemic Phases described in the World Health Organisation (WHO) guidelines. This Section prescribes the d t areas of response in the coaddresses the practical issues 2. Phased Response 2.1 This section addresses the following activities by WHO Phase:

26 A pandemic response, at UK Government alert level 4, within PNB will include all Lodger Units, Contractors and Suppliers.

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re at home, information and support will be available from an emergency ommunications infrastructure comprising:

a. The normal site telephone numbers, which in extreme be switched through to a recorded general status

announcement which will include a number for specific enquiries.

n on a public internet site (www.teamportsmouth.co.uk

ac

conditions will

b. The specific enquiry line linked into the HR process. c. Informatio

), which will be set up for the purpose,

disseminate information proactively through a network of employees process.

ortant

absent from the ons will be an essential part of business. 4. Identifyi / ase 4.1 The risk of e e risk of person-person transmission wh ) may be controlled by:

a Infection control list I1

ing ’.

o Adequate (increased if necessary) cleaning and disinfection of g or home environment.

o Specific cleansing of door knobs and handrails.

b

sks, office equipment and other commonly used office and industrial items (and the equivalent in the

Implementing social distancing policies at work (and advice on be

a prophylactic basis (if the decision is made to stock Tamiflu on this basis).

briefed to the workforce and referred to by the recorded message as above. d. A telephone cascade call-out system27 established to

via the BCM

3.3 Keeping the lines of communication open is one of the most impaspects of the Comms and HR team’s work. With many people expected to be

wo kplace environment, maintaining communicati of managing the

r managing the scenario and also

ng Containing Infection by Ph

mployees becoming infected (ie thilst on NBC(P)/ BAE sites

.

o Appropriate personal hygiene (ie washing hands and containsneezes and coughs in a tissue), ‘Catch it, Bin it, Kill it

the workin

Or if the threat becomes greater:

. Infection control list I2

o Specific cleansing of de

home environment) – see also section on risk from inanimate objects.

ohaviour in life outside work).

o Deployment of medication (Tamiflu) on

Or if the Pandemic becomes acute:

27 See NBC(P) BCMP, Part 2 Para 10 and Annex L.

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t I3

Ba

essential): catering staff, maintenance personnel, post deliverers, cle

Isolation of the workforce into groups forbidden to meet ph cilities such as

rne viruses).

4.2 Infection y b ice will be given to emphome in themselves or their family. Employees will be advised that, if they suspect symptoms in themselves or their family, to:

o Which in the early phases of Pandemic involve visiting osis and receive treatment (ie

medication or in hospital according to the severity of the

takes hold, to ask suspected sufferers to telephone a NHS Direct helpline to

ms and await home delivery of medication – or be taken to hospital according to the

ated to give patients access possible. The

icated website and a central call centre and is able to quickly tell people if they have

nosed with the virus symptoms, the mber to enable a ‘flu

cal

4.3 Advice will be widely available to line managers regarding what symptoms to look for in their e pProtection Agen ( proactive to contact their GP/ Medical Centre/should not retur o

a. If the Pandemic reaches UK Government alert level 4 (a widespread state across the UK):

o Employees and managers will be instructed to be proactive in looking for specified symptoms.

c. Infection control lis

o nning the activity of personnel whose roles involve travelling around the site meeting many people and/or touching many objects (making local alternative arrangements instead where

aners, etc. o

ysically (and discontinuing pan-site farefectories).

o Use of facemasks by medical/ welfare carers, (to protect from airbo

ma e identified in the home or the work environment. Advloyees at an appropriate stage as to what symptoms to look for at

a. Not come to work. b. Seek medical advice, following national guidelines:

the GP to confirm the diagn

case). o But are expected, once the Pandemic

confirm their sympto

severity of the case. o As and when the number of cases of pandemic Flu

continues to rise rapidly, the National Pandemic Flu Service (NPFS) will be activto information and antivirals as quickly asNPFS is made up of a ded

Pandemic Flu. If diagpatient will be given an authorised nufriend’ to collect their antivirals from one of their loantiviral collection points.

m loyees. This information will be promulgated by the Health cy HPA). Line managers should be NHS Direct for advice and treatment as appropriate. Employees n t work until all symptoms are resolved.

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b. The severity of impact upon an infected employee may be controlled by agi proactive in managing cases of infection in terms of:

o

5. Control of H 5.1 In a Pan and every human enteri C(P)/ BAE personnel wor e. Hence limiting the categories of personnel permitted to ent n ic risk escalates, is be ctive means of controlling infection. The categories concerned are:

home). o Personnel normally employed at the site, who have travelled but

b. Po NB

those wo UK cus

excludi who have travelled overseas. o Oth v

ove eo Person

overse

c. Personn lo NBC(P ave

travelleo UK cus

have tro Other v

to unaf d. Personnel l

o Person cted areas. o To reduce the risk further, personnel can be asked to work from

nterests by limiting the egree of travel and thus the opportunity for employees to come into contact with

infected perapplied at e mic, relating to travel to:

Unaffected UK customer sites.

eng ng medical support to be

o Prompt medical advice as to how best to recover. Arranging hospitalisation in cases where such is appropriate.

uman Presence Threat by Phase

demic scenario there is an infection risk associated with eachng into PNB, posing risk of transmitting the disease to NBking on the sit

er i to the site, expanding the scope of the limitation as the Pandemlieved to be an effe

a. Personnel list P1

o Personnel normally employed at the site, and who have not travelled (other than from

not overseas. ersonnel list P2

C(P)/ BAE employees visiting from other UK sites, excludingho have travelled overseas. tomers, suppliers and contractors visiting the site, ng those

er isitors from the UK, excluding those who have travelled rs as.

nel normally employed at the site, who have travelledas but only to unaffected areas.

el ist P3 )/ BAE employees visiting from other UK sites, who hd overseas but only to unaffected areas. tomers, suppliers and contractors visiting the site, who avelled overseas but only to unaffected areas. isitors from the UK, who have travelled overseas but only fected areas.

ist P4 s who have travelled to affe

home.

6. Travel Control by Phase 6.1 NBC(P)/ BAE can protect its people and business id

sons. The Table at the end of this Annex lists the restrictions to be ach phase of the Pande

oo

Unaffected UK MoD / BAE sites.

UNCLASSIFIED


W - 5 UNCLASSIFIED

erseas locations.

When travel is b e

olving more densely opulated crowds of travellers becomes less desirable than more isolated modes of

t

of eir return to PNB. NBC(P)/ BAE have a duty of care to

uch employees. When personnel return from an affected area, the personnel concerned s main away from PNB until the incubation period for the disease h 7. Control of I 7.1 There is a risk of infection from inanimate objects (which risk can change as the virus evo anything that people (who may be infected) have handled, includi s

ao

o nt such as computer keyboards, mouse’s and printers

o electric sockets

s

b.o

o o coins and banknotes

d for Pandemic protection

c. o ocuments passed between people

postal contents and packaging es.

or usiness-

ritical processes) may need a particular focus of attention in terms of the factors addressed abov I high, the business should consider affordin s ion through:

o Unaffected UK supplier/service provider sites. o Unaffected other UK locations. o Unaffected ovo Affected areas. arr d, business may continue via video/ voice conferences.

6.2 As the Pandemic status rises, travel by means invptransport (especially travel by car, when interpersonal contact is minimised) – albeithere is not always a choice. 6.3 Persons already present at locations other than their base site may be at risk of infection (especially those on extended assignments) – and may present a riskpassing on infection upon ths

hould be ordered to reas elapsed.

nanimate Threats by Phase

lves). The risk affectsng uch items as:

. Threats list T1 door-handles and handrails

o industrial equipment handling points IT equipme

o office equipment and furniture remote controls for projectors or TVs

oo coffee machineo delivered goods Threats list T2

personal possessions such as pens o mobile phones

coats and jackets

o facemasks use

Threats list T3 paper d

oo catering suppli

8. Protection of Key Human Assets by Phase 8.1 Personnel offering unique/ scarce expertise in key areas of the businesswho have unique knowledge/ insights in key areas (such as relating to bc

e. n times when the Pandemic risk isg uch personnel enhanced protect

UNCLASSIFIED


W - 6 UNCLASSIFIED

olation from personnel who might be

usiness purposes, again maximising isolation. k during

home life.

.1 Internal Communication within NBC(P)/ BAE is essential, throughout a period of Pandemic ther spread of

key to the management of a Pandemic:

taken from all due authorities, and that the most is made of the support they can provide.

pliers changes to requirements or delivery schedules.

10.2 The stak o

ittee. tees.

t of Health. Authorities/Trusts.

itals. Local Authorities.

Services.

neral public.

s

Suppliers iders (utilities, maintenance providers, facility

11. Business Decisions by Phase

1.1 NBC(P)/ BAE business critical outputs may be affected as the constraints

, rts

o Working at home, to maximise isinfected.

o Not travelling for bo Advice (obviously non-mandatory) on how to minimise ris

o Priority for prophylactic medication (if such is provided).

9. Internal Communication by Phase 9threat, in terms of education, managing the impact of the pandemic and preventing furthe infection. 10. External Communications by Phase 10.1 External liaison will be

o To ensure the proper advice is

o To manage the impact upon the business where there is interaction with external parties – for example agreeing with customers/sup

eh lders include:

o Government authorities in the UK, eg Civil Contingency Comm Regional Contingency Commit Departmen Local Health Local Hosp

Emergency

o Press and the ge o Business stakeholder

Customers

Service provproviders, etc)

Partners

1imposed by a Pandemic increase. This (as with other BCM incidents) is addressed through the Business Impact Analysis (BIA) process: through the analysis of risksincluding Pandemic risks, upon the Key Business Processes. As the Pandemic sta

UNCLASSIFIED


W - 7 UNCLASSIFIED

impact on the longer term recovery process, this type of issue will be referred to the Crisis Mana 11.2 As the P dneed to change rstakeholders involved) include:

Changing the nature of what is to be delivered to Customers: , revised products, revised delivery

schedules.

activity/allocation of resources; eg perhaps making a decision to increase stock levels to guard

upply being affected. o Changing the nature (accordingly) of what is to be obtained from

ts, revised delivery schedules.

the

11.3 All s n priorities upon whic s based. The decisions will be informed by the predictions of staff absence.

a. If changes are made to the business in response to the Pandemic, this u ess Enablers (CBE), which will n onsequence. b. If the Pa e very severe, the optimal decision m t NB and await the opportunity

12. Contingent Au One poss e y of an unfolding Pandemic may be that personnel responsible for key decisions within NBC(P)/ BAE may become unavailable or un

o Illne nel concerned. o Illne o Decisio me working. o Breakdown of communications infrastructure.

erned relate to:

togement Steering Group28.

an emic begins to assert an effect on PNB, the business plans will in esponse. Options to be considered (all by agreement with the

orevised delivery numbers

o Changing the business approach to delivering the above eg changing business priorities and sequence of

against the possibility of s

Suppliers: revised delivery numbers, revised produc

o Revising programme plans and supporting asset configuration (personnel, equipment, facility allocation etc) in line withabove changes.

uch action should reflect and respond to the Business Pla

h the BIA wa

in t rn will affect the BIA and Critical Busineed to be reviewed/renewed as a c

ndemic circumstances becomigh be to shut down some or all of P to reopen.

thority by Phase

ibl effect of the increasing severit

contactable due to:

ss of the personss of their family.

ns regarding ho

The key business decisions conc

o Authority for spending money and other financial matters (including budgetary sign off, working hours allocations, expenses etc).

o Authority for commercial/ contractual/ procurement decisions.

28 For details of the BC Command and Control structure, see NBC(P) BCMP Part 2 and Annex I.

UNCLASSIFIED


W - 8 UNCLASSIFIED

administrative decisions (time and attendance, project bookings etc).

External Communication.

The above addresses th e likely nature of a Pandemic, it is unpHowever, it is probable t e will be a strong link to the progression of the Pandemic lifecycle.

o Authority for regulatory/ governance decisions. o Authority for important

o Authority for HR decisions. o Authority for security decisions. o Authority for

e matters of reserve authority and succession rules. By thredictable when personnel may fall victim.

hat ther

UNCLASSIFIED


W - 9 UNCLASSIFIED

Pandemic Staged Response Table

The suggested Phase Responses below will be in support of Government guidelines, dependent on the scale of the Pandemic within the UK

WHO Pandemic Status Information Release Identifying / Containing Infection

Human Presence Travel Control reats Protect Key Human Assets

Internal Communications External Communications Business

Decisions Contingent Authority Non-Human Th

Phase 1 (MoD Stage 1 Preliminary).

No new influenza virus subtypes detected in humans. Low risk of development/ infection.

• Basic awareness information only. • Facts, Questions and Answers (F, Q&A) on Intranet.

Inte

r Pan

dem

ic P

erio

d


No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans however a circulation of animal influenza virus subtype poses a risk of human disease.

• Basic awareness information only. • F, Q&A on Intranet.

• n/a • n/a • n/a • n • Discussion in PNB.

• Recognise all stakeholders and keep lines of communication established and open.

• At the periodic BIA Workshops review

(in the light of unfolding

experience) and update recognised Pandemic related

risks and their associated resilience

& response measures.

• Normal coverage of authorities. /a • n/a


Human infections with a new subtype, but no human to human spread, or at most, rare occurrences.

• Basic awareness information only. • F, Q&A on Intranet. • n/a • n/a • n/a • n

• Discussion in PNB.• Liaison with/ update Pandemic Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG).

• Recognise all stakeholders and keep lines of communication established and open.

• At the periodic BIA Workshops review (in the light of unfolding experience) and update recognised Pandemic related risks and their associated resilience & response measures.

• Normal coverage of authorities. /a • n/a

Phase 4 (MoD Stage 2 Prepare.)

Small clusters with limited human to human transmission but spread is highly localised, suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to humans.

• Limited information on nature of threat to personnel & the business. • Increased exposure of Pandemic preparations and what they entail for each element of the workforce.

• Infection control list I1.

• Exclude personnel on list P4.

• Bar on travel to affected areas.

reg r-haha

• Home

on siteimport

unless important/ urgent.

• Active management. • CMSG (JOB) informed of status and instruction taken. • Liaison with/ update Pandemic CMWG.

• Liaise regularly with stakeholders to inform them of PNB status and its implications, and to obtain information about stakeholder status and its implications. • Obtain information to inform PNB Pandemic decision-making.

• As Phase 1 AND: • Evaluate any current and/ or predictable pandemic impact and: • review through liaison with the business stakeholders. • decide on suitable changes of business plans as per the options described above.

• Normal coverage of authorities likely; isolated recourse to reserve authority & succession plans may be needed.

• Special cleaning imes for doo

ndles and ndrails.

worunless presence

is ant.

• No business travel overseas

king

Pand

emic

Ale

rt P

erio

d

Phase 5 (MoD Stage 3 Absorb).

Large clusters, but still localised, suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly better at adapting to a humans, (substantial Pandemic risk).

• Detailed information on nature of threat to personnel & the business. • Detailed briefings of Pandemic preparations and what they entail for each element of the workforce. • Advice on behaviour/precautions at work and at home. • Emergency communications infrastructure deployed if needed.

• Infection control lists I1/ I2. • Advice to employees & managers as to how to recognise symptoms if they notice them.

• Exclude personnel on lists P3/ P4. • Direct home working for persons (if applicable).

• Bar on travel to affected areas. • Bar on personnel returning from affected area entering PNB. • Bar on travel to unaffected overseas locations. • Preference for travel by car to unaffected destinations in the UK.

• Special cleaning regimes for all threats on list T1. • Instructions to ensure personal items (including those on threat list T2) are kept away from other people.

• Home working unless presence on site is business-critical.• No business travel unless business-critical (and no travel overseas or to affected UK areas irrespective of business situation).

• Active management. • Liaison with/ update Pandemic CMWG. • Pandemic CMWG proactive in implementing policy depending on circumstances. • CMSG (JOB) informed of status and instruction taken.

• As Phase 4 AND: • Obtain support from Government authorities. • Act with business stakeholders to review and revise business agreements in the light of developments. • Act to assure the Press and the general public that NBC(P)/ BVT Surface Fleet is managing the situation effectively.

• As Phase 4 but activity is likely to be more intense/ urgent. • Renew Business Plans in the light of any change made to the business approach in response to the Pandemic.

• Normal coverage of authorities likely; recourse to reserve authority & succession plans more likely to be needed. • Review “strength in depth” and add to the depth where necessary.

Pand

emic

Per

iod

Phase 6 (MoD Stage 3 Absorb and UK Govt Alert Levels 1 – 4).

Pandemic phase: increased and sustained transmission of the virus(es) to the general population.

• Detailed information on nature of threat to personnel & the business. • Specific instructions to categories of workers as to procedures to follow and what to do in defined circumstances. • Information helpline established to answer questions. • Emergency communications infrastructure deployed if needed.

• Infection control lists I1/ I2/ I3. • Instructions to employees & managers to actively look for specified symptoms. • Proactive management of cases of infection.

• Exclude personnel on lists P2/P3/ P4; ie allow only those on list P1. • Direct home working for persons (if applicable).

• Bar on all travel. • Bar on personnel who have travelled (other than from home) entering PNB.

• Special cleaning regimes for threats on list T1. • Instructions to ensure personal items (including those on threat list T2) are kept away from other people. • Ban on threat list T3 activities (no post, no paper passed between people).

• Home working irrespective of business situation. • No business travel. • Prophylactic medication.

• Active management. • Liaison with/ update Pandemic CMWG. • Pandemic CMWG proactive in implementing policy depending on circumstances. • CMSG (JOB) proactive in implementing policy depending on circumstances.

• As for Phase 5 BUT more intensely. • Liaise with health authorities about status of infected NBC(P)/ BVT Surface Fleet personnel; provide support.

• As Phase 4 but activity is likely to be critical. • Manage actively the possible decision to shut down some or all of the business.

• Extensive recourse likely to be needed to reserve authority & succession plans. • Communicate strongly (but remotely) to ensure a viable top level of command is maintained.

UNCLASSIFIED

NBC(P) Busi ty Master Plan

X - 1 UNCLASSIFIED

n o: NBCPandemic Recovery

ness Continui

An ex X (P) BCMP T

1. Understand Post-Pandemic Scenario 1.1 The first step in recovering from a Pandemic will be to build up an

tanding of the scenario faced following the disruption. estions to a wered include:

Has the s ed FLEET/ MoD strategic requirements?

(1). If so the business strategy and (within this) the list of Major Programmes driving the outputs may need to be changed.

Was business output criticality changed during Pandemic response e Pandemic pact), in terms of which Major Programmes are now

order of criticality (and the priorities among them)?

(1). If so a BIA update is needed to amend the list of tical dependencies recognised.

1.2 issues to consider are:

Is the pre-Pandemic infrastructure still viable? or what is the best capability it can offer?

the pre- ndemic supply chain still viable?

(1). Where do the programmes stand in terms of supplier contribution? (2). Is each of the suppliers capable of resto ndemic position?

r the best t y can offer?

wers to the above questions me base? trategy still viable?

This understanding will provide the baseline from which the recovery can be planned. 2 rm o usiness Recovery Nee 2 f n from nario assessmePandemic, asserting a pr t on BAE employees re, c m ntail r Business Recovery. However a P m a e s volvi re than a small p e t h inc he work, may well not need formal Business Recovery.

undbe

a.

b. (dusee

Fur

a. b.

c.

Fo

Dif

ersic

los

ersns

The qu

ituation chang

ton in

im

cri

ther

Is Pa

ring the pre-Pa

an for the cost

o

What do tIs the bus

what is

he ansiness s

hat the

f B

t pictures

suppliersrting a lee busine

may emergeofound effec will clearly eser effect, in

ss and delays

ere

andss

to t

ded

the sceNBC(P)/ a need fong no mourred to t

.

.1

ustoandeeopl

nt. A major , infrastructu

proportion of

UNCLASSIFIED

NBC(P) Business Continuity Master Plan

. Implementation

.1 This Section addresses the situation whereby NBC(P)/ BAE needs to apply a ough means that are less or more

ical) Business Strategy that is the same

gy.

.2

a. The identity of the Major Programme

Th

reviewed, delivered through restor the pre-Pandemic approach

e a different, perhaps radically different, be different from that which prevailed at

4. enew 4.1 ce B h Business Impact Analysi (BIA) sho re of the Major Programthe critical outputsreduction/responsof the post-Pande

3 Business Recovery 3formal Business Recovery process to rebuild (thr

d capability to resume implementation of araas or little different from that being pursued pre-Pandemic.

The Section is also relevant to a Business Recovery programme implementing a new Business Strate

3follows;

If formal Business Recovery is required, decisions should be made as

s supporting delivery of the Business Plan should be reviewed, and either confirmed - or the list changedthrough Joint Operations Board (JOB) discussion to reflect the realities of thesituation.

b. e routes to realisation of the Major Programmes should be and reaffirmed or changed. Each Major Programme may be

ation of the requisites of – or delivery could involvapproach (noting the situation may the time the initial plans were established).

BCM R

Os

n usiness Recovery has been completed, a fresuld be undertaken. This BIA will be based on the new pictumes, emerging from the above. It will establish a fresh analysis of underpinning the major programmes and will assess risk and risk e in respect of the regenerated Strategic Objectives in the context

ic m circumstances.

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nbc(p) business continuity management plan...

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