necessary and sufficient conditions in tort law
DESCRIPTION
Condición necesaria y condición suficiente en el Derecho de la ResponsabilidadTRANSCRIPT
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Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law
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ThePhilosophicalFoundationsofTortLawDavidG.Owen
Printpublicationdate:1997PrintISBN-13:9780198265795PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:March2012DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.001.0001
NecessaryandSufficientConditionsinTortLawTONYHONOR
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.003.0017
AbstractandKeywords
Argumentaboutcausationinsideandoutsidethelawisoftenconcernedwiththefollowingquestion:Mustacausebeanecessaryconditionofaresult,asufficientconditionoftheresult,oranecessaryelementinasetofconditionsjointlysufficienttoproducetheresult?Thischaptersupportsthethirdview,bothoutsidethelawandinsideit,wheneverasequenceofphysicaleventsisinissue.Adifferentbutrelatedideacanbeusedtoexplainreasonsforhumanaction,causingorinducingpeopletoactratherthancausingthingstohappen.Whencausalconnectionmustbeproved,thelawalsosettleswhatmustbeshowntohavecausedwhat.Tortlawgenerallyimposesfaultliabilityonpeoplewhobytheirwrongfulconductcauseharmtoothers;butsometimesitimposesstrictliabilityonpeoplewhosespeciallydangerousactivities,thoughnotwrongful,causeothersharm.
Keywords:causation,necessarycondition,causalconnection,tortlaw,harm,strictliability,dangerousactivities
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Argumentaboutcausationinsideandoutsidethelawisoftenconcernedwiththequestion:mustacausebeanecessaryconditionofaresult,mustitbeasufficientconditionoftheresult,ormustitbeanecessaryelementinasetofconditionsjointlysufficienttoproducetheresult?Thisessaysupportsthethirdview,bothoutsidethelawandinsideit,wheneverasequenceofphysicaleventsisinissue.Adifferentbutrelatedideacanbeusedtoexplainreasonsforhumanaction,causingorinducingpeopletoactratherthancausingthingstohappen.Thereis,Icontend,nospeciallegalmeaningofcausationandrelatedconceptssuchasinducement.
Ontheotherhand,lawalonedetermineswhencausalconnectionmustbeprovedandwhenitcanbedispensedwithinlegalcontexts.Whencausalconnectionmustbeproved,lawalsosettleswhatmustbeshowntohavecausedwhat.Thisisspeciallyimportantintortlaw.Tortlawgenerallyimposesfaultliabilityonpeoplewhobytheirwrongfulconductcauseharmtoothers;butsometimesitimposesstrictliabilityonpeoplewhosespeciallydangerousactivities,thoughnotwrongful,causeothersharm.Thecausalinquirytakesadifferentformdependingonwhetherfaultorstrictliabilityisinissue.
Tortlawyershavetraditionallyheldtheviewthat,whateverthemeaningofcausalconnection,thewaytotestwhetheritexistsinagivencaseistoaskwhetherinthecircumstancestheharmfulresultwouldhaveoccurredintheabsenceofthewrongfulact.Thisisthewidelyadoptedbut-fortest,bywhichcausalconnectionisdeemedtoexistbetweenconditionandconsequencewhenever,butforthecondition,theconsequencewouldnothaveoccurred.Thebut-fortestisalsocalledthetestofstrongnecessity.1Itoftengiveswhatisintuitivelytherightanswer,butitsometimesfailstodoso.Thistestismeanttoexcludethosefactorsthathadnoimpactonaparticularcourseofevents.Butsometimesitcutsoutfactorsthatdidhaveanimpact.Itservestoexcludemanyirrelevantconditions,butitcanalsoexclude(p.364) othersthatarerelevant.2Thusinsomecasesofover-determinationcaseswhereeachoftwoormoreindependentwrongfulactsalonewouldhavesufficedtobringabouttheharmthebut-fortestleadstothedubiousconclusionthatneitheractcausedtheharm.So,ifthebut-fortestwereappliedtosuchacase,thevictimcouldrecoverfromneitherwrongdoer.Asawayaroundthisandotherdifficulties,courtshavedevelopedanalternativetestofcausalconnection,foruseintortcaseswhenthebut-fortestseemstogivethewronganswer.Thisalternativetestaskswhethertheconditioninquestionwasasubstantialfactorinproducingtheresult.Butthisdevice,whichallowsjudgesandjuriestofollowtheirintuitions,ispurelypragmatic3andleavesthetheoreticalproblemuntouched.Thesubstantialfactornotionisindefinite,ifnotindeterminate,anditisdifficulttoseehowitmightbefittedintoacoherenttheoryofcausation.
I.TheCausationStory:ModernEffortstoUnravelitsMysteriesIn1959HerbertHartandIproposedathesisthatwethoughtwouldexplainthebasisofandjustifyourintuitionsincertainunusualcases,suchastheover-determinationsituation,aswellasinstraightforwardones.4Wearguedthat,tobeacauseofanevent,aprioreventmustbeshowntobeacausallyrelevantconditionofthatevent.Whethersomethingmoreisneededtoturnacausallyrelevantconditionintoacausemayforthe
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momentbeleftaside;fornowletitbeassumed(contrarytoourview)thateverycausallyrelevantconditionisacause.Ourtheorywasthataneventsuchasapriorwrongfulactiscausallyrelevantonlyifitisanecessaryelementinasetofconditionsthatistogethersufficienttoproducetheconsequence.Aconditionmaybenecessaryjustinthesensethatitisoneofasetofconditionsjointlysufficientfortheproductionoftheconsequence.Itisnecessarybecauseitisrequiredtocompletethisset.5Atleastthatwastrue,wesaid,ofphysicalsequences.6Thisweaksenseofnecessary(necessarytocompletethatparticularsetofconditions)canbecontrastedwiththestrongnecessityinherentinthebut-fortest.Ontheotherhandoursenseofsufficientisastrongone.Ifthesetofconditionssufficienttoproducetheconsequenceoccurred,theconsequenceoccurred;andiftheconsequence(p.365) hadnotoccurred,thesetofconditionswouldnothaveoccurredeither.7
In1965JohnMackieappliedourideatocausalregularitiescausalgeneralizationsasdistinguishedfromspecificevents.8Hecombinedwithitthedoctrineofthepluralityofcauses.Thislattertheorypostulatesthatondifferentoccasionscertaintypesofeventssaydeathorroadaccidents-canhavedifferentcauses.Wediscovercausalregularities,andultimatelyscientificcausallaws,byassemblingsetsofconditions.Ideally,theseshouldbesuchthatwecansayofeachconstituentconditionthatitisanecessary9memberofasetsuchthat,whenallthemembersofthatsetarepresent,aparticularconsequenceinvariablyfollows.Theconditionsarejointlysufficientfortheresultbut,inviewofthepluralityofcauses,theymaynotbeactuallynecessaryforit,sincetheremaybealternativesetsofconditionsthatwillproducethesameconsequence.10Mackiecalledsuchaconditionanecessarymemberofasetjointlysufficient(butunnecessary)toproduceagiventypeofresultanINUS(InsufficientbutNecessarypartofanUnnecessarybutSufficient)condition.
Forexample,theremaybeonecausalregularity,bywhichadriversnotkeepingaproperlookoutpluscertainotherconditionsissufficienttobringaboutaroadaccident,andanothercausalregularity,bywhichgoingtoofastplusadifferentsetofconditionsissufficientforaroadaccident.Ifso,notkeepingaproperlookoutandgoingtoofastarebothINUSconditionsofroadaccidentsthough,belongingtodifferentsufficientsets,11neitherconditionisnecessarytoproducearoadaccident.
Itisworthnotingthatsetsofconditionsofthissortgenerallyhaveasoneoftheirmemberstheabsenceofcounteractingorfrustratingconditions.Acertaindoseofstrychninewill,givencertainbodilyconditions,resultindeath,butonly(1)intheabsenceofanantidote,and(2)intheabsenceofsomeothercauseofdeathinterveningbeforethepoisontakeseffect.Thestrengthofthedose,thebodilyconditions,theabsenceofanantidote,theabsenceofsomeotherinterveningcauseofdeath,etc.areallINUSmembersofthesetofconditionsthatistogethersufficienttoresultindeath.
(p.366) Withsomehesitation,12MackieconcludedthatthoughthisanalysisofcausalregularitiesassetsofINUSconditionsoftenappliesnotonlytotypesofeventbuttospecificevents,13itdoesnotalwaysdoso.14Hethoughtthatatleastsometimeswecansayofaspecificinstanceofacondition,suchasnotkeepingaproperlookout,thatit
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causedacollision,thoughwearenottherebycommittedtoanyregularitythatwouldmakenotkeepingalookoutanINUSconditionofroadaccidents.Itisnotjustthatweandscientificexpertsareunabletoframeasatisfactorygeneralizationcombiningspeed,positionofthevictim,visibility,roadcondition,etc.intherightproportions.Rather,wesometimesconcludethatbutforthelackofaproperlookoutthiscollisionwouldnothaveoccurredwithoutbelievingthatthiswasaninstanceofaregularityconcerningspeed,position,roadcondition,andtheotherfactors.Asingularcausalstatementneednotimplyeventhevaguestgeneralization.15IfinaspecificcasewecanbackourconvictionupbypointingtoasetofINUSconditions,somuchthebetter;butthatisnotessential.
In1985RichardWrightinanimportantpaperdissentedfromMackiesviewonthispointand,propoundingtheNESS(NecessaryElementofaSufficientSet)test,elaboratedtheideathatHartandIhadoriginallyputforward.16Hisversionisonlymarginallydifferentfromours.AccordingtoWright,aparticularconditionwasacauseof(contributedto)aspecificresultifandonlyifitwasanecessaryelementofasetofantecedentactualconditionsthatwassufficientfortheoccurrenceoftheresult.17Thisperhapsdiffersfromourviewinonerespect.Wrightseemstorequirethatalltheconditionsthatbelongtothesetbeantecedenttotheresult,whereasitappearstomethat,tobesufficientfortheresult,someconditionsatleastcanbeofthesortthatmustpersistuntiltheresultoccurs.Anexampleistheicyconditionoftheroadasafactorinaroadaccident.
Thisdifferenceofview,ifitisone,doesnotaffectthevalueoftheNESStest,whichiswidelysupportedbytorttheorists,andnotonlybythem.18Nevertheless,Mackieisnotaloneindefendingthebut-fornotionasanexplanationofsingularcausalevents.InGermancriminallaw,FriedrichToepelhasrecentlypublishedamonographoncrimesofnegligence,which(p.367) clearlyhavemuchincommonwithtortactions.Toepelsupportsthebut-fortestanddissentsfromthedominantviewamongGermanscholars,whichrejectsit.19
Thecontroversyisclearlynotover.InsectionsIIandIII,IexploresomeaspectsofcausalconnectionthatarecommontotheNESSandbut-fortheoriesandothersthatdividethem.Theanalysisfocusesinparticularonhowfarcausationintortlawdependsonconceptsthatapplyoutsidethelaw,andhowfaritreflectsnormativeconsiderations,legalormoral.
II.CommonElementsintheNessandBut-ForTheoriesSomepointsare,orshouldbe,commongroundbetweentheNESSandbut-fortheories.First,eachofthesetwotheoriesembracesbothasearchforthemeaningofcausallyrelevantconditionandatestbywhichwecantellwhetheraconditioniscausallyrelevant.Thatis,theyarebothattimessemanticandattimesheuristic.Theimportanceofthisdistinctionisthatwemaybelievethataconditionwasacauseofaspecificeventbecauseitwasamemberofasetofconditionsjointlysufficienttobringitaboutandyetnotbeabletosayexactlywhatthoseconditionswere.Wemaythereforemeanbycauseaconditionofthatsortandyetbesatisfiedinagiveninstancethatitwasacauseonthebasisoftheroughuniformitiesobservedineverydaylifethatleadustoconcludethatthepresenceoftheconditionmadeadifferencetotheoutcome.Wemaydothisthoughwe
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cannotspecifytheINUSconditionsexemplifiedinthecaseathand.20Noonewilldenythatthebut-fortesthasinmanyinstancesaheuristicvalue:itoftenprovidesaquickwayoftestingtheexistenceofcausalconnection.However,itisanothermatterwhetheritispartofthemeaningofcausallyrelevantconditionorcause.
Philosophersdebatewhethercausalconnectionisarelationbetweeneventsorbetweenfacts.21Aneventcanbedescribedinmanydifferentways,butafactistiedtoaspecificdescription.ThatBrutusstabbedCaesarandthathebetrayedCaesardescribethesamehistoricaleventbutthefactthatBrutusstabbedthedictatorisnotthesamefactasthefactthathebetrayedhim.Thisdifferencehasabearingonwhataplaintiffmustproveinalawsuit.InawrongfuldeathactionbyCaesarswidow,shewouldhavetoprove,first,thefactthatBrutusstabbedherhusbandand,second,thefurtherfactthatCaesarsdeathwascausedbythefirstfactofBrutusstabbing;itwouldnotbeenoughtoshowthatBrutusbetrayedCaesar,even(p.368) thoughwhatBrutusdidcouldbetruthfullydescribedasbetrayal,becausenotallformsofbetrayalwillfoundtortactions.
Inmyviewbotheventsandfactscanbecausallyconnected;andinlaw,includingtortlaw,botheventsandfactscanberelevant.Aplaintiffmust(1)identifytheeventoreventsthatgiverisetohisclaimand(2)provethatthefactthatthedefendantactedinacertainwaycausedtheharmofwhichhecomplains.Hemustpointtothetime,place,andpersonsinvolved,whichcanbedescribedinanumberofways.Butthenhemustgoontoshowthatsomespecificaspectoftheeventsheidentifies(suchasthefactthatthedefendantdroveatanexcessivespeed)bringsthedefendantwithintherelevantlegalcategoryandsupportstheconclusionthathiswrongfulorrisk-creatingconductcausedtheharmofwhichtheplaintiffcomplains.Hemustshowthattheelementthatmakestheconductwrongfulorcreatestheundueriskwasrelevanttotheharmfuloutcomeforwhichthelawprovidesaremedy.
Thus,iftheplaintiffallegesthatthedefendantdroveatexcessivespeedhemustshowthatthefactthathedroveatthatsuch-and-suchaspeed,ratherthanattheproperspeed,wasrelevanttothefactthattheplaintiffsufferedsuch-and-suchinjuries.ThoughtheincidentinwhichthedefendantisallegedtohavedrivenatanexcessivespeedcanbedescribedindifferentwaysasDanDawesdrivingdownMainStreet,orastheengineerintheyellowJerseyhurryingtogethomethesedescriptionsservemerelytoidentifytheincidentinissue.Again,iftheplaintiffinjuredinanexplosionreliesonstrictliabilityforthedefendantsuseofexplosives,hemustshowthatthefactthatthedefendantusedexplosiveswasrelevanttothedamageforwhichheseeksredress,thoughwhatthedefendantdidcanbedescribedinvariousotherwaysquarryingforstone,ortryingoutanewfuse.Lawissostructuredthataplaintiffmustproveaconnectionbetweenthefactsthatspecifythosefeaturesoftheeventsthatarebothcausallyrelevantandlegallyrelevantinotherways.
Itfollowsthatthelawdeterminesthewayinwhichthecausalinquiryisframed.Causalconnection(inGermanterminologyKausalzusammenhang)cannotbeseparatedincasesoffaultliabilityfromunlawfulconnection(Rechtswidrigkeitszusammenhang);their
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separationinthewritingsofsomeGermantheoristsisinmyviewasourceoferror.Theinquiryisintowhethercertainfaultyconduct(orrisk-creatingconductentailingstrictliability)causedcertainharm.Inacountrywhereliabilityfordrivinganautomobiledependsonnegligence,thelegalissuewillbewhetherthefactthatthedefendantdrovenegligently(e.g.,withoutkeepingaproperlookout)causedtheinjuries.Butinajurisdictionwhereautomobileliabilityisstrict,thequestionwillbewhetherthefactthatthedefendantdrovecausedtheharm.Theanswertothesetwoquestionsmaybedifferent.Thedefendantsdrivingmayhavecausedtheinjury,yethisnegligentdrivingmaynothave(p.369) donesobecausehisnegligencemadenodifferencetotheoutcome;thesamecollisionwouldhaveoccurredhadhedrivencarefully.Intortlaw,theissueisnottheopen-endedoneWhatcausedthisharm?butDidthefactthatthedefendantbehavedinacertainunlawfulorunduerisk-creatingwaycauseit?Thefirstquestioncallsforanexplanationofhowtheharmcameabout,thesecondforanassessmentofthedefendantsresponsibilityforconductdescribedincategoriesfixedbythelaw.
Agoodillustrationisthecaseinvolvingthenavigationofashipbyanofficerwhowascompetentandexperiencedbutwhodidnotpossessthecertificaterequiredbylaw.22Theofficernavigatednegligentlyandtheshipwasinvolvedinacollision.Thedefendantsadmittedthatthenegligentnavigationcausedthecollision,buttheydeniedthatthelackofacertificatewascausallyrelevant.Haditbeenrelevant,theamountofdamageswouldhavebeengreater.Giventhatthebasisofliabilitywasfault,itwasrightlyheldthatthelackofacertificatewasirrelevant,sincetheofficerwouldhavenavigatednobetterhadhepossessedone.
Thelackofacertificate,itseemstome,wouldhavebeencausallyrelevanthaditbeenthecasethattheofficerwasincompetentandthat,inordertoobtainacertificate,hewouldhavehadtoacquirethenecessarycompetence.Ontheotherhand,hadtherebeenstrictliabilityfornavigatingtheshipwithoutacertificate,sothatiftheshipwasnavigatedbyapilotwithoutacertificatethenavigationwasatthedefendantsrisk,thenavigationwouldhavebeenheldtohavecausedthecollision.Sincestrictliabilityisliabilitynotforwrongfulconduct,butforengagingincertainrisk-creatingactivity,therewouldhavebeennoneedinthiscasetoshowthatthelackofacertificatewascausallyrelevant.Insuchastrictliabilitycase,itwouldhavebeenenoughthat,hadtheshipnotbeennavigatedbyX(whodidnotinfactpossessacertificate),nocollisionwouldhaveoccurred.Intheactualcase,however,whatexplainedthecollisionwasthefactthattheshipwasnegligentlynavigated,notthatitwasnavigated.Thereisadistinctionbetweenconductthatcountsasacauseinanexplanatoryinquiry,ontheonehand,andconductthatismadebythelawabasisofliabilityprovideditiscausallyconnectedwiththeharmsuffered,ontheother.
ThispointismisunderstoodbyWright23whothinksthattheHartandHonorcriteriaofvoluntaryhumanactionandabnormality(inthesenseofactionsoreventsthatareunusualinthecontext),usedtodistinguishcausesfrommerecausallyrelevantconditions,aremeanttoidentifytortiousconduct.24Wearesaidtohavedifficultyinaccommodatingstrictliability,wheretheconductonwhichliabilityisbased(e.g.,using
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explosives)(p.370) maynotbeeitherabnormalorvoluntaryinthesenseofintendedtodoharm.Buttheroleofourcriteriaistomarkabackwardlimitinexplanatorycausalinquiriesandonlyaforwardlimittowhateverresponsibilityisappropriateunderother,normativeconceptsoftortlaw.Ourcausalcriteriaarenotasubstitutefortheotherprinciplesoftortlawthatdefinewhatconductiswrongfulorentailsstrictliability.Thatdependsonpositivelaw,andvariesfromsystemtosystem,somesystemsimposingstrictliabilityornoliabilityincircumstanceswhereothersinsistonfault(e.g.,forautoaccidents).Itremainstrue,however,thatoftenthelawforgoodreasondesignatesconductaswrongfulwhenitisintendedtodoharmorisadeparturefromarecognizednorm.Inthiswaywrongfulconductthatcausesharmoftencoincideswithwhatwouldcountasacausalexplanationoftheharmthatensues.Butincasesofstrictliability,wherethewrongfulnessofthedefendantsconductisnotinissue,thereisnooccasiontotraceacausalpathfromwrongfulnesstotheplaintiffsharm.
Athirdpointisthat,whichevertheoryweadopt,ahypotheticalquestionmustbeputandanswered.Thisinvolvesacounterfactualproposition,namelythatifaconditionthatinfactoccurredhadnotoccurred,theoutcomewouldhavebeenso-and-so.25Onthebut-fortheory,wemustaskwhetherinthecircumstancestheconsequencewouldhaveoccurredhadtheconditionnotoccurred.OntheNESStheory,wemustaskwhetherinthecircumstancestheconditionwasanecessarymemberofasetofconditionsthatwastogethersufficienttoproducetheconsequence,i.e.,wouldtheremainingsetofconditionshaveproducedtheconsequenceintheabsenceoftheconditioninissue?
Buttospeakoftheabsenceofacondition,orthehypothesisthatitdidnotoccur,canmislead.Itsuggeststhattheconditionweareinterestedincanbenotionallyeliminatedandthatwecanthencalculatewhatwouldhavehappenedifonlytheremainingcircumstanceshadbeenpresent.Wrightsaysthatwehypotheticallyeliminatetheconditionbeingtestedwithoutaddingorsubtractinganyotherconditions.26ThisviewofeliminationalsohasadherentsinGermanlegaltheory,partlybecausetheoriststheretendtoseparatecausalconnectionfromunlawfulconnection.Ifthisweretherightwaytotestacausalhypothesis,weshouldindeedbecomparingtherealworldwithanimaginaryworld.Forintherealworldconductisoftenachoicebetweenalternatives.IfJohnhadnotdoneso-and-so,hewouldhavedonesomethingelse.Ifhehadnotintervened,someoneelsemighthave,perhapsinadifferentway.Sometimesthesealternativeswouldhavehadabearingonthecourseofeventsweareinvestigating.Mackierightlysaysthatbothnecessityinthestrongsenseandsufficiencyinthestrongsense(viz.,boththebut-forandNESStheories)involveassertions(p.371) abouthowtheworldwouldhaverunonifsomethingdifferenthadbeendone.27
Butthisisratherlooselyexpressed,foritleavesopenthequestion,whatisthesomethingdifferentthatwemustsupposetohavebeendone?28Inmanycontextstheansweris,whateverinthecircumstanceswouldhaveoccurredhadtheconditioninquestionnotoccurred.Sometimesthereisnoreasontosupposethatanythingcausallyrelevantwouldhaveoccurredinthatevent,andthenitlooksasiftheconditioninissueissimplybeingeliminatedascausallyrelevant.Johndroppedalightedmatchonsome
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brushwood.Didhecausethedestructionoftheforest?Totestthis,weaskwhether,ifJohnhadnotdroppedthelightedmatch,theforestfirewouldhaveoccurredanyway.Webeginbysupposingthecontradictoryofthecondition,viz.,Johndidnotdropthelightedmatch.Oftenitisclearthat,hadhenotdroppedthematch,whateverelsewouldhavehappenedwouldnothaveresultedinafire.Butthepositionwouldbedifferentifweknewthat,hadJohnnotdroppedamatch,Davidwouldhavedonesoanyway.Inthatcase,thoughJohnwillindeedhavedestroyedtheforest,hedestroyedaforestthatwasanyhowdoomed,andthatmayaffecttheforest-ownersclaim.However,thereusuallyisnoreasontosupposeanysuchalternativeeventandthereforenoneedexpresslytosubstituteanythingfortheconditioneliminated.
Butthisnotion,thatwedonotsubstituteanythingfortheconditionwhosecausalrelevancewearetesting,isanillusion.SupposewewanttotesttheassertionthatChurchillkeptBritaininthewarin1940.WasthefactthathewasPrimeMinisterthecauseofBritainremaininginthewar?HerewecannoteliminateChurchillwithoutsubstitutinganotherPrimeMinisterwhosehypotheticalconductofaffairswouldhavehadabearingonwhetherBritainremainedinthewar.ThecontradictoryofChurchillwasPrimeMinister,viz.,ChurchillwasnotPrimeMinister,wouldhaveimpliedintheworldof1940thatsomeoneelsewasPrimeMinister(sayHalifax);andwemustthenaskwhetherthatpersonwouldhavewantedandbeenabletoconvinceParliamentandtheBritishpeopletocontinuethewar.ThecausalstatementaboutChurchillimplicitlycontrastshimwiththishypotheticalsubstitute.Logically,ChurchillwasnotPrimeMinisterin1940isalsocompatiblewiththerebeingnoPrimeMinisteratall.Butitistherealworld,notanimaginaryworldoralogicalcalculus,thatdetermineswhatisimpliedinthecontextbythecontradictoryoftheconditioninquestion,andwhatshouldthereforebesubstitutedforitintestingthecounter-factualproposition.Inthatrealworld,hadChurchillnotbeenPrime(p.372) Minister,someoneelsewouldhaveheldthatoffice.AndthesomeoneelsemightormightnothavekeptBritaininthewar.
Inalegalcontext,thesameapproachmaybeapplied,exceptthatwhentheinquiryconcernsthecausalrelevanceofwrongfulconduct,asisusualintortclaims,wemustsubstituteforthewrongfulconductofthedefendantrightfulconductonhispart.29Thatis,whenliabilityisbasedonfault,thecomparisonisnotwithwhatwouldhavehappenedhadthedefendantdonenothing,butwhatwouldhavehappenedhadheactedproperly.ThereasonformakingthissubstitutionissimilartothatinChurchillscase.Thecontradictoryofthedefendantactedwrongfullyisthedefendantdidnotactwrongfully,andthisislogicallyquiteunspecific;forinstance,itiscompatiblewithhisdoingnothing.Oncemorewemustturntothefeaturesoftherealworldinthiscase,theworldofpositivetortlawwhichtellsusthatwhatisimpliedbyhisnotactingwrongfullyishisactingrightfully.Thereasonwhythisistheappropriatesubstitutionisthattheaimofthelegalinquiryistodiscovernotwhetherthedefendantsconductassuchmadeadifferencetotheoutcome,butwhetherthefactthatitwaswrong-fuldidso.
Again,tortlawnormallyrequirestheplaintifftoshowthatthewrongfulaspectofthedefendantsconductwascausallyconnectedwiththeharm.30Toeliminatedrivingatan
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excessivespeedthereforerequiresustosubstitutefortheexcessivespeeddrivingataproperspeed,andthentoaskwhetherthatconductwouldhaveledtotheinjuriesthatinfactoccurred.Moreover,thehypothesisofrightfulconductinvolvessupposing,notmerelythatthedefendantdroveataproperspeed,butalsothatthelikelyconsequencesofhisdoingsobetakenintoaccount.Forexample,ifthepedestrianwhowasrunoverwouldhaveseenthedefendantsautomobilecomingintimetoavoidit,hadthedefendantbeendrivingatareasonablepace,thismustbetakenintoaccount.Inthesameway,ifsomeoneotherthanChurchillhadbeeninoffice,hiscolleagueswouldhavebeenlessafraidofcontradictinghim,andthismustbetakenintoaccountinansweringthehistoricalquestionabout1940.Inmostlegalcontexts,thehypotheticalinquiryrequiresthatallconditionsbekeptsteadyexceptthatwesubstituterightfulconductanditslikelyconsequencesforthewrongfulconductofwhichthedefendantisallegedtohavebeenguilty.
(p.373) Inthecontextofstrictliability,however,theinquiryismorelikethatinthedroppedmatchcase.31Substitutionoflawfulconductisnotpossibleandisnotrequiredincasesofstrictliability,sincethedefendantsconduct,thoughitcreatesarisk,isnotunlawfulunlessitcausesharm.Insuchacase,thehypotheticalinquirythusmustbewhethertheplaintiffwouldhavesufferedinjuryhadthedefendantnotengagedintheactivity(e.g.,usingexplosives)thatentailsstrictliability.Thereisnormallynoreasontosupposethat,ifthedefendanthadnotusedexplosivesforblasting,heorsomeoneelsewouldthenandtherehaveinjuredtheplaintiffbysomeothermeans.
Bothinsideandoutsidethelaw,therefore,thepurposeoftheinquirydetermineshowweshouldframethehypothesistobetested.Tortlawlaysdownwhatcountsaswrongfulconductorconductentailingstrictliabilityandsowhattheplaintiffhastoprove.Itaimstoprotectpeopleagainstwrongfulinfringementoftheirrightsandexposuretounduedanger.So,toascertainwhetheraninfringementhasoccurred,thewrongfulconductofthedefendantmustnormallybecomparedwiththenotionalrightfulconductthattheplaintiffwasentitledtoexpectinthecircumstances.Thequestioniswhetherthedifferencebetweenthewrongfulconductthatoccurredintherealworldandtherightfulconduct(togetherwithitslikelyconsequences)thatweimagineasoccurringwouldhaveledtoadifferentresultinthehypotheticalworldthatresemblestherealworldinallotherrespects.Inthestrictliabilitycontext,wherethelawprotectsagainstriskscreatedbylawfulconductonthepartofothers,thecausalinquiryisadaptedtothataim.
Doesthefactthatintortlawwenormallycomparewrongfulwithrightfulconductshowthatthecausalquestionisanormativequestionindisguise?Itdoesnot,fortheinquiryintowhatwouldhaveoccurredhadthedefendantobeyedalegalnormisnomorenormativethanthequestionwhatwouldhaveoccurredhadthePrimeMinisterbeensomeoneotherthanChurchill.Theanswertothesecausalinquireshasnonormativecomponent.ItremainsthesameevenifwesupposethatitwouldhavebeenbetterforBritaintomakepeacein1940,orthatitwouldbebetter,inordertocombatover-population,forthosewhodriveautomobilestodriveblindfold.
Therearethosewhothinkthatcounterfactualpropositionscannotbetrueorfalse.32The
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tortprocesshoweverassumes,inmyviewrightly,thattheycanbe.Wecanoftenknowwhat,onacertainhypothesis,wouldprobablyhappenintherealworld.Weknowthatifwestrikeamatchundercertainconditionsaflamewillappear.Thestatement,ifamatchisstruck(p.374) underconditionsXYZaflamewillappear,canbetrueorfalseanditstruthvaluecanbetested.Whynot,also,ifamatchhadbeenstruckaflamewouldhaveappeared?Theonlydifferenceisthatthepropositionaboutthepastcanbeverifiedonlyindirectly,ontheassumptionthatinsimilarconditionssimilarresultsrecur.Thisassumptioncannotitselfbeverified,butunlessitiswell-foundedwecannotrelyoncausalregularitiesorscientificlaws.Ofcourseweareoftenuncertainwhatwouldhavehappenedonagivenoccasionhadthedefendantactedlawfully.Insuchacase,thoughthecounterfactualstatementhadXnotdonewhathedidYwouldnothavebeenharmedisinprinciplestilltrueorfalse,wecannottellforcertainwhichitis.Wemustthenhaverecoursetorulesoflawthatinstructthejudgeorjurytogobytheprobabilitiesand,ifnecessary,tofallbackonrulesabouttheburdenofproof.
III.NessVersusBut-For:DifferencesintheTheoriesInowturntosomeoftheexamplesthatsupportersoftheNESSandbut-fortheoriesinterpretdifferently.Someconcernover-determination,othersindeterminacy.Over-determinationcases,itwillberecalled,involvetwoormoreindependentactseachofwhichalonewouldhavesufficedtobringabouttheharm.Insuchcases,theseparatecausalprocessesmaybesimilarordifferent,andtheymayculminateinharmeitheratthesametimeorsuccessively.When(1)similarcausalprocessesculminateinharmatthesametime,theNESSandbut-fortheoriespointtodifferentcausalconclusions.Butwhen(2)thecausalprocessesaredifferentor(3)oneculminatesinharmbeforetheother,theypointtothesamecasualconclusion.Incasesof(4)causingorinducingpeopletoact,neithertheoryisadequate,butthenotionofsufficiency,inamodifiedform,explainswhythesecasesarethoughtofascausalorquasi-causalrelations.
A.Over-determination:SimilarCausalProcessesCulminatingattheSameTimeTwosimilarcausalprocessesmayculminateinthesameharmatthesametime.Twoshots,negligentlybutindependentlyfiredbyAandBwhenouthunting,simultaneouslyhitCanddestroyhislefteye.Eachshotwassufficienttodothiswithouttheother,andtheeffectsofthetwoshotscannotbedistinguished.Neithershotwasnecessaryinthestrongbut-forsense,buteachwasnecessaryintheweaksensethatitwasanecessarymemberofasetofconditionstogethersufficienttodestroythevictimseye.33It(p.375)wouldbecounter-intuitivetoholdthatneitherAnorBisresponsibleforthelossofCseye.Butisthatbecauselegalpolicy,orintuitionsaboutresponsibility,leadustodisregardthelackofcausalconnectionbetweeneachshotandthelossoftheeye?
Mackie,supportingthebut-fortheory,arguesthatwhenthistypeofover-determinationispresentthecauseoftheharmconsistsintheactsofAandBtakenasacluster.34Intheabsenceofbothacts,Cseyesightwouldnothavebeenlost.Butitmakesnosense,hethinks,toaskwhichwasthecause.Perhapsnot,butwhyneedweaskwhichwasthecause?CannoteachshothavebeenacauseofthelossofeyesightinasenseadequatebothtoexplainwhathappenedcausallyandtoascriberesponsibilitytoAand22?It
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seemsthat,inMackiesview,ifAandBareheldliableintortorcriminallawthismustbebasedonalegalpolicythatoverridesthelackofcausalconnection,oritmustrestonaspeciallegalconceptofcause.Indeedhesays,whateverouractualconceptmaybe,itisobviousthatwecanconstructcausalconceptsaswewish,whichmaybeusefulforparticularpurposes.35Itisworthasking,therefore,whetherinsuchcasesofsimultaneousover-determinationlawyersresorttoaspeciallegalnotionofcause.
Ourconceptsaretoolsshapedbythepurposesforwhichweusethem.Causationisusedmainlyforthreepurposes:toproviderecipes,toexplainevents,andtoallotresponsibility.Itsrootsprobablylieinthefirstofthese.Evennon-humanprimatesdeveloprecipesforwhattheywant.Tocrackanut,youneedastoneofacertainsizeandweightandyoumustbringitdownonthenutwithacertainforce.Youlearntoconstructwhatyoursophisticatedcousinsofalateragewillcallasetofconditionstogethersufficienttoproduceagivenresult,nut-cracking.Havingassembledwhatseemstobeasetofsufficientconditions,youwhittlethemdownbyelimi-natingthosethattrialanderrorshowtobeunnecessary.Itturnsouttobenecessarythatthestonebeofacertainweight,thatacertaindegreeofforcebeemployed,andthatthenutshellbenottoothick,butunnecessarythatthewindlieinanortherlydirectionorthattheagentutterablood-curdlingwhoop.Therecipeisgeneral,builtupovertimeasinstancesaccumulateandconditionsaretested.
Thediscoveryofconditionsthatarenecessarymembersofasetsufficienttoproducesomeresultcanbeusedtoexplaineventsaswellastobringthemabout.Itcanextendtoeventsoverwhichwehavenocontrol.Weseektodiscovertheconditionsoftheseevents,perhapsinordertocontrolsimilareventsinthefuture,orsimplytounderstandhowtheuniverseworks.Theknowledgethusacquiredmaycomeinhandy,butitmaybepursuedforitsownsake.Itcanbeusedtotracetheeffectsofnaturalevents(p.376)andinanimateforces.Itcanalsobeusedtoassignresponsibilitysocialaccountabilitytohumanbeingsfortheoutcomeoftheirconduct.
Forallthesepurposesmakingrecipes,explainingevents,andattributingresponsibilitywecanusetheconceptofthenecessarymembersofasetofconditionstogethersufficienttoproducearesultofagiventype,thoughwemaynotbeabletospecifyorquantifyalltheconditions.Thislimitedabilitytospecifyconditionsdoesnotpreventourusingcausalideastoexplaineventsbackwardsintermsofpreviouseventsandconditionsortoallotresponsibilityforconductforwardintermsofoutcomes.Thesearenotnormativefunctions.Itmakesnodifferencewhethertheeventstobeexplained,ortheconducttobeassessed,isjudgedgoodorbad.Itisthenormativeaspectoftortlaw,nottheconceptofcause,thatinvitesustofocusonthenatureandlegalconsequenceofwrongfulconduct.
Whatbearinghasthisontheproblemofover-determination?ThelessonissurelythattheNESStestisnotconfinedtothecontextofresponsibilityingeneralortortlawinparticular.ToreverttothetwoindependentshotsbyAandBthatputoutCseye,theactsofAandBeachexemplifyhowtoputCslefteyeout,ifthatwas,perhaps,theobjectiveofsnipersinamilitarycampaign.EachshotalsoprovidesanexplanationofCs
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lossofhislefteye.Why,then,shouldnoteachprovideabasisforassigninglegalandmoralresponsibilitytoAandB?Norecoursetolegalpolicy,ortonormativeconsiderations,isneededtoreachtheconclusionthatbothAandBindependentlycausedtheharmtoC.Noneofthepurposesforwhichcausalconceptsareusedrequiresustoadoptthebut-fortheory.Therecanbedifferentrecipesforattainingagiventypeofresult,morethanoneofwhichisusedonagivenoccasion.Therecanbedifferentexplanationsofaneventofagiventypeintermsofpriororconcurrentconditions,morethanoneofwhichispresentonagivenoccasion.Topreventtheconstructionofabrickwall,onerecipeistowithholdbricks,anothertowithholdmortar.IfAwithholdsbricksandBindependentlywithholdsmortar,andthewallisnotbuiltornotbuiltontime,havenotbothAandBpreventeditsconstruction?Wedonotneedaspeciallegalconceptofcausetodealwithsimultaneousover-determinationbysimilarcausalprocesses.
ToepelinthecontextofcriminallawdeniesthateitherAorBisresponsibleforputtingoutCslefteyeinacaseliketheshootingcase.36Apartfrompointingtothepresumptionofinnocence,hearguesthatitisarbitrarytodisregardBsshotwhendecidingwhetherAswasanecessarymemberofasetofconditionssufficienttoproducetheharm,andviceversa.TheanswertothisobjectionisthatBsshotcanbeprovisionallydisregardedwhenweareconsideringthesetofconditionsofwhichAsshotisamemberbecausethatsetmaybesufficientwithoutBsshot.Theproper(p.377) preliminaryprocedureininvestigatingthecauseofaphysicalsequenceofeventsistoassembleasetofconditionsapparentlysufficienttoproduceandhenceexplaintheresult.ThiswedointhelightofwhatweknowtobeINUSconditionsofresultsofthattype.37Butthesetweprovisionallyassemblemaycontainsomeconditionsthatturnouttohavebeenunnecessaryfortheresult.
Forexample,theprovisionalsetofconditionsmightconsistofAsshot,thedistancebetweenAandC,thestrengthofthewind,thecolorofAsjacket,andBsshot.Wethenreducethesetbyeliminatingthoseconditionsthatwerenotnecessarytoit.ThisdisposesofthecolorofAsjacket.BsshotweprovisionallyeliminatenotbecauseitwasclearlynotnecessarybutbecauseourknowledgeofcausalregularitiesandscientificlawsleadsustothinkthatAsshotmayhavebeensufficienttoputCseyeoutwithoutBs.Havingreducedthesetsofar,wethentesttherelevanceofAsshot(moreprecisely,thefactthatAshotnegligently)byhypotheticallysubstituting,forAsnegligentshot,histakingpropercareinshooting.WeaskwhetherinthateventCwouldhavelosthiseyefromthatsetofconditions.Ifnot,AsnegligentshootingwasacauseofCslossofeyesight.ButsupposethatcarefulinvestigationshowsthatAsshotmissed.InthatcaseAsshotwasnotcausallyrelevanttotheoutcomeandwemustconstructanothersetofconditions,includingBsshot,andtestwhetherBsshotwasanecessarymemberofthatsetofconditionswhichtogetherproducedthelossofeyesight.ToepelobjectsthatthisprocedureinvolvesdecidingthatAsshotwascausallyrelevantbeforewetestitforcausalrelevance.38Thatisnotso.AllwehavedecidedbeforetestingAsshotforrelevancewhileprovisionallyomittingBsisthat,asweknowsomeoftheINUSconditionsforlossofeyesight,AsshotmayonthisoccasionhavebeenacausallyrelevantconditionevenintheabsenceofBsshot.Itistruethatthetestingprocedureispossibleonlyifwe
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knowsomecausalregularitiesbeforewestart.Butweneednotassumefromthestartthattheoutcomeofthetestwillbepositive.
Asimilarcausalover-determinationanalysismaybeappliedtoothercasesinwhichtwoormoresimilarprocessesappearresponsibleforanevent,forexample,wheretwofiresmergeandjointlyculminateinharm,39orwherethepollutioncreatedbyanumberofpersonsindependentlypollutesastreamorlake.40
B.Over-determination:DifferentCausalProcessesInotherover-determinationcasesthetwosetsofconditionsinvolvequalitativelydifferentcausalprocesses,suchaspoisoninganddehydration,the(p.378) variousstagesofwhichhavebeenstudiedandcanbedistinguished.Inthatcase,ifweknowenoughaboutthestagesbywhichtheeventscameaboutwecangenerallytell,evenincasesofover-determination,whichcausalprocessranitscourseandwhichwasfrustrated.Sointhecaseofthedeserttraveller41whereApoisonsCswaterkeg,BemptiesthekegbeforeCdrinksthepoisonedwater,andCdiesofthirstitnowseemstomethatBcausesCsdeath.Iregretthat,despitecriticismbyMackie,42sinceendorsedbyWright,43thesecondeditionofHartandHonorsresistedthisconclusion.44MycurrentreasoningisthatBsconductintroducesacondition,lackofwater,thatinthecircumstances,includingtheabsenceofanalternativewatersupply,issufficienttobringaboutanddoesbringaboutCsdeathfromdehydration.
ItisalsotruethatBsavedCfromdyingofpoison.Butthisisnotrelevantinanexplanatoryinquiry,sinceBsactadequatelyexplainshowCsdeathcameabout(throughdehydration),norshoulditberelevantinawrongfuldeathactionorprosecutionforhomicide.IfB,notrealizingthatthewaterkegwaspoisoned,emptieditintendingtoharmCornegligentlyfailinginhisdutyofcaretoC,thedeceasedswidowoughtthereforetosucceedinawrongfuldeathaction45thoughsinceCwasdoomedinanyeventthedamageswillbeminimal.Ontheotherhand,ifBrealizedthatthewaterwaspoisonedandemptiedthekegtopreventCdrinkingthepoisonedwater,andbelievingthatanalterativesupplycouldbefoundintimetosaveC,BwouldstillunintentionallyhavecausedCsdeath;buthewouldnotbelegallyresponsiblefordoingso.Thereisnoneedtopostulateanyspeciallegalconceptofcauseinordertounderstandthistypeofcase.
Incasesofover-determination,wheredifferentcausalprocessesareassociatedwiththetwoconditionsthatarecausalcandidates,thereshouldbenoneedtoshowthatoneofthemwasaNESSconditionofdeathasandhowthedeathoccurred(e.g.bydehydrationonTuesdayratherthanbypoisoningonMonday).46Thatwouldbetorequireestablishingtheverypointinissue,namelyhowthevictimsdeathcameabout.Whathastobeshowninatortactionisthatthedefendantswrongfulactcausedtheharm,inthiscasethevictimsdeath.Weknowfromthewayinwhichthelawstructuresactionsforwrongfuldeaththatwhatislegallyrelevantisdeath,notdeath(p.379) atthisorthattimeorplaceorbythisorthatprocess.47However,theplaintiff(thewidow)hastoidentifythedeathforwhichsheclaimsredress.Thisrequiresthatthevictim,time,and
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placebespecified.Shealsohastoshowthatthedefendantswrongfulactcausedthedeath,whichinvolvesshowingthatsomecausalprocessinitiatedbythedefendantbroughtitabout.Inthewaterkegexample,thatBsconduct(inemptyingthewaterkeg)wasaconditionofCsdeathbydehydrationisrelevantbecausetheprocessofdehydrationconnectsBsactbyaseriesofstageswithCsdeath.Toestablishthatthisprocessoccurredisrelevantbecause,giventhepluralityofpossiblecausesofdeath,itisnecessaryforCswidowtopointtoaspecificcausalprocessthatlinksthetwo,anddehydrationissuchaprocess.
C.Over-determination:HarmthatHasAlreadyOccurredAlthoughphilosophersmaydebatethepossibilityofbackwardcausation,itseemsclearthatitisimpossibletocauseaneventthathasalreadyoccurred.Onecanflogadeadhorsebutnotkillit.Ontheotherhandonecankillsomeonewhohasonlyamomenttolive,asinthecasewheredefendantswereallegedtohavenegligentlyelectrocutedthedeceasedboyashefelltocertaindeath.48Thefactthatourconceptofcausedoesnotallowforcausingharmthathasalreadyoccurredcangiverisetoaproblemofover-determinationwhentheharmconsistsofdeprivingsomeoneoffutureopportunities.
SupposethatAnegligentlyinjuresC,awrestler,sothatheispermanentlydisabledfromwrestling.SixmonthslaterBindependentlyandnegligentlyrunsCoversothat,evenhadhenotbeeninjuredthefirsttime,hewouldnothavebeenabletowrestleinfuture.49ThatBsactwasindependentimpliesthatthefirstinjurydidnotcontributetothesecond,forexamplebypreventingCfromavoidingthesecondaccident.WhatisthestatusofCsclaimtolossoffutureearningsasawrestler?A,andonlyA,isclearlyresponsibleforwhatCwouldhaveearnedinthesixmonthsfollowingthefirstinjury.AsregardsCslostwrestlingearningsfollowingthesecondinjury,however,responsibilityismuchlessclear.BwillpleadthathedidnotcauseCsdisabilityasawrestlereveninpartsinceCwaspermanentlydisabledalready.YetAwillpleadthathisliabilityislimitedtothesixmonthsearningsalonesince,asitturnsout,Cwouldnothavebeenabletowrestleformorethanthatperiodinanyevent.Ifbothoftheseargumentsareaccepted,C,havingbeenwrongfullyinjuredontwooccasions,(p.380) obtainslessthanhadhebeeninjuredonlyonce,whichisunsatisfactory.Yetthisisnotlikethecaseofsimultaneousover-determinationwhereeachagentcanproperlybesaidtohavecausedthesameinjury.Someonewhoclaimstohavelostfutureopportunitiesofearningmoneymustshowthathewouldhavebeenabletotakeadvantageofthoseopportunitiesintheabsenceofthewrongfulactofwhichhecomplains.Forexample,ifaftersixmonthsChaddiedofaheartattack,notbroughtonbytheearlierinjuryinflictedbyA,hisestatecouldnotclaimlossofearningsfortheperiodafterhewasdead.Adeadmancannotwrestle,andthereisnoreasontoimposeonAtheriskthatCcoulddieofnaturalcausesunconnectedwithAswrongfulact.
Therearetwopossiblewaysroundthisdifficulty,oneofwhichisconsistentwithcausalprincipleswhiletheotherrestsonabasisofrisk-allocation.Thefirstsolutionistoholdthatthereisacauseofactionintortlawfordeprivingsomeonebyawrongfulactofatortremedythatwouldotherwisehavebeenavailabletohim.Intheinjuredwrestlercase,B
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hasdeprivedCofatortremedyagainstAforhislostwrestlingearningsfollowingthesecondinjury.Thiscauseofaction,ifitexisted,wouldbelikethesuggestedremedy,nowmuchdiscussed,againstadefendantwhowrongfullydeprivesaplaintiffofachance.50ThealternativewayofsolvingtheinjuredwrestlerconundrumistotreatAasguaranteeingCthathewillnotbedeprivedofhisprospectiveremedyforlossofearningsbyalaterwrongfulactofsomeoneelse.Toconstructsuchaguaranteeistoprovideanon-causalbasisofliability,anexampleofthefamiliarprinciplebywhichtheriskofharmtoCissometimesplacedonA.HeretheriskwouldbeimposedonAasaresultofAswrongdoing,justasinthelawofsalesriskissometimestransferredtothesellerbecauseofhisfailuretodelivergoodsontime.ThejustificationforputtingtheriskonAwouldbethatitisthefunctionofthelawtoprotectpeopleagainstwrongfulinvasionsoftheirrights.Ratherthanletapersonwhohassufferedtwowrongsgowithoutremedy,itisbettertomakethefirstwrongdoerguaranteehimagainsttheeconomicconsequencesofalatertortbysomethirdperson.Todothiswouldnotbetointroduceaspeciallegalsenseofcause.Itwouldbetosubstitute,forliabilitybasedoncausingharm,liabilitybasedonrisk-allocation.
D.IndeterminacyIndeterminacypresentsadifficultyfortheNESStheory.Iftheworldisindeterminate,wecannotassembleasetofconditionsinvariablysufficient(p.381) toproduceagivenoutcome.Theoutcomemayusuallyfollow,buttherewillbeoccasionswhenitdoesnot.Atmosttheremaybeacertainprobabilitythatonagivenoccasiontheoutcomewillfollow.Anindeterminateworldalsopresentsadifficultyforthebut-fortheory,sinceinanindeterminateworldwecannotaccuratelycalculatewhatwouldhavehappenedintheabsenceofaparticularwrongfulact.But,ifitispermissiblewithMackietofallbackonourintuitivegraspofbut-forrelationships,51thedifficultyislessseriousforthebut-forthanfortheNESStheory.
Mackie,thoughleavingopenwhethertheworldreallyisindeterminate,arguesthatwhatwewouldsayaboutcausationinanindeterminateworldsupportsthebut-fortheory.52Heimaginestwocandymachines,bothindeterministic53Oneneverproducescandyunlessthepropercoinisinserted,butdoesnotalwaysproducecandywhenitis.Theotheralwaysproducescandywhenacoinisinserted,butsometimesdoessowithoutacoin.Applyingthebut-fortest,Mackiethinksthatwewouldsayofthefirstmachinethatitcausedthecandytoappearwhenitdidappear,butdenythisforthesecondmachine.
Mackiesargumentisnotconvincing.54Ifwethoughtthatthecandymachineworldwasindeterminatewewouldhavenoreasontosupposethatthefirstmachinewouldnotinthefuturebehavelikethesecondmachineandproducecandywithoutacoinbeinginserted,andviceversaforthesecondmachine.Wewouldhavenoreasontoconcludethattheinsertionofthecoincausedthecandytoappearintheonemachinebutnotintheother.But,thoughtheiroperationmaybeerratic,webelievethatcandymachinesaredeterministic.55Weexplaintheirdeviantbehavioronthebasisthat,ifthemachinedoesnotproducecandywhenacoinisinsertedordoesproduceitwhenacoinisnotinserted,themechanismisfaulty.Inthefirstcase,acounteractingfactorispresent;
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somethinginthemachinehasjammedandpreventsthecandyfromemerging.Recallthatinmostsetsofjointlysufficientconditionsoneconditionistheabsenceofcounteractingconditions.56Inthesecondcase,giventhepluralityofcauses,weconcludethatanalternativesetofINUSconditionsfortheproductionofcandyispresent,whichmightconsistforexampleingivingthemachineaheftykickwhenthemechanismisjammed.
Theargumentfromanimaginedindeterminateworlddoesnotsupportthebut-fortheory.Whatoftheargumentthattheworldreallyisindeterminate?(p.382) Themicro-levelindeterminacyassociatedwithquantummechanicsisnotinpoint.AsWrightneatlyobserves,indeterminacyatthismicro-levelmightbeanobstacletoactionsbetweenfundamentalparticles,butitdoesnotaffectthemacro-phenomenawhicharethelawsconcern.Morebafflingisthedifficultyoftracingcausalconnectionorsomethinglikeitwithhumanactionsdoneforreasonswhenonepersonprovidesanotherwithareasonfordoingso-and-so.57Althoughwehaveuptonowdiscussedphysicalsequencesofeventsasiftheytookplaceuntroubledbyhumanintervention,thereareinpracticefewsituationsintortlawwhereaphysicalsequenceofeventsisnotpartlydeterminedbyhumandecisionstakeninthelightofasituationasitdevelops.
Totakeanexample,adaptedfromMackie,58supposethequestioniswhetherAlecsstatementcausedBilltohitCharles.IfAlecsaid,forinstance,thatCharleswashavinganaffairwithBillsgirlfriend,itwouldbeintelligiblethatwhathesaidcausedBilltohitCharles.IfoneobjectstotheuseofcausedinacontextwhereBillshouldhavecontrolledhimself,otherexpressionssuchasled,induced,andprovokedcouldreplaceit.Thissituationisofageneraltypethatoftenarisesintortlaw,forexampleinconnectionwithfalsestatementsthatinduceotherstoinvestmoneyorpersuasionsthatleadcontractingpartiestobreaktheircontracts.Howshouldsequencesofthissort,whichinvolveprovidingreasonsonwhichothersact,beanalyzed?
ItseemsimpossibletosupposeasetofNESSconditionsthatwouldtogetherbesufficienttoproduceBillsassaultonCharles.Manypeoplebelievethathumanconductisnotstrictlydetermined.Ifso,onecannoteveninprincipleassembleasetofconditionssufficienttoinduceapersontoactinaparticularway.Evenifhumanactionisdetermined,itwillstillnotbepossibletoassembleasetofconditionsofthissort.Thisisnotmerelybecausethereactionsofhumanbeingsvary.Agreaterdifficultyisthatapersonwhohasbeenconfrontedwithasimilarsetofconditionsinthepastmay,inthelightofthatexperience,reactdifferentlyonthisoccasion.ItdoesnotfollowfromBillsreactiononthisoccasionthathewouldreactsimilarlyiftoldthesamethingagain.NordoesitfollowthatDavidwouldreactinthesamewayifAlectoldhimthesamethingabouthis(Davids)girlfriend.Evenwithagreatdealofinformationaboutpeoplescharactersandbackground,theirreactionssimplyarenottotallypredictable.Moreover,anyprediction,ifknownbythepersonaboutwhomitismade,mayprovideareasonforreactingdifferently.
(p.383) Thus,determinisminregardtohumanconduct,eveniftrue,cannotreliablybetested.YetBillsreactionisexplainedbywhatAlecsaidtohim,andtothatextentfunctionsasacausal(orquasi-causal)explanation.WhatAlecsaidwasinsomesense
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sufficientinthecircumstancestoleadBilltoreactashedid.Yetifwearetospeakeitherofcausingpeopletoactor,moremodestly,ofinfluencingthemintheirdecisions,adifferentaccountoftheconnectioniscalledfor.
Mackiethinksthatourattitudetointerpersonaltransactionsfavorsthebut-fortheory.59HadAlecnotsaidwhathedid,wemaybesurethatBillwouldnothavehitCharles.Buthowcanwetellthis?Presumablybecausewehaveassembled,fromourexperienceandthatofothers,notsetsofINUSconditionsrelatingtohumanbehavior,butsomeloosegeneralizationsthattelluswhatsortsofreasonspeopleacton.Inthepresentcase,theonlyreasonthatcouldexplainBillsattackwaswhatAlecsaidtohim.IfBilladmitsthatthiswaswhyhestruckCharles,thediagnosisisconfirmed.
Butthisisnotenoughtoshowthatthebut-fortheoryexplainsthesortofconnectioninvolvedinactingforareason.Forapersonusuallyhastwoormore(typicallymanymore)reasonsforreachingadecisionandactingonit.Apotentialinvestormaybeinfluencedbyafalsestatementinaprospectusandbyadvicefromhisstockbroker.Supposethatforthesetworeasonshemakesanill-fatedinvestmentinEldoradoMines.Nothingturns,itseemstome,onwhethereachreasonwasnecessaryorsufficienttopersuadehimtoinvest,ortodissuadehimfromchanginghismind.60Wouldweconcludethatthefalseprospectusdidnotinducehimtomaketheinvestmentiftheadvicefromthestockbrokerwasalsosufficienttopersuadehimtodoso?Iftheinvestorispreparedtosaytruthfullythateachofthereasonsinfluencedhim,itseemsimmaterialwhetherheisalsopreparedtosaythat,butforoneofthem,hewouldnothavereachedthedecisionhedid.Thereasonsonwhichhedecidesandactsarepreciselythatthereasonsthat,eitherindividuallyorjointly,appearedtohimsufficientandmotivatedhimtodecideandact.
SamisofferedapostinMiddletownatanincreasedsalary.Middletownishiswifeshometownsothatshewishestoreturntheretolive.BothofthesefactorstheincreasedsalaryandhiswifeswishesmaybereasonssufficienttoinduceSamtoaccepttheoffer,inwhichcaseneitherisabut-forreason.OrbothmaybenecessaryelementsinasetofreasonstogethersufficienttopersuadeSamtoaccepttheoffer.Ineithercase,Samactson(p.384) thesetworeasons,whichareeithersinglyorjointlysufficienttopersuadehim.ButalongwiththesereasonsthatinducehimtogotoMiddletown,therewillbeotherconditionssuchthat,hadtheynotexisted,hewouldhaverefusedtheoffer.TherearegoodschoolsinMiddletownforthechildren;Middletownhasalivelychoralsociety.Hadtherenotbeengoodschoolsandalivelychoralsociety,Samwouldhaverefusedtheoffer;buttheywerenothisreasonsforaccepting.Sofarasthesereasonsareconcerned,hemightjustaswellhavestayedwherehewas.But-forreasonsareoftennotreasonsformakingadecisionoractingonit,butarereasonsagainstnotmakingit.Theydonotcause,lead,induce,orpromptSamtomove,anymorethantheinvestorspossessionofinvestmentfunds,ortheexistenceofthecapitalistsystem,induceshimtoputhismoneyinEldoradoMines.
Itseemstomethatwereachourconclusionsaboutwhatcaused,induced,persuaded,orprovokedsomeonetoactashedidinawaysomewhatlikebutnotidenticalwiththe
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wayinwhichwereachconclusionsaboutthecausesofphysicalevents.WecannotconstructINUSconditionsandNESSconditionsforsituationsinwhichhumanbeingsmakeandactondecisions.Butweknowenoughaboutthesortsofreasonsthatmotivateustobeableoftentoconcludethatcertainfactorsweresinglyortogethersufficientforthedecision.Allthatismeantbysufficientinthiscontextisthattheyprovideanadequateexplanationofthedecisionandthatthepersonwhomakesthedecisionwouldacknowledge,iftruthful,thatthesewerehisreasons.Theyweresufficientforthisindividualinthissituation,thoughthereisnoimplicationthattheywouldbesufficientforhimoranyoneelseinasimilarsituationonanotheroccasion.Whatwemeanwhenwespeakofinducing,persuading,etc.istorefertoreasonsthatseemedadequatetothispersononthisoccasionandonwhichhethereforeacted.Someorallofthemmayalsohavebeennecessarytothedecision;anditisoftenagoodprocedureheuristicallytoaskwhetherthesamedecisionwouldhavebeenreachedintheabsenceofagivenreason.Buttheanswertothisbut-forquestionisnotdecisiveoftheexistenceofacausalorquasi-causalrelationbetweenreasonandaction.Itisnopartofthemeaningofcause,induce,etc.ininterpersonaltransactionsthatthepersonconcernedwouldnothaveactedashedidapartfromtheconductofthepersonwhoissaidtohaveinducedhimtoact.Themeaningofcausalorquasi-causalconnectionishereclosertosufficiencythattonecessity,butsufficiencynotinthesenseinwhichthattermisusedinregardtophysicalsequences,butratherinthesenseofwhatsomeoneregardsasanadequategroundonwhichtodecideandactinthecircumstances.
(p.385) IV.ConclusionWhyiscausationimportantintortlaw?Onereasonisthattoinsistoncausalconnectionbetweenconductandharmensuresthatingeneralweimposeliabilityonlyonthosewho,byinterveningintheworld,havechangedthecourseofeventsfortheworse.Butwhatisittochangethecourseofeventsfortheworse?Isittodo(1)somethingsuchthatintheconditionsprevailingharmcomesabout,or(2)somethingintheabsenceofwhichharmwouldnothavecomeabout?ThefirstinterpretationisthatoftheNESStheory(forphysicalsequences);andavariantofthattheorycanbeusedtoexplainwhatitistoinfluencehumandecisionsandactions.Thesecondinterpretationisthatofthebut-fortheory.
Thefirstinterpretationistobepreferred.Causingagivenharmfulresultmeans,inrelationtophysicalevents,completingasetofconditionssufficienttobringitabout,i.e.,providingaNESSconditionofthatharm.Inrelationtoinfluencinghumanaction,itmeansprovidingareasonthatthehumanagentaccepts,oftenalongwithotherreasons,assufficienttoinducehimtodecideandactashedoes(tohisorsomeoneelsesdetriment).
Ontheotherhandthebut-fortheory,thoughausefulheuristicdevice,providestheintuitivelywronganswerincertaincasesofover-determinationandindeterminacy.Theexplanationforthisseemstobethatourconceptofcausederivesultimatelyfromoursearchforrecipestobringabouttheoutcomeswewant.Welookforsetsofconditionsthataresufficient(or,inthecaseofhumandecisions,thatmayberegardedbytheagentassufficient)tobringaboutacertainoutcome.Knowledgeofthesesetsofconditions,
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thoughnearlyalwaysimperfect,hasmanyapplications.Inparticular,itoftenenablesustoexplainpuzzlingeventsand,inmanycontextsoflaw,includingtortlaw,tofixtheouterlimitsofsocialresponsibilityforconduct.
Thatdoesnotmaketheconceptofcauseanormativeone.Thesameconceptofcauseisusedfordiscoveringrecipes,forexplainingevents,andforassigningresponsibilityforoutcomes.Thenormativeelementsaresuppliedbysubstantivetortlaw,whichdefinestheconductthatentailsormayentailtortliabilityandprescribeswhencausalconnectionbetweenconductandharmmustbeproved.(p.386)
Notes:(1)Onstrongandweaknecessityandsufficiency,seeJOHNL.MACKIE,THECEMENTOFTHEUNIVERSE:ASTUDYOFCAUSATION(1974),3940,606,126127;RichardW.Wright,Causation,Responsibility,Risk,Probability,NakedStatisticsandProof:PruningtheBrambleBushbyClarifyingtheConcepts,73IOWAL.REV.1001,1020(1988)[hereinafterPruning].
(2)Wright,Pruning,supra,note1,at1022.
(3)Id.at10181019,
(4)H.L.A.HART&A.M.HONORS,CAUSATIONINTHELAW(1959).
(5)Id.at106(1959).
(6)Adifferent,thoughrelatedaccountwasneededforinterpersonaltransactions:H.L.A.HART&TONYHONOR,CAUSATIONINTHELAW(2dedn.,1985),5161,125.Seeinfra,notes5861andaccompanyingtext.
(7)Thisistoapplythereversebut-fortest.Wright,Pruning,supra,note1,at1021,note108.RichardWrighttermedaconditionofthissort,necessaryinaweaksensebutsufficientinastrongsense,aNESScondition.HederivedfromittheNESStest,whichismeanttoreplacethebut-fortest:id.at1019.Seeinfra,notes16&17andaccompanyingtext.
(8)MACKIE,supra,note1,at5963(buildingtosomeextentonKonradMarc-Wogau,OnHistoricalExplanation,28THEORIA213233(1962)).
(9)Mackiesaysinsufficient(onitsown),whichisobvious,butalsonon-redundant,i.e.,necessaryasanelementinthatparticularjointlysufficientsetofconditions:seeid.at62.
(10)Ihavemodifiedhisterminologysofarastheuseoffactorandconditionareconcerned,butthisdoesnotchangethesubstance.
(11)Theycouldalso,ofcourse,belongtothesameset.
(12)MACKIE,supra,note1,at4850adducespowerfulargumentsforacauseas
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somethingnecessaryandsufficientinthecircumstancesforitseffect.CfWright,Pruning,supra,note1,at10281029.
(13)MACKIE,supra,note1,at6566.
(14)Id.at4058.
(15)Id.at7778,effectivelycriticizedbyWright,Pruning,supra,note1,at10314.
(16)RichardWright,CausationinTortLaw,73CAL.L.REV.1735(1985)(especially17881813)[hereinafterCausation].SeealsoWright,Pruning,supra,note1,at10181044.
(17)Wright,Pruning,supra,note1,at1019.
(18)SeeWright,Pruning,supra,n.1,at1019,n.98.Foracriminallawexample,seeIngeborgPuppe,DerErfolgundseinekausaleErklarungimStrafrecht,92ZSTW863,867868(1980)[hereinafterDerErfolg];IngeborgPuppeDieBeziehungzwischenSorgfaltswidrigkeitundErfolgbeidenFahrltissigkeitsdelikten,99ZSTW595596(1987).
(19)FRIEDRICHTOEPEL,KAUSALITATUNDPFLICHTWIDRIOKEITSZUSAMMENHANGBEIMFAHRLASSI-OENERFOLOSDELIKT(1992).
(20)ButseeMACKIE,supra,note1,at5455(expressingthecontraryview).
(21)MACKIE,supra,note1,at258265.
(22)TheEmpireJamaica[1955]P.52,578(Probate,DivorceandAdmiraltyDivision).
(23)SeeWright,Pruning,supra,note1,at1014.
(24)Theyare,weargue,meanttoidentifythelimitsofresponsibilityinmostcases:HART&Honors(2dedn.),supra,note6,at6881.
(25)Wright,Pruning,supra,note1,at103942.
(26)Id.at104142.
(27)MACKIE,supra,note1,at52.
(28)Forthereasonsgiveninthetext,WrightsviewandthatofDAVIDK.LEWIS,COUNTERFACTUALS(1973),7277areunsatisfactory.
(29)HART&Honore(2dedn.),supra,note6,atlviii-lx,411414;TOEPEL,supra,note19,at106.
(30)Thisisnotthecaseifthelawprovidesthat,ifthedefendantactsunlawfully,heactsat
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hisrisk.Then,asincasesofstrictliability,ithasonlytobeshownthathisactionwascausallyconnectedwiththeharm,notthatthewrongfulaspectofitwassoconnected.HART&Honore(2dedn.),supra,note6,atlx-lxi.Andofcoursetherearetorts,suchastrespass,inwhichharmneednotbeproved.
(31)Thedroppedmatchincidentmightcropupinthecontextofnegligenceintortlaw,Inthatcasethecomparisonwouldbebetweenthedefendantsdroppingthematchandhisexercisingduecareinregardtothematch,e.g.byputtingitoutbeforethrowingitaway.
(32)MACKIE,supra,note1,at54;TOEPEL,supra,note19,at55.
(33)Necessityinthisweaksenseisdescribedabove.Seesupra,textaccompanyingnote4.
(34)MACKIE,supra,note1,at47.Seealso,TOEPEL,supra,note19,at7172,84.
(35)MACKIE,supra,note1,at58.
(36)TOEPEL,supra,note19,at66,7275.
(37)Seesupra,notes815andaccompanyingtext.
(38)TOEPEL,supra,note19,at69.
(39)Wright,Pruning,supra,note1,at1018,1022.
(40)Seegenerallyid.at10357.
(41)SeeJamesA.McLaughlin,ProximateCause,39HARV.L.REV.149,155,note25(19256);HART&Honore(2dedn.),supra,note6,at239241;MACKIE,supra,note1,at4446.
(42)MACKIE,supra,note1,at44,467.
(43)Wright,Pruning,supra,note1,at1024.
(44)HART&HONOR,supra,note4,at219220;HART&Honore(2dedn.),supra,note6,at239241.SeeMackie,supra,note1,at456.
(45)And,iftheharmwasintentional,Bwillbeguiltyofhomicide.
(46)AssuggestedbyMackie,supra,note1,at46;TOEPEL,supra,note19,at70,7879.
(47)Wright,Causation,supra,note16,at17771778;Wright,Pruning,supra,note1,at10251026;Puppe,DerErfolg,supra,note18,at863,867868.
(48)Dillonv.TwinStateGas&Elec.Co.,163A.111(N.H.1932).
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(49)ThefactsaresuggestedbyBakerv.Willoughby[1970]A.C.467;cf.Joblingv.AssociatedDairies[1982]A.C.794.
(50)SeeWright,Pruning,supra,note1,at10671072.Alostchancecasemayarise,forexample,ifadoctornegligentlyfailstodiagnoseaprogressivediseasesuchascancerinatimelymanner,andsodeprivesthepatientof,say,a20percentchanceofrecovery.Causesofactionalongtheselines,whatevertheirintrinsicmerits,donoviolencetocausalprinciples.
(51)Seesupra,textaccompanyingnote15.
(52)TOEPEL,supra,note19,at61,905.
(53)MACKIE,supra,note1,at403,47.ByindeterministicMackieappearstomeanindeterminate.
(54)HART&Honore(2dedn.),supra,note6,at124125,235n.56;Wright,Pruning,supra,note1,at1029;Wright,Causation,supra,note16,at17771778;cf.F.TOEPEL,supra,note19,at9293.
(55)Wright,Pruning,supra,note1,at1029.
(56)Seesupra,notes1112andaccompanyingtext.
(57)HART&Honore(2dedn.),supra,note6,at5161.ForwantofspaceIdonotdealinthischapterwiththeprovisionofopportunitieswhichanotherpersonexploitsorthefurnishingofhelpofwhichanothertakesadvantage.Theseareimportantlegallyandinordinarylifebutarestillmoreremotefromphysicalsequencesthanisactingonareasonprovidedbyanother.
(58)MACKIE,supra,note1,at43.
(59)Id.at131136.
(60)SeeAustralianSteel&MiningCorp.Pty.v.Corben,2N.S.W.R.202,209(1974);HART&Honor(2dedn.),supra,note6,at193;compareforcriminallaw,judgmentofFeb.24,1959,BGHGr.Sen.St.,13EntscheidungendesBundesgerichtshofesinStrafsachen[BGHSt]15(F.R.G.);contra,TOBPEL,supra,note19,at93.
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