negativity in political perception

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NEG TIVITY IN POLITIC L PERCEPTION

Richard R Lau

The tendency for negative information to have more w eigh t than equ ally extreme or

equally likely positive information appears in a variety of cognitive processing asks, but

has rarely been documented empirically in politics. This paper p rovides evidence for two

types of negativity effects in electora l behavior: negativity in the formation o f impressions

(of Humphrey and Nixon in 1968, of MeG overn and Nixon in 1972, and of Carter and

Reagan in 1980), and negativity as a consequence of impressions (in the 1974 and 1978

congressional elections). Both post hoc ra tionalization and the nonequivalenceof the posi-

tive and negative information were exam ined and ruled out as artifactual explanations for

these results. Discussion centered around two possible explanations for neg ativ it, a cost-

orientation hypothesis (which holds tha t people are more strongly motivated to avoid costs

than to approach gains) and a figure-ground hypothesis (which holds that negative infor

mation stands out against a general positive background).

A l t ho ugh t he pub l i c s pe r c e p t i on o f po li t i c al l e a de r s is one o f t he m os t

i m po r t a n t a s pe c ts o f po l i t i c a l be ha v i o r , t h i s a r e a ha s d r a w n s u rp r i s ing l y

l i tt l e s ys t e ma t i c r e s e a r c h . U n t i l r e c e n t l y w e kne w l i tt l e a bo u t t he dy na m i c s

o f p o l i t i c a l p e r s o n p e r c e p t i o n , o t h e r t h a n t h a t t h o s e p e r c e p t i o n s w e r e

s t rong l y s ha p e d b y l ongs t a nd i ng p a r t y i de n t i f i c a t i on (S e ar s, 1969) a nd pe r -

ha ps i de o l og i c a l s t a nds (W e i sbe rg a nd R us k , 1970) . W ha t i m a ge s pe op l e

d i d ha ve o f c a nd i da t e s s e e me d t o c ons i s t ma i n l y o f i mpre s s i ons o f t he i r

pe rs ona l q ua l i t i e s (Ca r te r s m ora l i ty , F ord s c lums iness ) or a s soc ia t ions

w i t h s i mp l e va l e nc e i s s ue s (R e a ga n i s f o r a s t r ong de f e ns e ) . A l t hough t h i s

p i c t u r e h a s n o t c h a n g e d m u c h , m o r e r e c e n t w o r k se e m s t o e m p h a s i z e t h e

d i m e n s i o n s o f i n t e g r i t y a n d c o m p e t e n c y in c a n d i d a t e e v a l u a t i o n s ( se e

M i l le r , W a t t e nb e rg , a n d M a l a nc h uk , 1982; K i nde r , F i ske , a nd Wa gne r ,

1980 , f o r a n e x c e l l e n t r e v i e w ) .

W i t h s o l i tt l e k n o w n a b o u t t h e d y n a m i c s o f p o l i ti c a l p e r c e p t i o n , i t

Richard R. Lau , Department of Social Sciences, Carnegie-MellonUniversit~

Political ehavior © Agathon Press, Inc.

Vol. 4, No. 4, 1982

353



54 LAU

come s as no surprise that even less is kno wn abo ut

biases

in percept ions of

pol i tical leaders. O nly two such biases com e to mind . F irst , the te nde ncy

for evaluat ions of candidates , par ty ident i f icat ion, and issue pos it ions to

fall in l ine has been explained in terms of cognitive consistency forces

(Kinder, 1978; Raven and Gallo, 1965). Second, Sears has noted a s trong

propensity for polit ical leaders (and other people) to be evaluated posi-

tively (Sears, 1982; Sears and Whitney, 1974). Besides these two brief for-

ays, however, the f ield of biases in polit ical perception remains, for the

most par t , unexplored.

Pol it ical lore suggests a t leas t one other b ias that could be imp or ta nt in

pol i tical percept ion. I t i s f requent ly suggested that people vote

against

one

c a n d i d a t e r a t h e r t h a n

f o r

his or her opponent . For ins tance the au thors of

The merica n Voter

sugges t that var ia t ions in e lectoral outcomes f rom

yea r to year can best be explained by a negat ive publ ic react ion to the

record of the par ty in powe r (Campbel l , Converse , Mil ler , and Stokes,

1960, p.554), which is not offset by a concomitant favorable public reac-

t ion whe n the pa r ty (or pres ident) in powe r does wel l. We hear mo re about

thro win g the rascals out tha n keeping the s ta tesmen in . Voters seem

mo re wil l ing to g ive symbolic kicks in the pants than pats on the back. And

whi le comments abou t the inord ina te s t r eng th o f nega t ive in fo rmat ion

ab ou nd in polit ical discussions, ther e is ver y l i t t le empirical e viden ce sup-

por t ing them.

There a re on ly th ree s tud ies tha t in any w ay have found nega t iv i ty in

polit ics . Mueller (1973) looked at correlations of presidential popularity

wi th the unemployment r a te as a genera l ind ica to r o f economic wel l -

being. He theor ized tha t increases in une mp loy me nt should lead to de-

creases in popular i ty . A var ie ty of d if ferent a t tem pts to rep resent th is the-

ory a l l proved unsuccessful , however . T he only reasonable model Mu el ler

cou ld f i t to the d at a explicit ly posits a typ e of negativity effect: increases in

une mp loy me nt lead to decreases in pres identia l populari ty , but decreases

in une mp loy me nt have no con com itant pos it ive ef fect on populari ty . L ike-

wise Bloom and Pr ice (1975) found th at incum bents are punished for wors-

ening econ omic condi t ions but n ot s imilar ly rewa rde d for improving con-

ditions.

Kernell 's (1977) alternativ e to the surge and decline mo del of off-year

congress ional vot ing is the most e labo rate s tudy o f negat iv i ty in pol i t ical

behavior to date . Surge and de cl ine refers to the tendenc y for the presi -

dent ' s par t y to gain seats in Congress whe n the pres ident is e lected and to

lose seats in t he o ff-yea r election tw o years later . Kernell argues in essence

that the pres ident ' s par ty wil l be hur t more by i ts suppor ters who disap-

prove of the job the pres ident is doing than i t wi ll be helped by par t isans of

the other par ty who approve of the pres ident ' s job performance. He de-



NEG TIVITY IN POUTICS

55

r ives and tests four hypotheses from his negative voting mode l. Firs t, tu rn-

out: tho se who disapp rove of the presiden t (regardless of party) w il l vote in

higher propor t ions than wi l l those who approve of his job performan ce.

Second, de fection of part isans: m em bers of the president 's party w ho dis-

approve of his per form ance wi l l defect away f rom his par ty in thei r con-

gressional vote a t h igher ra tes th an wi l l mem bers of the oppos ite par ty wh o

app rove of the president 's job pe rform anc e defect to his party. T hird , rein-

forcem ent of par ti sans : mem bers of the pres ident 's par ty w ho approve of

him will vote for their party 's congressional can didate less frequen tly than

wil l me mbe rs of the oppos i te par ty wh o disapprove of the pres ident 's per -

forma nce vote cons istent wi th thei r par ty ident if ication. Four th , candi-

date choice among independents: disapproval wil l cost the president 's

par ty more votes f rom inde penden ts than approval wi l l earn i t. Kernell

tests his hypotheses using Ga llup poll da ta from the off-year congressional

elections between 1946 and 1966, To summarize the results brief ly, the

three hypotheses involving candidate choice are supported in every elec-

t ion he examined. Th e tu rno ut hypothes is is suppor ted for independents

and for people wh o ident i fy wi th the oppos i te par ty f rom the pres ident ,

an d n ot for identif iers with the president 's party. T hus on th ree (and possi-

bly four) coun ts, nega tivity carries mo re imp ac t th an positivity. More gen-

erally, Kernell 's (1977) article provides the most systematic support for a

negativity effect in p oli t ical behavior to d ate.

In more formal terms , negat ivi ty refers to the tendency for negat ive

informat ion to hav e m ore we ight than equal ly extreme or equal ly l ikely

posit ive inform atio n in v arious im pression-form ation or co gnit ive process-

ing tasks. This tendency is welt documented in social psychological re-

search. F or exam ple, person percep tion research has consis tently fou nd

tha t negat ive t ra i t -descr iptions are m ore inf luent ia l than com parable pos i-

t ive trai t-descriptions in v arious impression form ation tasks (e.g., Ander-

son, 1965; Hamilton and Zanna, 1972; Koenigs, 1974), and further that

nega tive f irs t impressions are mo re resis tant to c han ge tha n posit ive first

impressions (e.g. , Beigel , 1973; Richey, McClelland, and Shimkunis ,

1967), Similarly, the r isk-taking l i terature has consis tently fou nd tha t po-

tential costs m ore often govern decisions tha n do poten tial gains in s impte

bets (Myers, Reilly, an d Tau b, 1961), ethica l risk tak ing (Rettig and Pasa-

ma nic k, 1964), life dil em m a situations (Kogan an d Wallach, 1967), or

decision making more generally (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; see Ka-

nouse and Han son, 1972, for a review of negativity) .

This l i terature suggests tha t th ere are in fact tw o different types of nega-

t iv ity effects . Fi rs t, negat ive informat ion is mo re im por tan t than compara-

ble pos i tive inform at ion in the form tion of impressions of others (or in the

ma kin g of decisions). An d second, the consequencesof negative evaluations



56 LAU

(h o w ev e r r each ed ) a r e g r ea t e r t h an t h e co n s eq u en ces o f p o s it i v e ev a l u a -

t io n s . B o t h B l o o m an d P r i ce (1 97 5) an d K ern e l l ( 1 9 7 7) ex am i n ed t h e r e l a -

t iv e co n s eq u en ce s o f p o s it i v e o r n eg a t i v e ev a l u a t i o n s an d ev en ts . N e i t h e r

s t u d y e x a m i n e d n e g a t i v it y i n

t h e f o r m a t i o n

of po l i t i ca l eva lua t ions . M uel -

l e r (1 97 3) d i d , b u t h e u s ed ag g reg a t e d a t a , an d a t h eo ry ab o u t in d i v i d u a l

b e h a v i o r c a n n o t b e a d e q u a t e l y t e st e d w i t h a g g r e g a t e d a t a . N o o n e , t h e n ,

h as d o c u m en t ed n eg a t i v i t y e ff ec ts i n t h e fo rm a t i o n o f i mp res s i o n s o f p o l it i-

ca l l eaders a t the ind iv idua l l eve l .

T h i s p ap e r p ro v i d es ev i d en ce fo r b o t h fo rms o f n eg a t i v i t y i n p o l i t i c a l

p e rcep t i o n . S t u d y i i ll u s tr a t e s n eg a t i v i t y as a co n s eq u en c e o f ev a l u a t i o n b y

ex tend ing Kerne l l s ana lyses to th e 1974 a nd 1978 congress iona l e l ec t ions .

S t u d i e s 2 a n d 3 t h e n t u r n t o t h e m o r e f o r m i d a b l e t a s k o f d o c u m e n t i n g

n eg a t i v i t y i n t h e f o rm a t i o n o f p o li t ic a l ev a l u a ti o n s . T h e N E S / CPS A mer i -

can N a t i o n a l E l ec t i o n S t u d ie s a re u s ed a s d a t a b a s e s t h ro u g h o u t .

B e c a us e th e d a t a a r e c o r r e l a ti o n a l a n d c o m e f r o m s u r ve y s i n w h i c h p r e -

c i se me as u rem en t is n o t a l w ay s f ea s ib l e , t w o p ro b l em s w i l l p e r si st i n a l l

t h e an a l y s e s t o fo l l o w . T h e f i r s t i s t h e p ro b l em o f t h e ex t r emi t y o f t h e

p o s i t i v e an d n eg a t i v e e f f ec t s i n v o l v ed . T h e t h eo ry p r ed i c t s t h a t equa l l y

e x t r e m e p o s i ti v e an d n eg a t i v e j u d g m en t s o r s t i mu l i w i ll h av e d i f f e r en t ia l l y

s t ro n g e f f ec t s ; b u t an y t h eo ry w o u l d p r ed i c t t h a t a v e ry s t ro n g n eg a t i v e

s t i mu l i w o u l d h av e g rea t e r e f f ec t s t h an a mu ch w eak e r p o s i t i v e s t i mu l i .

T h e p r o b l e m is in e q u a t i n g t h e p o s i ti v e a n d n e g a t i v e s t im u l i e m p l o y e d .

T h i s w i l l b e acco m p l i s h ed i n S t u d i e s 1 an d 3 b y u t i l iz i n g an ex t r an eo u s

ev a l u a t i v e m eas u re a s a c r i t e r io n o f ex t remi ty . T h e co m p l ex i t y o f t h e co n -

s t ru c t i o n o f t h e c ru c i a l v a r iab l e s i n S t u d y 2 w i l l n o t a l l o w s u ch a p ro ced u re

t o b e p e r f o r m e d t h e r e , a n d t h e e q u i v a l e n c e o f t h e e x t r e m i t y o f t h e p o s i ti v e

a n d n e g a t i v e s t im u l i w i ll h a v e t o b e t a k e n s o m e w h a t o n f a i t h i n t h a t s tu d y.

T h e s eco n d p ro b l e m d ea l s w i t h t h e d i r ec t i o n o f cau sa li ty . I n S t u d i e s 2

an d 3 , I w i ll b e a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e p o s i ti v e an d n eg a t i v e s t i mu l i caused t h e

eva lua t ions o f the p o l i t i ca l figures . S ince rea l peo p le a re used as s t imulus

persons , however , the poss ib i l i ty ex i s t s tha t the var i ab les used to p red ic t

ev a l u a t i o n s o f t h e s t i mu l u s p e r s o n s a r e i n f ac t r a t i o n a l i za t i o n s o f t h o s e

ev a l u a t i o n s . I n t h e m a i n an a l y s e s, t h e r a t i o n a l i za t i o n p ro b l em w i ll b e h an -

d l e d b y a) i n s u r i n g t h a t t h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i ab le s a r e co l l ec ted s ev e ra l

m o n t h s b e f o r e t h e e v a l u a t i v e d e p e n d e n t v a r ia b l e s , a n d b) s e l ec t i n g

re s p o n d en t s f ro m w h o m ra t i o n a l i za t i o n i s mu ch l e s s l i k e l y t o b e o ccu r -

r i n g . Ra t i o n a l i za t i o n w i l l b e ex p l ic i tl y ex am i n ed i n a s e p a ra t e s ec t i o n o f

Study 2 .

ST U D Y I : N EGA T I V I TY I N T HE C ON S EQU EN C ES OF EVA L U A T ION S

E v i d en ce t h a t t h e co n s eq u en ces o f n eg a t iv e ev a l u a t i o n s a r e g r ea t e r t h a n



NEG T IVIT Y IN POLITICS

57

the consequences of equally extreme posit ive evaluations already exists in

Kernell 's (1977) research. His negative voting mo del predicts tha t turn out ,

defec t ion , r e in fo rcement , and cand ida te cho ice among independen ts

should a l l be s t ronger a mo ng those wh o disapprove of the pres ident 's job

perfor manc e than am ong those who approve of h is performance. Kernel l' s

analyses were repeated here, using the 1974 and 1978 Michigan election

studies. Kernell did n ot prov ide necessary controls on the differen t propen-

sities of Rep ublica ns an d De moc rats to defect from thei r party; however, so

these controls are provided in the analyses below.

This necessary control is s imply party identif ication. Overall , Demo-

crats have a greater ten dency to defect f rom their par ty tha n do R epubl i-

cans (Converse, 1966). Given this fact , i t would be an error to s imply

present the raw data , for negat iv i ty wou ld look muc h greater with a Dem-

ocrat ic pres ident (and D emo crat ic defectors) than with a Republ ican pres-

ident. Indeed Kernell 's (1977) data, which do not control for this differ-

enee, are exactly consistent with these expectations: the negativity effect

looks much s t ronger in the four e lect ions he s tudied with a Democrat ic

pres ident than in the two elect ions with a Republ ican pres ident . There-

fore , the data presented below control on the overall tendency for Republ i -

cans , Democrats , and Inde pend ents to vote for candidates of the two par-

ties.

The key inde pen den t var iable is a s imple ques t ion asking respondents i f

they approve or d isapprove of the job the pres ident is doing. This is the

same ques t ion Ga l lup has been us ing for years to measure publ ic suppor t

for the p resident. Respon dents w ere also asked a series of questions to de-

termi ne their par ty ident i f icat ion, whic h here was def ined s imply as Dem-

o c r a t, R e p u b l i c a n , o r I n d e p e n d e n t . T h e d e p e n d e n t va r i ab l e s w e r e

whether they had, f i rs t , voted for any congress ional candidate and, sec-

ond, voted for a congress ional candid ate of the pres ident 's par ty (Republi -

can in 1974, Democratic in 1978) or some other candidate.

The results are presented in Table 1. The turnout hypothesis argues that

respondents who disapprove of the pres ident ' s job performance wil l vote

(to protest the president 's activit ies) in larger numbers than will respon-

dents who approv e of the pres ident ' s performan ce. In bo th years the nega-

t iv i ty hypothes is is suppo r ted am ong 2 of the 3 pa r t isan groups.

Th e vote preference dat a are s l ight ly more comp licated because of the

necessary controls . T aking the defe ction hypothesis in 1974 as an examp le,

19.0% of the Democrats who approved of Ford 's job performance voted

for a Republ ican congress ional candidate . When th is is compared to the

overal l tendency of Democrats to vote Republ ican in 1974--13.5 %-- this

yields an approv al ef fect of 5 .5 %. Similar ly 37.1% of the Republ icans

who disapproved of Ford 's performance voted for a Democrat ic candi-



58 tall

TABLE 1. Negativity as a Consequence of Evaluations in Congressional Voting

Presidential Popularity___ . . . .

Hypothesis Disapprove Approve Difference

1974: Turnout

Republicans 62.9% 105) a 61.1% (350) 1.8%

Democrats 55.6% (42 3) 48.2% (353) 7.4%

Independents 44.5% (192 ) 45.9% (4 3 4 ) -1.4%

Vote prefere nce

Defectio n of partisans 13.4% (6 2 ) 5.5% (163) 7.9%

Reinforcement of partisans 4.2% (2 3 5 ) 3.9% (212) .3%

Candidate choice among

Independents 9.8% (1 1 9 ) 6.7% (175) 3.1%

1978: Turnout

Republicans 73.2% (1 98 ) 59.4% (128) 13.8%

Democrats 55.9% (143 ) 60.8% (4 7 9 ) -4.9%

Independents 56.3% (19 9) 48.2% (384) .1%

Vote preJerence

Defection 4.0% (7 3) 6.7% (6 7) -2.7%

Reinforcement 3.5% (2 6 3 ) 1.2% (136) 2.3%

Cand idate choice 3.9% (1 36 ) 2.3% (6 7) 1.6%

Note Entries for the three vote preference hypotheses are the controlled effects (see text).

ONs are in parentheses.

da te , and compared to an overa l l de fec t ion propens i ty of 23.7%, th i s

yields a disapp rova l effect of 13.4 %. Neg at ivi ty predicts that the disap-

proval effect wil l be larger than the approval effect , and in five of the six

cases i t is, a l tho ugh the m agn itud e of the differences is redu ced b ecause of

the controls .

Hence th i s ana lys is found support for nega t iv i ty as a consequence of

eva lua t ions in n ine of twe lve poss ib le tes t s . Given the c rudeness of the

measure of eva lua t ion used here , th i s i s fa i r ly impress ive support . I f we

assume that the approval effect is as l ikely to be larger than the disap-

prov al effect or vice versa , the pa t tern of results observ ed in Table i w ou ld

occur by chance less than 6 t imes in 100.

As men t ioned above , the ana lyses assumed tha t approva l and disap-

prov a l , because they a re antonyms, a re equa l ly d isc repant. A s imi la r as-

sum pt ion is mad e in severa l psychologica l studies in the l i t e ra ture support -

ing negat ivi ty. However, i f disapproval is a more extreme affect than

approva l , we hav e an in te res t ing pol it ica l e f fec t but p sychom etr ica l ly

wea k evidence for nega t iv i ty i tse lf . Any theory w ould pred ic t tha t an ex-

t reme a ffec t wi l l have grea te r consequences than a more modera te one .

To t ry to de te rmine the ext remi ty of approva l and disapprova l , a second

eva lua t ive measure , a fee l ing therm om eter , was employ ed. A fee l ing

therm om eter i s a 100-point ra t ing sca le wide ly used by the NE S/CPS sur-



NEGATIVITYIN POLITI S

59

veys, with ratings above 50 meaning positive or warm and ratings below

50 meaning negative or cold. The midpoint 50 is explicitly labeled neu-

tral, neither warm nor cold. Using the feeling thermometer ratings of the

incumbent president as criteria, there is little evidence tha t either approval

or disapproval is much more extreme than the other. To take 1974 as an

example, the average rating of Ford by those who approved of his job

performance was 73.6, compared to 45.8 by the disapprovers, The ap-

provers are considerably farther above the objective midpoint of 50 than

are disapprovers below it, but the disapprovers are somewhat farther be-

low the empirical mean (61.9) than the approvers are above it. In neither

ease is there much evidence that disapproval is a much more extreme

affect than is approval, thereby artifactually building in the results.

We can now turn to the second type of negativity effect.

STUDY : NEGATIVITY IN THE FORMATION OF EVALUATIONS

The data employed in Study 2 come from the 1968, 1972, and 1980

NES/CPS American National Election Studies. These nationally represen-

tative surveys interviewed respondents twice, once before the election and

once after it. Open-ended questions about reasons for voting for and

against each major candidate provide relatively accurate and distinct mea-

sures of positive and negative information about them. In 1980, for in-

stance, this question was worded:

Now I'd like to ask you about the good and bad points of the two major candi-

dates for president. Is there anything in particular about Mr. Carter that might

make you want to vote for him? (What is that? . . . Anything else?) .. . Is there

anything in particular about Mr. Carter that might make you want to vote

against him? (What is it? . . . Anything else?).

Usually up to five positive responses are coded, and then up to five nega-

tive responses about the same candidate are recorded. The actual reasons

given are much too diverse for analysis here. But the number of positive

and the number of negative reasons given for voting for and against a

candidate, respectively, can be taken as an indication of the relative

amount of positive and negative information each respondent had about

each candidate. Distinct measures of positive and negative affect are

needed to contrast the influence of each and thereby test negativity.

Simple counts of positive and negative informat ion could not be used as

they were, however, for what is really of interest is the amount of positive

rel tive to

negative information. 1Hence two new variables were created to

represent an excess of positive over negative (or negative over positive)

information. The positive information variable was created by subtracting



36 LAU

the nu m ber of nega tive reasons from the n um ber of pos i tive reasons and

collapsing al l negat ive values of this difference into 0. This new variable

ran f rom 5 ( f ive reasons offe red for vot ing for a candida te , and none for

vot ing against him) to 0 (an equa l nu m ber of posi t ive and n egat ive reasons

given, or more n ega t ive reasons given) . The nega t ive informat ion var iable

w a s c re a t e d by sub t ra c t i ng the numbe r o f pos i t i ve f rom the numbe r o f

negat iv e reasons, and ran from 5 (5 reasons offered for vot ing against a

candid a te and n one to vot ing for h im) to 0. The d epend ent var iables were

fee ling thermo meters tha t had been ga thered abou t the major pres iden-

t ia l cand idates and a varie ty of othe r po l i t ical f igures s ince the 1968 study. ~

Before present ing the resul t s , one complexi ty should be ment ioned

aga in . Even i f pos i t ive and/or nega t ive informat ion corre la tes wi th the

vote choice , one cou ld a rgue tha t these reasons g iven for the vote were not

the ac tua l de te rminan ts of eva lua tions , but ra ther were s imple rationaliza

t /ons of the vo te dec is ion . Even though the op en-ended responses wer e

a lways col lec ted a t the very beg inning of the pre -e lee t ion in te rview, most

respondents had ma de up the i r minds ab out the candida tes before th is

t ime . Hence i t cannot be de te rmined for ce r ta in whe ther the reasons re -

spondents gave for the vote were the de te rminants of those dec is ions or

ra t ional izat ions generated after the fact . Indeed, e i ther interpreta t ion

seems plausible .

Consequent ly the ana lys i s was conduc ted in ways tha t minimize the

rat ional izat ion possibl ity. First , i t deals chiefly with responden ts for wh om

these reasons were probably not ra t ional izat ions of the vote decision, by

se lec t ing those who, a t the t ime of the ir pre -e lec t ion in te rview, w ere unde-

cided ab ou t their v ote choice . Th e reasons given for vot ing for or against a

can did ate we re less l ikely to be ra t ional izat ions of a vote decision for this

predeeision al samp le , s ince that decision had no t yet been reached.

Hen ce resul ts f rom both a predecis ional and, for purposes of comparison, a

pos tdec is iona l samp le ( those wh o had a l ready dec ided for whom to vote a t

the t ime of the pre -e lec t ion in te rview) a re presented be low.

An add it ional safeg uard against the ra t ional izat ion possibi l i ty is to mea-

sure the hypothes ized cause and e ffec t in two di f fe rent in te rviews. In

al l of the Michigan elect ion surveys, the reasons to vote for and against the

var ious candida tes were asked a t the very beginning of the pre -e lec t ion

inte rview. T he cand ida te fee ling thermo meters were obta ined in the pos t -

e lect ion inte rview in 1968, 1972, a nd 1980. 3 The pro blem of ra t ional iza-

t ion wil l be considered further after the basic resul ts are presented.

The fee l ing thermometers for the s ix candida tes wi th appropr ia te da ta

were regressed on the measures of pos i tive and nega t ive informat ion abou t

the candida tes and a dum m y v ar iable represent ing par ty ident if ica tion . 4

These results are sho wn in Table 2, for both the predeeisional and the



T

A

B

2

N

e

v

y

n

h

P

c

o

o

P

e

d

a

C

d

e

P

e

d

a

C

d

e

P

e

s

o

S

m

p

e

P

v

N

v

I

n

o

m

a

o

I

n

o

m

a

o

P

y

R

2

N

1

H

u

m

p

e

2

6

.

1

b

-

8

6

3

1

7

.

2

.

2

1

(

1

7

a

(

1

9

(

3

3

N

x

2

1

.

0

-

4

6

2

5

3

.

1

.

1

1

(

1

7

(

1

4

(

2

9

1

M

c

G

o

n

5

7

.

1

-

9

4

2

2

9

.

0

.

0

1

(

5

5

(

4

5

(

4

4

N

x

3

3

.

1

-1

1

2

7

0

.

0

.

1

1

(

4

4

(

4

5

(

4

5

1

C

e

2

6

.

1

-

6

4

-

4

3

6

.

0

.

2

2

(

1

3

(

9

(

2

1

R

3

7

.

1

-

6

6

3

5

1

.

1

.

2

2

(

1

5

(

1

3

(

2

6

P

d

s

o

S

m

p

e

P

e

d

a

C

d

e

P

v

N

v

P

y

R

2

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1

H

u

m

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6

5

.

3

-

6

9

2

1

1

.

2

.

4

1

(

5

(

7

(

1

4

N

x

5

3

.

2

-

5

6

2

1

2

.

2

.

3

1

(

6

(

7

(

1

4

1

M

c

G

o

n

1

5

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2

-1

7

3

9

7

.

1

.

3

9

(

2

3

(

2

1

(

1

7

N

x

1

5

.

2

-2

6

3

9

9

.

1

.

4

9

(

1

8

(

2

0

(

1

4

1

C

e

5

0

.

2

-

8

9

4

1

4

.

2

.

5

6

(

7

(

6

(

1

7

R

4

6

.

2

-

9

9

3

1

9

.

2

.

4

6

(

7

(

8

(

1

6

N

e

E

o

w

o

T

e

2

s

a

s

a

e

e

e

o

T

e

e

e

a

e

u

a

d

z

b

w

g

s

S

a

d

e

o

a

e

s

h

w

n

p

e

h

b

a

d

z

b

a

w

g

s

a

e

n

a

c



36 LAU

p o s t d ec i s i o n a l s am p l e s . S i n ce t h e m e t r i c s fo r t h e p o s i t iv e an d n eg a t i v e in -

fo rm a t i o n v a r i ab l e s a r e a l m o s t i d en t i ca l a c ros s al l reg re ss io n s , t h e u n s t an -

d a r d i z e d b w e i g h t s w i l l b e o u r f o c u s o f a t te n t i o n , a l t h o u g h f o r c o m p l e t e -

n ess t h e s t a n d a r d i z e d b e t a w e i g h t s a r e a ls o s h o w n . N e g a t i v i t y p r e d i c t s t h a t

t h i s b w e i g h t o r s lo p e s h o u l d b e s t eep e r ( f a r t h e r f ro m 0 ) fo r n eg a t i v e i n fo r -

m a t i o n t h a n f o r p o s it iv e . C o n s i d e r t h e r e g re s s io n p r e d i c t i n g e v a l u a ti o n s o f

H u b e r t H u m p h r e y i n 1 9 6 8 w i t h i n t h e p r e d e c i s i o n a l s a m p l e ( f i r s t r o w o f

Tab l e 2 ). T h e s l o p e o f t h e p o s it i v e i n fo r m a t i o n v a r i ab l e is 2 . 6 4; t h e co m p a-

r a b l e s l o p e f o r n e g a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n i s - 8 . 6 7 , m o r e t h a n t h r e e t i m e s a s

g rea t . I n t h i s c a s e, a n eg a t i v i t y h y p o t h es is is s t ro n g l y s u p p o r t ed . A n d i n a l l

s ix r eg re ss i o n s i n t h e p red ec i s i o n a l s am p l e (w h e re t h e r a t i o n a l i za t i o n a rg u -

m e n t s e e m s m o s t i m p l a u s i b le ) , t h e n e g a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n s lo p e is a l m o s t

t w i c e a s l a r g e o r l a r g e r t h a n t h e c o m p a r a b l e p o s it iv e i n f o r m a t i o n sl op e .

T h e p i c t u r e i s s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t w h e n t h e p o s t d ec i si o n al s a m p l e i s

co n s i d e red ( l o wer p a r t o f Tab l e 2 ) . R eca l l t h a t t h i s g ro u p a rg u ab l y i n -

d u d e s r a t i o n a l i za t i o n s am o n g i ts r ea s o n s . Ag a i n i n a l l s ix ca s es t h e n eg a -

t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n s l op e i s l a r g e r t h a n t h e p o s i ti v e i n f o r m a t i o n s l o pe , b u t t h e

d i f f e r e n c e s a r e n o t a s la r g e a s i n t h e p r e d e c i si o n a l sa m p l e . A l t h o u g h t h e

r e su l ts f r o m t h e p o s t d e c is i o n al s a m p l e p r o d u c e w e a k e r s u p p o r t f o r n e g a -

t iv i ty , t h ey a re co n s i s t en t w i t h t h o s e f ro m t h e p red ec i s i o n a l s am p l e .

The Rationalization r gu me nt

Th e s e an a l y s e s p ro v i d e s t ro n g ev i d en ce fo r a n eg a t i v i t y e f f ec t i n t h e fo r -

m a t i o n o f ev a l u a t i o n s o f p re s i d en t i a l c an d i d a t e s . In a l l 12 reg re ss io n s , an d

p a r t i cu l a r l y i n t h e 6 m o s t ap p ro p r i a t e an a l y s e s ( t h e p red ec i s i o n a l s am -

p i e s) , t h e n eg a t i v e i n fo rm a t i o n s l o p e is s t eep e r t h an t h e p o s i t iv e i n fo rm a-

t i o n s lo p e . W h y t h e e f f e c t w a s m u c h w e a k e r in t h e p o s td e c is i on a l s a m p l e is

d i f f i cu l t t o s ay . G i v en t h e p rev i o u s l y d is cu s s ed r e s e rv a t io n s ab o u t p o s t h o c

r a t i o n a l i z a ti o n w i t h i n t h is g r o u p , t h e s e d a t a m a y s i m p l y b e i n a p p r o p r i a t e .

T h e t r u e n e g a t i v i t y e f f e c t m a y a c t u a l l y b y b l u r r e d i n t h e p o s td e e is i on a l

s a m p l e i f p e o p l e a r e r e l u c t a n t t o a d m i t t o n e g a t i v e i n f lu e n c e s w h e n j u st if y -

ing p rev io us dec i s ions (see , fo r exam ple , Fo lkes an d S ears , 1977 , o r Tesser

an d R o s en , 1 9 75 ). Ne g a t i v i t y is a f t e r a l l p o s t u l a t e d t o a f f ec t t h e fo r m a t i o n

o f im p res s i o n s, n o t t h e i r r a t i o n a l i za t i o n .

A n a l t e r n a t e p o s si b il it y is t h a t o t h e r d i f fe r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e p r e - a n d

p o s t d ec i s i o n a l g ro u p s l ed t o t h e d i f f e r en ces i n t h e r e s ul ts . T h e l a t e r -

d ec i d i n g g ro u p ( t h e p red ec i s i o n a l s am p l e ) w as n o l es s ed u ca t e d o r l es s i n -

t e r e s t e d i n p o li ti cs . T h e y w e r e s o m e w h a t le ss p a r ti s a n , b u t c o n t r o l l in g o n

p a r t y i d en t i f i c a t i o n d i d n o t s u b s t an t i a l l y ch a n g e t h e r e su l ts . ~T h e p o s td e c i -

s io n a l g r o u p a l w a y s h a d m o r e p o s it iv e a n d / o r n e g a t i v e th i n g s to s a y a b o u t

t h e c a n d i d a t e s , b u t e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e s t a n d a r d i z e d r e g re s si o n w e i g h t s



NEG TIVITY N POLITICS

6

should cont ro l on an y m ean di f fe rences in the predic tors , and they do not

subs tant ia l ly a l te r the p ic ture presented by Table 2 .

Another s t ra tegy is to search act ively for ra t ional izat ion in both post-

and predec is iona l samples . The psychologica l theory tha t most d i rec t ly

addresses postdecisional ra t ional iza t ion is Fest inger s (1957) cognit ive dis-

sonance theory. According to Fest inger, once a decision has been reached,

the decision m ake r wil l experience dissonance i f he or she holds cognitions

that are inconsistent with that decision. So i f voters decide they l ike and

wi l l vote for a pa r t icula r candida te , any nega t ive informat ion they have

about the candidate wil l be dissonance arousing. Similarly i f voters decide

they d is l ike and wi l l vote aga ins t a candida te , any pos i t ive informat ion

about that candidate wil l be dissonance arousing. Since dissonance is as-

sumed to be an avers ive s ta te , individua ls a re mot iva ted to reduce the

dissonance.

Dissonance can be reduced, according to Fes t inger , in three d i f fe rent

ways: (1) One can add consonant e lements and subt rac t d i ssonant e le -

ments . Th at is , one can seek out , rem emb er, or invent reasons conso nant

wit h one s decision, an d avoid, repress, or den y reasons dissonant w ith

ones decision; (2) one can r edu ce the im po rtanc e of dissonant cognit ions;

(3) one can c hange the va lence of d i ssonant e lements , e i the r b y changing

one s ow n va lues and pre fe rences or by ch anging one s pe rcept ion of the

dissonant e lement so tha t i t appears to be consonant. The theory does not

predic t w hich of these wi l l opera te unde r p ar t icula r c i rcumstances , so pos-

sibly a l l three mechanisms are a t work here . If the fi rs t dissonance-

reduc ing mechanism is occurr ing , w e wo uld expec t survey respondents to

give ma ny reasons to vote for a chosen candida te and few reasons to vote

against him, wh ile they should give ma ny reasons to vote against a re jected

cand ida te and few reasons to vote for h im. I f rat iona l iza t ion is not occur-

r ing , the d i f fe rence should n ot be so prom inent .

Th e second dissonance-reduc ing mech anism wo uld suggest tha t n ot only

w o uld t he re be me a n d i f fe renc e s i n the n um be r o f r e asons re por t e d t o vo t e

for and aga ins t chosen and re jec ted candida tes , but tha t those reasons

wo ul d a lso differ in imp ortan ce. Th at is , a reason offered to vote for a

chosen candida te should have more weight in predic t ing eva lua t ions of

him then wo uld a reason given to vote for a re jec ted candida te . The opp o-

si te should be t rue for reasons offered to vote against the two candidates.

The th i rd d issonance-reduc ing m echanism, changing the va lence of d is -

sonant cognit ions, is best considered in the context of issue proximit ies .

Agree ing wi th a re jec ted candida te on the i ssues or d i sagree ing wi th a

chosen candidate should again be dissonance arousing. Voters can reduce

this dissonance by assimulat ing the posi t ions of chosen candidates to their

ow n pos i t ions and by cont ras t ing the pos i tions of re jec ted candida tes f rom



364 I.AtJ

their ow n. So issue dis tances should be smaller to chosen candida tes w he n

dissonance -reducing rat ionalization is occurring than wh en i t is not , an d

similarly greater to rejected cand idates if dissonance-reducing rat ionaliza-

t ion is occu rring th an if i t is not . 6

Al l three of the dissonance-reducing rat ional izat ions cou ld be examined

in the 1972 da ta set , so the d ata from th at election year were reanalyzed.

Th e basic s trategy was to repe at the analyses from Table 2, rea rrang ed b y

chosen voted for) and rejected voted against) candidates rather than by

Dem ocrat ic and Republ ican candidates . The N is therefore reduced to re-

spondents wh o repor ted vot ing for one or the other major can didate . All

analyses we re pe rform ed separately in the p re- an d postdecisional samples

to determine i f the amount of ra t ional izat ion in those two samples di f -

fered.

Th e d ata for al l three dissonance~reducing rat ionalizations are show n in

Table 3 , an d the results are dram at ic . The f ir st two column s show the

me an num ber of reasons offered to vote for and against the chosen and

rejected candidate . I f respondents were reducing dissonance by addin g

consonant e lements and su btract ing dissonant e lements , then they wo uld

have repo r ted m any more reasons to vote for their chosen candidate and

m an y m ore reasons to vote against their rejected cand idate. T his was the

case for bo th p redecisional and postdecisional samples. But th e differences

are s l ight for the predecisional sample, and huge for the postdeeisional

sample. Th e predecisional group had .25 more posit ive things to say abou t

thei r u l t imately chosen than rejected candidate , but the f igure for the pos t-

decisional groups is 1.57; l ikewise the predeeisional samp le h a d . 18 fewer

bad things to say abo ut thei r chosen candidate , com pared to 1 .31 fewer by

the postdecisional sam ple. 7

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 repor t the uns tandardized regress ion

weights from analyses predicting evaluations of the chosen and rejected

candidates . These weights ref lect the relat ive importance of the posit ive

and negat ive inform at ion predictors . D ata f rom the pos tdecisional sample

exhibi t exact ly the pat tern one would predict i f d issonance were being

reduced by increasing the importance of consonant cognit ions: Posit ive

informat ion has re la t ively mo re w eight in predict ing evaluat ions of the

chosen can dida te 7.41) than the rejected cand idate 1.61), while negative

informat ion has re la t ively more weight in predict ing evaluations of the

rejected candida te -15.43) than of the chosen candidate -11.02) . On the

other ha nd the p at tern in the predeeisional sample is exactly the opposite

Posit ive info rma tion has mo re we ight in pre dicting evaluations of the ult i-

ma tely re jected candid ate 7 .85) than the ul t imately chosen candidate

3.27), whi le negat ive inform at ion has m ore we ight in predict ing evalua-

t ions of the chosen -10.69) tha n the rejected can dida te -7.96). U sing this



T

B

3

R

a

o

z

o

n

1

P

a

P

d

s

o

S

m

p

e

M

e

V

u

P

v

N

v

R

e

o

W

e

g

s

P

v

N

v

I

u

P

o

m

i

y

N

P

s

o

C

c

d

e

R

e

e

c

d

e

D

e

e

1

2

1

1

.

9

1

3

.

2

-

1

3

2

-

1

6

(

3

9

(

4

0

7

8

-

7

9

(

5

3

(

4

8

-

4

5

°

2

7

1

8

2

5

.

6

°

1

1

P

d

s

o

C

c

d

e

R

e

e

c

d

e

D

e

e

1

9

.

5

.

4

1

8

1

5

1

3

7

4

-

1

0

(

1

6

(

2

6

1

6

-

1

3

(

3

8

(

2

5

5

8

-

4

3

1

3

2

9

1

5

a

6

6

N

e

S

a

d

e

o

a

e

n

p

e

h

~

n

h

c

u

m

h

c

c

d

e

e

y

w

~

s

u

a

e

o

m

h

e

e

e

c

d

e

e

y



66 LAU

second opera t ional iza t ion of ra t ional izat ion, here is good evidence for i t in

the postdecisional sample and no evidence for i t in the predecisional sam-

ple.

Th e final cri terion for ra t ional izat ion is perceiv ed issue distances to the

chosen and re jected candidates. The average issue proximit ies to the two

candidates on the six issues asked in the pre-elect ion survey were com-

puted. For readers unfamil iar with the CPS elect ion studies, these issue

proximi t ies a re easi ly com pute d b y cont ras t ing respondents' se l f -p lacement

on 7-p oint a t t i tude sca les to the i r p lacements of the two major candida tes

on thos e s am e scales. 8

The data , shown in the last column of Table 3, again suggest greater

ra t ional izat ion in the postdeeisional sample . For the predeeisional sample ,

the main issue distance is 1.83 for the chosen candidate and 2.52 for the

rejected candid ate , a differen ce of .69. The co mp ara ble f igures in the post-

decisional sample are 1.39 and 2.95, a difference of 1.56.

By al l three cri teria of ra t ional izat ion suggested by dissonance theory

then, the re i s c lea r ly much mo re evidence tha t ra t iona liza t ion occurred in

the pos tdec is iona l sample than tha t i t occurred in the predec is iona l sam-

ple. S ince the re a re no absolute s tandards here , one cannot conc lude f rom

the fi rs t and third tests that ra t ional izat ion did occur in the postdecisional

sample and did not occur in the predec is iona l sample . Cer ta in ly one can

conc lude , h owever , tha t i f ra t iona liza t ion d id occur, i t occurred to a much

greater extent in the postdecisional sample . On the other hand, the resul ts

from the second ra t ional izat ion cri terion, the re la t ive importance of disso-

nant and consonant informat ion, do sugges t tha t ra t iona l iza t ion d id not

occur in the predecisional sample , while i t did occur in the postdecisional

sample.

The abo ve eviden ce on ra t ional izat ion a l lows us to conclude fa irly confi-

dent ly tha t w hen respondents a re contac ted b efore they have dec ided for

wh om to vote, nega t ive inform at ion is more inf luent ial than pos i tive infor-

mat ion in candid a te eva lua tions . From a psychom etr ic s tandpoint , how-

ever, this is not yet conclusive evidence for negat ivi ty per se, for a cru cial

assumpt ion is tha t the pos i t ive and nega t ive informat ion tha t respondents

used in forming the i r eva lua t ions was equiva lent . I f every b i t of nega tive

in fo rma t ion me n t ione d a bou t a c a nd ida t e w e re some how ve ry impor t a n t

and e xtrem e in som e absolu te sense (e .g. , his s tance on nat ional defense

could lead to nu c lea r holocaus t ) whi le every posi t ive reason men t ioned

we re much less we ight y (e .g. , I l ike his wife ) , then any reasonab le the-

o ry w ou ld p re d i c t t ha t t he ne ga t ive i n fo rma tion w ou ld ha ve more w e igh t

than the posi tive . Fro m a pol i t ical beha vior s tandpo int , the possible non-

equiv alence of posi tive and n egat ive reasons is surely an acad emic point . If

i t turne d out tha t nega t ive reasons were , on the who le , m ore ext reme than



NEG TIVIW IN POLITICS

67

the pos i tive , that wo uld be f ine and va luable info rmat io n in i ts own r ight .

We would lea rn an in te res t ing fac t abou t w hat type o f in fo rmat ion peop le

use in form ing evaluat ions of pres ident ia l candidates . But f ro m a psycho-

logical v iewpoin t the da ta w ould then hav e no th ing to s ay abou t nega t iv -

i ty as a more genera l pheno meno n .

This one remaining poss ible confound in Study 2 cannot be precisely

examined. However , a somewhat imprecise tes t i s poss ible . The reasons

offered to vote for and agains t candidates in 1968 an d 1972 were grou ped

into f ive bro ad c ategories based loosely on the

The American Voter s

6-factor model) : p ar ty references , group references, personal qual i ties of

the candid ate , i ssues both domest ic and foreign pol icy) , and govern men t

management . I f one accepts the argument that issue vot ing is more ra-

t ional , more weighty , and more extreme than cons iderat ions of the per-

sonal qual i t ies of the candidates , then one could see i f more issue-based

reasons a re o f fe red to vo te aga inst a c and ida te r a ther tha n fo r a cand ida te ,

whi le more personal-qual i ty reasons are offered to vote for a candidate

ra ther than aga inst one . Happ i ly no la rge d i f fe rences in f r equenc y oc-

curre d. Exa min ing jus t the predecis ional samples , jus t the pos tdecisional

samples , o r com bin ing the two toge ther does no t change mat te r s much .

Likewise, looking at the m ea n n um be r of reasons in each category offered

to vote for and agains t the tw o candida tes or the percentage of respondents

offer ing any reason to vote for or agains t a ca ndid ate in ea ch category, does

no t chang e the genera l pa t te rn . I t i s ha rd to a rgue by looking at the da ta

that there is any case to be m ad e tha t th e typical reason to vote agains t a

can dida te is greater in im por ta nce or extremity tha n th e typical reason to

vote for a candidate . Yet the great d ivers i ty of reasons f rom which the

independent var iables were cons tructed remains a weakness in Study 2 .

Th e f inal s tu dy corrects th is weakness .

STUDY

The 1980 election s tudy includ ed a va r ie ty of new i tems descr ib ing the

candidate s . These new i tems een tered aro und affects and ascr ibed person-

ality traits see Kind er, Peters, Abelson, and Fiske, 1982; Kinder, Fiske,

an d Peters , 1980). T he affect checklis t asked respond ents if the y had ever

felt an y of seven affects to w ar d a can dida te: anger, hope, fear , pride, dis-

gus t, sym pathy, and fear. Th e t ra i t inven tory asked respondents the extent

to which they ascr ibed the t ra i ts moral , d ishones t , weak, knowledgeable ,

power hungry, inspir ing, and s t rong leader to the candidates . The af fect

checkl is t was des igned to include both pos i tive and negat ive feel ings . The

trai t in vento ry was des igned to measu re com peten ce and in tegr i ty , but i t

too includ ed both pos it ive and nega t ive tra i ts .



36 8 I AI I

These new i tems can be used as a l ternat ive measures of an excess of

pos i t ive or nega t ive fee lings tow ard a candida te . These new m easures have

two advantages over the ones u t i l i zed in S tudy 2 . F i rs t they a re much

c loser to the typ e of i t ems typica l ly used in psychology exper iments , thus

increasing comparabi l i ty. And second, there are only 14 t ra i ts and affects ,

ra ther than thousands of id iosyncra t ic reasons to vote for or aga ins t a can-

dida te . This wil l a l low for mo re prec ise de te rm ina t ion of the ext remi ty

of each individua l t ra i t or a f fec t . The bas ic s t ra tegy of S tudy 3 wi ll be to

repea t the m ain regress ions of S tudy 2 , us ing these new i tems to cons t ruc t

the indepe ndent var iables . °

The a ffec t and t ra i t m easures descr ibed abov e wer e both col lec ted in the

pre-elect ion wave. The t ra i ts and affects were t reated separate ly. The

nu mb er of pos i t ive affec ts fe l t abo ut each candid a te w ere sum med , as

we re the nu mb er of nega t ive a ffec ts fe lt . Because the re we re an u nequa l

nu m ber of pos i t ive and nega t ive a ffects , these two cou nts were s tandard-

ized before they were t rea ted exac t ly l ike the independent var iables in

Study 2 . Tha t i s , the nu m ber of nega t ive a ffec ts wer e subt rac ted f rom the

number of pos i t ive a ffec ts to c rea te the pos i t ive a ffec t independent var i -

able , whi le the nu mb er of pos i tive a ffects was subt rac ted f rom the nu mb er

of nega t ive a ffec ts to c rea te the nega t ive a ffec t indepen dent var iable , w i th

al l negat ive values for both variables col lapsed to 0. The resul t ing vari-

ables represent an excess of posi t ive over negat ive (or negat ive over posi-

t ive) affect fe l t about a candidate .

Respondents were asked to ra te how wel l each of the seven t ra i t s de -

sc r ibed each can dida te on 4-point sca les. T he ra t ings of the fou r pos i tive

t ra i ts we re sum med , as wer e the ra t ings of the three nega t ive t ra i ts . Aga in

the uneq ua l nu mb er of pos it ive and nega t ive t ra it s requi red s tandardiza -

t ion of each sum before the excess of posi t ive t ra i t and excess of negat ive

t ra i t a t t r ibut ion var iables were c rea ted .

Separate regressions were specified using fi rst the posi t ive and negat ive

affec t measures and then the pos i t ive and nega t ive t ra i t m easures (p lus the

measure of par ty ident i f ica t ion) to predic t the pos te lec t ion fee l ing ther-

mo meter ev a lua t ion of Car te r an d Reagan. The predec isiona l and pos tde-

eisional samples were examined separate ly.

Th e results are sho wn in Table 4. Th ey are ve ry similar to those in Table

2. In the predeeisional sample, for both affects and t ra i ts , the negat ive

affec ts and t ra i t s have much more inf luence than do the pos i t ive a ffec ts

and tra i ts . In the postdecisional sample the pat tern is the same, a l though

the di f fe rences be tw een th e pos i t ive and nega t ive a ffec ts or t ra i ts a re not so

large.

Th e possibi l i ty st il l remain s th at the indiv idual t ra i ts and affects used to

const ruc t the in depe nden t var iables a re unequa l ly ext reme. I f the individ-



T

B

4

A

f

e

a

T

n

h

F

m

a

o

o

E

u

o

1

P

e

s

o

S

m

p

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P

v

N

e

v

P

y

R

~

N

A

f

e

s

C

a

e

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e

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a

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5

1

.

2

a

-

8

7

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5

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1

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1

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8

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8

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7

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370

TABLE 5. Extrem ity of Individual A ffects and Trai ts , 1980

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c a r ie r~ Reagana Car ter b

LAU

Positive affects

Ho peful 9.0 12.8 .42

Pro ud 11.8 ~6.0 .57

Sym path etic 8.1 8.9 .28

Averag e 9.6 12.6 .42

Negative affects

Angry -7 .6 -12 .2 - .47

Af ra id -17 .6 -10 .8 - .75

Disgusted -9.6 -12.3 - .53

Uneasy -11.5 -8.2 - .58

Average -14.1 -10.9 - . 57

Positive traits

Mo ral 9.9 16.1 .47

Kn ow ledge able 16.0 13.2 .78

Inspir in g 23.5 13.0 1.25

Stron g lead er 30.6 18.4 1.60

Ave rage 20.0 15.2 1.03

Negat ive t ra i ts

Dishones t -22.8 -23.3 - . 75

Weak -21.1 -17.1 - .91

Power hungry -13 .0 -14 .0 - .59

Ave rage - 19.0 - 18.1 -. 75

Note

Table entries are deviations from overall means.

~Criterion is pre-eleetion feeling thermometer evaluation .

bCriterion is mean approval of Carter's job performance in five areas.

u a l n e g a t i v e t r a i ts o r a f f ec t s w e r e , o n t h e w h o l e , m o r e n e g a t i v e t h a n t h e

p o s i t iv e t r a i t s a n d a f f ec t s w e r e p o s i t i v e , t h e n n o o n e s h o u l d b e s u r p r is e d

t h a t t h e n e g a t i v e t r a i t s a n d a f f e c t s h a v e m o r e i n f l u e n c e o v e r f i n a l e v a l u a -

t i o ns t h a n t h e p o s i t i v e o n e s d o . T h i s w a s t h e o n e p r o b l e m t h a t c o u l d o n l y

b e a d d r e s s e d i n d i r e c t l y i n S t u d y 2 . T o e x p l o r e t h i s p o s si b i l i ty m o r e c l o se ly ,

t h e m e a n f e e l in g t h e r m o m e t e r e v a l u at i o n s of C a r t e r a n d R e a g a n b y re -

s p o n d e n t s w h o a t t r i b u t e d e a c h a f f e c t o r t ra i t t o t h e m a r e s h o w n i n T a b l e 5 .

T h e d a t a a r e a ls o d i s p l a y e d a s d e v i a t i o n s f r o m t h e m e a n e v a l u a t i o n o f e a c h

c a n d i d a t e . T h e s e m e a n e v a l u a t i o n s a r e a n e m p i r i c a l m e a s u r e o f h o w e x -

t r eme each t r a i t o r a f f ec t i s .~ °

T h e r e su l ts c l e a r ly d o n o t s u p p o r t t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e n e g a t i v e t r a i ts

a n d a f fe c t s a r e m o r e e x t r e m e t h a n t h e p o s i ti v e o n es . F o r e x a m p l e t h e m e a n

e v a l u a t i o n o f C a r t e r b y t h o se w h o c h e c k e d P r o u d o n t h e ad j e c ti v e c h e c k



37 LAU

a fairly general ph eno m eno n in poli t ical percept ion, as i t is in ma ny oth er

areas of hum an informat ion process ing .

One quest ion st i l l remains.

Why

is negat ive information more impor-

tant than comparable posi t ive information? This is a largely unanswered

question in social psychology as well as in this application to political be-

havior . A nu m ber of hypotheses have been suggested , fa l ling in to two main

groups.

A cost orientation

hypothesis views negat ivi ty as a motivat ional phe-

nomenon. According to this hypothesis, people are more strongly moti-

vate d to avoid costs tha n to a ppro ach gains. T he origins of this different ial

mot iva t ion are no t d ear , bu t they are usual ly a rgued to be genetic , s ince i t

is presumably adapt ive for species survival to be alert to danger. By this

argument negat iv i ty should be par t icu lar ly s t rong when the s takes a re

high. A person making a simple bet should be more loss-conscious when

the be t involves a win or loss of 1 ,000 tha n w he n the bet involves a win or

loss of 1 . This is a well-d ocum ente d phe nom eno n in the decision-making

l i teratu re (e .g . , Lu bfe r et a l . , 1972; Slovie, 1969) as indicated by the fa ct

tha t i t i s s imply assumed by Kahneman and Tversky 's p rospect theory

(1979).

The cost -orien tat ion not ion probably does no t account com ple te ly for

negativity in political perception, since politics and most political figures

are fa irly distant fro m people 's ev eryd ay lives. Of course some radical

changes in laws or values might affect many people more direct ly , but in

general l i fe goes on pret ty much the same for most people regardless of

what pol i t ic ians are doing.

Th e clear except ion to this g eneral rule is the president . He of all indi-

vidual pol i t ical f igures can potent ial ly have a great deal of control over

people 's lives. Th e presid ent can ge t the c oun try into war, inst i tute a draft ,

or speed up or slow down the economy. If cost orientat ion is going to be

a viable explanat ion for negat ivi ty anywhere in pol i t ical percept ion, i t

should help explain negat ivi ty in the percept ion of presidents and presi-

dent ial candidates.

A second type o f explanat ion for negat ivi ty employs the fam il iar 3¢igure

ground

hypothesis. M ost of us, m ost of the t im e, l ive in a posi t ive world.

We l ike a ma jor i ty of the people a ro und us, and we are sa ti sf ied wi th our

jobs, our famil ies, our neighborhoods, ou r experiences with gove rnm ent

agencies, and our l ives as a whole (Campbell , Converse, and Rodgers,

1975; K atz, G utek , K ahn , a nd Barto n, 1975; Sears, 1982). Against this

posi t ive background, negat ive information stands out because of i ts rela-

t ive infrequency. In Gestal t terms, negat ive inform ation is f igural against a

posit ive background. The f igure-ground hypothesis , then , is very much a

perceptual explanat ion for negat ivi ty .



NEG TIVITY N POLITICS

7

The polit ical translation of the f igure-ground hypothesis is clear . Most

people implicit ly expect polit icians to be l ike everyone else--basically

good, l ikable people. We are raised on stories about George Washington,

Abr aha m Lincoln , and other benevolent leaders . An overw helmin g major-

ity of curren t polit ical f igures are e valu ated posit ively (Sears , 1982; Sears

and Whitney, 1974). For instance, Sears (1982) reports that 76% of all

pol i t ical f igures evaluated on Gal lup pol ls between 1935 and 1975 were

evaluated posit ivel~ Again, i t is against this posit ive polit ical background

that negat ive informa t ion ab out a specif ic cand idate m ay s tand out . I t i s a

simple contrast effect: negative information stands out (or is f igural) in a

generally posit ive context (or ground).

A future paper will present evidence for both of these hypotheses (see

Lau , 1979, for a prel imin ary discussion). To briefly anticipate the relev ant

findings of this later paper, both the f igure-ground and cost-orientation

hypotheses can help explain negat iv i ty in the percept ion of pres ident ia l

candidates , but as expected only the f igure-ground hypothesis helps ex-

plain negativity in eongressional voting. The two explanations are not

com pet in g hypotheses ; they are bo th p robably t rue in d if ferent s ituations.

At the presen t t im e it is sufficient to point o ut the d ifferent explanations for

negat iv i ty and the dif ferent implicat ions those explanat ions have. When

negat iv i ty wil l be most pronounced and how i t can be reduced i f we so

desire ( imagine a polit ician with a skeleton or two in a closet) depend on

the psycho log ica l mechan ism u nder ly ing the phenom enon .

The curren t resul ts do ha ve clear implicat ions for the ra t ional pol i t ic ian

who seeks reelect ion. Here is c lear empir ical suppor t for the t radi t ional

advice of avoiding controvers ies and not taking s t rong s tands that could

upset substantial portions of one's consti tuency. Being well thought of is

apparen t ly no t as impor tan t to a cand ida te as no t be ing bad ly though t o f.

Havi ng pos i t ive facts associated with one 's nam e is not as imp or ta nt as not

havin g negat ive facts associated with one 's name . On the face of i t , these

resul ts could be in terpreted to sugges t that eandidates might prof i tably

spend more t ime in their campaigns s t ress ing their opponent ' s shor tcom-

ings tha n their o wn s t rengths . I f the naive (or wily) pol it ic ian should take

the implicat ions of these f indings too far , however , I would be quick to

point out that acquir ing the reputat io n of a mudsl inger would resul t in

havin g a very negat ive fact or reputat io n associated with one 's name. The

tr ick is being for tu nate enou gh to have ma ny negat ive th ings known about

your o ppo nen t with out your having to br ing those negat ive facts to l ight .

In any ease, these results make it clear that when voters are forming im-

pressions of polit ical candidates , the negative things they know are more

imp orta nt than the pos it ive th ings . Fur ther , once those impress ions have

been form ed, any subsequent v engeance ( resul t ing from negat ive evalua-



74 LAU

t io n s ) w i l l b e g r e a t e r t h a n a n y c o n s e q u e n t r e w a r d ( r e s u l t i n g f r o m p o s i t i v e

e v a l u a t i o n ) .

Acknowledgements D o r o t h e a M a r s h c h e e r f u l l y t y p e d m a n y d r a ft s o f th i s p a -

p e r , f o r w h i c h I a m g r a t e f u l . T h e d a t a u t i l i z e d i n t h is p a p e r w e r e m a d e a v a i l a b l e

b y t h e I n t e r - U n i v e r s i t y C o n s o r t i u m f o r P o l i t ic a l a n d S o c i a l R e s e a r c h . O f c o u rs e ,

t h e a u t h o r b e a r s c o m p l e t e r e s p o n s i b i l it y f o r t h e a n a l y se s o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s p r e -

s e n t e d h e r e . I w o u l d l i k e t o t h a n k D a v i d S e a r s, T h a d B r o w n , S u s an F i s k e , R o d

K i e w i e t , a n d j o h n P e t r o c i k f o r c o m m e n t i n g o n e a r l i e r v e rs i o n s o f t h is m a n u s c r i p t .

NOTES

1. To il lustrate that a simple coun t is inappro priate, consider two respondents, th e f irst wh o

gives f ive reasons to vote for a can didate and four reasons to vote against him, the second

who gives no reasons to vote for that same candidate and three reasons to vote against

him. Now clearly the second respondent 's basis for evaluation of the candidate is much

more negat ive than the f i rst 's , and one would expect the second respondent to evaluate

that candidate much more negat ively than the f irst . How ever , by us ing simple counts of

positive and nega tive respondents, the f irst respondent would be highe r on the negative

score than the second.

2. For simplicity, an inter med iate step in the analysis w hich insured that these new variable

would be linearly elated to the depe ndent var iables has been omit ted. This intermediate

step involved representing each nonzero level of these new variables with a separate

dum my var iable . This procedure al lows one to check the l ineari ty of the relat ion of the

new variables to the dependent variable. In most cases the relationship was l inear, al-

thoug h it was occasiona lly necessary to collapse adjacent categories to mo re closely ap-

proxim ate l inearity. I t w as desirable to have a single measu re of positive informa tion an d

a single measure of negative information, rather than two sets of dummy variables, be-

cause the compar ison o f pos i t ive to negat ive informat ion w ould therefore be great ly faci l -

i tated.

In 1968 and 1980, because so few respondents we re at th e highest (5) level of the

pos i t ive and negat ive informat ion var iables , the highes t level was col lapsed into the adja-

cent (4) categor~ H ence both the pos i t ive and negat ive informat ion var iables actual ly ran

from 0 to 4. In 1972, only three reasons for voting for and against each can didate were

recorded. In this year these new var iables had poss ible values between 0 and 3. I might

add that no pecul iar it ies in the resul t ing pos i tive and negat ive informat ion var iables can

explain the resul ts to b e presented below. Somet imes the va r iance of the pos i t ive var iable

is slightly higher; sometimes th e var ianc e of the ne gative variab le is s l ightly higher. L ike-

wise, there is no systematic difference in the means of the two crucial variables.

3. In 1976, th e feeling therm ome ters we re asked only in Wave 1. Hence the 1976 data are

not uti l ized here.

4 , This dumm y var iable equaled I i f the respondent identi f ied wi th the par ty of the candi-

da te being rated, and e qualed 0 otherwise. Th e postdecisional group was init ially broken

into those who know al l a long who m they would vote for, and those who decided

somet ime dur ing the cam paign b ut before they were interviewed. These two groups did

not differ substantially, however, and for simplicity they w ere collapsed together.

5. In 1968, for instance, the predecisional group had approximately $50 more in annual

family inco me, . 1 of a year less education; they we re ab out a year younger, 4 % m ore

white, .1% more female; and they were about .1 or a point less interested (on a 3-point

scale) in a cam paign. Only w hen the full 7-point Party ID scale is folded at i ts midp oint

are there any significant differences in the samples, an d e ven here the difference is only

.24 (on a 0-3 scale). As one m ight expect, the predecisional grou p is some wha t less parti-

san.



NEG TIVITY N POUTICS 375

6. This type o f rationalization is also predicted by Hieder's (1958) theory of cognitive bal-

ance. This test of rational izatio n was suggested by Brody an d Page (1972).

7. Controlling on the greater verbosity of the postdecisional sample reduces the magnitude

of the differences somewhat, but not enough to change the conclusion that, using this

criterion of rationalization, much more rationalization was occurring in the postdeci-

sional sample.

8. Absolute differences (ignoring signs) betwe en respo ndent's positions and their pe rceptio n

of the position of each candida te were compu ted for all six issues in the pre-eleetion

survey for which a ppro priate dat a were available. These distances w ere then averaged to

form a single ove rall measure of issue proximity. Respondents with missing dat a on more

tha n half of th e possible issues were excluded from the analyses.

9. The 1980 election study ha d a m ore complicated design than the previous election stud-

ies, involving three sep arate samples and interviews at various times throughout the ca m-

paign. For com parability; only that part of the 1980 study that is compa rable to previous

election studies is emp loyed here.

10. The criterion is most ap propria tely the feeling thermometer evaluation of the candidate

during the pre electionsur vey --th e same time the traits and affects we re collected and

several months before the depend ent variables used in Table 4 were collected. A second

criterion was availa ble for President Ca rter only; Prespondents were asked the extent to

which they ap prov ed his job perform ance in five areas: the Ir ania n hostage crisis, infla-

tion, unem ployment, the energy problem, a nd overall job approval. These rating on 5-

point scales were averages together and used as a second criterion for determining ex-

tremity. The results did not differ from those presented in Table 5, and hence are not

discussed further.

REFEREN ES

A nderson , N , H . (1965). A verag ing vs. A dd ing as a S t im ulus C om b ina t ion R ule in

P er son P e rcep t ion .

Journal of Experimental Psychology

70: 394-400.

B e ige l , A . (1973) . R es i s t ance to C hange : D i f f e ren t i a l E f fec t s o f F av ora b le and

U n f a v o r a b l e I n i t ia l C o m m u n i c a t i o n s .

British Journal of Social and Clinical

Psychology 12; 153-158.

B loom , H . S . , and H . D . P r i ce (1975) . V o ter R esponse to S hor t - run E con om ic

C ondi t ions : T he a sym m et r i c E f fec t o f P rospe r i ty and R ecess ion.

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