negotiating strategically

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•-mvAinilemyolManagemerHtXlCVTIVl. 1989. Vol III. No. I.pp J7-M Consider Both Relationships and Substance When Negotiating Strategically Grant T. Savage John D. Blair Ritch i. Sorenson Texas Tech University W hen David Peterson, director of services for Dicker- son Machinery, arrives at his office, he notes four j|)poinlmcnts on his schedule. With his lengthy experience in fiegoliating impoilant contracts for this large-equipment repair service, be does not take long to identify the agenda lor each appointment.' A sieering c luich disk salesman from Roadworks will arrive al 8:30 a.m. Peterson has relied for years on disks supplied by Catcrpilku and knows those disks can provide ihc 8.000 hours of service Dickerson guarantees. Price is an issue in Peterson s selection of a supplier, but more impor- lant is a guarantee on the life span of the part. A mcrting is sc hedulod at 9:30 with a met h.inif who hjs swapped a new (ompany battery tor o used baitery from hib own truck. This "trade" is. of course, against company [)()licy. and the employee has been reprimanded and lold hi-, iH'xl paycheck will ho clocked. However, the mechanic wants to disc uss the matter. A representative tor Taf c o. a large road-building con- iidctor. is scheduled for 10:00 a,m, Peterson has been inter- ested in this service contract for a couple of years. He believes that if he can secure a short-term service contract with T.irco, Diekcrson's high-f|ualitv mec hanica! service and guarantees will result in a long-term service relationship witb ihe contractor. The night before, Peterson had dinner with l.itco's reptt'sentative. and this morning he will provide a lout ot service facilities anci discuss the short-term contract with him. A meeting with fiiiiiia^emcnt representatives for union negotiations is scheduled for 1.00 p.m. That meeting wjll probtibiy lost .i couple ol hours. Peterson is concerned because the cc)m|),iny has losi money on the shop undor- Hoingcontr<3ct talks.,incJ now the union is demanding higher wages and threatening to strike. The t ompany c annot afford .1 (jroiongc'd strike, but it also c annot dttorcf to increase poyat I iirrent scTvice firoclut lion r.ites. Negotiating .i contract will tu)i be easy. Choosing Negotiation Strategies Peterson's appointments are not unicjue. Researchers .md scholars have examined similar situations. What strategic advice does tbe negotiation literature offer tor handling these four situations? One of the best developed approat hcs is ,i.,'<inK' iho- ory. which focuses on maximizing substantive outcomc^s in negotiations,' Peterson would probably do well by foe using on only tbe best possible outcome for Dickorson Machinery in his meetings with the salesman and the employee: He alrodcly has a good contract fora steering wheok lute h. bul if thesdlesTTian can cjffei a better deal. Peterson will takt'it; and in the case of the employee. Peterson will bear him out bul foresees no need to deviate from company polic y. In contrast, an exclusive focus on maximii^ing the (ofiipany's substantive outcomes would probably not work in the other two situations: Tarco m.iy continue being serv- iced elsewhere unless enticed to try Dickerson: and during the union negotiations, strategies to maximize outcomes for manageinent only could force a strike. Another well-developed strategic approiic h is win- win problem solving, li is designed to maximize outcomes for both parties and maintain positive relationships.' This approach ccjuld work in the union negotiation, but the outcome would probably be a compromise, ncii .l true win- win solution. Win-win negotiation probably is not the best strategy in the other three situations. Either Roadwork's salesman meets the guarantee and beats current prices, or he does not: trying to fiticJ a win-win solution woulcJ probably be a waste of time. Similarly, because the meeting with the employee will occur after company rules have been applied, a win-win solution is probably not in the company s best interest. Lastly, an attempt to maximize the company's sub- stantive outcomes in a short-term service contract with Tarco {ould hinder long-term contract prospects. 37

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Page 1: Negotiating strategically

•-mvAinilemyolManagemerHtXlCVTIVl. 1989. Vol III. No. I.pp J7-M

Consider Both Relationships andSubstance When Negotiating Strategically

Grant T. SavageJohn D. Blair

Ritch i. SorensonTexas Tech University

W hen David Peterson, director of services for Dicker-son Machinery, arrives at his office, he notes four

j|)poinlmcnts on his schedule. With his lengthy experiencein fiegoliating impoilant contracts for this large-equipmentrepair service, be does not take long to identify the agendalor each appointment.'

A sieering c luich disk salesman from Roadworks willarrive al 8:30 a.m. Peterson has relied for years on diskssupplied by Catcrpilku and knows those disks can provideihc 8.000 hours of service Dickerson guarantees. Price is anissue in Peterson s selection of a supplier, but more impor-lant is a guarantee on the life span of the part.

A mcrting is sc hedulod at 9:30 with a met h.inif whohjs swapped a new (ompany battery tor o used baitery fromhib own truck. This "trade" is. of course, against company[)()licy. and the employee has been reprimanded and lold hi-,iH'xl paycheck will ho clocked. However, the mechanicwants to disc uss the matter.

A representative tor Taf c o. a large road-building con-iidctor. is scheduled for 10:00 a,m, Peterson has been inter-ested in this service contract for a couple of years. Hebelieves that if he can secure a short-term service contractwith T.irco, Diekcrson's high-f|ualitv mec hanica! service andguarantees will result in a long-term service relationship witbihe contractor. The night before, Peterson had dinner withl.itco's reptt'sentative. and this morning he will provide alout ot service facilities anci discuss the short-term contractwith him.

A meeting with fiiiiiia^emcnt representatives forunion negotiations is scheduled for 1.00 p.m. That meetingwjll probtibiy lost .i couple ol hours. Peterson is concernedbecause the cc)m|),iny has losi money on the shop undor-Hoingcontr<3ct talks.,incJ now the union is demanding higherwages and threatening to strike. The t ompany c annot afford.1 (jroiongc'd strike, but it also c annot dttorcf to increase poyatI iirrent scTvice firoclut lion r.ites. Negotiating .i contract willtu)i be easy.

Choosing Negotiation Strategies

Peterson's appointments are not unicjue. Researchers.md scholars have examined similar situations. What strategicadvice does tbe negotiation literature offer tor handlingthese four situations?

One of the best developed approat hcs is ,i.,'<inK' iho-ory. which focuses on maximizing substantive outcomc^s innegotiations,' Peterson would probably do well by foe usingon only tbe best possible outcome for Dickorson Machineryin his meetings with the salesman and the employee: Healrodcly has a good contract fora steering wheok lute h. bul ifthesdlesTTian can cjffei a better deal. Peterson will takt'it; andin the case of the employee. Peterson will bear him out bulforesees no need to deviate from company polic y.

In contrast, an exclusive focus on maximii^ing the(ofiipany's substantive outcomes would probably not workin the other two situations: Tarco m.iy continue being serv-iced elsewhere unless enticed to try Dickerson: and duringthe union negotiations, strategies to maximize outcomes formanageinent only could force a strike.

Another well-developed strategic approiic h is win-win problem solving, li is designed to maximize outcomesfor both parties and maintain positive relationships.' Thisapproach ccjuld work in the union negotiation, but theoutcome would probably be a compromise, ncii .l true win-win solution.

Win-win negotiation probably is not the best strategyin the other three situations. Either Roadwork's salesmanmeets the guarantee and beats current prices, or he doesnot: trying to fiticJ a win-win solution woulcJ probably be awaste of time. Similarly, because the meeting with theemployee will occur after company rules have been applied,a win-win solution is probably not in the company s bestinterest. Lastly, an attempt to maximize the company's sub-stantive outcomes in a short-term service contract with Tarco{ould hinder long-term contract prospects.

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February, 79S9

Any one approach to negotiation clearly will notwork in all situations. Executives need a framework fordetermining what strategies are best in different situations.We believe the best strategy depends on desired outcomes.In this article, we characterize the two major outcomes atissue in the previous examples as substantive and relation-ship outcomes. Although both types of outcome have been(iiscussed in the literature, relationship outcomes havereceived much less attention. Our contention is that a sys-tematic model of strategic choice for negotiation mustaccount for both substantive and relationship outcomes. Inarticulating such a model, we suggest that executives canapproach negotiation strategically by assessing the negotia-tion context: considering unilateral negotiation strategies;transforming unilateral into interactive negotiation strate-gies: and monitoring tactics and reevaluating negotiationstrategies.

Assessing the Negotiation Context

At ru( itil context for any negoliation is the manager'scurrent and desired relationship with the other party. Unfor-tunately, in their rush to secure the best possible substantiveoutcome, managers often overlook the impact of the nego-lidtion on their relationships. This oversight can hurt a man-ager's relationship with the other party, thus limiting his orher ability to obtain desired substantive outcomes now or inthe future.

Each interaaion with another negotiator constitutesan episode that draws from current and affects future rela-tionships. Intertwined with pure concerns about relation-ships are concerns about substantive outcomes. Many timesnegotiators are motivated to establish or maintain positiverelationships and willingly "share the pie" through mutuallybeneficial collaboration. Other negotiations involve substan-tive outcomes that can benefit one negotiator only at theexpense of the other (a fixed pie). These cases often motivatenegotiators to discount the relationship and claim as much ofthe pie as possible.

Most negotiations, however, are neither clearly win-win nor win-lose situations, but combinations of both (anindeterminate pie). Such mixed-motive situations, in whichboth collaboration and competition may occur, are particu-larly difficult for managers to handle strategically.-" The rela-tionship that exists prior to the negotiation, the relationshipthat unfolds during negotiations, and the desired relation-ship often will determine whether either negotiator will bemotivated to share the pie, grab it, or give it away.

Assessing The Negotiation Context

NtGOTIAIIONCONTEXT:

Re dtive Power and Leve of Cont iti

MANAGERSSTRATFCY

EXISTING NEGOTIATION XSUBSTANTIVESITUATION EPISODE / OUTCOMES

OFNEGOTIATION

OTHER PARTY SSTRATEGY

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Consider Both Retationshipi and Substance When Negotiating Strategically

In any case, managers should keep existing anddesired relationships in mind as they bid for substantiveoutcomes. For example, when negotiators are on the losingenti of a win-lose negotiation, they should examine theimplications of taking a short-term loss. During his thirdappointment, Peterson's willingness to make only minimalgains in service contracts for the short term may create aposilivf relationship that will lead to a lucrative, long-termcontract with Tarco. The relative importance of possiblesubstantive and relationship outcomes should help execu-tives decide whether and how to negotiate. To guide theirdecision process, managers should begin by assessing ihoirrelative power and the level of conflict between them andthe other party. Both are key determinants of their currentrcLitionship with the other party.

Exhibit 1 illustrates the negotiation context, showingihose aspects of the situation and negotialion episode that' hape relationship and substantive outcomes. Exisling levelsof power and conflict influence (1) the relationship betweenthe executive and the other party and (2) (he negotiationstrategies they choose. These strategies are implementecithrough appropriate tactics during a negoliation episocie —aone-on-one encounter, a telephone call, or a meeting withrtiultiple parties — and result in substantive and relationshipoutcomes.

The multiplearrows linking strategies, tactics.and thetU'HOtialion episode in Exhibit 1 show the monitoring proc-ess through which both the manager and the other partyrefine their strategies and tactics during an episode. A com-plex .lnd lengthy negotialion.such asj union tontratt nego-li.ition. m.iy include many episodes; a simple negotiationm.iy be (omj^leted within one episode. Each episode,nonetheless, influences future negotiations by changing themanager's and the other party s relative power, the level ofconflict between them. ,ind their relationship.

Relative Power

The relative power of the negotiators establishes animportant aspect of their relationship: the extent of each|).irty s defiendence on the olher. Researchers have foundlh.il individuals assess their power in a relationship and( hoose whether Io (ompete, iK(ommo(Jate, tollaborote. orwithdraw when negotiating with others.' Managers canassess their power relative to the other party by comparingtheir respective abilities to induce compliance through thecontrol of human .ind material resources. To what extent cioihey each control key material resources? To what extent doihey each control the deployment, arrangement, andadvancement of people within the organization?*"

These questions will help managers determinewhether their relationship with the other party Is based onindependence, dependence, or interdependence. Addi-tionally, these questions should help executives considerhow and whether their relationship with the other parlyshould be strengthened or weakened. Often managers willfind themselves or their organisations in interdependenirelationships that have both beneficial and detrimcnl.ilaspects. These relationships are called mixed-motive situa-tions in the negotiation literature because they provideincentives for both competitive and cooperative actions.

In his relationship with the Roadwork salesman.Peterson has considerable power. He is satisfied wiih hiscurrent vendor and has other vendors wanting to sell himthe same product. The numerous choices available allowhim to make demancJs on the salesman. Similarly. Petersonli.ts more relative power than the mechanic. On the olherhand, he has relatively little power wiih Tarco. since thecontractor can choose from a number of equipment-serviceshops. Moreover. Tarco's representative did noi make theinitial contact and has not actively sought Dickerson'sservices.

Level ol Conflict

The levei of conflict underlying a potentkil negoti.i-lion establishes how the negotiators perceive the affectivedimension of their relationship — ihat is. ils degree of sup-fjorliveness or hostility. Managers can assess the relaliori-shi[is level of conflict by identifying the difleretices betweenedc h party's interests. On what issues do both parties agree?On what issues do they disagree? How intense and howingrained are these differences?"

Answers to these c]uestions will reve.il whcMhcrnegotiations will easily resolve differences and whether iherelationship is perceived as supportive or hostile. Thesequestions, like the questions about relative power, shouldalso help exec utivesccinsidcn how <in</whether ihe relation-ship should bestrenglhenecl or weakened. Very tew negcili-ations begin with a neutral relationship. Indexed, the affectiveslate of the relationship may be a primary reason fcjr nego-tiating with a powerful other party. es[iec i.illy if ihe rcLiticm-ship has deteriorated or been parliciiLirlv supportivc-

In Peterson's case, neutral to positive relationshipsexist with the Roadwork salesman and the Tarco representa-tive. However, his relationships with the mechanic and theunion are potentially hostile. Eorexomfile. mtin.igemeni andunion representatives have .ilreacK h.id (ontronl.ilions.Their conflict may escalate if the relationship is notand both sides are not willing to make concessions."

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February. 1989

Considering a Unilateral Negotiation Strategy

Before selecting a strategy for negotiation, a managershould consider his or her interests and the interests of theorganization. These interests will shape the answers to twobasic questions: (1) Is the substantive outcome very impor-tant to the manager? and (2) Is the relationship outcomevery important to the manager?

Four unilateral strategies (see Exhibit 2) emerge fromthe answers: trusting collaboration, firm competition, opensubordination, and active avoidance.'' We call these unilat-eral strategies because in using them, managers consideronly their own interests or the interests of their organization.ignoring for the time being the interests of the other party.

The unilateral strategies presented in Exhibit 2 aresimilar to the conflict management styles suggested by thecombined works of Blake and Moulon. Hall, and Kilmannand Thomas.'" However, while we agree that personalitiesand conflict-management preferences influence a person'sability to negotiate, our selection of terms reflects our focuson strategies instead of styles. For example. Johnston uses theterm "subordination" to refer to a strategy similar to theconflict-management style variously termed "accommoda-tion" (Kilmann and Thomas), "smoothing" (Blake and Mou-ton), or "yield-lose" (Hall)." We, however, see using theopenly subordinative strategy as more than simply "rollingover and playing dead" or "giving away the store." Rather.this strategy is designed to strengthen long-term relationalties, usually at the expense of short-lerm substantive out-comes. Our discussion below also goes beyond Johnston'sconception, showing how a negotiator can focus the openlysubordinative strategy according to his or her substantivegoals.

Our view is consistent with research that suggests thatindividuals adopt different strategies in different relationalcontexts.'-'We anticipate that managers' success with theseunilateral strategies depends on their ability to exhibit avariety of conflict styles. To highlight the role of relationshipand substantive priorities, we describe these four unilateralstrategies in their most extenuated, ideal form, and articulatetheir underlying assumptions. In many ways our descriptionsare classic depictions of each type of strategy. Two of thesestrategies — competition and collaboration — are frequentlydisc ussed in the conflict and negotiation literature.

7. Trusting Collaboration (Cl). In general, if bothrelationship and substantive outcomes are important to theorganization, the manager should consider trusting collabo-ration. The hallmark of this strategy is openness on the part ofboth parties. By encouraging cooperation as positions areasserted, the executive should be able to achieve importantrelationship and substantive outcomes. The executive seeksa win-win ouicome both to achieve substantive goals andmaintain a positive relationship.

fxhihit 2

Considering a Unilateral Negotiation Strategy

Is the SubstantiveOutcomt' Very Importanl

lo the Manager?

Yes No

Yes

I s i h cRelationship

Outcome VeryImporianI lo (he

Manager?

No

TRUSTINGLYCOLLABORATE

when boih types ofoutcomes are very

important

Sitiidtion 1

Strdtef^y PI

FIRMLY COMPETEwhen the priority is cmsubstantive outcomes

Slratony SI

OPENLYSUBORDINATE

when the priority is cjnfoldtionship ouiconios

Sifiwifon 2

ACTIVELY AVOIDNEGOTIATING

when neithei typeo*ouicome is very

important

Sitii.iiifin 4

Trustingly collaborative strategies generally are easi-est to use and most effective when the manager's organiza-tion and the other party are interdependent and mutuallysupportive. These circumstances normally create a trustingrelationship in which negotiators reciprocally disclose theirgoals and needs. In this climate, an effective problem-solvingprocess and a win-win settlement typically result.

2. Open Subordination (SI), If managers are moroconcerned with establishing a positive relationship withanother party than obtaining substantive outcomes, theyshould openly subordinate. We use the term subordinationinstead of accommodation to differentiate this strategicchoice from a conflict-management style. An openly subor-dinative strategy is a yield-win strategy that usually providesdesired substantive outcomes to the other party but rarely tothe manager. A subordinative strategy may be used regard-less of whether the manager exercises more, less, or equalpower relative to the other party. Our argument is thatsubordination can be an explicit strategic negotiation behav-ior — not simply a reflection of power. If the manager haslittle to lose by yielding to the substantive interests of theother party, open subordination can be a key way for him orher to dampen hostilities, increase support, and foster moreinterdependent relationships.

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Consider Both Relationships and Substance When Negotiating Strategically

3. Firm Competition (PI). If substantive interests areimportant bul ihe relationship is not, the manager should(onsitJer firmly competing. This situation often occurs whenmanagers have little trust for the other party or the relation-ship is not good to begin with. In such situations, they maywant to exert their power to gain substantive outcomes. Toenact this competitive strategy, they may also become highlyaggressive, bluffing, threatening the other party, or other-wise misrepresenting their intentions. Such tactics hide tht-manager's actual goals and needs, preventing the other partyfrom using that knowledge to negotiate its own substantive(>ut( omes. Not surprisingly, the creciibility of (he exet utive's.ij gressive tactics and, thus, the "success of (he firmly compet-i!ivt' strategy often rests on the organization's power vis-a-visihc other party. When following a firmly competitive strat-egy, the manager seeks a win-lose substantive outcome andis willing to accept a neutral or even d bad reLitionship.

4. Active Avoidance (AT). Managers should consider,((lively avoiding negotiation if neither the relationship northe substantive outcomes are important to them or theorganization. Simply rctu-.ing \o negoliaio is ihe most (Jiret tand active form ol avoitJance. Exe(utives cin simply tell theother party they are not inierestcd in or willing lo negotiate.Such an action, however, will usually have a negative impacton the organization's relationship with the other party.Moreover, managers must dcierniine which issues uro av\.isteof time to negotiate. We Ireat dvoicJjnc clikcsuhorcii-ti.iiion, as an explicit, strategic behavior ralher than as ,\no|)iic;)n (aken by default when the manager is uncertain.ihout what lo do.

However, we retogni/e that ihese utiiI.iU't>il sir.iic-gifs ,irc most successful only in a limited set of situations. InI he next section wo include various intoraciiw modifit at ionsiluit make these classic. unilateral strategies applicable lo .1\\!(!('[ set of negoli.ilicjn situ.itions.

Intoraclivo Negotiation Strategies

[.ic'lorc using ihc uniLilcMtil strategics sLiggcstccJ hyI \hibii 2, ihi't'vc'cutivc should examine the negotiation fromeach party's perspective. The choice of a negotiation strategyshould be based not only on the interests of the executive oroig.mi/.itioti, l)ut also on the interests of the other parly. Them.ui.igcn should antit i[ijtc' the olher party's substantive andrrl.itionship [priorities, assessing how the negotiation is likelylo progress when the parties interact. This step is cruciall)('( JuscMht' unilalcrai sir.ttegies described above could leatilo ^i.ivc [irolilenis il the other pariv's priorities ciittcr. Forcv.implc, when using c ither trusting collaboration or opensuhoKJInation. the manager is vulnerable to exploitaticjn itthe oihor party is concerned only about substantive oui-( onics. WhcMi (iniic ifialiti^ the other party's substjntivo ancii('Liti()rishi|) piiorltii's. executives should consider the kintisol >ic tions ihe Cither party might take. Are those actions likelyIo he supportive or hostile? Will they represent short-torm

reactions or long-term approaches to the substantive issuesunder negotiation? Are those actions likely to c hange theparty's degree of dependence on, or interdependence* with,the organization? The answers will depend on (1) the historyof the executive's relations with the other party and (2) theinfluence of key individuals and groups on the manager andihe other party.

In short, executives should take into account boththeir own and the other party's substantive and relationshippriorities in choosing a negotiating strategy. Exhibit 3 is adecision tree designed to help managers decide whichstrategy to use. The left side represents, in a ciifferent form,the analysis in Exhibit 2: thus. Exhibit 3 also shows how themanager's substantive and relationship priorities lead to U/JJ-Litoral strategies based solely on the manager's position. Theright side illustrates how ihesc unilateral strategies may becontinued, modified, or replaced after ihe mtin.iger consid-ers the other party's potential or apparent priorities."

Managers should examine the appropriateness of .iunilateral negotiation strategy by accounting for the otherparty's priorities before they use ii. Sometimes such sc rutinywill simply justify its use. For example, when hothsubst.intivt'and relationship outcomes are important to an executive,the appropriate unilateral strategy is trusting collaboration. Iftho manager antici[iatOS thai tho othor party also values bothsubstanlivo .HHI tc^Luionship ouicomos (soo Exhibit 3. Situa-tion 1), ho or she would continue [o favor this strategy. Alother times, scrutiny of tho other party's priorities may sug-gest some modifications. We discuss next each of the intor-.Ktivo varialions of tho classic, unilateral strategies.

7. Pri/H ;/)/oc/ Collaboration (C2). Tho CI collabora-tivo strategy dssumos that tho othor party will reciprocatewhenever tho executive discloses information. However, ifihe manager nogotiatos oponly and tho othor party is notopon or is rompotitivo. the manager could bo victimized.Under such circumstances, the manager shcjuld use thomodified collaborative strategy of princ iplod collaboration.'-'Rather than relying on only trust and reciprcjcity, the man-ager persuades the other party to conduct negotiationsbased on a sot of mutually agreed upon principles thai willijcMiofit oach nogoliator.

2. Focused Subordination (S2). The openly subordi-native strategy (SI) assumes that tho substantive outcome isc)t little importance to tho organization. Somotimos, how-ovor. an organi/.uicm has [)oth substantive and iolali()nshi|)interests, but tho olhor parly has liltle stake in oithor interest.By discovering and then acquiescing to those key needs thataro of interest only to the other party, the manager can stillgain some subslantive outcomes for tho organization whileassuring a rolativoly positivo relationship outcome. Horo,managers both create substantive outcomes for tho otherparty and achieve substantive outcomes for themselves orlhoir organization.

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February. 7989

[xhibil J

Selecting an Interactive Strategy

MANAGER'S PRIORITIES

K ihc subMjntivc h ihci)ul(om(' very impotiani outt ome vory importani

10 ihc mjrtjf^cr? lo ihr manager?

s ihe subslaniive Is the relationshipouicome very imporianl outcome very im[Kictant

lo the other parly? lo the olher party?

SUGGESTED STRATEGIES

Cl ; TfustingColijboration

C2; Principled Collaboration

PI; Firm Competition

P2: Soh Competition

SI: Open Subordinjiion

S2: f(KUsi'(i SulHirdinalion

A l ; Aftive Avoidance

(refuse Ki nc'goiiatel

A2: P-issiye AvoidantP

((ic'k'nate neKOtialionI

Ai : Respcinsivi' Avoidance

(apply rc^ubtionsl

3. Soft Competition (P2). Under some circumstancesthe directness of the firmly competitive strategy (PT) mayneed to be softened. For example, even though the managermay place little importanceon the relationship outcome, thisrelationship may be very important to the other party. If theother party is powerful and potentially threatening, themanager would be wise to use a competitive strategy thatmaintains the relationship. Here the executive would avoidhighly aggressive and other "dirty" tactics.

4. Passive Avoidartce (A2). If the manager does notconsider either the relationship or ihe substantive outcomeimportant but the other party views the negotiation asimportant for a relationship outcome, the manager probablyshouid delegate the negotiation. By passively avoiding thenegotiation, ihe manager allows someone else within iheorganization to explore possible outcomes for ihe organiza-tion and keep the relationship from becoming hostile. Dele-gating ensures that possible opportunities arc not ignoredwhile freeing the executive from what appears to be a low-priority negotiation.

5. Responsive Avoidance (A3). By contrast, if themanager considers neither the relationship nor the substan-live outcome important and ihe other party considers thesubstantive outcome importani and the relationship unim-portatit, ihe manager should re^Li/afothe issue. Direct Inter-action with the other party is not necessary; the manager canbe responsive but still avoid negotiating by either applyingstandard operating procedures or developing new policiesthai address the other parly's concern.

Transforming iinihloral Strategies

The model of strategic choice in Exhibit 3 connedsunilateral and interactive negotiation strategies. In manyinstances the interactive strategies are modifications of theunilateral strategies. We base the cJecision to modify orreplace a unilateral strategy almost c^xclusivoly on tho tnan-dger's and other party's differing outcome priorities. Thieeoutcome conditions and three sets of assumptions influenc cthe choice of interactive strategies.

7. Outcome Conilition Ono: The manager may v,iluv(/xTC'/cinUns/i/p. bul tho aiher party n)ay not. Forcx.itnplc.amanager who assumes that irust anci cooperatic^n will resultin a fair outcome may be taken advantage of by anotherparty who is concerned with only substantive outcomes.''Hence, we suggest either priticiplctJ collabor.ilioti ot softcompetition for such cases to ensure that the other p.irlydoes not take advantage of the manager (see Exhibit ^,Situation 2). On the other hand, the manager may simplywant to create a long-term business relationshif) with SOIIH'-one who currently Is inlore^.led in neithet sul)stjntiv(' notrelationship outcomes. In these cases ihe manager shouklchoose to subordinate in a focusedfashion —rather than lotrustingly collaborate — to establish a relationship with theolher party (see Exhibit 3. Situation 4).

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Consider Both Relationships and Substance When Negotiating Strategically

2. Outcome Condition Two: The manager may notvalue the relationship, but the other party may. Given onlytheir own substantive priorities, managers would firmlycompete or actively avoid negotiation under these circum-stances. However, if the other party is interested in therelationship, the manager may not have to compete firmly toobtain desired substantive outcomes. The manager may col-laborate or softly compete and still gain substantive goalswithout alienating the other party (see Exhibit 3, Situations5-8). Such strategies may also foster a long-term relationshipwiih substantive dividends for the manager.

Similarly, in situations where neither substantive norrelationship outcomes are important to the manager but therelationship is important to the other party, the manager maychoose an interactive strategy other than avoidance. Theother party is in a position to choose a subordinative strategyand may offer substantive incentives to the manager. If themanager chooses principled collaboration or soft competi-tion, he or she may gain some positive substantive outcomes(see Exhibit 3. Situation 13).

3. Outcome Condition Three. Both parties may valuethe relationship, but the manager may not value substantiveoutcomes. In these cases, whether or not ihe other party isinterested in substantive outcomes, the manager may choosea trustingly collaborative strategy to maintain positive tieswith ihe other party (see Exhibit 3, Situations 9 atxl 11).

4. Transformation Assumptions. Underlying thesethree outcome conditions are three sets of assumptions.First, we assume that most relationships will involve somemixture of dependence and interdependence as well assome degree of supportivetiess and hostility. Second, weassume that most negotiators will view the relationship out-come as important under four separate conditions — highinterdependence, high dependence, high supportiveness,or high hostility — or possible combinations of those c ondi-tions. Third, from .t manager's perspective, eac h of the basicstrategies has a different effect with regard to power andconflict: (1) collaborative strategies strengthen the interde-|)endence of the manager and the other party while alsoenhancing feelings of supportiveness, (2) subordinativesiralegies increase the other party's dependence on themanager while also deemphasizing feelings of hostility, and(3) competitive strategies decrease the manager's depend-ence on the other party but may also escalate feelings ofhostility.

Thus many of the interactive negotiation strategies inExhibii 3 seek to enhance interdependent relationships orf.ivnrably shift the balance of dependence within a relaiion-shi[). These same strategies also attempt lo d.itnpen feelingsoi hostility or heighten feelings of supportiveness.

Illustrations of Negotiation-Strategy Transformations

To demonstrate more concretely how Exhibit 3works, we will examine how Dickerson's Peterson might actif he were to follow the decision tree to choose his negotia-tion strategies.

7. From Avoidance to Collaboration or Competition.In planning to meet with the steering clutch salesman. Peter-son first considers whether the substantive outc ome is veryimportant to Dickerson Machinery. Because the companyalready has a satisfactory source for clutch disks, the substan-tive outcome is not very important. Second, Peterson con-siders the importance of the relationship ouicome. Giventhat Dickerson Machinery currently has no ties with Road-works and Peterson foresees no need to establish a long-lerm relationship, the relationship outcome is not veryimportant either. Based on Peterson's priorities only, unilat-eral avoidance strategy (Al) seems appropriate.

However, Peterson now considers the salesman'spriorities. First, is the substantive outcome important to thesalesman? Obviously, it is — Roadworks is a struggling, newcompany and needs nc w clients. Second, is the relationshipouicome important to Roadworks? Because the salesmatiworks on a commission with residuals, he probably desires along-term sales contract, so the relationship ouicome isimportant. The salesman's priorities suggest that he wouiciprobably collaborate trustingly (C1|.

After answering the questions forming the decisiontree in Exhibit 3 (see Situation 13). Peterson has two optionslor an interactive strategy. Since he is in a position of power.he (Joes not need to make concessions. Moreover, ihesalesman may have producis worthy of consicJer.ition, Thus.Peterson can engage in principled collaboration (C2) orsoftly compete (P2). In other words, he can collaborate basecJon principles, taking a strong stand on wh.it he expec ts in asales contract; or he can softly c ompete by making procluc tdemands that do not offend ihe salesman.

2. From Collaboration to Subordiriation. For ihesituation with the contractor, the relationship outcome isvery important to Dickerson Machinery hut ihe immediate,substantive ouicome is not. Peterson realizes th.it Die kcrsonneeds Tarco's business for long-term stability but does notneed lo make a profit in the short term. Therefore, hisunilateral strategy would be to subordinate openly (SI). Hedecides toch.inge his strategy from the iruslingly coll.il)or.i-tlve (Cl) approach he has used in past dealings with Tarco.

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As Peterson considers the contractor's priorities, heanticipates that the substantive outcome is important toTarco but the relationship outcome is not, Tarco's represen-tative has made clear the need for reliable service at thelowest possible price: conversely. Tarco has not respondedto Peterson's bids to provide service for more than two years.Peterson recognizes, based on Exhibit 2. that Tarco can com-pete firmly (PI). After assessing both parties' priorities usingthe decision tree (see Exhibit 3. Situation 10), he decides heshould continue with an interactive strategy of open subor-dination (SI), Such a strategy is more likely to induce Tarco'srepresentative to offer a contract than the trustingly collab-orative strategy he has used previously. For example, he isprepared to subordinate by offering a "winter special"' toreduce labor costs by 10'),,, cutting competitive parts costs by15V.., and providing a new paint job at 50"<, the normal costsor providing a 6-montb deferment on payment, all in addi-tion to paying for ihe trip to the plant.

3. From Competition (o Collaboration. Peterson'sanalysis of the negotiation with the labor union includes anassessment of the recent history of and level of conflictbetween the union and tbe company. Previous episodes inihis contract negotiation have led botb the union and Dick-erson Machinery to change their priorities. During the firstfew episodes, both parties focused on only substantive out-comes and ignored relationship oulcomes, using firmlycompetitive strategies. Also, during tbese earlier episodes,both sides' demands hardened to the point where the unionthreatened to strike and management threatened to give noincreases in wages or benefits.

Now. however. Peterson believes thdt boih substjn-tive and relationship outcomes are important to Dickerson.The company wants lo find a way to increase productivitywithout giving much of an inc rease in pay and benefits. Italso does not want to lose good mechanics or stimulate astrike. Dickerson's unilateral strategy under these new con-ditions should be Irustingly collaborative (CI).

From analyzing the union's position, Peterson realizesthat both the substantive and relationship outcomes shouldbe important to the union. His informal discussions withunion representatives have assured him that both sides arenow concerned about maintaining the relationship. None-theless, the union riearly wants an increase in pay and hono-fils even though it also does nol want a strike. In short, theunion now is likely to trustingly collaborate but could easilyshift its priorities and choose to firmly compete.

As he enters the negotiation strategy session thisafternoon. Peterson plans to recommend to the manage-ment negotiation team (he use of a principled c olldborative(C2) strategy (see Exbibit 3. Situation 2). Because of the cur-rent instability in tbe relationship, he does not want to pro-vide the union with .iny opportunity lo exploit a perceivedweakness that a more trustingly collaborative strategy mightcreate.

Monitoring and Reevaluating Strategies

After implementing their interactive strategy, man-agers should monitor the other party's UK tics. How the olhcrparty acts will signal its strategy. Based on the olher party'stactics, executives can (1) determine if their assumptions anilexpectations about tbe other party's strategy are accur.iieand (2) modify, if needed, their strategies during this .indsubsequent negotiation episodes. Exhibit 1 provides anoverview of this process. The arrows linking strategies totactics and the negotiation episode represent how tactics(1) are used to implement a strategy (first arrow). (2) provideinformation to each party (second, reversed arrow), iind(3) may affect the choice of alternative strategies during anegotiation episode (third arrow).

Tactics

More specifically, we view i.ictic •> in two ways: (1) .isclusters of specific aclions associated with the inifjk'mcnt.t-tionof one strategy or another, and (2) ab actions thot derivetheir strategic impact from the particular phase of the nego-tiation in which they are used. In Exhibit 4. we combine thesetwo perspectives to provide executivc^ wilh desaipiions olcompetitive, collaborative, and subcjrdinativc t.ictits acrossvarious phases of negotiation. We suggest that most negc;)ti,i-tions go through four phases: (1) tbo search for an arena .mdagenda formulation. (2) ihe st.iling of (lem.inds and offers.(3) ,1 ndrtowingof diflerences.dnd (4) tin.il b.ugjiriing,"' Notevery negotiation will involve all of these phases. R.ithei,these phases characterize typic.il negotiations in mixe<l-motive situations, Henc e, <i spot ific phase may be skipped ornever attained.'"

Eot example, the search tot,in arcn.i in whic h t ix .nryout discussions may be unnecessary tor some ongoing nego-tiations: however, most negotiations will initially involvesome Phase 1 interaction aboul the item^ to be discussed.During the second ph.ist', both ihc m.ui.iger .ind ifie ollictparty express their preferences anci cst.iblish their ccjinniil-ments to specific issues and outcomes. The third phase ni.i\ho skipped.although it usu.illvoccursif the manager and ihrothor party are t.ir .ip.irl in iheir prelerontc^s .ind commii-ments, Botb sidesm.iy.idd or delete b.irg.iiriirig rieni^or shitlpreferences tc avoid an impasse. Tho fourth phase corii-pletos the negotiation: Tho manager and tho other p.irureduce their oltornatives, making joint decisions .ihout (\n hitem until a lindl agreement is reac hed.

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Exhibit 4 should help managers recognize (1) howusing certain tacticsduring various phases of a negotiation isessential to implementing their strategy and (2) how thelac tics of the olher party reflect a particular strategic intent.An unanticipated strategy implemented by the other partyni.iy indicate that the executive inaccurately assessecj thenc^gotiation context or under- or over-estimated the strengthot the other party's priorities. Hence, once the managerrecognizes the other party's actual strategy, he or she shouldie.issess the negotiation, repeating the process discussed inprevious sections to check the appropriateness of his or herstrategies.

Sometimes, however, the other party's use of anunanticipated strategy does not mean the executive's assess-ment of the negotiation context was inaccurate. In Exhibit 3.some combinations of the manager'sand other party's prior-ities result in ihe listing of two interactive strategies. Man-agers should normally use the first (left-hand) strategies inthese listings. The secondary (right-hand) strategies are sug-gested as countermoves the executive should use if theother party uses a strategy different from the one expected.but the executive remains convinced that his or her diagno-sis is accurate.

Roevaluating Negotiation Strategies

Take, for example, Peterson's appointment with themechanic who had swapped a battery from <i c ompany truckwith his own used battery. Going into the negotiation. Peter-son decides that his unilateral strategy should be trustingcollaboration: The mec hanic is highly skilled ^md would behard lo replace, yet the infraction is a serious matter, He alsoantif ipales ihat the employee will be inleiesled primarily inretaining,igcK)d relationship with Dickersons management.Hence. Peterson decides to stick with trusting collaborationas his interactive strategy (see Exhibit 3. Situation 3).

However, during the frrst five minutes ot the meeting.Peterson's efforts to discuss returning the battery to thecompany and removing the infraction from the mechanic'spersonnel record are repeatedly rebuffed by the employee.Instead, ihe mec h.inic threatens to retire early fmm Die ker-son and collect the benefits (Jue him unless Petersontr.msters him. Peterson recognizes that the mechanic isemploying competitive tactics to set the agenda, whichreflects an interest in substantive outcomes but little c:oncernfor relationship outcomes.

Exhibit 4

Using Tactics Across Negotiation Phases

Negotiation Phases

The Search tor jn Arenaand A ;onc).i FofmuLition

COMPETITIVE

Ihe Stating of.indOtfcfs

\ N.ir rowing of Diifc'ronccs

I i r ] < i l

Negotiation Tactics

COLLABORATIVE SUBORDINATtVESeek lo {ondud negotiations onmanaKcr's home {groundDemand diMussion ( t manager'sagenda ilcms: curtail disruwions ofolhcT party's itemsl -nofc or cJis( ouni the olher parly'sdemands and requesls

tnsisi other parly make initial altersor demand*; on all ilemsRespond with very low offers orvery high demandsCommii ioea<h item; exaggeratemanager's position and distrcditother parly'i>

Demand ihat olher party make(oncessions: bark up demandwith ihreaKDelete, add, or yield only on lowmanager-interesl itemsMagnify degree ol manager's con-cessions; downplay olher parly's

Se(>k large (ont cssions from tlicolhci p.iilyConcede only minimally on hij hmanager-interest iti-msLJse concessions on low manager-interest items as hargaining c hips

Seek lo ronduci negoliations onneutral groundElicit the other party's agenda itemsand assert manager's items: in< or-porale bothConsider other party's demands andrequests

Alternate initial offers and cJemandson items with other partyRespond wiih moderate offers ormoderate demandsIncite ate reasons for manager'stomniitment lo item outcomes:probe the other party's reasons

Seek equitable exchange of conces-sions wiih the other partyDelete, add, or yickJ items il muUialinteresis convergeHonestly assess manager's and otherparly's c oncessions

Seek equitable exc hange of i one es-sions from ihe other partySeek rmitually beneficial outcomeswhen t one ecling or ac < epting < on-cessions on items

Seek to conduci negotiations on theolher parly's groundElicit the olher parly's agenda ilemsand subvert manager's itemsContecJe lo the cither party'sdemands and requesis

Make initial offers or demands on aolher party-feievani itemsMake high offers or low (JemandsAccept the other party's commit-ments lo items; explain manager'scommitments

Concede to ihr oiher [)arty'sdemandsDelete, add. or yield to any oihcrparly-relevant ilemAcknowledge ihe other party'sconcessions; downplay manager'sconcessions

Yield to ihe other parly's relevantpreferences by accepting low offersand making low demands

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As the negotiation enters the next phase. Petersonconsiders the mechanic's apparent priorities and reevaluateshis own priorities. Now neither the substantive nor the rela-tic:>nship outcomes are very important to him. He knows thatDickerson has no opening for the mechanic at any othershop; moreover, if the employee wants to leave, the rela-tionship is of litile value. Based on this reassessment (seeExhibit 3, Situation 14). Peterson sees that he has two interac-tive strategic options: He can regulate the matter (A3) bypressing criminal charges or compete firmly (PT) with theemployee.

Rather than withdraw from the interaction, Petersondecides to compete firmly and tells the mechanic that unlessthe battery is returned, he will do c^verything he can legallydo to prevent the mechanic frorTi receiving optima! sever-ance benefits. If the employee refuses to return the battery.Peterson can still request Dickerson's legal department to filecriminal charges against him (A3) as a way to publicize andenforce a legitimate regulatory approach designed to helpthe company avoid this kind of negotiation.

Discussion

Most of the negotiation literature focuses on substan-tive outcomes without systematically considering the waysnegotiations affect relationships. The approach we havetaken undersc ores how negotiation strategies should addressboth parties' substantive and relationship priorities. Further,we encourage executives proactively to view negotiation asan indeterminate, reiterative, and often confusing process. Ittec]uires them to anticipate and monitor the other party'sactions. The other party's tactics will inform managers as towhether their assumptions about the other party's prioritiesand strategy are correct. Based on this assessment, managerscan modify their negotiation strategies as needed duringcurrent or future episocies.

Managers should heed, however. a few caveats aboutour advice:

T. Uncierlying the strategic choice model in Exhibit 3is the assumption that most negotiations are of the mixed-motive sort: that is. the rnanjger and other party usuallynegotiate over several substantive items. Some items havepotential outcomes that can benefit both negotiators; othershave potential outcomes that can benefit only one negotia-tor. Under these conditions, collaborative, competitive, andsubordinative strategies may all come into play as the nego-tiators seek either win-win, win-lose, or yield-win substan-tive outcomes. Our emphasis in the model is on win-winsubstantive outcomes brought about through collaborativestrategies (Cl and C2).

2. We assume that most relationships will Involvesome mixture of dependence and interdependence.Furthermore, we posit that most negotiators will view therelationship outcome as important when it is characterizedby either high interdependence or high dependence. Col-laborative strategies will strengthen the interdependence ofthe organization and the other party, subordinative strate-gies will increase the other party's dependence on the organ-ization, and competitive strategies will decrease the organi-zation's dependence on the other party. Our .ldvice .iboiitnegotiation strategies is directed particularly toward m.ni-agers who want to enhance relationships of interdepend-ence or favorably shift the balance of dependence within arelationship.

3. We also recognize that the history and level otc onflict between an organization and ancJther party stronglyinfluence each negotiator's attitude toward the existing rela-tionship. Feelings of hostility, we assume, will beescal.ited by.1 competitive strategy; in contrast, feelings of hostility will bedeemphasized by a subordinative strategy. Following thissame logic, feelings of supportiveness will be enhanced by .icollaborative strategy. Several of the strategies suggested inFigure 3 — trusting collabotation. solt competition, opensubordination, and passive anc) responsive avoidance —attempt to dampen hostilities and increase supportivenessbetween the manager and the other party.

4. Our advice to executives is simultaneously well-supported and spec ulative. On one hanti, th(>{. lassie (itnikii-eral) strategies suggested in Exhibit 3 arc lairly well supportedwithin the negotiation literature; the link between thesestrategies and both relationship and substantive outcomes isthe special focus of our .lppro.u h. On the other h.ind. theeffectiveness ol the inleroctivestr.ilegies suggested tti I xhibil3 rem.iins open to coniinuing empirical investigation. Wehave developed this Interactive mocJel ol strategic c hoice bylinking our c oncerns about relationship outcomes with whatis currently known about the basic strategies of negoti.itiori.

Although the three sets of .issumptions we tnakeahout relationships are usually warranted in most organi-zation-related negotiations, executives should carefully con-sider whether their situations fit with these constraints beloirusing tHir sirjtej;ic choice model (Exhibit 3), However.reg.irdless ol the situation, we believe that managers willgenerally be more effec live negotiators when they c aretullvassess both (1) the reialionship and the substantive aspects otany potential nej-otiaiion and (2) what is importani to theother party and what is important to them, •

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Endnotos

lois wish to thiink the thtec .inonymous Fdilori.il Rc-view Bo.ird

, .and constiudive suggestions tor inipioving the manusiript.1. ihi ' incideri lsreportcdiri lbisvignelte.it idtbroLigbout the.Ktrdeaje

tiasedonadiral experiences in a multi-slaie m.ichinerv servicing compatiy.2. SeeH.Railla's //ie,-\f(.(/i(/5c(e/i( eo/Ne,i,>o(i.ir(on,C aml)ndgc,MA:

I t.irv.ird University Press. 1982, lof .idisc ussion ol howg,ime theory c an help'icnoti.ilors maximi/e iheii subsl.intive outcomes under a diverse set ol

Filley's

.!. HolhR. J , ,Wilhuiil C.ivittti In (BosUJti: t-iounhloti-Milfl in, 1981| .ind A. ( .'"Some Noim.itive Issues in Conilrc I M.iri.ij^emi'nt" \Cjlikirni,i(iicnl Kewew. 1978, 21(2), 61-65) tre.tt win-win problem solvin^^ .is ,i prin-(ipled, I oll.ihor.itive profess.

4. See S. ».i<h.ir.uh .ind I, |, L,iwler's h<wi-i .mil f(}litic>iii C>,t;.»i//.i-lioiw: Jhi- Soci.il I'w/dutltiiiy at Canlliit. (O.i/ifmris, .md Riryiiini/ij,' (S.inh. iruisio. CA; j()ssey-H.iss. 1%n) loi .\ ie(ent disi ussion ai nilxe<l-mo(ivencnotr.ition situations,

5. See I.. Putri.im .ind C. t , Wilson's "Comniuni i ,rtive Stiatej;jes inOrn.itii/atii)n.il Conll i i is: Reli.il)iiily .md Validity ot .i Measuiemeni St .ile,"in M, [iurmM)irs(Kd.) Cfininninii .iiiiyn Ve.ir/)<)ofc6,N<'w!n(ivP.irk.CA: S.i^ePiiltlii ations, 198i.629-652. See also R, A. Cosiet and 1. t , Ruble, "Researt hon Conl i id- l landl inn Behaviuf: An txperimrntal Appro.uh." At.nU'niv of

6. Pdwer as the abiliiy to indui e ( ompli.iiu e is dis< iissed in ). M.irc hH, Simon's (Jr.v.ifi/AituKh (New York: Wiley. 1958) and in P. Blau's

uin^f .md fowvi iti Sad.il lilr (New York: Wiley, 1%4). I wo ie(entksdist iissin^^ power Itotn a matPrial-ri'suLif(epefspe(tivedie H. M in t / -

liall,198)),.inci| Ptetfer's^owerin O/)^an(/jfio/is|Maisbiic-id,MA: Pitman,I 'Ki l) . A. t a d d c n s * 7/ie Constitution of Sndrty: Oiillinv ul the Ihcnry i>l

Sit 11, Ni/,i(iri/t (Berkeley: IJtiiversity ol Calilotnia Press, 1984) discusses powertinrn.udtital-theoryperspec l ivewilhin thelieldotsociology,eni()hjsi/ ir)ghow power involves cotitrol over humati resources.

7. For (iisc ussions ol c ondic t Intensiiy and (Kirability, see I. K. Andrewsand D. Tjosvold, "COrifl id Managemenl under tJitlerent Levels ol Contlic tIntcnsily," toiinhil of Of iiip.iiiiin,il Bc/i.ivjonr, 1983, 4, 223-228 and C. t.Brown, P. Yelsma, and P. W. Keller, "COmmunir.ition-Conllict Predisposi-tion: Development ol.) 1 beory and .in Insrr u"ic>ni," / him.iiiKri.ilii ms. 19H1,

H, See M, Deutschs Ihr ReNo/uf/o/( o/ Cnnlhl. Nev\ Hayen: Y.ileUniversity Press. 1973. tor .i disc ussion ol how spiraling (ont l ids c an be bolhintl.imeci and controlled,

9, lor lurther distussions of these b.isic srr.itegies. see C. B. Den's"M.in.iging t)rg, ini /at ion. i lConfl td: Collahc^iation. Bargainirig.and PoweiApproaches,' Ca;//ni(iij A,f.i*i.r.L;eMie/if Rewew, 197H, 21, 76-82: lillev, fnd-iiolc- ); hisber and Liiy. hu lnote 3: R, Johnston's "Negoli.it ion Str.i(egic-s:Dilleic>rit Strokes loi Ditterent Folks." in R. Lewie ki and ), l i i terei (Tds,!,^'e.i,'(jf(,i()o/i: We.((/in^'s, Axenises. . »K / Cases, Horriewood, U: Rii b.ird D.Irwin, 1985, pp. 1%- lM; D, A, Lax .md J. K. Sebenius, T/te ^/.ln.(>;c( .isNf^Dli.itor: li,iri^,iinin^ for Cr)o/>eMf(o/i .ind Cumpctitivi' (.'..lin. New York:Ihe Free Press. 1986: .>nd D. G Piuitl s "Strategic Cboice in Negoti.itiori."AiiH'rit.in Hrh.iwir,it'>(ivniist. 1983, 27,167-1<M.

10, For an overview o l the contributions by ihese and otbcT c ontIk t-m.inagement researchers, see the s[>e<ial issue on "CotntJUinicitlon andCOiillict Styles in Organizations," L. L, Putnam (fd. l , M.i/i.iyefiie/ir Cnni-nniim,\lionQti.irtrrly. 1968.1(3), 291-445. See also R, Blake .iiid |. Mcmton's

Ibc Mlih Acliievemeni," hniriutl nf Applioii Brh.ivifir.il .Science. 1970, 6,41.t-426; ). Hall's CinUlitt M.in.igvnivnt Survvv: A Stirvoyof Oiu-'s Cluir.it -

htii Reac tinn Kutiul H.inillint^ul Conllk ts Hetween /-/ifiise// ,\nd Olhi'f-.( on roe . TX: leleonicl i ics, 1986; and R. H. Kilmann and K. W. Ibom.is'"Interpersonal Conllic t-FHandling Bebavioi as Rellcu tions ol Kingiati Pc>r-sonality Dinic^nsions,"/'sy(/)o/o,i,'"'i'R<'/"»((s, 1975, 37,971-980.itur'Ucvel-oping a forced-Choice Measure ol Condid-H.indling Beb.ivior: The'Mode-' Instrumc-nt," hliu.iluuul S. Psyt/io/oi.,'i(.r/^/casl/fef^e/t/, 1977, 37,

I- i25.

11, Sei' I nclnole 1(1 above: cspec ially see |ohnslon.

12. M . l . K n a p p , ! . ! . P u t n a m , a n d I . J.Davis, • • M t p

C o n l l i i t i n O i n a n i / a l i o n s : W h e r e D o W e C.o F rom H e r e ? " \/,(n>t,i.;efne/((

C,,mnnn\ii.ititui Qiuntvilv. 19H8, 1,414-429: Putnam atid Wilson, f tidtioic5; and ). Sullivan, R. B. Pctctson, N. Kamed.i, .ind |. Sliiniad.i." I he Relaiion-ship Between Contlitt Resolution Appioaihcs. ind liust — A Cross C ulturalSmds, ' Ai.nlmiyot M.iii.iiii-niriU /oi/ni.i/, I'JHl, 24,Hn3-«TJ,

1.). We (.ill these siratef'iesinfer.K live because the\ lake into .Kiountilieiri1eraitiv('ette( t ol ihe ni.in.ij^et'sdnd the other parly's antit ip,iied oi.Ktual [ i i ior i l iesfo iHcrnin^ siil)st.intive and reLiiionsbip outioriies, l i i le i -.ii tivestiatcKies based on anti( ipatin^ rhc other p.irty's prior ities.as we l.itciilisiuss in some length, may be changed to rel ied more i losely the adualpriorities ol ihe other party, as levealed thiough the interaction during .incgotialion episode.

14. See [ isher and Ury, I tidnolc i.15. See, loi example, L. L. Cumniirigs. D, I.. H.irnelt.and ( ) . J, Stevens,

• Risk. faie. Condliai ion .ind l rus i : An lntertiation.il Siudy o) AttitudinalDiltetentes Among hxecutives," /\c.((/e/)iv of M,in.iiii-iiH-nt Imiin.il 197114,285-104.

16. Diftereni researcheis oiler varying desc riplions ol negoti.ilionph,(ses. Seel.. Putn.im's "Bar gaining as OiK.ini/. i t ion.i lCcimmunii. i t ioi i ," inR. I). McPhec.ind P, K. lor i ipkins' (Ids.] (.hii.ini/.iimn.il Ciminiufiii.ttiniiIIMIIIIOIUI Thcnit- .iml Now Oitvditins. Beverly Hills, C A: Sage Puhlic . i -tions,19H5, lor a sumniaiy ol ibis rese.irth. Ann tJougl.is proposed the Mistthree-step model in "1 be Peac elul Seitlenient ot IndusUial and lnte(^lOLl[^Disputes," /oi/if ia/ til Coittliit Rv>f>lulinn. 1957, 1, fi9-61. Flowevei, ihismodel .itul subsetjuent thiee-siage models do noi i orisidei the se.m h lotiheaiena.is.i(oinponenlpb.iseolanc.'goti. it iori.P.(;ull iver's/;(spii lc's,(ni/N'(\i.;olr.(()o/rs: A Cniw-Cultur.}! Prr^ptrtivr. New Yotk; Ac.idemic Press,1979, proposes .m eigbl-stage niocJel ol ne;4oti.ilion, renied\inK thai ovet-sigiii. Oui pioposed lour-()b.ise model (ondenses and draws {'xtetisivelyIrorn Ciiitliver's w»nk,

17. Additionally, wc'vicvi ibc ph.ises ol neHoii.iiion as l on i eptiialKsc'p.ir.ile Irorn our noticjn ol negotiation episodes (see fxhibit 1), All lourphases m.iy lake place during one episode, paitlcularlv il tbe neHcHi.itionmvok-esa single issue ol low concern l ooneor anc)tbei negoliatoi. On the-otbci hand, during vc-rv coniplex ncgoii.iiions stieit hirig over a period olniontbs, niinieious episodes may tcmsiilLile ca( b pfiase.

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Grant T. SdVii^e (Ph.D.. Ohio Slate University) is anassistant professor of managcmonl in ihe College of Businos''Administration at Texas Tech University and an assistantprofessor of health organization management in the TexasTech School of Medicine. Hv began his research on negotia-tion while working as <i ihird-pariy facililMor for the Qt/.i/ifyof Work Life Program in ihe City of Columbus. Ohio. Withadditional research interests in health-care managemenl.interpersonal and organizational communication, and/('.it/frs/i/p and stiiall-group behavior, he has publishod arti-cles in Communication Monographs. Health Care Man-agement Review. Hospital & Health Services Administration,.jnc/(he Internationa! journal of Small Croup Research. He fvcurrvntly caauthnritig. with David A. Bednar. a book onmanagerial communication lor Pracger Publishers. He /idsalso provided training and consultation for the New YorkCity Cooperative Labor-Management Program, the U.S. Airforce's Civilian Comptrollor Career Management Program.and (ho Center for Professional Developmenl at Texas TechI hiiversity.

lohn D. Blair is a professor of management in theCollege of Business Administration at Texas Tech Universityartd the associate chairman of the Department of HealthOrganization Management in the Texas Tech School ofMedicine. His current research ititerests are in the turbulentenvironment facing health-care organizations and appro-priate responses, including a strategic approach to negotia-tion. He has also written about the sociology of managementas a scientific discipline. He is the coauthor of two books andauthor of numerous articles on the military organization. Hislatest book, with Myron Fottler. is Stakeholder Managementfor Health Care Organizations (}ossey-Bass). His most recentresearch appears in Hospital & Health Services Administra-tion. Ho.ilth Care Managemenl Review, f he Journal of Man-agetiient. and the National Journal of Sociology, He wasassociate editor oft he ]ouTna\oiManii^emen[ (1983-86) andfoundinii coeditor of the Yearly Review of Managtmient(1985-87).

Ritch I.. Sorenson (Ph.D., Purdue University) is anassociate professor of managetiient in the College of Kusi-ness Adn)inistration at Texas Tech University. His resort/»interests include conflict management, leadership, atnloriianiz.ational communication. In addition to research unamflict management and negotiation, he is currently exani-iniitii the relationship of individual leadership prntotypes toorgtinizational effectiveness and the relationship of situa-tional variables and communication to leadership. He haspublished articles in Human Communicalion Rcscirch,Communication Educ at ion. <j/H/Communicjiion Qu.it torly.An active trainer in management developmetif, conflictmatiagement, managerial communication, and human rela-tions, he has provided consultation to such organizations asRockwell International, Preferred Risk Insurance Company,the U.S. Air Force's Civilian Comptrollei Career Manai^e-nient Program, and the Center for Professiot)al Develop-tnent at Texas Tech ilniversity.

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