TO: Professor Whitehurst FROM: Matthew JordanRE: Final Paper for ICNDATE: April 28, 2015Final PaperNegotiations in the Realm of Global PoliticsNegotiations are a common facet in the daily lives of all people. We use the art of negotiations to barter, or to get others to act or do as we want. For those in positions of power the art of negotiations can make or break nations. This latter point may seem a bit extreme but the truth is in the world of politics people live or die based on the outcomes of negotiations between those in positions of power. When the stakes are so high, good negotiation skills are a must. The goal of this paper is twofold. The first goal is an in-depth look at the role of negotiations in the realm of global politics. (I will focus on international relations specifically due to the high stakes nature of such negotiations.) An in-depth look at skills and type of styles negotiations will be the focus here. The second and final goal will be an in-depth look at the negotiations between the United States and the USSR during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. This is a point in our history where the world drifted so close to a cataclysmic global nuclear war. If not for the skillful negotiations, and concessions by both the US and USSR, the world as we knew it could very well have ended. We will examine the types of negotiations that occurred. We will examine what both sides did that was right and things that were wrong.

Everyday Negotiations in the Political Sphere

We conceptualize negotiation as a process in which actors take steps to agree on an outcome, and every actor seeks to make that outcome as good as possible from their own perspective.(Agreement in Politics 144). Some actors perspectives may include making the outcome as good as possible for their community or a common institution. In the realm of international politics a negotiator working on behalf of their government must consider the often competing nature of those who craft decisions in their nation. The high stakes nature of these negotiations be it in treaty discussions, or trade agreements (among others) can bear serious repercussions. With all these competing issues both internally and externally in the area of international negotiations among nations, the question becomes: what style of negotiations should be utilized? The answer to this question is not clear. Every nation/actor is different and thus the negotiation style should vary. (Agreement in Politics 152). Furthermore the issue that is being negotiated about affects the style used as well. For example negotiations between bitter rivals such as Iran and Israel would likely see both sides using the adversarial approach to negotiation. The Adversarial approach sees negotiation as a form of combat; the tougher and more aggressive negotiator wins, and the more conciliatory one loses. (Mnookin, Peppet, Tulumello 169) The adversarial approach lends itself to competition between negotiators, fundamentally a zero sum game where one can only win to the detriment of the others. (Mnookin, Peppet, Tulumello 170) Typically in matters related to peace treaties and weapons treaties, both parties can (and often do) take the adversarial approach. The adversarial approach can at times be the right plan, mainly in cases where you must flex your muscles as it were, when dealing with an abrasive opponent. The adversarial approach can also be effective when only one single objective is present and the stakes for it are high. However the adversarial approach has serious drawbacks, the most prominent of which is the likelihood of failure. (Mnookin, Peppet, Tulumello 171) When both sides dig in and treat the negotiation as an all-out war, each side tends to take positional bargaining. Positional bargaining is a negotiation strategy that involves holding on to a fixed idea, or position, of what you want and arguing for it and it alone, regardless of any underlying interests. Both sides may also fall into the act of brinksmanship. This is a negotiation style akin to agree with me or get out. This style of negotiation makes the odds of agreement between nations difficult and the odds of a walk out far higher. Compare this with the method of cooperative negotiations. Cooperative negotiations is one in which both parties work not as adversaries, but as partners working to solve a problem. (Spangler). This style of negotiation occurs in the international sphere in regards to things such as treaties between allies or treaties on things such as collective problems (such as the negotiations preceding the Kyoto protocol). This style of negotiation focuses on building trust and reaching a goal with the other nations. This system is in many ways preferable as it fosters cooperation and mutual problem solving, although one must consider numerous downsides--the largest of which is that this style of negotiation fosters the soft negotiation style. A soft negotiation style is one in which the negotiator tends to be more submissive and allows more concessions in the interest of keeping the dialogue open. (Fisher, Roger, Ury, and Patton pg. 8). While great in theory, it is important to keep in mind that when matters of national importance are on the table, there can be little room for blind concessions. Furthermore, being a soft negotiator could invite the negotiator who practices the hard method to push and bully. Would either the USSR or the US bully the other side if they practiced the soft negotiation style? Chances are the answer to this would be yes. Negotiations in the international political realm happen daily. Often, the matters may seem trivial. However, at other times the outcomes could very well bear outcomes on our economies and even national security. The skill and talent of these negotiators matters greatly. Now we will turn to examine one instance that occurred over 50 years ago where negotiations very likely staved off nuclear war.

Part B.Negotiations and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1. Overview of the conflict and the negotiation methods used.In 1962 the Cold War between the U.S and the USSR had reached a fever pitch. In 1959 the island nation of Cuba fell to communist rule following the revolution led by Fidel Castro. (Office of the Historian) Following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion orchestrated by the U.S, Cuba sought help from its ideological ally the USSR. The USSR decided to set up nuclear missile systems in Cuba due to its strategic location off the coast of the US. The US built similar systems in Turkey due to its close proximity to the USSR. Each side dug in, and the US threatened to attack should the USSR begin nuclear operations in Cuba. The USSR threatened a counter attack should the U.S strike. Neither side wanted to budge. The USSR wanted the U.S to end any future actions to invade Cuba. Further, they wanted the U.S to withdraw its weapon systems from Turkey. The U.S wanted all nuclear weapons in Cuba removed and set up a naval blockade to prevent more weapons from arriving. The world was on the brink of nuclear war. Numerous high stakes negotiations began between the U.S and her allies and the USSR and her allies. (Office of the Historian) These negotiations took place in the halls of the United Nations, between diplomats all over the world and late hours over the telegraph line between the leaders of both nations. When two adversaries such as the U.S. and USSR face a crisis, the likelihood is that in negotiations, both will use the adversarial system of negotiation. In a crisis such as this, a competing negotiation style carries many risks and downsides. 2. Analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis NegotiationsNegotiations at the early stages of the Cuban missile crisis were characterized by distributive (zero-sum) negotiation tactics. (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 111-120) However, in the latter stages, the actors began to use the integrative (positive-sum) negotiation style. (pg. 121-125) In the early phases of the crisis both the U.S and the USSR entrenched themselves in positions that the other side would not tolerate. A zero sum game approach in most negotiations carries extreme risk, especially when pride and posturing are the hallmarks of the negotiation. Neither side wanted to look weak during the standoff, and even when a deal looked beneficial to both sides, each side was guilty of rejecting deals for fear of looking soft. The major players in the crisis were U.S President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and their associated advisors. Each had others to please in the negotiation process. (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 111-120) Both wanted to avoid looking weak to their counterparts and those whom they served. Both sides feared looking weak in the negotiations and, due to this, fought tooth and nail to avoid having to make concessions. Making concessions is more often than not the needed outcome to move negotiations forward. Both sides fought to keep their status quo and force the other side to ditch theirs. Below is a list of the BATNA and Desired outcomes for each side. The WATNA does not need to be listed as it is the same for all parties and indeed all of humanity. PlayersInterestsBATNADesired Outcome

President Kennedy (US)i) Preventing the US from getting involved in a nuclear warii) Ensuring that Communism did not spread to the Americas or that the balance of power didnot favor the Soviet Unioniii) Showing the world that he was able to face Khrushchev with courage and firmness, unlike inthe Berlin crisisiv) Controlling Fidel Castro after the previously failed Bay of Pigs incident (Crisis Center)i) Do Nothing Wait and Watchii) Apply Diplomatic Pressuresiii) Secret Approach with Fidel Castroiv) Invasion of Cubav) Air Strikes on Cubavi) Have an integrative solution where something could be traded for the missiles in CubaKennedy wanted Russian missiles out of Cuba, Fidel Castro removed from power, and capitalism broughtinto Cuba.

Premier Khrushchev (USSR)i) Proving the supremacy of USSR over US by gaining a strategic foothold in Americasbackyardii) Spread Communism throughout the Americas as well as Europeiii) Having a way to remove the American missiles from Turkeyiv) Having a way to get the Allies out of West Berlinv) Preventing USSR from getting involved in a nuclear warvi) Strengthening his political position within his countryi) Attack the US using the nuclear missiles from Cubaii) Attack US in Berlin if the Cuban strategy failediii) Appear powerful without actually going through with the attackiv) Strengthen the spread of Communism by his alliance with Fidel CastroKhrushchev wished to use Cuba as a means of negotiating with US to get Allied Forces out of WestBerlin.

Even though it started out as distributive, this negotiation seems to be conducted in a textbook integrative manner. Kennedy and Khrushchev realized that they both had to give something up to allow for a successful negotiation. Even though it did initially seem both sides they were hard-core enemies, the common ground that they both had was I) Not to start a nuclear war, II) Not to lose face, III) Appear the winner in their home country and to their allies. Understanding the common interests as well as using private channels and negotiators to conduct some of the important negotiations was a key element to obtaining a win-win result.Once both sides realized this, they each made the necessary concessions. President Kennedy conveyed a letter to Premier Khrushchev with the proposal that the Soviet Union immediately withdraw its missiles from Cuba while the United States would end the naval blockade and pledge not to invade Cuba. This agreement was made public. Meanwhile, Attorney General Robert Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin and agreed in secret that once the crisis was resolved, the United States would withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. (Office of the Historian) Using the cooperative model at this juncture brought the crisis to its end.

3. Possible Alternatives to the Negotiations during the Cuban Missile CrisisLooking back on great alternatives to handling the Cuban Missiles Crisis is far easier now then it would have been in the heat of the moment. However, numerous alternative negotiation styles or options could have (and should have) been explored during the crisis. Both the USSR and the US should not have approached the negotiation with the zero sum game mindset. Each side should have held more face-to-face meetings between the highest leaders in their governments. Use of a third-party mediator, such as the United Nations, should have been seriously considered. The zero sum game mindset makes reaching a settlement difficult, if not downright impossible. Because both the U.S. and the USSR were bitter rivals with (in many respects) equal in bargaining power, it made reaching a settlement difficult. While at times the adversarial approach can be beneficial, the party that uses it must still consider that when both sides take this approach, little progress will likely ever be made. Furthermore the notion of my gains equal your losses is a standpoint that only hurts the negotiations in the long run. Face to face meetings allow key policy makers to see one another. This puts a face to the problem instead of keeping the other party as the mysterious and malevolent other. The US and USSR did much of the negotiations over telegraph lines. (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 111-120) Instead, back door channels between advisors in both governments did most of the actual negotiation. The biggest problem that emerges via negotiation through proxy is the disconnect that occurs. Parties must constantly break to give and receive updates from their superiors. This slows the process as the actual decision makers must be brought up to speed. Having both leaders face to face, as well as a direct line of communications, allows both faster and more efficient communication. This can help reduce the effect of the us vs. them mentality, since looking your opponent in the eye and seeing them face-to-face makes the problem more personal.Meditations are negotiations in which a third party facilitator works with both opposing sides to attempt to reach an agreement. (First Mediation) Having a third party facilitator helps to get both parties to reach a decision by having a neutral party guide the decision and keep it civil. When two sides are as bitterly opposed as the USSR and the US were during this crisis, having such a neutral support could have helped to ease tensions and allow cooler heads to prevail. The United Nations General Counsel would have been the ideal candidate. The United Nations is composed of a majority of the worlds national governments, and as such would be a legitimate mediator and one who could carry authority. Studies have shown that negotiations that make use of mediators are far more likely to reach an agreeable settlement then those that do (First Mediation) While it is speculation to say the Cuban Missile Crisis would have ended differently had such mediation been used, it is still a worthy question. After all when billions of lives hang in the balance, any and all reasonable means to bring a peaceful resolution should be explored. As such, use of mediations is one alternative that both sides should have considered during this crisis.

4. Reflections and lessons learned from the Negotiations during the Cuban Missile CrisisThe lessons to take away from my observations of the negotiations during the Cuban Missile crisis are threefold. Never approach a negotiation when the zero sum game mindset. Open communication is essential Separate the people from the problem As to point one: when you approach a negotiation as a game of I win and you lose. The U.S and Soviets spent many days of the crisis with the mindset of I win at your expense. When both parties treat a negotiation as such, then progress is unlikely. Therefore With this in mind, never treat your negotiations as such. It only hinders any hope of progress. Instead, treat the negotiation as a chance to resolve a common problem in a way that helps all parties. As to point two: Direct and open communication is essential in negotiations. So much of the negotiations between the US and USSR happened either behind closed doors or between people without the full authority to make decisions. Further, both sides kept far too much information about their plans and goals close to the chest. Direct and open communication is key, and the Cuban Missile Crisis showed us this. In fact, both nations installed a direct phone line so the President of the U.S. and the Premier of the USSR could talk directly instead of the game of telegraph tag that was the hallmark of the Crisis. The takeaway here is: always directly speak to the parties in negotiation and be open in discussions.As to point three: Separating people from the problem allows for a less emotionally charged negotiation. When blinded by emotions, people tend to lose rationality and mistakes are made. The U.S. and the USSR at this time were locked in a bitter Cold War and the rivalry was pitched and fierce. When negotiating with a side you have a strong bias against, you will be far less likely to reach a good solution for all parties. Eventually, the US and USSR were able to put aside their animosity and attack the problem. In everyday negotiations, you must separate the people from the problem and keep your emotions in check.

ConclusionI chose to use the Cuban Missile Crisis as my negotiation study topic due to the high stakes this event had for the world. Furthermore, due to the fact that negotiation was the tool that averted what could have been a disaster. Finally, the crisis was a sound lesson for both good and bad practices in the negotiation process. Negotiations are a facet of our daily lives from the mundane to the Earth shattering. Therefore, it is important to always keep in mind the positive traits you want to employ in your negotiations. You never know when your skills as a negotiator could be the deciding factor in moments of immense importance.

Sources1. The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962 - 19611968 - Milestones U.S Department of State Office of the Historian

2. "Task Force on Negotiating Agreement in Politics." American Political Science Association. Ed. Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Martin. American Political Science Association, 2013. Web. 27 Apr. 2015.

3. (Robert H. Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet and Andrew S. Tulumello, Beyond Winning [Belknap Press, 2004])

4. Spangler, Brad. "Competitive and Cooperative Approaches to Conflict | Beyond Intractability." Competitive and Cooperative Approaches to Conflict |. Beyond Intractability, June-July 2003. Web. 27 Apr. 2015.

5. Fisher, Roger, William Ury, and Bruce Patton. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving in. New York, N.Y: Penguin Books, 1991. Print.

6. Allison, G., & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc.

7. "First Mediation | Jeffrey Krivis | Mariam Zadeh Blog Archive Benefits of Mediation: High Success Rate, Low Cost." First Mediation Jeffrey Krivis Mariam Zadeh RSS. First Mediation, n.d. Web. 27 Apr. 2015.Page | 1