nehru and minorities

8/10/2019 Nehru and Minorities

1/4

Nehru and MinoritiesAuthor(s): S. GopalSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 23, No. 45/47, Special Number (Nov., 1988), pp.2463+2465-2466Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4394015.

Accessed: 01/11/2014 06:35

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Economic and Political Weeklyis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Economic and Political Weekly.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=epwhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4394015?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4394015?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=epw


2/4

e h r u

n d inorities

S Gopal

Pressure of circumstancesled Nehru

not to throw his full weight on the side of secularism. In 1948 he

committed

the support of the government to the

banning ofvscommunalpoliticalpartiesbut

did not implement the resolution.

He

agreed

with Gandhi that the compulsory stoppage of

cow-slaughter, taken as

an

isolated decision,

would appear

as

a

concession

to Hindu

bigotry

and

was

therefore

to

be

avoided;

yet

he did not

oppose

the

listing of

the banning

of cow-slaughter as one of the directive principles of state policy in the constitution and was content to see that

nothing came of it in practice. An even

greater deficiency in his policy of merging religious

communities

in

a

general citizenship

was the restriction of the insistence on

monogamy to Hindu men and the grant

of the rights

of divorce and inheritance only to

Hindu women. In his keenness

to win the

confidence

of the Muslim

community,

he failed

to

ensure

the equality before the law of

all

Indians

and enact a common civil code. Religion

can

be

separated from politics

more easily if

it

is also separated

from law.

WHEN Nehru came to active politics

in

the

early twenties, he had

not yet moved to the

personal position

of religious agnosticism

which was to mark him in later years. His'

conventional

Hindu theism

helped

to block

his mind from questioning

Gandhi's ffort to

strengthen he national

identity by drawing

up a programmewhich took for granted he

divergencebetween the Hindu and Muslim

communities but was acceptable to both.

Nehruwas not comfortablewith the Khilafat

movementbut justified t at a politicalrather

than a religious level by arguing that it

was

an effortto

thwart

he

divisionof

Tirkeyand

a part of the struggle for the freedom

of

India. This

enabled him to square the

Khilafat movement

with the assertion that

the

Congress

should not identify itself

with

controversialreligious issues.

But his

posi-

tion was not always logical.

It

is odd,

for

example,

to find him

saying

that it was the

duty of Hindus to help the Muslims at this

time for if the Britishsucceeded n destroy-

ing

Islam

they

would then try to destroy he

Hindu

religion.

'

Again,

as mayor of

Allahabad

in

1923

he

guided

the Board to

reject unanimously the suggestion to pro-

hibit the slaughterof cattle;

but

his

attitude

was based not so much

on any principleas

on

a

feeling

that

this was not

a

matter cal-

ling for administrative

ntervention; or he

had earlier uggested o the

Hindusthat they

should

request

Muslims to

stop cow-killing

rather than fight them about

it.

The spread of rioting across the face

of

India n the mid- twenties

nvolving

sections

of the

Hindu and Muslimcommunities om-

pelled Nehru

to

take a more

clearcut

posi-

tion on the

question

of

religion

in

politics.

It now became

obvious to him that

India,

caught

in the

whirlpool

of mutual an-

tagonism,

would be

dragged

down

into the

abyss

unless

this

so-called

religion

was

scot-

ched and the

intelligentsia

at

least was

secularised. Nehru used this

word in

1926,

not

in the

accepted

sense

of the

separation

of church and

state-this had

no

imme.liate

relevance

n

India

if

only because

the

state

was in alien hands-but to mean the tolera-

tion of all faiths and beliefs and permissi-

ble

religious practices,

eading

to a

separa-

tion of religion

from

politics.

For

such

tolerance

o

be

not

emotionalgenerosity

but

coldly reasoned Nehru

looked to both

industrialisation nd mass education of the

type that would dissolve dogma and the

dogmatic mentality. Nehru had begun to

discern the mesh of political *reaction,

economic stagnationand religioussupersti-

tion; and he himself shedthe vestigesof con-

ventional religious belief. He told Indians

on his return from Europe in December

1927, "the less,

we

talk of and worry about

the next

world,

the

more

good

we are like-

ly to do to our fellow countrymen and

country".

To Nehru religion was now the fountain-

head of authoritarianismand the method

used at all times to secure the submission

of the

oppressed.

But

getting

rid of

religion

altogether was a long-term objective; the

immediate problem was dealing with the

growing communal animosity. Nehru was

clear- ightedabout the reasons or this.

The

social

disharmony between

Hindus

and

Muslims had spread to other spheres

with

the regional mbalance n development nder

the East India Company, leading to the

classes who gained

most

from British rule

being predominantlyHindu. By

the time the

interior areas of India caught up

with the

rest, national

awarene5s

expressed itself

increasingly

n

aeHinduIdioin.

The

process

of

divergence between the religious

com-

munities

was further

aggravatedby

official

policy symbolised by

tht

establishment

of

separate lectorates;

nd as the franchisewas

broadened periodically on this basis,

the

communal

elements

grew correspondingly

stronger.

From this

analysis

Nehru

drew

he

conclusion

that the communal

problemwas

a

wasteful

diversion from the

main

cam-

paign

against

the British, The communal

parties,

both

Hindu

and

Muslim,

derived

their support from

thq

feudal and upper

classes,

defensive

of

vested

interests, seek-

ing office and employment

rom the British

and

pandering

o

myth

and

passion

in

their'

attempts

to secure

a

base

among

the

peo-

ple. So to Nehru these communal parties

weregiantswith feet of clay,who would fade

into

nothingness

n

the

light

of

reason

once

the British were

pushed

out.

He, therefore,

in

accordance

with

his favourite

strategy

of

indirect

approach, ignored

the

communal

problem and concentrated

his

energies

on

the national movementagainst foreignrule

and on the need to give that movement an

economic slant. The vast majority of the

Indian people, whatever heir religion, bore

the common burdensof hungerand poverty,

and whenthese burdenswere lightenedthe

curse of religion n politics would be lifted.

Religiousminorities houldbe of no political

significance; he minority hat mattered nd

which had to be resistedwas that of the rich

exploiters.

Nehru, therefore,regardedas a waste of

time all attemptsat a political settlementof

the commural problem. Ansari pinned his

faith on mutual

adjustments hrough

ormal

and informalconversations

with

communal

parties,

but

to

Nehru this was

a

futile

endeavour.

These parties

did not wish to see

unity conferences succeed; nor did the

British, who could always outbid the Con-

gress. So Congress Muslimswere alwayson

the retreat, continuously offering

conces-

sions to which there could be no end; and

Nehru, despite his personal affinity

with

Ansariand manyother Muslims n theCon-

gress, could not conceal his contempt for

their attitude.

Even

Nehru, however,especially

in

the

years

when

he

was the

president

of the Con-

gress, could not'completely

urn

away

from

trying to eliminate the communal menace.

Till the time came when class conflicts

set

aside religious clashes,

he wished the

Hindus,

as

the

majority ommunity,

o

show

the

generosity

which would remove

ear

and

suspicion.

The minorities should be

given

the fullestassurance, ot

of

jobs

and of

seats

in assemblies, but that their culture and

traditionswould be safe. Provision o foster

languages and education

would

help to

nourish the

rich, varied, larger,

common

culture

of

India.

The,

existence of

such

a

culturewasalso

one of

the points he sought

to establish n his

historicalwritings.Nehru

had not the training

of

a professional

historianbut he

had

the instincts of

a

good

one. He

rejected,

even

in

the

early thirties,

the

gtandard

eriodisationof

Indian

history

into Hindu,

Muslim

and British;

and he

stressed to his readers that Islam

did

not

believe

in

religious persecution

and a

man

like

Mahmud

of

Ghazni, who

was

generally

regardedas an iconoclast, was in fact no

Economic

and

Political Weekly

Special Number

November

1988

2463

This content downloaded from 210.212.129.125 on Sat, 1 Nov 2014 06:35:48 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/4

more than a successful soldier who would

have

looted for whichever

religion

he had

belonged. The best of Indian culturewas to

Nehru a

synthesis;this had badly frayed

n

recent times and should be rebuilt on

the

more

secure foundations

of

freedom 4nd

social

equality

and

in

consonance with a

better world order.

To ensurethat civil disobedience n

1930

was not weakened by

communal forces,

Nehru reasserted the

commitment of the.

Congress o religious, ultural,

inguistic

and

educational

reedom,

and

promised

hat on

communal issues the

Congress

would

not

favour

any

side but hold

the centre

mpar-

tially.

2

In the

resolution on fundamental

rightsat the Karachi

Congress

n

1931, ook-

ing

forward o a free

India,

he

incorporated

clauses

providing

that

every

citizen should

enjoy

freedom of conscience and the

right

freely to profess

and

practise any religion,

subject

o

public

orderand

morality,

hat all

citizens were

equal

before

t

S law, irrespec-

tive of

religion, creed,

caste

or

sex,

that no

disability attached to citizens for these

reasons

n

regard o

publicemploymentand

in the exerciseof any trade or calling, and

that the

state

should

observe

neutrality

n

regard

to

all religions. This

was

the first

breakdown,

n

concrete

terms,

of the con-

cept

of secularism n

the Indian contextand

formed

the basis of

the articles

in

the

con-

stitution

many years later. Once the Con-

gress,

he

leading

politicalparty

n

the

coun-

try,

had

committed tself to these

provisions,

Nehru

expected the

ground

to be

removed

from under

communalism,

or there

was no

logical justification left for communal

demands. On the

political

plane,

the

only

solution was the nationalist

one,

with

no

room for

special

representation.

Life,however, s Nehruhimselfoftensaid,

is differentfrom and

larger

than

logic.

He

might

assertthat

communalismwas a

ghost

but the

ghost

refused to vanish and con-

tinued to drink

blood.

So, tacitly shedding

the view

that theHindu-Muslim

roblem

did

not

exist because

it

had

nothing

to

do with

the

masses,

Nehru

decided, during

the few

months at the end of

1933when he was out

of

prison,

to face the issue. He was

still of

the

opinion

that

the

communal

parties

were

basicallyprops

of

political reaction,

and he

continued

to

urge

the

Hindus,

as the

majority

community,

to

take

the

initiative

in

generosity.

But

he

shifted from

the

posi-

tion that communal feeling was alwaysthe

artificial

creation

of

politicalgroups.

To

the

extentthat it existed

among

the

Hindus and

was able to

disguise itself as

nationalism, t

was the

Indianversionof fascism

and deser-

ving

of

the

severestcondemnation.

Muslim

communal

groups

seemed

o him

at

least middle class

and

representative n

some

degree

of the Muslim

viewpoint,

while

its leadersbehavedwith

greaterdignity hah

those of the Hindu

Mahasabha,who

spoke

only for

capitalists, landlords, and a

few

princes and their hangers-on.

Nehru also

now conceded that it was

understandable

that the Muslims,

as an economically and

educationallybackward ommunity,might

be apprehensive

about the future. "Honest

communalism s fear; alse communalism

s

political reaction".

To distinguish between shades of com-

munalism and to

contend that it could

sometimes be

honest and, therefore,

presumably egitimate,

was to embarkon a

dangerous ourse. It at once jeopardised

he

position of the many Muslims in the Con-

gress who had not hesitated to participate

in the civil disobedience movement;

and

Nehru made this worse by stating that

no

other organisation

could successfully

challengethe claim

of the communaliststo

speak for the Muslims and that their

ag-

gressively ommunal

character avethem an

advantage ver the Muslims n the Congress.

Having yielded so much ground in argu-

ment to Muslim communalists, Nehru

sought to defeat them

in practiceby conten-

ding that the way to deal with communal

parties was not to barter with them but

to

appeal overtheir heads to the masses.Their

culturalunity was enduring,

he demand

for

political and

economic freedom

was the

reality

and the communal

myth

wouldcease

to exist

when

put

to the testof mass

opinion.

A constituent ssembly

lected

by

adultfran-

chise,

even

on the basis

of

separate

elec-

torates,

would dispose

of the communal

pro-

blem

readily

enough.

All this seemed

very

remote as

the

Congressdeveloped

no clear

objectives

or

ideology,

the

government

with

the Communal

Award divided

the

people

into numerous

religiouscompartments

and

Nehru, sitting

in

prison,

heard of

persistent

communal

voilence.

"What

a

disgusting

savage people

we are.

Politics, progress,

socialism,

communism,

science-where

are

they

before

this

black

religious savagery".4

But

the election

campaign of 1936,

with a

wider franchise

han before,gaveNehru his

chance.

He

played

down

the communal

issue,

held

up independence

and better

economic

conditions as the

first

priorities

and centredhis fire

on the alien

rulers,

the

capitalists

and the landlords.

In the United

Provinces,

a clash

with

the

Muslim

League

was avoided.Speakingon the

same

platform

as

Jinnah,

Nehru referred o communalism

as no

more than a nuisance

which made

people petty-minded

and hid

from view the

maj6r problems.

In his

presidential

address

at the

FaizpurCongress

n

December

1936

he did

not refer

to communalism

at all.

The results

of the elections

confirmed

Nehruin his view, gained duringhis tours,

that

the

Congress

had

never been

stronger.

But

it had contested

few Muslimseats and

of

these

lost

most. Even

so,

Nehru

felt

that

*the

Congress

should have

fielded more

Muslimcandidates.

The Muslim-masses

ad

been too

long doped

with

communal

poison

and

were

suspicious

of the

Congress;

but

there was

a ferment

among

the

younger

Muslims and the masses and

the

Congress

should reachout to

them. The

Muslimrank-

and-file

had

a

greaterpotentiality,perhaps

because

of more freedom

n

social

relations,

than the Hindu counterpart and, if con-

vinced of a new thought, would accept it.

So, smothering Jinnah's hopes of a resur-

rection

of

the atmosphere

of

the Lucknow

pact

and the

reaching

of a

political

agree-

ment

at the leadership

evel,

Nehru

in 1937

initiated

a Muslim

mass

contact

campaign.

This

was a chance

for

implementing

his

theory

that

the

masses

had no

communal

problem

and could

be led

to forget

this

side-issue

by

offering

them

political

action

and placing

before

them

an economic

programme;

but

the opportunity

was

squandered.5

In fact, it

was Jinnah

who,

acceptingwhat he regardedas a challenge,

strengthened

the position

of the

League

among

the

Muslimmasses

by

appealing

to

God and

the

Koran

and alleging

that

Islam

was being

threatened.

Taking

advantage

of

acceptance

f office by

the

Congress,

he slid

easily

fromattacking

he Congress,

epresen-

ting

majority

opinion,

to denouncing

it

as

representing

indu

opinion

and

complained

of general

harassment

of Muslims

without

specifying

his charges.

Nehru

had gradually

and reluctantly

o

change

his opinion

that

there

was no real

strength

behind

the

League.

Jinnah's

demand

that his party

be

recognised

as

the

authoritative nd representativerganisation

of the

Muslims

wasunacceptable;

ut it

was

no

longer enough

merely

to go

half-way

o

meet

the rminorities

nd allay

their fears

in

matters

of culture, language

and

religious

observances.

Nehru waswilling

to consider,

in

any

scheme

of

provincial

redistribution,

the grant

o important roups

and minorities

of

territories

within

which

they

wouldhave

full

opportunities

or self-development;

ut

the

League,

not being

serious

about

non-

political

matters,

paid

no attention. By

the

beginning

of

1939

Nehru

was forced

to

acknowledge

that

the communal

problem

had

acquired

a new

and serious

aspect.

The

fear of the Muslims that they might be

swamped

by

the

Hindu

majority

had

widened

considerably;

there was, parti-

cularly

n the

UnitedProvinces,

more

general

ill-will among

the

Muslim

masses

towards

the

Congress

than at

any

time

before,

and

fascist

elements

werebecoming stronger

n

both

the

communal

parties.

Even

now,

Nehru

was

hopeful

that

the economic

issue

would

wither

the communal problem

f the

provincial

overnments

ave

priority

o such

measures

as the

wiping

out of

old debts

and

the

arrears

of

rent;

but

the

Congress

ministries

were

too

conservative

o move

in

these

matters.By

the

time war

broke

out

and

these ministries resigned, Nehru had to

accept

defeat:

"There s no doubt

that we

have been

unable

to

check

the

growth

of

communalism

and anti- Congress

feeling

among

the

Muslim

masses '6Even

civil war

now seemed

to

him

possible.

His

buoyant

optimism,

however,

soon

returned

o the

surface.

He

placed

hopes

in

the

League's

ommitment

o

independence;

and

even

its

attainment of

a mass

basis

might

behelpful

n

bringing

pressure

o

bear

on

its feudal

eadership.

f

the

Congress

and

the League

could

work

together

in

dealing

with the

government

n the

war crisis,

the

communal

grievances

would

fall

into

perspective.So the Congresswaswillingto

Economic and

Political

Weekly

Special

Number

November 1988

2465



4/4

accept

the

League,

f

not

as the

sole Muslim

organisation,

at least as an

important

and

influential

party.

But

joint

action with the

Congresshad no interest or Jinnah and he

would not

go beyond seeking

statutorypro-

vision for coalition

ministries. With the

eelebration of the

'day

of deliverance'

and

the

passing

of the Pakistan

resolution

there

was no

scope for negotiations with

the

League,and Nehru

became more

concerned

withgiving assurances o the Christiansand

Sikhs that the

Congress

was

committed

to

secularismand

legitimate

minority

nterests

couldbeprotectedby a constituent

assembly,

in which

such questions

would be

settlednot

by a

majority

vote but

by common consent

and differences referred f

necessary

to ar-

bitration

not

by

the British

but

preferably

by

the

League

of Nations. But

during

the

war years such

matterswere not in Nehru's

hands. The League,

with

active British

sup-

port, expanded

its

popular backing

and

moved to

the

climax of

partition.

Nehru's

policy

towards the

minorities

before

1947, therefore,

had

not

been

a suc-

cess. He had been convincedthat the com-

munal problem was not a

matter for solu-

tion by

the

communalists. These were

political

reactionaries

converting religious

matters nto a political

problem

to

promote

their own narrow

interests;

and the

best

answer to

them was

religious toleration,

safeguarding

of culture

and

languages

and

emphasis

on

political

independence

and

economic

betterment,

both

of

which

cut

across

religious

differences.

But

the

British

government

gave

Nehru no

chance to

translate

his

flawless thesis

into

practice.

A

dissolution

of

the communal

problem

was

not

possible

in a

colonial

setting.

Nehru had written as far back as 1936,

"the

day

on

which India

achieves her

freedom,

communal

differences

and

jealousies

will

get

solvedof

themselves".

ar

frombeing his the

case,

n

August

1947

uch

differences assumed national and even

international

proportions. The refusal to

synchronise acceptance

of

Pakistan with

recognition

f the

two-nation

heory

and

the

presence

f

largereligious

minorities

n

India

made

secularism the

only possible basis of

a

uniform and

durable national

identity.

Rational thinking and

a civilised outlook

meant

the insistenceon

religionas a private

matter or

the individualwith

no bearingon

civic rights and duties; and in a multi-

religious society the

state

had

to stay aloof

from all

faiths and permit diverse

forms of

worship

provided hey did not

conflict with

other

religions. But to provide in

the con-

stitution for

secular

behaviourwas

only the

beginningof the

struggle.The

circumstances

of

1947had intensified

he communal

mood

and even the most

senior of

Nehru's col-

leagueswerenot

alwayscareful n

maintain-

ing

that the

state

shouldnot

promote any

particular religion.

It

was

suggested that

secularismwas a

westernconcept unsuited

to

India, where the

largemajority,practised

Hinduism as a social

religion. To

counter

this Nehru had, long before independence,

defined secularism

not

according

o any dic-

tionary.or

historical

tradition

but

in

a way

adapted to

conditions in

this

country. The

future Indian

state

would not be

hostile to

religion but

would

not represent

any one

religion

and would

provide

reedomof

con-

science to all.

As

before

1947, Nehru as

prime

minister

was

more

concernedwith Hindu

than-with

Muslim

communalism.

The Hindu

faith,

preachinghospitality to all forms of belief,

wasideal on

paper;but the

practicewas

rigid

and

narrow. The

Muslim

outlook

might

often be

worse, but it

could not

makemuch

difference

to the

future of

India. So the

destruction of

Hindu

communalism was

indispensable for

India's

survival.

But just

as

Hindu

revivalismwas the

greatest

danger,

so also

it was

the prime

responsibility

f the

Hindus

to

provide the

religious

minorities

with a sense

of

security.The test of

success

was not

what the

Hindus

thoughtbut how

theMuslims

and

other

minorities

elt. It was

only

if

the

Hindus

were ecular hat

the non-

Hindus

could

becomesecular.

They should

not gain the impression hat theywerebeing

treated as

second-class

citizens.

So Nehru

assured

the

Christians of full

freedom

for

evangelicalwork so

long as

it

did

not

imp-

inge on

politics

and,

giving the

Muslims

special

attention,

encouragedtheir

recruit-

ment to

the

armed and

civil

services, par-

ticularly the

police, and

their

employment

in

the

private ector.

Recognising hat

Urdu,

while spoken

by both

Hindus and

Muslims,

had become

a symbol

of Islamic

culture,he

provided

hat its

useand

teachingweregiven

priority,

especially

in

Delhi

and

Uttar

Pradesh.

Yet,

ust as to distinguish

between

Hindu

and Muslimcommunalismwas to falterin

logic, so

too to seem to

favourthe

majority

or to

provide

pecial treatment

o

minorities

is

to

weakensecularism as the

foundation

of

equality

and

democracy.

Pressure

of cir-

cumstances

ometimes

ed

Nehru to

hesitate

and

not to throw

his full

weight

on

the side

of

secularism.

n

1948he

committed

he

sup-

port

of

the

government

to the

banning

of

communal

political

parties

but did

not

im-

plement the

resolution. He

agreed

with

Gandhi

that the

compulsory stoppage

of

cow-

slaughter,

aken

as

an isolated

decision,

would

appear as a

concession to Hindu

bigotry

and therefore

o be

avoided; yet

he

did not oppose the listingof the banningof

cow-slaughter

as

one

of

the directive

prin-

ciples

of

state

policy

in

the constitution

and

was content

to see that

nothing

came

of

it

in

practice.

An

even

greater

deficiency

n

his

policy

of

merging religious

communities

n

a

general

citizenship

was the restrictionof

the insistenceon

monogamy

to Hindu men

and

the

grant

of the

rights

of divorce and

inheritance

only

to

Hindu women. In his

keenness to

win the

confidence

of

the

Muslim

community,

he

failed to ensurethe

equality

before the law

of all Indians

and

enact

a common

civil code.

Religioncan

be

separated from

politics more

easily if it

is

also separatedfrom the law. There is no

room

in

a

secular

society

for differences n

rl.

vnal law which claim

religious

anction.

To deny rights to Muslim

women

which

are

available

o women

of other faiths s a

viola-

tion

of

the

provision

n

the

constitution

hat

the state shall not discriminate

against any

citizen

on

grounds

of

religion.

As Nehru

had realised rom the

verystart,

the real

answer

o

the

mixing

of

religion

with

politics is mass

education.

An

educated

society, forward-lookingand striving for

development,

will,

even without

knowing t,

liquidate

communalism, both

of

reaction

and

of

fear. Nehru

was

always

aware

that

the

problem

of

minoritieswas best

handled

not in

itself

but

as a

part of

wider

issues.

But he

could not achieve

what

he

hoped for

during

the

freedom movement

and he did

not

do what

he knew should

be done

in

an

independent

India. He himself

suggested

that the

problems

of

the

minoritieswerenot

suited o

his

temperament nd cast of

mind.

"I

must

confess to you" he

wrote to Jinnah

aftersome talks

with

him

soon after he

out-

breakof

war,

"that

n

this matterI

have ost

confidence in myself, though I am not

usually

given

that

way.

But

the

last two or

threeyears

have

had a

powerful

ffect on me.

My own mind

moves on a different

plane

and

most of

my interests ie in

other direc-

tions.

And

so,

though

I

have given much

thought o the

problem

nd

understand

most

of its

implications,

I

feel as if I was

an out-

sider and

alien

in

spirit."

But

if

he did

not

come

up

with

appropriateand effective

ac-

tions in different

contexts,

he

at least left

us

with the right

answers and the

correct

approaches.

Notes

(This

s the

sixth M A AnsariMemorial

Lecture

delivered at

the Department of

History,Jamia

Millia

Islamia.]

1

Presidentialaddress at

the Bundelkhand

con-

ference,

June

13,

1921.

Selected

Works,

Vol

1,

p

177

ff.

2

'The Problem of Minorities' March

14,

1930.

Selected

Works, Vol 4, pp 259-261.

3

Interview, November

29,

The

Bombay

Chronicle, December 2, 1933.

4 Diary entry,

April 17, 1935.

5

Mushirul

Hasan,

'The

Muslim Mass

Contact

Campaign',

Economic

ndPolitical

Weekly,

December

27,

1986.

6 Nehru

to

Rajendra

Prasad,

October

18,

1939.

7 October 18, 1939.

Economic

and

Political

Weekly

Available

rom

M/s

Dey

and

Bose

Magazine

Agent,

C/o

Sridum

Mazumdar,

107,

Sadar

Baxi

Lane,

Howrah - 711

101.

West

Bengal

Central

News

Agency

(P)

Ltd.

23/90,

Connaught

Circus,

New

Delhi

-

110

001.

2466

Economic

and

Political

Weekly

Special

Number

November

1988


nehru and minorities

Documents