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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON ZII.D.C.

o

t'. The Chairman's Staff Group has revie ...ed the 1956 Reportof the Net E:valuation Subcommittee. \~e consider 1t to beresponsive to the directive and guidance contained in NSC 5605.

The report itself contains four major parts; Introduction,Summary, Conclusions and Discussion. In add::tion, there area n~mber of annexes ...hich contain detailed information andanalyses which have been used in formulating the report.

CJCS .381 (Net Evaluation)

(1 Nov 56)

rllE f~O RA t..1)'Jr'l FO R A DH IR AL H AD FO RD

1 l \ov em be r 1956

2. The Chairman's Staff Group recommends that you read theI ntroduction, Summary and Conclusions (pages 1through 10).In noting these conclusions .. ''I eare again impressed with the

urgency of major technological improvement in air,defense.In addition to the Swnrnary and Conc Lus L ona , there are certainitems of interest contained in the Disc~ssion which we havehighlighted for you in an Appendix hereto.

3. The Chairman's Staff Group recommends that you approvethe report as "'lri tten for distribution to members of the t>!etEvaluation Subcommittee for their concurrence and comments •

.''" STAFF GROUP

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A P PEN D I X

ACTIONS AND RESUL~S U~~ER COrIDITIONS OF

IISTRATEGI C SURPRI SE"

1. The total time involved fo~ this nuclear exchange was14 hours.

2. Under conditions of "strategic sLlrprlse", the Sovietforces had as an objective the security of the USSR and theneLltrallzation of U.S. nuclear capability to prevent devas-tating nuclear counter attack. The Soviet concept also providedfor the launching of strong la~d offensive forces in Europe andthe rUddle East with an objective of seizing key bases" industrialareas and communication centers. Also under the Soviet ooncept,the Red naval forces were to find and to destroy if possible

U.S. and Allied carrier attack forces.

3. In addition to the objective of destroying the U.S. nuclearretaliatory capability, the Red forces also had as an objectivedestruction of industrial and population type targets which wouLd

destroy the U,S. economic, political and social structure. Sovietair tactics were deSigned to penetrate 5imultaneo:.J.slyU.S. andAllied early warning nets at H-hour during the hours of darkness.Their tactics also provided for the use of aircraft in one-waymissions.

4. The Soviet attacks produced the ~ollowlng general results:

~. They were able to :a~nch some 1706 aircraft against

the United states and Allies. This operation resulted in}::laclngsome 6600 r r. eg at on s on t he U.S. and its Allies.

a- The losses from those attacks ·.....re very high; in theneighborhood of 1300 ai~craft. A high percentage of thoselosses resulted fro~ the use of one-~ay ~trlke8.

c. The Soviet clandestine attack ,rovlded for thedetonation of one 10 1le,;;aton,·'eaponn tr,e 80viet Embassy

in l::ashington and one 10 megaton "'ecpon i:1 the Soviet ~n:offices in ~ew Yor~.

: : 1 . I'he Soviets also launched 'll':'::;s::'lcs !'rorn submar'Lne sa6e..lrls~ s ome o f ' a . .~r c o as ta.I bas e s ano : c . .c . J l _ l: ! . ta e e ,

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e. The general results rr -o -nt hi s n uc iear a t tack ver ehiS~ losses across the board 1n our clv!lia~ ?OPulRt1onand also 1n our military personnel. As an EK2.'nple, SACpersonnel losses wer-e about 66% ; 6g,:, of C01{A]) oersonnelH er e c as ua lt ie sj Army forces in the United States hadabout 65% ca su a l t i es j th e Navy suf'f'er-e-t lower losses

with some 42% casualties world ~1de.

5 . The FCDA e s t i m a t e d t h a t the r e s u l t s of this l I s u r p r i s e l lattack would find:

§:.. The national Government virtually uiped O.lt.

b. Transportation severely damaged.

c. Energy and po-rer- severely damaged.

d. Manufacturing capability severely crippled.

e. Labor forces almost non-existent.

f. Financlal structure almost completely paralyzed and,as previously stated, over-all p er so nn el c as '. la lt ies inexcess of 5 0%.

6, The U.S. concept for reacting to the "surprise!! attack'.JaS as f01101<18:

a. The United States had as objectives the defense cfC O l ' : ' I T s with forces available to CINCOKAD ~ and the launchingo~ nuclear stri~es against the USS? deB~gned to ~eatroy its1t'111taI"'J capabllit~r and \,111 to r-estst ,

b. Allied and U.S, roi-ces thr-oughout the wor-Ld wer-e topa:otlcipate Ln defensive operations '."it.hin their capabll:!.ty.

c, ~actlca] ~orceo in 3u~orye an~ cthe~ areas were toun-jerta1ce cf fens:!. v e o "')e::"E.lo:lt •

E _ , St""i\es by naval carr:er t:r;e a:!.rc~'a~tl rr,:sslles ancs~a~lane~ to support the atove o;e~att0n~' E~cti~ a~d1~lon,osv.::.' f'1:::ce6 -'er~ ~a rrotect sea cO·"'_,~.1~C3.t:!.'J1L2 E..n"l s ecur-ethe seC ' 1~r·2S.

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Lc. level delivery tactics ",e:,'e to be us ed h'he"E p o s c Lbl e ,employing E e r l , decoys and radar busters to the max tmumc ap ab il i t y.

8. The r eadz.neee of :r.S. s tirLke forces =as as fcl~o,.~:

~. SAC expected to have 5 0 % of their overseas forceson alert and 1/3 of their forces in the 21 on alert. Thefi:-ostaircraft wer-e to be launched in five to seven minutesaf ter w arn i!1 g.

b. TAC and Navy had 25% forces on alert and their firststrIkes ~lere launched in 25 to 35 minutes.

c. U.S. sur!ace-to-surface missiles were launched 15 minutesafter the execution order.

d. CONA~ had four aircraft squadrons on rummy alert andcould man the rest during the period enemy aircraft crossed

from the DEW Line to the GCr Line.

9. In carrying out its quick stril{e~ SAC '4aS able to ~aunch642 bomb carriers, ''11th7l~0 bomb carriers on a !'ollc':l-Up. Italso launched 40 SNA::tKnuclear surface-to-surface missiles.The SAC combat losses in these two strikes were 610 aircraft.The Navy launched on quick strike 65 aircraft in the r"editerraneanEnd 46 in the Pacific, with over 100 fo110~-up strikes in those

n-t~he r-esu'lts of these strikes was a delivery of some~ on the Sino Soviet BlO~ ,

" 1 lH Q I t lW A t: T (X i F J g

10. The U.S. and Allied armies had a total of 72 divisions

deployed. Since the over-all military operation totaled only14 hours, no decisive results could be determined as far asground "'arfare Ls concerned. The report does indicate thatall Soviet army ac tions in Europe wou.l.dbe at a virtual haltdue to fall-out after H/14 hours.

11. T~a report provides some infcrmation a5 to 'lhat theU.S. attacks wout o do to the USSR. The Soviet :on::;-r~nbeair force lost almost 2/3 of its personnel as h~ll 2S s~b-stan~!Fl nu~~ers of aircraft and base faClllt1es. Ec~ever,the ma1'" !'c:.ctor \/~dch limited its c on t Inuac cc~,''Jc,t caj.."bill;:y',lasaxpeud it.:.::.'ef t+ie 'JSSR atomic stocl{pil'? TIle r~~cr~ eE-t j; nat ea t he ,. ,]'1"0,' ?O,~ 0 : : : ' t he L RA .l 1'1 1' f ac il ities and ,)ersonnel,~cre Lost.

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12. It 1s ..

i'lestern E u r oto note that of 114 divisions in

13. The S o v i e t naval forces did not s u s t a i n heavy lossesand were estimated to continue as an effective force at Bea for15 to 45 d a y s .

~."~he report indicates that the Soviet....... ~~a effectively damaged; exercising .......wou ld therefore be a di ff icu lt p ro bl em .

8 that U on the USSR

17. Since the Allies still possessed 30% of their originalwar-head stockpiles and adequate delivery means, whereas the

USSR retained only 10% of its weapons (26), it i s co ns ide re dthat the U,S, forces could effectively terminate any furtherresistance on the part of Soviet forces.

AC l'ION S AND RESi:LTS m.mE :R COND IT IOKS OF IF'JLL ALERT "

1 8 . Under t h ~ s c o n d I t i o n , tte Soviets had the same generalconcept of operations, I.e., security of the OSSR and neutrali-zation of :':.3. nuclear capabf.Lf ty , '.:'0 attain tr.ose objac tives ,they planned a1!' att.acks, land c ampa tgris and nava) , c a-npaf.gnsTheir t ~ c t l c was to ~el1v~r thei~ ai~ 5t~ike3 agEin~t t h e ~.s.~nder cover of ~-3.!'~:'l'2f::S, ri"3.:!.n : : " 1 1 J : r l ' ! ~ l a t e l y'o l.. .v ....g.s :-lollc1:-:'per rcd ,

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· ,

19. Under the ter-n l Iful1 alert" the U.S. was to be in aperiod of international tension for 20 days prior to the SovietBloc attack. T!1is alert period enabled some force augmentationand r ede pl oy me nt s~ p ar ti cu la rl y in the Air Porce. Also~ the

early ' ' l a r n i l ' ! glines wer-e extended and augmented to obtain earlierwar-nf.ng of attack. The early wannf.ng line provided for some tvro

to six hours ...ar-nf.ng for U.S. strike forces, both in " su rp ri se "and under condition of "full alert".

20. The Soviet attacked with 965 bombers against the Unitedsta.tes. Lo' , ' l al tltudes, ECf . i decoys and air-to-aurface missileswere employ ed. 674 weapons were detonated with the yield of5047 megatons against the United States. Against this attack,the U,S. employed 3650 all-weather fighter sortIes and 180 of304 HIKE batteries. U. S. air defense kills totaled 367 f ly ing o b~(218 bombers and 189 decoys).

21. The Soviets also l au nc he d a tt ac ks i n other areas of Europe

and the Far East} delivering an additional2000

megatons againsttargets in those a~eas.

22. In addition to thejr air attacks, Soviet naval forcesp a r t i c l l l a r l y sLlb'l1arines- p a r t i C i p a t e d actively i n missileattacks agains~ U.S. bases a nd i ns ta ll at io ns .

23. Har gaming \las not accomplished on a ground phase nor anaval phas e 0:' a ttac k ...de r conditions of "full alert".

2 ll . T he res~lts of the Soviet attack on the U.S. were in~ost resoects the same as for the conoition of "strategicsurprlse

h• The forces they dispatched against the U.S. were

slightly larger J an« they ",ere able to put do ...n some 500 moremegatons. However- J due t . .9__ tp~.£J:1. .<; :R_y.3ed in the selectionof their targets~ the over-all results \ i e r e nct as great asunder slJrt::r1sea t back , 'I'her-e 11€re fevIer pel'sonne!KTITed inthis "rull 2.1ert" than under the sur~rise type of attack.

25. In gene r-al , It is 'orthy of none trLat ~nde!" tre cond.;tion0:' "f.)11 alert"} tr.e possibility of' cont tnua tLon of government\;o'lld be i:1cre2..sej. Ot'1er';ise, 5'CDA es tLrnate s c:~ d amaz e sbo stne aane Geno:o- ra l O:,_'d2~ of r1a;;,ni tll'je as unde r "su!"pr1seW• t'lll:-tary losses ere ~lsc 0~ a~prox~nate:y the same ~e~e:El o~der.

> ..,.,""lr.~ .. ,....,.:; C't~'_~- " e a c ' - e - ' t o ~ . _. . c k n d - "f I" , .._J1... d.oc; ... __ v.._:" I ._. C\ J'_,:' _ l. ' 1 , . . 1 u\.. vel l'\. LH c!" I .l.~ Q.J..Er't,. as

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· .. ~.

£ . The second is the progress of the Soviet guided missileprogram.

c. Third is the composition of U,S. forcee in 1959. andwhether or not pro8rammed equipment ...il1 etta1n t he ex pect ed

capability.

31. Certain aspects of special analysis are treated as follows:

a. Areas of special interest requiring concentration ofintelligence effort are:

(1) Soviet nuclear t...e ap on s s to ck pi le s.

(2) Soviet long-range all' force.

( 3) Soviet guided missile program.

( 4) Soviet e le ct ro ni c c ou nt er me as ur es .

b. The alert requirement for U.S. nuclear military forces.For-SAC to achieve the reaction ti~e of from five to sevenminutes to launch B-47 and B-52 aircraft w111 require augmen-tation of SAC forces and increase 1n SAC facilities.

32. The report concludes by discussing the ICB~ probleM,particularly the proolem of defense against ballistic missiles.There is also a discussion of the psychological effect of a nuclearattack. It is pointed out that the people will not be preparedfor an attack of this type, ....1th res pec t t o ch emi cal ·... ,ra .rf are ,the report concludes that the total havoc of nuclear war offersa more profitable course of action for the Soviets than chemicalwar rar-e ,

33. In a comparison of the 1555 and 1956 reports, it 1sconcluded that in 1959 the U.S. wo~ld be in a period charac-terized by eIther side havln~ a capability to launch an attackwhich uou ld r-eau l t in mutual destruction (s8me as Period # J J . ofthe Killian qeport) •

I~ppenc~~y.

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