DEDICATION

Formymotherandfatherwhoshowedmeunconditionallove

andtaughtmethevaluesofhardworkandintegrity

CONTENTS

Dedication

CHAPTER1|THENEWRULESHowtoBecometheSmartestPerson...inAnyRoom

CHAPTER2|BEAMIRRORHowtoQuicklyEstablishRapport

CHAPTER3|DON’TFEELTHEIRPAIN,LABELIT

HowtoCreateTrustwithTacticalEmpathy

CHAPTER4|BEWARE“YES”—MASTER“NO”HowtoGenerateMomentumandMakeItSafeto

RevealtheRealStakes

CHAPTER5|TRIGGERTHETWOWORDSTHATIMMEDIATELYTRANSFORMANY

NEGOTIATIONHowtoGainthePermissiontoPersuade

CHAPTER6|BENDTHEIRREALITYHowtoShapeWhatIsFair

CHAPTER7|CREATETHEILLUSIONOFCONTROL

HowtoCalibrateQuestionstoTransformConflictintoCollaboration

CHAPTER8|GUARANTEEEXECUTIONHowtoSpottheLiarsandEnsureFollow-Through

fromEveryoneElse

CHAPTER9|BARGAINHARDHowtoGetYourPrice

CHAPTER10|FINDTHEBLACKSWANHowtoCreateBreakthroughsbyRevealingthe

UnknownUnknowns

AcknowledgmentsAppendix:PrepareaNegotiationOneSheet

NotesIndex

AbouttheAuthorsCreditsCopyright

AboutthePublisher

kindle:embed:0002?mime=image/jpg

CHAPTER1

THENEWRULES

Iwasintimidated.I’d spent more than two decades in the FBI, including

fifteenyearsnegotiatinghostage situations fromNewYorkto thePhilippinesandtheMiddleEast,andIwasontopofmy game.At any given time, there are ten thousand FBIagents in the Bureau, but only one lead internationalkidnappingnegotiator.Thatwasme.

But I’d never experienced a hostage situation so tense,sopersonal.

“We’vegotyourson,Voss.Giveusonemilliondollarsorhedies.”

Pause. Blink. Mindfully urge the heart rate back tonormal.

Sure,I’dbeeninthesetypesofsituationsbefore.Tonsofthem.Moneyforlives.Butnotlikethis.Notwithmysonontheline.Not$1million.Andnotagainstpeoplewithfancydegreesandalifetimeofnegotiatingexpertise.

You see, the people across the table—my negotiatingcounterparts—were Harvard Law School negotiatingprofessors.

I’dcomeuptoHarvardtotakeashortexecutivenegotiating

course, to see if I could learn something from thebusinessworld’s approach.Itwas supposed to bequiet and calm, alittle professional development for an FBI guy trying towidenhishorizons.

ButwhenRobertMnookin, the director of theHarvardNegotiationResearchProject, learned Iwasoncampus,heinvitedmetohisofficeforacoffee.Justtochat,hesaid.

I was honored.And scared. Mnookin is an impressiveguywhomI’dfollowedforyears:notonly isheaHarvardlawprofessor,he’salsooneof thebigshotsof theconflictresolutionfieldandtheauthorofBargainingwiththeDevil:WhentoNegotiate,WhentoFight.1

To be honest, it felt unfair thatMnookinwantedme, aformer Kansas City beat cop, to debate negotiation withhim. But then it got worse. Just after Mnookin and I satdown, the door opened and another Harvard professorwalkedin.ItwasGabriellaBlum,aspecialistininternationalnegotiations, armed conflict, and counterterrorism, who’dspent eight years as a negotiator for the Israeli NationalSecurityCounciland theIsraelDefenseForces.The tough-as-nailsIDF.

On cue, Mnookin’s secretary arrived and put a taperecorderonthetable.MnookinandBlumsmiledatme.

I’dbeentricked.“We’vegotyourson,Voss.Giveusonemilliondollars

or he dies,” Mnookin said, smiling. “I’m the kidnapper.Whatareyougoingtodo?”

I experienced a flash of panic, but that was to be

expected. It never changes: even after two decadesnegotiating for human lives you still feel fear. Even in arole-playingsituation.

I calmedmyself down. Sure, I was a street cop turnedFBIagentplayingagainstrealheavyweights.AndIwasn’tagenius.ButIwasinthisroomforareason.OvertheyearsIhad picked up skills, tactics, and a whole approach tohumaninteractionthathadnotjusthelpedmesavelivesbut,as I recognize now looking back, had also begun totransformmyownlife.Myyearsofnegotiatinghadinfusedeverything from how I dealtwith customer service reps tomyparentingstyle.

“C’mon. Get me the money or I cut your son’s throatrightnow,”Mnookinsaid.Testy.

Igavehimalong,slowstare.ThenIsmiled.“HowamIsupposedtodothat?”Mnookinpaused.Hisexpressionhadatouchofamused

pity in it, like a dog when the cat it’s been chasing turnsaround and tries to chase it back. It was as if we wereplayingdifferentgames,withdifferentrules.

Mnookin regained his composure and eyed me witharchedbrowsasiftoremindmethatwewerestillplaying.

“Soyou’reokaywithmekillingyourson,Mr.Voss?”“I’m sorry,Robert, howdo I knowhe’s even alive?” I

said, using an apology and his first name, seeding morewarmthintotheinteractioninordertocomplicatehisgambitto bulldozeme. “I really am sorry, but how can I get youany money right now, much less one million dollars, if I

don’tevenknowhe’salive?”Itwasquitea sight to seesuchabrilliantman flustered

bywhatmusthaveseemedunsophisticatedfoolishness.Onthe contrary, though,mymovewas anythingbut foolish. Iwas employing what had become one of the FBI’s mostpotentnegotiatingtools:theopen-endedquestion.

Today, after some years evolving these tactics for theprivate sector in my consultancy,The Black Swan Group,wecallthistacticcalibratedquestions:queriesthattheothersidecanrespondtobut thathavenofixedanswers.Itbuysyoutime.Itgivesyourcounterparttheillusionofcontrol—theyaretheonewiththeanswersandpowerafterall—anditdoes all that without giving them any idea of howconstrainedtheyarebyit.

Mnookin, predictably, started fumbling because theframeoftheconversationhadshiftedfromhowI’drespondtothethreatofmyson’smurdertohowtheprofessorwoulddealwiththelogisticalissuesinvolvedingettingthemoney.How he would solvemy problems. To every threat anddemandhemade,IcontinuedtoaskhowIwassupposedtopayhimandhowwasIsupposedtoknowthatmysonwasalive.

Afterwe’d been doing that for threeminutes,GabriellaBluminterjected.

“Don’tlethimdothattoyou,”shesaidtoMnookin.“Well,youtry,”hesaid,throwinguphishands.Blum dove in. She was tougher from her years in the

MiddleEast.Butshewasstilldoingthebulldozerangle,and

allshegotweremysamequestions.Mnookinrejoinedthesession,buthegotnowhereeither.

His face started to get redwith frustration. I could tell theirritationwasmakingithardtothink.

“Okay,okay,Bob.That’sall,”Isaid,puttinghimoutofhismisery.

Henodded.Mysonwouldlivetoseeanotherday.“Fine,” he said. “I suppose the FBImight have

somethingtoteachus.”

I had done more than just hold my own against two ofHarvard’s distinguished leaders. I had takenon the best ofthebestandcomeoutontop.

But was it just a fluke? For more than three decades,Harvardhadbeentheworldepicenterofnegotiatingtheoryandpractice.AllIknewaboutthetechniquesweusedattheFBIwasthattheyworked.InthetwentyyearsIspentattheBureau we’d designed a system that had successfullyresolved almost every kidnappingwe applied it to.Butwedidn’thavegrandtheories.

Our techniques were the products of experientiallearning; they were developed by agents in the field,negotiating through crisis and sharing stories of whatsucceeded andwhat failed. Itwas an iterative process, notanintellectualone,aswerefinedthetoolsweuseddayafterday.And it was urgent.Our tools had towork, because iftheydidn’tsomeonedied.

Butwhydidtheywork?Thatwasthequestionthatdrewme to Harvard, to that office with Mnookin and Blum. I

lacked confidence outsidemy narrowworld.Most of all, Ineeded to articulate my knowledge and learn how tocombine it with theirs—and they clearly had some—so Icouldunderstand,systematize,andexpandit.

Yes, our techniques clearly worked with mercenaries,drug dealers, terrorists, and brutal killers.But, Iwondered,whataboutwithnormalhumans?

AsI’dsoondiscoverinthestoriedhallsofHarvard,ourtechniquesmadegreatsenseintellectually,andtheyworkedeverywhere.

It turned out that our approach to negotiation held thekeys to unlock profitable human interactions in everydomainandeveryinteractionandeveryrelationshipinlife.

Thisbookishowitworks.

THESMARTESTDUMBGUYINTHEROOM

Toanswermyquestions,ayear later, in2006, I talkedmywayintoHarvardLawSchool’sWinterNegotiationCourse.Thebestandbrightestcompete toget into thisclass,and itwas filled with brilliant Harvard students getting law andbusinessdegreesandhotshotstudentsfromothertopBostonuniversities like theMassachusetts Institute ofTechnologyandTufts.TheOlympictrialsfornegotiating.AndIwastheonlyoutsider.

The first day of the course, all 144 of us piled into alecture hall for an introduction and thenwe split into fourgroups,eachledbyanegotiationinstructor.Afterwe’dhada chat with our instructor—mine was named Sheila Heen,

andshe’sagoodbuddytothisday—wewerepartneredoffinpairsandsent intomocknegotiations.Simple:oneofuswassellingaproduct,theotherwasthebuyer,andeachhadclearlimitsonthepricetheycouldtake.

My counterpartwas a languid redhead namedAndy (apseudonym), oneof thoseguyswhowear their intellectualsuperiority like they wear their khakis: with relaxedconfidence. He and I went into an empty classroomoverlookingoneofthoseEnglish-stylesquaresonHarvard’scampus, andwe each used the toolswe had.Andywouldthrowoutanofferandgivearationallyairtightexplanationforwhyitwasagoodone—aninescapablelogictrap—andI’d answerwith somevariation of “Howam I supposed todothat?”

We did this a bunch of times until we got to a finalfigure.Whenweleft,Iwashappy.IthoughtI’ddoneprettywellforadumbguy.

After we all regrouped in the classroom, Sheila wentaround the students and asked what price each group hadagreedon,andthenwrotetheresultontheboard.

Finally,itwasmyturn.“Chris, howdid you dowithAndy?” she asked. “How

muchdidyouget?”I’llneverforgetSheila’sexpressionwhenItoldherwhat

Andyhadagreedtopay.Herwholefacefirstwentred,asifshecouldn’tbreathe,and thenoutpoppeda little strangledgasp like a baby bird’s hungry cry. Finally, she started tolaugh.

Andysquirmed.“Yougotliterallyeverydimehehad,”shesaid,“andin

his brief he was supposed to hold a quarter of it back inreserveforfuturework.”

Andysankdeepinhischair.

Thenextdaythesamethinghappenedwithanotherpartner.Imean,Iabsolutelydestroyedtheguy’sbudget.Itdidn’tmakesense.Aluckyone-offwasonething.But

this was a pattern. With my old-school, experientialknowledge,Iwaskillingguyswhokneweverycutting-edgetrickyoucouldfindinabook.

The thingwas, itwas the cutting-edge techniques theseguys were using that felt dated and old. I felt like I wasRogerFedererandIhadusedatimemachinetogobacktothe 1920s to play in a tennis tournament of distinguishedgentlemenwhoworewhitepantsuitsandusedwoodracketsand had part-time training regimens.There I was withmytitanium alloy racket and dedicated personal trainer andcomputer-strategized serve-and-volley plays. The guys Iwasplayingwerejustassmart—actually,moreso—andwewerebasicallyplaying the samegamewith the same rules.ButIhadskillstheydidn’t.

“You’re getting famous for your special style, Chris,”Sheilasaid,afterIannouncedmysecondday’sresults.

IsmiledliketheCheshirecat.Winningwasfun.“Chris, why don’t you tell everybody your approach,”

Sheilasaid.“It seems likeallyoudo to theseHarvardLawSchoolstudents issay‘No’andstareat them,andtheyfall

apart.Isitreallythateasy?”I knewwhat shemeant:While Iwasn’t actually saying

“No,” the questions I kept asking sounded like it. Theyseemedto insinuate that theothersidewasbeingdishonestand unfair.And that was enough tomake them falter andnegotiate with themselves. Answering my calibratedquestions demanded deep emotional strengths and tacticalpsychological insights that the toolbox they’d been givendidnotcontain.

Ishrugged.“I’m just asking questions,” I said. “It’s a passive-

aggressiveapproach.Ijustaskthesamethreeorfouropen-endedquestionsoverandoverandoverandover.TheygetwornoutansweringandgivemeeverythingIwant.”

Andyjumpedinhisseatasifhe’dbeenstungbyabee.“Damn!” he said. “That’s what happened. I had no

idea.”

By the time I’d finishedmy winter course at Harvard, I’dactually become friends with some of my fellow students.EvenwithAndy.

Ifmy time atHarvard showedme anything, itwas thatweattheFBIhadalottoteachtheworldaboutnegotiating.

In my short stay I realized that without a deepunderstanding of human psychology, without theacceptance that we are all crazy, irrational, impulsive,emotionally driven animals, all the raw intelligence andmathematical logic in theworld is littlehelp in the fraught,shiftinginterplayoftwopeoplenegotiating.

Yes, perhaps we are the only animal that haggles—amonkey does not exchange a portion of his banana foranother’s nuts—but no matter how we dress up ournegotiations in mathematical theories, we are always ananimal, always acting and reacting first and foremost fromour deeply held but mostly invisible and inchoate fears,needs,perceptions,anddesires.

That’snothowthesefolksatHarvardlearnedit,though.Their theoriesandtechniquesallhadtodowithintellectualpower, logic, authoritative acronyms like BATNA andZOPA, rational notions of value, and a moral concept ofwhatwasfairandwhatwasnot.

Andbuilt on topof this false edificeof rationalitywas,of course, process. They had a script to follow, apredeterminedsequenceofactions,offers,andcounteroffersdesigned in a specific order to bring about a particularoutcome.Itwasasiftheyweredealingwitharobot,thatifyoudida,b,c,anddinacertainfixedorder,youwouldgetx.But in the realworldnegotiation is far toounpredictableand complex for that.You may have to do a thend, andthenmaybeq.

IfIcoulddominatethecountry’sbrighteststudentswithjust one of the many emotionally attuned negotiatingtechniques I had developed and used against terrorists andkidnappers,whynotapplythemtobusiness?Whatwasthedifference between bank robbers who took hostages andCEOswhousedhardballtacticstodrivedownthepriceofabillion-dollaracquisition?

After all, kidnappers are just businessmen trying to getthebestprice.

OLD-SCHOOLNEGOTIATION

Hostage taking—and therefore hostage negotiating—hasexistedsincethedawnofrecordedtime.TheOldTestamentspins plenty of tales of Israelites and their enemies takingeachother’scitizenshostageasspoilsofwar.TheRomans,for their part, used to force the princes of vassal states tosend their sons to Rome for their education, to ensure thecontinuedloyaltyoftheprinces.

But until the Nixon administration, hostage negotiatingas aprocesswas limited to sending in troops and trying toshoot the hostages free. In law enforcement, our approachwas pretty much to talk until we figured out how to takethemoutwithagun.Bruteforce.

Thenaseriesofhostagedisastersforcedustochange.In1971,thirty-ninehostageswerekilledwhenthepolice

tried to resolve theAtticaprison riots inupstateNewYorkwith guns.Then at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, elevenIsraeli athletes and coacheswerekilledby theirPalestiniancaptorsafterabotchedrescueattemptbytheGermanpolice.

But the greatest inspiration for institutional change inAmerican law enforcement came on an airport tarmac inJacksonville,Florida,onOctober4,1971.

The United States was experiencing an epidemic ofairline hijackings at the time; therewere five in one three-dayperiod in1970. Itwas in that chargedatmosphere that

an unhinged man named George Giffe Jr. hijacked achartered plane out of Nashville, Tennessee, planning toheadtotheBahamas.

By the time the incidentwas over,Giffe hadmurderedtwohostages—his estrangedwife and thepilot—andkilledhimselftoboot.

But this time the blame didn’t fall on the hijacker;instead, it fell squarely on the FBI. Two hostages hadmanaged toconvinceGiffe to let themgoon the tarmac inJacksonville,wherethey’dstoppedtorefuel.Buttheagentshadgotten impatientandshotout theengine.AndthathadpushedGiffetothenuclearoption.

In fact, theblameplacedon theFBIwas so strong thatwhen thepilot’swifeandGiffe’sdaughter filedawrongfuldeathsuitallegingFBInegligence,thecourtsagreed.

In the landmarkDowns v. United States decision of1975, the U.S. Court of Appeals wrote that “there was abetter suited alternative to protecting the hostages’ well-being,”and said that theFBIhad turned“whathadbeenasuccessful‘waitinggame,’duringwhichtwopersonssafelylefttheplane,intoa‘shootingmatch’thatleftthreepersonsdead.” The court concluded that “a reasonable attempt atnegotiationsmustbemadepriortoatacticalintervention.”

TheDownshijackingcasecametoepitomizeeverythingnot todoinacrisissituation,andinspiredthedevelopmentof today’s theories, training, and techniques for hostagenegotiations.

Soon after theGiffe tragedy, theNewYorkCityPolice

Department (NYPD) became the first police force in thecountry to put together a dedicated team of specialists todesignaprocessandhandlecrisisnegotiations.TheFBIandothersfollowed.

Aneweraofnegotiationhadbegun.

HEARTVS.MIND

In the early 1980s,Cambridge,Massachusetts,wasthe hotspot in the negotiating world, as scholars from differentdisciplines began interacting and exploring exciting newconcepts. The big leap forward came in 1979, when theHarvardNegotiationProjectwasfoundedwithamandatetoimprovethetheory,teaching,andpracticeofnegotiationsothat people couldmore effectively handle everything frompeacetreatiestobusinessmergers.

Two years later, Roger Fisher and William Ury—cofoundersoftheproject—cameoutwithGettingtoYes ,2agroundbreaking treatise on negotiation that totally changedthewaypractitionersthoughtaboutthefield.

Fisher andUry’s approachwas basically to systematizeproblem solving so that negotiating parties could reach amutually beneficial deal—the getting to “Yes” in the title.Their core assumption was that the emotional brain—thatanimalistic, unreliable, and irrational beast—could beovercome through a more rational, joint problem-solvingmindset.

Theirsystemwaseasytofollowandseductive,withfour

basic tenets.One, separate the person—the emotion—fromtheproblem; two, don’t getwrappedup in theother side’sposition(what they’reaskingfor)butinsteadfocusontheirinterests(whythey’reaskingforit)sothatyoucanfindwhattheyreallywant;three,workcooperativelytogeneratewin-win options; and, four, establish mutually agreed-uponstandardsforevaluatingthosepossiblesolutions.

Itwasabrilliant,rational,andprofoundsynthesisofthemost advancedgame theory and legal thinkingof the day.For years after that book came out, everybody—includingthe FBI and the NYPD—focused on a problem-solvingapproach to bargaining interactions. It just seemed somodernandsmart.

HalfwayacrosstheUnitedStates,apairofprofessorsattheUniversity of Chicago was looking at everything fromeconomicstonegotiationfromafardifferentangle.

They were the economist Amos Tversky and thepsychologistDanielKahneman.Together,thetwolaunchedthe field of behavioral economics—and Kahneman won aNobelPrize—byshowingthatmanisaveryirrationalbeast.

Feeling,theydiscovered,isaformofthinking.As you’ve seen, when business schools like Harvard’s

began teaching negotiation in the 1980s, the process waspresented as a straightforwardeconomic analysis. It was aperiodwhen theworld’s topacademiceconomistsdeclaredthat we were all “rational actors.” And so it went innegotiation classes: assuming the other side was actingrationallyandselfishlyintryingtomaximizeitsposition,the

goalwas to figureouthow to respond invarious scenariostomaximizeone’sownvalue.

This mentality baffled Kahneman, who from years inpsychologyknewthat,inhiswords,“[I]tisself-evidentthatpeopleareneither fully rationalnorcompletelyselfish,andthattheirtastesareanythingbutstable.”

Through decades of research withTversky, Kahnemanproved that humans all suffer fromCognitive Bias, that is,unconscious—and irrational—brain processes that literallydistort the way we see the world. Kahneman andTverskydiscoveredmorethan150ofthem.

There’s theFraming Effect, which demonstrates thatpeopleresponddifferentlytothesamechoicedependingonhow it is framed (people place greater value on movingfrom 90 percent to 100 percent—high probability tocertainty—thanfrom45percentto55percent,eventhoughthey’re both ten percentage points).Prospect Theoryexplains why we take unwarranted risks in the face ofuncertain losses. And the most famous isLoss Aversion ,whichshowshowpeoplearestatisticallymore likely toacttoavertalossthantoachieveanequalgain.

Kahneman later codified his research in the 2011bestsellerThinking,FastandSlow.3Man,hewrote,hastwosystems of thought: System 1, our animal mind, is fast,instinctive, and emotional; System 2 is slow, deliberative,andlogical.AndSystem1isfarmoreinfluential.Infact, itguidesandsteersourrationalthoughts.

System 1’s inchoate beliefs, feelings, and impressions

are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberatechoicesofSystem2.They’rethespringthatfeedstheriver.We react emotionally (System 1) to a suggestion orquestion.ThenthatSystem1reactioninformsandineffectcreatestheSystem2answer.

Now think about that: under this model, if you knowhow toaffect your counterpart’s System 1 thinking, hisinarticulate feelings, by how you frame and deliver yourquestionsandstatements, thenyoucanguidehisSystem2rationality and thereforemodify his responses.That’swhathappened to Andy at Harvard: by asking, “How am Isupposed to do that?” I influencedhisSystem1 emotionalmind into accepting thathisofferwasn’t goodenough;hisSystem2thenrationalizedthesituationsothatitmadesensetogivemeabetteroffer.

If you believed Kahneman, conducting negotiationsbased on System 2 concepts without the tools to read,understand, and manipulate the System 1 emotionalunderpinningwasliketryingtomakeanomeletwithoutfirstknowinghowtocrackanegg.

THEFBIGETSEMOTIONAL

As the new hostage negotiating team at the FBI grew andgainedmoreexperienceinproblem-solvingskillsduringthe1980sand’90s,itbecameclearthatoursystemwaslackingacrucialingredient.

At the time,weweredeepintoGettingtoYes .Andasanegotiator, consultant, and teacher with decades of

experience, I still agree with many of the powerfulbargainingstrategiesinthebook.Whenitwaspublished,itprovided groundbreaking ideas on cooperative problemsolving and originated absolutely necessary concepts likeentering negotiations with a BATNA: the BestAlternativeToaNegotiatedAgreement.

Itwasgenius.ButafterthefatallydisastroussiegesofRandyWeaver’s

Ruby Ridge farm in Idaho in 1992 and David Koresh’sBranchDavidiancompoundinWaco,Texas,in1993,therewas no denying that most hostage negotiations wereanythingbutrationalproblem-solvingsituations.

I mean, have you ever tried to devise a mutuallybeneficialwin-win solutionwithaguywho thinkshe’s themessiah?

It was becoming glaringly obvious thatGetting to Yesdidn’t work with kidnappers. Nomatter howmany agentsreadthebookwithhighlightersinhand,itfailedtoimprovehowweashostagenegotiatorsapproacheddealmaking.

There was clearly a breakdown between the book’sbrilliant theory and everyday law enforcement experience.Whywasit thateveryonehadreadthisbestsellingbusinessbookandendorseditasoneofthegreatestnegotiationtextsever written, and yet so few could actually follow itsuccessfully?

Werewemorons?AfterRubyRidgeandWaco,alotofpeoplewereasking

that question. U.S. deputy attorney general Philip B.

Heymann, tobespecific,wanted toknowwhyourhostagenegotiation techniques were so bad. In October 1993, heissueda report titled“LessonsofWaco:ProposedChangesin Federal Law Enforcement,”4 which summarized anexpert panel’s diagnosis of federal law enforcement’sinabilitytohandlecomplexhostagesituations.

Asaresult,in1994FBIdirectorLouisFreehannouncedthe formation of the Critical Incident Response Group(CIRG), a blended division that would combine the CrisesNegotiation, CrisesManagement, Behavioral Sciences, andHostageRescueteamsandreinventcrisisnegotiation.

The only issuewas,what techniqueswerewe going touse?

Around this time, twoof themost decorated negotiators inFBI history, my colleague Fred Lanceley and my formerbossGaryNoesner,wereleadingahostagenegotiationclassin Oakland, California, when they asked their group ofthirty-five experienced law enforcement officers a simplequestion: How many had dealt with a classic bargainingsituationwhereproblemsolvingwasthebesttechnique?

Notonehandwentup.Then they asked the complementary question: How

many students had negotiated an incident in a dynamic,intense,uncertainenvironmentwherethehostage-takerwasinemotionalcrisisandhadnocleardemands?

Everyhandwentup.Itwasclear:ifemotionallydrivenincidents,notrational

bargaining interactions, constituted the bulk of what mostpolice negotiators had to deal with, then our negotiatingskills had to laser-focus on the animal, emotional, andirrational.

Fromthatmomentonward,ouremphasiswouldhavetobenoton training inquidproquobargainingandproblemsolving,butoneducationinthepsychologicalskillsneededin crisis intervention situations. Emotions and emotionalintelligence would have to be central to effectivenegotiation,notthingstobeovercome.

Whatwereneededweresimplepsychologicaltacticsandstrategies that worked in the field to calm people down,establishrapport,gaintrust,elicittheverbalizationofneeds,and persuade the other guy of our empathy.We neededsomethingeasytoteach,easytolearn,andeasytoexecute.

Thesewere cops andagents, after all, and theyweren’tinterested in becoming academics or therapists.What theywanted was to change the behavior of the hostage-taker,whoever theywere andwhatever theywanted, to shift theemotional environmentof the crisis just enough so thatwecouldsecurethesafetyofeveryoneinvolved.

Intheearlyyears,theFBIexperimentedwithbothnewandold therapeutic techniques developed by the counselingprofession. These counseling skills were aimed atdeveloping positive relationships with people bydemonstrating an understanding of what they’re goingthroughandhowtheyfeelaboutit.

It all starts with the universally applicable premise that

peoplewanttobeunderstoodandaccepted.Listeningisthecheapest,yetmosteffectiveconcessionwecanmaketogetthere. By listening intensely, a negotiator demonstratesempathy and shows a sincere desire to better understandwhattheothersideisexperiencing.

Psychotherapyresearchshowsthatwhenindividualsfeellistened to, they tend to listen to themselvesmorecarefullyand to openly evaluate and clarify their own thoughts andfeelings.Inaddition,theytendtobecomelessdefensiveandoppositional and more willing to listen to other points ofview,whichgets them to thecalmand logicalplacewheretheycanbegoodGettingtoYesproblemsolvers.

Thewholeconcept,whichyou’lllearnasthecenterpieceofthisbook,iscalledTacticalEmpathy .Thisislisteningasa martial art, balancing the subtle behaviors of emotionalintelligence and the assertive skills of influence, to gainaccess to themind of another person. Contrary to popularopinion, listening is not a passive activity. It is the mostactivethingyoucando.

Once we started developing our new techniques, thenegotiating world split into two currents: negotiation aslearned at the country’s top school continued down theestablished road of rational problem solving, while,ironically,wemeatheadsattheFBIbegantotrainouragentsin an unproven system based on psychology, counseling,and crisis intervention.While the Ivy League taught mathandeconomics,webecameexpertsinempathy.

Andourwayworked.

LIFEISNEGOTIATION

Whileyoumightbe curioushowFBInegotiatorsget someof theworld’s toughestbadguys togiveup theirhostages,you could be excused for wondering what hostagenegotiation has to do with your life.Happily, very fewpeopleareeverforcedtodealwithIslamistterroristswho’vekidnappedtheirlovedones.

But allow me to let you in on a secret: Life isnegotiation.

Themajorityof the interactionswehaveatworkandathomearenegotiationsthatboildowntotheexpressionofasimple,animalisticurge:Iwant.

“Iwantyoutofreethehostages,”isaveryrelevantonetothisbook,ofcourse.

Butsois:“Iwantyoutoacceptthat$1millioncontract.”“Iwanttopay$20,000forthatcar.”“Iwantyoutogivemea10percentraise.”and“Iwantyoutogotosleepat9p.m.”Negotiation serves two distinct, vital life functions—

information gathering and behavior influencing—andincludes almost any interaction where each party wantssomething from theother side.Your career, your finances,yourreputation,yourlovelife,eventhefateofyourkids—atsomepointallofthesehingeonyourabilitytonegotiate.

Negotiation as you’ll learn it here is nothingmore thancommunicationwith results. Gettingwhat youwant out of

life is all about getting what you want from—and with—otherpeople.Conflictbetweentwopartiesisinevitableinallrelationships.Soit’suseful—crucial,even—toknowhowtoengage in that conflict to get what you want withoutinflictingdamage.

Inthisbook,Idrawonmymorethantwo-decadecareerintheFederalBureauofInvestigationtodistilltheprinciplesand practices I deployed in the field into an exciting newapproach designed to help you disarm, redirect, anddismantleyourcounterpartinvirtuallyanynegotiation.Andtodosoinarelationship-affirmingway.

Yes, you’ll learn howwenegotiated the safe release ofcountlesshostages.Butyou’llalsolearnhowtouseadeepunderstanding ofhuman psychology to negotiate a lowercar price, a bigger raise, and a child’s bedtime.This bookwill teach you to reclaim control of the conversations thatinformyourlifeandcareer.

Thefirststeptoachievingamasteryofdailynegotiationis togetoveryouraversion tonegotiating.Youdon’tneedto like it;you justneed tounderstand that’show theworldworks.Negotiatingdoesnotmeanbrowbeatingorgrindingsomeone down. It simply means playing the emotionalgamethathumansocietyissetupfor.Inthisworld,yougetwhat you ask for; you just have to ask correctly. So claimyourprerogativetoaskforwhatyouthinkisright.

What this book is really about, then, is getting you toaccept negotiation and in doing so learn how to get whatyou want in a psychologically aware way.You’ll learn to

useyour emotions, instincts, and insights in any encounterto connect better with others, influence them, and achievemore.

Effective negotiation is applied people smarts, apsychological edge in every domain of life: how to sizesomeone up, how to influence their sizing up of you, andhowtousethatknowledgetogetwhatyouwant.

But beware: this is not another pop-psych book. It’s adeep and thoughtful (and most of all, practical) take onleading psychological theory that distills lessons from atwenty-four-year career in the FBI and ten years teachingandconsultinginthebestbusinessschoolsandcorporationsintheworld.

And itworks for one simple reason: itwas designed inand for the realworld. Itwasnotborn in a classroomor atraining hall, but built from years of experience thatimprovedituntilitreachednearperfection.

Remember,ahostagenegotiatorplaysauniquerole:hehas to win. Can he say to a bank robber, “Okay, you’vetakenfourhostages.Let’ssplitthedifference—givemetwo,andwe’llcallitaday?”

No. A successful hostage negotiator has to geteverything he asks for, without giving anything back ofsubstance, and do so in a way thatleaves the adversariesfeeling as if they have a great relationship. His work isemotionalintelligenceonsteroids.Thosearethetoolsyou’lllearnhere.

THEBOOK

Likeacontractorbuildingahouse,thisbookisconstructedfromthegroundup:firstcomesthebigslabsoffoundation,then the necessary load-bearing walls, the elegant butimpermeableroof,andthelovelyinteriordecorations.

Each chapter expands on the previous one. First you’lllearn the refined techniques of this approach toActiveListeningandthenyou’llmoveontospecifictools,turnsofphrase, the ins and outs of the final act—haggling—and,finally,howtodiscovertheraritythatcanhelpyouachievetruenegotiatinggreatness:theBlackSwan.

InChapter2,you’lllearnhowtoavoidtheassumptionsthatblindneophytenegotiatorsandreplacethemwithActiveListening techniques likeMirroring,Silences, and theLate-Night FM DJ Voice . You’ll discover how to slow thingsdownandmakeyourcounterpartfeelsafeenoughtorevealthemselves; to discern between wants (aspirations) andneeds (thebareminimumforadeal);and to laser-focusonwhattheotherpartyhastosay.

Chapter3willdelveintoTacticalEmpathy .You’lllearnhow to recognize your counterpart’s perspective and thengain trust and understanding throughLabeling—that is, byrepeating that perspective back to them.You’ll also learnhowtodefusenegativedynamicsbybringingthemintotheopen.Finally,I’llexplainhowtodisarmyourcounterpart’scomplaints about you by speaking them aloud in anAccusationAudit.

Next, in Chapter 4, I’ll examine ways to make your

counterpart feel understood and positively affirmed in anegotiation in order to createan atmosphere ofunconditional positive regard. Here, you’ll learn why youshould strive for “That’s right” instead of “Yes” at everystageofanegotiation,andhowtoidentify,rearticulate,andemotionally affirm your counterpart’s worldview withSummariesandParaphrasing.

Chapter5 teaches the flip sideofGetting to Yes.You’lllearnwhyit’svitallyimportanttogetto“No”because“No”starts the negotiation.You’ll also discover how to step outof your ego and negotiate in your counterpart’sworld, theonly way to achieve an agreement the other side willimplement. Finally, you’ll see how to engage yourcounterpart by acknowledging their right to choose, andyou’lllearnanemailtechniquethatensuresthatyou’llneverbeignoredagain.

InChapter 6, you’ll discover the art of bending reality.That is, I’ll explain a variety of tools for framing anegotiation in such a way that your counterpart willunconsciouslyacceptthelimitsyouplaceonthediscussion.You’ll learn how to navigate deadlines to create urgency;employ the ideaof fairness tonudgeyourcounterpart;andanchor theiremotionsso thatnotacceptingyouroffer feelslikealoss.

After this, Chapter 7 is dedicated to that incrediblypowerful tool I used at Harvard:CalibratedQuestions, thequeries thatbeginwith“How?”or“What?”Byeliminating“Yes” and “No” answers they force your counterpart to

applytheirmentalenergytosolvingyourproblems.In Chapter 8 I demonstrate how to employ these

Calibrated Questions to guard against failures in theimplementation phase. “Yes,” as I always say, is nothingwithout “How?” You’ll also discover the importance ofnonverbal communication; how to use “How”questions togentlysay“No”;howtogetyourcounterpartstobidagainstthemselves; and how to influence the deal killers whenthey’renotatthetable.

At a certain point, every negotiation gets down to thebrasstacks:thatis,toold-schoolhaggling.Chapter9offersastep-by-stepprocessforeffectivebargaining,fromhowtopreparetohowtododgeanaggressivecounterpartandhowto go on the offensive.You’ll learn theAckerman system,the most effective process the FBI has for setting andmakingoffers.

Finally,Chapter 10 explains how to find and use thosemost rareofnegotiationanimals: theBlackSwan. Ineverynegotiation there are between three and five pieces ofinformationthat,weretheytobeuncovered,wouldchangeeverything. The concept is an absolute game-changer; somuchso,I’venamedmycompanyTheBlackSwanGroup.In this chapter, you’ll learn how to recognize the markersthat show theBlackSwan’s hidden nest, aswell as simpletoolsforemployingBlackSwanstogainleverageoveryourcounterpartandachievetrulyamazingdeals.

Each chapter will start with a fast-paced story of ahostage negotiation, which will then be dissected with an

eye to explaining what worked and what didn’t. After Iexplain the theory and the tools, you’ll read real-life casestudies from me and others who’ve used these tools toprevail while negotiating a salary, purchasing a car, orworkingoutnettlesomeproblemsathome.

When you finish this book, I will have succeeded ifyou’ve applied these crucial techniques to improve yourcareer and life. I’m sure you will. Just remember, tosuccessfullynegotiateit iscriticaltoprepare.WhichiswhyintheAppendixyou’llfindaninvaluabletoolIusewithallmystudentsandclientscalledtheNegotiationOneSheet:aconciseprimerofnearlyallourtacticsandstrategiesforyouto think through and customize for whatever kind of dealyou’relookingtoclose.

Mostimportanttomeisthatyouunderstandhowurgent,essential, and even beautiful negotiation can be.Whenweembrace negotiating’s transformative possibilities,we learnhowtogetwhatwewantandhowtomoveotherstoabetterplace.

Negotiationistheheartofcollaboration.Itiswhatmakesconflict potentially meaningful and productive for allparties.Itcanchangeyourlife,asithaschangedmine.

I’ve always thought of myself as just a regular guy.Hardworking andwilling to learn, yes, but not particularlytalented. And I’ve always felt that life holds amazingpossibilities. Inmymuchyoungerdays, I just didn’t knowhowtounlockthosepossibilities.

ButwiththeskillsI’velearned,I’vefoundmyselfdoing

extraordinary things and watching the people I’ve taughtachieve truly life-changing results.When I use what I’velearnedoverthelastthirtyyears,IknowIactuallyhavethepower tochange thecourseofwheremy life isgoing,andtohelpothersdo thataswell.Thirtyyearsago,while I feltlikethatcouldbedone,Ididn’tknowhow.

NowIdo.Here’show.

CHAPTER2

BEAMIRROR

September30,1993

Abriskautumnmorning,aroundeightthirty.Twomaskedbank robbers triggeranalarmas theystorm into theChaseManhattan Bank at SeventhAvenue and Carroll Street inBrooklyn. There are only two female tellers and a malesecurityguardinside.Therobberscracktheunarmedsixty-year-old security guard across the skull with a .357, draghim to the men’s room, and lock him inside. One of thetellersgetsthesamepistol-whippingtreatment.

Thenoneoftherobbersturnstotheotherteller,putsthebarrel in her mouth, and pulls the trigger—click, goes theemptychamber.

“Next one is real,” says the robber. “Now open thevault.”

Abankrobbery,withhostages.Happensall the timein themovies, but it had been almost twenty years since there’dbeenoneofthesestandoffsinNewYork,thecitywithmorehostage negotiation jobs than any other jurisdiction in thecountry.

Andthishappenedtobemyveryfirstfeet-to-the-fire,in-

your-facehostagejob.Ihadbeentrainingforaboutayearandahalfinhostage

negotiations,butIhadn’thadachancetousemynewskills.Forme,1993hadalreadybeenaverybusyand incredibleride.Working on the FBI’s Joint TerrorismTask Force, Ihadbeentheco–caseagentinaninvestigationthatthwartedaplottosetoffbombsintheHollandandLincolnTunnels,theUnitedNations, and 26Federal Plaza, the home of theFBIinNewYorkCity.Webrokeitupjustasterroristsweremixingbombsinasafehouse.Theplotterswereassociatedwith an Egyptian cell that had ties to the “Blind Sheikh,”who laterwouldbe foundguiltyofmasterminding theplotthatweuncovered.

Youmightthinkabankrobberywouldbesmallpotatoesafterwebustedupaterroristplot,butbythenIhadalreadycome to realize that negotiation would be my lifelongpassion. Iwas eager to putmy new skills to the test.Andbesides,therewasnothingsmallaboutthissituation.

When we got the call, my colleague Charlie Beaudoinand I raced to the scene, bailed out of his black CrownVictoria, and made our way to the command post. Thewholecavalryshowedupforthisone—NYPD,FBI,SWAT—all themuscle and savvy of law enforcement up againstthe knee-jerk desperation of a couple of bank robbersseeminglyinovertheirheads.

NewYorkpolice,behindawallofblueandwhitetrucksand patrol cars, had set up across the street inside anotherbank. SWAT team members, peering through rifle scopes

from the roofs of nearby brownstone buildings, had theirweaponstrainedonthebank’sfrontandreardoors.

ASSUMPTIONSBLIND,HYPOTHESESGUIDE

Goodnegotiators,goingin,knowtheyhavetobereadyforpossiblesurprises;greatnegotiatorsaimtousetheirskillstorevealthesurprisestheyarecertainexist.

Experience will have taught them that they are bestservedbyholdingmultiplehypotheses—aboutthesituation,about the counterpart’s wants, about a whole array ofvariables—in theirmindat thesame time.Presentandalertinthemoment,theyuseallthenewinformationthatcomestheir way to test and winnow true hypotheses from falseones.

In negotiation, each new psychological insight oradditional piece of information revealed heralds a stepforward and allows one to discard one hypothesis in favorof another.You should engage the processwith amindsetof discovery. Your goal at the outset is to extract andobserve as much information as possible. Which, by theway, is one of the reasons that really smart people oftenhavetroublebeingnegotiators—they’resosmarttheythinktheydon’thaveanythingtodiscover.

Too often people find it easier just to stick with whattheybelieve.Usingwhatthey’veheardortheirownbiases,they often make assumptions about others even beforemeeting them.They even ignore their own perceptions tomake them conform to foregone conclusions. These

assumptions muck up our perceptual windows onto theworld, showing us an unchanging—often flawed—versionofthesituation.

Great negotiators are able to question the assumptionsthat the rest of the involved players accept on faith or inarrogance, and thus remain more emotionally open to allpossibilities,andmoreintellectuallyagiletoafluidsituation.

Unfortunately,backin1993,Iwasfarfromgreat.Everyonethought thecrisiswouldbeoverquickly.The

bank robbers had little choice but to surrender—or so wethought.We actually started the day with intelligence thatthe bank robbers wanted to surrender. Little did we knowthat was a ruse their ringleader planted to buy time.Andthroughout the day, he constantly referred to the influencethe other four bank robbers exerted on him. I hadn’t yetlearned to be aware of a counterpart’s overuse of personalpronouns—we/they o rme/I. The less important he makeshimself,themoreimportantheprobablyis(andviceversa).We would later find out there was only one other bankrobber,andhehadbeen tricked into therobbery.Actually,three robbers, if you counted the getaway driver, who gotawaybeforeweevenenteredthescene.

The “lead” hostage-taker was running his own“counterintelligence operation,” feeding us all kinds ofmisinformation. Hewanted us to think he had a bunch ofco-conspirators with him—from a number of differentcountries.Healsowantedustothinkthathispartnersweremuchmorevolatileanddangerousthanhewas.

Looking back, of course, his game planwas clear—hewanted to confuse us as much as he could until he couldfigureawayout.Hewouldconstantlytellusthathewasn’tin charge and that every decisionwas the responsibility oftheotherguys.Hewouldindicatethathewasscared—or,atleast, a little tentative—when we asked him to pass alongcertain information.Andyet he always spokewith a voiceof complete calm and absolute confidence. It was aremindertomycolleaguesandmethatuntilyouknowwhatyou’re dealing with, you don’t know what you’re dealingwith.

Though the call had come in about 8:30 a.m., by thetimewe arrived across the street from the bank andmadecontactitwasprobablyabout10:30a.m.Thewordwhenwecame on the scene was that this was going to be cookie-cutter, by the book, short and sweet. Our commandersthoughtwe’dbeinandoutofthereintenminutes,becausethebadguyssupposedlywantedtogivethemselvesup.Thiswould later become a problem, when negotiations stalledand Command became embarrassed, because they’dmadethe mistake of sharing this early optimism with the press,basedonalltheearlymisinformation.

We arrived on the scene to take a surrender, but thesituationwentsidewaysalmostimmediately.

Everythingweassumedweknewwaswrong.

CALMTHESCHIZOPHRENIC

OurNegotiationOperationCenter (NOC)was set up in an

officeinabankimmediatelyacrossanarrowstreetfromtheChasebranch.Wewerewaytooclosetothehostagesite,soright away we were at a disadvantage.We were less thanthirtyyardsfromthecrisispoint,whereideallyyouwanttohave a little more of a buffer than that.You want to putsome distance between you and whatever worst-casescenariomightbewaitingattheotherendofthedeal.

When my partner and I arrived, I was immediatelyassigned to coach the police department negotiator on thephone. His name was Joe, and he was doing fine—but inthesetypesofsituations,nobodyworkedalone.Wealwaysworked in teams.The thinking behind this policywas thatalltheseextrasetsofearswouldpickupextrainformation.In some standoffs, we had as many as five people on theline, analyzing the information as it came in, offeringbehind-the-scenes input and guidance to our man on thephone—and that’s how we were set up here.We had Joetakingtheleadonthephone,andanotherthreeorfourofuswere listening in, passing notes back and forth, trying tomakesenseofaconfusingsituation.Oneofuswastryingtogaugethemoodofthebadguytakingtheleadontheotherend, and another was listening in for clues or “tells” thatmightgiveusabetterreadonwhatwewerefacing,andsoon.

Studentsofminebalkat thisnotion,asking,“Seriously,doyoureallyneedawholeteamto...hearsomeoneout?”The fact that the FBI has come to that conclusion, I tellthem, shouldbe awake-up call. It’s really not that easy to

listenwell.We are easily distracted. We engage in selective

listening, hearing only what we want to hear, our mindsactingonacognitivebias forconsistency rather than truth.Andthat’sjustthestart.

Most people approach a negotiation so preoccupied bytheargumentsthatsupporttheirpositionthattheyareunabletolistenattentively.Inoneofthemostcitedresearchpapersinpsychology,1GeorgeA.Millerpersuasivelyputforththeidea that we can process only about seven pieces ofinformationinourconsciousmindatanygivenmoment.Inotherwords,weareeasilyoverwhelmed.

For those people who view negotiation as a battle ofarguments, it’s the voices in their own head that areoverwhelming them. When they’re not talking, they’rethinking about their arguments, andwhen they are talking,they’remaking their arguments.Often those on both sidesof the table are doing the same thing, so you havewhat Icall a state of schizophrenia: everyone just listening to thevoice in their head (and not well, because they’re doingseven or eight other things at the same time). Itmay looklike there areonly twopeople in a conversation,but reallyit’smorelikefourpeoplealltalkingatonce.

There’s one powerful way to quiet the voice in yourheadandthevoiceintheirheadatthesametime:treattwoschizophrenicswithjustonepill.Insteadofprioritizingyourargument—infact,insteadofdoinganythinkingatallintheearly goings about what you’re going to say—make your

soleandall-encompassingfocus theotherpersonandwhatthey have to say. In that mode of true active listening—aidedbythetacticsyou’lllearninthefollowingchapters—you’lldisarmyourcounterpart.You’llmakethemfeelsafe.Thevoiceintheirheadwillbegintoquietdown.

The goal is to identify what your counterparts actuallyneed (monetarily, emotionally, or otherwise) and get themfeeling safe enough to talk and talk and talk some moreaboutwhat theywant.The latterwillhelpyoudiscover theformer. Wants are easy to talk about, representing theaspirationofgettingourway,andsustaininganyillusionofcontrol we have as we begin to negotiate; needs implysurvival,theveryminimumrequiredtomakeusact,andsomakeusvulnerable.Butneitherwantsnorneedsarewherewe start; it beginswith listening,making it about the otherpeople,validatingtheiremotions,andcreatingenoughtrustandsafetyforarealconversationtobegin.

Wewere far from that goalwith the lead hostage-takeron thecall.Hekeptputtingup theseweird smoke screens.Hewouldn’tgiveuphisname,hetriedtodisguisehisvoice,hewas always telling Joe hewas being put on speaker soeveryone around him in the bank could hear, and then hewouldabruptlyannouncethathewasputtingJoeon“hold”and hang up the phone.Hewas constantly asking about avan,sayingheandhispartnerswantedustoarrangeoneforthemsotheycoulddrivethemselvesandthehostagestothelocal precinct to surrender. That was where the surrendernonsense had come from—but, of course, this wasn’t a

surrenderplansomuchasitwasanescapeplan.Inthebackofhismind, this guy thought he could somehow leave thebank without being taken into custody, and now that hisgetaway driver had fled the scene he needed access to avehicle.

Afteritwasallover,acoupleofotherdetailscameclear.Weweren’ttheonlyoneswhohadbeenliedto.Apparently,this lead bank robber hadn’t told his partners they weregoing to rob a bank that morning. It turned out he was acash courierwho serviced the bank, and his partnerswereunder theimpressionthat theyweregoingtoburglarize theATM. They didn’t sign up for taking hostages, so welearnedthatthisguy’sco-conspiratorswerealsohostages,inaway.Theywere caught up in a bad situation they didn’tsee coming—and, in the end, it was this “disconnect”among the hostage-takers that helped us to drive a wedgebetweenthemandputanendtothestalemate.

SLOW.IT.DOWN.

Theleaderwantedtomakeusthinkheandhispartnersweretakinggoodcareofhishostages,but in reality the securityguardwasoutofthepictureandthesecondbanktellerhadrun to the bank basement to hide.Whenever Joe said hewantedtotalktothehostages,thehostage-takerwouldstall,andmakeitseemliketherewasthisfrenzyofactivitygoingoninsidethebank,goingtoridiculouslengthstotellushowmuchtimeandenergyheandhiscohortswerespendingontaking good care of the hostages. Very often, the leader

would use this as a reason to put Joe on hold, or to end acall.He’dsay,“Thegirlsneed togo to thebathroom.”Or,“Thegirlswanttocalltheirfamilies.”Or,“Thegirlswanttogetsomethingtoeat.”

Joewasdoingagood jobkeeping thisguy talking,buthe was slightly limited by the negotiating approach thatpolice departments were using at the time. The approachwas half MSU—Making Shit Up—and half a sort of salesapproach—basically trying to persuade, coerce, ormanipulateinanywaypossible.Theproblemwas,wewerein too much of a hurry, driving too hard toward a quicksolution;tryingtobeaproblemsolver,notapeoplemover.

Going too fast isoneof themistakesallnegotiatorsareprone tomaking. Ifwe’re toomuch inahurry,peoplecanfeel as if they’renot beingheard andwe riskunderminingtherapportandtrustwe’vebuilt.There’splentyofresearchthat now validates the passage of time as one of themostimportanttoolsforanegotiator.Whenyouslowtheprocessdown, you also calm it down. After all, if someone istalking,they’renotshooting.

We caught a break when the robbers started to makenoise about food. Joewasgoingback and forthwith themfor awhile onwhat theywere going to have and howweweregoingtogetittothem.Itbecameanegotiationinandofitself.Wegotitallsetup,preparedtosendthefoodinona kind of robot device, because that’s what this guy wascomfortable with, but then he did an about-face, said toforget about it. Said they’d found some food inside, so it

wasjustonebrickwallafteranother,onesmokescreenafteranother. It would feel to us like we were making a littleprogress, then this guywould take an abrupt turn, or hanguponus,orchangehismind.

Meanwhile, our investigators used the time to run theregistration of every one of the dozens of vehicles foundnearbyonthestreet,andmanagedtospeaktotheownersofeveryoneofthemexceptone—acarbelongingtosomeonenamedChrisWatts.Thisbecameouroneandonly lead,atthetime,andasourendlessback-and-forthcontinuedonthephone we sent a group of investigators to the address onChrisWatts’s registration,where they found someonewhoknewChrisWattsandagreedtocomedowntothesceneofthestandofftopossiblyidentifyhim.

We still didn’t have a visual on the inside, so oureyewitnesshadtobemoreofan“earwitness”—andhewasabletoidentifyChrisWattsbyhisvoice.

Wenowknewmoreaboutouradversarythanhethoughtweknew,whichputusatamomentaryadvantage.Wewereputtingtogetherallthepuzzlepieces,butitdidn’tgetusanyclosertoourendgame,whichwastodetermineforsurewhowasinsidethebuilding,toensurethehealthandwell-beingof the hostages, and to get them all out safely—the goodguysandthebadguys.

THEVOICE

Afterfivehours,wewerestuck,sothelieutenant inchargeaskedme to take over. Joewas out; Iwas in. Basically, it

was the only strategic play at our disposal that didn’tinvolveanescalationinforce.

ThemanwenowknewasChrisWatts hadbeen in thehabit of endinghis calls abruptly, somy jobwas to find awaytokeephimtalking.IswitchedintomyLate-Night,FMDJ Voice : deep, soft, slow, and reassuring. I had beeninstructed to confrontWatts as soon as possible about hisidentity. I also came onto the phone with no warning,replacing Joe, against standard protocol. It was a shrewdmove by the NYPD lieutenant to shake things up, but iteasily could have backfired. This soothing voice was thekeytoeasingtheconfrontation.

ChrisWatts heardmyvoice on the line and cutme offimmediately—said,“Hey,whathappenedtoJoe?”

I said, “Joe’s gone.This isChris.You’re talking tomenow.”

I didn’t put it like a question. I made a downward-inflectingstatement,inadownward-inflectingtoneofvoice.Thebestwaytodescribethelate-nightFMDJ’svoiceisasthevoiceofcalmandreason.

Whendeliberatingonanegotiatingstrategyorapproach,peopletendtofocusalltheirenergiesonwhattosayordo,but it’s how weare (our general demeanor and delivery)that is both the easiest thing to enact and the mostimmediately effectivemode of influence. Our brains don’tjustprocessandunderstandtheactionsandwordsofothersbut their feelings and intentions too, the socialmeaning oftheirbehaviorandtheiremotions.Onamostlyunconscious

level, we can understand the minds of others not throughany kind of thinking but through quite literally graspingwhattheotherisfeeling.

Think of it as a kind of involuntary neurologicaltelepathy—each of us in every givenmoment signaling totheworldarounduswhetherweare ready toplayor fight,laughorcry.

Whenweradiatewarmthandacceptance,conversationsjust seem to flow.When we enter a room with a level ofcomfortandenthusiasm,weattractpeopletowardus.Smileatsomeoneonthestreet,andasareflexthey’llsmileback.Understanding that reflex and putting it into practice iscritical to the success of just about every negotiating skillthereistolearn.

That’s why your most powerful tool in any verbalcommunication is your voice.You can use your voice tointentionally reach into someone’s brain and flip anemotional switch. Distrusting to trusting. Nervous to calm.Inaninstant,theswitchwillflipjustlikethatwiththerightdelivery.

There are essentially three voice tones available tonegotiators: the late-nightFMDJvoice, thepositive/playfulvoice,andthedirectorassertivevoice.Forget theassertivevoicefornow;exceptinveryrarecircumstances,usingitislike slapping yourself in the face while you’re trying tomake progress. You’re signaling dominance onto yourcounterpart, who will either aggressively, or passive-aggressively,pushbackagainstattemptstobecontrolled.

Most of the time, you should be using thepositive/playfulvoice.It’sthevoiceofaneasygoing,good-naturedperson.Yourattitudeis lightandencouraging.Thekeyhereistorelaxandsmilewhileyou’retalking.Asmile,evenwhiletalkingonthephone,hasanimpacttonallythattheotherpersonwillpickupon.

Theeffectthesevoiceshavearecross-culturalandneverlost in translation. On a vacation to Turkey with hisgirlfriend,oneofour instructors atTheBlackSwanGroupwas befuddled—not to mention a little embarrassed—thathis partner was repeatedly getting better deals in theirbackstreethagglingsessionsatthespicemarketsinIstanbul.For the merchants in such markets throughout the MiddleEast,bargainingisanartform.Theiremotionalintelligenceis finely honed, and they’ll use hospitality and friendlinessinapowerfulwaytodrawyouinandcreatereciprocitythatends inanexchangeofmoney.But itworksbothways,asour instructor discovered while observing his girlfriend inaction: she approached each encounter as a fun game, sothatnomatterhowaggressively shepushed,her smile andplayfuldemeanorprimedhermerchantfriendstosettleonasuccessfuloutcome.

Whenpeopleareinapositiveframeofmind,theythinkmore quickly, and are more likely to collaborate andproblem-solve (insteadof fight and resist). It applies to thesmile-er asmuch as to the smile-ee: a smile on your face,andinyourvoice,willincreaseyourownmentalagility.

Playfulwasn’t themovewithChrisWatts.Theway the

late-nightFMDJvoiceworksisthat,whenyouinflectyourvoice inadownwardway,youput itout there thatyou’vegot it covered.Talking slowly andclearlyyouconveyoneidea:I’m in control.When you inflect in anupward way,you invite a response.Why?Because you’ve brought in ameasureofuncertainty.You’vemadeastatementsoundlikea question.You’ve left the door open for the other guy totakethelead,soIwascarefulheretobequiet,self-assured.

It’sthesamevoiceImightuseinacontractnegotiation,whenanitemisn’tupfordiscussion.IfIseeawork-for-hireclause, for example, I might say, “We don’t do work-for-hire.”Justlikethat,plain,simple,andfriendly.Idon’tofferup an alternative, because it would beg further discussion,soIjustmakeastraightforwarddeclaration.

That’showIplayed ithere. I said,“Joe’sgone.You’retalkingtomenow.”

Donedeal.Youcanbeverydirect and to thepoint as longasyou

create safetybya toneofvoice that says I’mokay,you’reokay,let’sfigurethingsout.

The tidewas turning.ChrisWattswas rattled,buthehadafewmoves left inhim.Oneof thebadguyswent down tothe basement and collected one of the female bank tellers.She’d disappeared into the bowels of the bank at somepoint, but ChrisWatts and his accomplice hadn’t chasedafter her because they knew she wasn’t going anywhere.Nowoneofthebankrobbersdraggedherbackupstairsandputheronthephone.

Shesaid,“I’mokay.”That’sall.Isaid,“Whoisthis?”Shesaid,“I’mokay.”Iwanted tokeepher talking, so Iaskedhername—but

then,justlikethat,shewasgone.ThiswasabrilliantmoveonChrisWatts’spart.Itwasa

threat, teasing us with the woman’s voice, but subtly andindirectly. Itwas away for the bad guy to let us knowhewas calling the shots on his end of the phone withoutdirectly escalating the situation.He’d given us a “proof oflife,”confirmingthathedidindeedhavehostageswithhimwhowereindecentenoughshapetotalkonthephone,butstopped short of allowing us to gather any usefulinformation.

He’dmanagedtotakebackameasureofcontrol.

MIRRORING

Chris Watts came back on the phone trying to act likenothinghadhappened.Hewasalittlerattled,that’sforsure,butnowhewastalking.

“We’veidentifiedeverycaronthestreetandtalkedtoalltheowners exceptone,” I said toWatts. “We’vegot avanout here, a blue and gray van.We’ve been able to get ahandleontheownersofallofthevehiclesexceptthisoneinparticular.Doyouknowanythingaboutit?”

“The other vehicle’s not out there because you guyschasedmydriveraway...”heblurted.

“Wechasedyourdriveraway?”Imirrored.

“Well,whenheseenthepolicehecut.”“Wedon’tknowanythingabout thisguy; ishe theone

whowasdrivingthevan?”Iasked.ThemirroringcontinuedbetweenmeandWatts,andhe

madeaseriesofdamagingadmissions.Hestartedvomitinginformation,aswenowrefertoitinmyconsultingbusiness.Hetalkedaboutanaccomplicewehadnoknowledgeofatthe time. That exchange helped us nail the driver of thegetawaycar.

Mirroring, also called isopraxism, is essentially imitation.It’s another neurobehavior humans (and other animals)displayinwhichwecopyeachothertocomforteachother.It can be done with speech patterns, body language,vocabulary, tempo, and tone of voice. It’s generally anunconscious behavior—we are rarely aware of itwhen it’shappening—butit’sasignthatpeoplearebonding,insync,andestablishingthekindofrapportthatleadstotrust.

It’s a phenomenon (and now technique) that follows averybasicbutprofoundbiologicalprinciple:Wefearwhat’sdifferent and are drawn to what’s similar. As the sayinggoes,birdsofafeatherflocktogether.Mirroring,then,whenpracticed consciously, is the art of insinuating similarity.“Trustme,”amirrorsignalstoanother’sunconscious,“YouandI—we’realike.”

Once you’re attuned to the dynamic, you’ll see iteverywhere:coupleswalkingonthestreetwiththeirstepsinperfect synchrony; friends in conversation at a park, bothnoddingtheirheadsandcrossingthelegsataboutthesame

time.Thesepeopleare,inaword,connected.Whilemirroring ismost often associatedwith forms of

nonverbal communication, especially body language, asnegotiators a “mirror” focuses on the words and nothingelse.Notthebodylanguage.Nottheaccent.Notthetoneordelivery.Justthewords.

It’s almost laughably simple: for the FBI, a “mirror” iswhenyou repeat the last threewords (or thecriticalone tothreewords)ofwhatsomeonehas justsaid.Of theentiretyof the FBI’s hostage negotiation skill set, mirroring is theclosest one gets to a Jedi mind trick. Simple, and yetuncannilyeffective.

By repeating back what people say, you trigger thismirroring instinct and your counterpart will inevitablyelaborate onwhatwas just said and sustain the process ofconnecting.PsychologistRichardWiseman created a studyusing waiters to identify what was the more effectivemethodofcreatingaconnectionwithstrangers:mirroringorpositivereinforcement.

One group of waiters, using positive reinforcement,lavishedpraiseandencouragementonpatronsusingwordssuch as “great,” “no problem,” and “sure” in response toeach order. The other group of waiters mirrored theircustomers simply by repeating their orders back to them.Theresultswerestunning:theaveragetipofthewaiterswhomirrored was 70 percent more than of those who usedpositivereinforcement.

I decided itwas time to hit himwith his name—to let him

knowwewereontohim.Isaid,“There’savehicleouthere,andit’sregisteredtoaChrisWatts.”

Hesaid,“Okay.”Notlettinganythingon.Isaid,“Ishethere?Isthisyou?AreyouChrisWatts?”It was a stupid question, onmy part.Amistake. For a

mirrortobeeffective,you’vegottoletitsitthereanddoitswork.Itneedsabitofsilence.Isteppedallovermymirror.AssoonasIsaidit,Iwantedtotakeitback.

“AreyouChrisWatts?”What thehell could this guy say to that?Of course, he

replied,“No.”I’dmadeabone-headedmoveandgivenChrisWatts a

way to dodge this confrontation, but he was neverthelessrattled. Up until this moment, he’d thought he wasanonymous.Whatever fantasy he had running through hishead, therewas awayout forhim, ado-overbutton.Nowhe knew different. I composed myself, slowed it down alittle, and this time shutmymouthafter themirror—I said,“No?Yousaid‘okay.’”

Now I had him, I thought.His voicewentway up.Heended up blurting a few things out, vomiting moreinformation, andbecame so flusteredhe stopped talking tome. Suddenly his accomplice, who we later learned wasBobbyGoodwin,cameontothephone.

We hadn’t heard from this second hostage-taker, untilnow.We’dknown all along thatChrisWattswasn’t actingalone, but we hadn’t gotten a good read on how manypeoplehehadworkingwithhimonthis,andnowherewas

his unwitting accomplice, thinking our original policedepartmentnegotiatorwasstillhandlingourend.Weknewthis because he kept callingme “Joe,” which told us he’dbeen in the loop early on, and somewhat less involved asthestalematedraggedon.

At the very least, the disconnect told me these guysweren’t exactly on the same page—but I didn’t jump tocorrecthim.

Another thing: it sounded like this second guy wasspeaking through a towel, or a sweatshirt—like he wasbiting on some kind of fabric, even. Going to all theselengths to mask his voice, which meant he was clearlyscared. Hewas nervous, jumpy as hell, anxious over howthisstandoffwasgoingdown.

I tried to set him at ease—still with the downward-inflectingDJ voice. I said, “Nobody’s going anywhere.” Isaid,“Nobody’sgonnagethurt.”

Afteraboutaminuteandahalf,thejumpinessseemedtodisappear.Themuffledvoice, too.Hisvoicecame throughmuchmoreclearlyashesaid,“Itrustyou,Joe.”

ThemoreIkeptthissecondguyonthephone,themoreit became clear he was someplace he did not want to be.Bobbywantedout—and, of course, hewantedoutwithoutgettinghurt.Hewasalreadyindeep,buthedidn’twantittogetanydeeper.Hedidn’tstartoutthatdayplanningtorobabank,butittookhearingmycalmvoiceontheotherendofthe phone for him to start to see a way out.The seventh-largeststandingarmyin theworldwasat thereadyoutside

thebankdoors—that’s the sizeandscopeof theNYPD, infullforce,andtheirgunswerefixedonhimandhispartner.Obviously, Bobby was desperate to step out those doorsunharmed.

Ididn’tknowwhereBobbywas,insidethebank.Tothisday, I don’t know if he managed to step away from hispartner, or if he was talking to me in plain sight of ChrisWatts. Ionlyknowthat Ihadhis fullattention,and thathewas looking for away to end the standoff—or, at least, toendhisroleinit.

I learned later that in between phone calls ChrisWattswasbusysquirrelingcashinsidethebankwalls.Hewasalsoburning piles of cash, in full view of the two femalehostages.Onthefaceofit,thiswasbizarrebehavior,buttoa guy like Chris Watts there was a certain logic to it.Apparently, he’d gotten it in his head that he could burn,say, $50,000, and if $300,000 was reported missing bankofficials wouldn’t think to go looking for the other$250,000. It was an interesting deception—not exactlyclever,butinteresting.Itshowedaweirdattentiontodetail.Inhisownmindat least, ifChrisWattsmanaged toescapethisboxhe’dmadeforhimself,hecouldlielowforawhileand come back at some future date for the money he’dstashed away—money that would no longer be on thebank’sledgers.

WhatI likedabout thissecondguy,Bobby,wasthathedidn’ttrytoplayanygameswithmeonthephone.Hewasa straight shooter, so I was able to respond as a straight

shooter inkind.ThesamewayI’dgetbackwhatever Iputout,hewasgettingbackwhateverhewasputtingout, so Iwaswithhimonthis.ExperiencetoldmeallIhadtodowaskeephimtalkingandhe’dcomearound.We’dfindawaytogethimoutofthatbank—withorwithoutChrisWatts.

Someoneonmyteamhandedmeanote:“Askhimifhewantstocomeout.”

Isaid,“Doyouwanttocomeoutfirst?”Ipaused,remainingsilent.“Idon’tknowhowI’ddoit,”Bobbysaidfinally.“What’sstoppingyoufromdoingitrightnow?”Iasked.“HowdoIdothat?”heaskedagain.“Tellyouwhat.Meetmeoutfrontrightnow.”This was a breakthrough moment for us—but we still

had to get Bobby out of there, and find a way to let himknow that I’d be waiting for him on the other side of thedoor.I’dgivenhimmywordthatIwouldbetheonetotakehis surrender, and that he wouldn’t get hurt, and now wehad to make that happen—and very often it’s thisimplementationphasethatcanbethemostdifficult.

Our teamscrambled toput aplan inplace tobring thisabout.Istartedputtingonbulletproofgear.Wesurveyedthescene,figuringIcouldpositionmyselfbehindoneofthebigtruckswe’d parked out in front of the bank, to giveme ameasureofcover,justincase.

Then we ran into one of those maddening situationswhere one hand didn’t knowwhat the other was doing. Itturned out the bank door had been barricaded from the

outsideearlyoninthestandoff—aprecautiontoensurethatnoneofthebankrobberscouldfleethescene.Weallknewthis, of course, on some level, butwhen the timecame forBobbytogivehimselfupandwalkoutthedoor,it’slikeourbrains went into sleep mode. No one on the SWAT teamthought to remind anyone on the negotiating team of thisone significant detail, so for a couple long beats Bobbycouldn’tgetout,andIgotasickfeelinginmystomachthatwhatever progress we’d justmadewith this guywould befornothing.

So there we were, scrambling to recover. Soon, twoSWAT guys moved forward toward the entrance, withballistic shields, guns drawn, to take the locks and thebarricade off the door—and at this point they still didn’tknow what they were facing on the other side. It was asuper-tensemoment.There could have been a dozen gunsonthesetwoSWATguys,buttherewasnothingforthemtodo but make their slow approach. Those guys were rocksolid.Theyunlockedthedoor,backedaway,andfinallyweweregoodtogo.

Bobby came out—his hands in the air. I’dwalked himthroughaspecificsetofinstructionsonwhattodowhenhecameoutthedoor,whattoexpect.AcoupleofSWATguyspatted him down. Bobby turned and looked and said,“Where’sChris?TakemetoChris.”

Finally, they brought him around to me, and we wereable to debrief him inside our makeshift command post.Thiswas the firstwe learned that therewasonlyoneother

hostage-taker inside—and thisnaturally set thecommanderoff. I didn’t learn this until later, but I could see why hewouldhavebeenangryandembarrassedat this latest turn.Allalong,he’dbeentellingthemediatherewereabunchofbad guysinside—an international assemblageof badguys,remember? But now that it turned out it was essentially atwo-manoperation,andoneofthebadguyshadwantednopart of it, the commander looked like he didn’t have ahandleonthesituation.

But like I said,wedidn’tknowabout thecommander’sreaction justyet.Allweknewwas thatwe’d justgottenallthisnewintel,whichtolduswewereclosertoachievingourdesired outcome than we had just thought. This was apositivedevelopment,somethingtocelebrate.Withwhatwenowknew,itwasgoingtobeawholeloteasiertonegotiateourwaythroughtherestofit,andyetthiscommanderwasangry.Hedidn’tlikethathe’dbeenplayed,soheturnedtoone of the guys from NYPD’s Technical AssistanceResponse Unit (TARU) and commanded them to get acamerainsidethebank,amic...something.

Now that I was huddled with Bobby, the commanderswappedme out in favor of another primary negotiator onthephone.ThenewnegotiatorplayeditthesamewayIhad,a couple of hours earlier—said, “This isDominick.You’retalkingtomenow.”

DominickMisinowasagreathostagenegotiator—inmyview,oneof theworld’s great closers,whichwas the termoftenusedfortheguybroughtintobangoutthelastdetails

andsecurethedeal.Hedidn’tgetrattledandhewasgoodatwhathedid.

Matter-of-fact.Streetsmart.Dominick plowed ahead. And then, an amazing thing

happened—a nearly disastrous amazing thing. As ChrisWattswas talking toDominick,heheardanelectric toolofsomekindburrowing itsway through thewallbehindhim.Itwas one of ourTARUguys, trying to get a bug plantedinside—inprecisely thewrong spot, atprecisely thewrongtime.ChrisWattswas already rattled enough as itwas, hispartnergivinghimselfup like that and leavinghim toplayoutthesiegeonhisown.Andnow,tohearourguysdrillingthroughthewall,itjustaboutsethimoff.

He responded like a pit bull backed into a corner. HecalledDominickaliar.Dominickwasunflappable.HekepthiscoolasChrisWattsragedontheotherendofthephone,and eventually Dominick’s cool, calm demeanor broughttheguyfromaboiltoasimmer.

Inretrospect,itwasafoolmovetotrytogetabuginsidethebankatthislatestage—bornoutoffrustrationandpanic.We’dgottenoneof thehostage-takersoutof thebank,butnowwe’dgivenbackameasureofcontrol.Startlingtheoneremaininghostage-taker,whomayormaynothavebeenaloosecannon,wasabsolutelynotagoodidea.

AsDominickwenttoworksmoothingoverthesituation,ChrisWattsswitchedthingsuponus.Hesaid,“WhatifIletahostagego?”

This came as if from nowhere. Dominick hadn’t even

thought to ask, but ChrisWatts just offered up one of thetellerslikeitwasnobigdeal—andtohim,atthislatestagein the standoff, I guess it wasn’t. From his view, such aconciliatorymovemightbuyhimenoughtimetofigureoutawaytoescape.

Dominickremainedcalm,butseizedontheopportunity.Hesaidhewantedto talk to thehostagefirst, tomakesureeverything went okay, so ChrisWatts tapped one of thewomen and put her on the phone. The woman had beenpaying attention, knew there’d been some sort of snafuwhenBobbywantedtogivehimselfup,soeventhoughshewasstillcompletelyterrifiedshehadthepresenceofmindtoaskaboutthedoor.Irememberthinkingthisshowedalotofbrass—tobe terrified, held against yourwill, roughedup abit,andtostillhaveyourwitsaboutyou.

She said, “Are you sure you have a key to the frontdoor?”

Dominicksaid,“Thefrontdoor’sopen.”Anditwas.Ultimately,whathappenedwasoneofthewomencame

out, unharmed, and an hour or so later the other womanfollowed,alsounharmed.

Wewereworkingongettingthebankguardout,butwecouldn’t be sure from the accounts of these bank tellerswhat kind of shape this guy might be in.We didn’t evenknow ifhewas still alive.Theyhadn’t seenhimsince firstthing that morning. He could have had a heart attack anddied—therewasjustnowaytoknow.

But Chris Watts had one last trick up his sleeve. Hepulledafastoneonusandoutoftheblue,offeredtocomeout.Maybehethoughthecouldcatchusoffguardonelasttime.What was strange about his sudden appearance wasthat he seemed to be looking about, surveying the scene,likehe still thoughthe’d somehoweludecapture.Rightupuntil the moment the cops put the handcuffs on him, hisgazewasdartingbackandforth,scanningforsomekindofopportunity. The bright lights were on this guy, he wasbasically surrounded, but somewhere in the back of hisscheming,racingmindhestillthoughthehadachance.

Itwasalong,longday,butitwentdowninthebooksasasuccess.Nobodywashurt.Thebadguyswereincustody.AndIemergedfromtheexperiencehumbledbyhowmuchmore therewas to learn,butat thesametime,awakenedtoand inspired by the elemental power of emotion, dialogue,and the FBI’s evolving toolbox of applied psychologicaltactics to influence and persuade just about anyone in anysituation.

Inthedecadessincemyinitiationintotheworldofhigh-stakes negotiations, I’ve been struck again and again byhow valuable these seemingly simple approaches can be.Theabilitytogetinsidethehead—andeventuallyundertheskin—ofyourcounterpartdependsonthesetechniquesanda willingness to change your approach, based on newevidence, along the way.As I’ve worked with executivesandstudentstodeveloptheseskills,Ialwaystrytoreinforcethe message that being right isn’t the key to a successful

negotiation—havingtherightmindsetis.

HOWTOCONFRONT—ANDGETYOURWAY—WITHOUTCONFRONTATION

I only half-jokingly refer to mirroring as magic or a Jedimind trick because it gives you the ability to disagreewithoutbeingdisagreeable.

To consider just how useful that can be, think of theaverage workplace: invariably there is still someone in aposition of authority who arrived at that position throughaggressive assertiveness, sometimes outright intimidation,with “old school” top-down, command-and-controlassumptions that the boss is always right. And let’s notdelude ourselves: whatever the enlightened rules of the“new school,” in every environment (work or otherwise)you will always have to deal with forceful typeA peoplewhopreferconsenttocollaboration.

Ifyoutakeapitbullapproachwithanotherpitbull,yougenerally end up with a messy scene and lots of bruisedfeelings and resentment. Luckily, there’s another waywithoutallthemess.

It’sjustfoursimplesteps:

1. Usethelate-nightFMDJvoice.

2. Startwith“I’msorry...”

3. Mirror.

4. Silence.At least four seconds, to let the mirrorworkitsmagiconyourcounterpart.

5. Repeat.

Oneofmystudentsexperiencedtheeffectivenessofthissimpleprocess atherworkplace,whereher impulsivebosswas known for his “drive-bys”: an infuriating practice bywhich the boss would suddenly swing by one’s office orcubicle unannouncedwith an “urgent,” poorly thought outassignment that created a lot of unnecessary work. Pastattemptsatanykindofdebatecreatedimmediatepushback.“There’s abetterway”was always interpretedby thisbossas“thelazyway.”

Such a drive-by occurred toward the end of a longconsulting engagement, one that had generated literallythousands of documents. The boss, still skeptical ofanything“digital,”wantedthesecurityofpapercopies.

Popping his head into her office, the boss said, “Let’smaketwocopiesofallthepaperwork.”

“I’m sorry, two copies?” she mirrored in response,rememberingnotonlytheDJvoice,buttodeliverthemirrorin an inquisitive tone. The intention behind most mirrorsshould be “Please, help me understand.” Every time youmirror someone, theywill rewordwhat they’ve said.Theywill never say it exactly the sameway they said it the firsttime. Ask someone, “What do you mean by that?” andyou’re likely to incite irritation or defensiveness.Amirror,however,will get you the clarity youwantwhile signaling

respectandconcernforwhattheotherpersonissaying.“Yes,”herboss responded,“one forusandone for the

customer.”“I’msorry,soyouaresayingthattheclientisaskingfor

acopyandweneedacopyforinternaluse?”“Actually,I’llcheckwiththeclient—theyhaven’tasked

foranything.ButIdefinitelywantacopy.That’sjusthowIdobusiness.”

“Absolutely,”sheresponded.“Thanksforcheckingwiththe customer.Where would you like to store the in-housecopy?There’snomorespaceinthefileroomhere.”

“It’s fine.You can store it anywhere,” he said, slightlyperturbednow.

“Anywhere?” she mirrored again, with calm concern.When another person’s tone of voice or body language isinconsistent with his words, a good mirror can beparticularlyuseful.

Inthiscase,itcausedherbosstotakeanice,longpause—somethinghedidnotoftendo.Mystudentsatsilent.“Asa matter of fact, you canput them inmy office,” he said,withmorecomposurethanhe’dhadthewholeconversation.“I’llgetthenewassistanttoprintitformeaftertheprojectisdone.Fornow,justcreatetwodigitalbackups.”

Adaylaterherbossemailedandwrotesimply,“Thetwodigitalbackupswillbefine.”

Not long after, I received an ecstatic email from thisstudent: “I was shocked! I love mirrors!A week of workavoided!”

Mirroring will make you feel awkward as heck whenyou first try it. That’s the only hard part about it; thetechniquetakesalittlepractice.Onceyougetthehangofit,though, it’ll become a conversational Swiss Army knifevaluableinjustabouteveryprofessionalandsocialsetting.

KEYLESSONS

The language of negotiation is primarily a language ofconversation and rapport: a way of quickly establishingrelationships and getting people to talk and think together.Whichiswhywhenyouthinkofthegreatestnegotiatorsofalltime,I’vegotasurpriseforyou—thinkOprahWinfrey.

Her daily television showwas a case study of amasterpractitioner at work: on a stage face-to-facewith someoneshehasnevermet,infrontofacrowdedstudioofhundreds,with millions more watching from home, and a task topersuade that person in front of her, sometimes against hisorherownbest interests, to talkand talkandkeep talking,ultimately sharing with the world deep, dark secrets thattheyhadheldhostageintheirownmindsforalifetime.

Look closely at such an interaction after reading thischapter and suddenly you’ll see a refined set of powerfulskills: a conscious smile to ease the tension, use of subtleverbalandnonverballanguagetosignalempathy(andthussecurity), a certain downward inflection in the voice,embrace of specific kinds of questions and avoidance ofothers—awhole array of previously hidden skills that willproveinvaluabletoyou,onceyou’velearnedtousethem.

Here are some of the key lessons from this chapter toremember:

■ A good negotiator prepares, going in, to beready for possible surprises; a great negotiatoraimstouseherskillstorevealthesurprisessheiscertaintofind.

■ Don’t commit to assumptions; instead, viewthem as hypotheses and use the negotiation totestthemrigorously.

■ People who view negotiation as a battle ofarguments become overwhelmed by the voicesin theirhead.Negotiation isnotanactofbattle;it’s a process of discovery. The goal is touncoverasmuchinformationaspossible.

■ Toquietthevoicesinyourhead,makeyoursoleandall-encompassingfocustheotherpersonandwhattheyhavetosay.

■ Slow. It. Down. Going too fast is one of themistakes all negotiators are prone tomaking. Ifwe’re toomuch inahurry,peoplecan feelas ifthey’re not being heard.You risk underminingtherapportandtrustyou’vebuilt.

■ Put a smileonyour face.Whenpeople are in a

positiveframeofmind,theythinkmorequickly,andaremore likely to collaborate andproblem-solve (instead of fight and resist). Positivitycreates mental agility in both you and yourcounterpart.

Therearethreevoicetonesavailabletonegotiators:

1. The late-night FM DJ voice: Use selectively tomake a point. Inflect your voice downward,keeping it calm and slow.Whendone properly,you create an aura of authority andtrustworthinesswithouttriggeringdefensiveness.

2. The positive/playful voice: Should be yourdefault voice. It’s the voice of an easygoing,good-natured person.Your attitude is light andencouraging.Thekeyhere is to relaxand smilewhileyou’retalking.

3. The direct or assertive voice: Used rarely.Willcauseproblemsandcreatepushback.

■ Mirrorsworkmagic.Repeat the last threewords(or the critical one to three words) of whatsomeone has just said.We fearwhat’s differentandaredrawntowhat’ssimilar.Mirroringistheart of insinuating similarity, which facilitatesbonding.Usemirrorstoencouragetheotherside

to empathize and bond with you, keep peopletalking, buy your side time to regroup, andencourage your counterparts to reveal theirstrategy.

CHAPTER3

DON’TFEELTHEIRPAIN,LABELIT

Itwas1998andIwasstandinginanarrowhallwayoutsidean apartment on the twenty-seventh floor of a high-rise inHarlem. I was the head of the NewYork City FBI CrisisNegotiation Team, and that day I was the primarynegotiator.

The investigative squad had reported that at least threeheavilyarmed fugitiveswereholedup inside.Severaldaysearlierthefugitiveshadusedautomaticweaponsinashoot-out with a rival gang, so the NewYork City FBI SWATteam was arrayed behind me, and our snipers were onnearby rooftops with rifles trained on the apartmentwindows.

In tense situations like this, the traditional negotiatingadvice is to keep a poker face. Don’t get emotional. Untilrecently, most academics and researchers completelyignored the role of emotion in negotiation. Emotionswerejustanobstacletoagoodoutcome,theysaid.“Separatethepeoplefromtheproblem”wasthecommonrefrain.

Butthinkaboutthat:Howcanyouseparatepeoplefromthe problem when their emotionsare the problem?

Especiallywhentheyarescaredpeoplewithguns.Emotionsareoneofthemainthingsthatderailcommunication.Oncepeople get upset at one another, rational thinking goes outthewindow.

That’s why, instead of denying or ignoring emotions,goodnegotiatorsidentifyandinfluencethem.Theyareableto precisely label emotions, those of others and especiallytheirown.Andoncetheylabeltheemotionstheytalkaboutthemwithoutgettingwoundup.Forthem,emotionisatool.

Emotionsaren’ttheobstacles,theyarethemeans.The relationship between an emotionally intelligent

negotiatorand theircounterpart isessentially therapeutic. Itduplicates that of a psychotherapist with a patient. Thepsychotherapistpokesandprodstounderstandhispatient’sproblems,andthenturnstheresponsesbackontothepatientto get him to go deeper and change his behavior. That’sexactlywhatgoodnegotiatorsdo.

Getting to this level of emotional intelligence demandsopening up your senses, talking less, and listening more.Youcanlearnalmosteverythingyouneed—andalotmorethan other people would like you to know—simply bywatchingand listening,keepingyoureyespeeledandyourearsopen,andyourmouthshut.

Think about the therapist’s couch as you read thefollowing sections.You’ll see how a soothing voice, closelistening, and a calm repetition of the words of your“patient” can get you a lot further than a cold, rationalargument.

Itmay sound touchy-feely, but if you can perceive theemotionsofothers,youhaveachancetoturnthemtoyouradvantage.Themore you know about someone, themorepoweryouhave.

TACTICALEMPATHY

Wehadonebigproblem thatday inHarlem:no telephonenumbertocall intotheapartment.Soforsixstraighthours,relievedperiodically by twoFBI agentswhowere learningcrisisnegotiation,Ispokethroughtheapartmentdoor.

Iusedmylate-nightFMDJvoice.I didn’t give orders in my DJ voice, or ask what the

fugitiveswanted.Instead,Iimaginedmyselfintheirplace.“It looks like you don’t want to come out,” I said

repeatedly. “It seems like you worry that if you open thedoor, we’ll come in with guns blazing. It looks like youdon’twanttogobacktojail.”

For six hours, we got no response. The FBI coacheslovedmyDJvoice.Butwasitworking?

And then,whenwewere almost completely convincedthat no one was inside, a sniper on an adjacent buildingradioed that he saw one of the curtains in the apartmentmove.

The front door of the apartment slowly opened. Awomanemergedwithherhandsinfrontofher.

I continued talking.All three fugitives came out.Noneofthemsaidaworduntilwehadtheminhandcuffs.

Then I asked them the question thatwasmost nagging

me:Whydidtheycomeoutaftersixhoursofradiosilence?Whydidtheyfinallygivein?

Allthreegavemethesameanswer.“We didn’t want to get caught or get shot, but you

calmed us down,” they said. “We finally believed youwouldn’tgoaway,sowejustcameout.”

There is nothing more frustrating or disruptive to anynegotiation than to get the feeling you are talking tosomeone who isn’t listening. Playing dumb is a validnegotiating technique, and “I don’t understand” is alegitimate response.But ignoring the other party’s positiononlybuildsup frustrationandmakes themless likely todowhatyouwant.

Theoppositeofthatistacticalempathy.Inmynegotiatingcourse,Itellmystudentsthatempathy

is“theability torecognizetheperspectiveofacounterpart,and the vocalizationof that recognition.” That’s anacademicwayofsayingthatempathyispayingattentiontoanother human being, asking what they are feeling, andmakingacommitmenttounderstandingtheirworld.

Notice I didn’t say anything about agreeing with theotherperson’svaluesandbeliefsorgivingouthugs.That’ssympathy.WhatI’mtalkingabout is tryingtounderstandasituationfromanotherperson’sperspective.

Onestepbeyondthatistacticalempathy.Tactical empathy is understanding the feelings and

mindsetofanother in themomentandalsohearingwhat isbehind those feelings so you increase your influence in all

themoments that follow. It’sbringingourattention toboththe emotional obstacles and the potential pathways togettinganagreementdone.

It’semotionalintelligenceonsteroids.As a cop in Kansas City, I was curious about how a

select handful of veteran cops managed to talk angry,violentpeopleoutoffightsortogetthemtoputdowntheirknivesandguns.

WhenIaskedhowtheydidthat,Irarelygotmorethanashrug. They couldn’t articulate what they did. But now Iknow the answer is tactical empathy. They were able tothink fromanother person’s point of viewwhile theyweretalkingwiththatpersonandquicklyassesswhatwasdrivingthem.

Most of us enter verbal combat unlikely to persuadeanyoneof anythingbecauseweonlyknowandcare aboutour own goals and perspective. But the best officers aretunedintotheotherparty—theiraudience.Theyknowthatiftheyempathize,theycanmoldtheiraudiencebyhowtheyapproachandtalktothem.

That’swhy,ifacorrectionsofficerapproachesaninmateexpectinghim to resist, heoftenwill.But ifheapproachesexuding calm, the inmate will be much more likely to bepeaceful. It seems like wizardry, but it’s not. It’s just thatwhen the officer has his audience clearly in mind, he canbecomewhoheneedstobetohandlethesituation.

Empathy is a classic “soft” communication skill, but ithas a physical basis.When we closely observe a person’s

face, gestures, and toneof voice, our brainbegins to alignwiththeirsinaprocesscalledneuralresonance,andthatletsusknowmorefullywhattheythinkandfeel.

In an fMRI brain-scan experiment,1 researchers atPrincetonUniversityfoundthatneuralresonancedisappearswhen people communicate poorly. The researchers couldpredicthowwellpeoplewerecommunicatingbyobservinghowmuch their brains were aligned.And they discoveredthat people who paid the most attention—good listeners—couldactuallyanticipatewhat thespeakerwasabout tosaybeforehesaidit.

Ifyouwanttoincreaseyourneuralresonanceskills,takea moment right now and practice. Turn your attention tosomeonewho’s talking near you, orwatch a person beinginterviewedonTV.As they talk, imagine that you are thatperson.Visualizeyourself in thepositiontheydescribeandput in as much detail as you can, as if you were actuallythere.

But be warned, a lot of classic deal makers will thinkyourapproachissoftheadedandweak.

JustaskformersecretaryofstateHillaryClinton.A few years ago during a speech at Georgetown

University, Clinton advocated, “showing respect, even forone’s enemies. Trying to understand and, insofar aspsychologically possible, empathize with their perspectiveandpointofview.”

You can predict what happened next. A gaggle ofpundits and politicians pounced on her. They called her

statement inane and naïve, and even a sign she hadembraced theMuslimBrotherhood.Somesaid thatshehadblownherchancesatapresidentialrun.

Theproblemwithallofthathotairisthatshewasright.Politics aside, empathy is not about being nice or

agreeingwiththeotherside.It’saboutunderstandingthem.Empathy helps us learn theposition the enemy is in, whytheir actions make sense (to them), and what might movethem.

As negotiators we use empathy because it works.Empathyiswhythethreefugitivescameoutaftersixhoursofmy late-nightDJ voice. It’swhat helpedme succeed atwhatSunTzucalled“thesupremeartofwar”:tosubduetheenemywithoutfighting.

LABELING

Let’sgobacktotheHarlemdoorwayforaminute.We didn’t have a lot to go on, but if you’ve got three

fugitives trapped in an apartment on the twenty-seventhfloorofabuildinginHarlem,theydon’thavetosayawordfor you to know that they’re worried about two things:gettingkilled,andgoingtojail.

So for six straight hours in that sweltering apartmentbuilding hallway, the two FBI negotiating students and Itook turns speaking.We rotated in order to avoid verbalstumbles and other errors caused by tiredness. And westayed relentlessly on message, all three of us saying thesamething.

Now, pay close attention to exactly what we said: “Itlooks like you don’t want to come out. It seems like youworry that if you open the door, we’ll come in with gunsblazing.Itlookslikeyoudon’twanttogobacktojail.”

We employed our tactical empathy by recognizing andthen verbalizing the predictable emotions of the situation.We didn’t just put ourselves in the fugitives’ shoes. Wespottedtheirfeelings,turnedthemintowords,andthenverycalmly and respectfully repeated their emotions back tothem.

Inanegotiation,that’scalledlabeling.Labeling is a way of validating someone’s emotion by

acknowledgingit.Givesomeone’semotionanameandyoushow you identifywith how that person feels. It gets youclosetosomeonewithoutaskingaboutexternalfactorsyouknow nothing about (“How’s your family?”). Think oflabeling as a shortcut to intimacy, a time-saving emotionalhack.

Labelinghasaspecialadvantagewhenyourcounterpartis tense.Exposingnegative thoughts todaylight—“It lookslikeyoudon’twant togoback to jail”—makes themseemlessfrightening.

In one brain imaging study,2 psychology professorMatthew Lieberman of the University of California, LosAngeles,foundthatwhenpeopleareshownphotosoffacesexpressing strongemotion, thebrain showsgreater activityintheamygdala,thepartthatgeneratesfear.Butwhentheyare asked to label the emotion, the activity moves to the

areasthatgovernrationalthinking.Inotherwords,labelinganemotion—applyingrationalwords toa fear—disrupts itsrawintensity.

Labelingisasimple,versatileskillthatletsyoureinforceagoodaspectof thenegotiation,ordiffuseanegativeone.Butithasveryspecificrulesaboutformanddelivery.Thatmakes it less like chatting than like a formal art such asChinesecalligraphy.

For most people, it’s one of the most awkwardnegotiatingtoolstouse.Beforetheytryitthefirsttime,mystudentsalmostalwaystellmetheyexpecttheircounterparttojumpupandshout,“Don’tyoudaretellmehowIfeel!”

Letmeletyouinonasecret:peopleneverevennotice.The first step to labeling is detecting the other person’s

emotional state. Outside that door in Harlem we couldn’teven see the fugitives, but most of the time you’ll have awealth of information from theother person’swords, tone,andbody language.Wecall that trinity“words,music,anddance.”

Thetricktospottingfeelingsis topaycloseattentiontochanges people undergo when they respond to externalevents.Mostoften,thoseeventsareyourwords.

Ifyousay,“Howis the family?”and thecornersof theother party’s mouth turn down even when they say it’sgreat,youmightdetectthatallisnotwell;iftheirvoicegoesflat when a colleague is mentioned, there could be aproblem between the two; and if your landlordunconsciously fidgets his feet when you mention the

neighbors, it’s pretty clear that he doesn’t think much ofthem(we’lldigdeeper intohowtospotanduse thesecuesinChapter9).

Picking up on these tiny pieces of information is howpsychics work. They size up their client’s body languageandaskhimafewinnocentquestions.Whenthey“tell”hisfutureafewminuteslater,they’rereallyjustsayingwhathewants tohearbasedon small details they’ve spotted.Morethan a few psychicswouldmake good negotiators for thatveryreason.

Onceyou’vespottedanemotionyouwant tohighlight,the next step is to label it aloud.Labels can be phrased asstatementsorquestions.Theonlydifferenceiswhetheryouendthesentencewithadownwardorupwardinflection.Butno matter how they end, labels almost always begin withroughlythesamewords:

Itseemslike...Itsoundslike...Itlookslike...Noticewesaid“Itsoundslike...”andnot“I’mhearing

that . . .”That’s because theword “I” gets people’s guardup.When you say “I,” it says you’re more interested inyourself than the other person, and it makes you takepersonal responsibility for the words that follow—and theoffensetheymightcause.

But when you phrase a label as a neutral statement ofunderstanding, it encourages your counterpart to beresponsive.They’ll usually give a longer answer than just

“yes” or “no.”And if they disagree with the label, that’sokay.Youcanalwaysstepbackandsay,“Ididn’tsaythatwaswhatitwas.Ijustsaiditseemslikethat.”

The last ruleof labeling issilence.Onceyou’ve thrownout a label,be quiet and listen.We all have a tendency toexpandonwhatwe’vesaid,tofinish,“Itseemslikeyoulikethe way that shirt looks,” with a specific question like“Wheredidyougetit?”Butalabel’spoweristhatitinvitestheotherpersontorevealhimself.

Ifyou’lltrustmeforasecond,takeabreaknowandtryitout:Strikeupaconversationandputalabelononeoftheotherperson’semotions—itdoesn’tmatter ifyou’re talkingtothemailmanoryourten-year-olddaughter—andthengosilent.Letthelabeldoitswork.

NEUTRALIZETHENEGATIVE,REINFORCETHEPOSITIVE

Labelingisatactic,notastrategy,inthesamewayaspoonisagreattoolforstirringsoupbutit’snotarecipe.Howyouuselabelingwillgoalongwayindeterminingyoursuccess.Deployedwell,it’showweasnegotiatorsidentifyandthenslowly alter the inner voices of our counterpart’sconsciousnesstosomethingmorecollaborativeandtrusting.

First,let’stalkalittlehumanpsychology.Inbasicterms,people’s emotions have two levels: the “presenting”behavioristhepartabovethesurfaceyoucanseeandhear;beneath, the “underlying” feeling is what motivates thebehavior.

Imagine a grandfather who’s grumbly at a familyholidaydinner: thepresentingbehavior is thathe’scranky,buttheunderlyingemotionisasadsenseoflonelinessfromhisfamilyneverseeinghim.

Whatgoodnegotiatorsdowhenlabelingisaddressthoseunderlying emotions. Labeling negatives diffuses them (ordefuses them, in extreme cases); labeling positivesreinforcesthem.

We’llcomebacktothecrankygrandfatherinamoment.First,though,Iwanttotalkalittlebitaboutanger.

Asanemotion,angerisrarelyproductive—inyouortheperson you’re negotiatingwith. It releases stress hormonesand neurochemicals that disrupt your ability to properlyevaluateand respond tosituations.Anditblindsyouto thefact that you’re angry in the first place,whichgives you afalsesenseofconfidence.

That’s not to say that negative feelings should beignored.Thatcanbejustasdamaging.Instead,theyshouldbe teased out. Labeling is a helpful tactic in de-escalatingangry confrontations, because it makes the personacknowledgetheirfeelingsratherthancontinuingtoactout.

Early on in my hostage negotiation career, I learned howimportant it was to go directly at negative dynamics in afearlessbutdeferentialmanner.

Itwas to fix a situation I’d createdmyself. I’d angeredthe top FBI official in Canada when I entered the countrywithoutfirstalertinghim(sohecouldnotifytheDepartmentofState),aprocedureknownas“countryclearance.”

IknewIneededtocallandassuagehimtostraightenoutthe situation, or I risked being expelled.Top guys like tofeel on top. They don’t want to be disrespected. All themoresowhentheofficetheyrunisn’tasexyassignment.

“Bless me, Father, for I have sinned,” I said when heansweredthephone.

Therewasalongpauseattheotherendoftheline.“Whoisthis?”hesaid.“Bless me, Father, for I have sinned,” I repeated. “It’s

ChrisVoss.”Againtherewasalongsilence.“Doesyourbossknowyou’rehere?”I saidhedid,andcrossedmyfingers.At thispoint, the

FBIofficialwouldhavebeencompletelywithinhisrightstotellmetoleaveCanadaimmediately.Butbymentioningthenegativedynamic,IknewI’ddiffuseditasmuchasIcould.Ihadachance.

“Allright,you’vegotcountryclearance,”hefinallysaid.“I’lltakecareofthepaperwork.”

Trythisthenexttimeyouhavetoapologizeforabone-headedmistake.Gorightatit.Thefastestandmostefficientmeans of establishing a quick working relationship is toacknowledge the negative and diffuse it.Whenever I wasdealingwiththefamilyofahostage,IstartedoutbysayingI knew they were scared.And when I make a mistake—something that happens a lot—I always acknowledge theother person’s anger. I’ve found the phrase “Look, I’m anasshole” to be an amazingly effective way to make

problemsgoaway.Thatapproachhasneverfailedme.

Let’sgobacktothecrankygrandfather.He’s grumpy because he never sees the family and he

feelsleftout.Sohe’sspeakingupinhisowndysfunctionalwaytogetattention.

Howdoyoufixthat?Instead of addressing his grumpy behavior, you

acknowledge his sadness in a nonjudgmental way. Youheadhimoffbeforehecanreallygetstarted.

“Wedon’tseeeachotherall thatoften,”youcouldsay.“It seems like you feel like we don’t pay any attention toyou and you only see us once a year, sowhy should youmaketimeforus?”

Notice how that acknowledges the situation and labelshis sadness? Here you can pause briefly, letting himrecognize and appreciateyour attempts tounderstandwhathe’sfeeling,andthenturnthesituationaroundbyofferingapositivesolution.

“For us this is a real treat.We want to hear what youhave to talk about.We want to value this time with youbecausewefeelleftoutofyourlife.”

Researchshowsthatthebestwaytodealwithnegativityis to observe it, without reaction and without judgment.Thenconsciously labeleachnegativefeelingandreplace itwithpositive,compassionate,andsolution-basedthoughts.

One of my GeorgetownUniversity students, a guy named

TJ,whoworkedasanassistantcontrollerattheWashingtonRedskins, put that lesson toworkwhile hewas takingmynegotiationsclass.

Theeconomywasinthetoiletatthetime,andRedskinsseason ticket holders were leaving in droves to avoid thecost.Worse,theteamhadbeen terribletheyearbefore,andoff-fieldplayerproblemswerealienatingthefans.

Theteam’sCFOwasgettingmoreworried—andcranky—bytheday,andtwoweeksbeforetheseasonwastostarthewalkedbyTJ’sdeskandslammeddownafolderfullofpaper.

“Betteryesterdaythantoday,”hesaidandwalkedaway.Inside was a list of forty season ticket holders who

hadn’tpaidtheirbills,aUSBdrivewithaspreadsheetabouteachone’ssituation,andascripttousewhencallingthem.

TJsawrightawaythatthescriptwasadisaster.Itbeganby saying that his colleagues had been trying to call formonths, and the account had been escalated to him. “Iwantedtoinformyou,”itread,“thatinordertoreceiveyourtickets for the upcoming season opener against the NewYorkGiants,youwillneedtopayyouroutstandingbalanceinfullpriortoSeptember10.”

It was the stupidly aggressive, impersonal, tone-deafstyleofcommunicationthatisthedefaultformostbusiness.Itwasall“me,me,me”fromTJ,withnoacknowledgmentoftheticketholder’ssituation.Noempathy.Noconnection.Justgivemethemoney.

MaybeIdon’tneedtosayit,butthescriptdidn’twork.

TJleftmessages;noonecalledback.Afewweeksintotheclass,TJrewrotethescript.These

weren’tmassive changes, and he didn’t offer the fans anydiscounts.Whathedidwas add subtle tweaks tomake thecallaboutthefans,theirsituation,andtheirloveoftheteam.

Now the teamwas “YOURWashingtonRedskins” andthe purpose of the callwas to ensure that the team’smostvaluablefans—thedelinquentcustomers—wouldbethereatthe season opener. “The home-field advantage created byyou each and every Sunday at FedEx Field does not gounnoticed,”TJwrote.He then told them,“In thesedifficulttimes,weunderstandourfanshavebeenhithardandweareheretoworkwithyou,”andaskedtheticketholderstocallbacktotalkthroughtheir“uniquesituation.”

Thoughsuperficiallysimple,thechangesTJmadeinthescript had a deep emotional resonancewith the delinquentticket holders. Itmentioned their debt to the team but alsoacknowledgedtheteam’sdebt to them,andbylabelingthetough economic times, and the stress theywere causing, itdiffusedthebiggestnegativedynamic—theirdelinquency—andturnedtheissueintosomethingsolvable.

Thesimplechangesmaskedacomplexunderstandingofempathy onTJ’s side.With the new script,TJwas able toset up payment planswith all the ticket holders before theGiantsgame.AndtheCFO’snextvisit?Well,itwasfarlessterse.

CLEARTHEROADBEFOREADVERTISINGTHE

DESTINATION

Remembertheamygdala,thepartofthebrainthatgeneratesfear in reaction to threats?Well, the fasterwecan interruptthe amygdala’s reaction to real or imaginary threats, thefasterwecancleartheroadofobstacles,andthequickerwecangeneratefeelingsofsafety,well-being,andtrust.

We do that by labeling the fears. These labels are sopowerfulbecausetheybathethefearsinsunlight,bleachingthem of their power and showing our counterpart that weunderstand.

Think back to that Harlem landing: I didn’t say, “Itseems likeyouwantus to let yougo.”Wecould all agreeonthat.But thatwouldn’thavediffused thereal fear in theapartment, or shown that I empathized with the grimcomplexityof theirsituation.That’swhyIwent right at theamygdalaandsaid,“Itseemslikeyoudon’twanttogobacktojail.”

Once they’ve been labeled and brought into the open,the negative reactions in your counterpart’s amygdala willbegin to soften. I promise itwill shock you how suddenlyhis language turns from worry to optimism. Empathy is apowerfulmoodenhancer.

The road is not always cleared so easily, so don’t bedemoralizedifthisprocessseemstogoslowly.TheHarlemhigh-risenegotiationtooksixhours.Manyofuswearfearsuponfears, like layersagainst thecold, sogetting tosafetytakestime.

Thatwastheexperienceofanotheroneofmystudents,a

fund-raiserfortheGirlScouts,whobackedintonaminghercounterpart’sfearsalmostaccidentally.

We’re not talking about someone who sold Girl Scoutcookies: my student was an experienced fund-raiser whoregularlygotdonorstoponyup$1,000to$25,000acheck.Overtheyears,she’ddevelopedaverysuccessfulsystemtoget her “clients,” usually wealthy women, to open theircheckbook.

She’d inviteapotentialdonor toheroffice, servea fewGirl Scouts cookies, walk her through an album ofheartwarming snapshots and handwritten letters fromprojects thatmatched thewoman’sprofile,and thencollectacheckwhenthedonor’seyeslitup.Itwasalmosteasy.

One day, though, shemet the immovable donor. Oncethe woman sat down in her office, my student began tothrowout the projects her research had saidwould fit.Butthewomanshookherheadatoneprojectafteranother.

My student found herself growing perplexed at thedifficultdonorwhohadnointerestindonating.Butsheheldheremotionincheckandreachedbacktoalessonfrommyrecent class on labeling. “I’m sensing somehesitationwiththese projects,” she said in what she hoped was a levelvoice.

As if she’d been uncorked, the woman exclaimed: “Iwant my gift to directly support programming for GirlScoutsandnotanythingelse.”

This helped focus the conversation, but as my studentput forth project after project that seemed to fulfill the

donor’scriteria,allshegotwasstillrejection.Sensing the potential donor’s growing frustration, and

wantingtoendonapositivenotesothattheymightbeabletomeetagain,mystudentusedanotherlabel.“Itseemsthatyouarereallypassionateaboutthisgiftandwanttofindtheright project reflecting the opportunities and life-changingexperiencestheGirlScoutsgaveyou.”

And with that, this “difficult” woman signed a checkwithout even picking a specific project. “You understandme,”shesaidasshegotuptoleave.“Itrustyou’llfindtherightproject.”

Fear of her money being misappropriated was thepresenting dynamic that the first label uncovered. But thesecond label uncovered the underlying dynamic—her verypresenceintheofficewasdrivenbyveryspecificmemoriesofbeingalittleGirlScoutandhowitchangedherlife.

Theobstacleherewasn’tfindingtherightmatchfor thewoman. Itwasn’t that shewas this highly finicky, hard-to-pleasedonor.Therealobstaclewasthatthiswomanneededtofeelthatshewasunderstood,thatthepersonhandlinghermoneyknewwhyshewasinthatofficeandunderstoodthememoriesthatweredrivingheractions.

That’s why labels are so powerful and so potentiallytransformative to the stateof anyconversation.Bydiggingbeneathwhatseemslikeamountainofquibbles,details,andlogistics, labels help to uncover and identify the primaryemotion driving almost all of your counterpart’s behavior,the emotion that, once acknowledged, seems to

miraculouslysolveeverythingelse.

DOANACCUSATIONAUDIT

Onthefirstdayofnegotiatingclasseachsemester,Imarchthe group through an introductory exercise called “sixtyseconds or she dies.” I play a hostage-taker and a studenthas toconvinceme to releasemyhostagewithinaminute.It’s an icebreaker that showsme the level ofmy students,anditrevealstothemhowmuchtheyneedtolearn.(Here’salittlesecret:thehostagenevergetsout.)

Sometimes students jump right in, but finding takers isusually hard because it means coming to the front of theclassandcompetingwiththeguywhoholdsallthecards.IfIjustaskforavolunteer,mystudentssitontheirhandsandlook away.You’ve been there.You can almost feel yourbackmuscles tense as you think, Oh please, don’t call onme.

So I don’t ask. Instead, I say, “In case you’re worriedaboutvolunteeringtorole-playwithmeinfrontoftheclass,Iwanttotellyouinadvance...it’sgoingtobehorrible.”

After the laughterdiesdown, I thensay,“And thoseofyou who do volunteer will probably get more out of thisthananyoneelse.”

IalwaysendupwithmorevolunteersthanIneed.Now,lookatwhatIdid:Iprefacedtheconversationby

labeling my audience’s fears; how much worse cansomething be than “horrible”? I defuse them and wait,lettingitsinkinandtherebymakingtheunreasonableseem

lessforbidding.

All of us have intuitively done something close to thisthousands of times.You’ll start a criticism of a friend bysaying, “I don’twant this to soundharsh . . .” hoping thatwhatever comes next will be softened. Or you’ll say, “Idon’t want to seem like an asshole . . .” hoping yourcounterpartwilltellyouafewsentenceslaterthatyou’renotthat bad. The small but critical mistake this commits isdenyingthenegative.Thatactuallygivesitcredence.

Incourt,defenselawyersdothisproperlybymentioningeverythingtheirclientisaccusedof,andalltheweaknessesof their case, in the opening statement. They call thistechnique“takingthestingout.”

What Iwant to do here is turn this into a process that,applied systematically, you can use to disarm yourcounterpart while negotiating everything from your son’sbedtimetolargebusinesscontracts.

The first step of doing so is listing every terrible thingyour counterpartcould say about you, in what I call anaccusationaudit.

Thisideaofanaccusationauditisreally,reallyhardforpeople to get their minds around.The first time I tell mystudentsaboutit,theysay,“OhmyGod.Wecan’tdothat.”It seems both artificial and self-loathing. It seems like itwouldmake thingsworse.But then I remind them that it’sexactlywhatIdidthefirstdayofclasswhenIlabeledtheirfears of the hostage game in advance.And they all admitthatnoneofthemknew.

Asanexample, I’mgoing touse theexperienceofoneofmystudents,Anna,becauseIcouldn’tbemoreproudathowsheturnedwhatshelearnedinmyclassinto$1million.

Atthetime,Annawasrepresentingamajorgovernmentcontractor. Her firm had won a competition for a sizablegovernment deal by partnering with a smaller company,let’scallitABCCorp.,whoseCEOhadacloserelationshipwiththegovernmentclientrepresentative.

Problems started right after they won the contract,though.BecauseABC’s relationship hadbeen instrumentalinwinningthedeal,ABCfeltthatitwasowedapieceofthepiewhetheritfulfilleditspartofthecontractornot.

And so, while the contract paid them for the work ofnine people, they continually cut back support.AsAnna’scompany had to perform ABC’s work, the relationshipbetween ABC and Anna’s company fragmented intovituperative emails and bitter complaining. Facing analreadylowprofitmargin,Anna’scompanywasforcedintotough negotiations to getABC to take a cut to 5.5 people.The negotiationsleft a bitter aftertaste on both sides. Thevituperative emails stopped, but then againa l lemailsstopped.Andnocommunicationisalwaysabadsign.

A few months after those painful talks, the clientdemanded amajor rethink on the project andAnna’s firmwasfacedwithlosingseriousmoneyifitdidn’tgetABCtoagree to further cuts. BecauseABCwasn’t living up to itsside of the bargain, Anna’s firm would have had strongcontractual grounds to cut out ABC altogether. But that

would have damagedAnna’s firm’s reputationwith a veryimportant customer, and could have led to litigation fromABC.

Faced with this scenario, Anna set up a meeting withABC where she and her partners planned to informABCthat its paywas being cut to three people. Itwas a touchysituation, asABCwas already unhappy about the first cut.Eventhoughshewasnormallyanaggressiveandconfidentnegotiator, worries about the negotiations ruined Anna’ssleep for weeks. She needed to extract concessions whileimproving the relationship at the same time.No easy task,right?

To prepare, the first thingAnna didwas sit downwithhernegotiatingpartner,Mark,andlisteverynegativechargethatABC could level at them. The relationship had gonesour long before, so the list was huge. But the biggestpossibleaccusationswereeasytospot:

“Youarethetypicalprimecontractortryingtoforceoutthesmallguy.”

“Youpromiseduswewouldhaveallthisworkandyourenegedonyourpromise.”

“You could have told us about this issueweeks ago tohelpusprepare.”

Anna and Mark then took turns role-playing the twosides,withoneplayingABCand theotherdisarming theseaccusationswithanticipatorylabels.“You’regoingtothinkwe are a big, bad prime contractor when we are done,”Anna practiced saying slowly and naturally. “It seems you

feel this work was promised to you from thebeginning,”Marksaid.Theytrainedinfrontofanobserver,honingtheirpacing; deciding atwhat point theywould label each fear;and planning when to include meaningful pauses. It wastheater.

When the day of themeeting arrived,Anna opened byacknowledgingABC’s biggest gripes. “Weunderstand thatwe brought you on board with the shared goal of havingyou lead thiswork,” shesaid.“Youmay feel likewehavetreated you unfairly, and that we changed the dealsignificantly since then.We acknowledge that you believeyouwerepromisedthiswork.”

This received an emphatic nod from the ABCrepresentatives,soAnnacontinuedbyoutliningthesituationinaway that encouraged theABC reps to see the firmsasteammates, peppering her statements with open-endedquestionsthatshowedshewaslistening:“Whatelseisthereyoufeelisimportanttoaddtothis?”

By labeling the fears and asking for input, Anna wasable to elicit an important fact aboutABC’s fears, namelythat ABC was expecting this to be a high-profit contractbecause it thoughtAnna’s firmwas doing quite well fromthedeal.

This provided an entry point for Mark, who explainedthat the client’s newdemands had turned his firm’s profitsintolosses,meaningthatheandAnnaneededtocutABC’spay further, to three people. Angela, one of ABC’srepresentatives,gasped.

“It sounds like you think we are the big, bad primecontractortryingtopushoutthesmallbusiness,”Annasaid,headingofftheaccusationbeforeitcouldbemade.

“No,no,wedon’t think that,”Angelasaid,conditionedbytheacknowledgmenttolookforcommonground.

Withthenegativeslabeledandtheworstaccusationslaidbare,AnnaandMarkwereable to turn theconversation tothe contract.Watch what they do closely, as it’s brilliant:they acknowledge ABC’s situation while simultaneouslyshifting the onus of offering a solution to the smallercompany.

“It sounds like you have a great handle on how thegovernment contractshould work,” Anna said, labelingAngela’sexpertise.

“Yes—but I know that’s not how it always goes,”Angela answered, proud to have her experienceacknowledged.

Anna then asked Angela how she would amend thecontractsothateveryonemadesomemoney,whichpushedAngela to admit that she saw no way to do so withoutcuttingABC’sworkercount.

Several weeks later, the contract was tweaked to cutABC’s payout,which broughtAnna’s company$1millionthat put the contract into the black. But it was Angela’sreactionattheendofthemeetingthatmostsurprisedAnna.AfterAnna had acknowledged that she had givenAngelasomebadnewsandthatsheunderstoodhowangryshemustfeel,Angelasaid:

“This is not a good situation butwe appreciate the factthat you are acknowledgingwhat happened, andwe don’tfeel like you aremistreating us.And you are not the ‘BigBadPrime.’”

Anna’sreactiontohowthisturnedout?“Holycrap,thisstuffactuallyworks!”

She’s right.As you just saw, the beauty of going rightafternegativityisthatitbringsustoasafezoneofempathy.Every one of us has an inherent, human need to beunderstood,toconnectwiththepersonacrossthetable.Thatexplains why, afterAnna labeledAngela’s fears,Angela’sfirst instinct was to add nuance and detail to those fears.And that detail gaveAnna the power to accomplish whatshewantedfromthenegotiation.

GETASEAT—ANDANUPGRADE—ONASOLD-OUTFLIGHT

Up to this point, we’ve been building each skill as if theywere musical instruments: first, try the saxophone mirror;nowhere’sthebasslabel;andfinally,whydon’tyoublowanote on the French horn of tacticalsilence. But in a realnegotiation the band all plays together. So you’ve got tolearnhowtoconduct.

Keeping all the instruments playing is really awkwardformostpeople. It seems togoby insucha rush.SowhatI’mgoingtodohereisplayasongatslowspeedsoyoucanheareachinstrumentnotebynote.Ipromiseyou’llquicklysee how the skills you have been building play off one

another, rising, riffing, falling, and pausing in perfectharmony.

Here is the situation (the song, if youwill):My studentRyanB.wasflyingfromBaltimoretoAustintosignalargecomputer-consulting contract. For six months, the clientrepresentative had gone back and forth on whether hewanted the services, but a major system collapse put therepresentative in a tight spot with his CEO. To shift theblame, he called Ryanwith his CEO on the line and veryaggressivelydemandedtoknowwhyitwastakingRyansolong to come ink the contract. If Ryan was not there byFridaymorning,hesaid,thedealwasoff.

Ryan bought a ticket for the next morning, Thursday,butafreaklightningstormwhippedupinBaltimore,closingthe airport for five hours. It became painfully clear thatRyan wasn’t going to make his original connection toAustin from Dallas. Worse, when he called AmericanAirlines justbeforedeparting,he found thathisconnectionhad been automatically rebooked to 3 p.m. the next day,puttingthecontractinjeopardy.

WhenRyanfinallygottoDallasat8p.m.,herantothegatewheretheday’sfinalAmericanAirlinesflighttoAustinwas less than thirtyminutes from takeoff. His goal was toget on that flight or, atworst, get an earlier flight the nextday.

Infrontofhimatthegate,averyaggressivecouplewasyellingatthegateagent,whowasbarelylookingatthemasshetappedonthecomputer infrontofher;shewasclearly

making every effort not to scream back.After she’d said,“There’s nothing I can do,” five times, the angry couplefinallygaveupandleft.

Tostart,watchhowRyanturnsthatheatedexchangetohis advantage. Following on the heels of an argument is agreat position for a negotiator, because your counterpart isdesperate for an empathetic connection. Smile, and you’realreadyanimprovement.

“Hi,Wendy, I’m Ryan. It seems like they were prettyupset.”

This labels thenegativeandestablishes a rapportbasedonempathy.ThisinturnencouragesWendytoelaborateonher situation, words Ryan then mirrors to invite her to gofurther.

“Yeah.Theymissed their connection.We’vehad a fairamountofdelaysbecauseoftheweather.”

“Theweather?”AfterWendy explains how the delays in the Northeast

had rippled through the system, Ryan again labels thenegative and then mirrors her answer to encourage her todelvefurther.

“Itseemslikeit’sbeenahecticday.”“There’vebeena lotof ‘irateconsumers,’youknow? I

mean,Igetit,eventhoughIdon’tliketobeyelledat.AlotofpeoplearetryingtogettoAustinforthebiggame.”

“Thebiggame?”“UT is playing Ole Miss football and every flight into

Austinhasbeenbookedsolid.”

“Bookedsolid?”Now let’spause.Up to thispoint,Ryanhasbeenusing

labels and mirrors to build a relationship withWendy.Toheritmustseemlikeidlechatter,though,becausehehasn’tasked for anything. Unlike the angry couple, Ryan isacknowledginghersituation.Hiswordsping-pongbetween“What’sthat?”and“Ihearyou,”bothofwhichinvitehertoelaborate.

Nowthattheempathyhasbeenbuilt,sheletsslipapieceofinformationhecanuse.

“Yeah, all through the weekend. Though who knowshow many people will make the flights. The weather’sprobably going to reroute a lot of people through a lot ofdifferentplaces.”

Here’s where Ryan finally swoops in with an ask. Butnoticehowheacts:notassertiveorcoldly logical,butwithempathy and labeling that acknowledges her situation andtacitlyputstheminthesameboat.

“Well,itseemslikeyou’vebeenhandlingtheroughdaypretty well,” he says. “I was also affected by the weatherdelays andmissedmy connecting flight. It seems like thisflightislikelybookedsolid,butwithwhatyousaid,maybesomeone affected by the weather might miss thisconnection.Isthereanypossibilityaseatwillbeopen?”

Listen to that riff: Label, tactical empathy, label. Andonlythenarequest.

Atthispoint,Wendysaysnothingandbeginstypingonhercomputer.Ryan,who’seagernottotalkhimselfoutofa

possibledeal,engagesinsomesilence.Afterthirtyseconds,Wendy prints a boarding pass and hands it to Ryan,explainingthattherewereafewseatsthatweresupposedtobe filledbypeoplewhowouldnowarrivemuch later thantheflight’sdeparture.TomakeRyan’ssuccessevenbetter,sheputshiminEconomyPlusseating.

Allthatinundertwominutes!The next time you find yourself following an angry

customer at a corner store or airplane line, take amomentand practice labels and mirrors on the service person. Ipromise theywon’t scream,“Don’t try tocontrolme!”andburst into flames—and you might walk away with a littlemorethanyouexpected.

KEYLESSONS

Asyou try to insert the tools of tactical empathy into yourdailylife,Iencourageyoutothinkofthemasextensionsofnatural human interactions and not artificial conversationaltics.

Inanyinteraction,itpleasesustofeelthattheothersideis listening and acknowledging our situation.Whether youare negotiatinga business deal or simply chatting to theperson at the supermarket butcher counter, creating anempatheticrelationshipandencouragingyourcounterparttoexpand on their situation is the basis of healthy humaninteraction.

These tools, then, are nothing less than emotional bestpractices that help you cure the pervasive ineptitude that

marksourmostcriticalconversationsinlife.Theywillhelpyou connect and create more meaningful and warmrelationships. That they might help you extract what youwantisabonus;humanconnectionisthefirstgoal.

With that in mind, I encourage you to take the risk ofsprinkling these in everyconversationyouhave. Ipromiseyou that they will feel awkward and artificial at first, butkeepatit.Learningtowalkfeltawfullystrange,too.

As you internalize these techniques, turning the artificeoftacticalempathyintoahabitandthenintoanintegralpartof your personality, keep in mind these lessons from thechapteryou’vejustread:

■ Imagineyourself inyourcounterpart’ssituation.Thebeautyofempathyisthatitdoesn’tdemandthatyouagreewiththeotherperson’sideas(youmay well find them crazy). But byacknowledging theother person’s situation, youimmediately convey that you are listening.Andoncetheyknowthatyouarelistening,theymaytellyousomethingthatyoucanuse.

■ Thereasonswhyacounterpartwillnotmakeanagreement with you are often more powerfulthanwhytheywillmakeadeal,sofocusfirstonclearing the barriers to agreement. Denyingbarriers or negative influences gives themcredence;getthemintotheopen.

■ Pause. After you label a barrier or mirror astatement, let it sink in. Don’t worry, the otherpartywillfillthesilence.

■ Label your counterpart’s fears to diffuse theirpower.Weallwanttotalkaboutthehappystuff,but remember, the faster you interrupt action inyour counterpart’s amygdala, the part of thebrain that generates fear, the faster you cangeneratefeelingsofsafety,well-being,andtrust.

■ List the worst things that the other party couldsay about you and say them before the otherperson can. Performing an accusation audit inadvance prepares you to head off negativedynamics before they take root. And becausetheseaccusationsoftensoundexaggeratedwhensaid aloud, speaking them will encourage theother person to claim that quite the opposite istrue.

■ Remember you’re dealing with a person whowants to be appreciated and understood. So uselabels to reinforce and encourage positiveperceptionsanddynamics.

CHAPTER4

BEWARE“YES”—MASTER“NO”

Letmepaint a scenariowe’veall experienced:You’reathome, just before dinner, and the phone rings. It is, nosurprise, a telemarketer. He wants to sell you magazinesubscriptions, water filters, frozen Argentine beef—to behonest, it doesn’t matter, as the script is always the same.After butchering your name, and engaging in somedisingenuouspleasantries,helaunchesintohispitch.

The hard sell that comes next is a scripted flowchartdesigned to cut off your escape routes as it funnels youdownapathwithnoexitbut“Yes.”“Doyouenjoyaniceglassofwaterfromtimetotime.”“Well,yes,but...”“Me,too.And likeme I bet you like crisp, cleanwaterwith nochemicalaftertaste,likeMotherNaturemadeit.”“Well,yes,but...”

Who is this guy with a fake smile in his voice, youwonder,whothinkshecantrickyouintobuyingsomethingyoudon’twant?Youfeelyourmuscles tighten,yourvoicegodefensive,andyourheartrateaccelerate.

Youfeellikehisprey,andyouare!The last thingyouwant todo is say “Yes,” evenwhen

it’s the only way to answer, “Do you drink water?”

Compromise and concession, even to the truth, feels likedefeat. And “No,” well, “No” feels likesalvation, like anoasis. You’re tempted to use “No” when it’s blatantlyuntrue, just to hear its sweet sound. “No, I donot needwater,carbonfilteredorotherwise.I’macamel!”

Now let’s think about this selling technique. It’sdesignedtogetto“Yes”atallcosts,asif“No”weredeath.And for many of us it is. We have all these negativeconnotations with “No.” We talk about the rejection of“No,” about the fear of hearing it. “No” is the ultimatenegativeword.

Butat theendof theday,“Yes” isoftenameaninglessanswer that hides deeper objections (and “Maybe” is evenworse).Pushinghardfor“Yes”doesn’tgetanegotiatoranyclosertoawin;itjustangerstheotherside.

So if “Yes” can be so damn uncomfortable, and “No”such a relief, why have we fetishized one and demonizedtheother?

Wehaveitbackward.Forgoodnegotiators,“No”ispuregold.Thatnegativeprovidesagreatopportunityforyouandthe other party to clarify what you really want byeliminatingwhatyoudon’twant.“No”isasafechoicethatmaintains the status quo; it provides a temporary oasis ofcontrol.

Atsomepoint in theirdevelopment,allnegotiatorshave tocometogripswith“No.”Whenyoucometorealizetherealpsychologicaldynamicbehind it, you’ll love theword. It’snot just that you lose your fear of it, but that you come to

learnwhatitdoesforyouandhowyoucanbuilddealsoutofit.

“Yes” and “Maybe” are often worthless. But “No”alwaysalterstheconversation.

“NO”STARTSTHENEGOTIATION

My fascinationwith “No” in all its beautiful nuance beganwith a conversation I had a few months before mynegotiationcareerbegan.

I startedmycareerwith theBureauasamemberof theFBISWAT team in thePittsburghDivisionbut after nearlytwo years I was transferred to NewYork, where the FBIattachedmetotheJointTerrorismTaskForce(JTTF).Itwasan amazing post:We spent our days and nights trackingsuspected terrorists, investigating their cells, and assessingwhetherorhowtheymightstrike.WewereuntyingknotsofhumanangerinthemidstofAmerica’sbiggestcity,makinglife-and-death decisions on who was dangerous and whowasjustblowinghotair.Theworkfascinatedme.

Ever since my first days with the Bureau, I had beenobsessed with crisis response. The immediacy of the taskenthralled me. The stakes were high. Lives hung in thebalance.

Theemotionalterrainwascomplex,changing,andoftenconflicting.Tosuccessfullygainahostage’s safe release,anegotiatorhadtopenetratethehostage-taker’smotives,stateof mind, intelligence, and emotional strengths andweaknesses. The negotiator played the role of bully,

conciliator, enforcer, savior, confessor, instigator, andpeacemaker—andthat’sjustafewoftheparts.

IthoughtIwascutoutforeveryoneofthem.AfewweeksafterIgottoManhattan,Ishowedupatthe

desk of Amy Bonderow, who ran the FBI’s CrisisNegotiationTeaminNewYork.Ididn’tknowbeansaboutnegotiating,soIwentforthedirectapproach.

“Iwantbeahostagenegotiator,”Isaid.“Everyonedoes—gotanytraining?”sheasked.“No,”Isaid.“Anycredentials?”“Nope.”Ianswered.“Anyexperience?”sheasked.“No,”Ianswered.“Do you have a degree in psychology, sociology,

anythingatallrelatedtonegotiation?”“No.”“Lookslikeyouansweredyourownquestion,”shesaid.

“No.Nowgoaway.”“Goaway?”Iprotested.“Really?”“Yep.Asin,‘Leavemealone.’Everybodywantstobea

hostagenegotiator,andyouhavenorésumé,experience,orskills. Sowhatwould you say inmy position?You got it:‘No.’”

I paused in front of her, thinking,This is not howmynegotiating career ends. I had stared down terrorists; Iwasn’tgoingtojustleave.

“Come on,” I said. “There has to besomething I can

do.”Amy shook her head and gave one of those ironic

laughs that mean the person doesn’t think you’ve got asnowball’schanceinhell.

“I’ll tell youwhat.Yes, there is somethingyoucando:Volunteer at a suicide hotline.Then come talk to me. Noguarantees,gotit?”shesaid.“Now,seriously,goaway.”

MyconversationwithAmykickedoffmyawarenessofthecomplexandhiddensubtletiesofconversation,thepowerofcertainwords, the seeminglyunintelligible emotional truthsthatsooftenunderlieintelligibleexchanges.

Atrapintowhichmanyfallistotakewhatotherpeoplesay literally. I started to see that while people played thegameofconversation,itwasinthegamebeneaththegame,wherefewplayed,thatalltheleveragelived.

In our chat, I saw how the word “No”—so apparentlyclear and direct—really wasn’t so simple. Over the years,I’vethoughtbackrepeatedlytothatconversation,replayinghowAmysoquicklyturnedmedown,againandagain.Buther“No’s”werejustthegatewayto“Yes.”Theygaveher—andme—time topivot,adjust,andreexamine,andactuallycreatedtheenvironmentfortheone“Yes”thatmattered.

While assigned to the JTTF, I worked with an NYPDlieutenantnamedMartin.Hehadahardshell,andwheneveraskedforanythingherespondedwithatersenegative.AfterI’dgotten toknowhimabit, Iaskedhimwhy.“Chris,”hesaid,proudly,“alieutenant’sjobistosay,‘No.’”

At first, I thought that sort of automated response

signaled a failure of imagination. But then I realized I didthesame thingwithmy teenageson,and thatafter I’dsaid“No”tohim,IoftenfoundthatIwasopentohearingwhathehadtosay.

That’s because having protected myself, I could relaxandmoreeasilyconsiderthepossibilities.

“No” is thestart of the negotiation, not theend of it.We’ve been conditioned to fear theword “No.”But it is astatement of perception far more often than of fact. Itseldommeans,“Ihaveconsideredall the factsandmadearational choice.” Instead, “No” is often a decision,frequently temporary, tomaintainthestatusquo.Changeisscary, and “No” provides a little protection from thatscariness.

Jim Camp, in his excellent book,Start with NO,1counsels the reader to give their adversary (his word forcounterpart) permission to say “No” from the outset of anegotiation.Hecallsit“therighttoveto.”Heobservesthatpeoplewill fight to the death to preserve their right to say“No,” so give them that right and the negotiatingenvironment becomes more constructive and collaborativealmostimmediately.

WhenIreadCamp’sbook,Irealizedthiswassomethingwe’dknownashostagenegotiatorsforyears.We’dlearnedthatthequickestwaytogetahostage-takeroutwastotakethe time to talk themout,asopposed to“demanding” theirsurrender. Demanding their surrender, “telling” them tocomeout,alwaysendedupcreatingamuchlongerstandoff

andoccasionally,actuallycontributedtodeath.Itcomesdowntothedeepanduniversalhumanneedfor

autonomy. People need to feel in control. When youpreserve a person’s autonomy by clearly giving thempermission to say “No” to your ideas, the emotions calm,theeffectivenessofthedecisionsgoup,andtheotherpartycanreallylookatyourproposal.They’reallowedtoholditin their hands, to turn it around.And it gives you time toelaborateorpivotinordertoconvinceyourcounterpartthatthechangeyou’reproposingismoreadvantageousthanthestatusquo.

Great negotiators seek “No” because they know that’softenwhentherealnegotiationbegins.

Politelysaying“No”toyouropponent(we’llgointothisinmore depth in Chapter 9), calmly hearing “No,” and justletting the other side know that they are welcome to say“No”hasapositiveimpactonanynegotiation.Infact,yourinvitation for the other side to say “No” has an amazingpower to bring down barriers and allow for beneficialcommunication.

Thismeans you have to train yourself to hear “No” assomething other than rejection, and respond accordingly.When someone tells you “No,” you need to rethink theword in one of its alternative—and much more real—meanings:

■ Iamnotyetreadytoagree;

■ Youaremakingmefeeluncomfortable;

■ Idonotunderstand;

■ Idon’tthinkIcanaffordit;

■ Iwantsomethingelse;

■ Ineedmoreinformation;or

■ Iwanttotalkitoverwithsomeoneelse.

Then, after pausing, ask solution-based questions orsimplylabeltheireffect:

“Whataboutthisdoesn’tworkforyou?”“Whatwouldyouneedtomakeitwork?”“Itseemslikethere’ssomethingherethatbothersyou.”Peoplehaveaneed to say, “No.”Sodon’t justhope to

hearitatsomepoint;getthemtosayitearly.

PERSUADEINTHEIRWORLD

I’d like topresentyouwithaguynamedJoeBusinessmanas he readies himself for a negotiation. You’ve met himbefore. He’s the prepared type, with all hisGetting to Yesstrategies written out and memorized.And he’smore thanready to unleash them on the guy across the table. Joepausestolookathisexpensivesuitinthemirror,fantasizingabout the impressive things he’ll say and the fancy chartsand graphs that’ll back up those things and leave his

counterpart—hisopponent—vanquishedandindefeat.HeisRussellCroweinGladiator.HeisTheMan.

Now allow me to let you in on a secret: None of thatpreparationwillmeanadamnthing.Hisnegotiationstyleisallme,me,me,ego,ego,ego.Andwhenthepeopleontheothersideofthetablepickupthosesignals,they’regoingtodecide that it’s best to politely, even furtively, ignore thisSuperman...bysaying“Yes”!

“Huh?”yousay.Sure, the word they’ll say right off is “Yes,” but that

wordisonlyatooltogetthisblowhardtogoaway.They’llweasel out later, claiming changing conditions, budgetissues, theweather. For now, they justwant to be releasedbecause Joe isn’t convincing them of anything; he’s onlyconvincinghimself.

I’ll letyouinonasecret.Thereareactuallythreekindsof“Yes”:Counterfeit,Confirmation,andCommitment.

A counterfeit “yes” is one in which your counterpartplans on saying “no” but either feels “yes” is an easierescape route or just wantsto disingenuously keep theconversation going to obtain more information or someother kind of edge. A confirmation “yes” is generallyinnocent,a reflexive response toablack-or-whitequestion;it’s sometimesused to laya trapbutmostly it’s just simpleaffirmation with no promise of action.And a commitment“yes” is the real deal; it’s a true agreement that leads toaction,a“yes”atthetablethatendswithasignatureonthecontract.The commitment “yes” iswhat youwant, but the

threetypessoundalmostthesamesoyouhavetolearnhowtorecognizewhichoneisbeingused.

Human beings the world over are so used to beingpursuedforthecommitment“yes”asaconditiontofindoutmore that they have become masters at giving thecounterfeit “yes.” That’s what the people facing JoeBusinessman are doing, dangling the counterfeit “yes” sotheycanhearmore.

Whether you call it “buy-in” or “engagement” orsomethingelse,goodnegotiatorsknowthattheirjobisn’ttoput on a great performance but to gently guide theircounterparttodiscovertheirgoalashisown.

Letmetellyou,Ilearnedthatthehardway.TwomonthsaftertalkingwithAmy,Istartedanswering

phonesforHelpLine, thecrisishotlinefoundedbyNormanVincentPeale.

Thebasicrulewasthatyoucouldn’tbewithanybodyonthe phone for more than twenty minutes. If you did yourjob,itwasn’tgoingtotakeyoulongerthanthattogetthemtoabetterplace.Wehada thickbookoforganizationswereferred them to for help. It was a paramedic approach:patchthemupandsendthemontheirway.

Butpeopleincrisisonlyaccountedforabout40percentof the calls we got. The majority of the calls came fromfrequent callers. These are highly dysfunctional people,energy vampires whom no one else would listen toanymore.

Wekeptalistoffrequentcallersandwhenyougotone,

thefirst thingyouhadtodowaschecktoseeif thepersonhadcalledthatday,becausetheywereonlyallowedonecalladay.Theyknewit,too.Alotoftimes,they’dsay,“Yeah,I’mEddie. Ihaven’tcalledyet today.Goaheadandcheckthelist.Yougottotalktome.”

Since I was there primarily to learn a skill, I loved thefrequentcallers.Theywereaproblem,andIlovedtryingtofigure them out. I felt I had some talent at it. I felt like asuperstar.

When it came time for my performance review, theyassignedmeashiftsupervisornamedJimSnyder.Jimwasahotline veteran and a sweetheart; the only problemwas healways wanted to joke around. Jim understood thatvolunteer burnoutwas the biggest problem at a hotline, sohe dedicated his time tomakingwork fun. I became goodfriendswithJim.

Formyreview,JimwaiteduntilIgotacallandwentintothemonitoring roomwhere the supervisors could listen toour calls.The call was from one ofmy frequent clients, acabbiewithafearofgoingoutsideandplentyoftimetotellme about it. This energy vampire (his name was Daryl)launchedintohisshtickabouthowhewasgoingtolosehishouseandwithithiswilltoliveifhecouldn’twork.

“Seriously,whenwasthelasttimesomeonetriedtohurtyouonthestreets?”Iasked.

“Well,Imean,it’sbeenalongtime,”Darylsaid.“Like...?”“I can’t really remember adate,Chris.Maybe ayear, I

guess.”“Soit’ssafetosaythattheoutsideworldhasn’tbeentoo

hardonyou,right?”“Yes,”Darylsaid.“Isupposeso.”Wewentbackandforth like this forawhile,as Imade

him admit thatmost of us had little to fear in theworld. Iwas feeling good about my new skills, about listening toDaryland then“CareFronting”him,whichwas theslightlygoofy name we gave to assertively—but caringly—respondingtofrequentcallers.

Itwasallflowing,andourrapportwasgreat.IevengotDaryl to laugh a few times. By the time I was done withhim,hecouldn’tgivemeonereasonnottostepoutside.

“Thankyou,Chris,”Daryl said justbeforehehungup.“Thanksfordoingsuchagreatjob.”

BeforeIwenttoseeJim,Ileanedbackinmychairandbaskedinthatcompliment.Howoftendoyougetthatfroma man in pain, I thought. Then I sprung up and strodetoward the monitoring room, so proud I was practicallybuffingmynailsonmyshirtandpattingmyownback.

Jimmotionedme to the chair in front of him and gavemehisbiggestsmile.Imusthavereturneditwithtwicethewattage.

“Well,Chris,”hesaid,stillsmiling.“ThatwasoneoftheworstcallsIeverheard.”

Istaredathim,gape-jawed.“Jim, did youhearDaryl congratulateme?” I asked. “I

talkedhimdown,man.Ikilledit.”

Jimsmiled—Ihatedthatsmilerightthen—andnodded.“That’s one of the signs, because they should be

congratulating themselves when they get off the line,” hesaid. “Theydon’t need tobe congratulatingyou.That tellsmeyoudidtoomuch.Iftheythinkyoudidit—ifyouwerethe guywho killed it—how is he going to help himself? Idon’twanttobeharsh,butyouwerehorrible.”

As I listened to what Jim said, I felt that acid stomachrush you get when you are forced to accept that the guydumping on you is completely right.Daryl’s response hadbeen a kind of “yes,” but it had been anything but a truecommitment “yes.” He’d made no promise to action. His“yes”hadbeendesigned tomakeme feel good enough toleavehimalone.Darylmaynothaveknownit,buthis“yes”wasascounterfeitastheycame.

Yousee,thatwholecallhadbeenaboutmeandmyegoand not the caller.But the onlyway to get these callers totake action was to havethem own the conversation, tobelievethattheywerecomingtotheseconclusions,tothesenecessarynextsteps,andthatthevoiceattheotherendwassimplyamediumforthoserealizations.

Using all your skills to create rapport, agreement, andconnectionwith a counterpart is useful, but ultimately thatconnectionisuselessunlesstheotherpersonfeelsthattheyare equally as responsible, if notsolely responsible, forcreatingtheconnectionandthenewideastheyhave.

Inoddedslowly,thefightdrainedoutofme.“Oneoftheworstcalls?”IsaidtoJim.“That’sright.”

Iworkedhardatreorientingmyselffromthatpointon.Iasked so many questions and read so much about it thatsoontheyhadmeteachingtwoclassesfornewvolunteersatHelpLine:theopeningclass,onactivelistening;andtheoneonCareFrontation.

Gotit,yousay.It’snotaboutme.Weneedtopersuadefromtheirperspective,notours.Buthow?

Bystartingwiththeirmostbasicwants.In every negotiation, in every agreement, the result

comes from someone else’s decision. And sadly, if webelievethatwecancontrolormanageothers’decisionswithcompromiseand logic,we’re leavingmillionson the table.But while we can’t control others’ decisions, we caninfluence them by inhabiting their world and seeing andhearingexactlywhattheywant.

Though the intensitymaydiffer fromperson to person,you can be sure that everyone youmeet is driven by twoprimalurges:theneedtofeelsafeandsecure,andtheneedto feel in control. If you satisfy those drives, you’re in thedoor.

AswesawwithmychatwithDaryl,you’renotgoingtologicallyconvince them that they’re safe, secure, or incontrol. Primal needs are urgent and illogical, so arguingthemintoacornerisjustgoingtopushyourcounterparttofleewithacounterfeit“Yes.”

And being “nice” in the form of feigned sympathy isoften equally as unsuccessful. We live in an age thatcelebrates niceness under various names.We are exhorted

tobeniceandtorespectpeople’sfeelingsatalltimesandineverysituation.

Butnicealoneinthecontextofnegotiationcanbackfire.Nice,employedasaruse,isdisingenuousandmanipulative.Who hasn’t received the short end of the stick in dealingswitha“nice”salesmanwhotookyouforaride?Ifyourushinwithplasticniceness,yourblandsmileisgoingtodredgeupallthatbaggage.

Instead of getting inside with logic or feigned smiles,then, we get there by asking for “No.” It’s the word thatgivesthespeakerfeelingsofsafetyandcontrol.“No”startsconversations and creates safe havens to get to the final“Yes”ofcommitment.Anearly“Yes”isoftenjustacheap,counterfeitdodge.

About five months after she’d told me to “go away,” Istopped byAmy Bonderow’s office and told her that I’dvolunteeredatHelpLine.

“You did?” she asked, smiling with surprise. “I telleverybodytodothat.Andnobodyeverdoes.”

ItturnedoutthatAmyhadstartedhernegotiatingcareerby volunteering at the same place. She started namingpeoplewhowere nowmutual friends of ours.We laughedaboutJim.

In a sudden shift,Amy stopped speaking and stared atme. I shifted inmy shoes as she gaveme thePause.Thenshesmiled.

“Yougetthenextposition.”Atthattime,therewerefiveotherpeopleaimingforthe

sameslot,peoplewhohadpsychologydegrees,experience,and credentials. But Iwas on the road to the next hostagenegotiationtrainingcourseattheFBIAcademyinQuantico,Virginia,aheadofeverybodyelse.Mycareerasanegotiatorhadofficiallybegun.

“NO”ISPROTECTION

Think back to the telemarketer at the beginning of thischapter.Theobviousreplytohisquestion—“Doyouenjoyaniceglassofwater?”—is“Yes.”Butallyouwanttodoisscream,“No!”After aquestion like thatyou justknow therestofthephonecallisgoingtobepainful.

That, inanutshell,distills the inherentcontradictions inthe values we give “Yes” and “No.” Whenever wenegotiate, there’snodoubtwewant to finishwitha“Yes.”But wemistakenly conflate the positive value of that final“Yes” with a positive value of “Yes” in general. Andbecause we see “No” as the opposite of “Yes,” we thenassumethat“No”isalwaysabadthing.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Saying “No”givesthespeakerthefeelingofsafety,security,andcontrol.Youuse a question that prompts a “No” answer, and yourcounterpart feels that by turning you down he has provedthat he’s in the driver’s seat. Good negotiatorswelcome—even invite—a solid “No” to start, as a sign that the otherpartyisengagedandthinking.

Gun for a “Yes” straight off the bat, though, and yourcounterpartgetsdefensive,wary,andskittish.That’swhyI

tellmystudentsthat,ifyou’retryingtosellsomething,don’tstartwith“Doyouhaveafewminutestotalk?”Insteadask,“Isnowabadtimetotalk?”Eitheryouget“Yes,itisabadtime” followedbyagood timeora request togoaway,oryouget“No,it’snot”andtotalfocus.

As an exercise, the next time you get a telemarketingcall, write down the questions the seller asks. I promiseyou’llfindthatyourlevelofdiscomfortcorrelatesdirectlytohowquicklyhepushesyoufor“Yes.”

MycolleagueMartiEvelsizerwastheonewhofirstopenedmyeyestowhy“No”wasbetterthan“Yes.”

Marti was the FBI’s Crisis Negotiation Coordinator inPittsburghatthetime.Shewasadynamoandanegotiatinggenius, which earnedher huge respect both within theBureau and with the local police. But human beings areinnately jealous, and her immediate supervisor was noexceptiontothatrule.Hersuccessdiminishedhim,andthatmadeherathreat.

His jealousy got the better of him when the PittsburghPoliceDepartment’sHostageNegotiationTeamaskedhertosit on the selectionboard for their newcandidates.Pickingher, and doing so over her boss, was an unprecedentedmove.

Soherbossdecidedtoremoveherfromherposition.Forignoring her regular duties, he said. But really it was forbeingathreat.

WhenMartisatdownwithhersupervisorforherofficialdismissal,heroptionswerefew.Hehadeveryrighttodoas

hepleased.Martitoldmethatsheconsideredavarietyofscenarios.

Shethoughtaboutgoingrightathisjealousyandhashingitout, or explaining how the job would reflect well on theBureau: “Would you like our office to be honored for itsexpertise?”

Butby the timeshesatdownwithhim, shehadpickedone of the most strongly worded “No”-oriented setupquestionsIhaveeverheard.

“DoyouwanttheFBItobeembarrassed?”shesaid.“No,”heanswered.“Whatdoyouwantmetodo?”sheresponded.He leaned back in his chair, one of those 1950s faux-

leather numbers that squeak meaningfully when the sittershifts. He stared at her over his glasses and then noddedeversoslightly.Hewasincontrol.

“Look, you can keep the position,” he said. “Just goback out there and don’t let it interfere with your otherduties.”

AndaminutelaterMartiwalkedoutwithherjobintact.

WhenIheardMartidothat,Iwaslike,“Bang!”Bypushingfora“No,”Martinudgedhersupervisor intoazonewherehe was making the decisions.And then she furthered hisfeelingsofsafetyandpowerwithaquestioninvitinghimtodefinehernextmove.

TheimportantthinghereisthatMartinotonlyacceptedthe“No”;shesearcheditoutandembracedit.

Atarecentsalesconference,Iaskedtheparticipantsfor

theonewordtheyalldread.Theentiregroupyelled,“No!”Tothem—andtoalmosteveryone—“No”meansonething:endofdiscussion.

Butthat’snotwhatitmeans.“No”isnotfailure.Usedstrategicallyit’sananswerthat

opens the path forward. Getting to the point where you’renolongerhorrifiedbytheword“No”isaliberatingmomentthateverynegotiatorneedstoreach.Becauseifyourbiggestfear is “No,” you can’t negotiate. You’re the hostage of“Yes.”You’rehandcuffed.You’redone.

So let’sundress“No.” It’sa reaffirmationofautonomy.Itisnotauseorabuseofpower;itisnotanactofrejection;itisnotamanifestationofstubbornness;itisnottheendofthenegotiation.

Infact,“No”oftenopensthediscussionup.Thesooneryousay“No,”thesooneryou’rewillingtoseeoptionsandopportunities that you were blind to previously. Saying“No”oftenspurspeopletoactionbecausetheyfeelthey’veprotected themselves and now see an opportunity slippingaway.

Since I’ve demystified “No” formyself, I’ve found theideas, perceptions, and baggage that people havewith thattwo-letterwordtobefascinating.Tome,it’slikewatchingamovie or amusic video from the 1980s for the umpteenthtime. You can identify with the experience—whilesimultaneously being conscious of the fact that the world,andyou,havemovedon.

Today,Icoachmystudentstolearntosee“No”forwhat

itis.Ratherthanharmingthemorthosetheynegotiatewith,“No”protectsandbenefitsallpartiesinanexchange.“No”creates safety, security, and the feeling of control. It’s arequirementtoimplementablesuccess.It’sapause,anudge,andachanceforthespeakertoarticulatewhattheydowant.

Asyoucansee,“No”hasalotofskills.

■ “No”allowstherealissuestobebroughtforth;

■ “No” protects people from making—and letsthemcorrect—ineffectivedecisions;

■ “No” slows things down so that people canfreely embrace their decisions and theagreementstheyenterinto;

■ “No”helpspeoplefeelsafe,secure,emotionallycomfortable,andincontroloftheirdecisions;

■ “No”moveseveryone’seffortsforward.

One ofmy grad school students, a political fund-raisernamedBenOttenhoff,drovehomethis lessonwithabang.Foryears,he’dbeenusingatraditional“Yespattern”fund-raising script to raise money for Republican congressionalcandidates.

FUND-RAISER:Hello,canIspeakwithMr.Smith?MR.SMITH:Yes,thisishe.

FUND-RAISER: I’m calling from the XYZCommittee,and I wanted to ask you a few important questionsabout your views on our economy today. Do youbelievethatgaspricesarecurrentlytoohigh?

MR. SMITH: Yes, gas prices are much too high andhurtingmyfamily.

FUND-RAISER:Doyoubelieve that theDemocratsarepart of the problem when it comes to high gasprices?

MR.SMITH:Yes,PresidentObamaisabadpersonFUND-RAISER: Do you think we need change in

November?MR.SMITH:Yes,Ido.FUND-RAISER: Can you give me your credit card

numbersoyoucanbeapartofthatchange?

Intheoryatleast,the“Yes”answersbuiltupareservoirofpositivitythatexplodedintodonationswhenrequestedatthe end of the script.The problem, in reality,was that the“Yes pattern” scripts had been giving poor rates of returnforyears.Allthestepswere“Yes,”butthefinalanswerwasinvariably“No.”

Then Ben read Jim Camp’s bookStart with NO in myclassandbegantowonderif“No”couldbeatooltoboostdonations.Benknew thatgiving thepotentialdonorsano-hard-feelingswaytogetoffthecallwasgoingtobeatoughsell to his grassroots fund-raisers, because it goes againsteverything they had been trained to do.ButBen’s a smartguy, so instead of totally swapping scripts he had a small

group of his grassroots guys test-market a “No”-orientedscript.

FUND-RAISER:Hello,canIspeakwithMr.Smith?MR.SMITH:Yes,thisishe.FUND-RAISER: I’m calling from the XYZCommittee,

and I wanted to ask you a few important questionsabout your views on our economy today. Do youfeel that if things stay the way they are,America’sbestdaysareaheadofit?

MR.SMITH:No,thingswillonlygetworse.FUND-RAISER: Are you going to sit and watch

PresidentObamataketheWhiteHouseinNovemberwithoutputtingupafight?

MR. SMITH: No, I’m going to do anything I can tomakesurethatdoesn’thappen.

FUND-RAISER: If you want do something today tomakesurethatdoesn’thappen,youcangivetoXYZCommittee,whichisworkinghardtofightforyou.

Seehowclearlythatswaps“Yes”for“No”andofferstotakeadonationifMr.Smithwants?ItputsMr.Smithinthedriver’s seat; he’sin charge. And it works! In a trulyremarkable turnaround, the “No”-oriented script got a23percentbetterrateofreturn.

Theonly sadpart ofBen’s tale is that despite the hugeimprovement inresults,hecouldn’t rollout thescript toallhisfund-raisers.Itwentagainstfund-raisingorthodoxy,andlongtime fund-raisers like the fake comfort of the “Yes.”

Geniusisoftenmissedthefirsttimearound,right?

One negotiating genius who’s impossible to miss is MarkCuban, the billionaire owner of the Dallas Mavericks. Ialways quote to my students one of his best lines onnegotiation: “Every ‘No’ gets me closer to a ‘Yes.’” ButthenIremindthemthatextractingthose“No’s”ontheroadto“Yes”isn’talwayseasy.

There is a big difference between making yourcounterpartfeelthattheycansay“No”andactuallygettingthem to say it. Sometimes, if you’re talking to somebodywho is just not listening, the onlywayyou can crack theircraniumistoantagonizetheminto“No.”

Onegreatway todo this is tomislabeloneof theotherparty’s emotions or desires. You say something that youknowis totallywrong, like“So it seems thatyoureallyareeager to leave your job” when they clearly want to stay.That forces them to listen and makes them comfortablecorrectingyoubysaying,“No,that’snotit.Thisisit.”

Anotherwaytoforce“No”inanegotiationistoasktheotherpartywhattheydon’twant.“Let’stalkaboutwhatyouwouldsay‘No’to,”you’dsay.Andpeoplearecomfortablesaying “No” here because it feels like self-protection.Andonce you’ve gotten them to say “No,” people are muchmore open to moving forward toward new options andideas.

“No”—or the lack thereof—also serves as a warning, thecanaryinthecoalmine.Ifdespiteallyourefforts,theother

partywon’t say “No,” you’re dealingwith peoplewho areindecisive or confused orwho have a hidden agenda. Incases like that you have to end the negotiation and walkaway.

Thinkofitlikethis:No“No”meansnogo.

EMAILMAGIC:HOWNEVERTOBEIGNOREDAGAIN

There’s nothing more irritating than being ignored. Beingturneddownisbad,butgettingnoresponseatallisthepits.Itmakesyoufeel invisible,asifyoudon’texist.Andit’sawasteofyourtime.We’veallbeenthroughit:Yousendanemailtosomeoneyou’retryingtodobusinesswithandtheyignore you. Then you send a polite follow-up and theystonewallyouagain.Sowhatdoyoudo?

Youprovokea“No”withthisone-sentenceemail.

Haveyougivenuponthisproject?

Thepointisthatthisone-sentenceemailencapsulatesthebest of “No”-oriented questions and plays on yourcounterpart’s natural human aversion to loss. The “No”answertheemaildemandsofferstheotherpartythefeelingofsafetyandtheillusionofcontrolwhileencouragingthemtodefinetheirpositionandexplainittoyou.

Just as important, it makes the implicit threat that youwill walk away on your own terms. To stop that fromhappening—to cut their losses and prove their power—the

otherparty’snatural inclinationis toreplyimmediatelyanddisagree.No, our priorities haven’t changed. We’ve justgottenboggeddownand...

If you’re a parent, you already use this techniqueinstinctively.What do you dowhen your kidswon’t leavethehouse/park/mall?Yousay,“Fine.I’mleaving,”andyoubegin towalkaway. I’mgoing toguess thatwelloverhalfthetimetheyyell,“No,wait!”andruntocatchup.Noonelikestobeabandoned.

Now,thismayseemlikearudewaytoaddresssomeoneinbusiness,butyouhavetogetoverthat.It’snotrude,andthough it’s direct, it’s cloaked with the safety of “No.”Ignoringyouiswhat’srude.IcantellyouthatI’veusedthissuccessfully not just in NorthAmerica, but with people intwo different cultures (Arabic and Chinese) famous forneversaying“No.”

KEYLESSONS

Using this chapter’s tools in daily life is difficult formanypeople because they go directly against one of society’sbiggestsocialdictums.Thatis,“Benice.”

We’ve instrumentalized niceness as a way of greasingthesocialwheels,yet it’softenaruse.We’repoliteandwedon’t disagree to get throughdaily existencewith the leastdegreeof friction.Butby turningniceness intoa lubricant,we’ve leeched it of meaning. A smile and a nod mightsignify“Getmeoutofhere!”asmuchasitmeans“Nicetomeetyou.”

That’s death for a good negotiator, who gains theirpower by understanding their counterpart’s situation andextracting informationabout their counterpart’sdesires andneeds. Extracting that information means getting the otherparty to feel safe and in control.And while it may soundcontradictory, the way to get there is by getting the otherparty to disagree, to draw their own boundaries, to definetheirdesiresasafunctionofwhattheydonotwant.

As you try to put the chapter’s methods to use, Iencourageyoutothinkofthemastheanti–“nicenessruse.”Not in the sense that theyareunkind,but in the sense thatthey are authentic.Triggering “No” peels away the plasticfalsehood of “Yes” and gets you towhat’s really at stake.Alongtheway,keepinmindthesepowerfullessons:

■ Breakthehabitofattemptingtogetpeopletosay“yes.” Being pushed for “yes” makes peopledefensive. Our love of hearing “yes” makes usblind to the defensiveness we ourselves feelwhensomeoneispushingustosayit.

■ “No”isnotafailure.Wehavelearnedthat“No”is the anti-“Yes” and therefore a word to beavoidedatallcosts.Butitreallyoftenjustmeans“Wait”or“I’mnotcomfortablewiththat.”Learnhow to hear it calmly. It is not the end of thenegotiation,butthebeginning.

■ “Yes”isthefinalgoalofanegotiation,butdon’t

aimforitatthestart.Askingsomeonefor“Yes”too quickly in a conversation—“Do you like todrinkwater,Mr.Smith?”—getshisguardupandpaintsyouasanuntrustworthysalesman.

■ Saying“No”makesthespeakerfeelsafe,secure,andincontrol,sotriggerit.Bysayingwhattheydon’twant, your counterpart defines their spaceandgainstheconfidenceandcomforttolistentoyou.That’swhy“Isnowabad time to talk?” isalwaysbetter than “Doyouhave a fewminutestotalk?”

■ Sometimestheonlywaytogetyourcounterparttolistenandengagewithyouisbyforcingtheminto a “No.” That means intentionallymislabeling one of their emotions or desires oraskingaridiculousquestion—like,“Itseemslikeyouwant this project to fail”—that can only beanswerednegatively.

■ Negotiate in theirworld.Persuasionisnotabouthow bright or smooth or forceful you are. It’sabouttheotherpartyconvincingthemselvesthatthesolutionyouwantistheirownidea.Sodon’tbeat them with logic or brute force. Askthemquestions that open paths to your goals.It’s notaboutyou.

■ If a potential business partner is ignoring you,contact them with a clear and concise “No”-orientedquestionthatsuggeststhatyouarereadyto walk away. “Have you given up on thisproject?”workswonders.

CHAPTER5

TRIGGERTHETWOWORDSTHATIMMEDIATELYTRANSFORMANYNEGOTIATION

InAugust2000,themilitantIslamicgroupAbuSayyaf,inthe southern Philippines, broadcast that it had captured aCIAagent.Thetruthwasnotasnewsworthy,orasvaluabletotherebels.

Abu Sayyaf had kidnapped Jeffrey Schilling, a twenty-four-year-oldAmericanwhohadtraveledneartheirbaseinJoloIsland.ACalifornianative,Schillingbecameahostagewitha$10millionpricetagonhishead.

At the time I was a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)attached to the FBI’s elite Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU).The CNU is the equivalent of the special forces ofnegotiations. It’s attached to the FBI’s Hostage RescueTeam (HRT). Both are national counterterrorist responseassets.Theyarethebestofthebest.

The CNU is based at the FBI Academy in Quantico,Virginia.TheFBIAcademyhas come to be knownby theone word, “Quantico.” Rightly or wrongly, Quantico has

developed the reputation as one of the centers, if notthecenter of knowledge, for law enforcement. When anegotiation isgoingbadlyand thenegotiators involvedaredirectedtocallandfindoutwhat“Quantico”hastosay,theCNUiswhotheycall.

CNU developed what is a powerful staple in the high-stakes world of crisis negotiation, the Behavioral ChangeStairwayModel(BCSM).Themodelproposesfivestages—activelistening,empathy,rapport,influence,andbehavioralchange—that take any negotiator from listening toinfluencingbehavior.

TheoriginsofthemodelcanbetracedbacktothegreatAmericanpsychologistCarlRogers,whoproposedthatrealchangecanonlycomewhenatherapistacceptstheclientasheorsheis—anapproachknownasunconditionalpositiveregard. The vast majority of us, however, as Rogersexplained, come to expect that love, praise, and approvalare dependent on saying and doing the things people(initially,ourparents)considercorrect.That is,becauseformostofusthepositiveregardweexperienceisconditional,wedevelopahabitofhidingwhowereallyareandwhatwereally think, instead calibratingourwords to gain approvalbutdisclosinglittle.

Which is why so few social interactions lead to actualbehavior change. Consider the typical patient with severecoronaryheartdisease recovering fromopen-heart surgery.Thedoctor tells thepatient: “This surgery isn’t a cure.Theonlywaytotrulyprolongyourlifeistomakethefollowing

behaviorchanges. . .”Thegratefulpatientresponds:“Yes,yes,yes,ofcourse,Doctor!Thisismysecondchance.Iwillchange!”

And do they? Study after study has shown that, no,nothingchanges; twoyearsafter theiroperation,more than90percentofpatientshaven’tchangedtheirlifestyleatall.

Thoughthestakesofaneverydaynegotiationwithyourchild, boss, or client are usually not as high as that of ahostage (or health crisis) negotiation, the psychologicalenvironment necessary for not just temporary in-the-momentcompliance,butrealgut-levelchange,isthesame.

If you successfully take someone up the BehavioralChange Stairway, each stage attempting to engender moretrust and moreconnection, there will be a breakthroughmoment when unconditional positive regard is establishedandyoucanbeginexertinginfluence.

After years of refining the BCSM and its tactics, I canteach anyone how to get to that moment. But ascardiologists know all too well, and legions of B-schoolgradsweaned on themost famous negotiating book in theworld,GettingtoYes ,haveultimatelydiscovered,youmorethanlikelyhaven’tgottenthereyetifwhatyou’rehearingistheword“yes.”

As you’ll soon learn, the sweetest two words in anynegotiationareactually“That’sright.”

CREATEASUBTLEEPIPHANY

IwasanaturalfortheSchillingcase.Ihadspentsometime

in the Philippines and had an extensive background interrorismfrommyNewYorkCitydaysassignedtotheJointTerrorismTaskForce(JTTF).

AfewdaysafterSchillingbecameahostage,mypartnerChuckRegini and I flew toManila to run thenegotiations.AlongwithJimNixon, theFBI’shighestofficial inManila,weconferredwithtopPhilippinemilitarybrass.Theyagreedto let us guide the negotiations. Then we got down tobusiness. One of us would take charge of the negotiationstrategy for the FBI and consequently for the U.S.government.Thatbecamemyrole.With thesupportofmycolleagues,myjobwas tocomeupwith thestrategy,get itapproved,andimplementit.

As a result of the Schilling case, I would become theFBI’sleadinternationalkidnappingnegotiator.

Our principal adversary wasAbu Sabaya, the rebel leaderwho personally negotiated for Schilling’s ransom. Sabayawasaveteranoftherebelmovementwithaviolentpast.Hewas straight out of the movies,a terrorist-sociopath-killer.Hehadahistoryofrape,murder,andbeheadings.Helikedto record his bloody deeds on video and send them to thePhilippinemedia.

Sabaya alwayswore sunglasses, a bandana, a blackT-shirt, and camo pants. He thought it made him a moredashing figure. If you look for any photos ofAbu Sayyafterroristsfromthisperiod,youalwaysseeoneinsunglasses.That’sSabaya.

Sabaya loved, loved, loved the media. He had the

Philippinereportersonspeeddial.They’dcallhimandaskhim questions in Tagalog, his native tongue. He wouldanswer inEnglishbecausehewanted theworld tohearhisvoiceonCNN.“Theyshouldmakeamovieaboutme,”hewouldtellreporters.

In my eyes, Sabaya was a cold-blooded businessmanwithanegoasbigasTexas.Arealshark.Sabayaknewhewas in the commodities game. In Jeffrey Schilling, he hadanitemofvalue.Howmuchcouldhegetfor it?Hewouldfindout,andIintendedittobeasurprisehewouldn’tlike.AsanFBIagent,Iwantedtofreethehostageandbringthecriminaltojustice.

One crucial aspect of any negotiation is to figure outhow your adversary arrived at his position. Sabaya threwoutthe$10millionransombasedonabusinesscalculation.

First, the United States was offering $5 million forinformation leading to the arrest of any of the remainingfugitives from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.Sabaya reasoned that if the United States would pay $5million to get its handson someone it didn’t like, itwouldpaymuchmoreforacitizen.

Second, a rival faction of the Abu Sayyaf had justreportedlybeenpaid$20million for sixWesternEuropeancaptives. Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi had madethepaymentas“developmentaid.”Thisabsurdityhadbeencompounded by a significant portion of the ransom beingpaidincounterfeitbills.ItwasanopportunityforGaddafitoboth embarrassWestern governments andgetmoney over-

the-tabletogroupswithwhomhesympathized.I’msurehelaughedaboutthatepisodeuntilthedayhedied.

Regardless, a price had been set. Sabaya did the mathand figuredSchillingwasworth$10million.Problemwas,JeffSchillingcamefromaworking-classfamily.Hismothercould come up with $10,000, perhaps. The United Stateswasn’t about to pay one dollar. But we would allow apaymenttobemadeifitcouldberunasa“sting”operation.

If we could draw Sabaya into an offer-counterofferbargaining situation, we had a bargaining system thatworked every time.We could beat himdown towherewewantedhim,getthehostageout,andsetupthe“sting.”

For months Sabaya refused to budge. He argued thatMuslims in thePhilippineshadsuffered fivehundredyearsof oppression, since Spanish missionaries had broughtCatholicism to the Philippines in the sixteenth century. Herecited instances where atrocities had been committedagainst his Islamic forebears. He explained why the AbuSayyafwanted to establish an Islamic state in the southernPhilippines.Fishing rights hadbeenviolated.Youname it,hethoughtitupandusedit.

Sabaya wanted $10 million in war damages—notransom,butwardamages.Heheld firm inhisdemandandkept us out of the offer-counteroffer systemwe wanted touseagainsthim.

And he occasionally dropped in threats that he wastorturingJeffSchilling.

Sabaya negotiated directly with Benjie, a Filipino

military officer. They talked in Tagalog. We reviewedtranscripts translated to English and used them to adviseBenjie.IrotatedinandoutofManilaandoversawthetalksandstrategy.IinstructedBenjietoaskwhatSchillinghadtodowith fivehundredyearsofbadbloodbetweenMuslimsand Filipinos. He told Sabaya that $10 million was notpossible.

No matter what approach we took to “reason” withSabayaoverwhySchillinghadnothingtodowiththe“wardamages,”itfellondeafears.

Ourfirst“that’sright”breakthroughactuallycamewhenIwasnegotiatingwithBenjie.HewasatrueFilipinopatriotand hero. He was the leader of the Philippine NationalPolice’sSpecialActionForce andhadbeen inhis shareoffirefights.Onmanyoccasions,Benjieandhismenhadbeensent on rescue missions to save hostages, and they had asterlingrecord.Hismenwerefeared,forgoodreason.Theyrarelytookhandcuffs.

BenjiewantedtotakeahardlinewithSabayaandspeakto him in direct, no-nonsense terms.Wewanted to engageSabaya in dialogue to discover what made the adversarytick. We actually wanted to establish rapport with anadversary.ToBenjiethatwasdistasteful.

Benjietoldusheneededabreak.Wehadbeenworkinghimnearlytwenty-fourhoursaday,sevendaysaweekforseveral weeks. He wanted to spend some time with hisfamily in the mountains north of Manila.We agreed, butonly on the condition that we could accompany him and

spendseveralhoursbothonSaturdayandSundayworkingonnegotiationstrategy.

ThatSaturdaynightwesatinthelibraryoftheAmericanambassador’ssummerresidenceworkingonthestrategy.AsI was explaining to Benjie the value of establishing arapport-based,workingrelationship,evenwithanadversaryasdangerousasSabaya,Icouldseeasnarlcomingoverhisface.IrealizedIneededtonegotiatewithBenjie.

“You hate Sabaya, don’t you?” I said, leading with alabel.

Benjie unloaded onme. “I tell you Ido!” he said. “Hehasmurderedandraped.Hehascomeuponourradiowhenwe were lobbing mortars on his position and said ‘thesemortars aremusic tomy ears.’ I heard his voice come onour radio one day and celebrate that hewas standing overthebodyofoneofmymen.”

This outburst was Benjie’s equivalent of “that’s right.”Asheacknowledgedhisrage,Iwatchedhimgetcontrolofhis anger andcalmdown.Though he had been very gooduptothatpoint,fromthatmomentforwardBenjiebecameasuperstar.Heblossomedintoatrulytalentednegotiator.

This “negotiation” between Benjie and me was nodifferentthananyothernegotiationbetweencolleagueswhodisagree on a strategy. Before you convince them to seewhatyou’retryingtoaccomplish,youhavetosaythethingstothemthatwillgetthemtosay,“That’sright.”

The“that’sright”breakthroughusuallydoesn’tcomeatthe beginning of a negotiation. It’s invisible to the

counterpartwhen it occurs, and theyembracewhatyou’vesaid.Tothem,it’sasubtleepiphany.

TRIGGERA“THAT’SRIGHT!”WITHASUMMARY

After four months of negotiations, Sabaya still refused tobudge.Idecideditwastimetohittheresetswitch.

Benjie had gotten so good at extending theconversations that you could tell that therewere times thatSabayamusthavepacedbackandforthforanhourbeforecalling Benjie, trying to figure out how to get what hewanted.Hewouldcall inandsay,“Tellmeyesorno!Justyesorno!”

We had to get Sabaya off this war damages nonsense.Nomatterwhat typeofquestioning, logic,or reasoningwetried with him, he wouldn’t release it. Threats againstSchillingcameandwent.Wetalkedhimdowneachtime.

I decided that in order to break through this phase weneeded to reposition Sabayawith his ownwords in awaythatwould dissolve barriers.Weneeded to get him to say,“That’sright.”Atthetime,Ididn’tknowforsurewhatkindof breakthrough it was going to give us. I just knew weneededtotrusttheprocess.

I wrote a two-page document that instructed Benjie tochangecourse.Weweregoingtousenearlyeverytacticintheactivelisteningarsenal:

1. Effective Pauses: Silence is powerful. We toldBenjie to use it for emphasis, to encourage

Sabaya to keep talking until eventually, likeclearingoutaswamp,theemotionsweredrainedfromthedialogue.

2. Minimal Encouragers: Besides silence, weinstructed using simple phrases, such as “Yes,”“OK,” “Uh-huh,” or “I see,” to effectivelyconveythatBenjiewasnowpayingfullattentiontoSabayaandallhehadtosay.

3. Mirroring:RatherthanarguewithSabayaandtryto separate Schilling from the “war damages,”BenjiewouldlistenandrepeatbackwhatSabayasaid.

4. Labeling:BenjieshouldgiveSabaya’sfeelingsanameandidentifywithhowhefelt.“Itallseemsso tragically unfair, I can now see why yousoundsoangry.”

5. Paraphrase:Benjieshould repeatwhatSabaya issayingbacktohiminBenjie’sownwords.This,we told him, would powerfully show him youreallydounderstandandaren’tmerelyparrotinghisconcerns.

6. Summarize:Agoodsummaryisthecombinationofrearticulatingthemeaningofwhatissaidplustheacknowledgmentof theemotionsunderlying

that meaning (paraphrasing + labeling =summary).We told Benjie he needed to listenandrepeatthe“worldaccordingtoAbuSabaya.”Heneededtofullyandcompletelysummarizeallthe nonsense that Sabaya had come up withabout war damages and fishing rights and fivehundred years of oppression.And once he didthat fully and completely, the only possibleresponse for Sabaya, and anyone faced with agoodsummary,wouldbe“that’sright.”

Two days later Sabaya phoned Benjie. Sabaya spoke.Benjie listened.Whenhe spoke, he followedmy script: hecommiserated with the rebel group’s predicament.Mirroring, encouraging, labeling, each tactic workedseamlesslyandcumulativelytosoftenSabayaupandbeginshiftinghisperspective.Finally,Benjie repeated inhisownwords Sabaya’s version of history and the emotions thatcamewiththatversion.

Sabayawassilentfornearlyaminute.Finallyhespoke.“That’sright,”hesaid.Weendedthecall.The“wardamages”demandjustdisappeared.FromthatpointforwardSabayanevermentionedmoney

again. He never asked for another dime for the release ofJeffrey Schilling. He ultimately became so weary of thiscaseandholdingtheyoungCalifornianthatheletdownhisguard. Schilling escaped from their camp, and Philippinecommandoes swooped in and rescued him. He returned

safelytohisfamilyinCalifornia.Two weeks after Jeff Schilling escaped, Sabaya called

Benjie:“Haveyoubeenpromotedyet?”he asked. “If not, you

shouldhavebeen.”“Why?”Benjieasked.“IwasgoingtohurtJeffrey,”Sabayasaid.“Idon’tknow

what you did to keepme from doing that, butwhatever itwas,itworked.”

In June 2002 Sabaya was killed in a shoot-out withPhilippinemilitaryunits.

In the heat of negotiations for a man’s life, I didn’tappreciatethevalueofthosetwowords:“That’sright.”Butwhen I studied the transcripts and reconstructed thetrajectory of the negotiations, I realized that Sabaya hadchanged course when he uttered those words. Benjie hadused some fundamental techniques that we had developedovermanyyears.HehadreflectedSabaya’svision.Hehadsteppedbackfromconfrontation.HehadallowedSabayatospeakfreelyandexhausthisversionofevents.

“That’s right” signaled that negotiations could proceedfrom deadlock. It broke down a barrier thatwas impedingprogress. It created a realization point with our adversarywhere he actually agreed on a pointwithout the feeling ofhavinggivenin.

Itwasastealthvictory.

When your adversaries say, “That’s right,” they feel they

have assessed what you’ve said and pronounced it ascorrectoftheirownfreewill.Theyembraceit.

“That’sright”allowedustodrawoutthetalksanddivertSabaya from hurting Schilling. And it gave Philippinecommandostimetomounttheirrescueoperation.

Inhostagenegotiations,wenevertriedtogetto“yes”asanendpoint.Weknewthat“yes”isnothingwithout“how.”And when we applied hostage negotiating tactics tobusiness,we sawhow“that’s right”often leads to thebestoutcomes.

“THAT’SRIGHT”ISGREAT,BUTIF“YOU’RERIGHT,”NOTHINGCHANGES

Driving toward “that’s right” is a winning strategy in allnegotiations.Buthearing“you’reright”isadisaster.

Take my son, Brandon, and his development as afootball player.He had been playing on the offensive anddefensivelinesallthroughhighschool.Atsixfoottwoand250 pounds, hewas formidable. He loved to knock everyplayerwearinganopposingjerseytotheground.

Havingplayedquarterback, Ididn’t fullyappreciate theblue-collar nature of being a lineman. Linemen are likemountaingoats.Theyputtheirheadsdownandhitthings.Itmakesthemhappy.

At St. Thomas More prep school in Connecticut,Brandon’s coach moved him to linebacker, and his rolesuddenly changed from hitting everything he saw toavoiding players who were trying to block him. He was

supposedtoplayoffblocks—dodgethem,ifyouwill—andgettotheball.ButBrandoncontinuedtoconfrontopposingblockers head-on, which kept him from getting to theballcarrier. His coach pleaded with him to avoid blockers,but Brandon couldn’t change. He loved to hit. Flatteningopposingplayerswasasourceofpride.

Both his coach and I kept trying to explain it to him.Andeverytimewegottheworstpossibleanswer—“You’reright.” He agreed, in theory, but he didn’t own theconclusion.Thenhewouldgorightbacktothebehaviorwewere trying to get him to stop. He would smash blockersandtakehimselfoutoftheplay.

Whyis“you’reright”theworstanswer?Considerthis:Wheneversomeoneisbotheringyou,and

theyjustwon’tletup,andtheywon’tlistentoanythingyouhave to say,what do you tell them to get them to shut upandgoaway?“You’reright.”

Itworkseverytime.Tellpeople“you’reright”andtheyget a happy smile on their face and leave you alone for atleast twenty-four hours. But you haven’t agreed to theirposition.Youhave used “you’re right” to get them to quitbotheringyou.

IwasinthesamesituationwithBrandon.Hedidn’thearme and embrace my request. What could I say to getthrough to this kid?How could I reach Brandon and helphimchangecourse?

I thought back to Benjie and Sabaya. I took Brandonasidebeforeacrucialgame. Ihad searchedmymind for a

waytohearthetwocriticalwords,“That’sright.”“You seem to think it’s unmanly to dodge a block,” I

toldhim.“You think it’scowardly togetoutofsomeone’swaythat’stryingtohityou.”

Brandonstaredatmeandpaused.“That’sright,”hesaid.WiththosewordsBrandonembracedtherealityofwhat

was holding him back. Once he understood why he wastryingtoknockdowneveryblocker,hechangedcourse.Hestarted avoiding the blocks and became an exceptionallyfinelinebacker.

With Brandon on the field tackling and playing starlinebacker,St.ThomasMoreSchoolwoneverygame.

USING“THAT’SRIGHT”TOMAKETHESALE

Getting to “that’s right” helped one of my students in herjob as a sales representative for a large pharmaceuticalcompany.

She was trying to sell a new product to a doctor whousedsimilarmedication.Hewasthelargestuserofthiskindof medication in her territory.The sale was critical to hersuccess.

In her first appointments, the doctor dismissed herproduct. He said it was no better than the ones he wasalready using. He was unfriendly. He didn’t even want tohear her viewpoint. When she presented the positiveattributes of her product, he interrupted her and knockedthemdown.

Making the sales pitch, she soaked up as much aspossible about the doctor. She learned that he waspassionate about treating his patients. Each patient wasspecialinhiseyes.Improvingtheirsenseofcalmandpeacewasthemostimportantoutcomeforhim.Howcouldsheputher understanding of his needs, desires, and passions toworkforher?

Athernextvisit,thedoctoraskedwhatmedicationsshewanted to discuss. Rather than tout the benefits of herproduct,shetalkedabouthimandhispractice.

“Doctor,” she said, “the last time I was in we spokeaboutyourpatientswiththiscondition.Irememberthinkingthat you seemed verypassionate about treating them, andhowyouworkedhardtotailorthespecifictreatmenttoeachandeverypatient.”

Helookedherintheeyesasifhewereseeingherforthefirsttime.

“That’sright,”hesaid.“IreallyfeellikeI’mtreatinganepidemic that other doctors are not picking up on—whichmeans that a lot of patients are not getting treatedadequately.”

Shetoldhimheseemedtohaveadeepunderstandingofhowtotreatthesepatients,especiallybecausesomeofthemdidn’t respond to theusualmedications.They talkedaboutspecific challenges he had confronted in treating hispatients.Hegaveherexamples.

When he was finished, she summarized what he hadsaid,especiallytheintricaciesandproblemsintreatment.

“Youseemto tailorspecific treatmentsandmedicationsforeachpatient,”shesaid.

“That’sright,”heresponded.Thiswasthebreakthroughshehadhopedtoreach.The

doctor had been skeptical and cold. But when sherecognizedhispassionforhispatients—usingasummary—thewalls came down.He dropped his guard, and shewasable togainhis trust.Rather thanpitchherproduct, she lethim describe his treatment and procedures.With this, shelearnedhowhermedicationwouldfit intohispractice.Shethen paraphrasedwhat he said about the challenges of hispracticeandreflectedthembacktohim.

Oncethedoctorsignaledhistrustandrapport,shecouldtouttheattributesofherproductanddescribepreciselyhowit would help him reach the outcomes he desired for hispatients.Helistenedintently.

“It might be perfect for treating a patient who has notbenefitedfromthemedicationIhavebeenprescribing,”hetoldher.“Letmegiveyoursatry.”

Shemadethesale.

USING“THAT’SRIGHT”FORCAREERSUCCESS

One of my Korean students got to “that’s right” innegotiatingwithhisex-bossforanewjob.

Returning toSeoulaftergettinghisMBA,hewanted toworkinhiscompany’sconsumerelectronicsdivision,ratherthan the semiconductor section, where he had beenstationed. Hewas a human resources specialist. Under the

company’s rules, he believed he had to remain in hispreviousdepartment,unlesshecouldalsogetapprovalfromhisex-boss.Hehadgottentwojoboffersfromtheconsumerproducts division. He phoned his ex-boss from theUnitedStates.

“You should reject this offer and find your spot herewiththesemiconductordivision,”theex-bosssaid.

Mystudenthungupdepressed.Ifhewantedtoadvancein the company, he had to obey his former superior. Herejected the two offers and prepared to return to thesemiconductorside.

Thenhecontactedafriendwhowasaseniormanagerinthehumanresourcesdepartmenttocheckonthecompany’sregulations.Hefound therewasnorule thathehad tostaywithinhisdivision,buthedidneedhisex-boss’sblessingtoswitch.

He phoned his ex-boss again. This time he askedquestionstodrawhimout.

“Is there any reason you want me to go to thesemiconductorheadquarters?”heasked.

“It’sthebestpositionforyou,”theex-bosssaid.“Thebestposition?”heasked.“Itsoundslikethere’sno

regulation that I have to remain with the semiconductordivision,”hesaid.“Hmm,” theex-bosssaid.“Idon’t thinkthereisany.”

“ThenwillyoupleasetellmewhatmadeyoudecidethatIremaininthesemiconductorheadquarters?”heasked.

The ex-boss said he needed someone to help him

network atheadquarters between the semiconductor andconsumerproductsdivisions.

“So it sounds like you could approvemy new positionnomatterwhich division, as long as Iwas in headquartersand could help you communicate better with the topmanagers.”

“That’sright,”hesaid.“ImustadmitIneedyourhelpinheadquarters.”

My student realized he had made a breakthrough. Notonly had his ex-boss uttered those sweet words—“that’sright”—but he had revealed his truemotive: he needed anallyinheadquarters.

“Isthereanyotherhelpyouneed?”heasked.“Letmetellyoueverything,”theex-bossresponded.It turns out his former superior would be up for a

promotion to vice president in two years. He desperatelywanted to move up into this job. He needed someone inheadquarterstolobbythecompanyCEO.

“Iwouldhelpyouinanyway,”mystudentsaid.“ButIcouldhelpwith thenetworkingandalso talkyouup to theCEO even if I were at headquarters with the consumerproductsdivision,right?”

“That’s right,” he said. “If you get an offer from theconsumerproductsunit,Iwillapproveit.”

Bingo!Byaskingquestionsthatgothimto“that’sright,”my student had achieved his goal.He also got his boss toreveal two “Black Swans,” the unspoken, underlyingbreakthrough dynamics of a negotiation (explored inmore

detailinChapter10):

■ His boss needed someone to help him networkandcommunicateinheadquarters.

■ His boss would be up for a promotion andneededsomeonetotalkhimuptotheCEO.

My student was able to win the job he desired on theconsumerelectronicsdivision.Andhe’sbeentalkinguphisformerboss.

“I was stunned,” he wrote me in an email. “In thisculture it is not really possible to knowwhat a superior isthinking.”

Ihavemanyopportunitiestotravelthecountryandspeaktobusiness leaders, either in formal speaking engagementsorprivate counseling sessions. I entertain them with warstories, then I describe some basic negotiating skills. Ialwaysimpartafewtechniques.Gettingto“that’sright”isastaple.

After a speech in Los Angeles, one of the attendees,Emily,sentmeanemail:

HiChris, I feelcompelled to tellyou thatI just triedthe “That’s right” technique in a price negotiationwithapotentialnewclient.And,IgotwhatIwanted.I’msoexcited!

Before Iprobablywouldhave justgonewith the

“in-the-middle” suggested price (halfway betweenmy initial offer and her initial counter). Instead, Ibelieve I correctly assessed her motivations,presented her with the right statement to get to a“that’s right” (in her mind) . . . and then sheproposedthesolutionIwantedandaskedifIwouldagreetoit!So,Ididofcourse.

Thankyou!Emily

AndIthoughttomyself:That’sright.

KEYLESSONS

“Sleeping in the samebed anddreamingdifferent dreams”is anoldChinese expression that describes the intimacyofpartnership(whetherinmarriageorinbusiness)withoutthecommunicationnecessarytosustainit.

Such is the recipe for bad marriages and badnegotiations.

Witheachpartyhavingitsownsetofobjectives,itsowngoals and motivations, the truth is that the conversationalniceties—the socially lubricating “yeses” and “you’rerights” that get thrown out fast and furious early in anyinteraction—are not in any way a substitute for realunderstandingbetweenyouandyourpartner.

The power of getting to that understanding, and not tosome simple “yes,” is revelatory in the art of negotiation.The moment you’ve convinced someone that you truly

understand her dreams and feelings (the whole world thatshe inhabits), mental and behavioral change becomespossible, and the foundation for a breakthrough has beenlaid.

Usetheselessonstolaythatfoundation:

■ Creatingunconditionalpositiveregardopensthedoor to changing thoughts and behaviors.Humans have an innate urge toward sociallyconstructive behavior.The more a person feelsunderstood, and positively affirmed in thatunderstanding, the more likely that urge forconstructivebehaviorwilltakehold.

■ “That’s right” is better than “yes.” Strive for it.Reaching “that’s right” in a negotiation createsbreakthroughs.

■ Use a summary to trigger a “that’s right.”Thebuilding blocks of a good summary are a labelcombined with paraphrasing. Identify,rearticulate, and emotionally affirm “the worldaccordingto...”

CHAPTER6

BENDTHEIRREALITY

OneMondaymorninginHaiti’scapital,Port-au-Prince,acall came in to the FBI office from the nephew of aprominentHaitianpolitical figure.He spoke so fast hehadto repeat his story three times before I understood. Butfinally I got the basics: kidnappers had snatched his auntfromhercar,andtheirransomdemandwas$150,000.

“Giveusthemoney,”thekidnapperstoldhim,“oryourauntisgoingtodie.”

In the lawless, chaotic wake of the 2004 rebellion thattoppled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti surpassedColombiaasthekidnapcapitaloftheAmericas.Infact,withbetween eight and ten people abducted every day in theCaribbeannationofeightmillion,Haiti earned thedubioushonorofhavingthehighestkidnappingrateintheworld.

During thisonslaughtofabductionsanddeath threats, IwastheFBI’sleadinternationalkidnappingnegotiator.AndI had never seen anything like it. Reports of abductions—increasinglybold,daylightattacks right inPort-au-Prince—seemed to roll into the office hourly: fourteen studentsabducted on their school bus;Americanmissionary PhillipSnyder shot in an ambush and seized alongwith aHaitian

boyhewas taking toMichigan for eye surgery; prominentHaitian politicians and businessmen bundled from theirhomesinbroaddaylight.Noonewasspared.

Most of the abductions went down the same way: ski-mask-clad kidnappers surrounded a house or a car, forcedentrywithagun,andsnatchedavulnerablevictim—usuallyawoman,child,orelderlyperson.

Early on, therewas the possibility that the kidnappingswere driven by politically aligned gangs seeking todestabilize Haiti’s new government. This proved to bewrong. Haitian criminals are famous for employing brutalmeansforpoliticalends,butwhenitcametokidnappings,itwasalmostalwaysallbusiness.

Lateron,I’llget tohowwepiecedtogether thecluestodiscover who the perpetrators were and what they reallywanted—invaluableinformationwhenitcametonegotiatingwith and destabilizing these gangs. But first I want todiscuss the crystallizing feature of high-stakes, life-and-deathnegotiating:thatis,howlittleofitisonthesurface.

When that Monday ransom call came in to thepolitician’snephew,theguywassopetrifiedhecouldonlythink of doing one thing: paying the thugs. His reactionmakessense:whenyougetacallfrombrutalcriminalswhosaythey’llkillyourauntunlessyoupaythemimmediately,itseemsimpossibletofindleverageinthesituation.Soyoupaytheransomandtheyreleaseyourrelative,right?

Wrong.There’salways leverage.Negotiation isneveralinear formula: addX toY to getZ.We all have irrational

blindspots,hiddenneeds,andundevelopednotions.Once you understand that subterranean world of

unspokenneedsandthoughts,you’lldiscoverauniverseofvariablesthatcanbeleveragedtochangeyourcounterpart’sneeds and expectations. From using some people’s fear ofdeadlinesandthemysteriouspowerofoddnumbers,toourmisunderstood relationship to fairness, there are alwaysways to bend our counterpart’s reality so it conforms towhatwe ultimately want to give them, not to what theyinitiallythinktheydeserve.

DON’TCOMPROMISE

Let’s go back to the $150,000 ransom demand. We’realways taught to look for the win-win solution, toaccommodate, to be reasonable. So what’s the win-winhere?What’s the compromise?The traditional negotiatinglogic that’s drilled into us from an early age, the kind thatexaltscompromises,says,“Let’sjustsplitthedifferenceandofferthem$75,000.Theneveryone’shappy.”

No.Just,simply,no.Thewin-winmindsetpushedbysomany negotiation experts is usually ineffective and oftendisastrous. At best, it satisfies neither side. And if youemploy itwithacounterpartwhohasawin-loseapproach,you’resettingyourselfuptobeswindled.

Ofcourse,aswe’venotedpreviously,youneedtokeepthe cooperative, rapport-building, empathetic approach, thekindthatcreatesadynamicinwhichdealscanbemade.Butyou have to get rid of that naïveté. Because compromise

—“splitting the difference”—can lead to terrible outcomes.Compromiseisoftena“baddeal”andakeythemewe’llhitinthischapteristhat“nodealisbetterthanabaddeal.”

Eveninakidnapping?Yes.Abaddealinakidnappingiswheresomeonepays

andnoonecomesout.Tomakemypointoncompromise, letmepaintyouan

example:Awomanwantsherhusbandtowearblackshoeswith his suit. But her husband doesn’t want to; he prefersbrownshoes.Sowhatdo theydo?Theycompromise, theymeethalfway.And,youguessedit,hewearsoneblackandonebrownshoe.Isthisthebestoutcome?No!Infact,that’st h eworst possible outcome. Either of the two otheroutcomes—black or brown—would be better than thecompromise.

Next timeyouwant to compromise, remindyourself ofthosemismatchedshoes.

So why are we so infatuated with the notion ofcompromiseifitoftenleadstopoorresults?

Therealproblemwithcompromiseisthatithascometobeknownasthisgreatconcept,inrelationshipsandpoliticsandeverythingelse.Compromise,wearetoldquitesimply,isasacredmoralgood.

Think back to the ransom demand: Fair is no ransom,andwhatthenephewwantsistopaynothing.Sowhyishegoing to offer $75,000, much less $150,000, for theransom?There isnovalidity in the$150,000request.Withanycompromise, thenephewendsupwith abizarrelybad

result.I’m here to call bullshit on compromise right now.We

don’t compromise because it’s right; we compromisebecauseitiseasyandbecauseitsavesface.Wecompromiseinordertosaythatatleastwegothalfthepie.Distilledtoitsessence, we compromise to be safe. Most people in anegotiationaredrivenbyfearorbythedesiretoavoidpain.Toofewaredrivenbytheiractualgoals.

Sodon’tsettleand—here’sasimplerule—neversplitthedifference.Creativesolutionsarealmostalwaysprecededbysome degree of risk, annoyance, confusion, and conflict.Accommodation and compromise produce none of that.You’vegottoembracethehardstuff.That’swherethegreatdealsare.Andthat’swhatgreatnegotiatorsdo.

DEADLINES:MAKETIMEYOURALLY

Timeisoneofthemostcrucialvariablesinanynegotiation.The simple passing of time and its sharper cousin, thedeadline, are the screw that pressures every deal to aconclusion.

Whether your deadline is real and absolute ormerely aline in thesand, itcan trickyouintobelievingthatdoingadeal now is moreimportant than getting a good deal.Deadlines regularly make people say and do impulsivethings that are against their best interests, because we allhaveanaturaltendencytorushasadeadlineapproaches.

What good negotiators do is force themselves to resistthisurgeandtakeadvantageofitinothers.It’snotsoeasy.

Ask yourself: What is it about a deadline that causespressure and anxiety? The answer is consequences; theperceptionofthelosswe’llincurinthefuture—“Thedealisoff!” our mind screams at us in some imaginary futurescenario—should no resolution be achieved by a certainpointintime.

When you allow the variable of time to trigger suchthinking, you have taken yourself hostage, creating anenvironmentofreactivebehaviorsandpoorchoices,whereyour counterpart can now kick back and let an imaginarydeadline,andyourreactiontoit,doalltheworkforhim.

Yes, I used theword “imaginary.” In all the years I’vebeendoingworkintheprivatesector,I’vemadeitapointtoask nearly every entrepreneur and executive I’ve workedwith whether, over the course of their entire careers, theyhave ever been awitness to or a party of a negotiation inwhich a missed deadline had negative repercussions.Amonghundredsofsuchclients,there’sonesingle,solitarygentlemanwhogavethequestionseriousconsiderationandresponded affirmatively. Deadlines are often arbitrary,almost always flexible, and hardly ever trigger theconsequenceswethink—oraretold—theywill.

Deadlines are the bogeymen of negotiation, almostexclusively self-inflicted figments of our imagination,unnecessarilyunsettlingusfornogoodreason.Themantrawe coach our clients on is, “No deal is better than a baddeal.” If that mantra can truly be internalized, and clientsbegin to believe they’ve got all the time they need to

conduct the negotiation right, their patience becomes aformidableweapon.

Afewweeksafter theHaitiankidnappingboombegan,westarted tonotice twopatterns.First,Mondays seemed tobeespecially busy, as if the kidnappers had a particularlystrong work ethic and wanted to geta jump on the week.And,second, the thugsgrew increasinglyeager togetpaidastheweekendapproached.

At first, this didn’t make any sense. But by listeningclosely to the kidnappers and debriefing the hostages werescued, we discovered something that should have beenobvious:These crimes weren’t politically motivated at all.Instead, these guyswere garden-variety thugswhowantedto get paid by Friday so they could party through theweekend.

Once we understood the pattern and knew thekidnappers’ self-imposed deadline,we had two key piecesofinformationthattotallyshiftedtheleveragetoourside.

First, if we let the pressure build by stalling thenegotiationsuntilThursdayorFriday,wecouldcutthebestdeal.And,second,becauseyoudidn’tneedanythingcloseto$150,000tohaveagoodweekendinHaiti,offeringalot,lotlesswouldsuffice.

How close we were getting to their self-imposeddeadline would be indicated by how specific the threatswere that they issued. “Give us themoney or your aunt isgoing to die” is an early stage threat, as the time isn’tspecified. Increasing specificity on threats in any type of

negotiationsindicatesgettingclosertorealconsequencesata real specified time. To gauge the level of a particularthreat,we’dpayattentiontohowmanyofthefourquestions—What?Who?When?Andhow?—were addressed.Whenpeople issue threats, they consciously or subconsciouslycreateambiguitiesandloopholestheyfullyintendtoexploit.As the loopholes started to close as the week progressed,and did so over and over again in similar ways withdifferentkidnappings,thepatternemerged.

With this information in hand, I came to expect thekidnappings to be orderly, four-day events. It didn’tmakethe abductions any more pleasant for the victim, but itcertainly made them more predictable—and a whole lotcheaper—forthefamiliesontheotherend.

It’snotjustwithhostagenegotiationsthatdeadlinescanplay intoyourhands.Cardealersarepronetogiveyouthebestpriceneartheendofthemonth,whentheirtransactionsareassessed.Andcorporatesalespeopleworkonaquarterlybasis and are most vulnerable as the quarter comes to aclose.

Now, knowing how negotiators use their counterpart’sdeadlines to gain leverage would seem to suggest that it’sbest to keep your own deadlines secret. And that’s theadviceyou’llgetfrommostold-schoolnegotiationexperts.

In his bestselling 1980 book,You Can NegotiateAnything,1negotiationexpertHerbCohen tells thestoryofhis first big business deal, when his company sent him toJapantonegotiatewithasupplier.

When he arrived, his counterparts asked him how longhewasstaying,andCohensaidaweek.Forthenextsevendays, his hosts proceeded to entertain him with parties,tours, and outings—everything but negotiation. In fact,Cohen’s counterparts didn’t start serious talks until hewasabout to leave, and the two sides hammered out the deal’sfinaldetailsinthecartotheairport.

Cohen landed in the United States with the sinkingfeelingthathe’dbeenplayed,andthathehadconcededtoomuchunderdeadlinepressure.Wouldhehavetoldthemhisdeadline in retrospect? No, Cohen says, because it gavethematoolhedidn’thave:“Theyknewmydeadline,butIdidn’tknowtheirs.”

Thatmentalityiseverywherethesedays.Seeingasimplerule to follow and assuming that a deadline is a strategicweakness,mostnegotiatorsfollowCohen’sadviceandhidetheirdrop-deaddate.

Allowmetoletyouinonalittlesecret:Cohen,andtheherd of negotiation “experts” who follow his lead, arewrong.Deadlinescutbothways.Cohenmaywellhavebeennervous about what his boss would say if he left Japanwithout an agreement. But it’s also true that Cohen’scounterpartswouldn’thavewon ifhe’d leftwithoutadeal.That’s the key:When the negotiation is over for one side,it’soverfortheothertoo.

Infact,DonA.Moore,aprofessorattheHaasSchoolofBusinessattheUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley,saysthathiding a deadline actually puts the negotiator in the worst

possible position. In his research, he’s found that hidingyourdeadlinesdramaticallyincreasestheriskofanimpasse.That’s because having a deadline pushes you to speed upyour concessions, but the other side, thinking that it hastime,willjustholdoutformore.

Imagine if when NBA owners set a lockout deadlineduring contract negotiations they didn’t tell the players’union. They would concede and concede as the deadlineapproached, inciting theunion tokeepnegotiatingpast thesecret deadline. In that sense, hiding a deadline meansyou’renegotiatingwithyourself,andyoualwayslosewhenyoudoso.

Moore discovered that when negotiators tell theircounterparts about their deadline, theyget better deals. It’strue. First, by revealing your cutoff you reduce the risk ofimpasse. And second, when an opponent knows yourdeadline, he’ll get to the real deal- and concession-makingmorequickly.

I’ve got one final point to make before we move on:Deadlinesarealmostneverironclad.What’smoreimportantis engaging in the process and having a feel for how longthat will take. You may see that you have more toaccomplish than time will actually allow before the clockrunsout.

NOSUCHTHINGASFAIR

In the third week of my negotiations class, we play myfavorite type of game, that is, the kind that shows my

students how much they don’t understand themselves (Iknow—I’mcruel).

It’s called the Ultimatum Game, and it goes like this:After the students split into pairs of a “proposer” and an“accepter,”Igiveeachproposer$10.Theproposerthenhasto offer the accepter a round number of dollars. If theaccepteragreesheorshe receiveswhat’sbeenofferedandthe proposer gets the rest. If the accepter refuses the offer,though,theybothgetnothingandthe$10goesbacktome.

Whether they“win” andkeep themoneyor “lose” andhave to give it back is irrelevant (except to my wallet).What’simportantistheoffertheymake.Thetrulyshockingthing is that, almost without exception, whatever selectionanyone makes, they find themselves in a minority. Nomatterwhether theychose$6/$4,$5/$5,$7/$3,$8/$2,etc.,theylookaroundandareinevitablysurprisedtofindnosplitwaschosenfarmorethananyother.Insomethingassimpleas merely splitting $10 of “found” money, there is noconsensusofwhatconstitutesa“fair”or“rational”split.

Afterwerunthislittleexperiment,Istandupinfrontofthe class and make a point they don’t like to hear: thereasoning each and every student used was 100 percentirrationalandemotional.

“What?”theysay.“Imadearationaldecision.”ThenIlayouthowthey’rewrong.First,howcouldthey

all beusing reason if somanyhavemadedifferent offers?That’s the point:Theydidn’t.They assumed the other guywouldreasonjustlikethem.“Ifyouapproachanegotiation

thinkingthattheotherguythinkslikeyou,you’rewrong,”Isay.“That’snotempathy;that’sprojection.”

AndthenIpushitevenfurther:Why,Iask,didnoneofthe proposers offer $1, which is the best rational offer forthemandlogicallyunrejectablefortheaccepter?Andiftheydid and they got rejected—which happens—why did theaccepterturnthemdown?

“Anyone who made any offer other than $1 made anemotionalchoice”Isay.“Andforyouaccepterswhoturneddown $1, sincewhen is getting $0 better than getting $1?Didtherulesoffinancesuddenlychange?”

This rocksmy students’ view of themselves as rationalactors.But they’renot.Noneofusare.We’reall irrational,all emotional. Emotionis a necessary element to decisionmaking thatwe ignore at ourownperil.Realizing that hitspeoplehardbetweentheeyes.

I nDescartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and theHumanBrain,2 neuroscientist Antonio Damasio explained agroundbreaking discovery he made. Studying people whohad damage in the part of the brain where emotions aregenerated,hefound that theyallhadsomethingpeculiar incommon: They couldn’t make decisions. They coulddescribe what they should do in logical terms, but theyfounditimpossibletomakeeventhesimplestchoice.

In other words, while we may use logic to reasonourselves toward a decision, the actual decision making isgovernedbyemotion.

THEF-WORD:WHYIT’SSOPOWERFUL,WHENTOUSEIT,ANDHOW

Themostpowerfulwordinnegotiationsis“Fair.”Ashumanbeings, we’re mightily swayed by how much we feel wehavebeenrespected.Peoplecomplywithagreementsiftheyfeelthey’vebeentreatedfairlyandlashoutiftheydon’t.

A decade of brain-imaging studies has shown thathumanneuralactivity,particularlyintheemotion-regulatinginsular cortex, reflects the degree of unfairness in socialinteractions. Even nonhuman primates are hardwired toreject unfairness. In one famous study, two capuchinmonkeys were set to perform the same task, but one wasrewarded with sweet grapes while the other receivedcucumbers. In response to such blatant unfairness, thecucumber-fedmonkeyliterallywentbananas.

In theUltimatumGame,yearsofexperiencehasshownmethatmostaccepterswillinvariablyrejectanyofferthatisless than half of the proposer’smoney.Once you get to aquarter of the proposer’smoney you can forget it and theaccepters are insulted. Most peoplemake an irrationalchoicetolet thedollarslipthroughtheirfingersrather thanto accept a derisory offer, because the negative emotionalvalueofunfairnessoutweighs thepositiverationalvalueofthemoney.

Thisirrationalreactiontounfairnessextendsallthewaytoseriouseconomicdeals.

RememberRobinWilliams’sgreatworkas thevoiceofthegenie inDisney’sAladdin?Becausehewanted to leave

somethingwonderfulbehindforhiskids,hesaid,hedidthevoice for a cut-rate fee of $75,000, far belowhis usual $8million payday. But then something happened: the moviebecameahugehit,rakingin$504million.

AndWilliamswentballistic.Now look at this with the Ultimatum Game in mind.

Williams wasn’t angry because of the money; it was theperceivedunfairnessthatpissedhimoff.Hedidn’tcomplainabout his contract untilAladdin becameablockbuster, andthen he and his agentwent loud and long about how theygotrippedoff.

Lucky for Williams, Disney wanted to keep its starhappy. After initially pointing out the obvious—that he’dhappilysignedthedeal—Disneymadethedramaticgestureof sending the star a Picasso paintingworth a reported $1million.

ThenationofIranwasnotsolucky.Inrecentyears,Iranhasputupwithsanctionsthathave

cost itwell over$100billion in foreign investment andoilrevenue in order to defend a uranium-enriching nuclearprogramthatcanonlymeet2percentofitsenergyneeds.Inother words, like the students who won’t take a free $1becausetheofferseemsinsulting,Iranhasscreweditselfoutofitschiefsourceofincome—oilandgasrevenue—inordertopursueanenergyprojectwithlittleexpectedpayoff.

Why?Again,fairness.For Iran, it’s not fair that the global powers—which

togetherhaveseveralthousandnuclearweapons—shouldbe

able to decide if it can use nuclear energy.Andwhy, Iranwonders, is it considered a pariahfor enriching uraniumwhen India and Pakistan, which clandestinely acquirednuclearweapons,areacceptedmembersoftheinternationalcommunity?

In a TV interview, former Iranian nuclear negotiatorSeyed Hossein Mousavian hit the nail on the head. “ThenuclearissuetodayforIraniansisnotnuclear,”hesaid,“it’sdefendingtheirintegrity[asan]independentidentityagainstthepressureoftherest.”

You may not trust Iran, but its moves are pretty clearevidence that rejecting perceived unfairness, even atsubstantialcost,isapowerfulmotivation.

Once you understand what a messy, emotional, anddestructive dynamic “fairness” can be, you can see why“Fair”isatremendouslypowerfulwordthatyouneedtousewithcare.

In fact,of the threeways thatpeopledrop thisF-bomb,onlyoneispositive.

Themostcommonuseisajudo-likedefensivemovethatdestabilizes the other side.Thismanipulation usually takestheformofsomethinglike,“Wejustwantwhat’sfair.”

Think back to the last time someonemade this implicitaccusation of unfairness to you, and I bet you’ll have toadmitthatitimmediatelytriggeredfeelingsofdefensivenessand discomfort.These feelings are often subconscious andoftenleadtoanirrationalconcession.

AfriendofminewassellingherBostonhomeinabust

marketafewyearsback.Theoffershegotwasmuchlowerthan she wanted—it meant a big loss for her—and out offrustration she dropped this F-bomb on the prospectivebuyer.

“Wejustwantwhat’sfair,”shesaid.Emotionally rattled by the implicit accusation, the guy

raisedhisofferimmediately.If you’re on the business end of this accusation, you

needtorealizethattheothersidemightnotbetryingtopickyour pocket; likemy friend, they might just beoverwhelmed by circumstance. The best response eitherway is to take a deep breath and restrain your desire toconcede. Then say, “Okay, I apologize. Let’s stopeverything and go back to where I started treating youunfairlyandwe’llfixit.”

TheseconduseoftheF-bombismorenefarious.Inthisone, your counterpart will basically accuse you of beingdense or dishonest by saying, “We’ve given you a fairoffer.”It’saterriblelittlejabmeanttodistractyourattentionandmanipulateyouintogivingin.

Wheneversomeonetries thisonme,I thinkback to thelastNFLlockout.

NegotiationsweregettingdowntothewireandtheNFLPlayersAssociation(NFLPA)saidthatbeforetheyagreedtoafinaldealtheywantedtheownerstoopentheirbooks.Theowners’answer?

“We’vegiventheplayersafairoffer.”Notice the horrible genius of this: instead of opening

their books or declining to do so, the owners shifted thefocus to the NFLPA’s supposed lack of understanding offairness.

Ifyoufindyourself in thissituation, thebest reaction isto simplymirror the “F” that has just been lobbed at you.“Fair?”you’d respond,pausing to let theword’spowerdoto themas itwas intended todo toyou.Follow thatwithalabel: “It seems like you’re ready to provide the evidencethatsupportsthat,”whichalludestoopeningtheirbooksorotherwise handing over information that will eithercontradict their claim to fairness or give youmore data toworkwiththanyouhadpreviously.Rightaway,youdeclawtheattack.

The last use of the F-word is my favorite because it’spositive and constructive. It sets the stage for honest andempatheticnegotiation.

Here’show Iuse it:Earlyon in a negotiation, I say, “Iwantyoutofeellikeyouarebeingtreatedfairlyatalltimes.Sopleasestopmeatany time ifyou feel I’mbeingunfair,andwe’lladdressit.”

It’ssimpleandclearandsetsmeupasanhonestdealer.Withthatstatement,I letpeopleknowit isokaytousethatword withme if theyuse it honestly.As a negotiator, youshouldstrivefora reputationofbeingfair.Yourreputationprecedes you. Let it precede you in a way that pavessuccess.

HOWTODISCOVERTHEEMOTIONALDRIVERS

BEHINDWHATTHEOTHERPARTYVALUES

Afewyearsago,IstumbleduponthebookHowtoBecomeaRainmaker,3andIliketoreviewitoccasionallytorefreshmy sense of the emotional drivers that fuel decisions.Thebook does a great job to explain the sales job not as arationalargument,butasanemotionalframingjob.

If you can get the other party to reveal their problems,pain, andunmet objectives—if you canget atwhat peoplearereally buying—thenyoucan sell themavisionof theirproblemthatleavesyourproposalastheperfectsolution.

Lookatthisfromthemostbasiclevel.Whatdoesagoodbabysitter sell, really? It’s not child care exactly, but arelaxed evening. A furnace salesperson? Cozy rooms forfamilytime.Alocksmith?Afeelingofsecurity.

Know the emotional drivers and you can frame thebenefitsofanydealinlanguagethatwillresonate.

BENDTHEIRREALITY

Take the same person, change one or two variables, and$100 can be a glorious victory or a vicious insult.Recognizing this phenomenon lets you bend reality frominsulttovictory.

Letmegiveyouanexample.Ihavethiscoffeemug,redand white with the Swiss flag. No chips, but used.Whatwouldyoupayforit,deepdowninyourheartofhearts?

You’reprobablygoingtosaysomethinglike$3.50.Let’s say it’s yourmug now.You’re going to sell it to

me.Sotellmewhatit’sworth.You’reprobablygoingtosaysomethingbetween$5and

$7.Inbothcases, itwas theexactsamemug.All Ididwas

move themug in relation to you, and I totally changed itsvalue.

Or imagine that I offer you $20 to run a three-minuteerrandandgetmeacupofcoffee.You’regoingtothinktoyourselfthat$20forthreeminutesis$400anhour.You’regoingtobethrilled.

Whatifthenyoufindoutthatbygettingyoutorunthaterrand I made a million dollars. You’d go from beingecstatic for making $400 an hour to being angry becauseyougotrippedoff.

The value of the $20, just like the value of the coffeemug,didn’tchange.Butyourperspectiveof itdid. JustbyhowIpositionthe$20,Icanmakeyouhappyordisgustedbyit.

I tell you that not to expose our decision making asemotional and irrational.We’ve already seen that.What Iam saying is that while our decisions may be largelyirrational,thatdoesn’tmeantherearen’tconsistentpatterns,principles, and rules behind how we act. And once youknow those mental patterns, you start to see ways toinfluencethem.

Byfarthebesttheoryfordescribingtheprinciplesofourirrational decisions is something calledProspect Theory .Createdin1979bythepsychologistsDanielKahnemanand

Amos Tversky, prospect theory describes how peoplechoose between options that involve risk, like in anegotiation.Thetheoryarguesthatpeoplearedrawntosurethings over probabilities, even when the probability is abetterchoice.That’scalledtheCertaintyEffect.Andpeoplewilltakegreaterriskstoavoidlossesthantoachievegains.That’scalledLossAversion.

That’s why people who statistically have no need forinsurance buy it. Or consider this: a person who’s told hehas a 95 percent chance of receiving $10,000 or a 100percentchanceofgetting$9,499willusuallyavoidriskandtake the 100 percent certain safe choice, while the sameperson who’s told he has a 95 percent chance of losing$10,000ora100percentchanceoflosing$9,499willmaketheoppositechoice,riskingthebigger95percentoptiontoavoidtheloss.Thechanceforlossincitesmoreriskthanthepossibilityofanequalgain.

Over the next few pages I’ll explain a few prospecttheorytacticsyoucanusetoyouradvantage.Butfirstletmeleave you with a crucial lesson about loss aversion: In atough negotiation, it’s not enough to show the other partythatyoucandeliverthethingtheywant.

To get real leverage, you have to persuade them thatthey have something concrete to lose if the deal fallsthrough.

1.ANCHORTHEIREMOTIONSTo bend your counterpart’s reality, you have to start withthebasicsofempathy.Sostartoutwithanaccusationaudit

acknowledging all of their fears. By anchoring theiremotions in preparation for a loss, you inflame the otherside’s loss aversion so that they’ll jump at the chance toavoidit.

On my first consulting project after leaving the FBI, Ireceived thehonor to train thenationalhostagenegotiationteam for the United Arab Emirates. Unfortunately, theprestigeof theassignmentwas temperedduring theprojectby problems with the general contractor (I was asubcontractor). The problems became so bad that I wasgoing to have to go back to the contractors I’d signed up,who normally got $2,000 a day, and tell them that forseveralmonths,Icouldonlyoffer$500.

I knew exactly what they would do if I just told themstraightout: they’d laughmeoutof town.So Igoteachofthem on the phone and hit them hard with an accusationaudit.

“I got a lousy proposition for you,” I said, and pauseduntil each askedme to go on. “By the timeweget off thephone, you’re going to think I’m a lousy businessman.You’regoing to thinkIcan’tbudgetor plan.You’regoingtothinkChrisVossisabigtalker.HisfirstbigprojecteveroutoftheFBI,hescrewsitupcompletely.Hedoesn’tknowhow to run an operation.And hemight even have lied tome.”

And then, once I’d anchored their emotions in aminefield of low expectations, I played on their lossaversion.

“Still, IwantedtobringthisopportunitytoyoubeforeItookittosomeoneelse,”Isaid.

Suddenly,theircallwasn’taboutbeingcutfrom$2,000to$500buthownottolose$500tosomeotherguy.

Every single one of them took the deal. Nocounteroffers, no complaints. Now, if I hadn’t anchoredtheir emotions low, their perception of $500 would havebeentotallydifferent.IfI’djustcalledandsaid,“Icangiveyou$500perday.Whatdoyouthink?”they’dhavetakenitasaninsultandslammeddownthephone.

2. LETTHEOTHERGUYGO FIRST . . . MOSTOFTHETIME.Now, it’s clear that the benefits of anchoring emotions aregreat when it comes to bending your counterpart’s reality.But going first is not necessarily the best thing when itcomestonegotiatingprice.

WhenthefamousfilmdirectorBillyWilderwenttohirethe famous detective novelist Raymond Chandler to writethe 1944 classicDouble Indemnity, Chandler was new toHollywood. But he came ready to negotiate, and in hismeeting withWilder and the movie’s producer, Chandlermade the first salary offer: he bluffly demanded $150 perweekandwarnedWilderthatitmighttakehimthreeweekstofinishtheproject.

Wilder and the producer could barely stop fromlaughing,because theyhadbeenplanning topayChandler$750 per week and they knew that movie scripts tookmonths to write. Lucky for Chandler, Wilder and the

producervalued their relationshipwithChandlermore thanafewhundreddollars, so they tookpityonhimandcalledanagenttorepresentChandlerinthenegotiations.

Similarly, I had a student named Jerry who royallyscreweduphissalarynegotiationbygoingfirst(letmesaythatthishappenedbeforehewasmystudent).

In an interview at a New York financial firm, hedemanded $110,000, in large part because it represented a30percentraise.Itwasonlyafterhestartedthatherealizedthat the firm had started everybody else in his program at$125,000.

That’s why I suggest you let the other side anchormonetarynegotiations.

Therealissueisthatneithersidehasperfectinformationgoingtothetable.Thisoftenmeansyoudon’tknowenoughtoopenwithconfidence.That’sespeciallytrueanytimeyoudon’t know the market value of what you are buying orselling,likewithJerryorChandler.

By letting them anchor you also might get lucky: I’veexperiencedmanynegotiationswhen the other party’s firstofferwashigherthantheclosingfigureIhadinmind.IfI’dgone first they would have agreed and I would have leftwitheitherthewinner’scurseorbuyer’sremorse,thosegut-wrenchingfeelingsthatyou’veoverpaidorundersold.

That said, you’ve got to be careful when you let theotherguyanchor.Youhavetoprepareyourselfpsychicallytowithstandthefirstoffer.Iftheotherguy’sapro,ashark,he’s going to go for an extreme anchor in order to bend

yourreality. Then, when they come back with a merelyabsurdoffer itwill seem reasonable, just like an expensive$400iPhoneseemsreasonableaftertheymarkitdownfromacrazy$600.

The tendency to be anchored by extreme numbers is apsychologicalquirkknownas the“anchorandadjustment”effect. Researchers have discovered that we tend to makeadjustments from our first reference points. For example,mostpeopleglimpsing8×7×6×5×4×3×2×1estimatethat ityieldsahigher result than the samestring in reverseorder. That’s because we focus on the first numbers andextrapolate.

That’snottosay,“Neveropen.”Ruleslikethatareeasyto remember,but, likemost simplisticapproaches, theyarenot always good advice. If you’re dealing with a rookiecounterpart,youmightbetemptedtobethesharkandthrowout an extreme anchor. Or if you really know the marketandyou’redealingwithanequallyinformedpro,youmightofferanumberjusttomakethenegotiationgofaster.

Here’smypersonaladviceonwhetherornotyouwantto be the shark that eats a rookie counterpart. Justremember, your reputation precedes you. I’ve run intoCEOs whose reputation was to always badly beat theircounterpartandprettysoonnoonewoulddealwiththem.

3.ESTABLISHARANGEWhile going first rarely helps, there is oneway toseemtomakeanofferandbendtheirrealityintheprocess.Thatis,byalludingtoarange.

WhatImeanisthis:Whenconfrontedwithnamingyourterms or price, counter by recalling a similar deal whichestablishesyour“ballpark,”albeitthebestpossibleballparkyouwishtobein.Insteadofsaying,“I’mworth$110,000,”Jerrymighthavesaid,“AttopplaceslikeXCorp.,peopleinthisjobgetbetween$130,000and$170,000.”

That gets your point across without moving the otherparty intoadefensiveposition.And it getshim thinkingathigherlevels.Researchshowsthatpeoplewhohearextremeanchors unconsciously adjust their expectations in thedirectionof theopeningnumber.Manyevengodirectly totheir price limit. If Jerry had given this range, the firmprobablywouldhaveoffered$130,000becauseitlookedsocheapnextto$170,000.

In a recent study,4 Columbia Business Schoolpsychologistsfoundthatjobapplicantswhonamedarangereceivedsignificantlyhigheroverallsalariesthanthosewhoofferedanumber,especiallyiftheirrangewasa“bolsteringrange,”inwhichthelownumberintherangewaswhattheyactuallywanted.

Understand,ifyouofferarange(andit’sagoodideatodoso)expectthemtocomeinatthelowend.

4.PIVOTTONONMONETARYTERMSPeople get hung up on “Howmuch?”But don’t dealwithnumbers in isolation.That leads to bargaining, a series ofrigid positions defined by emotional views of fairness andpride. Negotiation is a more intricate and subtle dynamic

thanthat.One of the easiest ways to bend your counterpart’s

realitytoyourpointofviewisbypivotingtononmonetaryterms. After you’ve anchored them high, you can makeyour offer seem reasonable by offering things that aren’timportanttoyoubutcouldbeimportanttothem.Oriftheirofferislowyoucouldaskforthingsthatmattermoretoyouthan them. Since this is sometimes difficult,whatwe oftendoisthrowoutexamplestostartthebrainstormingprocess.

Not long ago I did some training for theMemphis BarAssociation. Normally, for the training they were lookingfor, I’d charge $25,000 a day.They came inwith amuchlowerofferthatIbalkedat.Theythenofferedtodoacoverstoryaboutme in theirassociationmagazine.Forme tobeonthecoverofamagazinethatwentouttowhoknowshowmanyofthecountry’stoplawyerswaspricelessadvertising.(Plusmymomisreallyproudofit!)

They had to put something on the cover anyway, so ithadzerocost to themand Igave themasteepdiscountonmy fee. I constantly use that as an example in mynegotiations nowwhen I name a price. Iwant to stimulatemy counterpart’s brainstorming to see what valuablenonmonetarygems theymighthave thatarecheap to thembutvaluabletome.

5.WHENYOUDOTALKNUMBERS,USEODDONESEvery number has a psychological significance that goesbeyond its value.And I’m not just talking about how youlove17becauseyouthinkit’slucky.WhatImeanisthat,in

terms of negotiation, some numbers appear moreimmovablethanothers.

Thebiggest thing to remember is thatnumbers thatendin 0 inevitably feel like temporary placeholders,guesstimates that you can easily be negotiated off of. Butanything you throw out that sounds less rounded—say,$37,263—feels likeafigure thatyoucametoasaresultofthoughtful calculation. Such numbers feel serious andpermanent to your counterpart, so use them to fortify youroffers.

6.SURPRISEWITHAGIFTYoucangetyourcounterpartintoamoodofgenerositybystaking an extreme anchor and then, after their inevitablefirstrejection,offeringthemawhollyunrelatedsurprisegift.

Unexpected conciliatory gestures like this are hugelyeffective because they introduce a dynamic calledreciprocity; the other party feels the need to answer yourgenerosity in kind. They will suddenly come up on theiroffer, or they’ll look to repay your kindness in the future.Peoplefeelobligedtorepaydebtsofkindness.

Let’slookatitintermsofinternationalpolitics.In1977Egyptian president Anwar Sadat dramatically pushednegotiations on the Egypt-Israel peace treaty forward bymakingasurpriseaddresstotheIsraeliKnesset,agenerousgesture thatdidnot involvemakinganyactualconcessionsbutdidsignifyabigsteptowardpeace.

BackinHaiti,afewhoursafterthekidnappershadsnatched

hisaunt,Iwasonthephonewiththepolitician’snephew.There was no way their family could come up with

$150,000,hetoldme,buttheycouldpaybetween$50,000and $85,000. But since learning that the ransom was justpartymoney, I was aimingmuch lower: $5,000.Wewerenot going to compromise. It was a matter of professionalpride.

Iadvisedhimtostartoffbyanchoringtheconversationin the idea that he didn’t have the money, but to do sowithoutsaying“No”soasnottohittheirpridehead-on.

“Howam I supposed to do that?” he asked in the nextcall.

The kidnapper made another general threat against theauntandagaindemandedthecash.

That’s when I had the nephew subtly question thekidnapper’sfairness.

“I’m sorry,” the nephew responded, “but how are wesupposedtopayifyou’regoingtohurther?”

That brought up the aunt’s death, which was the thingthekidnappersmostwantedtoavoid.Theyneededtokeepher unharmed if they hoped to get anymoney.Theywerecommoditytraders,afterall.

Notice that to this point the nephew hadn’t named aprice.Thisgameofattritionfinallypushedthekidnapperstoname a number first. Without prodding, they dropped to$50,000.

Now that the kidnappers’ reality had been bent to asmaller number, my colleagues and I told the nephew to

standhisground.“HowcanIcomeupwiththatkindofmoney?”wetold

himtoask.Again,thekidnapperdroppedhisdemand,to$25,000.Nowthatwehadhiminoursights,wehad thenephew

makehisfirstoffer,anextremelowanchorof$3,000.The line went silent and the nephew began to sweat

profusely, but we told him to hold tight. This alwayshappened at the moment the kidnapper’s economic realitygottotallyrearranged.

When he spoke again, the kidnapper seemed shell-shocked. But he went on. His next offer was lower,$10,000.Then we had the nephew answer with a strangenumberthatseemedtocomefromdeepcalculationofwhathisaunt’slifewasworth:$4,751.

His newprice? $7,500. In response,wehad the cousin“spontaneously”sayhe’dthrowinanewportableCDstereoandrepeatedthe$4,751.Thekidnappers,whodidn’treallywanttheCDstereofelttherewasnomoremoneytobehad,saidyes.

Six hours later, the family paid that sum and the auntcamebackhomesafely.

HOWTONEGOTIATEABETTERSALARY

Oneofthecriticalfactorsinbusinessschoolrankingsishowwell their graduates are compensated.So I tell everyMBAclass I lecture that my first objective is to single-handedlyraise the ranking of their school by teaching them how to

negotiateabettersalary.Ibreakdowntheprocessintothreeparts thatblendthis

chapter’sdynamicsinawaythatnotonlybringsyoubettermoney,butconvincesyourbosstofighttogetitforyou.

BE PLEASANTLY PERSISTENT ON NONSALARYTERMSPleasant persistence is a kind of emotional anchoring thatcreates empathy with the boss and builds the rightpsychologicalenvironmentforconstructivediscussion.Andthe more you talk about nonsalary terms, the more likelyyouare tohear thefull rangeof theiroptions. If theycan’tmeet your nonsalary requests, theymay even counterwithmore money, like they did with a French-born Americanformerstudentofmine.Shekeptasking—withabigsmile—for an extra week of vacation beyond what the companynormallygave.Shewas“French,”shesaid,andthat’swhatFrench people did. The hiring company was completelyhandcuffed on the vacation issue, but because she was sodarned delightful, and because she introduced anonmonetary variable into the notion of her value, theycounteredbyincreasinghersalaryoffer.

SALARY TERMS WITHOUT SUCCESS TERMS ISRUSSIANROULETTEOnce you’ve negotiated a salary, make sure to definesuccess foryourposition—aswell asmetrics foryournextraise. That’s meaningful for you and free for your boss,muchlikegivingmeamagazinecoverstorywasforthebar

association. It gets you a planned raise and, by definingyoursuccess in relation toyourboss’s supervision, it leadsintothenextstep...

SPARKTHEIR INTEREST INYOUR SUCCESSANDGAINANUNOFFICIALMENTORRemember the ideaof figuringwhat theotherside isreallybuying?Well,whenyouare sellingyourself toamanager,sellyourselfasmorethanabodyforajob;sellyourself,andyour success, as a way they can validate their ownintelligence and broadcast it to the rest of the company.Make sure they know you’ll act as a flesh-and-bloodargument for their importance. Once you’ve bent theirreality to include you as their ambassador, they’ll have astakeinyoursuccess.

Ask:“Whatdoesittaketobesuccessfulhere?”Pleasenoticethatthisquestionissimilartoquestionsthat

aresuggestedbymanyMBAcareercounselingcenters,yetno texactly the same. And it’s the exact wording of thisquestionthat’scritical.

Students from my MBA courses who have asked thisquestion in job interviews have actually had interviewerslean forward and say, “Noone ever askedus that before.”Theinterviewerthengaveagreatanddetailedanswer.

The key issue here is if someone gives you guidance,theywillwatch tosee ifyou follow theiradvice.Theywillhave a personal stake in seeing you succeed.You’ve justrecruitedyourfirstunofficialmentor.

To show how this can be done to near perfection, I canthink of no better example than my former MBA studentAngelPrado.

WhileAngelwas finishinguphisMBA,hewent to hisboss and began to lay the groundwork for his work post-MBA (which the company was paying). During his lastsemester,hesetanonspecificanchor—akindofrange—bysuggesting to his boss that once hegraduated and thecompanywasdone investing inhisMBA(around$31,000peryear),thatmoneyshouldgotohimassalary.

His boss made no commitment, but Angel waspleasantly persistent about it, which set the idea as ananchorinhisboss’smind.

Upon graduation,Angel and his boss had their big sit-down. In an assertive and calmmanner,Angel broached anonfinancial issue to move the focus away from “Howmuch?”:heaskedforanewtitle.

Angel’s boss readily agreed that a new role was a no-brainerafterAngel’snewdegree.

At that point,Angel and hismanager definedwhat hisrolesand responsibilitieswouldbe inhisnewrole, therebysetting success metrics. Then Angel took a breath andpaused so that his boss would be the first to throw out anumber. At last, he did. Curiously enough, the numbershowedthatAngel’searliereffortsatanchoringhadworked:heproposedtoadd$31,000toAngel’sbasesalary,almosta50percentraise.

ButAngelwasnorookienegotiator,notaftertakingmy

class. So instead of countering and getting stuck in “Howmuch?” he kept talking, labeling the boss’s emotions andempathizingwithhissituation(atthetimethecompanywasgoingthroughdifficultnegotiationswithitsinvestors).

AndthenAngelcourteouslyaskedforamomenttostepaway and print up the agreed-upon job description. Thispause created a dynamic of pre-deadline urgency in hisboss, which Angel exploited when he returned with theprintout. On the bottom, he’d added his desiredcompensation:“$134.5k—$143k.”

In thatone littlemove,Angelweaved togetherabunchof the lessons from this chapter. The odd numbers gavethem the weight of thoughtful calculation. The numberswerehigh too,whichexploitedhisboss’snatural tendencyto go directly to his price limitwhen faced by an extremeanchor.And they were a range, which madeAngel seemless aggressive and the lower end more reasonable incomparison.

From his boss’s body language—raised eyebrows—itwas clear that he was surprised by the compensationrequest.But ithad thedesiredeffect: after somecommentsaboutthedescription,hecounteredwith$120,000.

Angel didn’t say “No” or “Yes,” but kept talking andcreating empathy. Then, in the middle of a sentence,seemingly out of the blue, his boss threw out $127,000.With his boss obviously negotiating with himself, Angelkept him going. Finally his boss said he agreed with the$134,500 and would pay that salary starting in three

months,contingentontheboardofdirectors’approval.Astheicingonthecake,Angelworkedinapositiveuse

oftheword“Fair”(“That’sfair,”hesaid),andthensoldtheraise tohis boss as amarriage inwhichhis bosswouldbethe mentor. “I’m asking you, not the board, for thepromotion, and all I need is for you to agree with it,” hesaid.

AndhowdidAngel’sbossreplytohisnewambassador?“I’llfighttogetyouthissalary.”SofollowAngel’sleadandmakeitrain!

KEYLESSONS

Compared to the tools discussed in previous chapters, thetechniques here seem concrete and easy to use. Butmanypeople shy away from them because they seemmanipulative. Something that bends your counterpart’srealitymustbecheating,right?

In response, letme just say that these toolsareusedbyall the best negotiators because they simply recognize thehuman psyche as it is.We are emotional, irrational beastswho are emotional and irrational in predictable, pattern-filledways.Usingthatknowledgeisonly,well,rational.

Asyouwork these tools into your daily life, rememberthefollowingpowerfullessons:

■ All negotiations are defined by a network ofsubterranean desires and needs. Don’t letyourself be fooled by the surface. Once you

knowthattheHaitiankidnappersjustwantpartymoney,youwillbemilesbetterprepared.

■ Splittingthedifferenceiswearingoneblackandonebrown shoe, so don’t compromise.Meetinghalfwayoftenleadstobaddealsforbothsides.

■ Approachingdeadlinesenticepeopletorushthenegotiatingprocessanddoimpulsive things thatareagainsttheirbestinterests.

■ The F-word—“Fair”—is an emotional termpeopleusuallyexploittoputtheothersideonthedefensive and gain concessions. When yourcounterpart drops the F-bomb, don’t getsuckeredintoaconcession.Instead,askthemtoexplainhowyou’remistreatingthem.

■ You can bend your counterpart’s reality byanchoringhisstartingpoint.Beforeyoumakeanoffer, emotionally anchor them by saying howbad itwillbe.Whenyouget tonumbers, setanextreme anchor tomake your “real” offer seemreasonable, or use a range to seem lessaggressive.The real value of anything dependsonwhatvantagepointyou’relookingatitfrom.

■ Peoplewill takemore risks to avoid a loss thanto realize a gain. Make sure your counterpart

seesthatthereissomethingtolosebyinaction.

CHAPTER7

CREATETHEILLUSIONOFCONTROL

A month after I’d finished working the case of JeffreySchilling in May 2001, I got orders from headquarters tohead back to Manila. The same bad guys who’d takenSchilling,abrutalgroupofradicalIslamistsnamedtheAbuSayyaf,hadraidedtheDosPalmasprivatedivingresortandtaken twenty hostages, including three Americans: Martinand Gracia Burnham, a missionary couple fromWichita,Kansas; andGuillermoSobero, aguywho ranaCaliforniawaterproofingfirm.

DosPalmaswasanegotiator’snightmarefromthestart.The day after the kidnappings, the recently electedPhilippine president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, set up themost confrontational, nonconstructive dynamic possible bypubliclydeclaring“all-outwar”ontheAbuSayyaf.

Notexactlyempatheticdiscourse,right?Itgotalotworse.The Philippine army andmarines had a turfwar in the

midst of the negotiations, pissing off the kidnappers withseveral botched raids. Because American hostages wereinvolved, the CIA, the FBI, and U.S. military intelligence

were all called in andwe too squabbled among ourselves.Thenthekidnappersrapedandkilledseveralhostages,9/11happened,andtheAbuSayyafwaslinkedtoAlQaeda.

Bythe timethecrisisconcluded inanorgyofgunshotsinJune2002,DosPalmashadofficiallybecomethebiggestfailureinmyprofessionallife.Tocallitatrainwreckwouldbegenerous,ifyouknowwhatImean.

But failures plant the seeds of future success, and ourfailureinthePhilippineswasnoexception.

If theDosPalmascalamityshowedmeanything, itwasthat we all were still suffering under the notion thatnegotiation was a wrestling match where the point is toexhaust your opponent into submission, hope for the best,andneverbackdown.

As my disappointment with Dos Palmas forced me toreckonwith our failed techniques, I took a deep look intothe newest negotiating theories—some great and somecompletelyharebrained—andIhadachanceencounterwitha case inPittsburgh that completely changedhow I lookedattheinterpersonaldynamicsofnegotiationconversations.

FromtheashesofDosPalmas,then,welearnedalessonthat would forever change how the FBI negotiatedkidnappings.We learned that negotiationwas coaxing, notovercoming; co-opting, not defeating. Most important, welearned that successful negotiation involved getting yourcounterpart to do the work for you and suggest yoursolution himself. It involved giving him the illusion ofcontrol while you, in fact, were the one defining the

conversation.ThetoolwedevelopedissomethingIcallthecalibrated,

oropen-ended,question.Whatitdoesisremoveaggressionfromconversationsbyacknowledgingtheothersideopenly,without resistance. In doing so, it lets you introduce ideasand requests without sounding pushy. It allows you tonudge.

I’ll explain it in depth later on, but for now letme saythat it’s really as simple as removing the hostility from thestatement“Youcan’tleave”andturningitintoaquestion.

“Whatdoyouhopetoachievebygoing?”

DON’TTRYTONEGOTIATEINAFIREFIGHT

The moment I arrived in Manila on the Burnham-Soberocase I was sent down to the Mindanao region, where thePhilippine military was lobbing bullets and rockets into ahospital complex where theAbu Sayyaf and the hostageswereholedup.

This was no place for a negotiator, because it’simpossible to have a dialogue in themiddle of a firefight.Thenthingsgotworse:whenIwokeupthenextmorning,Ilearnedthatduringthenightthekidnappershadtakentheirhostagesandescaped.

The “escape” was the first sign that this operation wasgoing to be a rolling train wreck and that the Philippinemilitarywaslessthanatrustworthypartner.

During debriefings following the episode, it wasrevealedthatduringacease-fireamilitaryguyhadcollected

asuitcasefromthe thugs in thehospital,andnot longafterthatallthesoldiersontherearperimeterofthehospitalhadbeencalledawayfora“meeting.”Coincidentally—ornot—thebadguyschosethatmomenttoslipaway.

Things really blew up two weeks later, on thePhilippines’ Independence Day, when Abu Sabayaannouncedthathewasgoingtobehead“oneofthewhites”unless the government called off its manhunt by midday.WeknewthismeantoneoftheAmericansandanticipateditwouldbeGuillermoSobero.

Wedidn’thaveanydirectcontactwiththekidnappersatthe timebecauseourpartners in thePhilippinemilitaryhadassigned us an intermediarywho always “forgot” tomakesurewewerepresentforhisphonecallswiththekidnappers(and similarly “forgot” to tape them).Allwecoulddowassendtextmessagesofferingtoscheduleatimetospeak.

Whatendeduphappeningwasthatjustbeforethenoondeadline, Sabaya and a member of the Philippinepresidentialcabinethadaconversationonaradiotalkshow,andthegovernmentconcededtoSabaya’sdemandtonamea Malaysian senator as a negotiator. In exchange, Sabayaagreednottokillahostage.

But it was too late to fix this atmosphere ofconfrontation,distrust,andlies.Thatafternoon,thehostagesheardSabayaonthephoneyelling,“Butthatwaspartoftheagreement! That was a part of the agreement!” Not longafter, theAbu Sayyaf beheaded Guillermo Sobero and forgoodmeasurethegrouptookfifteenmorehostages.

WithnoneoftheimportantmovingpartsanywherenearunderourcontrolandtheUnitedStateslargelyuninterestedin spiteofSobero’smurder, I headedback toWashington,D.C.Itseemedliketherewaslittlewecoulddo.

Then9/11changedeverything.Once a minor terrorist outfit, the Abu Sayyaf was

suddenly linked to Al Qaeda. And then a Philippine TVreporter namedArlyn dela Cruz got into theAbu Sayyafcamp and videotaped Sabaya as he taunted theAmericanmissionaries Martin and Gracia Burnham, who were soemaciated they looked like concentration camp survivors.Thevideohit theU.S.newsmedia like thunder.Suddenly,thecasebecameamajorU.S.governmentpriority.

THEREISALWAYSATEAMONTHEOTHERSIDE

TheFBIsentmebackin.NowIwassentintomakesureadealgotmade.Itwasallveryhighprofile,too.Someofmycontacts reported that FBI director Robert Mueller waspersonally briefing President George W. Bush everymorning on what we were doing.When Director Muellershowed up in the U.S. Embassy in Manila and I wasintroducedtohim,alookofrecognitioncameoverhisface.Thatwasaveryheadymoment.

But all the support in the world won’t work if yourcounterpart’s team is dysfunctional. If your negotiationefforts don’t reach past yourcounterpart and into the teambehind him, then you’ve got a “hope”-based deal—andhopeisnotastrategy.

One of the things I failed to fully appreciate then wasthat the kidnappers had changed negotiators themselves.Sabayahadbeenreplaced.

My boss Gary Noesner had, in a previous kidnapping,pointedout tome thatachange innegotiatorsby theothersidealmostalwayssignaledthattheymeanttotakeaharderline.WhatIdidn’trealizeatthetimewasthismeantSabayawas going to play a role as a deal breaker if he wasn’taccountedfor.

OurnewtackwastobuytheBurnhamsback.Althoughthe United States officially doesn’t pay ransoms, a donorhad been found who would provide $300,000. The newAbuSayyafnegotiatoragreedtoarelease.

Theransomdropwasadisaster.Thekidnappersdecidedthattheywouldn’treleasetheBurnhams:or,rather,Sabaya,who was physically in charge of the hostages, refused torelease them.Hehadcuthisownside-deal—onewedidn’tknowabout—andithadfallenthrough.Thenewnegotiator,now embarrassed and in a foulmood, covered himself byclaimingthatthepaymentwasshort$600.Wewerebaffled—“Sixhundreddollars?Youwon’tlethostagesgobecauseof six hundred dollars?”—andwe tried to argue that if themoneywasmissing,itmusthavebeenthecourierwhohadstolen the money. But we had no dynamic of trust andcooperationtobackusup.The$300,000wasgoneandwewerebacktorarelyansweredtextmessages.

The slow-motion wreck culminated about two monthslater with a botched “rescue.”A team of Philippine Scout

RangerswalkingaroundinthewoodscameacrosstheAbuSayyaf camp, or so they said. Later we heard anothergovernment agency had tipped them off. That othergovernment agency (OGA) had not told us about theirlocationbecause . . .because . . .why?That’ssomethingIwillneverunderstand.

The Scout Rangers formed a skirmish line from a treeline above the camp and opened fire, indiscriminatelypouringbulletsintothearea.GraciaandMartinweretakinganapintheirhammockswhenthefirestartedrainingdown.They both fell out of their hammocks and started to rolldown the hill toward safety.But as a sheet of bullets fromtheir rescuers fell on them,Gracia felt a searing burn flarethroughherrightthigh.Andthen,shefeltMartingolimp.

Minutes later, after the last rebels fled, the squad ofPhilippinesoldierstriedtoreassureGraciathatherhusbandwasfine,butsheshookherhead.Afterayear incaptivity,shehadnotimeforfantasies.Graciaknewherhusbandwasdead, and she was right: he’d been hit in the chest, threetimes,by“friendly”fire.

Intheend,thesupposedrescuemissionkilledtwoofthethree hostages there that day (a Philippine nurse namedEdiborah Yap also died), and the big fish—Sabaya—escapedtoliveafewmoremonths.Frombeginningtoend,the thirteen-monthmissionwas a complete failure, awasteoflivesandtreasure.AsIsatinthedarkathomeafewdayslater, dispirited and spent, I knew that something had tochange.Wecouldn’tletthishappenagain.

If the hostages’ deathswere going tomean something,we would have to find a new way to negotiate,communicate, listen,andspeak,bothwithourenemiesandwithourfriends.Notforcommunication’ssake,though.

No.Wehadtodoittowin.

AVOIDASHOWDOWN

Notwowaysaboutit,myreturntotheUnitedStateswasatimeof reckoning. Iquestioned—Ievendoubted—someofwhat we were doing at the FBI. If what we knew wasn’tenough,wehadtogetbetter.

Therealkick in thepantscameaftermyreturn,whenIwasreviewinginformationaboutthecase,alotofwhichwehadn’thadinthefield.Amongthepilesofinformationwasonefactthattotallyblewmymind.

MartinBurnhamhadbeenoverheardonaphonecall tosomeone. Iwonderedwhat inGod’snameourhostagewasdoing talking on the phonewithout us knowing.Andwithwhomwas he talking?There’s only one reason a hostageevergetsonaphone.It’stoprovideproofoflife.SomeoneelsehadbeentryingtoransomtheBurnhamsout.

It turned out to be someone working for a crookedPhilippine politician who’d been running a parallelnegotiationfortheBurnhams’release.Hewantedtobuythehostages out himself in order to show up PhilippinepresidentArroyo.

Butitwasn’tsomuchthatthisguywasgoingbehindourbacks that bothered me. As is pretty clear already, there

were a whole lot of underhanded things going on.Whatreallyateatmewasthat thisschmuck,whowasn’tanFBI-trained hostage negotiator, had pulled off something that Ihadn’tbeenableto.

He’dgotten to speak toMartinBurnhamon thephone.Forfree.

That’s when I realized that this crooked pol’s successwherewehadfailedwasakindofmetaphorforeverythingthatwaswrongwithourone-dimensionalmindset.

Beyond our problems with the Philippine military, thebig reason we had no effective influence with thekidnappersandhostageswasthatwehadthisverytit-for-tatmentality.Underthatmentality,ifwecalledupthebadguyswewereaskingforsomething,andif theygave it touswehadtogivethemsomethingback.Andso,becausewewerepositivethattheBurnhamswerealive,we’dneverbotheredto call and ask for proof of life.Wewere afraid to go intodebt.

Ifwemadean“ask”andtheygrantedit,we’dowe.Notmaking good on a debt risked the accusation of bad-faithnegotiationandbadfaithinkidnappingsgetspeoplekilled.

And of course we didn’t ask the kidnappers to talkdirectly to the hostage because we knew they’d say “no”andwewereafraidofbeingembarrassed.

That fear was amajor flaw in our negotiatingmindset.There is some information that you can only get throughdirect,extendedinteractionswithyourcounterpart.

We also needednewways to get thingswithout asking

for them. We needed to finesse making an “ask” withsomething more sophisticated than closed-ended questionswiththeiryes-nodynamic.

That’s when I realized that what we had been doingwasn’t communication; it was verbal flexing.We wantedthemtoseethingsourwayandtheywantedustoseeittheirway. If you let this dynamic loose in the real world,negotiation breaks down and tensions flare. That wholeethospermeated everything theFBIwasdoing.Everythingwasashowdown.Anditdidn’twork.

Our approach to proof-of-life questions embodied alltheseproblems.

At the time,weproved that our hostageswere alivebydevisingquestionsthataskedforapieceofinformationonlythehostagecouldknow.Computer-security-stylequestions,like, “What’s the name ofMartin’s first dog?” or “What’sMartin’sdad’smiddlename?”

This particular type of question had many failings,however.Foronething,ithadsortofbecomeasignatureoflaw enforcement in the kidnapping world.When a familystartsaskingaquestionofthattype,it’sanearcertaintythatthe cops are coaching them. And that makes kidnappersverynervous.

Even beyond the nerves, you had the problem thatansweringquestions like those required little, if any,effort.The bad guys go and get the fact and give it to you rightaway,becauseit’ssoeasy.Bang,bang,bang!Ithappenssofast thatyoudidn’tgainany tacticaladvantage,anyusable

information, any effort on their part toward a goal thatserves you.And all negotiation, done well, should be aninformation-gatheringprocessthatvestsyourcounterpartinanoutcomethatservesyou.

Worstofall,thebadguysknowthattheyhavejustgivenyou something—a proof of life—which triggers thiswholehumanreciprocitygene.Whetherwe like torecognize itornot,auniversalruleofhumannature,acrossallcultures, isthat when somebody gives you something, they expectsomethinginreturn.Andtheywon’tgiveanythingelseuntilyoupaythemback.

Now, we didn’t want to trigger this whole reciprocitything because we didn’t want to give anything. So whathappened?Allofourconversationsbecametheseparalyzedconfrontations between two parties who wanted to extractsomething from each other but didn’t want to give. Wedidn’tcommunicate,outofprideandfear.

That’swhywefailed,whilenumbskullslikethiscrookedPhilippine politician just stumbled in and got what we sodesperately needed. That is, communication withoutreciprocity.Isatbackandwonderedtomyself,Howthehelldowedothat?

SUSPENDUNBELIEF

While I was racking my brains over how this sleazypolitician managed to get Martin Burnham on the phonewhile we never could, FBI Pittsburgh had a kidnappingcase.

My partner Chuck brought me the tapes from the casebecause he thought it was funny.You see, one Pittsburghdrug dealer had kidnapped the girlfriend of anotherPittsburgh drug dealer, and forwhatever reason the victimdrug dealer came to the FBI for help. Coming to the FBIseemed kind of contrary to his best interests, being a drugdealerandall,buthediditbecausenomatterwhoyouare,whenyouneedhelpyougototheFBI.Right?

On the tapes, our hostagenegotiators are riding aroundwith this drug dealer while he’s negotiatingwith the otherdrug dealer. Normally we would have had the guy ask abulletproofproof-of-lifequestion,like,“Whatwasthenameof the girlfriend’s teddy bear when she was little?” But inthis situation, this drug dealer hadn’t yet been coached onasking a “correct” question. So in the middle of theconversationwith thekidnapper, he just blurts, “Hey, dog,howdoIknowshe’sallright?”

Andthefunniestthinghappened.Thekidnapperactuallywentsilentfortenseconds.Hewascompletelytakenaback.Thenhesaid, inamuch lessconfrontational toneofvoice,“Well,I’llputheronthephone.”Iwasflooredbecausethisunsophisticated drug dealer just pulled off a phenomenalvictoryinthenegotiation.Togetthekidnapperto volunteertoputthevictimonthephoneismassivelyhuge.

That’swhenIhadmy“Holyshit!”momentandrealizedthat this is the technique I’d been waiting for. Instead ofasking some closed-ended question with a single correctanswer, he’d asked an open-ended, yet calibrated one that

forcedtheotherguytopauseandactuallythinkabouthowto solvethe problem. I thought to myself,This is perfect!It’s anatural andnormalquestion,not a request for a fact.It’s a “how” question, and “how” engages because “how”asksforhelp.

Bestofall,hedoesn’towethekidnapperadamnthing.The guy volunteers to put the girlfriend on the phone: hethinks it’s his idea. The guy who just offered to put thegirlfriendonthelinethinkshe’sincontrol.Andthesecrettogaining theupperhand in a negotiation is giving theothersidetheillusionofcontrol.

Thegeniusof this technique is reallywellexplainedbysomething that the psychologist Kevin Dutton says in hisbookSplit-Second Persuasion.1 He talks about what hecalls“unbelief,”whichisactiveresistancetowhattheotherside is saying, complete rejection. That’s where the twopartiesinanegotiationusuallystart.

If you don’t ever get off that dynamic, you end uphavingshowdowns,aseachsidetriestoimposeitspointofview.You get two hard skulls banging against each other,likeinDosPalmas.Butifyoucangettheothersidetodroptheir unbelief, you can slowly work themtoyour point ofviewonthebackoftheirenergy,justlikethedrugdealer’squestiongotthekidnappertovolunteertodowhatthedrugdealerwanted.Youdon’tdirectlypersuadethemtoseeyourideas. Instead, you ride them to your ideas.As the sayinggoes,thebestwaytorideahorseisinthedirectioninwhichitisgoing.

Ourjobaspersuadersiseasierthanwethink.It’snottoget others believing what we say. It’s just to stop themunbelieving. Once we achieve that, the game’s half-won.“Unbelief is the friction that keeps persuasion in check,”Duttonsays.“Withoutit,there’dbenolimits.”

Givingyourcounterparttheillusionofcontrolbyaskingcalibratedquestions—byaskingforhelp—isoneofthemostpowerfultoolsforsuspendingunbelief.Notlongago,Ireadthis great article in theNew York Times2 by a medicalstudentwhowasfacedwithapatientwhohadrippedouthisIV, packed his bags, and was making a move to leavebecausehisbiopsyresultsweredayslateandhewastiredofwaiting.

Just then a senior physician arrived. After calmlyofferingthepatientaglassofwaterandaskingiftheycouldchatforaminute,hesaidheunderstoodwhythepatientwaspissedoffandpromisedtocallthelabtoseewhytheresultsweredelayed.

But what he did next is what really suspended thepatient’sunbelief: he asked a calibratedquestion—whathefelt was so important about leaving—and then when thepatient saidhehaderrands tohandle, thedoctoroffered toconnect the patient with services that could help him getthemdone.And,boom,thepatientvolunteeredtostay.

What’s sopowerful about the seniordoctor’s techniqueisthathetookwhatwasashowdown—“I’mgoingtoleave”versus“Youcan’tleave”—andaskedquestionsthatledthepatient tosolvehisownproblem. . . in thewaythedoctor

wanted.Itwasstillakindofshowdown,ofcourse,butthedoctor

took the confrontation and bravado out of it by giving thepatient the illusion of control.As an oldWashington Posteditor named Robert Estabrookonce said, “He who haslearned to disagree without being disagreeable hasdiscoveredthemostvaluablesecretofnegotiation.”

This same technique for suspending unbelief that youuse with kidnappers and escaping patients works foranything,evennegotiatingprices.Whenyougointoastore,instead of telling the salesclerkwhat you “need,” you candescribewhatyou’relookingforandaskforsuggestions.

Then,onceyou’vepickedoutwhatyouwant,insteadofhittingthemwithahardoffer,youcanjustsaythepriceisabitmorethanyoubudgetedandaskforhelpwithoneofthegreatest-of-all-time calibrated questions: “How am Isupposed to do that?”The critical part of this approach isthat you really are asking for help and your deliverymustconvey that. With this negotiating scheme, instead ofbullyingtheclerk,you’reaskingfortheiradviceandgivingthemtheillusionofcontrol.

Asking for help in this manner, after you’ve alreadybeen engaged in a dialogue, is an incredibly powerfulnegotiating technique for transforming encounters fromconfrontational showdowns into joint problem-solvingsessions.Andcalibratedquestionsarethebesttool.

CALIBRATEYOURQUESTIONS

Afewyears ago, Iwasconsultingwitha clientwhohadasmall firm that did public relations for a large corporation.The folks at the big company were not paying their bills,and as timewent on, they owedmy clientmore andmoremoney. They kept her on the hook by promising lots ofrepeat business, implying that she would get a pile ofrevenueifshejustkeptworking.Shefelttrapped.

Myadviceforherwassimple:Itoldhertoengagethemin a conversation where she summarized the situation andthenasked,“HowamIsupposedtodothat?”

Sheshookherhead.Noway.Theideaofhavingtoaskthisquestionjustterrifiedher.“IftheytellmeIhaveto,thenI’mtrapped!”washerreaction.

Shealsoheardthequestionas“You’rescrewingmeoutofmoneyandithastostop.”Thatsoundedlikethefirststeptohergettingfiredasaconsultant.

Iexplainedtoherthatthisimplication,thoughreal,wasin her mind. Her client would hear the words and not theimplicationaslongasshekeptcalmandavoidedmakingitsoundbyherdelivery likeanaccusationor threat.As longas she stayed cool, theywould hear it as a problem to besolved.

She didn’t quite believe me. We walked through thescriptseveraltimes,butshewasstillafraid.Thenafewdayslatershecalledme,totallygiddywithhappiness.Theclienthad calledwith another request and she had finally gottenup the courage to summarize the situation, and ask, “HowamIsupposedtodothat?”

Andyouknowwhat?The answer shegotwas “You’reright, youcan’t and I apologize.”Her client explained thatthey were going through some internal problems, but shewasgivenanewaccountingcontactandtoldshe’dbepaidwithinforty-eighthours.Andshewas.

Now, think about how my client’s question worked:without accusing them of anything, it pushed the bigcompany to understand her problem and offer the solutionshewanted.That in a nutshell is thewhole point of open-endedquestionsthatarecalibratedforaspecificeffect.

Like the softening words and phrases “perhaps,”“maybe,” “I think,” and “it seems,” the calibrated open-endedquestiontakestheaggressionoutofaconfrontationalstatementorclose-endedrequestthatmightotherwiseangeryour counterpart.What makes them work is that they aresubjecttointerpretationbyyourcounterpartinsteadofbeingrigidly defined. They allow you to introduce ideas andrequestswithoutsoundingoverbearingorpushy.

Andthat’s thedifferencebetween“You’rescrewingmeoutofmoney,andithastostop”and“HowamIsupposedtodothat?”

The real beauty of calibrated questions is the fact thattheyoffernotargetforattacklikestatementsdo.Calibratedquestions have the power to educate your counterpart onwhat the problem is rather than causing conflict bytellingthemwhattheproblemis.

Butcalibratedquestionsarenotjustrandomrequestsforcomment.Theyhaveadirection:onceyoufigureoutwhere

you want a conversation to go, you have to design thequestions that will ease the conversation in that directionwhile letting theotherguy think it’shischoice to takeyouthere.

That’s why I refer to these questions ascalibratedquestions. You have to calibrate them carefully, just likeyou would calibrate a gun sight or a measuring scale, totargetaspecificproblem.

Thegoodnewsisthattherearerulesforthat.First off, calibratedquestions avoidverbs orwords like

“can,”“is,”“are,”“do,”or“does.”Theseareclosed-endedquestions that can be answered with a simple “yes” or a“no.”Instead,theystartwithalistofwordspeopleknowasreporter’s questions: “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,”“why,”and“how.”Thosewordsinspireyourcounterparttothinkandthenspeakexpansively.

Butletmecutthelistevenfurther:it’sbesttostartwith“what,” “how,” andsometimes “why.” Nothing else.“Who,” “when,” and “where” will often just get yourcounterparttoshareafactwithoutthinking.And“why”canbackfire. Regardless of what language the word “why” istranslatedinto,it’saccusatory.Thereareveryraremomentswhenthisistoyouradvantage.

Theonly timeyoucanuse “why” successfully iswhenthe defensiveness that is created supports the change youaretryingtogetthemtosee.“Whywouldyoueverchangefrom the way you’ve always done things and try myapproach?”isanexample.“Whywouldyourcompanyever

change from your long-standing vendor and choose ourcompany?” isanother.Asalways, toneofvoice, respectfulanddeferential,iscritical.

Otherwise, treat “why” like a burner on a hot stove—don’ttouchit.

Havingjusttwowordstostartwithmightnotseemlikealot of ammunition, but trust me, you can use “what” and“how”tocalibratenearlyanyquestion.“Doesthislooklikesomething you would like?” can become “How does thislooktoyou?”or“Whataboutthisworksforyou?”Youcaneven ask, “What about this doesn’t work for you?” andyou’llprobablytriggerquiteabitofusefulinformationfromyourcounterpart.

Evensomethingasharshas“Whydidyoudoit?”canbecalibratedto“Whatcausedyoutodoit?”whichtakesawaytheemotionandmakesthequestionlessaccusatory.

Youshouldusecalibratedquestionsearlyandoften,andthere are a few that you will find that you will use in thebeginningofnearlyeverynegotiation.“What is thebiggestchallenge you face?” is one of those questions. It just getsthe other side to teach you something about themselves,whichiscriticaltoanynegotiationbecauseallnegotiationisaninformation-gatheringprocess.

Hereare someothergreat standbys that Iuse in almosteverynegotiation,dependingonthesituation:

■ Whataboutthisisimportanttoyou?

■ HowcanIhelptomakethisbetterforus?

■ Howwouldyoulikemetoproceed?

■ Whatisitthatbroughtusintothissituation?

■ Howcanwesolvethisproblem?

■ What’s the objective? /What are we trying toaccomplishhere?

■ HowamIsupposedtodothat?

Theimplicationofanywell-designedcalibratedquestionisthatyouwantwhattheotherguywantsbutyouneedhisintelligencetoovercometheproblem.Thisreallyappealstoveryaggressiveoregotisticalcounterparts.

You’ve not only implicitly asked for help—triggeringgoodwill and less defensiveness—but you’ve engineered asituation in which your formerly recalcitrant counterpart isnowusinghismentalandemotionalresourcestoovercomeyour challenges. It is the first step in your counterpartinternalizingyourway—andtheobstaclesinit—ashisown.Andthatguidestheotherpartytowarddesigningasolution.

Yoursolution.Thinkback tohow thedoctorusedcalibratedquestions

to get his patient to stay.As his story showed, the key togetting people to see things your way is not to confrontthemontheirideas(“Youcan’tleave”)buttoacknowledgetheir ideas openly (“I understand why you’re pissed off”)andthenguidethemtowardsolvingtheproblem(“Whatdo

youhopetoaccomplishbyleaving?”).Like I saidbefore, the secret togaining theupperhand

in a negotiation is giving the other side the illusion ofcontrol. That’s why calibrated questions are ingenious:Calibratedquestionsmakeyourcounterpartfeellikethey’rein charge, but it’s really you who are framing theconversation. Your counterpart will have no idea howconstrainedtheyarebyyourquestions.

OnceIwasnegotiatingwithoneofmyFBIbossesaboutattending a Harvard executive program. He had alreadyapproved the expenditure for the travel, but on the daybeforeIwassupposedto leavehecalledmeintohisofficeandbegantoquestionthevalidityofthetrip.

I knewhimwell enough to know that hewas trying toshow me that he was in charge. So after we talked for awhile, I looked at him and asked, “When you originallyapprovedthistrip,whatdidyouhaveinmind?”

He visibly relaxed as he sat back in his chair andbrought the top of his fingers and thumbs together in theshape of a steeple. Generally this is a body language thatmeansthepersonfeelssuperiorandincharge.

“Listen,” he said, “just make sure you brief everyonewhenyougetback.”

Thatquestion,calibratedtoacknowledgehispowerandnudgehimtowardexplaininghimself,gavehimtheillusionofcontrol.

AnditgotmejustwhatIwanted.

HOWNOTTOGETPAID

Let’s pause for a minute here, because there’s one vitallyimportant thing you have to remember when you enter anegotiation armed with your list of calibrated questions.That is, all of this is great, but there’s a rub: without self-controlandemotionalregulation,itdoesn’twork.

Thevery first thing I talk aboutwhen I’m trainingnewnegotiators is the critical importance of self-control. If youcan’t control your own emotions, how can you expect toinfluencetheemotionsofanotherparty?

ToshowyouwhatImean,letmetellyouastory.Not long ago, a freelance marketing strategist came to

mewithaproblem.OneofherclientshadhiredanewCEO,a penny pincher whose strategy was to cut costs byoffshoring everything he could. He was also a malechauvinist who didn’t like the assertive style in which thestrategist,awoman,conductedherself.

ImmediatelymyclientandtheCEOstartedtogoateachotheronconferencecallsinthatpassive-aggressivewaythatis everpresent in corporateAmerica.After a fewweeksofthis,myclientdecided she’dhad enoughand invoiced theCEOforthelastbitofworkshe’ddone(about$7,000)andpolitely said that the arrangementwasn’tworking out.TheCEOansweredbysayingthebillwastoohigh,thathe’dpayhalfofitandthattheywouldtalkabouttherest.

Afterthat,hestoppedansweringhercalls.The underlying dynamic was that this guy didn’t like

being questioned by anyone, especially a woman. So she

andIdevelopedastrategythatshowedhimsheunderstoodwhereshewentwrongandacknowledgedhispower,whileat the same time directing his energy toward solving herproblem.

The scriptwe cameupwith hit all the best practices ofnegotiationwe’vetalkedaboutsofar.Hereitisbysteps:

1. A “No”-oriented email question to reinitiatecontact: “Have you given up on settling thisamicably?”

2. A statement that leaves only the answer of“That’s right” to form a dynamic of agreement:“Itseemsthatyoufeelmybillisnotjustified.”

3. Calibrated questions about the problem to gethim to reveal his thinking: “How does this billviolateouragreement?”

4. More “No”-oriented questions to removeunspoken barriers: “Are you saying I misledyou?” “Are you saying I didn’t do as youasked?” “Are you saying I reneged on ouragreement?”or“AreyousayingIfailedyou?”

5. Labeling and mirroring the essence of hisanswers if they are not acceptable so he has toconsider themagain:“It seems likeyou feelmywork was subpar.” Or “. . . my work was

subpar?”

6. Acalibratedquestion in reply toanyofferotherthan fullpayment, inorder togethim toofferasolution:“HowamIsupposedtoacceptthat?”

7. If none of this gets an offer of full payment, alabelthatflattershissenseofcontrolandpower:“It seems like you are the type of person whoprides himself on the way he does business—rightfully so—and has a knack for not onlyexpandingthepiebutmakingtheshiprunmoreefficiently.”

8. A long pause and then onemore “No”-orientedquestion:“Doyouwanttobeknownassomeonewhodoesn’tfulfillagreements?”

Frommylongexperienceinnegotiation,scriptslikethishave a 90 percent success rate. That is, if the negotiatorstayscalmandrational.Andthat’sabigif.

Inthiscase,shedidn’t.Thefirststep—themagicemail—workedbetterthanshe

imagined,andtheCEOcalledwithintenminutes,surprisingher.Almostimmediatelyherangerflaredatthesoundofhispatronizingvoice.Heronlydesirebecametoshowhimhowhe was wrong, to impose her will, and the conversationbecameashowdownthatwentnowhere.

Youprobablydon’t needme to tell you that shedidn’t

evengethalf.With that inmind, Iwant toend thischapterwithsome

adviceonhowtoremainrationalinanegotiation.Evenwithall the best techniques and strategy, you need to regulateyouremotionsifyouwanttohaveanyhopeofcomingoutontop.

Thefirstandmostbasicruleofkeepingyouremotionalcoolistobiteyourtongue.Notliterally,ofcourse.Butyouhave to keep away from knee-jerk, passionate reactions.Pause.Think.Let thepassiondissipate.That allowsyou tocollectyourthoughtsandbemorecircumspectinwhatyousay. It also lowers your chance of saying more than youwantto.

The Japanese have this figured out.When negotiatingwith a foreigner, it’s common practice for a Japanesebusinessman to use a translator evenwhen he understandsperfectly what the other side is saying. That’s becausespeaking through a translator forces him to step back. Itgiveshimtimetoframehisresponse.

Anothersimpleruleis,whenyouareverballyassaulted,do not counterattack. Instead, disarm your counterpart byasking a calibrated question. The next time a waiter orsalesclerk tries to engage you in a verbal skirmish, try thisout. I promise you it will change the entire tenor of theconversation.

The basic issue here is that when people feel that theyare not in control, they adopt what psychologists call ahostagementality.Thatis,inmomentsofconflicttheyreact

to their lack of power by either becoming extremelydefensiveorlashingout.

Neurologically, in situations like this the fight-or-flightmechanism in the reptilian brain or the emotions in thelimbicsystemoverwhelm the rationalpartofourmind, theneocortex, leading us to overreact in an impulsive,instinctiveway.

In a negotiation, like in the one betweenmy client andtheCEO, this always produces a negative outcome. Sowehave to train our neocortex to override the emotions fromtheothertwobrains.

That means biting your tongue and learning how tomindfully change your state to something more positive.And it means lowering the hostage mentality in yourcounterpart by asking a question or even offering anapology.(“You’reright.Thatwasabitharsh.”)

Ifyouwereabletotakeanarmedkidnapperwho’dbeensurroundedbypoliceandhookhimuptoacardiacmonitor,you’dfindthateverycalibratedquestionandapologywouldlowerhisheartratejustalittlebit.Andthat’showyougettoadynamicwheresolutionscanbefound.

KEYLESSONS

Whohascontrol inaconversation, theguy listeningor theguytalking?

Thelistener,ofcourse.That’sbecause the talker is revealing informationwhile

thelistener,ifhe’strainedwell,isdirectingtheconversation

toward his own goals. He’s harnessing the talker’s energyforhisownends.

When you try to work the skills from this chapter intoyourdailylife,rememberthatthesearelistener’stools.Theyarenotaboutstrong-armingyouropponentintosubmission.Rather,they’reaboutusingthecounterpart’spowertogettoyourobjective.They’relistener’sjudo.

As you put listener’s judo into practice, remember thefollowingpowerfullessons:

■ Don’t try to force your opponent to admit thatyou are right. Aggressive confrontation is theenemyofconstructivenegotiation.

■ Avoid questions that can be answered with“Yes” or tiny pieces of information. Theserequirelittlethoughtandinspirethehumanneedfor reciprocity; you will be expected to givesomethingback.

■ Askcalibratedquestionsthatstartwiththewords“How”or“What.”Byimplicitlyaskingtheotherparty for help, these questions will give yourcounterpartanillusionofcontrolandwillinspirethem to speak at length, revealing importantinformation.

■ Don’taskquestionsthatstartwith“Why”unlessyouwantyourcounterpart todefendagoal that

serves you. “Why” is always an accusation, inanylanguage.

■ Calibrate your questions to point yourcounterpart toward solving your problem. Thiswill encourage them to expend their energy ondevisingasolution.

■ Bite your tongue. When you’re attacked in anegotiation, pause and avoid angry emotionalreactions. Instead, ask your counterpart acalibratedquestion.

■ There isalwaysa teamon theotherside. Ifyouare not influencing those behind the table, youarevulnerable.

CHAPTER8

GUARANTEEEXECUTION

DuringadangerousandchaoticprisonsiegeinSt.MartinParish, Louisiana, a few years ago, a group of inmatesarmedwithmakeshiftknives took thewardenand someofhisstaffhostage.Thesituationwasespeciallynervybecausetheprisonerswerebothtenseanddisorganized,aworrisomemixthatmeantanythingcouldhappen.

The negotiators sensed that, beneath the bluster, theprisonersdidn’treallywanttohurtthestaff.Theyknewthattheyfeltbackedintoacornerand,morethananything,theywantedthesituationtoend.

Buttherewasastumblingblock:theinmateswereafraidthat the prisoners who gave up after taking correctionalofficershostage,not tomention thewarden,would endupbeaten,andbadly.

So the negotiators delivered a pair of walkie-talkies tothe inmates and designed this elaborate surrender ritual toget the hostage-takers to end the siege. The idea waselegantlysimple:

The inmates would send out one of their guys with awalkie-talkie, and he’d walk past the three perimeters ofcombinedmultiagencylawenforcement thatwerestationed

outside the prison. Once he’d walked past the finalperimeter,he’dgetintothepaddywagonandbetransferredto jail. There, he’d use the walkie-talkie to call the guysback inthe prison and say, essentially, “They didn’t kickmyass.”Andthey’dknowitwasokaytocomeoutjustlikehedid,oneatatime.

After some haggling, the inmates agreed with the planand the first inmatecomesout. It startsoffgreat.Hewalkspast the federal zone, then the SWAT zone, and then hemakes it to the outer perimeter. But just as he’s about toclimb into the paddy wagon, some guy sees the walkie-talkie and says, “What the hell are you doing with that?”andconfiscatesitbeforesendingtheguyofftothejail.

Theinmatesbackintheprisonstarttofreakoutbecausetheir buddy hasn’t called.The one with the other walkie-talkiecallsthenegotiatorsandstartsyelling,“Whydidn’thecall? They’re kicking his ass. We told you!” He startstalking about cutting off a hostage’s finger, just to makesurethenegotiatorsknowtheinmatesareforreal.

Now it’s the negotiators who are freaking out. Theysprint to theperimeterandstart screamingateveryone. It’slifeanddeathatstake.Oratleastanamputatedfinger.

Finally, fifteennail-bitingminutes later, thisSWATguycomes striding up, all proud of himself. “Some idiot gavethis dude a radio,”he says, and sort of smiles as hehandsthenegotiatorsthewalkie-talkie.Thenegotiatorsbarelystopthemselvesfromsluggingtheguybeforetheytearofftothejailtohavethefirstinmatecallin.

Crisisaverted,butbarely.Thepointhereisthatyourjobasanegotiatorisn’tjustto

get to an agreement. It’s getting to one that can beimplemented and making sure that happens. Negotiatorshavetobedecisionarchitects:theyhavetodynamicallyandadaptivelydesign theverbalandnonverbalelementsof thenegotiationtogainbothconsentandexecution.

“Yes”isnothingwithout“How.”Whileanagreementisnice, a contract is better, and a signed check is best.Youdon’tgetyourprofitswiththeagreement.Theycomeuponimplementation. Success isn’t the hostage-taker saying,“Yes,wehaveadeal”; successcomesafterward,when thefreedhostagesaystoyourface,“Thankyou.”

In this chapter, I’ll show how to drive toward andachieveconsent,bothwiththoseatthenegotiatingtableandwith the invisible forces “underneath” it; distinguish truebuy-in from fake acquiescence; and guarantee executionusingtheRuleofThree.

“YES”ISNOTHINGWITHOUT“HOW”

About ayear after theDosPalmas crisis, Iwas teachingatthe FBI Academy in Quantico when the Bureau got anurgent call from the State Department: an American hadbeen kidnapped in the Ecuadoran jungle by a Colombia-based rebel group.As the FBI’s lead international hostagenegotiator, thiswasmybaby, so I put a team together andsetupoperationheadquartersinQuantico.

For a few years, José and his wife, Julie, had been

guidingtourgroupsthroughthejunglenear theColombianborder. Born in Ecuador, José had become an Americancitizenandwasworkingas aparamedic inNewYorkCitywhenheandJuliedecidedtosetupanecotourismbusinessinhisnativecountry.JosélovedtheEcuadoranjungle,andhe’d long dreamed of teaching visitors about themonkeysthatswungthrough the treesand theflowers thatperfumedthetrails.

The business grew as ecotourists fell for the pair’sobvious passion, and onAugust 20, 2003, José and Julietook eleven people on a white-water rafting trip down theMira River.After a great day on the water, everyone wassmilingandsoakedastheypiledintoJeepsandpickupsforthe ride toan inn inanearbyvillage. José told tall talesashedrove the lead truck,Julie tohis rightwith theireleven-month-oldbabyinherlap.

They were five minutes from the inn when three menjumpedintotheroadandaimedgunsatthetruck.Afourthman emerged and held a revolver to Julie’s head as thethugspulledJoséfromthecarandforcedhimintothetruckbed. The kidnappers then ordered the caravan throughseveralsmalltownstoaforkintheroad,wheretheygotoutandwalkedJosépastJulie’sseatinthecab.

“Justremember,”Juliesaid,“nomatterwhathappens,Iloveyou.”

“Don’tworry.I’llbefine,”Joséanswered.Andthenheandhiscaptorsdisappearedintothejungle.

Thecaptorswanted$5million.Wewantedtobuytime.

Ever since the Dos Palmas debacle and the Pittsburghepiphany, I had been raring to employ the lessons we’dlearned about calibrated questions. So when José waskidnapped,IsentmyguysdowntoEcuadorand told themthatwehadanewstrategy.Thekidnappingwouldprovideanopportunitytoprovethisapproach.

“Allwe’regoingtosayis,‘Hey,howdoweknowJoséisokay?HowarewesupposedtopayuntilweknowJoséisokay?’Againandagain,”Itoldthem.

Although they were queasy about untested techniques,my guys were game. The local cops were livid, though,becausetheyalwaysdidproofoflifetheold-fashionedway(which theFBIhad taught them in the first place).LuckilyJulie was with us 100 percent because she saw how thecalibrated questions would stall for time, and she wasconvincedthatwithenoughtimeherhusbandwouldfindawaytogethome.

The day after the kidnapping, the rebels marched Joséinto themountains along theColombianborder and settledinacabinhighinthejungle.ThereJosébuiltarapportwiththekidnappers tomakehimself harder for them tokill.Heimpressedthemwithhisknowledgeof thejungleand,witha black belt in karate, he filled the time by teaching themmartialarts.

MynegotiatorscoachedJulieeverydayaswewaitedforcontactfromtherebels.Welearnedlaterthatthedesignatednegotiator from José’s captors had to walk to town tonegotiatebyphone.

My guys told Julie to answer every one of thekidnappers’ demands with a question. My strategy was tokeepthekidnappersengagedbutoffbalance.

“HowdoIknowJoséisalive?”sheaskedthefirst timetheytalked.

To their demand for $5 million, she said, “We don’thavethatkindofmoney.Howcanweraisethatmuch?”

“How canwe pay you anything until we know José isokay?”Julieaskedthenexttimetheytalked.

Questions,alwaysquestions.

The kidnapper who was negotiating with Julie seemedextremelyperplexedbyherpersistentquestions,andhekeptaskingfor time to think.Thatslowedeverythingdown,buthe never got angry with Julie.Answering questions gavehimtheillusionthathehadcontrolofthenegotiation.

By constantly asking questions and making minusculeoffers,Juliedrovetheransomdownto$16,500.Whentheycametothatnumber,thekidnappersdemandedshegetittothemimmediately.

“How can I do that when I have to sell my cars andtrucks?”sheasked.

Alwaysbuyingmoretime.We were starting to grin because success was within

reach;wewerereallyclosetoaransomthatthefamilycouldafford.

And then I got a phone call in themiddle of the nightfrom one of my deployed guys in Ecuador, Kevin Rust.Kevinisaterrificnegotiatorandthesameguywho’dcalled

to tell me a year earlier that Martin Burnham had beenkilled.MystomachtiedintoaknotwhenIheardhisvoice.

“WejustgotacallfromJosé,”Kevinsaid.“He’sstillinguerrillaterritorybutheescapedandhe’sonabusandhe’smakinghiswayout.”

Ittookmehalfaminutetorespond,andwhenIdidallIcouldsaywas“Holyshit!That’sfantasticnews!”

What had happened,we learned later,was thatwith allthe delays and questions, some of the guerrillas peeled offand didn’t return. Pretty soon therewas only one teenagerguardingJoséatnight.Hesawanopeninglateoneeveningwhen it began to chuck down rain. Pounding on themetalroof,theraindrownedoutallothersoundastheloneguardslept. Knowing the wet leaves outside would absorb thesound of his footsteps, José climbed through the window,randownjunglepathstoadirtroad,andworkedhiswaytoasmalltown.

Two days later he was back with Julie and their baby,justafewdaysbeforehisdaughter’sfirstbirthday.

Julie was right: with enough time he had found a wayhome.

Calibrated “How” questions are a surefire way to keepnegotiations going. They put the pressure on yourcounterpart to come up with answers, and to contemplateyourproblemswhenmakingtheirdemands.

Withenoughoftheright“How”questionsyoucanreadand shape the negotiating environment in such a way thatyou’ll eventually get to the answer youwant to hear.You

just have to have an idea of where you want theconversationtogowhenyou’redevisingyourquestions.

Thetrickto“How”questionsisthat,correctlyused,theyare gentle and graceful ways to say “No” and guide yourcounterpart to develop a better solution—your solution.Agentle How/No invites collaboration and leaves yourcounterpart with a feeling of having been treated withrespect.

Lookback atwhat Julie didwhen theColombian rebelkidnappersmadetheirfirstdemands.

“Howcanweraisethatmuch?”sheasked.Notice thatshedidnotuse theword“No.”Butshestill

managed to elegantly deny the kidnappers’ $5 milliondemand.

As Juliedid, the first andmost common“No”questionyou’ll use is some version of “How am I supposed to dothat?”(forexample,“Howcanweraisethatmuch?”).Yourtone of voice is critical as this phrasecan be delivered aseither an accusation or a request for assistance. So payattentiontoyourvoice.

Thisquestiontendstohavethepositiveeffectofmakingthe other side take a good look at your situation. ThispositivedynamiciswhatIrefertoas“forcedempathy,”andit’s especially effective if leading up to it you’ve alreadybeen empathic with your counterpart. This engages thedynamic of reciprocity to lead them to do something foryou.StartingwithJosé’skidnapping,“HowamI supposedto do that?” became our primary response to a kidnapper

demandingaransom.Andweneverhaditbackfire.Once I was working with an accounting consultant

namedKellywhowasowedapileofmoneybyacorporateclient. She kept consulting because she believed she wasdeveloping a useful contact, and because the promise of afuturepaydayseemedtojustifycontinuingingoodfaith.

ButatacertainpointKellywassofarbehindonherownbills that shewas in abind.She couldn’t continue toworkwith only a vague idea of when she’d get paid, but sheworriedthatifshepushedtoohardshewouldn’tgetpaidatall.

I told her towait until the client asked formorework,becauseifshemadeafirmpaymentdemandrightawayshewouldbevulnerableiftheyrefused.

Luckily for Kelly, the client soon called to ask her formorework.Oncehefinishedhisrequest,shecalmlyaskeda“How”question:

“I’dlovetohelp,”shesaid,“buthowamIsupposedtodothat?”

Byindicatingherwillingnesstoworkbutaskingforhelpfindingawaytodoso,sheleftherdeadbeatcustomerwithnochoicebuttoputherneedsaheadofeverythingelse.

Andshegotpaid.

Besides saying “No,” the other key benefit of asking“How?” is, quite literally, that it forces your counterpart toconsider and explain how adeal will be implemented.Adeal is nothing without good implementation. Poorimplementationisthecancerthateatsyourprofits.

Bymaking your counterparts articulate implementationin their own words, your carefully calibrated “How”questionswill convince them that the final solution istheiridea.Andthat’scrucial.Peoplealwaysmakemoreefforttoimplement a solution when they think it’s theirs. That issimplyhumannature.That’swhynegotiationisoftencalled“theartoflettingsomeoneelsehaveyourway.”

There are two key questions you can ask to push yourcounterparts to think they are defining successtheir way:“How will we know we’re on track?” and “How will weaddress things if we find we’re off track?” When theyanswer,yousummarizetheiranswersuntilyougeta“That’sright.”Thenyou’llknowthey’veboughtin.

On the flip side, bewary of two telling signs that yourcounterpartdoesn’tbelievetheideaistheirs.AsI’venoted,when they say, “You’re right,” it’s often a good indicatorthey are not vested inwhat is being discussed.Andwhenyou push for implementation and they say, “I’ll try,” youshould get a sinking feeling in your stomach.Because thisreallymeans,“Iplantofail.”

When you hear either of these, dive back in withcalibrated “How” questions until they define the terms ofsuccessfulimplementationintheirownvoice.Followupbysummarizingwhattheyhavesaidtogeta“That’sright.”

Lettheothersidefeelvictory.Letthemthinkitwastheiridea. Subsume your ego. Remember: “Yes” is nothingwithout“How.”Sokeepasking“How?”Andsucceed.

INFLUENCINGTHOSEBEHINDTHETABLE

A few weeks after José got back to the United States, Idrovetohisfamily’splaceinupstateNewYork.

I was thrilled when José escaped, but the case left mewithonenaggingworry:Hadmynewstrategyfailed?Yousee, José had gotten home safely, but not because we’dnegotiatedhisrelease.Iworriedthatourwinninghadlesstodowithourbrilliantstrategythanwithdumbluck.

After being greeted warmly by Julie and her parents,José and I grabbed some coffee and sat down. I’d gonethere to do what CNU referred to as a hostage survivaldebriefing. I was after insights into how to better advisepeoplefacingpotentialkidnappingshowbesttosurvive,notjust physically, but psychologically. I was also burning tofind out what had occurred behind the scenes because itseemedasifmynewstrategyhadn’tworked.

Finally the conversation came around to our use ofcalibratedquestions.

“Youknowwhat?”hesaid.“Thecraziestthingwasthattheirnegotiatorwassupposedtostayintownandnegotiatethe deal but because Julie kept asking him questions hedidn’t reallyknowforsurehowtoanswer,hekeptcomingout to the jungle.They all would get together and have ahugediscussion about how to respond.They even thoughtabout taking me into town and putting me on the phonebecause Julie was so persistent with asking how did sheknowifIwasokay.”

Right then I knewwehad the right tool. Itwas exactly

theoppositeoftheBurnhamcase,whereournegotiatorcutthedealwithoneoftheguysandthentherestofthemtookthe$300,000andsaid,“No,we’renotdoingthat.”Causingthe other side to work that hard and forcing that muchinternal coordination in service of our own goals wasunprecedented.

Our negotiating strategy in Ecuador worked not justbecausethequestionscontributedtotheenvironmentthatletJosé escape, but because theymade sure the kidnappers—ourcounterparts—wereallonthesamepage.

Yes,fewhostage-takers—andfewbusinessdealmakers—fly solo. But for the most part, there are almost alwaysother players, peoplewho can act as deal makers or dealkillers. Ifyou trulywant toget to “Yes” andget your dealimplemented, you have to discover how to affect theseindividuals.

When implementation happens by committee, thesupport of that committee is key. You always have toidentify and unearth theirmotivations, even if you haven’tyetidentifiedeachindividualonthatcommittee.Thatcanbeeasy as asking a few calibrated questions, like “How doesthisaffecttherestofyourteam?”or“Howonboardarethepeople not on this call?” or simply “What do yourcolleaguesseeastheirmainchallengesinthisarea?”

The larger concept I’m explaining here is that in anynegotiationyouhavetoanalyzetheentirenegotiationspace.

Whenotherpeoplewillbeaffectedbywhatisnegotiatedandcanassert their rightsorpower lateron, it’s juststupid

to consider only the interests of those at the negotiationtable.Youhave to beware of “behind the table” or “LevelII”players—thatis,partiesthatarenotdirectlyinvolvedbutwho can help implement agreements they like and blockones they don’t. You can’t disregard them even whenyou’re talking to a CEO.There could always be someonewhispering into his ear. At the end of the day, the dealkillersoftenaremoreimportantthanthedealmakers.

Think back to the prison siege: it was almost ruinedbecauseonebitplayeronoursidewasnottotallyonboard.That’s what our use of calibrated questions in Ecuadoravoided,andthat’swhyJosé’scasewasahomerun.

Itonlytakesonebitplayertoscrewupadeal.

A few years into private practice I’d lost sight of theimportance of assessing and influencing the hiddennegotiation that happens “behind the table,” and I paid asubstantialprice.

Wewere closing a dealwith a big company in Floridathat wanted negotiation training for one of its divisions.We’dbeenonthephoneabunchoftimeswiththeCEOandtheheadofHR,andtheywereboth100percentgunghoonouroffering.Wewereelated—wehadwhatwethoughtwastotalbuy-in from the topdecisionmakers for an incrediblylucrativedeal.

And then, as we were figuring out the small print, thedealfelloffthetable.

It turnsout that theheadof thedivisionthatneededthetraining killed the deal. Maybe this guy felt threatened,

slighted, or otherwise somehow personally injured by thenotion that he and his people “needed” any training at all.(A surprisingly high percentage of negotiations hinge onsomething outside dollars and cents, often havingmore todo with self-esteem, status, and other nonfinancial needs.)We’llneverknownow.

The point is, we didn’t care until too late because weconvinced ourselves that we were on the phone with theonlydecisionmakersthatmattered.

We could have avoided all that had we asked a fewcalibrated questions, like: How does this affect everybodyelse?How on board is the rest of your team?How dowemake sure that we deliver the right material to the rightpeople? How do we ensure the managers of those we’retrainingarefullyonboard?

If we had asked questions like that, the CEO and HRhead would have checked with this guy, maybe evenbroughthimintotheconversation.Andsavedusallalotofpain.

SPOTTINGLIARS,DEALINGWITHJERKS,ANDCHARMINGEVERYONEELSE

As a negotiator, you’re going to run into guys who lie toyour face and try to scare you into agreement.Aggressivejerks and serial fabricators come with the territory, anddealingwiththemissomethingyouhavetodo.

But learning how to handle aggression and identifyfalsehoodis justpartofa larger issue: that is, learninghow

tospotandinterpret thesubtletiesofcommunication—bothverbalandnonverbal—thatreveal thementalstatesofyourcounterparts.

Truly effective negotiators are conscious of the verbal,paraverbal (how it’s said), and nonverbal communicationsthat pervade negotiations and group dynamics. And theyknowhowtoemploy thosesubtleties to theirbenefit.Evenchanging a single word when you present options—likeusing “not lose” instead of “keep”—can unconsciouslyinfluencetheconsciouschoicesyourcounterpartmakes.

HereIwanttotalkaboutthetoolsyouneedtoIDliars,disarm jerks, and charm everybody else. Of course, theopen-ended “How” question is one of them—maybe themostimportantone—buttherearemanymore.

Alastair Onglingswan was living in the Philippines when,one evening in 2004, he hailed a taxi and settled in for alongridehomefromManila’sGreenhillsshoppingcenter.

Hedozedoff.Andhewokeupinchains.Unfortunately for Alastair, the cabbie had a second

businessasakidnapper.Hekeptabottleofetherinhisfrontseat, and when a target fell asleep he would drug him,imprisonhim,andaskforransom.

Within hours, the kidnapper used Alastair’s phone tocontact his girlfriend in NewYork. He demanded a dailypayment to “take care” ofAlastairwhile he researched thefamily’swealth.

“It’sokayifyoudon’tpay,”hesaid.“Icanalwayssell

hisorgansinSaudiArabia.”Withintwenty-fourhours,I’dbeenchargedwithheading

thenegotiation fromQuantico.Alastair’sgirlfriendwas toonervoustohandlethefamilysideofthenegotiation,andhismother,who lived in thePhilippines, justwanted to acceptanydemandthekidnappermade.

ButAlastair’sbrotherAaron,inManila,wasdifferent:hejustgottheideaofnegotiationandheacceptedthatAlastairmight die, which would make him a better and moreeffectivenegotiator.AaronandIsetupanalways-onphoneline and I becameAaron’s guru on the other side of theworld.

Throughthekidnapper’scommentsanddemands,Isawthat he was experienced and patient. As a token of hisintentions, he offered to cut off one ofAlastair’s ears andsendittothefamilyalongwithavideoofhimseveringtheear.

Thedemandforthedailypaymentwasclearlyatricktoquickly drain the family of as much money as possiblewhile at the same time gauging their wealth. We had tofigureoutwhothisguywas—Washealoneoperatororpartofagroup?DidheplanonkillingAlastairornot?—andwehad to do that before the familywent broke.To get there,we were going to have to engage the kidnapper in aprotracted negotiation. We were going to have to sloweverythingdown.

From Quantico, I loaded Aaron up with calibratedquestions. I instructed him to keep peppering the violent

jerkwith“How?”HowamIsupposedto. . .?Howdoweknow . . . ? How can we . . . ?There is great power intreating jerkswith deference. It gives you the ability to beextremelyassertive—tosay“No”—inahiddenfashion.

“How do we know if we pay you that you won’t hurtAlastair?”Aaronasked.

In the Chinese martial art of tai chi, the goal is to useyour opponent’s aggressiveness against him—to turn hisoffenseintoyourwaytodefeathim.That’stheapproachwetook with Alastair’s kidnapper: we wanted to absorb histhreats and wear him down. We made sure that evenschedulingacallwithuswascomplex.Wedelayedmakingemailresponses.

Through all these tactics, we gained the upper handwhile giving the kidnapper the illusion of control. Hethought he was solvingAaron’s problems while we werejustreadinghimandwastinghistime.Yousee,it’sbestnottogochintochinwithaggressivenesslikethatofAlastair’skidnapper; rather, default to using “what” and “how”questions to avoid making bids or adjusting your ownnegotiatingposition.Dodgeandweave.

Finally, followingdaysofback-and-forthbargainingonthe daily rate, Aaron got the kidnapper down to a tokenamount andagreed todeposit aportionof the funds inhisbank account.After that partial paymentwasmade,Aaroncame up with the perfect way to nonconfrontationallyconfront the cabbie with a calibrated “When/What”question.

“Whenwerunoutofmoney,whatwillhappen?”Aaronasked.

Thekidnapperpaused.“Itwillbeallright,”hefinallyresponded.Yes!Without realizingwhat he had just agreed to, our killer

hadjustpromisedushewouldn’thurtAlastair.Arepetitiveseries of “What” and “How” questions can help youovercome the aggressive tactics of a manipulativeadversary.

As you can see in that last exchange, the kidnapper’sprotractedchatswithAaronhadturnedAaronalmostintoafriend. Over time the kidnapper had become unguardedaboutspendingtimeonthephonewithhis“friend.”Finally,the Philippine National Police investigators tracked thephone toahouseandraided it.ThekidnapperandAlastairwere not there, but the kidnapper’swifewas. She told thepoliceaboutanotherhousetheyowned.Thepolicequicklyraided the other house, freed Alastair, and arrested thekidnapper.

There are plenty of other tactics, tools, and methods forusingsubtleverbalandnonverbal formsofcommunicationto understand and modify the mental states of yourcounterpart.AsIrunthroughsomeofthemhere,Iwantyoutotakeamomenttointernalizeeachone.Thesearethekindoftoolsthatcanhelpobservantnegotiatorshithomeruns.

THE7-38-55PERCENTRULE

In two famous studies on what makes us like or dislikesomebody,1UCLApsychologyprofessorAlbertMehrabiancreated the 7-38-55 rule. That is, only 7 percent of amessageisbasedonthewordswhile38percentcomesfromthe tone of voice and 55 percent from the speaker’s bodylanguageandface.

While thesefiguresmainlyrelate tosituationswhereweare forming an attitude about somebody, the rulenonetheless offers a useful ratio for negotiators.You see,bodylanguageandtoneofvoice—notwords—areourmostpowerful assessment tools. That’s why I’ll often fly greatdistances to meet someone face-to-face, even when I cansaymuchofwhatneedstobesaidoverthephone.

So how do you use this rule? First, pay very closeattention to tone and body language to make sure theymatchupwiththeliteralmeaningofthewords.Iftheydon’talign, it’squitepossible that thespeaker is lyingorat leastunconvinced.

When someone’s tone of voice or body language doesnotalignwiththemeaningofthewordstheysay,uselabelstodiscoverthesourceoftheincongruence.

Here’sanexample:You:“Sowe’reagreed?”Them:“Yes...”You: “I heard you say, ‘Yes,’ but it seemed like there

washesitationinyourvoice.”

Them:“Oh,it’snothingreally.”You: “No, this is important, let’smake sureweget this

right.”Them:“Thanks,Iappreciateit.”This is the way to make sure your agreement gets

implemented with no surprises.And your counterpart willbe grateful.Your act of recognizing the incongruence andgently dealing with it through a label will make them feelrespected. Consequently, your relationship of trust will beimproved.

THERULEOFTHREE

I’m positive that sometime in your life you’ve beeninvolved in a negotiationwhere you got a “Yes” that laterturnedouttobea“No.”Maybetheotherpartywaslyingtoyou,ormaybe theywere just engaged inwishful thinking.Eitherway,thisisnotanuncommonexperience.

This happens because there are actually three kinds of“Yes”:Commitment,Confirmation,andCounterfeit.

AswediscussedinChapter5,somanypushysalesmantry to trap their clients into the Commitment “Yes” thatmanypeoplegetverygoodattheCounterfeit“Yes.“

OnegreattoolforavoidingthistrapistheRuleofThree.The Rule of Three is simply getting the other guy to

agree to the same thing three times in the sameconversation. It’s tripling thestrengthofwhateverdynamicyou’re trying to drill into at the moment. In doing so, ituncovers problems before they happen. It’s really hard to

repeatedlylieorfakeconviction.WhenI first learned thisskill,mybiggest fearwashow

to avoid sounding like a broken record or coming off asreallypushy.

Theanswer,Ilearned,istovaryyourtactics.The first time they agree to something or give you a

commitment, that’s No. 1. For No. 2 you might label orsummarize what they said so they answer, “That’s right.”AndNo.3couldbeacalibrated“How”or“What”questionabout implementation that asks them to explainwhat willconstitutesuccess,somethinglike“Whatdowedoifwegetofftrack?”

Or the three times might just be the same calibratedquestion phrased three different ways, like “What’s thebiggestchallengeyoufaced?Whatareweupagainsthere?What do you see as being the most difficult thing to getaround?”

Eitherway,goingatthesameissuethreetimesuncoversfalsehoodsaswellastheincongruencesbetweenwordsandbody language we mentioned in the last section. So nexttime you’re not sure your counterpart is truthful andcommitted,tryit.

THEPINOCCHIOEFFECT

With Carlo Collodi’s famous character Pinocchio, it waseasy to tell when he was lying: you just had to watch thenose.

It turns out that Collodi wasn’t far off reality. Mostpeopleofferobvioustelltalesignswhenthey’relying.Notagrowingnose,butcloseenough.

In a study of the components of lying,2 HarvardBusiness School professor Deepak Malhotra and hiscoauthorsfoundthat,onaverage,liarsusemorewordsthantruth tellers and use farmore third-person pronouns.Theystart talking abouthim, her, it, one, they, andtheir ratherthanI, in order to put some distance between themselvesandthelie.

And they discovered that liars tend to speak in morecomplexsentencesinanattempttowinovertheirsuspiciouscounterparts. It’swhatW.C. Fieldsmeantwhen he talkedabout baffling someone with bullshit. The researchersdubbed this the Pinocchio Effect because, just likePinocchio’snose,thenumberofwordsgrewalongwiththelie.Peoplewhoarelyingare,understandably,moreworriedabout beingbelieved, so theyworkharder—toohard, as itwere—atbeingbelievable.

PAYATTENTIONTOTHEIRUSAGEOFPRONOUNS

The use of pronouns by a counterpart can also help giveyou a feel for their actual importance in the decision andimplementation chains on the other side of the table.Themore in love they are with “I,” “me,” and “my” the lessimportanttheyare.

Conversely,theharderitistogetafirstpersonpronoun

out of a negotiator’s mouth, the more important they are.Just like in theMalhotra studywhere the liar is distancinghimselffromthelie,inanegotiation,smartdecisionmakersdon’t want to be cornered at the table into making adecision.Theywilldefer tothepeopleawayfromthetabletokeepfromgettingpinneddown.

Our cabdriver kidnapper in the Philippines of AlastairOnglingswanused “we,” “they,” and “them” so rigorouslyearly on in the kidnapping I was convinced we wereengaged with their leader. I just never knew how literallytrue it was until the rescue. In the ChaseManhattan Bankrobbery from Chapter 2, the bank robber Chris Wattsconsistently talked out how dangerous the “others” wereandhowlittleinfluencehehadonthem,allalie.

THECHRISDISCOUNT

People always talk about remembering and using (but notoverusing) your counterpart’s name in a negotiation.Andthat’simportant.Therealitythoughispeopleareoftentiredof being hammered with their own name. The slicksalesmantryingtodrivethemto“Yes”willhitthemwithitoverandover.

Instead, take a different tack and use your own name.That’showIgettheChrisdiscount.

Just as using Alastair’s name with the kidnapper andgettinghimtouseitbackhumanizedthehostageandmadeit less likely he wouldbe harmed, using your own namecreatesthedynamicof“forcedempathy.”Itmakestheother

sideseeyouasaperson.AfewyearsagoIwasinabarinKansaswithabunchof

fellowFBInegotiators.Thebarwaspacked,but I sawoneemptychair.ImovedtowarditbutjustasIgotreadytosittheguynexttoitsaid,“Don’teventhinkaboutit.”

“Why?” I asked, and he said, “Because I’ll kick yourass.”

He was big, burly, and already drunk, but look, I’m alifelong hostage negotiator—I gravitate toward tensesituationsthatneedmediationlikeamothtotheflame.

Iheldoutmyhand toshakehisandsaid,“Myname isChris.”

The dude froze, and in the pause my fellow FBI guysmoved in,pattedhimon the shoulders, andoffered tobuyhim a drink. Turned out he was a Vietnam veteran at aparticularly low point. He was in a packed bar where theentire world seemed to be celebrating. The only thing hecouldthinkofwastofight.ButassoonasIbecame“Chris,”everythingchanged.

Nowtakethatmindsettoafinancialnegotiation.IwasinanoutletmallafewmonthsaftertheKansasexperienceandI picked out some shirts in one of the stores.At the frontcounter the young lady askedme if I wanted to join theirfrequentbuyerprogram.

I askedher if I got adiscount for joining and she said,“No.”

So I decided to try another angle. I said in a friendlymanner,“MynameisChris.What’stheChrisdiscount?”

She looked from the register,metmy eyes, and gave alittlelaugh.

“I’ll have to ask my manager, Kathy,” she said andturnedtothewomanwho’dbeenstandingnexttoher.

Kathy,who’dheardthewholeexchange,said,“ThebestIcandoistenpercent.”

Humanize yourself. Use your name to introduceyourself. Say it in a fun, friendlyway. Let them enjoy theinteraction,too.Andgetyourownspecialprice.

HOWTOGETYOURCOUNTERPARTSTOBIDAGAINSTTHEMSELVES

LikeyousawAaronandJuliedowiththeirkidnappers,thebestwaytogetyourcounterpartstolowertheirdemandsistosay“No”using“How”questions.Theseindirectwaysofsaying “No” won’t shut down your counterpart the way ablunt, pride-piercing “No” would. In fact, these responseswill sound somuch likecounterbids thatyour counterpartswilloftenkeepbiddingagainstthemselves.

We’ve found that you can usually express “No” fourtimesbeforeactuallysayingtheword.

Thefirststepinthe“No”seriesistheoldstandby:“HowamIsupposedtodothat?”Youhavetodeliveritinadeferentialway,soitbecomes

a request for help. Properly delivered, it invites the othersidetoparticipateinyourdilemmaandsolveitwithabetteroffer.

Afterthat,someversionof“Yourofferisverygenerous,

I’m sorry, that just doesn’t work for me” is an elegantsecondwaytosay“No.”

Thiswell-tested responseavoidsmakingacounteroffer,andtheuseof“generous”nurturesyourcounterpart to liveup to theword.The“I’msorry”also softens the“No”andbuilds empathy. (You can ignore the so-called negotiatingexpertswhosayapologiesarealwayssignsofweakness.)

Then you can use something like “I’m sorry but I’mafraid I just can’t do that.” It’s a littlemore direct, and the“can’t do that” does great double duty. By expressing aninability toperform, it can trigger theother side’s empathytowardyou.

“I’msorry,no”isaslightlymoresuccinctversionforthefourth“No.”Ifdeliveredgently,itbarelysoundsnegativeatall.

Ifyouhavetogofurther,ofcourse,“No”isthelastandmost direct way. Verbally, it should be delivered with adownwardinflectionandatoneofregard; it’snotmeant tobe“NO!”

One ofmy students, a guy named JesusBueno,wrotemenot long ago to tell me an amazing story about how he’dusedthemulti-step“No”tohelphisbrotherJoaquinoutofastickybusinesssituation.

Hisbrotherandtwofriendshadboughtacannabisgrowshop franchise in northern Spain, where the cultivation ofmarijuanaforpersonaluseislegal.Joaquinandhispartner,Bruno,each invested20,000euros in thebusinessfora46percent stake (a minority partner invested another €3,500

for8percent).From the beginning, Joaquin and Bruno had a rocky

relationship. Joaquin isanexcellent salesman,whileBrunowasmoreofabookkeeper.Theminoritypartnerwasalsoanexcellent salesman, and he and Joaquin believed thatgrowingsaleswas thecorrectstrategy.Thatmeantofferingdiscounts for large orders and repeat customers, whichBrunodisagreedwith.Theirplannedspendingonlaunchingawebsite and expanding inventory also rubbed Bruno thewrongway.

Then Bruno’s wife became a problem as she startednagging Joaquin about how he should not spend somuchon expansion and instead take more profits. One day,Joaquinwasreviewinginventorypurchasesandnoticedthatsome items they had ordered had not been placed on thestore’s shelves.Hebegansearching for themonlineand tohis surprise he found an eBay store set upwith thewife’sfirstnamethatwassellingexactlythosemissingproducts.

This started a huge argument between Bruno andJoaquin, and soured their relationship. In the heat of themoment,BrunotoldJoaquinthathewasopentosellinghisshares because he felt the business risks they were takingwere too large. So Joaquin consultedwith his brother:mystudentJesus.

Because they believed that pressure fromBruno’s wifewas why he wanted to sell, Jesus helped Joaquin craft anempathymessagearoundthat:“Itseemslikeyouareundera lot of pressure from yourwife.” Joaquinwas also in the

middleofadivorce,sotheydecidedtousethat torelate tothewife issues, and they prepared an accusation audit—“Iknowyou think I don’t care about costs and takingprofitsfromthecompany”—inordertodiffusethenegativeenergyandgetBrunotalking.

Itworked likeacharm.Bruno immediatelyagreedwiththe accusation audit and began explainingwhy he thoughtJoaquinwas carelesswith spending.Bruno also noted thathe didn’t have someone to bail him out like Joaquin did(Joaquingotastart-uploanfromhismother).JoaquinusedmirrorstokeepBrunotalking,andhedid.

Finally, Joaquin said, “I know how the pressure fromyourwifecanfeel,I’mgoingthroughadivorcemyselfandit really takesa lotoutofyou.”Bruno thenwentona ten-minute rant about his wife and let slip a huge piece ofinformation: thewifewasveryupsetbecause thebank thatlent them the €20,000 had reviewed their loan and hadgiven them two options: repay the loan in full, or pay amuchhigherinterestrate.

Bingo!Joaquin and Jesus huddled after learning that, and

decided that Joaquin could reasonably pay just above theloan price because Bruno had already taken €14,000 insalaryfromthebusiness.TheletterfromthebankputBrunoinabadspot,andJoaquinfiguredhecouldbidlowbecausetherewasn’treallyamarketforBrunotosellhisshares.

Theydecidedthat€23,000wouldbethemagicnumber,with €11,000 up front with the remaining €12,000 over a

yearperiod.Thenthingswentsideways.Instead of waiting for Bruno to name a price, Joaquin

jumped the gun andmade his full offer, tellingBruno thathe thought itwas“very fair.” If there’soneway toputoffyourcounterpart,it’sbyimplyingthatdisagreeingwithyouisunfair.

Whathappenednextprovedthat.Bruno angrily hung up the phone and two days later

Joaquin received an email from a guy saying he’d beenhiredtorepresentBruno.Theywanted€30,812:€20,000fortheloan,€4,000forsalary,€6,230forequity,and€582forinterest.

Nonround figures that seemed unchangeable in theirspecificity.Thisguywasapro.

Jesus told Joaquin that he’d truly screwedup.But theybothknew thatBrunowasprettydesperate to sell. So theydecided touse themulti-step“No”strategy togetBrunotobid against himself.Theworst-case scenario, theydecided,wasthatBrunowouldjustchangehismindaboutsellinghisshares and the status quo would continue. It was a riskthey’dhavetotake.

Theycraftedtheirfirst“No”message:

The price you offered is very fair, and I certainlywish that I could afford it. Bruno has worked veryhard for this business, and he deserves to becompensated appropriately. I am very sorry, butwishyouthebestofluck.

Notice how they made no counteroffer and said “No”withoutusingtheword?

Joaquin was shocked when the following day hereceived an email from the advisor lowering the price to€28,346.

JoaquinandJesusthencraftedtheirsecondgentle“No”:

Thank you for your offer. You were generous toreducetheprice,whichIgreatlyappreciate.Ireallywish that I could pay you this amount, but I amsincere in that I cannot afford this amount at thistime.As you know, I am in themiddle of a divorceand I just cannot come upwith that type ofmoney.Again,Iwishyouthebestofluck.

ThenextdayJoaquinreceivedaone-lineemailfromtheadvisor dropping the price to €25,000. Joaquin wanted totakeitbutJesustoldhimthathehadsome“No”stepstogo.Joaquinfoughthim,butintheendherelented.

There’sacriticallessonthere:Theartofclosingadealisstayingfocused to theveryend.Therearecrucialpointsatthe finale when youmust draw on yourmental discipline.Don’tthinkaboutwhattimethelastflightleaves,orwhatitwould be like to get home early and play golf. Do not letyourmindwander.Remainfocused.

Theywrote:

Thank you again for the generous offer. You havereallycomedownonthepriceandIhavetriedvery

hardtocomeupwiththatamount.Unfortunately,noone is willing to lend me the money, not even mymother. I have tried various avenues but cannotcomeupwiththefunding.Intheend,Icanofferyou€23,567, although I can only pay €15,321.37 upfront.Icouldpayyoutheremainderoveraone-yearperiod,butthatisreallythemostIcando.Iwishyouthebestinyourdecision.

Brilliantuseofspecificnumbers,andwhatanempathy-buildingwaytosay“No”withoutusingtheword!

And itworked.Withinonehour, theadvisor respondedtoaccept.

Look at this closely: see how the mixture of mirroringand open-ended questions dragged out the informationabout Bruno’s financial problems, and then the “No”methodexploitedhisdesperation?Itmightnothavebeenagreatideatousethismethodifthere’dbeenanotherbuyer,butwith no one else itwas a brilliantway to getBruno tobidagainsthimself.

KEYLESSONS

Superstar negotiators—real rainmakers—know that anegotiation is a playing field beneath the words, wherereally getting to a good deal involves detecting andmanipulating subtle, nonobvious signalsbeneath thesurface. It is only by visualizing and modifying thesesubsurface issues that you can craft a great deal andmake

surethatitisimplemented.As you put the following tools to use, remember this

chapter’smost importantconcept.That is,“Yes”isnothingwithout “How.” Asking “How,” knowing “How,” anddefining “How” are all part of the effective negotiator’sarsenal.Hewouldbeunarmedwithoutthem.

■ Ask calibrated “How” questions, and ask themagain and again. Asking “How” keeps yourcounterpartsengagedbutoffbalance.Answeringthe questions will give them the illusion ofcontrol. It will also lead them to contemplateyourproblemswhenmakingtheirdemands.

■ Use “How” questions to shape the negotiatingenvironment.You do this by using “How can Ido that?” as a gentle version of “No.”Thiswillsubtlypushyour counterpart to search forothersolutions—yoursolutions.Andveryoften itwillgetthemtobidagainstthemselves.

■ Don’t just pay attention to the people you’renegotiating with directly; always identify themotivations of the players “behind the table.”Youcando sobyaskinghowadealwill affecteverybodyelseandhowonboardtheyare.

■ Followthe7-38-55PercentRulebypayingcloseattention to tone of voice and body language.

Incongruencebetween thewords andnonverbalsignswillshowwhenyourcounterpartislyingoruncomfortablewithadeal.

■ Is the “Yes” realor counterfeit?Test itwith theRule of Three: use calibrated questions,summaries,andlabels togetyourcounterpart toreaffirm their agreement at least three times. It’sreallyhardtorepeatedlylieorfakeconviction.

■ Aperson’suseofpronounsoffersdeep insightsinto his or her relative authority. If you’rehearing a lot of “I,” “me,” and “my,” the realpowertodecideprobablylieselsewhere.Pickingup a lot of “we,” “they,” and “them,” it’smorelikely you’re dealing directly with a savvydecisionmakerkeepinghisoptionsopen.

■ Use your own name to make yourself a realperson to the other side and evenget your ownpersonal discount.Humor and humanity are thebest ways to break the ice and removeroadblocks.

CHAPTER9

BARGAINHARD

AfewyearsagoIfellinlovewitharedToyota4Runner.Actually not just “red,” but “Salsa Red Pearl.” Kind of asmoldering red that seemed to glow at night.How sexy isthat?Ijusthadtohaveit;gettingonebecamemyobsession.

IsearchedthedealersinmetropolitanWashington,D.C.,and I quickly realized that Iwasn’t the only one obsessedwithgettingthattruck:thereweren’tanyinthatcolorintheentirearea,noneatall,saveatonedealer.

You know how they tell you not to shop for grocerieswhen you’re hungry?Well, I was hungry. Very hungry.Actually,Iwasinlove....Isatdown,centeredmyself,andstrategized. This lot was my only shot. I had to make itcount

Idrove to thedealerona sunnyFridayafternoon. I satdownacross from the salesman,aniceenoughguynamedStan,andtoldhimhowgorgeousthevehiclewas.

Heofferedmetheusualsmile—hehadme,hethought—andmentioned thestickerpriceon“thatbeautifulvehicle”:$36,000.

I gave him an understanding nod and pursed my lips.Thekeytobeginningahaggleistorattletheotherguyever

so gently.You do it in the nicest way possible. If I couldthreadthatneedle,Ihadagoodchanceatgettingmyprice.

“Icanpay$30,000,”Isaid.“AndIcanpayitupfront,all cash. I’ll write a check today for the full amount. I’msorry,I’mafraidIjustcan’tpayanymore.”

His smile flickered a little bit at the edges, as if itwerelosingfocus.Buthetighteneditdownandshookhishead.

“I’m sure you can understand we can’t do that. Thestickerpriceis$36,000,afterall.”

“HowamIsupposedtodothat?”Iaskeddeferentially.“I’m sure,” he said, then paused as if he wasn’t sure

whathe’dmeanttosay.“I’msurewecanfiguresomethingoutwithfinancingthe$36,000.”

“It’s a beautiful truck. Really amazing. I can’t tell youhowmuchI’dlovetohaveit.It’sworthmorethanwhatI’moffering. I’m sorry, this is really embarrassing. I just can’tdothatprice.”

Hestaredatme insilence,a littlebefuddlednow.Thenhe stood and went into the back for what seemed like aneternity. He was gone so long that I remember saying tomyself, “Damn! I should have come in lower! They’regoing to comeall thewaydown.”Any response that’snotanoutrightrejectionofyouroffermeansyouhavetheedge.

He returned and told me like it was Christmas that hisbosshadokayedanewprice:$34,000.

“Wow,yourofferisverygenerousandthisisthecarofmy dreams,” I said. “I reallywish I could do that. I reallydo.Thisissoembarrassing.Isimplycan’t.”

Hedropped into silence and I didn’t take the bait. I letthesilencelinger.Andthenwithasighhetrudgedoffagain.

Hereturnedafteranothereternity.“Youwin,”hesaid.“Mymanagerokayed$32,500.”Hepushedapaperacrossthedeskthatevensaid“YOU

WIN” inbig letters.Thewordswereeven surroundedwithsmileyfaces.

“I am so grateful. You’ve been very generous, and Ican’t thankyouenough.The truck isnodoubtworthmorethanmyprice,”Isaid.“I’msorry,Ijustcan’tdothat.”

Uphestoodagain.Nosmilenow.Stillbefuddled.Afterafewseconds,hewalkedbacktohismanagerandIleanedback. Icould tastevictory.Aminute later—noeternity thistime—hereturnedandsat.

“Wecandothat,”hesaid.Twodayslater,IdroveoffinmySalsaRedPearlToyota

4Runner—for$30,000.GodIlovethattruck.Stilldriveittoday.

Mostnegotiationshitthatinevitablepointwheretheslightlyloose and informal interplay between two people turns toconfrontation and the proverbial “brass tacks.”You knowthe moment: you’ve mirrored and labeled your way to adegree of rapport; an accusation audit has cleared anylingering mental or emotional obstacles, and you’veidentified and summarized the interests and positions atstake,elicitinga“That’sright,”and...

Nowit’stimetobargain.Here it is: theclash forcash,anuneasydanceofoffers

andcountersthatsendmostpeopleintoacoldsweat.Ifyoucountyourselfamongthatmajority,regardingtheinevitablemoment as nothing more than a necessary evil, there’s agoodchanceyouregularlygetyourclockcleanedbythosewhohavelearnedtoembraceit.

No part of a negotiation induces more anxiety andunfocusedaggressionthanbargaining,whichiswhyit’sthepart that is more often fumbled and mishandled than anyother. It’s simply not a comfortable dynamic for mostpeople.Evenwhenwehave thebest-laidplans, a lotofuswimpoutwhenwegettothemomentofexchangingprices.

Inthischapter,I’mgoingtoexplainthetacticsthatmakeup the bargaining process, and look at how psychologicaldynamicsdeterminewhich tactics shouldbeusedandhowtheyshouldbeimplemented.

Now,bargainingisnotrocketscience,butit’snotsimpleintuitionormathematics, either.Tobargainwell, youneedto shed your assumptions about the haggling process andlearn to recognize the subtle psychological strategies thatplayvitalrolesatthebargainingtable.Skilledbargainersseemore than just opening offers, counteroffers, and closingmoves.They see thepsychological currents that runbelowthesurface.

Onceyou’velearnedtoidentifythesecurrents,you’llbeable to “read” bargaining situations more accurately andconfidently answer the tactical questions that dog even thebestnegotiators.

You’llbereadyfor the“bare-knucklebargaining.”And

they’llneverseeitcoming.

WHATTYPEAREYOU?

A few years ago I was on my boat with one of myemployees, a great guynamedKeenon; Iwas supposed tobegivinghimapeptalkandperformancereview.

“When I think of what we do, I describe it as‘uncoveringtheriptide,’”Isaid.

“Uncoveringtheriptide,”Keenonsaid.“Yes, theideais thatwe—youandIandeveryonehere

—havetheskillstoidentifythepsychologicalforcesthatarepullingusawayfromshoreandusethemtogetsomewheremoreproductive.”

“Somewheremoreproductive,”Keenonsaid.“Exactly,”Isaid.“Toaplacewherewecan...”Wehadtalkedforaboutforty-fiveminuteswhenmyson

Brandon,who runs operations forTheBlackSwanGroup,brokeoutlaughing.

“I can’t take it anymore! Don’t you see? Really, Dad,don’tyousee?”

Iblinked.DidIseewhat?Iaskedhim.“All Keenon is doing is mirroring you.And he’s been

doingitforalmostanhour.”“Oh,” I said, my face going red as Keenon began to

laugh.Hewas totally right.Keenonhadbeenplayingwithme

theentiretime,usingthepsychologicaltoolthatworksmosteffectivelywithassertiveguyslikeme:themirror.

Your personal negotiation style—and that of yourcounterpart—is formed through childhood, schooling,family,culture,andamillionotherfactors;byrecognizingityoucanidentifyyournegotiatingstrengthsandweaknesses(andthoseofyourcounterpart)andadjustyourmindsetandstrategiesaccordingly.

Negotiation style is a crucial variable in bargaining. Ifyoudon’tknowwhat instinctwill tellyouor theothersidetodoinvariouscircumstances,you’llhavemassivetroublegaming out effective strategies and tactics.You and yourcounterparthavehabitsofmindandbehavior,andonceyouidentifythemyoucanleveragetheminastrategicmanner.

JustlikeKeenondid.There’s an entire library unto itself of research into the

archetypesandbehavioralprofilesofallthepossiblepeopleyou’re bound to meet at the negotiating table. It’s flat-outoverwhelming, somuch so that it loses its utility.Over thelastfewyears,inaneffortprimarilyledbymysonBrandon,we’ve consolidated and simplified all that research, cross-referencingitwithourexperiencesinthefieldandthecasestudies of our business school students, and found thatpeople fall into three broad categories. Some people areAccommodators; others—like me—are basicallyAssertive;andtherestaredata-lovingAnalysts.

Hollywoodnegotiation scenes suggest that anAssertivestyle is required for effective bargaining, but each of thestyles can be effective.And to truly be effective you needelementsfromallthree.

AstudyofAmerican lawyer-negotiators 1 found that 65percent of attorneys from two major U.S. cities used acooperativestylewhileonly24percentweretrulyassertive.And when these lawyers weregraded for effectiveness,more than75percentof theeffectivegroupcamefromthecooperative type; only 12 percent were Assertive. So ifyou’re not Assertive, don’t despair. Blunt assertion isactuallycounterproductivemostofthetime.

And remember, your personal negotiating style is not astraitjacket.Nooneisexclusivelyonestyle.Mostofushavethecapacitytothrottleupournondominantstylesshouldthesituation call for it. But there is one basic truth about asuccessfulbargaining style:Tobegood,youhave to learntobeyourselfatthebargainingtable.Tobegreatyouhavetoaddtoyourstrengths,notreplacethem.

Here’saquickguidetoclassifyingthetypeofnegotiatoryou’refacingandthetacticsthatwillbemostfittingforyou.

ANALYSTAnalystsaremethodicalanddiligent.Theyarenot inabigrush. Instead, theybelieve thatas longas theyareworkingtoward the best result in a thorough and systematic way,time is of little consequence.Their self-image is linked tominimizingmistakes.Theirmotto:Asmuchtimeasit takestogetitright.

Classic analysts prefer towork on their own and rarelydeviate from their goals. They rarely show emotion, andthey often use what is very close to the FM DJ Voice I

talked about in Chapter 3, slow and measured with adownward inflection. However,Analysts often speak in away that is distant and cold instead of soothing.This putspeopleoffwithoutthemknowingitandactuallylimitsthemfromputtingtheircounterpartateaseandopeningthemup.

Analystspride themselvesonnotmissinganydetails intheir extensive preparation. They will research for twoweekstogetdatatheymighthavegotteninfifteenminutesat the negotiating table, just to keep from being surprised.Analystshatesurprises.

They are reserved problem solvers, and informationaggregators,andarehypersensitivetoreciprocity.Theywillgive you a piece, but ifthey don’t get a piece in returnwithin a certain period of time, they lose trust and willdisengage.Thiscanoftenseemtocomeoutofnowhere,butremember, since they likeworkingon thingsalone the factthattheyaretalkingtoyouatallis,fromtheirperspective,aconcession. They will often view concessions by theircounterpartasanewpieceof information tobe takenbackand evaluated. Don’t expect immediate counterproposalsfromthem.

People like this are skeptical by nature. So asking toomany questions to start is a bad idea, because they’re notgoing to want to answer until they understand all theimplications.With them, it’svital tobeprepared.Usecleardatatodriveyourreason;don’tad-lib;usedatacomparisonsto disagree and focus on the facts; warn them of issuesearly;andavoidsurprises.

Silence to them is an opportunity to think.They’re notmadat you and they’renot trying togiveyou a chance totalkmore.Ifyoufeeltheydon’tseethingsthewayyoudo,givethemachancetothinkfirst.

Apologies have little value to them since they see thenegotiation and their relationship with you as a personlargely as separate things.They respond fairly well in themoment to labels.They are not quick to answer calibratedquestions, or closed-ended questions when the answer is“Yes.”Theymayneedafewdaystorespond.

Ifyou’reananalystyoushouldbeworriedaboutcuttingyourself off from an essential source of data, yourcounterpart.Thesinglebiggestthingyoucandoistosmilewhen you speak. People will be more forthcoming withinformation to you as a result. Smiling can also become ahabit that makes it easy for you to mask any momentsyou’vebeencaughtoffguard.

ACCOMMODATORThe most important thing to this type of negotiator is thetime spent building the relationship.Accommodators thinkas long as there is a free-flowing continuous exchange ofinformation time isbeing well spent. As long as they’recommunicating, they’rehappy.Theirgoal is tobeongreattermswiththeircounterpart.Theylovethewin-win.

Of the three types, they are most likely to build greatrapportwithoutactuallyaccomplishinganything.

Accommodators want to remain friends with theircounterparteveniftheycan’treachanagreement.Theyare

very easy to talk to, extremely friendly, and have pleasantvoices.Theywillyieldaconcessiontoappeaseoracquiesceandhopetheothersidereciprocates.

If your counterparts are sociable, peace-seeking,optimistic, distractible, and poor time managers, they’reprobablyAccommodators.

If they’re your counterpart, be sociable and friendly.Listen to them talk about their ideas and use calibratedquestions focused specifically on implementation to nudgethemalongandfindways to translate their talk intoaction.Due to their tendency to be the first to activate thereciprocity cycle, they may have agreed to give yousomethingtheycan’tactuallydeliver.

Theirapproachtopreparationcanbelackingastheyaremuch more focused on the person behind the table.Theywant toget toknowyou.Theyhavea tremendouspassionfor the spirit of negotiation and what it takes not only tomanageemotionsbutalsotosatisfythem.

WhileitisveryeasytodisagreewithanAccommodator,becausetheywantnothingmorethattohearwhatyouhaveto say, uncovering their objections can be difficult. Theywillhaveidentifiedpotentialproblemareasbeforehandandwillleavethoseareasunaddressedoutoffearoftheconflicttheymaycause.

If you have identified yourself as an Accommodator,stick toyour ability tobevery likable, butdonot sacrificeyour objections. Not only do the other two types need tohear your point of view; if you are dealing with another

Accommodator theywillwelcome it.Alsobe consciousofexcesschitchat:theothertwotypeshavenouseforit,andifyou’re sitting across the table from someone like yourselfyouwillbepronetointeractionswherenothinggetsdone.

ASSERTIVETheAssertive type believes time is money; every wastedminuteisawasteddollar.Theirself-imageislinkedtohowmanythingstheycangetaccomplishedinaperiodoftime.For them, getting the solution perfect isn’t as important asgettingitdone.

Assertives are fierypeoplewho lovewinning above allelse, often at the expense of others. Their colleagues andcounterparts neverquestionwhere they standbecause theyare always direct and candid. They have an aggressivecommunication style and they don’t worry about futureinteractions.Theirviewofbusinessrelationshipsisbasedonrespect,nothingmoreandnothingless.

Most of all, theAssertive wants to be heard.And notonlydotheywanttobeheard,buttheydon’tactuallyhavetheabilitytolistentoyouuntiltheyknowthatyou’veheardthem. They focus on their own goals rather than people.Andtheytellratherthanask.

When you’re dealing withAssertive types, it’s best tofocus on what they have to say, because once they areconvinced you understand them, then and only then willtheylistenforyourpointofview.

ToanAssertive,everysilenceisanopportunitytospeakmore. Mirrors are a wonderful tool with this type. So are

calibrated questions, labels, and summaries. The mostimportant thing to get from anAssertive will be a “that’sright” thatmaycome in the formofa“that’s itexactly”or“youhititonthehead.”

Whenitcomestoreciprocity,thistypeisofthe“giveaninch/take a mile” mentality. They will have figured theydeserve whatever you have given them so they will beoblivious to expectations of owing something in return.Theywillactuallysimplybe looking for theopportunity toreceivemore. If theyhavegiven somekindofconcession,they are surely counting the seconds until they getsomethinginreturn.

IfyouareanAssertive,beparticularlyconsciousofyourtone.You will not intend to be overly harsh but you willoftencomeoff thatway.Intentionallysoftenyourtoneandworktomakeitmorepleasant.Usecalibratedquestionsandlabels with your counterpart since that will alsomake youmore approachable and increase the chances forcollaboration.

We’veseenhoweachofthesegroupsviewstheimportanceof time differently (time = preparation; time = relationship;time = money). They also have completely differentinterpretationsofsilence.

I’m definitely an Assertive, and at a conference thisAccommodator type told me that he blew up a deal. Ithought, What did you do, scream at the other guy andleave?Becausethat’smeblowingupadeal.

But it turned out that he went silent; for an

Accommodatortype,silenceisanger.ForAnalysts, though,silencemeans theywant to think.

And Assertive types interpret your silence as either youdon’t have anything to say or you want them to talk. I’mone,soIknow:theonlytimeI’msilentiswhenI’verunoutofthingstosay.

The funny thing is when these cross over. When anAnalyst pauses to think, their Accommodator counterpartgets nervous and an Assertive one starts talking, therebyannoyingtheAnalyst,whothinkstoherself,EverytimeItryto thinkyoutake thatasanopportunity to talksomemore.Won’tyouevershutup?

Beforewemoveon Iwant to talk aboutwhypeople oftenfailtoidentifytheircounterpart’sstyle.

Thegreatest obstacle to accurately identifying someoneelse’sstyleiswhatIcallthe“Iamnormal”paradox.Thatis,our hypothesis that the world should look to others as itlookstous.Afterall,whowouldn’tmakethatassumption?

Butwhile innocentandunderstandable, thinkingyou’renormal is one of the most damaging assumptions innegotiations. With it, we unconsciously project our ownstyleontheotherside.Butwiththreetypesofnegotiatorsintheworld,there’sa66percentchanceyourcounterparthasadifferentstylethanyours.Adifferent“normal.”

ACEOoncetoldmeheexpectednineoftennegotiationstofail. This CEO was likely projecting his beliefs onto theother side. In reality, he probably only matched with

someonelike-mindedoneoftentimes.Ifheunderstoodthathis counterpart was different from him, he would mostsurelyhaveincreasedhissuccessrate.

From the way they prepare to the way they engage indialogue,thethreetypesnegotiatedifferently.Sobeforeyoucan even think about bargaining effectively, you have tounderstand your counterpart’s “normal.” You have toidentify their type by opening yourself to their difference.Becausewhen it comes to negotiating, theGolden Rule iswrong.

The Black Swan rule is don’t treat others the way youwant to be treated; treat them the way they need to betreated.

(I’ve got a complementary PDF available thatwill helpyouidentifyyourtypeandthatofthosearoundyou.Pleasevisithttp://info.blackswanltd.com/3-types.)

TAKINGAPUNCH

Negotiation academics like to treat bargaining as a rationalprocess devoidof emotion.They talk about theZOPA—orZone of Possible Agreement—which is where the seller’sandbuyer’szonescross.SayTonywantstosellhiscarandwon’ttakelessthan$5,000andSamanthawantstobuybutwon’tpaymore than$6,000.TheZOPAruns from$5,000to$6,000.SomedealshaveZOPAsandsomedon’t.It’sallveryrational.

Orsothey’dhaveyouthink.You need to disabuse yourself of that notion. In a real

bargaining session, kick-ass negotiators don’t use ZOPA.Experienced negotiators often lead with a ridiculous offer,anextremeanchor.Andifyou’renotpreparedtohandleit,you’ll lose your moorings and immediately go to yourmaximum. It’s human nature. Like the great ear-bitingpugilistMikeTysononcesaid,“Everybodyhasaplanuntiltheygetpunchedinthemouth.”

As a well-prepared negotiator who seeks informationandgathersitrelentlessly,you’reactuallygoingtowanttheotherguytonameapricefirst,becauseyouwanttoseehishand. You’re going to welcome the extreme anchor. Butextreme anchoring is powerful and you’re human: youremotionsmaywellup.Iftheydotherearewaystoweatherthe storm without bidding against yourself or respondingwithanger.Onceyoulearnthesetactics,you’llbepreparedtowithstandthehitandcounterwithpanache.

First, deflect the punch in a way that opens up yourcounterpart.Successfulnegotiatorsoftensay“No”inoneofthemanywayswe’vetalkedabout(“HowamIsupposedtoaccept that?”) or deflect the anchor with questions like“What are we trying to accomplish here?” Responses likethesearegreatways to refocusyourcounterpartwhenyoufeelyou’rebeingpulledintothecompromisetrap.

Youcanalso respond to apunch-in-the-faceanchorbysimplypivoting to terms.What Imeanby this is thatwhenyoufeelyou’rebeingdraggedintoahaggleyoucandetourthe conversation to the nonmonetary issues thatmake anyfinalpricework.

You can do this directly by saying, in an encouragingtoneofvoice,“Let’sputpriceoff to thesideforamomentandtalkaboutwhatwouldmakethisagooddeal.”Oryoucouldgoat itmoreobliquelybyasking,“Whatelsewouldyoubeabletooffertomakethatagoodpriceforme?”

Andiftheothersidepushesyoutogofirst,wrigglefromhis grip. Instead of naming a price, allude to an incrediblyhighnumberthatsomeoneelsemightcharge.Oncewhenahospitalchainwantedmetonameapricefirst,Isaid,“Well,if you go to Harvard Business School, they’re going tochargeyou$2,500adayperstudent.”

Nomatterwhathappens, thepointhere is tospongeupinformationfromyourcounterpart.Lettingyourcounterpartanchorfirstwillgiveyouatremendousfeelforhim.Allyouneedtolearnishowtotakethefirstpunch.

One of my Georgetown MBA students, a guy namedFarouq, showedhownot to foldafterbeingpunchedwhenhe went to hit up the MBA dean for funds to hold a bigalumnieventinDubai.Itwasadesperatesituation,becauseheneeded$600andshewashislaststop.

Atthemeeting,FarouqtoldthedeanabouthowexcitedthestudentswereaboutthetripandhowbeneficialitwouldbefortheGeorgetownMBAbrandintheregion.

Beforehecouldevenfinish,thedeanjumpedin.“Sounds like a great trip you guys are planning,” she

said.“ButmoneyistightandIcouldauthorizenomorethan$300.”

Farouq hadn’t expected the dean to go so quickly.But

thingsdon’talwaysgoaccordingtoplan.“Thatisaverygenerousoffergivenyourbudgetlimits,

but I am not sure how that would help us achieve a greatreception for the alums in the region,” Farouq said,acknowledging her limits but saying no without using theword.Thenhedroppedanextremeanchor. “Ihaveaveryhighamountinmyhead:$1,000iswhatweneed.”

As expected, the extreme anchor quickly knocked thedeanoffherlimit.

“That isseverelyoutofmyrangeandIamsureIcan’tauthorizethat.However,Iwillgiveyou$500.”

Farouq was half-tempted to fold—being $100 shortwasn’t make-or-break—but he remembered the curse ofaiminglow.Hedecidedtopushforward.

The$500gothimcloser tothegoalbutnotquite there,hesaid;$850wouldwork.

Thedean repliedby saying that shewasalreadygivingmore than what she wanted and $500 was reasonable.Atthispoint, ifFarouqhadbeen lesspreparedhewouldhavegivenup,buthewasreadyforthepunches.

“I think your offer is very reasonable and I understandyour restrictions, but I needmoremoney to put on a greatshowfortheschool,”hesaid.“Howabout$775?”

Thedeansmiled,andFarouqknewhehadher.“Youseemtohaveaspecificnumber inyourhead that

youaretryingtogetto,”shesaid.“Justtellittome.”At thatpointFarouqwashappy togiveherhisnumber

ashefeltshewassincere.

“Ineed$737.50tomakethisworkandyouaremylaststop,”hesaid.

Shelaughed.Thedeanthenpraisedhimforknowingwhathewanted

andsaidshe’dcheckherbudget.Twodayslater,Farouqgotanemailsayingherofficewouldputin$750.

PUNCHINGBACK:USINGASSERTIONWITHOUTGETTINGUSEDBYIT

When a negotiation is far from resolution and goingnowhere fast, you need to shake things up and get yourcounterpart out of their rigid mindset. In times like this,strongmovescanbeenormouslyeffectivetools.Sometimesa situation simply calls for you to be the aggressor andpunchtheothersideintheface.

Thatsaid, ifyouarebasicallyaniceperson, itwillbearealstretchtohit theotherguylikeMikeTyson.Youcan’tbewhat you’re not.AstheDanish folk sayinggoes, “Youbakewith theflouryouhave.”Butanyonecan learnafewtools.

Hereareeffectivewaystoassertsmartly:

REAL ANGER, THREATSWITHOUT ANGER, ANDSTRATEGICUMBRAGEMarwan Sinaceur of INSEAD and Stanford University’sLarissaTiedens found that expressions of anger increase anegotiator’s advantage and final take.2 Anger shows

passionandconvictionthatcanhelpswaytheothersidetoaccept less. However, by heightening your counterpart’ssensitivity to danger and fear, your anger reduces theresourcestheyhaveforothercognitiveactivity,settingthemup to make bad concessions that will likely lead toimplementationproblems,thusreducingyourgains.

Also beware: researchers have also found thatdisingenuous expressions of unfelt anger—you know,faking it—backfire, leading to intractable demands anddestroying trust.Foranger tobeeffective, ithas tobe real,the key for it is to be under control because anger alsoreducesourcognitiveability.

And sowhen someone puts out a ridiculous offer, onethat really pisses you off, take a deep breath, allow littleanger,andchannelit—attheproposal,nottheperson—andsay,“Idon’tseehowthatwouldeverwork.”

Such well-timed offense-taking—known as “strategicumbrage”—can wake your counterpart to the problem. InstudiesbyColumbiaUniversityacademicsDanielAmesandAbbieWazlawek, people on the receiving end of strategicumbrage were more likely to rate themselves asoverassertive, even when the counterpart didn’t think so.3The real lesson here is being aware of how this might beused onyou. Please don’t allow yourself to fall victim to“strategicumbrage.”

Threats delivered without anger but with “poise”—thatis, confidence and self-control—are great tools. Saying,“I’msorrythatjustdoesn’tworkforme,”withpoise,works.

“WHY”QUESTIONSBackinChapter7,Italkedabouttheproblemswith“Why?”Acrossourplanetandaround theuniverse,“Why?”makespeopledefensive.

As an experiment, the next time your boss wantssomething done ask him or her “Why?” and watch whathappens.Thentryitwithapeer,asubordinate,andafriend.Observe their reactions and tellme if you don’t find somelevelofdefensivenessacrossthespectrum.Don’tdothistoomuch,though,oryou’llloseyourjobandallyourfriends.

The only time I say, “Why did you do that?” in anegotiation iswhen Iwant toknocksomeoneback. It’saniffytechnique,though,andIwouldn’tadvocateit.

There is, however, another way to use “Why?”effectively. The idea is to employ the defensiveness thequestion triggers to get your counterpart to defend yourposition.

I know it soundsweird, but itworks.The basic formatgoeslikethis:Whenyouwanttoflipadubiouscounterparttoyourside,askthem,“Whywouldyoudothat?”butinaway that the “that” favors you. Letme explain. If you areworkingtolureaclientawayfromacompetitor,youmightsay, “Why would you ever do business with me? Whywould you ever change from your existing supplier?They’regreat!”

Inthesequestions, the“Why?”coaxesyourcounterpartintoworkingforyou.

“I”MESSAGES

Usingthefirst-personsingularpronounisanothergreatwaytosetaboundarywithoutescalatingintoconfrontation.

When you say, “I’m sorry, that doesn’t work for me,”the word “I” strategically focuses your counterpart’sattentionontoyoulongenoughforyoutomakeapoint.

Thetraditional“I”messageistouse“I”tohitthepausebutton and step out of a bad dynamic.When youwant tocounteract unproductive statements from your counterpart,youcansay,“I feel___whenyou___because___,”andthatdemandsatime-outfromtheotherperson.

Butbecarefulwiththebig“I”:Youhavetobemindfulnot tousea tone that isaggressiveorcreatesanargument.It’sgottobecoolandlevel.

NO NEEDINESS: HAVING THE READY-TO-WALKMINDSETWe’vesaidpreviouslythatnodealisbetterthanabaddeal.If you feel you can’t say “No” then you’ve taken yourselfhostage.

Onceyou’reclearonwhatyourbottomlineis,youhavetobewillingtowalkaway.Neverbeneedyforadeal.

Beforewemoveon,Iwanttoemphasizehowimportantitisto maintain a collaborative relationship even when you’resettingboundaries.Yourresponsemustalwaysbeexpressedintheformofstrong,yetempathic,limit-settingboundaries—that is,toughlove—notashatredorviolence.Angerandother strong emotions can on rare occasions be effective.Butonlyascalculatedacts,neverapersonalattack. Inany

bare-knucklebargainingsession, themostvitalprinciple tokeep in mind is never to look at your counterpart as anenemy.

The person across the table is never the problem.Theunsolved issue is.So focuson the issue.This isoneof themost basic tactics for avoiding emotional escalations. Ourculture demonizes people in movies and politics, whichcreates the mentality that if we only got rid of the persontheneverythingwouldbeokay.Butthisdynamicistoxictoanynegotiation.

Punching back is a last resort. Before you go there, Ialways suggest an attempt at de-escalating the situation.Suggest a time-out.When your counterparts step back andtakeabreath,they’llnolongerfeelthattheyarehostagetoabad situation.They’ll regain a senseof agencyandpower.Andthey’llappreciateyouforthat.

Thinkofpunchingbackandboundary-setting tacticsasa flattened S-curve: you’ve accelerated up the slope of anegotiationandhitaplateauthatrequiresyoutotemporarilystopanyprogress,escalateorde-escalatetheissueactingastheobstacle,andeventuallybringtherelationshipbacktoastateofrapportandgetbackontheslope.Takingapositive,constructive approach to conflict involves understandingthatthebondisfundamentaltoanyresolution.Nevercreateanenemy.

ACKERMANBARGAINING

I’vespentalotoftimetalkingaboutthepsychologicaljudo

that I’vemademy stock in trade: the calibrated questions,the mirrors, the tools for knocking my counterpart off hisgameandgettinghimtobidagainsthimself.

But negotiation still comes down to determining whogets which slice of the pie, and from time to time you’regoing to be forced into some real bare-knuckle bargainingwithahard-asshaggler.

I faced bare-knuckle bargaining all the time in thehostage world. I haggled with a lot of guys who stuck totheirgameplanandwereusedtogettingtheirway.“Payorwe’llkill,” they’d say, and theymeant it.Youhad tohaveyour skills drum-tight to negotiate them down.You needtools.

BackatFBInegotiation training, I learned thehagglingsystemthatIusetothisday.AndIswearbyit.

I call the system theAckermanmodel because it camefrom this guy Mike Ackerman, an ex-CIA type whofoundedakidnap-for-ransomconsultingcompanybasedoutofMiami.Onmanykidnappingswe’dconstantlybepairedwith “Ackerman guys”—neverMike himself—who helpeddesignthehaggle.

AfterIretiredfromtheFBI,IfinallymetMikeonatripto Miami. When I told him I also used the system forbusiness negotiations, he laughed and said he’d run thesystembyHowardRaiffa, a legendaryHarvardnegotiationguy, andHoward had said itwouldwork in any situation.SoIfeltprettyjustifiedbythat.

TheAckermanmodelisanoffer-counteroffermethod,at

least on the surface. But it is a very effective system forbeating theusual lacklusterbargainingdynamic,whichhasthepredictableresultofmeetinginthemiddle.

The systematized and easy-to-remember process hasonlyfoursteps:

1. Setyourtargetprice(yourgoal).

2. Set your first offer at 65 percent of your targetprice.

3. Calculate three raises of decreasing increments(to85,95,and100percent).

4. Uselotsofempathyanddifferentwaysofsaying“No”toget theothersidetocounterbeforeyouincreaseyouroffer.

5. When calculating the final amount, use precise,nonroundnumberslike,say,$37,893ratherthan$38,000. It gives the number credibility andweight.

6. On your final number, throw in a nonmonetaryitem (that they probably don’t want) to showyou’reatyourlimit.

The genius of this system is that it incorporates thepsychologicaltacticswe’vediscussed—reciprocity,extremeanchors, loss aversion, and soon—withoutyouneeding to

thinkaboutthem.If you’ll bear with me for a moment, I’ll go over the

stepssoyouseewhatImean.First,theoriginalofferof65percentofyourtargetprice

willsetanextremeanchor,abigslapinthefacethatmightbringyourcounterpartrighttotheirpricelimit.Theshockofanextremeanchorwillinduceafight-or-flightreactioninallbut the most experienced negotiators, limiting theircognitiveabilitiesandpushingthemintorashaction.

Now look at the progressive offer increases to 85, 95,and 100 percent of the target price.You’re going to dropthese in sparingly: after the counterpart has made anotheroffer on their end, and after you’ve thrown out a fewcalibratedquestionstoseeifyoucanbaitthemintobiddingagainstthemselves.

When you make these offers, they work on variouslevels. First, they play on the norm of reciprocity; theyinspireyourcounterparttomakeaconcession,too.Justlikepeople are more likely to send Christmas cards to peoplewho first sendcards to them, theyaremore likely tomakebargaining concessions to those who have madecompromisesintheirdirection.

Second, the diminishing size of the increases—noticethat they decrease by half each time—convinces yourcounterpartthathe’ssqueezingyoutothepointofbreaking.Bythetimetheygettothelastone,they’llfeelthatthey’vereallygotteneverylastdrop.

This really juices their self-esteem. Researchers have

foundthatpeoplegettingconcessionsoftenfeelbetteraboutthe bargaining process than those who are given a singlefirm, “fair” offer. In fact, they feel better even when theyend up paying more—or receiving less—than theyotherwisemight.

Finally, the power of nonround numbers bearsreiterating.

Back in Haiti, I used to use the Ackerman systemferociously. Over eighteen months we got two or threekidnappings a week, so from experience, we knew themarketpriceswere$15,000to$75,000pervictim.BecauseIwasahard-ass,Imadeitmygoaltogetinunder$5,000ineverykidnappingthatIran.

One really stands out, the first one I mentioned in thisbook.IwentthroughtheAckermanprocess,knockingthemoff their game with an extreme anchor, hitting them withcalibratedquestions, and slowlygaveprogressively smallerconcessions. Finally, I dropped the weird number thatclosedthedeal.I’llneverforget theheadof theMiamiFBIofficecallingmycolleaguethenextdayandsaying,“Vossgot this guy out for $4,751? How does $1 make adifference?”

Theywerehowlingwithlaughter,andtheyhadapoint.That $1 is ridiculous. But it works on our human nature.Noticethatyoucan’tbuyanythingfor$2,butyoucanbuya million things for $1.99. How does a cent changeanything? It doesn’t.But itmakes a difference every time.We just like$1.99more than$2.00even ifweknow it’sa

trick.

NEGOTIATINGARENTCUTAFTERRECEIVINGNOTICEOFANINCREASE

Eight months after a Georgetown MBA student of minenamedMishary signed a rental contract for $1,850/month,he got some unwelcome news: his landlord informed himthatifhewantedtore-up,itwouldbe$2,100/monthfortenmonths,or$2,000/monthforayear.

Mishary loved the place and didn’t think he’d find abetter one, but the pricewas already high and he couldn’taffordmore.

Taking to heart our class slogan, “You fall to yourhighest level of preparation,” he dove into the real estatelistings and found that prices for comparable apartmentswere $1,800–$1,950/month, but none of them were in asgood a building. He then examined his own finances andfiguredtherenthewantedtopaywas$1,830.

Herequestedasit-downwithhisrentalagent.Thiswasgoingtobetough.At their meeting, Mishary laid out his situation. His

experienceinthebuildinghadbeenreallypositive,hesaid.And, he pointed out, he always paid on time. It would besadforhimtoleave,hesaid,andsadforthelandlordtoloseagoodtenant.Theagentnodded.

“Totally in agreement,” he said. “That’s why I think itwillbenefitbothofustoagreeonrenewingthelease.”

HereMishary pulled out his research: buildings around

the neighborhood were offering “much” lower prices, hesaid. “Even though your building is better in terms oflocation and services,how am I supposed to pay $200extra?”

Thenegotiationwason.Theagentwentsilent forafewmomentsand thensaid,

“Youmakeagoodpoint,but this isstillagoodprice.Andasyounoted,wecanchargeapremium.”

Misharythendroppedanextremeanchor.“I fully understand, you do have a better location and

amenities. But I’m sorry, I just can’t,” he said. “Would$1,730amonthforayearleasesoundfairtoyou?”

Theagent laughedandwhenhefinishedsaid therewasno way to accept that number, because it was way belowmarketprice.

Insteadofgettingpulled intoahaggle,Misharysmartlypivotedtocalibratedquestions.

“Okay,sopleasehelpmeunderstand:howdoyoupriceleaserenewals?”

The agent didn’t say anything shocking—merely thattheyusedfactorslikeareapricesandsupply-and-demand—butthatgaveMisharytheopeningtoarguethathis leavingwould open the landlord to the risk of having an unrentedapartment and the cost of repainting. Onemonth unrentedwouldbea$2,000loss,hesaid.

Then he made another offer. Now, you’re probablyshaking your head that he’s making two offers withoutreceiving one in return.And you’re right; normally that’s

verboten.Butyouhavetobeabletoimprovise.Ifyoufeelincontrolofanegotiation,youcandotwoorthreemovesatatime.Don’tlettherulesruintheflow.

“Let me try and move along with you:how about$1,790for12months?”

Theagentpaused.“Sir, I understand your concerns, and what you said

makessense,”hesaid.“Yournumber, though, isverylow.However,givemetimetothinkthisoutandwecanmeetatanothertime.Howdoesthatsound?”

Remember,anyresponsethatisnotanoutrightrejectionmeansyouhavetheedge.

Fivedayslaterthetwometagain.“Iranthenumbers,andbelievemethisisagooddeal,”

theagentstarted.“Iamabletoofferyou$1,950amonthforayear.”

Mishary knew he’dwon.The agent just needed a littlepush. So he praised the agent and said nowithout saying,“No.”Andnoticehowhebrilliantlymislabelsinordertogettheguytoopenup?

“That is generous of you, but how am I supposed toaccept itwhen Icanmovea fewblocksawayandstay for$1,800?Ahundredandfiftydollarsamonthmeansalottome.Youknow I ama student. I don’t know, it seems likeyou would rather run the risk of keeping the placeunrented.”

“It’snotthat,”theagentanswered.“ButIcan’tgiveyouanumberlowerthanthemarket.”

Mishary made a dramatic pause, as if the agent wasextractingeverycenthehad.

“ThenItellyouwhat,Iinitiallywentupfrom$1,730to$1,790,”hesaid,sighing.“Iwillbringitupto$1,810.AndIthinkthisworkswellforboth.”

Theagentshookhishead.“Thisisstilllowerthanthemarket,sir.AndIcannotdo

that.”Mishary thenprepared togive the lastofhisAckerman

offers.Hewent silent for awhileand thenasked theagentforapenandpaper.Thenhestarteddoingfakecalculationstoseemlikehewasreallypushinghimself.

Finally,helookedupattheagentandsaid,“Ididsomenumbers,andthemaximumIcanaffordis$1,829.”

The agent bobbed his head from side to side, as ifgettinghismindaroundtheoffer.Atlast,hespoke.

“Wow.$1,829,” he said. “You seemveryprecise.Youmust be an accountant. [Mishary was not.] Listen, I valueyouwanting to renewwith us and for that I thinkwe canmakethisworkforatwelve-monthlease.”

Ka-ching!NoticethisbrilliantcombinationofdecreasingAckerman offers, nonround numbers, deep research, smartlabeling, and saying nowithout saying “No”?That’swhatgetsyouarentdiscountwhenalandlordwantedtoraisehismonthlytake.

KEYLESSONS

When push comes to shove—and it will—you’re going to

find yourself sitting across the table from a bare-knucklenegotiator. After you’ve finished all the psychologicallynuancedstuff—thelabelingandmirroringandcalibrating—youaregoingtohavetohashoutthe“brasstacks.”

Formostofus,thatain’tfun.Topnegotiatorsknow,however,thatconflictisoftenthe

pathtogreatdeals.Andthebestfindwaystoactuallyhavefunengaging in it.Conflictbringsout truth, creativity, andresolution. So the next time you find yourself face-to-facewithabare-knucklebargainer,rememberthelessonsinthischapter.

■ Identify your counterpart’s negotiating style.Once you know whether they areAccommodator, Assertive, or Analyst, you’llknowthecorrectwaytoapproachthem.

■ Prepare, prepare, prepare.When the pressure ison, you don’t rise to the occasion; you fall toyour highest level of preparation. So design anambitiousbut legitimategoalandthengameoutthe labels, calibrated questions, and responsesyou’llusetogetthere.Thatway,onceyou’reatthebargainingtable,youwon’thavetowingit.

■ Get ready to take a punch.Kick-ass negotiatorsusually lead with an extreme anchor to knockyou off your game. If you’re not ready, you’llfleetoyourmaximumwithoutafight.Soprepare

yourdodgingtacticstoavoidgettingsuckedintothecompromisetrap.

■ Set boundaries, and learn to take a punch orpunch back, without anger.The guy across thetableisnottheproblem;thesituationis.

■ PrepareanAckermanplan.Beforeyouheadintothe weeds of bargaining, you’ll need a plan ofextreme anchor, calibrated questions, and well-defined offers. Remember: 65, 85, 95, 100percent. Decreasing raises and ending onnonround numbers will get your counterpart tobelieve that he’s squeezing you for all you’reworthwhen you’re really getting to the numberyouwant.

CHAPTER10

FINDTHEBLACKSWAN

At 11:30 a.m. on June 17, 1981, a beautiful 70-degreespring day with an insistent westerly breeze, thirty-seven-year-old William Griffin left the second-floor bedroomwherehe lived inhisparent’sRochester,NewYork,homeand trod down the shoe-buffed stairs that led to theirmeticulouslivingroom.

At the bottom he stopped, paused, and then, without awordofwarning,shotoffthreeshotgunblaststhatkilledhismother and a handyman who was hanging wallpaper andcriticallywoundedhisstepfather.Thesoundreverberatedintheenclosedspace.

Griffinthenleft thehouseandshotaworkmanandtwobystanders as he jogged two blocks to the Security TrustCompany, aneighborhoodbank.Seconds after he entered,people began sprinting from the bank asGriffin took ninebank employees hostage and ordered the customers toleave.

Forthenextthreeandahalfhours,GriffinledpoliceandFBI agents in a violent standoff in which he shot andwounded thefirst twopoliceofficerswhoresponded to thebank’ssilentalarm,andshotsixpeoplewhohappenedtobe

walking near the bank. Griffin shot off somany rounds—more than one hundred in all—thatthe police used agarbagetrucktoshieldoneofficerashewasbeingrescued.

Waving the nine bank employees into a small office at2:30 p.m., Griffin told the manager to call the police anddeliveramessage.

Outside, FBI agent Clint Van Zandt stood by whileRochesterpoliceofficerJimO’Brienpickedupthephone.

“Eitheryoucometothefrontentrancedoorsofthebankat three o’clock and have a shoot-out with him in theparkinglot,”themanagerblurtedthroughhertears,“orhe’sgoingtostartkillinghostagesandthrowingoutbodies.”

Thenthelinewentdead.Now, never in the history of the United States had a

hostage-taker killed a hostage on deadline. The deadlinewas always a way to focus the mind; what the bad guysreally wanted was money, respect, and a helicopter.Everyone knew that. It was a permanent and inalterableknownknown.Itwasthetruth.

But that permanent and inalterable truth was about tochange.

What came next showed the power of Black Swans,those hidden and unexpected pieces of information—thoseunknownunknowns—whoseunearthinghasgame-changingeffectsonanegotiationdynamic.

Negotiation breakthroughs—when the game shiftsinalterably in your favor—are created by those who canidentifyandutilizeBlackSwans.

Here’show.

FINDINGLEVERAGEINTHEPREDICTABLYUNPREDICTABLE

At exactly 3 p.m., Griffin gestured toward one of hishostages, a twenty-nine-year-old teller named MargaretMoore, and told her to walk to the glass bank doors.Petrified,Moore did as shewas ordered, but first cried outthatshewasasingleparentwithayoungson.

Griffin didn’t seem to hear her, or to care. Once theweepingMooremadeittothevestibule,Griffinshotofftwoblasts from his twelve-gauge shotgun. Both of the heavyrounds struck Moore in the midsection, violently blowingher through the glass door and almost cutting her body inhalf.

Outside, law enforcement was stunned into silence. ItwasobviousthatGriffindidn’twantmoneyorrespectoranescape route.The only way he was coming out was in abodybag.

At that moment, Griffin walked over to a full-lengthbank window and pressed his body against the glass. Hewas in full view of a sniper stationed in the church acrossthe street. Griffin knew quite well the sniper was there;earlierinthedayhe’dshotathim.

Less thanasecondafterGriffin’ssilhouetteappearedinhisscope,thesniperpulledthetrigger.

Griffincrumpledtothefloor,dead.

Black Swan theory tells us that things happen that werepreviouslythoughttobeimpossible—orneverthoughtofatall. This is not the same as saying that sometimes thingshappenagainstone-in-a-millionodds,but rather that thingsneverimagineddocometopass.

The idea of the Black Swan was popularized by riskanalyst Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his bestselling booksFooled by Randomness (2001)1 andThe Black Swan(2007),2 but the term goes back much further. Until theseventeenth century, people could only imagine whiteswans because all swans ever seen had possessed whitefeathers. In seventeenth-centuryLondon itwas common torefertoimpossiblethingsas“BlackSwans.”

But then theDutch explorerWillem deVlaminghwentto western Australia in 1697—and saw a black swan.Suddenly the unthinkable and unthought was real. Peoplehadalwayspredictedthatthenextswantheysawwouldbewhite, but the discovery of black swans shattered thisworldview.

Black Swans are just a metaphor, of course. Think ofPearl Harbor, the rise of the Internet, 9/11, and the recentbankingcrisis.

None of the events above was predicted—yet onreflection, the markers were all there. It’s just that peopleweren’tpayingattention.

AsTalebuses the term, theBlackSwansymbolizes theuselessness of predictions based on previous experience.Black Swans are events or pieces of knowledge that sit

outside our regular expectations and therefore cannot bepredicted.

This is a crucial concept in negotiation. In everynegotiatingsession,therearedifferentkindsofinformation.Therearethosethingsweknow,likeourcounterpart’snameandtheirofferandourexperiencesfromothernegotiations.Those areknown knowns. There are those things we arecertainthatexistbutwedon’tknow,likethepossibilitythatthe other side might get sick and leave us with anothercounterpart. Those areknown unknowns and they are likepokerwildcards;youknowthey’reouttherebutyoudon’tknowwhohasthem.Butmostimportantarethosethingswedon’t know that we don’t know, pieces of informationwe’venever imaginedbut thatwouldbegamechanging ifuncovered. Maybe our counterpart wants the deal to failbecausehe’sleavingforacompetitor.

TheseunknownunknownsareBlackSwans.

With theirknown knowns and prior expectations so firmlyguiding their approach, Van Zandt, and really, the entireFBI, were blind to the clues and connections that showedtherewassomethingoutsideofthepredictableatplay.Theycouldn’tseetheBlackSwansinfrontofthem.

Idon’tmeantosingleoutVanZandthere.Hedidalloflawenforcementaservicebyhighlightingthiseventandhetoldmeanda roomfullofagents thestoryof thathorribleJune day during a training session at Quantico. It was anintroduction to the suicide-by-cop phenomenon—when anindividualdeliberatelycreatesacrisissituationtoprovokea

lethal response from law enforcement—but therewas anevengreaterlessonatstake:thepointofthestorythen,andnow,washowimportantitistorecognizetheunexpectedtomakesurethingslikeMoore’sdeathneverhappenagain.

OnthatdayinJune1981,O’Brienkeptcallingthebank,but each time the bank employee who answered quicklyhung up. It was at thatmoment they should have realizedthe situationwas outside theknown. Hostage-takersalwaystalked because theyalways had demands; theyalwayswantedtobeheard,respected,andpaid.

Butthisguydidn’t.Then, midway through the standoff, a police officer

entered the command post with the news that a doublehomicide with a third person critically wounded had beenreportedafewblocksaway.

“Doweneedtoknowthis?”VanZandtsaid.“Isthereaconnection?”

No one knew or found out in time. If they had, theymight have uncovered a second Black Swan: that Griffinhadalreadykilledseveralpeoplewithoutmakingmonetarydemands.

And then, a fewhours in, thehostage-taker hadoneofthe hostages read a note to the police over the phone.Curiously, there were no demands. Instead, it was arambling diatribe about Griffin’s life and the wrongs he’dendured.Thenotewasso longandunfocused itwasneverread in its entirety. Because of this, one important line—anotherBlackSwan—wasn’tregistered:

“...afterthepolicetakemylife...”Because these Black Swans weren’t uncovered, Van

Zandtandhiscolleaguesneversawthesituationforwhatitwas:Griffinwantedtodie,andhewantedthepolicetodoitforhim.

Nothing like this—ashootoutonadeadline?—hadeverhappenedtotheFBI,sotheytriedtofittheinformationintowhathadhappenedinthepast.Intotheoldtemplates.Theywondered,Whatdoesheactuallywant?After scaring themfor a bit, they expected Griffin to pick up the phone andstartadialogue.Noonegetskilledondeadline.

Orsotheythought.

UNCOVERINGUNKNOWNUNKNOWNS

Thelessonofwhathappenedat3p.m.onJune17,1981,inRochester, NewYork, was that when bits and pieces of acase don’t add up it’s usually because our frames ofreference are off; they will never add up unless we breakfreeofourexpectations.

Every case is new.We must let what we know—ourknownknowns—guideusbutnotblindustowhatwedonotknow; we must remain flexible and adaptable to anysituation;wemustalwaysretainabeginner’smind;andwemust never overvalue our experience or undervalue theinformationalandemotional realities servedupmomentbymomentinwhateversituationweface.

But those were not the only important lessons of thattragic event. If an overreliance onknown knowns can

shackle a negotiator to assumptions that prevent him fromseeingandhearingallthatasituationpresents,thenperhapsanenhancedreceptivity to theunknownunknowns can freethat same negotiator to see and hear the things that canproducedramaticbreakthroughs.

From the moment I heard the tale of June 17, 1981, Irealized that Ihad tocompletelychangehowIapproachednegotiating.Ibegantohypothesizethatineverynegotiationeach side is in possession of at least three Black Swans,threepiecesofinformationthat,weretheytobediscoveredbytheotherside,wouldchangeeverything.

Myexperiencesincehasproventhistobetrue.Now,Ishouldnoteherethatthisisnotjustasmalltweak

to negotiation technique. It is not coincidence that IembracedBlackSwanasthenameofmycompanyandthesymbolofourapproach.

Finding and actingonBlackSwansmandates a shift inyour mindset. It takes negotiation from being a one-dimensional move-countermove game of checkers to athree-dimensional game that’s more emotional, adaptive,intuitive...andtrulyeffective.

FindingBlacksSwansisnoeasytask,ofcourse.Weareall to some degree blind.We do not knowwhat is aroundthe corner until we turn it. By definition we do not knowwhatwedon’tknow.

That’s why I say that finding and understanding BlackSwans requires a changeofmindset.Youhave toopenupyour established pathways and embracemore intuitive and

nuancedwaysoflistening.This is vital to people of all walks of life, from

negotiators to inventors and marketers. What you don’tknow can kill you, or your deal. But to find it out isincrediblydifficult.Themostbasicchallenge is thatpeopledon’tknowthequestions toask thecustomer, theuser . . .the counterpart. Unless correctly interrogated,most peoplearen’tabletoarticulatetheinformationyouwant.Theworlddidn’t tell Steve Jobs that itwanted an iPad: he uncoveredour need, that Black Swan, without us knowing theinformationwasthere.

The problem is that conventional questioning andresearch techniquesaredesigned toconfirmknown knownsandreduceuncertainty.Theydon’tdigintotheunknown.

Negotiations will always suffer from limitedpredictability.Yourcounterpartmighttellyou,“It’salovelyplotofland,”withoutmentioningthatitisalsoaSuperfundsite.They’llsay,“Aretheneighborsnoisy?Well,everyonemakes a bit of noise, don’t they?” when the actual fact isthataheavymetalbandpracticestherenightly.

Itisthepersonbestabletounearth,adaptto,andexploittheunknownsthatwillcomeoutontop.

To uncover these unknowns, we must interrogate ourworld, must put out a call, and intensely listen to theresponse.Ask lots of questions.Read nonverbal clues andalwaysvoiceyourobservationswithyourcounterpart.

Thisisnothingbeyondwhatyou’vebeenlearninguptonow. It is merely more intense and intuitive.You have to

feel for the truth behind the camouflage; you have to notethesmallpausesthatsuggestdiscomfortandlies.Don’tlooktoverifywhatyouexpect.Ifyoudo,that’swhatyou’llfind.Instead,youmustopenyourselfuptothefactualrealitythatisinfrontofyou.

This is why my company changed its format forpreparing and engaging in a negotiation. No matter howmuchresearchourteamhasdonepriortotheinteraction,wealways ask ourselves, “Why are they communicatingwhattheyarecommunicatingrightnow?”Remember,negotiationismore likewalkingona tightrope thancompetingagainstan opponent. Focusing so much on the end objective willonlydistractyoufromthenextstep,andthatcancauseyoutofallofftherope.Concentrateonthenextstepbecausetherope will lead you to the end as long as all the steps arecompleted.

Most people expect that Black Swans are highlyproprietaryorcloselyguardedinformation,wheninfacttheinformation may seem completely innocuous. Either sidemay be completely oblivious to its importance. Yourcounterpart always has pieces of information whose valuetheydonotunderstand.

THETHREETYPESOFLEVERAGE

I’m going to come back to specific techniques foruncoveringBlackSwans,but first I’d like toexaminewhatmakesthemsouseful.

The answer is leverage. Black Swans are leverage

multipliers.Theygiveyoutheupperhand.Now,“leverage” is themagicword,but it’salsooneof

thoseconceptsthatnegotiationexpertscasuallythrowaboutbutrarelydelveinto,soI’dliketodosohere.

In theory, leverage is the ability to inflict loss andwithhold gain.Where does your counterpart want to gainand what do they fear losing? Discover these pieces ofinformation,wearetold,andyou’llbuildleverageovertheotherside’sperceptions,actions,anddecisions.Inpractice,where our irrational perceptions are our reality, loss andgain are slippery notions, and it often doesn’tmatter whatleverage actually exists against you; what really matters istheleveragetheythinkyouhaveonthem.That’swhyIsaythere’salwaysleverage:asanessentiallyemotionalconcept,itcanbemanufacturedwhetheritexistsornot.

If they’re talking to you, you have leverage.Who hasleverage in a kidnapping? The kidnapper or the victim’sfamily? Most people think the kidnapper has all theleverage. Sure, the kidnapper has something you love, butyouhavesomethingtheylustfor.Whichismorepowerful?Moreover,howmanybuyersdothekidnappershaveforthecommodity they are trying to sell? What business issuccessfulifthere’sonlyonebuyer?

Leveragehasalotofinputs,liketimeandnecessityandcompetition. If youneed to sell your housenow, youhavelessleveragethanifyoudon’thaveadeadline.Ifyouwantto sell it but don’thave to, you havemore.And if variouspeoplearebiddingonitatonce,goodonyou.

Ishouldnotethatleverageisn’tthesamethingaspower.DonaldTrumphas tonsofpower, but if he’s stranded in adesert and the owner of the only store for miles has thewaterhewants,thevendorhastheleverage.

Onewaytounderstandleverageisasafluidthatsloshesbetween the parties.As a negotiator you should always beawareofwhichside,atanygivenmoment, feels theyhavethemosttoloseifnegotiationscollapse.Thepartywhofeelstheyhavemore to loseandare themost afraidof that losshaslessleverage,andviceversa.Togetleverage,youhavetopersuadeyourcounterpart that theyhavesomething realtoloseifthedealfallsthrough.

At a taxonomic level, there are three kinds: Positive,Negative,andNormative.

POSITIVELEVERAGEPositiveleverageisquitesimplyyourabilityasanegotiatorto provide—or withhold—things that your counterpartwants.Whenevertheothersidesays,“Iwant . . .”as in,“Iwanttobuyyourcar,”youhavepositiveleverage.

Whentheysaythat,youhavepower:youcanmaketheirdesire come true; you can withhold it and thereby inflictpain; or you can use their desire to get a better deal withanotherparty.

Here’sanexample:Three months after you’ve put your business on the

market, apotentialbuyer finally tellsyou,“Yes, I’d like tobuy it.”You’re thrilled,buta fewdays lateryour joy turnsto disappointment when he delivers an offer so low it’s

insulting.This is the only offer you have, sowhat do youdo?

Now, hopefully you’ve had contact with other buyers,evencasually.Ifyouhave,youcanusetheoffertocreateasenseofcompetition,andtherebykickoffabiddingwar.Atleastyou’llforcethemtomakeachoice.

Butevenifyoudon’thaveotheroffersortheinterestedbuyerisyourfirstchoice,youhavemorepowerthanbeforeyourcounterpartrevealedhisdesire.Youcontrolwhattheywant. That’s why experienced negotiators delay makingoffers—theydon’twanttogiveupleverage.

Positive leverage should improve your psychologyduringnegotiation.You’vegonefromasituationwhereyouwant something from the investor to a situationwhere youbothwantsomethingfromeachother.

Once you have it, you can then identify other thingsyour opponent wants. Maybe he wants to buy your firmover time. Help him do that, if he’ll increase the price.Maybehisofferisallthemoneyhehas.Helphimgetwhathewants—yourbusiness—bysayingyoucanonlysellhim75percentforhisoffer.

NEGATIVELEVERAGENegative leverage iswhatmost civilianspicturewhen theyheartheword“leverage.”It’sanegotiator’sabilitytomakehis counterpartsuffer.And it isbasedon threats:youhavenegative leverage if you can tell your counterpart, “If youdon’t fulfill your commitment/pay your bill/etc., I willdestroyyourreputation.”

Thissortofleveragegetspeople’sattentionbecauseofaconcept we’ve discussed:loss aversion.As effectivenegotiators have long known and psychologists haverepeatedlyproved,potentiallossesloomlargerinthehumanmind than do similar gains.Getting a gooddealmaypushus toward making a risky bet, but saving our reputationfromdestructionisamuchstrongermotivation.

SowhatkindofBlackSwansdoyoulooktobeawareofas negative leverage? Effective negotiators look for piecesof information, oftenobliquely revealed, that showwhat isimportanttotheircounterpart:Whoistheiraudience?Whatsignifies status and reputation to them?Whatmostworriesthem?Tofindthisinformation,onemethodistogooutsidethe negotiating table and speak to a third party that knowsyour counterpart.Themost effectivemethod is to gather itfrominteractionswithyourcounterpart.

Thatsaid,awordofwarning:Idonotbelieveinmakingdirect threats and am extremely careful with even subtleones.Threats can be like nuclear bombs.There will be atoxic residue thatwillbedifficult tocleanup.Youhave tohandle thepotentialofnegativeconsequenceswithcare,oryou will hurt yourself and poison or blow up the wholeprocess.

If you shove your negative leverage down yourcounterpart’s throat, it might be perceived as you takingawaytheirautonomy.Peoplewilloftensoonerdiethangiveup their autonomy.They’ll at least act irrationallyand shutoffthenegotiation.

A more subtle technique is to label your negativeleverage and thereby make it clear without attacking.Sentenceslike“Itseemslikeyoustronglyvaluethefactthatyou’ve always paid on time” or “It seems like you don’tcarewhat position you are leavingme in” can really openupthenegotiationprocess.

NORMATIVELEVERAGEEverypersonhasasetofrulesandamoralframework.

Normativeleverageisusingtheotherparty’snormsandstandards to advance your position. If you can showinconsistencies between their beliefs and their actions, youhave normative leverage. No one likes to look like ahypocrite.

For example, if your counterpart lets slip that theygenerallypayacertainmultipleofcashflowwhentheybuyacompany,youcanframeyourdesiredpriceinawaythatreflectsthatvaluation.

Discovering the Black Swans that give you normativevaluation can be as easy as asking what your counterpartbelieves and listening openly. You want to see whatlanguagetheyspeak,andspeakitbacktothem.

KNOWTHEIRRELIGION

In March 2003 I led the negotiation with a farmer whobecameoneofthemostunlikelypost-9/11terroristsyoucanimagine.

The drama started when Dwight Watson, a North

Carolina tobacco grower, hooked up his jeep to a JohnDeere tractor festoonedwith banners and an invertedU.S.flag and towed it to Washington, D.C., to protestgovernment policies he thought were putting tobaccofarmersoutofbusiness.

WhenWatsongottothecapital,hepulledhistractorintoa pond between the Washington Monument and theVietnamVeterans Memorial and threatened to blow it upwiththe“organophosphate”bombsheclaimedwereinside.

Thecapitalwentintolockdownasthepoliceblockedoffan eight-block area from the Lincoln Memorial to theWashington Monument. Coming just months after theBeltwaysniperattacksandalongsidethebuilduptotheIraqWar, theeasewithwhichWatsonthrewthenation’scapitalintoturmoilfreakedpeopleout.

Talking on his cell phone,Watson told theWashingtonPost that he was on a do-or-die mission to show howreducedsubsidieswerekillingtobaccofarmers.HetoldthePostthatGodhadinstructedhimtostagehisprotestandhewasn’tgoingtoleave.

“IfthisisthewayAmericawillberun,thehellwithit,”hesaid.“Iwillnotsurrender.Theycanblow[me]outofthewater.I’mreadytogotoheaven.”

TheFBIdeployedmetoaconvertedRVontheNationalMall,where Iwas to guide a team of FBI agents andU.S.ParkPoliceaswetriedtotalkWatsonoutofkillinghimselfandwhoknowshowmanyothers.

Andthenwegotdowntobusiness.

Like you’d expect of a negotiation with a guythreateningtodestroyagoodpartoftheU.S.capital,itwasrighteously tense. Sharpshooters had theirweapons trainedonWatson, and they had the “green light” to shoot if hemadeanycrazymoves.

Inanynegotiation,butespeciallyinatenseonelikethis,it’s not how well you speak but how well you listen thatdetermines your success. Understanding the “other” is aprecondition to be able to speak persuasively and developoptions that resonate for them. There is the visiblenegotiationandthenallthethingsthatarehiddenunderthesurface (the secret negotiation space wherein the BlackSwansdwell).

Access to this hidden space very often comes throughunderstanding the other side’s worldview, their reason forbeing,theirreligion.Indeed,diggingintoyourcounterpart’s“religion” (sometimes involving God but not always)inherentlyimpliesmovingbeyondthenegotiatingtableandintothelife,emotionalandotherwise,ofyourcounterpart.

Once you’ve understood your counterpart’sworldview,you can build influence. That’s why as we talked withWatson I spent my energy trying to unearth who he wasratherthanlogicallyarguinghimintosurrender.

From this we learned thatWatson had been finding itincreasinglyhardtomakealivingonhis1,200-acretobaccofarm, which had been in his family for five generations.Afterbeinghitbyadroughtandhavinghiscropquotacutby half, Watson decided he couldn’t afford the farm

anymore and drove toWashington to make his point. Hewanted attention, and knowing what he wanted gave uspositiveleverage.

Watsonalso toldushewasaveteran,andveteranshadrules. This is the kind of music you want to hear, as itprovides normative leverage. He told us that he would bewillingtosurrender,butnotrightaway.Asamilitarypoliceofficerinthe82ndAirborneinthe1970s,he’dlearnedthatif he was trapped behind enemy lines, he could withdrawwithhonorifreinforcementsdidn’tarrivewithinthreedays.Butnotbefore.

Now,wehadarticulatedruleswecouldholdhimto,andthe admission that he could withdraw also implied that,despite his bluster about dying, he wanted to live. One ofthefirst thingsyoutry todecide inahostagenegotiation iswhether your counterpart’s vision of the future involvesthemliving.AndWatsonhadansweredyes.

Weusedthisinformation—apieceofnegativeleverage,as we could take away something he wanted: life—andstarted working it alongside the positive leverage of hisdesire to be heard.We emphasized toWatson that he hadalreadymadenationalnewsandifhewantedhismessagetosurvivehewasgoingtohavetolive.

Watsonwassmartenoughtounderstandthattherewasareal chance hewouldn’tmake it out alive, but he still hadhisrulesofmilitaryhonor.Hisowndesiresandfearshelpedgeneratesomepositiveandnegativeleverage,buttheyweresecondarytothenormsbywhichhelivedhislife.

It was tempting to just wait until the third day, but Idoubted we’d get that far. With each passing hour theatmospherewasgrowingtenser.Thecapitalwasundersiegeandwe had reason to believe hemight have explosives. Ifhemadeonewrongmove,onespasticfreak-out,thesniperswouldkillhim.He’dalreadyhadseveralangryoutbursts,soevery hour that passed endangered him.He could still gethimselfkilled.

Butwecouldn’thitonthatatall;wecouldn’tthreatentokill him and expect that to work. The reason for that issomething called the “paradox of power”—namely, theharder we push the more likely we are to be met withresistance. That’s why you have to use negative leveragesparingly.

Still,timewasshortandwehadtospeedthingsup.Buthow?Whathappenednextwasoneofthosegloriousexamples

of how deeply listening to understand your counterpart’sworldview can reveal a Black Swan that transforms anegotiationdynamic.Watsondidn’tdirectlytelluswhatweneeded to know, but by close attention we uncovered asubtletruththatinformedeverythinghesaid.

Aboutthirty-sixhoursin,WinnieMiller,anFBIagentonour teamwho’dbeen listening intently to subtle referencesWatsonhadbeenmaking,turnedtome.

“He’s a devout Christian,” she told me. “Tell himtomorrow is the Dawn of the Third Day. That’s the dayChristiansbelieveJesusChristlefthistombandascendedto

Heaven. IfChristcameouton theDawnof theThirdDay,whynotWatson?”

Itwasabrilliantuseofdeeplistening.BycombiningthatsubtextofWatson’swordswithknowledgeofhisworldviewsheletusshowWatsonthatwenotonlywere listening,butthatwehadalsoheardhim.

Ifwe’d understood his subtext correctly, thiswould lethimendthestandoffhonorablyandtodosowiththefeelingthathewassurrenderingtoanadversarythatrespectedhimandhisbeliefs.

Bypositioningyourdemandswithintheworldviewyourcounterpartuses tomakedecisions,youshowthemrespectand that gets youattention and results. Knowing yourcounterpart’s religion is more than just gaining normativeleverageperse.Rather,it’sgainingaholisticunderstandingof your counterpart’s worldview—in this case, literally areligion—and using that knowledge to inform yournegotiatingmoves.

Using your counterpart’s religion is extremely effectivein large part because it has authority over them.The otherguy’s “religion” is what the market, the experts, God, orsociety—whatevermatterstohim—hasdeterminedtobefairandjust.Andpeopledefertothatauthority.

InthenextconversationwithWatson,wementionedthatthenextmorningwastheDawnoftheThirdDay.Therewasa longmomentof silenceon theotherendof the line.OurNegotiationOperationCenterwas so quiet you could heartheheartbeatoftheguynexttoyou.

Watsoncoughed.“I’llcomeout,”hesaid.And he did, ending a forty-eight-hour standoff, saving

himself from harm, and allowing the nation’s capital toresumeitsnormallife.

Noexplosiveswerefound.

Whiletheimportanceof“knowingtheirreligion”shouldbeclear fromWatson’s story, here are two tips for readingreligioncorrectly:

■ Review everything you hear.Youwill not heareverything the first time, so double-check.Compare notes with your team members. Youwilloftendiscovernewinformationthatwillhelpyouadvancethenegotiation.

■ Usebackup listenerswhoseonly job is to listenbetween the lines. They will hear things youmiss.

Inotherwords:listen,listenagain,andlistensomemore.We’ve seen how a holistic understanding of your

counterpart’s“religion”—ahugeBlackSwan—canprovidenormative leveragethat leads to negotiating results. Butthere are other ways in which learning your counterpart’s“religion”enablesyoutoachievebetteroutcomes.

THESIMILARITYPRINCIPLE

Research by social scientists has confirmed somethingeffectivenegotiatorshaveknownforages:namely,wetrustpeople more when we view them as being similar orfamiliar.

Peopletrustthosewhoareintheirin-group.Belongingisa primal instinct.And if you can trigger that instinct, thatsensethat,“Oh,weseetheworldthesameway,”thenyouimmediatelygaininfluence.

Whenourcounterpartdisplaysattitudes,beliefs,ideas—evenmodesofdress—that are similar toourown,we tendto like and trust themmore. Similarities as shallow as clubmembershipsorcollegealumnistatusincreaserapport.

That’s why in many cultures negotiators spend largeamountsof timebuildingrapportbefore theyeven thinkofoffers. Both sides know that the information they gleancould be vital to effective deal making and leveragebuilding. It’s a bit like dogs circling each other, smellingeachother’sbehind.

I onceworked a deal for our serviceswith thisCEO inOhiowherethesimilarityprincipleplayedamajorrole.

Mycounterpartwasconstantlymaking references that Irecognized as being sort of born-again Christian material.Aswe talked he kept going back and forth onwhether heshouldbringinhisadvisors.Thewholeissueofhisadvisorsclearly pained him; at one point he even said, “Nobodyunderstandsme.”

At that moment I began to rack my brain for theChristian word that captured the essence of what he was

saying.And thenthetermcametomymind,atermpeopleoften used in church to describe the duty one had toadministerourownandourworld’s—andthereforeGod’s—resourceswithhonesty,accountability,andresponsibility.

“Thisisreallystewardshipforyou,isn’tit?”Isaid.Hisvoiceimmediatelystrengthened.“Yes!You’retheonlyonewhounderstands,”hesaid.And he hired us at that moment. By showing that I

understood his deeper reasons for being and accessing asense of similarity, ofmutual belongingness, Iwas able tobring him to the deal.The minute I established a kind ofshared identitywith thisChristian,wewere in.Not simplybecause of similarity alone, but because of theunderstandingimpliedbythatmomentofsimilarity.

THEPOWEROFHOPESANDDREAMS

Once you know your counterpart’s religion and canvisualize what he truly wants out of life, you can employthoseaspirationsasawaytogethimtofollowyou.

Every engineer, every executive, every child—all of uswant to believe we are capable of the extraordinary. Aschildren, our daydreams feature ourselves as primaryplayers in great moments: an actor winning an Oscar, anathlete hitting the game-winning shot.As we grow older,however, our parents, teachers, and friends talk more ofwhatwe can’t and shouldn’t do thanwhat is possible.Webegintolosefaith.

But when someone displays a passion for what we’ve

alwayswantedandconveysapurposefulplanofhowtogetthere, we allow our perceptions of what’s possible tochange. We’re all hungry for a map to joy, and whensomeone is courageous enough to draw it for us, wenaturallyfollow.

So when you ascertain your counterpart’s unattainedgoals, invoke your own power and follow-ability byexpressing passion for their goals—and for their ability toachievethem.

Ted Leonsis is great at this. As the owner of theWashingtonWizards professional basketball team and theWashingtonCapitalsprofessionalhockeyteam,heisalwaystalking about creating the immortalmoments in sports thatpeoplewilltelltheirgrandchildrenabout.Whodoesn’twantto come to an agreement with someone who is going tomakethemimmortal?

RELIGIONASAREASON

Researchstudieshaveshownthatpeoplerespondfavorablytorequestsmadeinareasonabletoneofvoiceandfollowedwitha“because”reason.

In a famous study from the late 1970s,3 Harvardpsychology professor Ellen Langer and her colleaguesapproachedpeoplewaitingforcopymachinesandasked ifthey could cut the line. Sometimes they gave a reason;sometimes theydidn’t.What she foundwas crazy:withouther giving a reason, 60 percent let her through, but when

she did give one,more than 90 percent did.And it didn’tmatter if the reasonmade sense. (“Excuseme, I have fivepages.May I cut in line because I have tomake copies?”worked great.) People just responded positively to theframework.

Whileidioticreasonsworkedwithsomethingsimplelikephotocopying,onmorecomplicatedissuesyoucanincreaseyour effectiveness by offering reasons that reference yourcounterpart’sreligion.HadthatChristianCEOofferedmealowballofferwhenheagreedtohiremyfirm,Imighthaveanswered, “I’d love to but I too have a duty to be aresponsiblestewardofmyresources.”

IT’SNOTCRAZY,IT’SACLUE

It’snothumannaturetoembracetheunknown.Itscaresus.Whenweareconfrontedbyit,weignoreit,werunaway,orwe label it in ways that allow us to dismiss it. Innegotiations, that label most often takes the form of thestatement,“They’recrazy!”

That’s one reason I’ve been highly critical of some oftheimplementationofAmerica’shostagenegotiationpolicy—which is that we don’t negotiate with those we referbroadly to as “the Terrorists,” including groups from theTalibantoISIS.

The rationale for this nonengagement is summarizedwellbythejournalistPeterBergen,CNN’snationalsecurityanalyst: “Negotiations with religious fanatics who havedelusionsofgrandeurgenerallydonotgowell.”

The alternative we’ve chosen is tonot understand theirreligion, their fanaticism, and their delusions. Instead ofnegotiationsthatdon’tgowell,weshrugourshouldersandsay,“They’recrazy!”

Butthat’sabsolutelywrongheaded.Wemustunderstandthese things. I’m not saying that because I’m a softheadedpacifist(theFBIdoesn’thireagents likethat)butbecauseIknowunderstandingsuchthingsisthebestwaytodiscoverthe other side’s vulnerabilities andwants and thereby gaininfluence.Youcan’tgetthatstuffunlessyoutalk.

Noone is immune to “They’re crazy!”Youcan see it rearits head in every kind of negotiation, from parenting tocongressionaldealmakingtocorporatebargaining.

But the moment when we’re most ready to throw ourhands up and declare “They’re crazy!” is often the bestmoment for discovering Black Swans that transform anegotiation.Itiswhenwehearorseesomethingthatdoesn’tmake sense—something “crazy”—that a crucial fork in theroad is presented:push forward, evenmore forcefully,intothatwhichweinitiallycan’tprocess;ortaketheotherpath,theonetoguaranteedfailure,inwhichwetellourselvesthatnegotiatingwasuselessanyway.

In their great bookNegotiation Genius,4 HarvardBusiness School professors Deepak Malhotra and Max H.Bazermanprovidealookatthecommonreasonsnegotiatorsmistakenly call their counterparts crazy. I’d like to talkthroughthemhere.

MISTAKE#1:THEYAREILL-INFORMED

Oftentheothersideisactingonbadinformation,andwhenpeople have bad information they make bad choices.There’s a great computer industry term for this: GIGO—GarbageIn,GarbageOut.

As an example, Malhotra talks about a student of hiswhowasinadisputewithanex-employeewhoclaimedhewasowed$130,000 incommissions forworkhehaddonebeforebeingfired;hewasthreateningalawsuit.

Confused, the executive turned to the company’saccountants.Therehediscoveredtheproblem:theaccountshadbeenamesswhentheemployeewasfiredbuthadsincebeen put into order. With the clean information, theaccountantsassuredtheexecutivethat infact theemployeeowedthecompany$25,000.

Eager to avoid a lawsuit, the executive called theemployee,explainedthesituation,andmadeanoffer:iftheemployee dropped the lawsuit he could keep the $25,000.To his surprise, the employee said that he was goingforwardwiththesuitanyway;heactedirrational,crazy.

Malhotra told his student that the problem was notcraziness, but a lack of information and trust. So theexecutivehadanoutsideaccountingfirmauditthenumbersandsendtheresultstotheemployee.

Theresult?Theemployeedroppedthesuit.The clear point here is that people operating with

incomplete information appear crazy to those who havedifferent information.Your job when faced with someone

like this in a negotiation is to discover what they do notknowandsupplythatinformation.

MISTAKE#2:THEYARECONSTRAINED

Inanynegotiationwhereyourcounterpartisactingwobbly,there exists a distinct possibility that they have things theycan’t do but aren’t eager to reveal. Such constraints canmake the sanest counterpart seem irrational.Theother sidemightnotbeabletodosomethingbecauseof legaladvice,or because of promises already made, or even to avoidsettingaprecedent.

Ortheymayjustnothavethepowertoclosethedeal.Thatlastsituationisonethataclientofminefacedashe

was trying to landCoca-Cola as a client for hismarketingfirm.

The guy had been negotiating a deal formonths and itwas getting on to November. He was petrified that if hedidn’tcloseitbeforethecalendaryearendedhewouldhavetowaitforCoca-Colatosetanewbudgetandhemightlosetheclient.

Theproblemwas thathiscontacthadsuddenlystoppedresponding.Sowetoldhimtosendaversionofourclassicemail fornonresponders, theone thatalwaysworks: “Haveyougivenuponfinalizingthisdealthisyear?”

Thensomethingweirdhappened.TheCoca-Colacontactdidn’trespondtotheperfectemail.Whatwasup?

This was superficially quite irrational, but the contacthadbeenastraight-upguyuntilthen.Wetoldourclientthis

could mean only one thing: that the guyhad given up onclosingthedealbytheendoftheyear,buthedidn’twanttoadmitit.Therehadtobesomeconstraint.

With this knowledge in hand, we had our client digdeep.After a batch of phone calls and emails he trackeddownsomeonewhoknewhiscontact.Anditturnedoutwehadbeenright:thecontact’sdivisionhadbeeninchaosforweeks, and in the midst of corporate infighting he hadcompletely lost influence. Not surprisingly, he wasembarrassed to admit it. That’s why he was avoiding myclient.

Toputitsimply,hehadmajorconstraints.

MISTAKE#3:THEYHAVEOTHERINTERESTS

Think back toWilliamGriffin, the first man ever to kill ahostageondeadline.

WhattheFBIandpolicenegotiatorsonthescenesimplydidnotknowwasthathismaininterestwasnotnegotiatinga deal to release the hostages formoney.Hewanted to bekilled by a cop.Had they been able to dig up that hiddeninterest, they might have been able to avoid some of thatday’stragedy.

The presence of hidden interests isn’t as rare as youmight think. Your counterpart will often reject offers forreasonsthathavenothingtodowiththeirmerits.

A clientmay put off buying your product so that theircalendar year closes before the invoice hits, increasing hischance for a promotion.Or an employeemight quit in the

middleofacareer-makingproject,justbeforebonusseason,because he or she has learned that colleagues are makingmore money. For that employee, fairness is as much aninterestasmoney.

Whatever thespecificsof thesituation, thesepeoplearenot acting irrationally. They are simply complying withneeds and desires that you don’t yet understand, what theworld looks like to them based on their own set of rules.YourjobistobringtheseBlackSwanstolight.

Aswe’veseen,whenyourecognizethatyourcounterpartisnot irrational, but simply ill-informed, constrained, orobeying interests that you do not yet know, your field ofmovement greatly expands. And that allows you tonegotiatemuchmoreeffectively.

Here are a few ways to unearth these powerful BlackSwans:

GETFACETIMEBlack Swans are incredibly hard to uncover if you’re notliterallyatthetable.

Nomatterhowmuchresearchyoudo,there’sjustsomeinformationthatyouarenotgoingtofindoutunlessyousitface-to-face.

Today, a lot of younger people do almost everythingover email. It’s just how things are done. But it’s verydifficult to find Black Swans with email for the simplereason that, even if you knock your counterpart off theirmoorings with great labels and calibrated questions, email

givesthemtoomuchtimetothinkandre-centerthemselvestoavoidrevealingtoomuch.

Inaddition,emaildoesn’tallowfortone-of-voiceeffects,and it doesn’t let you read the nonverbal parts of yourcounterpart’sresponse(remember7-38-55).

Let’sreturnnowtothetaleofmyclientwhowastryingtogetCoca-Colaasaclient,onlytolearnthathiscontactatthecompanyhadbeenpushedaside.

IrealizedthattheonlywaymyclientwasgoingtogetadealwithCoca-Colawasbygettinghiscontacttoadmitthathewasuselessforthesituationandpassmyclientontothecorrectexecutive.Buttherewasnowaythisguywantedtodo that, because he still imagined that he could beimportant.

So I toldmy client to get his contact out of the Coca-Colacomplex.“Yougottogethimtodinner.You’regoingto say, ‘Would itbeabad idea forme to takeyou toyourfavoritesteakhouseandwejusthaveafewlaughs,andwedon’ttalkbusiness?’”

The idea was that no matter the reason—whether thecontact was embarrassed, or didn’t like my client, or justdidn’t want to discuss the situation—the only way theprocess was going to move forward was through directhumaninteraction.

Somyclientgotthisguyoutfordinnerandaspromisedhe didn’t bring up business. But there was no way not totalk about it, and just because my client created personal,face-to-face interaction, the contact admitted he was the

wrong guy. He admitted that his division was a mess andhe’d have to hand things off to somebody else to get thedealdone.

And he did. It took more than a year to get the dealsigned,buttheydidit.

OBSERVEUNGUARDEDMOMENTSWhileyouhavetogetfacetime,formalbusinessmeetings,structuredencounters,andplannednegotiatingsessionsareoftentheleastrevealingkindsoffacetimebecausethesearethemomentswhenpeopleareattheirmostguarded.

Hunting for Black Swans is also effective duringunguardedmomentsatthefringes,whetheratmealslikemyclienthadwithhisCoca-Colacontact,orthebriefmomentsofrelaxationbeforeorafterformalinteractions.

Duringatypicalbusinessmeeting,thefirstfewminutes,before you actually get down to business, and the last fewmoments,aseveryoneisleaving,oftentellyoumoreaboutthe other side than anything in between. That’s whyreportershaveacredotoneverturnofftheirrecorders:youalwaysgetthebeststuffatthebeginningandtheendofaninterview.

Also pay close attention to your counterpart duringinterruptions,oddexchanges,oranythingthatinterruptstheflow.When someone breaks ranks, people’s façades crackjust a little. Simply noticing whose cracks and how othersrespondverballyandnonverballycanrevealagoldmine.

WHENITDOESN’TMAKESENSE,THERE’SCENTSTOBEMADE

Students often ask me whether Black Swans are specifickindsofinformationoranykindthathelps.Ialwaysanswerthat they are anything that you don’t know that changesthings.

Todrivethishome,here’s thestoryofoneofmyMBAstudents whowas interning for a private equity real estatefirminWashington.Facedwithactionsfromhiscounterpartthatdidn’tpass the sense test,he innocently turneduponeof the greatest Black Swans I’ve seen in years by using alabel.

My student had been performing due diligence onpotential targetswhen a principal at the firm asked him tolook into amixed-use property in the heart of Charleston,South Carolina. He had no experience in the Charlestonmarket, so he called the broker selling the property andrequestedthemarketingpackage.

Afterdiscussingthedealandthemarket,mystudentandhis boss decided that the asking price of $4.3millionwasabout $450,000 too high.At that point, my student calledthebrokeragaintodiscusspricingandnextsteps.

After initial pleasantries, the broker asked my studentwhathethoughtoftheproperty.

“It looks like an interesting property,” he said.“Unfortunately, we don’t know the market fundamentals.We like downtown and King Street in particular, but wehavealotofquestions.”

Thebrokerthentoldhimthathehadbeeninthemarketformorethanfifteenyears,sohewaswellinformed.Atthispoint, my student pivoted tocalibrated “How” and“What”questions inordertogatherinformationandjudgethebroker’sskills.

“Great,”my student said. “First and foremost, how hasCharlestonbeenaffectedbytheeconomicdownturn?”

Thebrokerrepliedwithadetailedanswer,citingspecificexamplesof market improvement. In the process, heshowedmystudentthathewasveryknowledgeable.

“It sounds like I’m in good hands!” he said,using alabel to build empathy. “Next question:What sort of capratecanbeexpectedinthistypeofbuilding?”

Throughtheensuingback-and-forth,mystudentlearnedthat owners could expect rates of 6 to 7 percent becausebuildings like this were popular with students at the localuniversity,agrowingschoolwhere60percentofthestudentbodylivedoffcampus.

Healsolearnedthatitwouldbeprohibitivelyexpensive—if not physically impossible—to buy land nearby andbuild a similar building. In the last five years no one hadbuilt on the street because of historic preservation rules.Even if they could buy land, the broker said a similarbuildingwouldcost$2.5millionjustinconstruction.

“Thebuilding is in great shape, especially compared totheotheroptionsavailabletostudents,”thebrokersaid.

“Itseemslikethisbuildingfunctionsmoreasaglorifieddormitory than a classicmultifamily building,”my student

said,usingalabeltoextractmoreinformation.Andhegotit.“Fortunately and unfortunately, yes,” the broker said.

“Theoccupancyhashistoricallybeenonehundredpercentand it is a cash cow, but the students act like collegestudents...”

A lightbulb went on in my student’s head: there wassomething strange afoot. If it were such a cash cow,whywould someone sell a 100 percent occupied buildinglocatednexttoagrowingcampusinanaffluentcity? Thatwasirrationalbyanymeasure.Alittlebefuddledbutstillinthe negotiation mindset, my student constructed a label.Inadvertently hemislabeled the situation, triggering thebrokertocorrecthimandrevealaBlackSwan.

“Ifheorsheissellingsuchacashcow,itseemslikethesellermusthavedoubtsaboutfuturemarketfundamentals,”hesaid.

“Well,”hesaid,“thesellerhas some tougherpropertiesin Atlanta and Savannah, so he has to get out of thispropertytopaybacktheothermortgages.”

Bingo!With that,my student had unearthed a fantasticBlackSwan.Thesellerwassufferingconstraints that,untilthatmoment,hadbeenunknown.

Mystudentputthebrokeronmuteashedescribedotherpropertiesandused themoment todiscusspricingwithhisboss.He quickly gave him the green light to make alowball offer—an extreme anchor—to try to yank thebrokertohisminimum.

Afterquizzingthebrokerifthesellerwouldbewillingtoclose quickly, and getting a “yes,” my student set hisanchor.

“I thinkIhaveheardenough,”hesaid.“Wearewillingtooffer$3.4million.”

“Okay,” the broker answered. “That is well below theaskingprice.However,Icanbringtheoffertothesellerandseewhathethinks.”

Laterthatday,thebrokercamebackwithacounteroffer.Thesellerhadtoldhimthatthenumberwastoolow,buthewas willing to take $3.7 million. My student could barelykeep from falling off his chair; the counterofferwas lowerthanhisgoal.Butratherthanjumpattheamount—andriskleaving value on the table with awimp-win deal—mystudent pushed further.He said “No” without using theword.

“That is closer towhatwe believe the value to be,” hesaid, “but we cannot in good conscience pay more than$3.55million.”

(Later, my student told me—and I agreed—that heshould have used alabel or calibrated question here topush the broker to bid against himself. But he was sosurprisedbyhowfarthepricehaddroppedthathestumbledintoold-schoolhaggling.)

“I amonlyauthorized togodown to$3.6million,” thebroker answered, clearly showing that he’d never taken anegotiationclassthattaughttheAckermanmodelandhowtopivottotermstoavoidthehaggle.

My student’s boss signaled to him that $3.6 millionworkedandheagreedtotheprice.

I’veteasedseveralofthetechniquesmystudentusedtoeffectivelynegotiate a great deal for his firm, fromthe useof labels and calibrated questions to the probing ofconstraints to unearth a beautiful Black Swan. It alsobears noting that my student did tons of work beforehandandhadpreparedlabelsandquestionssothathewasreadytojumpontheBlackSwanwhenthebrokerofferedit.

Onceheknewthatthesellerwastryingtogetmoneyoutof this building to pay off mortgages on theunderperformingones,heknewthattimingwasimportant.

Of course, there’s always room for improvement.Afterward my student told me he wished he hadn’tlowballed the offer so quickly and instead used theopportunity to discuss the other properties.Hemight havefound more investment opportunities within the seller’sportfolio.

In addition, he could have potentially built moreempathy and teased out more unknown unknowns withlabels or calibrated questions like “What markets are youfinding difficult right now?”Maybe even gottenface timewiththesellerdirectly.

Still,welldone!

OVERCOMINGFEARANDLEARNINGTOGETWHATYOUWANTOUTOFLIFE

People generally fear conflict, so they avoid useful

arguments out of fear that the tone will escalate intopersonal attacks they cannot handle. People in closerelationshipsoftenavoidmaking theirown interestsknownand instead compromise across the board to avoid beingperceivedasgreedyorself-interested.Theyfold,theygrowbitter, and they grow apart.We’ve all heard of marriagesthatendedindivorceandthecoupleneverfought.

Families are just an extreme version of all parts ofhumanity, from government to business. Except for a fewnaturals, everyone hates negotiation at first. Your handssweat, your fight-or-flight kicks in (with a strong emphasiso nflight), and your thoughts trip drunkenly overthemselves.

Thenaturalfirstimpulseformostofusistochickenout,throw in the towel, run. The mere idea of tossing out anextremeanchoristraumatic.That’swhywimp-windealsarethenorminthekitchenandintheboardroom.

Butstopandthinkaboutthat.Arewereallyafraidoftheguyacrossthetable?Icanpromiseyouthat,withveryfewexceptions,he’snotgoingtoreachacrossandslugyou.

No, our sweaty palms are just an expression ofphysiological fear, a few trigger-happy neurons firingbecauseofsomethingmorebase:ourinnatehumandesiretoget alongwithothermembers of the tribe. It’s not the guyacrossthetablewhoscaresus:it’sconflictitself.

If thisbookaccomplishesonlyone thing, Ihope itgetsyou over that fear of conflict and encourages you tonavigate it with empathy. If you’re going to be great at

anything—a great negotiator, a great manager, a greathusband, a great wife—you’re going to have to do that.You’regoingtohavetoignorethatlittlegeniewho’stellingyoutogiveup,tojustgetalong—aswellasthatothergeniewho’stellingyoutolashoutandyell.

You’re going to have to embrace regular, thoughtfulconflict as the basis of effective negotiation—and of life.Please remember that our emphasis throughout thebook isthat the adversary is the situation and that the person thatyouappeartobeinconflictwithisactuallyyourpartner.

More than a little research has shown that genuine,honest conflict between people over their goals actuallyhelps energize the problem-solving process in acollaborativeway.Skillednegotiatorshaveatalentforusingconflicttokeepthenegotiationgoingwithoutstumblingintoapersonalbattle.

Remember, pushing hard for what you believe is notselfish. It is not bullying. It is not just helping you.Youramygdala,thepartofthebrainthatprocessesfear,willtrytoconvince you to give up, to flee, because the other guy isright,oryou’rebeingcruel.

But if you are an honest, decent person looking for areasonableoutcome,youcanignoretheamygdala.

With the style of negotiation taught in the book—aninformation-obsessed,empathicsearchfor thebestpossibledeal—you are trying to uncover value, period. Not tostrong-armortohumiliate.

Whenyouaskcalibratedquestions,yes,youareleading

your counterpart to your goals. But you are also leadingthemtoexamineandarticulatewhattheywantandwhyandhow they can achieve it.You are demanding creativity ofthem, and therefore pushing them toward a collaborativesolution.

WhenIboughtmyred4Runner,nodoubtIdisappointedthesalesmanbygivinghimasmallerpaydaythanhewouldhaveliked.ButIhelpedhimreachhisquota,andnodoubtIpaidmorefor the truckthanthecar lothadpaidToyota. Ifall I’d wanted was to “win,” to humiliate, I would havestolenthething.

And so I’m going to leave you with one request:Whetherit’sintheofficeoraroundthefamilydinnertable,don’tavoidhonest,clearconflict.Itwillgetyouthebestcarprice,thehighersalary,andthelargestdonation.Itwillalsosaveyourmarriage,yourfriendship,andyourfamily.

One canonly be an exceptional negotiator, and a greatperson, by both listening and speaking clearly andempathetically;bytreatingcounterparts—andoneself—withdignity and respect; andmost of all bybeinghonest aboutwhatonewantsandwhatonecan—andcannot—do.Everynegotiation, every conversation, everymoment of life, is aseries of small conflicts that, managed well, can rise tocreativebeauty.

Embracethem.

KEYLESSONS

What we don’t know can kill us or our deals. But

uncoveringitcantotallychangethecourseofanegotiationandbringusunexpectedsuccess.

Finding the Black Swans—those powerfulunknownunknowns—isintrinsicallydifficult,however,forthesimplereasonthatwedon’tknowthequestionstoask.Becausewedon’t knowwhat the treasure is, we don’t knowwhere todig.

HerearesomeofthebesttechniquesforflushingouttheBlack Swans—and exploiting them. Remember, yourcounterpart might not even know how important theinformationis,oreventhattheyshouldn’trevealit.Sokeeppushing,probing,andgatheringinformation.

■ Let what you know—yourknown knowns—guide you but not blind you. Every case isnew, so remain flexible and adaptable.Remember the Griffin bank crisis: no hostage-taker had killed a hostage on deadline, until hedid.

■ BlackSwansareleveragemultipliers.Rememberthethreetypesofleverage:positive(theabilitytogive someone what they want); negative (theability to hurt someone); and normative (usingyourcounterpart’snormstobringthemaround).

■ Work to understand the other side’s “religion.”Digging into worldviews inherently impliesmovingbeyondthenegotiatingtableandintothe

life, emotional and otherwise, of yourcounterpart.That’swhereBlackSwanslive.

■ Review everything you hear from yourcounterpart. You will not hear everything thefirst time, so double-check.Compare noteswithteam members. Use backup listeners whosejobis to listen between the lines. They will hearthingsyoumiss.

■ Exploit the similarity principle. People aremoreapt to concede to someone they share a culturalsimilaritywith, sodig forwhatmakes them tickandshowthatyousharecommonground.

■ When someone seems irrational or crazy, theymost likely aren’t. Faced with this situation,search for constraints, hidden desires, and badinformation.

■ Getfacetimewithyourcounterpart.Tenminutesof face time often reveals more than days ofresearch. Pay special attention to yourcounterpart’s verbal and nonverbalcommunication at unguarded moments—at thebeginning and the end of the session or whensomeonesayssomethingoutofline.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ThisbookwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutmysonBrandon’s help.Brandonhas been involved in helpingmeshape and create these ideas since I first began teaching atGeorgetownUniversity.Hewasinitiallyjusttheretovideo-recordtheclassesbuthealsoprovidedmefeedbackonhowitwasgoingandwhatwasworking.Tobefair,heactuallyhasbeennegotiatingwithmesincehewastwoyearsold.Ithink I’veknown that ever since I foundout hewasusingempathytogetoutoftroublewithhisvice-principalinhighschool. Inmy firstmeetingwithmybrilliant cowriter,TahlRaz,BrandonwastheretokeeptheinformationflowgoingasTahl soaked it up. In the first progress conference callwithmyamazingpublisher,HollisHeimbouch,HollisaskedaboutBrandon’sroleandTahlsaidhavingBrandonaroundwas like having another Chris in the room. Brandon hasbeenindispensable.

Tahl Raz is a flat-out genius. Anyone who writes abusinessbookwithouthimhasn’tgottenasfarastheycouldhave.It’sthatsimple.Ican’tbelievehowsmartheisorhowquicklyhegetsit.Heisatruebusiness-writingartist.He’sagreatpersonaswell.

Steve Ross, my agent, is a man of integrity and was

perfect for thisbook.Hehasgreat industryknowledgeandmadethisbookhappen.Iamgratefultoknowhim.

Hollis Heimbouch rocks! I am thrilled that she led theHarperCollinsteamandbelievedenoughinthisbooktobuyit.Thankyou,Hollis.

Thankyou,MayaStevenson,forcomingontotheBlackSwan team and holding us together.We are going fartherbecauseofyou.

Sheila Heen and John Richardson are two amazingpeople.Theyaretheoneswhoreallypavedthewaytoshowthat these hostage negotiation ideas belong in the businessworld. Sheilawasmy teacher atHarvardLawSchool. Sheinspiredmewithhowshetaughtandwhosheis.Sheaskedmetoteachalongsidehertwoyearslater.Johnaskedmetoteach International Business Negotiation at Harvardalongsidehimayearafter that.Heguidedme through thatprocess,whichledtotheopportunitytobecomeanadjunctatGeorgetown.Whennothingwashappening forme,bothJohn and Sheila were there. Without them I don’t knowwhereI’dbe.Thankyouboth.

Gary Noesner was my mentor at the FBI. He inspiredandremadethehostagenegotiationworld(withthehelpofhis team at the Crisis Negotiation Unit—CNU). HesupportedmeinwhateverIwanted todo.HemademetheFBI’s lead international kidnapping negotiator. I could callGary at five a.m. and tell him I was getting on a plane inthreehourstogotoakidnappingandhewouldsay,“Go.”Hissupportneverwavered.AtCNUhepulled together the

most talented collection of hostage negotiators everassembled.CNUhititszenithwhenwewerethere.Noneofusknewhowluckywewere. JohnFlood,VinceDalfonzo,Chuck Regini, Winnie Miller, Manny Suarez, DennisBraiden,NeilPurtell,andSteveRomanowereallrockstars.I learned from you all. I can’t believewhat Chuck put upwithfrommeasmypartner.Denniswasamentorandgreatfriend.IconstantlyclashedwithVinceandgrewbecauseofhistalent.

All those who were on the FBI Critical IncidentNegotiationTeamduringthattimetaughtmeaswell.Thankyou.

Tommy Corrigan and John Liguori were my brotherswhen I was in New York City. The three of us didextraordinary things together. Iaminspiredby thememoryofTommy Corrigan to this day. I was privileged to be amember of the JointTerroristTask Force.We fought evil.Richie DeFilippo and Charlie Beaudoin were exceptionalwingmen on theCrisisNegotiationTeam.Thank you bothforallyoutaughtme.

Hugh McGowan and Bob Louden from the NYPD’sHostage Negotiation Team shared their wisdom with me.Both of you have been indispensable assets to the hostagenegotiationworld.Thankyou.

Derek Gaunt has been a great wingman in theWashington, D.C., metropolitan area. Derek gets it.Thankyou,Derek.KathyEllingsworthandher latehusband,Bill,havebeendearfriendsandasoundingboardforyears.Iam

gratefulforyoursupportandfriendship.TomStrentz is the godfather of theFBI’s hostage/crisis

negotiation program and has been an unwavering friend. Ican’tbelievehestilltakesmycalls.

My students at Georgetown and USC have constantlyproved that these ideas work everywhere. More than onestudent has stopped breathing when I looked at them andsaid,“Ineedacarinsixtysecondsorshedies.”Thanksforcomingalongfortheride.GeorgetownandUSChavebothbeen phenomenal places to teach.Both are truly dedicatedtohigher learning, thehighest academic standards, and thesuccessoftheirstudents.

The hostages and their families who allowed me induring their darkest hours to try to help are all blessedpeople. I amgrateful to still be in touchwith someof youtoday.What wisdom there is in the universe that decidedyourpathswerenecessary,Idon’tunderstand.Iwasblessedbyyourgrace.(IneedallthehelpIcanget.)

APPENDIX

PREPAREANEGOTIATIONONESHEET

Negotiationisapsychologicalinvestigation.Youcangaina measure of confidence going into such an investigationwithasimplepreparatoryexerciseweadviseallourclientstodo.Basically,it’salistoftheprimarytoolsyouanticipateusing,suchaslabelsandcalibratedquestions,customizedtotheparticularnegotiation.

When thepressure ison,youdon’t rise to theoccasion—youfalltoyourhighestlevelofpreparation.

Onenote of caution before going into greater depth onthisexercise:somenegotiationexpertsfetishizepreparationto such a degree that they advise people to create theequivalent of preordained scripts for exactly how thenegotiationwillunfoldandtheexactformandsubstancetheagreementwilltakeon.Bynow,afterreadingthisfar,you’llunderstandwhythat’safool’serrand.Notonlywillsuchanapproach make you less agile and creative at the table, itwillmakeyoumoresusceptibletothosewhoare.

Based on my company’s experiences, I believe thatgoodinitialpreparationforeachnegotiationyieldsatleasta7:1 rate of return on time saved renegotiating deals or

clarifyingimplementation.In the entertainment industry, they have a single

documentthatsummarizesaproductforpublicityandsalesthat theycalla“onesheet.”Alongthesamelines,wewantto produce a negotiation “one sheet” that summarizes thetoolswearegoingtouse.

Itwillhavefiveshortsections

SECTIONI:THEGOAL

Think through best/worst-case scenarios but only writedownaspecificgoalthatrepresentsthebestcase.

Typically,negotiationexpertswilltellyoutopreparebymakinga list:yourbottomline;whatyoureallywant;howyou’re going to try to get there; and counters to yourcounterpart’sarguments.

But this typical preparation fails in many ways. It’sunimaginative and leads to the predictable bargainingdynamic of offer/counteroffer/meet in the middle. In otherwords,itgetsresults,butthey’reoftenmediocre.

Thecenterpieceofthetraditionalpreparationdynamic—and its greatest Achilles’ heel—is something called theBATNA.

Roger Fisher andWilliamUry coined the term in their1981 bestseller,Getting to Yes , and it stands for BestAlternativeTo a NegotiatedAgreement. Basically, it’s thebestpossibleoptionyouhave ifnegotiationsfail.Your lastresort.Sayyou’reonacar lot tryingtosellyouroldBMW

3-series. If you already have another dealer who’s givenyouawrittenofferfor$10,000,that’syourBATNA.

The problem is that BATNA tricks negotiators intoaiming low. Researchers have found that humans have alimited capacity for keeping focus in complex, stressfulsituations like negotiations.And so, once a negotiation isunderway,wetendtogravitate towardthefocuspoint thathasthemostpsychologicalsignificanceforus.

In that context, obsessing over a BATNA turns it intoyourtarget,andtherebysetstheupperlimitofwhatyouwillask for. After you’ve spent hours on a BATNA, youmentallyconcedeeverythingbeyondit.

God knows aiming low is seductive. Self-esteem is ahuge factor in negotiation, and many people set modestgoalstoprotectit.It’seasiertoclaimvictorywhenyouaimlow. That’s why some negotiation experts say that manypeoplewho think theyhave “win-win” goals really have a“wimp-win”mentality.The “wimp-win” negotiator focusesonhisorherbottomline,andthat’swheretheyendup.

SoifBATNAisn’tyourcenterpiece,whatshouldbe?I tell my clients that as part of their preparation they

shouldthinkabouttheoutcomeextremes:bestandworst.Ifyou’vegotbothendscovered,you’llbereadyforanything.Soknowwhatyoucannotacceptandhaveanideaaboutthebest-case outcome, but keep in mind that since there’sinformationyettobeacquiredfromtheotherside,it’squitepossiblethatbestcasemightbeevenbetterthanyouknow.

Remember,neverbesosureofwhatyouwant thatyou

wouldn’t takesomethingbetter.Onceyou’vegotflexibilityin the forefront of yourmind you come into a negotiationwithawinningmindset.

Let’s sayyou’re sellingold speakers becauseyouneed$100 to put toward a new set. If you concentrate on the$100minimum,you’llrelaxwhenyouhearthatnumberandthat’swhatyou’llget.Butifyouknowthattheyareforsaleinusedaudiostoresfor$140,youcouldsetahigh-endgoalof$150,whileremainingopentobetterthings.

Now,while I counsel thinkingabout abest/worst rangeto give my clients the security of some structure, when itcomestowhatactuallygoesonyouronesheet,myadviceisto just stickwith the high-endgoal, as itwillmotivate andfocusyourpsychologicalpowers,primingyoutothinkyouarefacinga“loss”forany termthat fallsshort.Decadesofgoal-setting research is clear that people who set specific,challenging, but realistic goals end up getting better dealsthan thosewho don’t set goals or simply strive to do theirbest.

Bottom line:Peoplewhoexpectmore (andarticulate it)getmore.

Herearethefourstepsforsettingyourgoal:

■ Setanoptimisticbut reasonablegoalanddefineitclearly.

■ Writeitdown.

■ Discussyourgoalwithacolleague(thismakesit

hardertowimpout).

■ Carrythewrittengoalintothenegotiation.

SECTIONII:SUMMARY

Summarize andwrite out in just a couple of sentences theknownfactsthathaveleduptothenegotiation.

You’re going to have to have something to talk aboutbeyond a self-serving assessment of what you want.Andyouhadbetterbereadytorespondwithtacticalempathytoyour counterpart’s arguments; unless they’re incompetent,theotherpartywillcomepreparedtoargueaninterpretationofthefactsthatfavorsthem.

Getonthesamepageattheoutset.Youhave to clearly describe the lay of the land before

you can think about acting in its confines.Why are youthere?Whatdoyouwant?Whatdotheywant?Why?

Youmustbeabletosummarizeasituationinawaythatyourcounterpartwill respondwitha“That’s right.” If theydon’t,youhaven’tdoneitright.

SECTIONIII:LABELS/ACCUSATIONAUDIT

Preparethreetofivelabelstoperformanaccusationaudit.Anticipate how your counterpart feels about these facts

you’ve just summarized. Make a concise list of anyaccusations they mightmake—no matter how unfair orridiculous theymight be.Then turn each accusation into a

listofnomore thanfive labelsandspenda little timerole-playingit.

There are fill-in-the-blank labels that can be used innearly every situation to extract information from yourcounterpart,ordefuseanaccusation:

Itseemslike_________isvaluabletoyou.Itseemslikeyoudon’tlike_________.Itseemslikeyouvalue__________.Itseemslike_________makesiteasier.Itseemslikeyou’rereluctantto_________.As an example, if you’re trying to renegotiate an

apartment lease to allow subletters and you know thelandlordisopposedtothem,yourpreparedlabelswouldbeon the lines of “It seems as though you’re not a fan ofsubletters” or “It seems like you want stability with yourtenants.”

SECTIONIV:CALIBRATEDQUESTIONS

Preparethreetofivecalibratedquestionstorevealvaluetoyou and your counterpart and identify and overcomepotentialdealkillers.

Effectivenegotiators lookpast their counterparts’ statedpositions (what the party demands) and delve into theirunderlying motivations (what is making them want whattheywant).Motivationsarewhattheyareworriedaboutandwhattheyhopefor,evenlustfor.

Figuring out what the other party is worried aboutsounds simple, but our basic human expectations about

negotiationoftengetintheway.Mostofustendtoassumethat the needs of the other side conflictwith our own.Wetendto limitourfieldofvision toour issuesandproblems,and forget that the other side has its own unique issuesbased on its own unique worldview. Great negotiators getpast theseblindersbybeingrelentlesslycuriousaboutwhatisreallymotivatingtheotherside.

HarryPotterauthorJ.K.Rowlinghasagreatquotethatsumsupthisconcept:“Youmustaccepttherealityofotherpeople.You think that reality isup fornegotiation, thatwethink it’swhatever you say it is.Youmust accept thatweare as real as you are; you must accept that you are notGod.”

There will be a small group of “What” and “How”questions that youwill find yourself using in nearly everysituation.Hereareafewofthem:

Whatarewetryingtoaccomplish?Howisthatworthwhile?What’sthecoreissuehere?Howdoesthataffectthings?What’sthebiggestchallengeyouface?Howdoesthisfitintowhattheobjectiveis?

QUESTIONS TO IDENTIFY BEHIND-THE-TABLEDEALKILLERSWhenimplementationhappensbycommittee,thesupportofthat committee is key.You’llwant to tailoryour calibratedquestions to identify and unearth the motivations of thosebehindthetable,including:

Howdoesthisaffecttherestofyourteam?Howonboardarethepeoplenotonthiscall?Whatdoyourcolleaguesseeastheirmainchallengesin

thisarea?

QUESTIONS TO IDENTIFY AND DIFFUSE DEAL-KILLINGISSUESInternalnegotiatinginfluenceoftensitswiththepeoplewhoaremost comfortablewith things as they are.Changemaymake them look as if they haven’t been doing their job.Your dilemma in such a negotiation is how tomake themlookgoodinthefaceofthatchange.

You’llbetemptedtoconcentrateonmoney,butputthataside for now. A surprisingly high percentage ofnegotiations hinge on something outside dollars and cents.Often they have more to do with self-esteem, status,autonomy,andothernonfinancialneeds.

Think about their perceived losses. Never forget that alossstingsatleasttwiceasmuchasanequivalentgain.

Forexample, theguyacross thetablemaybehesitatingtoinstall thenewaccountingsystemheneeds(andyouareselling) because he doesn’t want to screw anything upbefore his annual review in four months’ time. Instead ofloweringyourprice,youcanoffertohelpimpresshisboss,and do it safely, by promising to finish the installation inninetydays,guaranteed.

QUESTIONS TO USE TO UNEARTH THE DEAL-KILLINGISSUES

Whatareweupagainsthere?Whatisthebiggestchallengeyouface?Howdoesmakingadealwithusaffectthings?Whathappensifyoudonothing?Whatdoesdoingnothingcostyou?How does making this deal resonate with what your

companypridesitselfon?It’softenveryeffectivetoasktheseingroupsoftwoor

three as they are similar enough that they help yourcounterpart think about the same thing from differentangles.

Every situation is unique, of course, but choosing theright mix of these questions will lead your counterpart toreveal information about what they want and need—andsimultaneouslypush them to see things fromyourpoint ofview.

Bereadytoexecutefollow-uplabels to theiranswers toyourcalibratedquestions.

Having labels prepared will allow you to quickly turnyourcounterpart’sresponsesbacktothem,whichwillkeepthem feeding you new and expanding information.Again,these are fill-in-the-blank labels that you can use quicklywithouttonsofthought:

Itseemslike__________isimportant.Itseemsyoufeellikemycompanyisinauniqueposition

to__________.Itseemslikeyouareworriedthat__________.

SECTIONV:NONCASHOFFERS

Prepare a list of noncash items possessed by yourcounterpartthatwouldbevaluable.

Askyourself: “What could theygive thatwould almostgetustodoitforfree?”ThinkoftheanecdoteItoldafewchapters ago about my work for the lawyers’ association:My counterpart’s interest was to pay me as little cash aspossible in order to look good in front of his board.Wecame upon the idea that they pay in part by publishing acover story aboutme in theirmagazine.Thatwas low-costforthemanditadvancedmyinterestsconsiderably.

Formoreinformationonmycompany,TheBlackSwanGroup,anyadditionalinformationorguidancewecangiveyouonnegotiation,or forcontactingmeaboutspeaking toyour company, please visit our website atwww.blackswanltd.com.

NOTES

Thepaginationofthiselectroniceditiondoesnotmatchtheedition from which it was made. To locate a specificpassage,pleaseusethesearchfeatureonyoure-bookreader

CHAPTER1:THENEWRULES1. Robert Mnookin,Bargaining with the Devil: When to

Negotiate,WhentoFight(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,2010).

2. Roger Fisher and William Ury,Getting to Yes:Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1981).

3. DanielKahneman,Thinking,FastandSlow(NewYork:Farrar,Straus&Giroux,2011).

4. Philip B. Heymann and United States Department ofJustice,LessonsofWaco:ProposedChangesinFederalLawEnforcement(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofJustice,1993).

CHAPTER2:BEAMIRROR1. GeorgeA.Miller,“TheMagicalNumberSeven,Plusor

MinusTwo:SomeLimitsonOurCapacityforProcessingInformation,”Psychological Review 63, no. 2 (1956):81–97.

CHAPTER3:DON’TFEELTHEIRPAIN,LABELIT1. Greg J. Stephens, Lauren J. Silbert, and Uri Hasson,

“Speaker–ListenerNeuralCouplingUnderliesSuccessfulCommunication,”Proceedingsof theNationalAcademyofSciencesof theUSA 107, no. 32 (August 10, 2010):14425–30.

2. Matthew D. Lieberman et al., “Putting Feelings intoWords:Affect Labeling DisruptsAmygdalaActivity inResponse toAffective Stimuli,” Psychological Science18,no.5(May2007):421–28.

CHAPTER4:BEWARE“YES”—MASTER“NO”1. Jim Camp,Start with NO: The Negotiating Tools That

the Pros Don‘t Want You to Know (NewYork: CrownBusiness,2002).

CHAPTER6:BENDTHEIRREALITY1. Herb Cohen,You Can Negotiate Anything (Secaucus,

NJ:LyleStuart,1980).2. Antonio R. Damasio,Descartes’ Error: Emotion,

Reason,andtheHumanBrain(NewYork:Quill,2000).3. JeffreyJ.Fox,HowtoBecomeaRainmaker:ThePeople

Who Get and Keep Customers (New York: Hyperion,2000).

4. Daniel Ames and Malia Mason, “Tandem Anchoring:Informational andPolitenessEffects ofRangeOffers inSocial Exchange,”Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology108,no.2(February2015):254–74.

CHAPTER7:CREATETHEILLUSIONOFCONTROL1. KevinDutton,Split-SecondPersuasion:TheAncientArt

andNewScienceofChangingMinds(Boston:HoughtonMifflinHarcourt,2011).

2. Dhruv Khullar, “Teaching Doctors the Art ofNegotiation,”New York Times , January 23, 2014,http://well.blogs.nytimes.com /2014/01/23/teaching-doctors-the-art-of-negotiation/, accessed September 4,2015.

CHAPTER8:GUARANTEEEXECUTION1. Albert Mehrabian,Silent Messages: Implicit

Communication of Emotions and Attitudes , 2nd ed.(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1981), and AlbertMeh ra b ia n ,Nonverbal Communication (Chicago:Aldine-Atherton,1972).

2. Lyn M. Van Swol, Michael T. Braun, and DeepakMalhotra,“EvidenceforthePinocchioEffect:LinguisticDifferencesBetweenLies,DeceptionbyOmissions,andTruths,”DiscourseProcesses49,no.2(2012):79–106.

CHAPTER9:BARGAINHARD1. Gerald R. Williams,Legal Negotiations and Settlement

(St.Paul,MN:West,1983).2. Marwan Sinaceur and Larissa Tiedens, “Get Mad and

GetMorethanEven:TheBenefitsofAngerExpressionsin Negotiations,”Journal of Experimental SocialPsychology42,no.3(2006):314–22.

3. Daniel R.Ames andAbbieWazlawek, “Pushing in the

Dark: Causes and Consequences of Limited Self-Awareness for InterpersonalAssertiveness,” PersonalityandSocialPsychologyBulletin40,no.6(2014):1–16.

CHAPTER10:FINDTHEBLACKSWAN1. Nassim Nicholas Taleb,Fooled by Randomness: The

HiddenRoleofChanceinLifeandintheMarkets(NewYork:RandomHouse,2001).

2. NassimNicholasTaleb,TheBlackSwan:The Impactofthe Highly Improbable (New York: Random House,2007).

3. Ellen J.Langer,ArthurBlank, andBenzionChanowitz,“TheMindlessnessofOstensiblyThoughtfulAction:TheRole of ‘Placebic’ Information in InterpersonalInteraction,”Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology36,no.6(1978):635–42.

4. Deepak Malhotra and Max H. Bazerman,NegotiationGenius: How to Overcome Obstacles and AchieveBrilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond(NewYork:BantamBooks,2007).

INDEX

Thepaginationofthiselectroniceditiondoesnotmatchtheeditionfromwhichitwascreated.Tolocateaspecificentry,pleaseuseyoure-bookreader’ssearchtools.

AbuSayyaf(militantIslamicgroup),96,99,100,140,142–44

Accommodators(bargainingstyle),192,194–96accusationaudit,19,64–68,73,128,182–83,254–55example,contractnegotiation,65–68Ackerman,Mike,205–6Ackermanmodel,21,205–8,212,240example,gettingarentcut,208–11fourstepsof,206Haitiankidnappingsand,207–8activelistening,16,19,53.SeealsotacticalempathyBCSMand,97crisisnegotiationsand,225difficultyoflistening,27–28effectivepauses,103focusingontheotherperson,28,47labelingand,103minimalencouragers,103mirroringand,19,103

paraphrasingand,103Schillingkidnappingcaseand,102–4silences,19,103summaries,103uncoveringBlackSwansand,228,244–45aggressiveness,155,160,172,173,175removing,141,152agreement,20,52,84,143,163,195,231best/worstrange,253clearingbarriersto,72commitment“yes”and,81dynamicof,157executionof,163,171,177fairnessand,122liarsand,172“no”and,89RuleofThreeand,177–78,186Aladdin(film),123AlQaeda,140,143Ames,Daniel,202Analysts(bargainingstyle),192,193–94“anchorandadjustment”effect,130anchoringbendingrealitywith,139emotionsand,20,128–29establishingarange,131–32,139extreme,199,200,206–7,212,240inkidnappingcase,133–35

monetarynegotiations,129–30anger,57–58,158,161,202,204apologizing,3,58–59,125,152,159,181,194Aristide,Jean-Bertrand,113Assertive(bargainingstyle),192,193,196–97 real anger, threats without anger, and strategic umbrage,

202assumptions,19,24–26,44,47,191bargainingstylesand,197–98ofFisherandUry,11knownknownsand,218

bargaininghard,20–21,188–212Accommodators,192,194–96Ackermanmodeland,205–8,212Analysts,192,193–94Assertivestyle,192,193,196–97BlackSwanrule,198effectivewaystoassertsmartly,201–5example,MBAstudentsolicitingfunds,200–201“falltoyourhighestlevelofpreparation,”208,211,251identifyingyourcounterpart’sstyle,197–98,211informationgatheringand,199–200,211–12keylessonsof,211–12lawyer-negotiators,192–93nodealisbetterthanabaddeal,115,117,204outcomegoalsand,253personalnegotiationstyles,192–98pivotingtononcashterms,199,206,258

psychologicalcurrentsand,191punchingback(usingassertion),201–5,212takingapunch,198–201,212Vossandbuyingatruck,188–90Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to

Fight(Mnookin),2BATNA (BestAlternativeTo a NegotiatedAgreement), 8,

13,252Bazerman,MaxH.,233Beaudoin,Charlie,24BehavioralChangeStairwayModel(BCSM),97behavioraleconomics,11behaviorchangeBCSMand,97healthissuesand,97lessonsthatlaythefoundationfor,112psychologicalenvironmentnecessaryfor,97–98“that’sright”and,98,101–5,107“you’reright”asineffective,105–7behindthetableorLevelIIplayers,171–72,186pronounusageand,179,187questionstoidentify,256bendingreality,126–35.Seealsoprospecttheorykeylessonsof,138–39Bergen,Peter,232BlackSwan,The(Taleb),215BlackSwanGroup,The,3,21,191,220complementaryPDFform,bargainingtypes,198

websiteandmoreinformation,258BlackSwans,19,21,213–45ascertainingcounterpart’sunattainedgoals,231askingquestionstoreveal,110“crazy”vs.aclue,232–33,245example,Griffinhostagecase,213–14,216–17,235,244example,MBAstudentuncoversseller’sconstraints,238–

41example,Watsonstandoff,WashingtonDC,224–28gettingfacetimetounearthhiddenfactors,236–37keylessonsof,244–45knowingacounterpart’s“religion”and,225,228–29,244asleveragemultipliers,220–24,244listeninganduncovering,228,244–45mistakingactingonbadinformationforcraziness,233–34mistakingconstrainedforactingcrazy,234–35mistakinghavingotherinterestsforactingcrazy,235observingunguardedmoments tounearthhidden factors,

237Taleb’suseofterm,216theoryof,215tipsforreadingreligioncorrectly,228uncoveringunknownunknowns,218–20whattheyare,238Blum,Gabriella,2–4,5bodylanguage.SeenonverbalcommunicationBonderow,Amy,76–77,81,85BranchDavidiansiege,Waco,Texas,13

Bueno,Jesus,182–85Burnham,MartinandGracia,140,143,144,145,146,166Burnham-Soberocase,DosPalmas,140–41,142–48,170Bush,GeorgeW.,143

calibrated, or open-ended, questions, 20, 141, 149, 150,151–56,243

Ackermanmodeland,207 toanalyzenegotiation teamandbehind the table/Level II

players,171,172Assertive(bargainingstyle)and,196cautionaboutusing“why,”153–54,160,203Ecuadorkidnappingand,160,165,166,167toelicitinformation,185example,doctorandunhappypatient,150,155examplestouse,154,256“forcedempathy”and,168greatest-of-all-timequestion,151,168“How”questions,167–69,181,186keylessonsof,160–61NegotiationOneSheetand,255–58questions to identifyanddiffusedeal-killing issues,256–

57questionstoidentifythebehind-the-tabledealkillers,256responsestoaggressivenessand,141,152,159,175RuleofThreeand,177–78scriptfor,157–58toneofvoicefor,167–68whentouse,154

wordstoavoidin,153wordstobeginwith,153,160Camp,Jim,78,90car-buyingnegotiations,119,188–90,243certaintyeffect,127Chandler,Raymond,129Chrisdiscount,179–80clearingthebarrierstoagreement,61–63,72Clinton,Hillary,53cognitivebias,12Cohen,Herb,119collaboration,21How/Noquestionsand,167–68nevercreateanenemy,204–5Collodi,Carlo,178ColumbiaBusinessSchool,131communication.See also active listening; calibrated, or

open-ended,question;voicetones calibrated, or open-ended, question, 20, 141, 149, 150,

151–56,165,166,167–69,170,174–75,255–58Chineseexpressionabout,111controlin,160,166empathyas“soft”skill,53hiddenaspectsof,77“I”messages,203–4literalinterpretations,mistakeof,77lyingand,178“no”and,75–80

pronounusageandperson’simportance,179,1877-38-55PercentRule,176–77,186subtleties,spottingandinterpreting,173–76uncoveringlying,176usingyourownname(Chrisdiscount),179–80,187“yes”and,80–81“yes”and“no,”valuesinherentin,86compromise,18–19,115–16,139reasonsfor,116win-winand,115,253control,140–61 calibrated, or open-ended, question and, 141, 149, 150,

151–56incommunication,160creatingtheillusionof,149–61,166,174–75influencevs.,84keylessonsof,160–61lackof,andhostagementality,159late-nightFMDJvoiceand,33asprimalurge,84saying“no”and,78–79,86–92,94self-control,156–59,161,202,204crisis negotiations, 4–5, 9–10, 13–16, 18–19, 54.See also

kidnappingorhostagenegotiationsHarlemstandoff,49–51,54–55Vossand,76Watsonstandoff,224–28CrisisNegotiationUnit(CNU),96–97

BehavioralChangeStairwayModel(BCSM),97Cruz,Arlyndela,143Cuban,Mark,91

Damasio,Antonio,122deadlines,20,116–20,139mistakeofhidingadeadline,120decision-makingdiscoveringemotionaldriversof,126emotionand,122,123prospecttheoryand,127–35Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and theHumanBrain

(Damasio),122directorassertivevoice,32–33,48DoubleIndemnity(film),129Downsv.UnitedStates,10Dutton,Kevin,149,150

Ecuadorkidnapping,164–67,169–70Egypt-Israelpeacetreaty,133emailtechnique,20,92–93,95emotionamygdalaandfear,55,61,62anchoringemotions,20,128–29avoidingescalations,204carefuluseof,204communicationderailedby,49contractforRobinWilliamsinAladdinand,123decision-makingand,122,123

detectingtheotherperson’s,55–56Harlemstand-offnegotiation,49–51,54–55intentionallymislabeling,reasonfor,91,94Iraniansanctionsand,123–24Japaneseregulatingtechnique,159labeling,50,54–73negativeemotions,57–61“presenting”behaviorand“underlying”feeling,57primalneedsand,84regulating,duringnegotiation,156–59,161replacingnegativewithpositive,59,73responsestoverbalassaults,159roleinnegotiation,49–50UltimatumGameand,121–22emotional intelligence, 19, 33, 50, 52.See also tactical

empathyempathy,15,53–54,72,128.SeealsotacticalempathyBCSMand,97definition,51–52FBIcrisisnegotiationtechniquesand,16“forcedempathy,”168,180HillaryClintonand,53labelingand,68asamoodenhancer,62negotiationand,16,53–54,61,70–71neuralresonanceand,53projectionversus,120rapportbasedon,70

as“soft”communicationskill,53usinganempathymessageinnegotiations,182usinglabelingtocreate,239usingyourownname(Chrisdiscount)and,179–80,187verbalandnonverballanguagetosignal,46encouragers,103Estabrook,Robert,150–51Evelsizer,Marti,86–87,88executionofagreements,20,162–87articulationofimplementation,169HowasnecessarywithYes,164–69Howquestionandimplementation,168–69,186prisonsiege,St.MartinParish,Louisiana,162–63RuleofThreeand,177–78

fairness,20,139compromiseasabaddeal,115–16,139contractforRobinWilliamsinAladdinand,123errorinusing,183Iraniansanctionsand,123–24NFLlockoutand,125UltimatumGame,120–23Voss’suseof,125–26whenandhowtouseinnegotiation,124–26whyit’spowerful,122–24falsehoodsandliars,172,173,176numberofwordsused,178Pinocchioeffect,178RuleofThreeand,177–78,186

useofpronouns,178fearamygdalaand,55,61,62,243labelingandcalming,61,63,64,67,73ofnegotiating,242FederalBureauofInvestigation(FBI)Ackermansystem,21“countryclearance,”58CrisisNegotiationTeams,49–51,76–77,86–87crisisnegotiation techniques,4–5,13–16,141,149,165,

166,167,170,174CrisisNegotiationUnit(CNU),96–97,170CriticalIncidentResponseGroup(CIRG),14Giffehijackinghostages,mishandlingof,9–10HostageRescueTeam(HRT),96JointTerrorismTaskForce(JTTF),24,76,77–78,98kidnappingnegotiations,141numberofagents,1Quantico,96,164,173,216RubyRidge,Waco,andnegotiationapproach,13–14SupervisorySpecialAgent(SSA),96SWATteams,49,76VossasaSSAwiththeCNU,96Vossasinternationalkidnappingnegotiator,1,98,164Vossbeginscareerwith,76Vossbeginsnegotiatorcareerat,85VossontheJTTF,NewYork,76,77–78,98Fields,W.C.,178

financialnegotiations.Seealsobargainingcar-buying,119,188–90,243Chrisdiscount,180gettingarentcut,208–11 getting your counterparts to bid against themselves and,

181–85MBAstudentandsolicitingfunds,200–201Fisher,Roger,10–11,252FooledbyRandomness(Taleb),215framingeffect,12,20Freeh,Louis,14fundraising,89–91

Gaddafi,Muammar,99–100Getting toYes(FisherandUry),11,13,14,16,20,80,98,

252Giffe,George,Jr.,9–10goals/outcome goals, 12, 52, 81, 95, 112, 160, 170, 174,

201,211,240,242,243Ackermanmodeland,206,208agreementor“yes”as,94ascertainingcounterpart’s,28,231bargainingstylesand,193,195,196BATNAand,252best/worstrange,69,253extractinginformationas,25,47,110,147fourstepsforsetting,253–54humanconnectionas,72NegotiationOneSheet,252–54

win-winorcompromise,115,116,253Griffin,William,213–14,216–17,235,244

Haitiaskidnapcapital,113–14kidnappingcase,113–15,133–35,207–8HarvardNegotiationResearchProject,2,10–11HarvardUniversity,4executivenegotiatingcourse,1,5–8Heen,Sheila,5–6,7HelpLine,81“CareFronting,”82,84Vossansweringphonesfor,81–84,85Heymann,PhilipB.,14hostagementality,159hostagenegotiation.SeekidnappingorhostagenegotiationsHowtoBecomeaRainmaker,126humor,187

“I”messages,203–4influence,16,20BCSMand,97,98demeanor,delivery,and,32FBI’spsychologicaltacticsand,43identifyingandinfluencingemotions,50negative,clearingout,72negotiationand,18persuadingfromother’sperspectiveand,84,225,227–29Iran,123–24

ISIS,232IsraelDefenseForces(IDF),2IsraeliNationalSecurityCouncil,2

Jobs,Steve,219Kahneman,Daniel,11,12,13,127kidnappingorhostagenegotiations,9–10,21,78airplanehijacking,9–10America’shostagenegotiationpolicy,232Atticaprisonriots,9bankrobbery,Brooklyn,23–43,179Burnham-Soberocase,140–48 calibrated, or open-ended, questions, use of, 141, 149,

165,166,167,170compromiseasabaddeal,115,133Ecuadorkidnapping,164–67,169–70exercisecalled“sixtysecondsorshedies,”64FBIand,1,141,147,170FBIPittsburghcase,148–49gaugingthelevelofathreatin,118Griffincase,213–14,216–17,235,244Haitiankidnapping113–15,133–35hostagesurvivaldebriefing,170late-nightFMDJvoiceand,33–34,38leveragein,114,118MunichOlympics,9NegotiationOperationCenter(NOC),27negotiatorteams,27neversplitthedifferencein,18–19

Onglingswankidnapping,173–75,179prisonsiege,St.MartinParish,Louisiana,162–63,171“proofoflife”and,34,147,148–49,165,170Schillingcase,96,98–105terroristsand,232“that’sright”and,101–5“knowingtheirreligion,”225,228–29,244offeringreasonsthatreferencecounterpart’sreligion,231powerofhopesanddreamsand,230–31similarityprincipleand,229–30Koresh,David,13

labeling,19,50,54–73,112accusationaudit,64–68,73,254–55Assertive(bargainingstyle)and,196avoiding“I,”56crankygrandfatherexample,59deescalatingangryconfrontationswith,58–59todiscoversourceofincongruence,176empathyasamoodenhancer,62empathybuildingand,239toextractinformation,239,257–58offears,61–62fill-in-the-blankexamples,255,258GirlScoutfundraiserand,62–63intentionallymislabelinganemotion,91,94keylessonsof,71–73labelingandcalmingfear,61,63,64,67,73lawyersand“takingthestingout”technique,65

Liebermanbrainimagingstudy,55negativityand,57–61,64–68,70phrasingthelabel,56RuleofThreeand,177rulesaboutformanddelivery,55Schillingkidnappingcaseand,103silencesand,56–57,71,72stepone:detectingtheotherperson’semotionalstate,55–

56steptwo:labelingitaloud,56astransformative,63WashingtonRedskinsticketholderscript,60–61“words,music,anddance”and,55Lanceley,Fred,14–15Langer,Ellen,231late-nightFMDJvoice,19,31–33,47contractdiscussionand,34downward-inflectingstatement,32,33generaldemeanoranddelivery,32Harlemfugitivestand-offnegotiationand,51hostagenegotiationand,33–34,38lawyer-negotiators,192–93Leonsis,Ted,231“Lessons of Waco: Proposed Changes in Federal Law

Enforcement”(Heymann),14leverage,220–24BlackSwansasleveragemultipliers,220–21,224,244inakidnapping,221

lossaversionand,128negative,222–23,226,227,244normative,224,226,244personalnegotiationstylesand,192positive,221–22,226,244whatitis,220liars.SeefalsehoodsandliarsLieberman,Matthew,55listening.Seeactivelisteninglossaversion,12,127–28,139,223,257

Macapagal-Arroyo,Gloria,140Malhotra,Deepak,178,179,233Mehrabian,Albert,176MemphisBarAssociation,132MiddleEasternmerchants,33Miller,GeorgeA.,28Miller,Winnie,227mindsetfindingandactingonBlackSwansand,218,219askeytosuccessfulnegotiation,43multiplehypothesesapproach,25positive,33,47ready-to-walk,204–5win-win,115mirroring(isopraxism),19,35–36,44,48,70,71,183activelisteningand,103bodylanguageand,36toelicitinformation,185

fourstepprocessforworkplacenegotiation,44–46reactiontouseof“fair”innegotiations,125silencesand,37,44,72usewithAssertivebargainers,196usewithassertivepeople,191–92verbal,36Wisemanwaiterstudy,36Misino,Dominick,41–42Mnookin,Robert,2–4,5Moore,DonA.,120Moore,Margaret,214–15,217Mousavian,SeyedHossein,124MSU(makingshitup)approach,30Mueller,Robert,143

negotiation.See also bargaining hard;specific situations;specifictechniques

clearingthebarrierstoagreement,61–63,72 confrontational showdowns or joint problem-solving

sessions,151creatingbreakthroughsbyuncoveringunknowns,213–45example,Annaandcontractnegotiation,65–68example,gettinganairlineticketandupgrade,68–71example,gettingarentcut,208–11extremeanchortobegin,199gainingpermissiontopersuade,96–112 getting your counterparts to bid against themselves and,

181–85guaranteeingexecutionofadeal,162–81

howtogetyourprice(bargaininghard),188–212asinformation-gatheringprocess,147,154labelingandtacticalempathy,49–73lifeas,17limitedpredictabilityand,219mantrafor,115,117,204mirroringtoestablishrapport,23–48neversplitthedifference,18–19,115,116,139“no”andgeneratingmomentum,74–95 preparation for, 211, 251–58 ( see alsoNegotiation One

Sheet)problem-solvingapproach,8,11,14,15psychologicaltacticsandstrategies,15–16,18questionstotransformconflictintocollaboration,140–61researchonandstudyof,10–13shapingwhat’sfair,113–39sweetesttwowordsfor,98System1and2conceptsand,13timingandsuccessof,119VossinHarvardcourse,5–8negotiationerrors.Seealsospecificnegotiationsaiminglow,252–53compromising,18–19,115–16,139deadlinesand,116–20gettingtoYestooquickly,86,94,112goingtoofast,30,47hidingadeadline,120lackofrealcommunication,145–48

notfocusingontheotherperson,28NegotiationGenius(MalhotraandBazerman),233NegotiationOneSheet,21,251–58SectionI:TheGoal,252–54SectionII:Summary,254SectionIII:Labels/AccusationAudit,254–55SectionIV:CalibratedQuestions,255–58SectionV:NoncashOffers,258neuralresonance,53NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment(NYPD),10,24,27,30,

31,38TechnicalAssistanceResponseUnit(TARU),41NFLPlayersAssociation(NFLPA),125niceness,85,939/11terroristattacks,140,143,216,224Nixon,Jim,98“No,”74–95askingfor,20,85demystifying,88emailtechnique,92–93,95fearof,88forcingaresponse,91fundraisingscriptusing,89–91asgatewayto“Yes,”77 getting your counterparts to bid against themselves and,

181–85 “How” questions as gentle ways to say “no,” 167–68,

174,181,186

MarkCubanon,91meaningsof,79,94 multi-step (for getting counterparts to bid against

themselves),182–85powerfullessonsof,94–95asprotection,78–79,86–92,93,94skillsof,89asstartofnegotiation,75–80voicetonesanddownwardinflection,181waystorespondto,79–80whentowalkaway,92Noesner,Gary,14–15,144nonmonetaryissues,132,134,135,199,206,257preparingnoncashoffers,258nonround numbers, 132–33, 134, 137, 183–84, 185, 201,

206,207,211,212Ackermansystemand,206,212Haitiankidnappingsand,207–8nonverbalcommunication,173matchingbodylanguagewithvoicetone,176mirroringbodylanguage,367-38-55PercentRuleand,176,186smiling,33,47

O’Brien,Jim,214,217Onglingswan,Aaron,174–75Onglingswan,Alastair,173–75,179Ottenhoff,Ben,89–91

“paradoxofpower,”227paraphrasing,20,103,112Peale,NormanVincent,81persuasionstrategy:negotiatingintheother’sworld,80–85,

94–95Philippines,96,98–104,140–41,142–48,173–75Pinocchioeffect,178Pittsburgh Police Department’s Hostage NegotiationTeam,

87positive/playfulvoice,32,33,48positivereinforcement,36smilingand,32,33,46,47Prado,Angel,136–38preparation for negotiation, 211, 251–58 (see also

NegotiationOneSheet)“falltoyourhighestlevelofpreparation,”208,211,251primalneeds,84PrincetonUniversity,fMRIbrain-scanexperimentonneural

resonance,53prisonsiege,St.MartinParish,Louisiana,162–63,171prospecttheory,12,127–35anchoringemotions,128–29establishingarange,131–32lettingtheotherguygofirst,129–31pivotingtononmonetaryterms,132surprisingwithagift,133 using odd numbers to fortify your offers, 107, 132–33,

134,137,183–84,185,206,211,212

ProspectTheory(KahnemanandTversky),127psychics,56

Raiffa,Howard,206rapport,30,47,83,84,165.SeealsomirroringAccommodatorsand,195basedonempathy,70BCSMand,97crisisnegotiationsamd,15mirroringtobuild,35negotiationand,46Schillingkidnappingcaseand,101usedforsales,108“rationalactors,”12reciprocity,133,148,160,168,193,196,206,207Regini,Chuck,98Rogers,Carl,97Rowling,J.K.,256RubyRidgesiege,Idaho,13RuleofThree,177–78,186Rust,Kevin,166

Sabaya,Abu,98–105,142–43,144,145Sadat,Anwar,133“safeandsecure,”84,86,94salarynegotiations,129–30,135–38“bolsteringrange,”131establishingarange,131–32example,AngelPrado,136–38

pleasantpersistenceonnonsalaryterms,135,137recruitingamentorwithaspecificquestion,136–37settingsuccessmetrics,135–36,137sales,30openingline,86,94using“that’sright”and,107–8Schilling,Jeffrey,96,98–105,140scripts,8,251forfundraising,89–91fornegotiatinggettingpaid,157–58telemarketerand,74WashingtonRedskinsticketholderscript,60–61self-esteem,253,2577-38-55PercentRule,176–77,186silencesbargainingstylesand,194,196,197closingadealand,189lastruleoflabelingand,56–57pausesforactivelistening,19,103 pausing after labeling a barrier ormirroring a statement,

37,44,71,72similarityprinciple,229–30,245Sinaceur,Marwan,202smiling,46Analysts(bargainingstyle)and,194creatingpositivitywith,32,33,46,47toestablishrapport,70nicenessandfeigned,74,85,93

positive/playfulvoiceand,48Snyder,Phillip,113–14Sobero,Guillermo,140,142,143Split-SecondPersuasion(Dutton),149StartwithNO(Camp),78,90“strategicumbrage,”202St.ThomasMoreSchool,106,107summaries,20Assertive(bargainingstyle)and,196buildingblocksof,112forimplementationofadeal,169NegotiationOneSheetand,254RuleofThreeand,177triggeringa“that’sright”with,108,112usedforsales,108whatagoodsummaryis,103SunTzu,53–54“thesupremeartofwar,”54System1and2thinkingmodel,12–13negotiationusing,13tacticalempathy,16,19,50–54accusationaudit,19airlinecounterand,70,71keylessonsof,71–73labeling,19WashingtonRedskinsticketholderscript,60–61whatitis,52taichi,174

Taleb,NassimNicholas,215telemarketers,74–75,86terrorism“BlindSheikh,”24thwartedattempts,NewYorkCity,24“that’sright,”98,101–2,112Assertive(bargainingstyle)and,196“How”questionandimplementationofadeal,169howtotrigger,102–5,108,112usedforcareersuccess,109–11usedinapricenegotiation,111usingtomakeasale,107–8“you’reright”asineffective,105–7,169Thinking,FastandSlow(Kahneman),12threats,202,222–23Tiedens,Larissa,202time-out,204Trump,Donald,221trustfakeangeranddestroying,202losing,194similarityand,229–30,245Tversky,Amos,11,12Tyson,Mike

UltimatumGame,120–23“unbelief,”149–50,151unconditionalpositiveregard,97,98,112UnitedArabEmirates,128

UniversityofCalifornia,BerkeleyHaasSchoolofBusiness,120UniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles(UCLA),55,176UniversityofChicago,11Ury,William,10–11,252

VanZandt,Clint,214,216Vlamingh,Willemde,215voicetonescontractdiscussionand,34directorassertivevoice,32–33,48,197forHowquestions,167–68late-nightFMDJvoice,19,31–33,47,51matchingwithbodylanguage,176positive/playfulvoice,32,487-38-55PercentRuleand,176,186Voss,Brandon,105–7,191,192

WashingtonCapitals,231WashingtonRedskins,60WashingtonWizards,231Watson,Dwight,224–28Watts,Chris,31–35,37–39,41–43,179Wazlawek,Abbie,202Weaver,Randy,13Wilder,Billy,129Williams,Robin,123wimp-windeal,240,242,253Winfrey,Oprah,46

win-wingoals,115,253Wiseman,Richard,36workplacenegotiationsfourstepprocess,usingmirroring,44–46“How”questiontocollectfundsowed,168salarynegotiations,129–30,131–32,135–38scriptforgettingpaid,157–58“that’sright”usedforcareersuccess,109–11WorldTradeCenterbombing(1993),99

Yap,Ediborah,145“Yes”achievingconsent,164analyzingtheentirenegotiationspace(theteam),170–71commitment,80,81,83,177confirmation,80,81,177counterfeit,80–81,84,85,177defensivenessand,86,94discomfortand,86“How”necessarywith,164–69,186RuleofThreeand,177–78,186usingtooearly,86,94,112YouCanNegotiateAnything(Cohen),119

ZOPA(ZoneofPossibleAgreement),8,198,199

ABOUTTHEAUTHORS

CHRISVOSS is one of the preeminent practitioners andprofessors of negotiating skills in the world. He currentlyteaches at both the University of Southern California’sMarshall School of Business and Georgetown University’sMcDonoughSchoolofBusiness.Chrishaslecturedatmanyother preeminent universities, including Harvard LawSchool, theSloanSchool ofManagement, and theKelloggSchoolofManagement.HelivesinLosAngeles,California.

TAHLRAZuncoversbigideasandgreatstoriesthatignitechange and growth in people and organizations. He is anaward-winning journalist and coauthor of theNew YorkTimes bestsellerNeverEatAlone .When not researching orwriting,hecoachesexecutives,lectureswidelyontheforcestransforming the new world of work, and serves as aneditorial consultant for several national firms. He invitesreaders to e-mail him at tr@tahlraz.com and to visit hiswebsiteatwww.tahlraz.com.

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NEVER SPLIT THE DIFFERENCE. Copyright © 2016 byChristopher Voss. All rights reserved under Internationaland Pan-AmericanCopyright Conventions. By payment oftherequiredfees,youhavebeengranted thenonexclusive,nontransferable right to access and read the text of this e-book on-screen. No part of this text may be reproduced,transmitted, downloaded, decompiled, reverse-engineered,orstored inor introduced intoany informationstorageandretrieval system, in any form or by any means, whetherelectronicormechanical,nowknownorhereafterinvented,without the express written permission of HarperCollins e-books.

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