new forms of power in ‘post’- neoliberal development policy: a case study of evolving world bank...
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New Forms of Power in ‘Post’-Neoliberal Development Policy: A
case study of evolving World Bank lending practices in Argentina
Abilene PittPhD CandidateDepartment of International Relations, Politics and SociologyOxford Brookes [email protected]
Argentina and the Bank
• Case study as a way to see the results when pressure for reform comes from both sides.
• Argentina post-crisis able to make new demands on the type of support received
• Concurrently re-think at the World Bank on the concept of development
WB Development Policy Shifts
• Washington consensus and the neo-liberal development focus
• Structural adjustment – Comprehensive Development Framework
• Lack of infrastructure to blame for failings
• World Development Report 2000/1 – a self critical approach
A ‘post’-neoliberalism?
• Post-neoliberal politics vs neoliberal ‘plus’ lending
• IFI targeted welfare measures
• Latin American critical break with Washington paradigms
• Jasasuriya- social reforms not opposed to neoliberal policies, but as market enabling
Development Policy Shifts plus Post-neoliberal Politics
• IMF default and repayment
• Backlash against presence of IFI’s
• Halt on all World Bank lending 2001-2003
• World Bank acknowledges image problem and takes steps to address it
• Visible changes required
Investment Lending
• Full replacement of structural adjustment
• Partnership approach to lending
• Diversifying the portfolio
• Specific welfare provision
• Re-branding?
Three Phases
Pre-Crisis Interim Measures Now
• Structural Adjustment• Conditions•Large scale macro economic loans •Decentralisation•Infrastructure
•Investment •‘Partner’•Small scale•Diverse•Grants•Welfare focus
•Investment•‘Partner’•Large scale ‘investment’ loans•Decentralisation
•Infrastructure
Partnerships
• More far-reaching than conditionalities
• Present in every political strata in Argentina
• Abrahamsen – development partnerships as advanced liberal rule
• True ‘Partnerships’ between a borrower and lender?
Benefits
• Government happy to receive technical assistance
• Provinces happy to receive greater independent support
• Re-branding as welfare investor successful
• Key to cheap development loans for Government
Reform?
• A better and more targeted form of conditionality
• World Bank presence throughout Argentina through diverse projects (more difficult to remove)
• Neo-liberal ‘plus’. Adding welfare measures similar to institution targeting in the 1990’s
• Plugging the leaks of a flawed system?