new mangalore port trust

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NEW MANGALORE PORT TRUST

Risk Assessment For Berth No. 12 (LPG) and 15 (Coal)

with Upgradation of Disaster Management

Plan (DMP) 2012

By

Indian Register of Shipping, Mumbai

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This is to state that at the request of New Mangalore Port Trust (NMPT), the undersigned surveyors have carried out a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) work for berth no. 12 (LPG) and 15 (Coal) and prepared emergency action plan. The scope of the analysis and the work undertaken are given in the attached report.

CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSE

This work has been carried out on behalf of New Mangalore Port Trust as per their work order dated 7th September 2011 and is confidential. No part of this report may be released to any outside organization unless explicitly advised by the owners in writing.

ISSUED BY:

On behalf of Indian Register of Shipping

Prepared by

A.K.Pande Dipak Sonawane Sudarshan Daga

Reviewed by

A.R.Kar

Quantitative Risk Assessment for Berth no.12 (LPG) & 15 (Coal)

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INTRODUCTION OF INDIAN REGISTER OF SHIPPING (IRS)

IRS is a classification society established for the promotion of safety of life and protection of property at sea & promotion of knowledge base. It is therefore engaged in the Management of Safety & Reliability through Development of Rules and Regulations, Surveys, Audits, Certification and Training. It is a member of the ‘International Association of Classification Societies’ (IACS) which is a consultative body to International Maritime Organisation, a subsidiary body of the ‘United Nations Organisation’. IRS has been incorporated as a section 25 public limited company under the companies Act, 1956 with no shareholders and is collectively managed by the clients it seeks to serve; therefore, no single interest is dominant in its functioning. The Technical & other committees are also constituted of representatives of the industry enabling both financial & organizational independence. IRS is a not-for-profit organization; any surplus resulting from our operations is invested for R&D and growth, to promote its objectives. IRS is a recognized R&D organization by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), Ministry of Science & Technology, ‘Govt. of India’ for its research related to the maritime industry. A strong team of about 300 highly qualified and experienced experts in various disciplines of marine science and technology is engaged in IRS to offer prompt technical solutions to marine industry.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS Pg.No. PREFACE 6 DISCLAIMER 7 ACRONYMS USED 8 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 9

1.0 Introduction 10 1.1 Background 10 1.2 Objectives and Scope 10 1.3 Methodology 10

2.0 Relevant Regulations 11 2.1 International Rules and Regulations 11

2.1.1 International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code)

11

2.2 National Rules and Regulations 11 2.2.1 Factories Act, 1948 11

2.2.2 Environmental Protection Act, 1986 11 2.2.3 Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous

Chemicals Rules, 1989 (MSIHC) 12

2.2.4 Petroleum Rules, 2002 12

3.0 Brief description of port facilities and operation 13 3.1 Area Description 13 3.2 Location 13 3.3 Meteorological Data 17

3.3.1 Climate 17 3.3.2 Wind 17 3.3.3 Waves 17 3.3.4 Cyclones 17 3.3.5 Visibility 17 3.3.6 Currents 17 3.3.7 Tides 17

3.4 Important features of the Port 18 3.4.1 Port Area 18 3.4.2 Entrance Channel 18 3.4.3 Berth Particulars 18 3.4.4 Floating crafts 19 3.4.5 Cargo Handling Equipment 19 3.4.6 Storage Spaces 19

3.5 Establishments in and around the Port Area 20 3.6 Reception facilities 21 3.7 Population Data (Approximate) 21 3.8 Berth no. 12: Fire Fighting Details 22

4.0 Risk Assessment for LPG Berth No. 12 23 4.1 Methodology 23


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4.2 Gathering of relevant information and Data 23 4.3 Hazard Identification 23

4.3.1 Deficiency 24 4.4 Failure Frequency Estimation 25 4.5 Consequence Estimation 29

4.5.1 Incident Outcomes – Definitions 29 4.5.2 Damage Severity Criteria 30 4.5.3 Potential Domino Effect 32

4.6 Risk Estimation 36 4.6.1 Individual Risk 36 4.6.2 Societal Risk 37

4.7 Recommendations 39

5.0 Risk Assessment for Coal Berth No. 15 41 5.1 Coal Storage at Berth No: 15 Open Yard 41 5.2 Relevant regulations for Coal Handling and Fire Safety 43 5.3 Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index 46 5.4 Risk Analysis for Coal Fires in Storage Yard Berth 15 49 5.5 Recommendations for Coal Storage at Berth No. 15 51

6.0 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 52

REFERENCES 55 APPENDIX A Consequence Analysis Results for LPG 57 APPENDIX B Vessel Traffic Data 68 APPENDIX C MSDS - LPG 71 APPENDIX D DMP updating for LPG berth no.12 and Collision,

Grounding Accidents 77


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Disclaimer The task of this Risk Analysis and updating DMP has been considered as a consulting service offered by IRS. The job has been performed using generally accepted guidelines, standards and practices, which we consider to be reliable to our belief. The findings, conclusions and suggestions resulting from the consulting service are based upon certain assumptions, information, documents, and procedures provided by the customer. The customer agrees that IRS shall have no liability for damages, which may result from client’s use, interpretation or application of the consulting services provided by us.

Preface New Mangalore Port Trust (NMPT) is a major port and functioning as a catalyst for the economic development of Karnataka region since 1975. The major commodities exported through the port are Iron ore concentrates and pellets, Iron ore fines, POL products, granite stones, containerized cargo, etc. The major imports of the port are Crude and POL products, LPG, Coal, wood pulp, timber logs, finished fertilizers, liquid ammonia, phosphoric acid, other liquid chemicals, containerized cargo, etc. NMPT has entrusted IRS for carrying out Risk Assessment for LPG berth no. 12 and Coal berth no. 15 and to upgrade the Disaster Management Plan (DMP). The scope of this work covers hazard identification; hazard evaluation (consequence analysis) and Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) pertaining to LPG berth no. 12 & Coal berth no. 15 only.


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Disclaimer The tasks of this Risk Analysis and updating DMP have been done as a consulting service offered by IRS. The findings, conclusions and recommendations resulting from the consulting services have been formed in good faith as the basis of the best information available at the time of carrying out the analysis work from sources believed to be reliable, but no warranty, express or implied, is made as for the accuracy, completeness or correctness thereof. IRS accepts no liability arising out of or in connection with the results and recommendations. It is concluded that any usage/implementation/interpretation of the recommendation is at the client’s risk. In particular, the recommendations should not be considered as certified, legal or otherwise.


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ACRONYMS

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

ERC Emergency Release Coupling

F Frequency

F & EI Fire and Explosion Index

GPH General Process Hazard

JF Jet Fire

LFL Lower Flammable Limit

LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas

LPM Litres per minute

PF Pool Fire

MCLS Maximum Credible Loss Scenario

MF Material Factor

Nf Flammability Factor

NFPA National Fire Protection Association, USA

Nh Health Factor

NMPT New Mangalore Port Trust

Nr Reactivity Factor

QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment

SPH Special Process Hazard

TLV Threshold Limit Values

UFL Upper Flammable Limit.

UHF Unit Hazard Factor

UVCE Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion

VTMS Vehicle Traffic Management System

WCLS Worst Credible Loss Scenario


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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Acceptance Criteria

Defines the level of risk to which an individual is exposed, as either tolerable (negligible risk), intolerable or within the ALARP region.

Accident A specific unplanned event or sequence of events that has undesirable consequences.

Consequence This is the severity associated with an event in terms of toxic doses, fire or explosion etc., i.e. the potential effects of a hazardous event.

Catastrophic Failure

The sudden opening up of a specified part of a containment system resulting in a rapid loss of contents.

Explosion A sudden release of energy characterized by accompaniment of a blast wave.

Fire A process of combustion characterized by heat or smoke or flame or any combination of these.

Frequency

The number of occurrences of an event per unit time.

Hazard

A characteristic of the system/plant process that represents a potential for an accident causing damage to people, property or the environment.

Initiating Event The first event in an event sequence. Mitigating System

Equipment and/or procedures designed to respond to an accident event sequence by interfering with accident propagation and/or reducing the accident consequence.

Most Credible Loss Scenario

The credible scenarios which can culminate into an accident out of several major and minor scenarios, possible for the release of material and energy.

Probability

The expression for the likelihood of an occurrence of an event or an event sequence or the likelihood of the success or failure of an event on test or demand. By definition, probability must be expressed as a number between 0 and 1.

Risk A measure of potential economic loss or human injury in terms of the probability of the loss or injury occurring and the magnitude of the loss or injury if it occurs.

Upper Flammable Limit

That concentration in air of a flammable material above which combustion will not propagate.

Vapour Cloud Explosion

The preferred term for an explosion in the open air of a cloud made up of a mixture of a flammable vapour or gas with air.

Worst Credible Loss Scenario

The incident, which has the highest potential to cause an accident of maximum damage.


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1. Introduction 1.1 Background New Mangalore Port Trust (NMPT) already has a Disaster Management Plan (DMP) in place, prepared by TATA AIG Consulting Service in 2001 and subsequently updated in 2008 by Telos Consultancy Services after two new berths (no.13 and no.14) were added to the port. NMPT has entrusted IRS for carrying out Risk Assessment for LPG berth no.12 and Coal berth no.15 and update the DMP taking account of hazards and potential mitigating actions accordingly. 1.2 Objectives and Scope

1. The scope of this project is to perform a risk analysis for hazards pertaining to fire and explosion at LPG berth no. 12 and Coal berth no. 15.

2. Updating of DMP for LPG berth no. 12 and Coal berth no. 15.

Note: The revised/updated part pertaining to oil spillage hazards due to grounding and collision have not been covered in this task as this have been already covered in Oil Spill Contingency Plan (OSCP) prepared by IRS.

1.3 Methodology The methodology/procedure used for the project is as follows:

i. Collection of the relevant information ii. Hazard Analysis – Identification of the fire and explosion hazards in LPG

berth no. 12 and Coal berth no. 15; iii. Frequency Analysis – Estimating the frequency based on data as available

from published literature and NMPT supplied data; iv. Consequence Analysis – Estimation of the severity of the consequences to

Life and Property; v. Risk Analysis and Review – Risk estimation has been done based on the

consequence and frequency as Estimated. The estimated risks have been compared with UK HSE risk criteria to assess the risk level and to determine requirement of any preventive or mitigative measures in order to keep the risk to the ALARP level;

vi. Reporting – On completion of the exercise, a draft report will be prepared for submission to NMPT for their review. NMPT’s Comments will be duly addressed and suitably incorporated in the final report.


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2. Relevant Regulations 2.1 International Rules and Regulations 2.1.1 International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code) The purpose of the code is to provide an international standard for the safe transport by sea in bulk of liquefied gases and certain other substances, by prescribing the design and construction standards of ships involved in such transport and the equipment they should carry so as to minimize the risk to the ship, its crew and to the environment, having regard to the nature of the products involved. The layout of this code is in line with the International Code for the Construction of Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code). 2.2 National Rules and Regulations The following statutory regulations have been referred in this task: -

i. The Factories Act, 1948 (amendment 1987). ii. The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (amended 1991).

iii. Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 (MSIHC) and the Chemical Accidents (Emergency, Planning, Preparedness and Response), Rules, 1996.

iv. The Petroleum Act, 1934 along with the Petroleum Rules, 1976. v. Dock workers Safety, Health and Welfare Act, 1986 along with

Regulations, 1990. vi. National disaster management authority guidelines – chemical (industrial)

disasters. vii. OISD-STANDARD-156: Fire protection facilities for ports handling

hydrocarbons. 2.2.1 Factories Act, 1948 and Rules, the Major provisions are: -

i. Constitution of Site Appraisal Committee by the State Governments. ii. Preparation of On-Site Emergency plans by the Occupier, detailing

Disaster Control Measures. iii. Detailed Health and Safety policy to be laid down by the occupier. iv. Occupier to constitute a Safety Committee comprising of workers and

management. v. Occupier to provide necessary training within the organization or at

specialized institutions. vi. Occupier to disclose all relevant information to general public also.

2.2.2 Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, the major provisions are: -

i. Lay down Procedures and Safeguards for the Prevention of Accidents and handling of Hazardous Chemicals.

ii. Notify rules for Prevention of Accidents and Procedures, Safeguards, Prohibition and Restriction on handling of Hazardous Chemicals.

iii. Occupier to be responsible for Prevention, Intimation and Mitigation of Accidents and the after effects.


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2.2.3 Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals, Rules, 1989 as amended in 1994 – Excerpts of some salient points are given as below:

Rule 13 (1): An occupier shall prepare and keep up-to-date [an on-site emergency plan containing details specified in Schedule II and detailing] how major accidents will be dealt with on the site on which the industrial activity is carried on and that plan shall include the name of the person who is responsible for safety on the site and the names of those who are authorized to take action in accordance with the plan in case of an emergency.

Rule 13 (4): The occupier shall ensure that a mock drill of the on-site emergency plan is conducted every six months.

Rule 14 (1): It shall be the duty of the concerned authority as identified in Column 2 of Schedule 5 to prepare and keep up-to-date an adequate off-site emergency plan containing particulars specified in Schedule 12 and detailing how emergencies relating to a possible major accident on that site will be dealt with and in preparing that plan the concerned authority shall consult the occupier and such other persons as it may deem necessary.

Column 2 of Schedule 5; Sl. No. 9: Concerned authority: District Collector or District Emergency Authority designated by the State Government (for preparation of off-site emergency plans as per rule 14).

Rule 14 (4): The concerned authority shall ensure that a rehearsal of the off-site emergency plan is concluded at least once in a calendar year.

2.2.4 Petroleum Rules, 2002

Rule 16 (3): Ports into which petroleum may be imported: Adequate fire-fighting facilities as per OISD standard – 156 shall be provided at the ports handling petroleum.

Rule 32 (1): Restriction on loading and unloading by night:

Petroleum shall not be loaded into, or unloaded from, any ship, vessel or vehicle between the hours of sunset and sunrise, unless –

a) Adequate electric lighting is provided at the place of loading or unloading.

b) Adequate fire-fighting facilities with personnel are kept ready at the place of loading for immediate use in the event of fire.


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3. Brief description of port facilities and operations 3.1 Area Description New Mangalore Port is located at Panambur on the West Coast of India midway between Kochi and Mormugao, which is at a distance of around 15 kms from Mangalore city. It is an all weather port and the maritime gateway of Karnataka State. The Port is well connected by road, rail and air.

The port is connected with 3 National Highways. The national highway NH 66 is passing near the port. The highway stretches from Kochi to Mumbai linking many important cities and towns in its en route. The NH 48 connects directly Mangalore to Bangalore and NH 13 Mangalore to Solapur.

The port provides a railway siding at its Panambur yard. The railway links

spread into the neighboring states of Maharashtra, Kerala and Tamilnadu. The rail network extends to major industrial cities like Bangalore, Chennai, Coimbatore and Mumbai.

The Mangalore Airport is located at Bajpe, which is around 18 kms away from

the Port. There are daily flights to Mumbai, Bangalore and Chennai, Cochin & Dubai.

3.2 Location

Latitude: 120 55’ N Longitude: 740 48’ E


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Figure 3.1: Port Layout of NMPT (Courtesy: NMPT)


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Figure 3.2: Fire Protection and Detection System Layout For Berth No. 12 (Jetty No. 4) (Courtesy: NMPT)


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Figure 3.3: Fire Protection System Layout for Berth No. 15 (Courtesy: NMPT)


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3.3 Meteorological Data 3.3.1 Climate

Temperature Max : 34oC Temperature Min : 18oC Annual rainfall : About 3450 mm Weather : Tropical climate with high humidity

3.3.2 Wind The winds in the monsoon months of June, July and August are predominantly from Southwest and West with a maximum intensity of 5 in the beaufort scale (with occasional squall up to force 7). The winds in the remaining months of the year are predominantly from Northwest and maximum intensity during this period is also force 5 in the Beaufort scale. 3.3.3 Waves The predominant direction of waves in the vicinity of New Mangalore Port during Monsoon months of June, July and August is West and Southwest whereas during the fair months it is Northwest and North. Analysis of data collected from ships in and around Mangalore revealed that 0.4% of the waves have a height of 4.9 meter. Maximum height recorded in 1974: 6.50 meter. The wave heights in the non-monsoon months are much less. 3.3.4 Cyclones The location of the port is such it does not encounter cyclones. 3.3.5 Visibility Thirty years observations conducted by the Indian Meteorological Department reveal that poor visibility (visibility less than 4 kms.) is encountered for about 10 days during the South West monsoon period. 3.3.6 Currents The current along the coast during the Southwest monsoon (from June to September) is in general towards south. During the Northeast monsoon (November to February) the current in general is towards North. During the period of heavy rains in the Southwest monsoon there have been observations of reversal of set in the approach channel near the edge of the breakwater with a strong drift. Drift is variable in the approach channel and can be as high as 1.5 knots during the Southwest monsoon. 3.3.7 Tides The tidal particulars at New Mangalore Port are as follows (with reference to Chart Datum):


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Higher High water springs : +1.68 m chart datum Mean Higher High Water : +1.48 m chart datum Mean Lower High Water : +1.26 m chart datum Mean Sea Level : +0.95 m chart datum Mean Lower Low Water : +0.26 m chart datum Lower Low Water Springs near solstices : +0.03 m chart datum 3.4 Important features of the Port: 3.4.1 Port Area

Water Spread : 320 acres (129 hectares) Land Area : 2030 acres (822 hectares)

Total : 2350 acres (951.04 hectares) 3.4.2 Entrance Channel

Length : 7500 meters Minimum Depth : 15.4 meters

Width : 245 meters 3.4.3 Berth Particulars

No BERTH NO. TYPE OF BERTH DRAUGHT

(In Mtrs.) LENGTH (In Mtrs.)

DWT (In Metric

tonnes) 1. BERTH NO.1 GEN.CARGO 7.00 125 4000 2 BERTH NO.2 GEN.CARGO 10.5 198 30000 3 BERTH NO.3 GEN.CARGO 10.3 198 30000

4 BERTH NO.4 GEN.CARGO/LIQUID AMMONIA/ PHOSPHORIC ACID

9.5 198 30000

5 BERTH NO.5 GEN.CARGO/BULK CEMENT/ EDIBLE OIL

9.5 198 30000

6 BERTH NO.6 GEN.CARGO 9.5 198 30000 7 BERTH NO.7 GEN.CARGO 9.5 198 30000

8 BERTH NO.8 IRON ORE/ GEN.CARGO 13.00 300 60000

9 BERTH NO.9 LPG 10.50 330 45000 10 BERTH NO.10 CRUDE OIL/POL 14.00 320 85000 11 BERTH NO.11 CRUDE OIL/POL 14.00 320 85000 12 BERTH NO.12 POL/LPG 12.50 320 50000

13 BERTH NO.13 UNDER CONSTRUCTION


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14 BERTH NO.14 GEN.CARGO/IRON ORE/COAL 14.00 350 90000

15 BERTH NO.15 COAL 14.00 350 85000

3.4.4 Floating crafts:

♦ 32 T Bollard Pull Tug Tractor Tug (SRP) - 1 No. ♦ 32 T Bollard Pull Tug Tractor Tug (VSP) - 3 Nos. ♦ 50 T Bollard Pull Tractor Tug (VSP) - 1 No. ♦ Pilot Launches - 4 Nos. ♦ Mooring Launches - 5 Nos. ♦ Survey Launch - 1 No. ♦ Buoy Laying Tender cum Skimmer 50 T capacity - 1 No (Under Repair)

3.4.5 Cargo Handling Equipment: S.NO. EQUIPMENT CAPACITY TOTAL

1.

Mobile cranes: i) TIL- Grove-RT-880 ii) Escorts Model 8100 Pick & Carry hydraulic Crane iii) Reach Stacker

75 Tons 10 Tons

40 Tons

1 No. 1 No.

2 Nos.

2. Forklift Trucks 3 Tons 10 Tons

2 Nos. 1 No.

3.4.6 Storage Spaces: 3.4.6.1 Transit Sheds/Overflow Sheds

Transit Sheds Nos. Area Capacity

1 5574 Sq. mtrs. 10,000 MT 1 4380 Sq. mtrs. 8,000 MT 1 Overflow Sheds 1 4920 (41m x 120m) 8,830 MT 2 4380 Sq.m. each 8,000 MT

3.4.6.2 Covered Warehouses

Sr. No.

Owner Nos. Area Capacity

1. N.M.P.T. 2 2190 Sq.m. 4000 MT each Workshop Godown 1 2600 Sq.m. each 6000 MT

2. C.W.C. 4 2190 sq.m. each 4000 MT each 3. Consolidated Coffee 1 2190 Sq.m. each 4000 MT


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Ltd. 4. Coffee Board 1 2190 Sq.m. each 4000 MT 5. Aspinwal & Co 1 2190 Sq.m. each 4000 MT

3.4.6.3 Storage Tanks

S.No. Owner/Operator Nos. Total capacity Liquid Stored 1. I.O.C. 25 1,22,452 KL Petroleum Products 2. I.M.C. 19 52,000 KL Chemicals/POL 3. I.P.W.C. 8 52,845 KL Molasses, Edible

oil/POL 4. Universal Agro Exports 3 12,792 KL Edible oil 5. M.C.F. 1 10,000 T Liquid Ammonia 6. M.C.F. 2 2 16,000 T Phosphoric Acid 7. Mangalore Impex 6 17,000 T Edible Oil 8. Ultra Tech Cement 3 18,000 T Cement

3.4.6.4 Open Stack yard S.No. Type No. Area

1. Open stack yard with bitumen pavement 2 18164 Sq. m. 2. Open stack yard with bitumen pavement 1 11534 Sq. m. 3. Open Stack yard without bitumen pavement 2 19693 Sq. m. 4 Paved Yard for stacking containers 1 122680 Sq. m.

5. Large Open Storage Area near the berths & Railway Marshalling yard

3.5 Establishments in and around the port area

• IOC Terminal has a tank farm with 25 storage tanks storing petroleum products in the SW side.

• KIOCL Iron Ore Concentrate and pelletisation plant is situated on the SE side of the Port.

• MCF Co. Ltd. is situated on the Eastern side across the National Highway-66 with liquefied ammonia and phosphoric acid tank farm adjacent to the boundary wall on the NE side of the Port.

• Mangalore Yard of MDL is situated within the boundary wall of the Port on the North-Western side

• Indian Molasses Company (IMC) Ltd. has a Tank Farm in SW side of the Oil Jetty

• Indian Ports Warehousing Corporation (IPWC) Ltd. Terminal having tank farm on the NW side of the Oil Jetty.


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3.6 Reception facilities 1. 5000 KL reception Tank of size 22 M x 13.5 M height - 1 No. 2. 500 KL Tank to receive recovered oil 9M x 9M height - 1 No. 3. 10 KL Cylindrical above ground tank to collect skimmed oil- 1 No. from

separator. 4. 100 KL/Hr. Capacity Oily Water Separator Unit with all – 1 Unit accessories. 5. On-Line Monitoring System 0-5000 PPM & 0-30 PPM 6. Main slop oil pumping set of 200 LPM at 12 Kg/Sq.cm. to pump skimmed oil

to MRPL crude main line (Screw Pump 12.5 HP) -1 No. 7. Transfer pump of 100 KL/Hr. to transfer the slop oil from 10 KL tank to 500

KL tank (screw pump of 3.0 HP) - 1 No. 8. Fire Fighting System including 3 Nos. Foam pourers for 5000 KL tank, 1 No.

for 500 KL tank and 4 nos. double headed hydrant system for the tank farm. This system is connected to the Hydrant Line of Fire Fighting Facilities of Berth No. 10 by 250 mm dia pipe line.

9. 300 mm dia. slop reception pipeline from Berth No. 10, 11 and 12 & connected to both 5000 KL and 500 KL Tanks and other pipeline inside Tank Farm with valves and controls.

10. Intrinsically safe / flame proof Electrification including lighting arrangements to the tank farm.

3.7 Population Data (Approximate)

Sr. No. Location No. Of people

1 General Cargo & Berths 125 2 A.O. Building 500 3 JNC auditorium 1200 4 Hospital / State Bank / Syndicate Bank/CISF

office 190

5 IPWC 14 6 IMC 35 7 MRPL Terminal 8 8 HPCL Terminal 5 9 KIOCL pallet plant & berth 500

10 Transit shed 20 11 VIP Guest House 10 12 STP (Sewage Treatment plant) 5 13 Ware houses (Traffic dept) 100 14 Temple 100 15 Coast guard office 50 16 Central School 1000 17 CISF Colony /Custom Colony + NMPT Colony 4000


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18 MCF 5 19 Signal Station 5 20 Ships crew for avg. 10 ships (@ 30 per ship) 300 21 POL Products 30 23 Marine Staff & others 150

3.8 Berth No: 12 Fire fighting details

a) 2 Nos – Tower Monitors (20 Meters Height) of 6000 LPM capacity each. b) 1 No – Ground Monitor (03 Meters Height) of 3000 LPM capacity. c) 2 Nos – Fixed Water Monitors of 2700 LPM capacity. d) Jumbo Water Curtain Nozzles of 362 LPM – 16 Nos. e) Hydrants – 15 Nos f) 60.0 Cubic Meter Foam Tank g) Water Discharge Pressure – 16 kg/cm2 h) Water Throw – 100 Meters i) 2 Nos – Vertical Turbine Pump of 15000 LPM capacity. j) 1 No – Motor Driven Pumps for Foam Injection. k) 1 No – Engine Driven Pump for Foam Injection l) Fire Alarm / Hooters – 02 Nos m) Manual Call points – 10 Nos n) Gas detection System – 04 Nos o) Flame Detectors – 10 Nos p) Public Address System – 7 Nos.


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4. Risk Assessment for LPG Berth No.12

4.1 Methodology The present Risk Assessment exercise has been done in the stages as follows:

Gathering of relevant information and Data (para 4.2) Hazard Identification (para 4.3) Frequency Estimation (para 4.4) Consequence Estimation (para 4.5) Risk Estimation (para 4.6) Recommendations (para 4.7)

4.2 Gathering of relevant information and Data Following data are collected and used for risk assessment study:

Facility description (Refer section 3) Population data (Refer para 3.7) Meteorological data (Refer section 3) Generic failure rate data from published literature MSDS of LPG (refer Appendix C) Vessel traffic data (Refer Appendix B)

4.3 Hazard identification A variety of hazardous materials are being handled at berth no.12. LPG (Class 2.1-Flammable gas) is handled having LPG carrier of DWT upto 20,000 Tones at berth no.12. We have identified potential accidents scenarios leading to the release/discharge of hazardous/flammable gas. Damages and/or deterioration of the structures/components have been identified as the main cause of consequential spillage of liquid cargo and leakages of flammable gases. This may give rise to a local fire or explosion, a wider flash fire or a large vapor cloud explosion. Potential accidents can be considered to fall into the following three categories:

Deterioration of hardware components (for e.g. ship hull, pipelines, pumps, compressors etc.) due to corrosion, vibration etc. Or overpressure in the containment.

Failure of containment due to Collision or Impact. Operational reasons, for e.g. - Ignition of leaking tank gases due to hot work.

The loss of containment of LPG from Pipelines, Tanks or Loading arm rupture/failures will lead to pool formation and evaporation. This causes formation of cloud, which


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moves in the wind direction and can potentially cause health hazard and also may lead to fire and explosion. Some of the important properties of LPG are as below (Ref. 27):

LPG at atmospheric pressure and temperature is a gas which is 1.5 to 2.0 times heavier than air.

LPG is an extremely flammable has an explosive range 1.8 % to 9.5 % volume of gas in air. This is considerably narrower than other common gaseous fuels.

In the gaseous phase it may have a slight anesthetic effect and/or an asphyxiating effect as it reduces the oxygen content in the air and in liquid phase it may cause cold burns.

LPG is colourless both in liquid and vapor phase The occupational exposure limits for LPG are as follows (as per MSDS provided by NMPT) For LPG vapors, TLV - TWA (ACGIH) = 1000 ppm. The criteria employed in the risk assessment are the Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health Concentration (IDLH) as defined by NIOSH (US National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health). Incase of accidental release of LPG at this level of concentration (conservative value) would require emergency action. The LOC’s for MCLS and WCLS considered in this report are as follows:

Minor leakage – 5 mm diameter hole from 12 inch pipeline (Assuming 100 m length)

Medium leakage – 25 mm diameter hole from 12 inch pipeline (Assuming 100 m length)

Major leakage – 100 mm diameter hole from 12 inch pipeline (Assuming 100 m length)

Full Bore Rupture - 12 inch pipeline (Assuming 100 m length) Marine Loading Arm failure – 12 inch (Assuming 10 m length).

4.3.1 Deficiency During the course of this review it was observed vide para 3.8 b) above that there is a significant deficiency of water curtain (jumbo nozzles) as compared to the requirement of OISD – 156 Table 2 (2) which is required by Petroleum rules 2002. This has also been brought out in para 2.2.4 above. The requirement is 12000 lpm as against 5792 lpm. Water curtains provide segregation of loading/unloading arms / piping manifold and ship tanker in the event of fire. A natural consequence such deficiency would be the increased risk due to heat radiation which may also lead to secondary events.


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4.4 Failure frequency estimation Case I: Failure frequency estimation with existing fire fighting system: An event tree analysis has been depicted in Figure 4.1(I) to determine failure frequency of incident – outcomes. The probability factors (P1,P2,..) used in event tree analysis have been derived based on failure rate data available from published literature, as modified appropriate to present case [Ref. 6, 7, 11]. These values are pertaining to existing system with deficient water curtain capacity. Figure 4.1(I): Event tree for the LPG release

The initial incident frequency per year for Leakage/Rupture, for the considered MCLS and WCLS (Ref. para 4.3) have been taken from failure rate data (Ref. 6, 7) as shown in the following Table 4.1 (I): Table 4.1(I): Frequency of Initial Incident Outcomes per year (Ref.6, 7)

12’’ Pipeline Leakage (Up to 100 mm) : 5.0 × 10−5


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Full Bore Rupture of 12’’ Pipeline : 1.0 × 10−5

Loading Arm Full Bore Rupture : 9.0 × 10−4 Frequencies of final incident outcomes [Table 4.2(I)] are calculated using Figure 4.1(I) and initial incident outcome frequency as given in Table 4.1(I). Table 4.2(I): Frequency of final incident outcomes

FINAL EVENTS

FREQUENCY OF THE FINAL EVENT/YR. PIPELINE

LEAKAGE (UPTO 100 mm)

FULL BORE RUPTURE OF

PIPELINE

LOADING ARM FULL BORE RUPTURE

FIREBALL ------ 4.5 × 10−6 ------

JET FIRE 2.42 × 10−5 3.5 × 10−7 4.36 × 10−4

DISPERSION 1.5 × 10−6 3.0 × 10−7 2.7 × 10−5

POOL FIRE 2.25 × 10−5 4.5 × 10−6 4.05 × 10−4

UVCE 1.175 × 10−8 3.5 × 10−9 3.15 × 10−7

FLASH FIRE 1.73 × 10−6 3.46 × 10−7 3.11 × 10−5


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Case II: Failure frequency estimation considering upgradation of water curtain system fulfilling the requirement of OISD 156. An event tree analysis has been depicted in Figure 4.1(II) to determine failure frequency of incident – outcomes. The probability factors (P1,P2,..) used in event tree analysis have been derived based on failure rate data available from published literature [Ref. 6, 7, 11]. Figure 4.1(II): Event tree for the LPG release

The initial incident frequency per year for Leakage/Rupture, for the considered MCLS and WCLS (Ref. para 4.3) have been taken from failure rate data (Ref. 6, 7) as shown in the following Table 4.1(II): Table 4.1(II): Frequency of Initial Incident Outcomes per year (Ref.6, 7)

12’’ Pipeline Leakage (Upto 100 mm) : 5.0 × 10−5

Full Bore Rupture of 12’’ Pipeline : 1.0 × 10−5

Loading Arm Full Bore Rupture : 9.0 × 10−4


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Frequencies of final incident outcomes [Table 4.2(II)] are calculated using Figure 4.1(I) and initial incident outcome frequency as given in Table 4.1(I). Table 4.2(II): Frequency of final incident outcomes

FINAL EVENTS

FREQUENCY OF THE FINAL EVENT/YR. PIPELINE

LEAKAGE (UPTO 100 mm)

FULL BORE RUPTURE OF

PIPELINE

LOADING ARM FULL BORE RUPTURE

FIREBALL ------ 3.0 × 10−6 ------

JET FIRE 1.8 × 10−5 6.0 × 10−7 3.24 × 10−4

DISPERSION 1.87 × 10−5 3.74 × 10−6 3.37 × 10−4

POOL FIRE 1.65 × 10−6 3.3 × 10−7 2.97 × 10−5

UVCE 1.17 × 10−7 2.34 × 10−8 2.11 × 10−6

FLASH FIRE 1.155 × 10−5 2.31 × 10−6 2.08 × 10−4


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4.5 Consequence Estimation Potential for damage of property, loss of lives and injury to health due to possibility of accidents has been estimated for various MCLS and WCLS as mentioned in Table 4.2 and the results are shown in Table 4.7. 4.5.1 Incident Outcomes - Definitions 4.5.1.1 Fireball One of significant fire hazard related to liquefied gas. The fireball either results from the bursting of pressure vessel or from vapor cloud explosion. In the first case bursting may occur under fire conditions and be part of a BLEVE or it may occur in the absence of fire. Momentum forces predominate, if fireball is formed from the bursting of vessel, while buoyancy forces predominate, if it is formed from a vapor cloud. 4.5.1.2 Pool Fire A pool fire occurs when a flammable liquid spills onto the ground and is ignited. A fire in a liquid storage tank is also a form of pool fire, as is a trench fire. A pool fire may also occur on the surface of flammable liquid spilled onto water. 4.5.1.3 Jet Fire Normally on high-pressure release of pressurized vessel or pipelines on ignition, burn likes a jet flames in open space. Any equipment can come in heavy thermal load if the flame jet impinges on it. The consequent radiation hazard is very small. 4.5.1.4 Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosions (UVCE) and Flash Fire When gaseous flammable material is released a vapor cloud forms and if it is ignited before it is diluted below its lower explosive limit, a vapor cloud explosion or a flash fire will occur. Insignificant level of confinement will result in flash fire. The vapor cloud explosion will result in overpressure. 4.5.1.5 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) A BLEVE occurs when there is a sudden loss of containment of a pressure vessel containing a superheated liquid or liquefied gas. It is sudden release of large mass of pressurized superheated liquid to atmosphere. The primary cause may be external flame impinging on the shell above liquid level weakening the vessel and leading to shell rupture. 4.5.1.6 Toxic Effect The critical toxicity values which should be considered for evaluating effect on humans in the event of release of chemicals are:

a) Permissible exposure limits b) Emergency response planning guidelines c) Lethal dose levels.


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Table 4.3: Loss Scenarios considered for this study are as follows

Fuel Sl. No. Scenario Description

Liq

uefie

d Pe

trol

eum

Gas

(L

PG)

A 5 mm hole (Minor Leak) on 12” Dia LPG pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (Approximate length 100 meters) where the lines go under ground.

B 25 mm hole (Medium Leak) on 12” Dia LPG pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (Approximate length 100 meters) where the lines go under ground.

C 100 mm hole (Major Leak) on 12” Dia LPG pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (Approximate length 100 meters) where the lines go under ground.

D Rupture of 12” Dia LPG pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (Approximate length 100 meters) where the lines go under ground.

E Rupture of unloading LPG arm of size 12” during operation (Approximate length of arm considered 10 meters from ERC)

4.5.2 Damage Severity Criteria The quantitative estimation of effects of Thermal radiations and overpressure on human population, process and equipment is given in following three tables. Table 4.4: Exposure at different incident levels of Thermal radiation (Ref. 6, 8)

RADIANT HEAT (kW/m2) HUMAN EXPOSURE LIMITS*

35 to 37.5

100% lethality in 1 min; 1% lethality in 10 seconds

25 100% lethality in 1 min; significant injury in 10 seconds

12.5 to 15.0 1% lethality in 1 min; first degree burns in 10 seconds

9.5 Pain threshold reached after 8 seconds; second-degree burns after 20 seconds

4.0 to 5.0

Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 seconds; However, blistering of the skin (second-degree burns) is likely; 0% lethality

1.6 Will cause no discomfort for long exposure


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Table 4.5: Thermal radiation damage levels (Ref.6, 8)

Table 4.6: Explosion overpressure damage impacts (Ref. 6, 8)

Analysis of liquid/gaseous release events are made by analytical methods, like computer dispersion models ALOHA (Area locations of Hazardous Atmosphere) which will predict real time scenario of the situations. The values of downwind concentration of vapor clouds are determined by the physical properties of the dangerous substances, meteorological data, leakage rate, etc. ALOHA is a computer program designed especially for use by people responding to chemical releases, as well as for emergency planning and training. ALOHA models key

INCIDENT

HEAT FLUX

(Kw/m2)

DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT REMARKS

35.0 to 37.5

Damage to process equipment Generally includes steel tanks, chemical process equipment, industrial machinery

25.0 Minimum energy to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposure without a flame

18.0 to 20.0 Plastic cable insulation degrades

12.5 to 15.0 Minimum energy to ignite wood with a flame; melts plastic tubing

* Based on an average 10 min exposure time

Overpressure (psi) Expected Damage

0.50-1.0 Windows usually shattered 1.0-8.0 Range for slight to serious injuries flying glass and other missiles

2.0 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses 2.4-12.2 Range for 1-90% eardrum rupture among exposed populations

5.0 Wooden utility poles snapped 5.0-7.0 Nearly complete destruction of houses

7.0 Loaded train cars overturned 10.0 Probable total building destruction

14.5-29.0 Range for 1-99% fatalities among exposed populations due to direct blast effects


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hazards-toxicity, flammability, thermal radiation (heat) and overpressure (explosion blast force)-related to chemical releases that result in toxic gas dispersions, fires and/or explosions. ALOHA was developed jointly by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The results of ALOHA analysis in diagrammatic form for 100 mm leakage, full bore rupture of pipeline and loading arm rupture scenarios are shown in appendix A. 4.5.3 Potential Domino Effect Failure of one LPG tank -BLEVE effect (for one tank volume 2900 m3 and 5500 m3) may lead to catastrophic event and subsequently domino effect. The triggering of secondary events by a primary event such as an explosion is known as Domino Effect. This effect may result in significant increase of consequences. The BLEVE effect from ALOHA analysis considering rupture of one representative tank of capacity 2900 m3 volume is shown in Figure 22 in Appendix A. It shows hazard affected distance up to 622 m.


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Table 4.7: Consequence analysis results using ALOHA software

Fuel

Scenario Wind

velocity m/s

Stability Class

Jet Fire (JF) / Pool Fire (PF)/ Fireball

Radiation dist. in Meters Explosion effect in Meters

Over pressure Level

4.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

37.5 kW/m2

1.0 Psi

3.5 Psi

8.0 Psi

LPG

5 mm hole (Small Leak) on LPG 12 Inch pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100

meters)

1 F JF – <10 PF – 59

JF – <10 PF – 33

JF – <10 PF – 15 46 28 ---

3 D JF – <10 PF – 66

JF – <10 PF – 40

JF – <10 PF – 20 28 14 ---

5 D JF – <10 PF – 22

JF – <10 PF – 16

JF – <10 PF – <10 26 13 ---

25 mm hole (Medium Leak) on LPG 12 Inch pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100

meters)

1 F JF – 31 PF – 56

JF – 17 PF – 31

JF – 10 PF – 14 235 165 ---

3 D JF – 32 PF – 62

JF – 19 PF – 38

JF – 10 PF – 19 100 62 ---

5 D JF – 33 PF – 63

JF – 20 PF – 43

JF – 10 PF – 26 77 49 ---

100 mm hole (Large Leak) on LPG 12 Inch pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100

meters)

1 F JF – 117 PF – 56

JF – 63 PF – 31

JF – 16 PF – 14 398 327 ---

3 D JF – 121 PF – 62

JF – 68 PF – 38

JF – 21 PF – 19 311 229 ---

5 D JF – 121 PF – 63

JF – 70 PF – 43

JF – 24 PF – 26 234 170 ---

Full Bore Rupture of 12 Inch line during LPG

unloading. (i.e. 100 meters)

1 F JF – 161 PF – 56 FB–306

JF – 81 PF – 31 FB–183

JF – 15 PF – 14 FB–100

398 327 ---

3 D JF – 168 PF – 62 FB–299

JF – 89 PF – 38 FB–179

JF – 19 PF – 19 FB–97

311 229 ---


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Fuel

Scenario Wind

velocity m/s

Stability Class

Jet Fire (JF) / Pool Fire (PF)/ Fireball

Radiation dist. in Meters Explosion effect in Meters

Over pressure Level

4.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

37.5 kW/m2

1.0 Psi

3.5 Psi

8.0 Psi

5 D

JF – 168 PF – 63 FB–299

JF – 92 PF – 38 FB–179

JF – 21 PF – 26 FB–97 234 170 ---

Rupture of 12 Inch arm during LPG unloading. (i.e. 10 meters)

1 F JF –57 PF–<10

JF –15 PF–<10

JF –10 PF–<10 168 131 ---

3 D JF –65 PF–22

JF –23 PF–14

JF –10 PF–<10 97 64 ---

5 D JF –71 PF–13

JF –30 PF–<10

JF –10 PF–<10 75 50 ---


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Fuel

Scenario Wind velocity m/s

Stability Class

Flammable/Toxic area of vapor cloud in Meters

2000 Ppm

2100 ppm

12,000 ppm

LPG

5 mm hole (Small Leak) on LPG 12 Inch pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100

meters)

1 F 78 77 34

3 D 45 44 16

5 D 26 80 13

25 mm hole (Medium Leak) on LPG 12 Inch pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100

meters)

1 F 478 468 217

3 D 225 219 81

5 D 198 192 67

100 mm hole (Large Leak) on LPG 12 Inch pipeline from jetty to the Trestle (i.e. 100

meters)

1 F 771 758 388

3 D 632 620 281

5 D 607 590 213

Full Bore Rupture of 12 Inch line during LPG unloading. (i.e. 100 meters)

1 F 771 758 338

3 D 632 620 281

5 D 607 590 213

Rupture of 12 Inch arm during LPG unloading. (i.e. 10 meters)

1 F 272 268 150

3 D 216 210 79

5 D 191 185 63


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4.6 Risk Estimation Risk Estimation combines the severity and likelihood of all incident outcomes from all considered incidents to derive quantity of risk in terms of Individual Risk and Societal risk. These estimated risks are shown in para 6.1. 4.6.1 Individual Risk The individual risk is as risk to the person located in the vicinity of a hazard. Individual Risk Criteria (IRC) is used to ensure that individuals living or working near a hazardous activity do not bear an excessive risk. Individual risk can be estimated for the most exposed individual, for groups of individuals at particular places or for an average individual in an effect zone. 4.6.1.1 Individual Risk Contour Individual risk contours show the geographical distribution of individual risk. The risk contours show the expected frequency of an event capable of causing the specified level of harm at a specified location, regardless of whether or not anyone is present at that location to suffer that harm. Thus, individual risk condition, assuming that somebody will be present and subject to the risk 100% of the time. Common forms of presentation of individual risk are risk contour plots (Figure 4.2). The risk contour plot shows individual risk estimates at specific points on a map. Risk contours connect points of equal risk around the facility. Places of particular vulnerability (e.g., schools, hospitals, population concentrations) may be quickly identified.

Figure 4.2: Example of an individual risk contour plot [Ref. 8]


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4.6.1.2 Individual Risk Criteria The most comprehensive and widely – used criteria for Individual Risks are the ones proposed by the UK HSE as follows. Table 4.8 Individual Risk Criteria

Maximum tolerable risk for workers : 10-3 per year Maximum tolerable risk for members of the public

: 10-4 per year

Broadly acceptable risk : 10-6 per year In between the maximum tolerable and broadly acceptable levels, the risk should be reduced to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), taking account of the cost and benefits of any further risk reduction.

Figure 4.3: Individual Risk Criteria

Figure 4.3 show the zone between the unacceptable and broadly acceptable regions is called the tolerable region. Risks in that region are typical of the risks from activities that people are prepared to tolerate in order to secure benefits in the expectation that the nature and level of the risks are properly assessed and the results used properly to determine control measures; the residual risks are not unduly high and kept as low as reasonably practicable (the ALARP principle); and the risks are periodically reviewed to ensure that they still meet the ALARP criteria. 4.6.2 Societal Risk Some major incidents have the potential to affect many people. Societal risk is a measure of risk to a group of people. It is most often expressed in terms of the frequency distribution of multiple casualty events (F-N curve) as shown in Figure 4.4. However, societal risk can also be expressed in terms similar to individual risk. For example, the likelihood of 10 fatalities at a specific location x, y is a type of societal risk measure. The calculation of societal risk requires the same frequency and consequence information as


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individual risk. Additionally, societal risk estimation requires a definition of the population at risk around the facility (e.g. residential, industrial, school). 4.6.2.1 FN Curve An F-N curve is a plot of cumulative frequency versus consequences (expressed as number of fatalities). A logarithmic plot is usually used because the frequency and number of fatalities range over several orders of magnitude. It is also common to show contributions of selected incidents to the total F-N curve as this is helpful for identification of major risk contributors.

Figure 4.4: Example of a societal risk F-N Curve [Ref. 8]

4.6.2.2 Societal Risk Criteria The criteria shown in Figure 4.5 are used here for calculation of Societal Risk. This criterion is proposed by the UK Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances (ACDS).

Intolerable

ALARP Region

Negligible

Possibly unjustifiable Risk

1.00E-06

1.00E-05

1.00E-04

1.00E-03

1.00E-02

1.00E-01

1 10 100 1000 10000Frequency of N or more

fatalities (per year)

Number of Fatalities (N)

FN Curve

Figure 4.5: ACDS Port Societal Risk Criteria


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4.7 Recommendations

i. Before any LPG transfer operation is commenced, it is imperative that the intended procedures are thoroughly discussed and a meeting held between the responsible personnel from the tanker and the terminal. The purpose of the meeting is primarily to make both sides fully conversant with the characteristics of the tanker and shore handling systems, the envisaged operational and safety procedures and requirements and the parameters to be adhered to during the transfer.

ii. In the event of an emergency during unloading of LPG, the personnel stationed in

the control room of berth no. 12 will immediately inform the ship personnel and activate the ERS (Emergency Release System) of the unloading arm. It is expected that the ERS will have alternative means of activation. In view the fact that LPG is highly flammable and any delay in response may lead to serious consequences.

iii. The movement of the tugboats around the LPG ship tanker while unloading needs

to be monitored. Tugboats could be a potential source of the ignition during any major leak of LPG in the area. If the LPG cloud, in the event of leakage, encounters a source of ignition, it may result in fire or explosion, depending on the size and intensity of a flammable cloud.

iv. The water curtain system at LPG berth no. 12 are to be in compliance with the

requirements of OISD-STANDARD-156 as mentioned in para 4.3.1 at the earliest opportunity.

v. To ensure that warning notices, preferably in the form of pictograms, relevant to

LPG handling operation are placed at all entrances and approaches to the berth no.12.

vi. To ensure that effective communication is established between ship and shore

personnel all through the LPG handling operations. vii. Loading arms: The master of a ship and the berth operator, within their respective

areas of responsibility, should ensure that: a) Adequate procedures and means are available for the operation,

supervision and disconnection of loading arms in the event of an emergency, to protect the environment, personnel safety and equipment;

b) no loading arm is used for substances other than those for which it is suitable, having regard to the temperature and compatibility of such substances and the working pressure or flow rate for which it is suitable;

c) in an emergency there are adequate means for draining the inner and outer arms before disconnection;

d) the operating envelope of the loading arm is suitable for the ship – to be checked before each transfer operation;


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e) the manifold spacing is satisfactory when more than one loading arm is connected simultaneously;

f) each loading arm has been periodically maintained and has a valid certificate for its fitness for use; and

g) there are adequate electrical insulation flanges.

viii. Maintenance: All firefighting and safety equipment are to be maintained in ready to fully operational at all times and be checked and tested on a routine basis. The fire detection and warning systems should be checked and tested regularly.

ix. Training:

a) All relevant personnel are trained to use the available firefighting systems for carrying out firefighting operation effectively;

b) Both ship and shore personnel should be aware of each other’s firefighting equipment and capabilities;

c) Joint firefighting training for both ship and shore personnel should, where possible, be carried out and fire drills executed while the LPG carrier is alongside.

x. General:

a) In the event of fire incident, severity of the consequences of an accident will very much depend on the actions taken during the early minutes. Those who discover the fire, should immediately raise the alarm, and judge the circumstances so that the fire can be effectively fought as soon as possible. It is essential that cargo transfer is stopped immediately;

b) A water spray should be used on unignited leaks to assist in the dispersion of LPG vapours and can also be used to deflect the vapours away from an ignition source. A water jet, however, should not be directly applied to the LPG gas since the rate of evaporation and the size of vapour cloud will be increased. An exception to this general rule would be in the protection of a ship’s steel structure from a liquid leak;

c) Normally, in case of LPG fires supply source should be shut off before extinguishment action is taken.


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5. Risk Assessment for Coal Berth No.15 5.1 Coal Storage at Berth No: 15 Open Yard 5.1.1 General Characteristics of Coal Coal is a fossil fuel extracted from the ground by underground mining or open pit mining. It is a readily combustible, black or brownish – black sedimentary rock. It is composed primarily of carbon along with assorted other elements. Carbon forms more than 50% by weight and more than 70% by volume of coal. Coal usually contains a considerable amount of incidental moisture, which is the water trapped within the coal in between the coal particles. Methane gas is another component of coal. Methane in coal is dangerous as it can cause explosion and may cause the coal to spontaneously combust. 5.1.2 Effects of Coal Burning Combustion of coal, like any other compound containing carbon, produces CO2, along with minor amount of SO2. Coal can be set on fire by spontaneous combustion. 5.1.3 Spontaneous Combustion in Coal [Ref. 18] The coal's temperature begins to climb above ambient. At about 150-300 degrees F, it begins to give off minute, but measurable, quantities of gas--aerosols, hydrogen, and CO(2)--precursors of combustion. As the temperature increases further--at about 600-700 degrees F--relatively, large, visible particulates are emitted. Soon, as the heating rate increases in intensity to about 750-800 degrees F, incipient combustion, and ultimately self-ignition and flame, will occur. The risk from fire exists where significant amounts of coal are in use of storage. Coal is a combustible material, making it susceptible to a variety of ignition scenarios. One of the most frequent and serious causes of coal fires is spontaneous combustion, which has been responsible for a number of incidents within the department in recent years. Preventing spontaneous combustion coal fires involves attention to many different factors. Among the most critical are the type, age and composition of coal, how it is stored and how it is used. Given the right kind of coal, oxygen, and a certain temperature and moisture content, coal will burn by itself. Spontaneous combustion has long been recognized as a fire hazard in stored coal. Spontaneous combustion fires usually begin as “hot spots” deep within the reserve of


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coal. The hot spots appear when coal absorbs oxygen from the air. Heat generated by the oxidation can initiate the fire. Such fires can be very stubborn to extinguish because of the amount of coal involved (often hundreds of tons) and the difficulty of getting to the seat of the problem. Moreover, coal in either the smouldering of flaming stage may produce copious amounts of methane and carbon monoxide gases. In addition to their toxicity, these gases are highly explosive in certain concentrations, and can further complicate efforts to fight this type of coal fire. Even the most universal fire fighting substance, water, cannot be used indiscriminately, because of the remote possibility of a steam explosion; it is advisable that water be applied carefully and from a safe distance. Certain chemicals such as carbon dioxide or nitrogen may mitigate fire effects, but their use has had mixed success. The above information suggests that coal fires require awareness and prior planning to extinguish efficiently, completely, and safely. 5.1.4 Causes of Spontaneous Coal Fires [Ref. 18] The following general factors have been mentioned as contributing causes:

Coal handling procedures allowed for long-time retention of coal, which increases the possibility of heating

New coal added on top of old coal created segregation of particle sizes, which is a major cause of heating

Too few temperature probes installed in the coal bunker resulted in an excessive period of time before the fire was detected

Failure of equipment needed to fight the fire Ineffective capability and use of carbon dioxide fire suppression system Delay in the application of water.

5.1.5 Preventing Spontaneous Combustion in Stored Coal [Ref. 18] High quantities of coal are stored in bunkers, silos, hoppers and open-air stockpiles. How susceptible such stocks of coal are to fire from spontaneous combustion depends on a number of factors, for e.g. the duration and pattern of the storage. 5.1.6 Roll Packing Roll packing helps to exclude O2 and thus to prevent fires by discouraging spontaneous combustion. Coal is distributed by a grab bucket or by other means in a uniform layer. The layer is then levelled by scraping and compacted by rolling. Distributing the coal evenly avoids breakage and segregation of the coal. The firm packing helps shed water.


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5.2 Relevant regulations for Coal Handling and Fire Safety 5.2.1 NFPA 850: Recommended practice for fire protection for electric generating plants 5.2.1.1 NFPA 850 (2-4.7.5) Coal Storage and Handling

2-4.7.5.1 Once the location and extent of a fire in a coal storage pile has been determined, the coal should be dug out and the heated coal removed. Since moisture accelerates oxidation, water used for fire fighting can aggravate the situation if the seat of the fire is not reached.

2-4.7.5.2 Clearly marked access panels in equipment should be provided for manual fire fighting. Coal dust presents both a fire and explosion hazard. Combustible, finely divided material is easily ignited. However, there is possibility that a deep seated hard-to-extinguish fire can occur.

5.2.1.2 NFPA 850 (5-4.1) Storage

5-4.1.1 Coal storage piles are subject to fires caused by spontaneous heating of the coal. The coals most susceptible to self-heating are those with high pyritic content and high intrinsic moisture and oxygen content, such as low-rank coals. The mixing of high pyritic coals with high moisture and oxygen coals increases self-heating.

5-4.1.2 There are measures that can be taken to lessen the likelihood of coal pile fires. These measures are dependent on the type and rank of coal. Among the more important are the following: (1) Short duration, active or “live” storage piles should be worked to prevent dead pockets of coal, a potential source of spontaneous heating. (2) Coal piles should not be located above sources of heat, such as steam lines, or sources of air, such as manholes. (3) Coal placed in long-term storage should be piled in layers, appropriately spread, and compacted prior to the addition of subsequent layers to reduce air movement and to minimize water infiltration into the pile. (4) Different types of coal that are not chemically compatible should not be stored in long-term storage piles. (5) Access to coal storage piles should be provided for fire fighting operations and for pulling out hot pockets of coal.

5.2.1.3 NFPA 850 (5-4.4) Coal Conveyors

5-4.4.1 Coal conveyor belt should be of material designed to resist ignition.

5-4.4.2 Each conveyor system should be arranged to automatically shut off driving power in the event of belt slowdown of greater than 20 % of misalignment of belts. In addition, a complete belt interlock shut down system should be provided so that, if any conveyor stops, the power to all conveyor systems feeding that belt would be shut down automatically.


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5-4.4.3 Hydraulic systems should use only listed fire retardant hydraulic fluids. Where unlisted hydraulic fluids must be used, considerations should be given to protection by a fire suppression system.

5-4.4.4 Foreign materials pose a threat by causing sparks capable of igniting coal dust/air mixtures. Means for removing such foreign material should be provided as early in the coal handling process as possible.

5-4.4.5 Prior to extended to idle periods, the conveyor system should be cleared of coal.

5.2.1.4 NFPA 850 (5-4.5) Coal Conveying and Handling Structures

5-4.5.1 Coal conveying and handling structures and supports should be of noncombustible construction.

5-4.5.7 Static electricity hazards should be minimized by the permanent bonding and grounding of all equipment, including duct work, conveyor drive belts, pulleys, idlers, take-up reels, motor drives, dust collection equipment, and vacuum cleaning equipment.

5.2.1.5 NFPA 850 (5-4.6) Fire Protection

5-4.6.1 Automatic sprinkler or water spray systems should be provided for coal handling structures that are subject to accumulations of coal or coal dust. Sprinkler systems should be designed for a minimum of 0.25 gpm/ft2 (10.2 mm/min) density over a 2500 ft2 (232 m2) area. If water spray systems are used to protect structures, the same densities should be used.

5-4.6.2 Automatic sprinkler or water spray systems should be provided for enclosed coal conveyors. Sprinklers should be designed for a minimum of 0.25 gpm/ft2 (10.2 mm/min) density over a 2000 ft2 (186 m2) of enclosed area or the most remote 100 linear ft (30 m) of conveyor structure up to 2000 ft2 (186 m2).

5-4.6.2.1 If a sprinkler system is used to protect the coal conveyor, particular care should be exercised in locating closed sprinkler heads so that they will be in the path of the heat produced by the fire and still be in a position to provide good coverage of all belt surfaces along the conveyor.

5-4.6.2.3 Actuation of water spray or sprinkler systems should shut down the conveyor belt involved and all conveyor belts feeding the involved belt.

5-4.6.2.4 The sprinkler or water system control valve should be located in an area or enclosure separate from the hazard.

5-4.6.2.6 Draft barriers installed at the end and mid-points of enclosed conveyors should be considered in the fire risk evaluation. Draft barriers will reduce the


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response time of installed automatic sprinkler or detection systems and minimize the chimney effects in the event of fire.

5-4.6.3 In Stacker-reclaimer conveyors, provision of hydrants in the area may not be sufficient protection primarily due to the extreme delay in response in the event of fire emergency and the difficulty in reaching all areas involved in a fire with hand-held hose equipment.

5-4.6.4 Consideration should be given to the installation of an automatic water spray or sprinkler system over the conveyor belt and striker plate areas within the stacker-reclaimer. The water supply could be from a 3000 gal to 5000 gal (11,355 L to 18,925 L) capacity pressure tank located on-board. A fire department pump connection should be provided so connection can be made to the fire hydrants in the area during down or repair periods to provide a more adequate water supply. Consideration should be given to protecting enclosed electrical control cabinets by a pre-engineered fixed automatic gaseous-type suppression system activated by a fixed temperature detection system.

5.2.2 Central Electricity Authority (CEA) guidelines

Detection System for Coal Conveyors i. The LHS cable detector for each conveyor shall be provided for forward and

return conveyors & rollers.

ii. The detection zone/loop divisions of LHSC system shall match with the MVW spray system. Upon detection of fire by LHSC detector, the spray system shall be initiated. It shall also initiate spray system for the two adjacent zones after a time delay settable at site. Wet type Q.B. detectors can also be used in addition to LHS cable.

iii. The LHSC detector may be either Digital or analogue type.

iv. The infra red type (IR) detectors shall be suitable for detecting moving fires in

coal conveyors and at least one detector shall be provided for each of the conveyor. IR detectors shall trip the running coal conveyor in case of detection of fire as well as give audio-visual annunciation locally and as well in fire alarm panel.

v. The IR detector shall be outdoor type weather proof and shall be able to

function continuously in heavily coal-dust prone atmosphere without regular maintenance.

vi. The IR detector shall be designed to reject deceptive phenomenon such as

electric arc, heaters, artificial light sources (HPSV/LPSV/incandescent lamps etc.)

vii. Each of the IR detectors shall be provided with purging arrangement.


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5.3 Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index 5.3.1 Introduction [Ref. 17] In order to rate the fire and explosion hazards within the port facility at Berth No 15th, the Dow’s Fire & Explosion Index (F & EI) is used. F & EI analysis is a step – by – step evaluation of the realistic fire, explosion and reactivity potential of processes, equipments and its contents. The F & EI is used for any operation in which flammable, combustible or reactive material is stored, handled or processed. It is a product of three attributes i.e. Material Factor (MF), General Process Hazards (GPH) and Special Process Hazards (SPH). The MF is the starting value in computation of F & EI. MF is a measure of intrinsic rate of potential energy released from fire or explosion produced by combustion or other chemical reaction. The MF is considered for the most hazardous material or mixture of materials present in the unit in sufficient quantity actually to present the hazard. The MF is obtained from Flammability factor and Reactivity factor i.e. Nf and Nr respectively given for various chemicals by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Process hazards that contribute to the magnitude of losses have been quantified as penalties, which provide factors for computation. Every penalty may not be applicable to a specific situation and the same may have to be modified. The GPH and SPH are taken into account as penalties, which are applied, to MF. The F & EI is defined as:

F & EI = MF x (GPH) (SPH) Wherein, the product of GPH and SPH is termed as the Unit Hazard Factor (UHF). The degree of hazard is identified based on F & EI range as per the criteria given Table 5.1: Table 5.1: F&EI

F & EI Range Degree of Hazard 0 – 60 Light

61 – 96 Moderate 97 – 127 Intermediate 128 –158 Heavy

> 158 Severe 5.3.2 Ranking of Chemical Hazards The NFPA classification for a chemical is based on three factors i.e. Health Hazard Factor (Nh), Flammability Hazard Factor (Nf) and Reactivity Hazard Factor (Nr).


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Table 5.2: NFPA Chemicals Handled at Port

Chemical Nh Nf Nr Coal 1 1 0

5.3.3 Summary of DOW’S Index For the Coal handled at Berth No 15, F & EI have been worked with conservative estimation as given in the Table below: Table 5.3: Summary of Dow’s Index Name of Chemical

Process Unit MF GPH SPH UHF F & EI Rating

Coal Storage 14 2.00 2.50 5.00 70.00 Moderate


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Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index – Coal Location Coal storage yard

Plant Storage yard

PROCESS UNIT Coal Storage

STATE OF OPERATION Coal handling at berth no.15

BASIC MATERIAL(S) FOR MATERIAL FACTOR Coal

MATERIAL FACTOR …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 14

1. General Process Hazards

Penalty Factor Range

Penalty Factor Used

Base Factor .............................................................................................................................. 1.00 1.00 A. Exothermic Chemical Reactions 0.30 to 1.25 0 B. Endothermic Processes 0.20 to 0.40 0 C. Material Handling and Transfer 0.25 to 1.05 0.4 D. Enclosed or Indoor Process Units 0.25 to 0.90 0 E. Access 0.20 to 0.35 0.35 F. Drainage and Spill Control . 0.25 to 0.50 0.25

General Process Hazards Factor (F1) ............................................................................................. 2.0

2. Special Process Hazards Base Factor .............................................................................................................................. 1.00 1.00 A. Toxic Material(s) 0.20 to 0.80 0 B. Sub-Atmospheric Pressure (< 500 mm Hg) 0.50 0 C. Operation In or Near Flammable Range 0 1. Tank Farms Storage Flammable Liquids 0.50 0 2. Process Upset or Purge Failure 0.30 0 3. Always in Flammable Range 0.80 0 D. Dust Explosion 0.25 to 2.00 0 E. Pressure Operating Pressure 4.5 bar Relief Setting 50 bar

From Figure 0

F. Low Temperature 0.20 to 0.30 0 G. Quantity of Flammable/Unstable Material: Quantity = lb HC = BTU/lb

0

1. Liquids or Gases in Process From Figure 0 2. Liquids or Gases in Storage From Figure 0 3. Combustible Solids in Storage, Dust in Process From Figure 1.5 H. Corrosion and Erosion 0.10 to 0.75 0 I. Leakage – Joints and Packing 0.10 to 1.50 0 J. Use of Fired Equipment From Figure 0 K. Hot Oil Heat Exchange System 0.15 to 1.15 0 L. Rotating Equipment 0.50 0

Special Process Hazards Factor (F2) .............................................................................................................. 2.5

Process Unit Hazards Factor (F1 x F2) = F3 ............................................................................................... 5.0

Fire and Explosion Index (F3 x MF = F&EI) ................................................................................................ 70.0

FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX (RATINGS) MODERATE


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5.4 Risk Analysis for Coal Fires in Storage Yard Berth 15 Data used for calculation of impact distance for coal fires. Type of coal – Bituminous (Medium Volatile)

Emissivity Constant (ε) = 0.9 for Bituminous Coal Stefan Boltzmann constant (σ) = 5.6 x 10-8 W/m2K4

Formula used for Calculation of Impact Distance (L) = IFQ Π4 …..[Ref. 6]

Where, L = Distance from flame centre to receiving point. F = Fraction of heat radiation = 0.15 (Conservative) Q = Total Heat Generated /Emitted by Coal I = Incident Thermal Radiation level

Maximum temperature attained by flame of Coal, T1 = 900DegC = 1173K Ambient surrounding temperature, T2= 27DegC to 35DegC = 300K – 308K

Q = σ A ε (T1 4– T2

4) …..[Ref. 6] Where, A = Active coal burning area in m2 T1

4 = (1173)4 K T2

4 = (300)4 K For active coal burning area = 10m2 Q = 5.6 x 10-8 x 0.9 x 10 (11734 – 3004) Q = 950 kW For Heat radiation 4 kW/m2 impact distance L

L = 414.3415.0950 ××× = 1.68 = 1.7m For Heat radiation 12.5 kW/m2 impact distance L

L = 5.1214.3415.0950 ××× = 0.9527 = 1 m For Heat radiation 37.5 kW/m2 impact distance L

L = 5.3714.3415.0950 ××× = 0.55 m


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For active coal burning area – 100 m2 Q = 5.6 x 10-8 x 0.9 x 100 (11734 – 3004) = 9500 kW/m2 For Heat radiation 4 kW/m2 impact distance L

L = 414.3415.09500 ××× = 5.32 m For Heat radiation 12.5 KW/m2 impact distance L

L = 5.1214.3415.09500 ××× = 3.012 m For Heat radiations 37.5 KW/m2 impact distance L

L = 5.3714.3415.09500 ××× = 1.74 m Table 5.4: The damage effects due to Thermal Radiation of varying intensity are summarised as follows:

Heat Radiation Impact distance for

Active Burning Coal Area

10 m2 100 m2 4 kW/m2 1.7 m 5.3 m

12.5 kW/m2 1.0 m 3.0 m 37.5 kW/m2 0.5 m 1.74 m

Note: CO could also be emitted during a coal fire due to incomplete combustion. Hence adequate respiratory protection should be used like canister gas mask or Self Contained Breathing Apparatus –SCBA.


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5.5 Recommendations for Coal Storage at Berth No. 15

i. The “First in, First out” rule for loading, stacking and unloading of coal removes the chances of hot spots by precluding heat build up.

ii. The inspection, testing and maintenance of the installed fire protection equipment

should be carried out strictly in accordance with the maintenance schedule. iii. We conclude that best practices for safe handling of coal is already in place at

berth no. 15, which should include the followings;

a. The shape and composition of open stock piles can help prevent fires. Dumping coal into a big pile with a trestle or grab bucket can lead to problems. Rather, coal should be packed in horizontal layers (ranging from 1 ½’ to 3’ high) which are then levelled by scraping and compacted by rolling. This method helps distribute the coal evenly and thus avoids breakage and segregation of fine coal. Segregation of coal particles by size should be avoided, as it may allow more air to enter the pile and subsequent heating of finer sizes.

b. Air entrapment within a coal pile should be prevented by adequate

compacting to remove out any air pockets within the pile.

c. Moisture in coal contributes to spontaneous heating because it assists the oxidation process. Moisture content should be limited to 3 %; sulphur content should be limited to 1 %, “as mined.” Coal having high moisture content should be segregated and used as quickly as possible. Efforts should be made to keep stored coal from being exposed to moisture.

d. As sulphur compound in coal liberates considerable heat when they oxidize,

the surveillance activity needs to be more intensive when coal with the high sulphur contents stored for a longer time span.


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6. Results and Conclusions 6.1 Results 6.1.1: Risk estimation for the Case I (as defined in para 4.4): Individual Risk Contour for LPG Berth No.12:

Societal Risk (F-N Curve) for LPG Berth No.12:


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6.1.2 Risk estimation for Case II (as defined in para 4.4) Individual Risk Contour for LPG Berth No.12:

Societal Risk (F-N Curve) for LPG Berth No.12:


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6.1.3 Comparison of results: Individual Risk As seen in para 6.1.1 and para 6.1.2, gives maximum individual risk 1 ×10-3 fatalities (red contour) per year in Case I as compared to 4 ×10-4 fatalities (red contour) per year in Case II considering distance of 15 m. Societal Risk As seen in para 6.1.1 and para 6.1.2 of F-N Curve, the onsite societal risk for Case I falls in intolerable region in the low fatality range whereas it falls in tolerable region (ALARP) for Case II. 6.2 Conclusions: 6.2.1 The tasks of Risk Analysis have successfully completed as per the agreed scope

of work as mentioned below: Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for LPG berth no.12 & Coal berth no.15

with regards to risk due to Fire and Explosion only. 6.2.2 The Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) study has revealed the following for LPG

berth no. 12 : It is found evident that the risk level (both Individual and Societal) are

unacceptably high in the present situation with deficient water curtain capacity. So, it is paramount important that the capacity of the water curtain needs to be enhanced to comply with the OISD-156 urgently.

Important Note: It is concluded that the best practices of ship and cargo handling operations will be followed and all the requirements towards applicable rules and regulations will be complied with.


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REFERENCES

1. Risk assessment and DMP report prepared by Tata AIG (2001) provided by NMPT.

2. QRA report for berth no. 13 & 14 prepared by Telos consultancy provided by

NMPT.

3. Disaster management plan upgraded by Telos consultancy (2010) provided by NMPT.

4. Vessel traffic data provided by NMPT.

5. Accident/Incident data provided by NMPT.

6. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Hazard Identification, Assessment and

Control, Volume 1, 2 and 3, 2nd Edition, Frank P. Lee.

7. TNO, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, CPR18E. Purple Book, TNO, Apeldoorn, 1999.

8. Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, 2nd Edition, Centre

for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS).

9. IMO publication ‘Revised Recommendations on the Safe Transport of Dangerous Cargoes and related activities in Port Areas’, ISBN: 9789280114720, 2007.

10. ‘Risk criteria for use in ship safety assessment’- Paper 15 of Conference

Proceedings –Marine Risk Assessment (Part I) by J. Spouge (DNV Technica), published by The Institute of Marine Engineers, ISBN: 0907206840, London, UK, 1997.

11. Journal of hazardous materials, ‘A quantitative risk analysis approach to port

hydrocarbon logistics’, by A. Ronza, 26 August 2005.

12. Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) ‘Hazard identification and risk analysis – Code of practice, IS 15656:2006’.

13. Risk Analysis for Process Plant, Pipelines and Transport, First edition-ISBN:

0419190902, J R Taylor, 1994.

14. Canvey, a second report, ISBN: 0118834592, September 1981.

15. ‘Fire protection facilities for ports handling hydrocarbons’, OISD-STANDARS-156, 2nd edition, 2005.


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16. ‘National Disaster Management Guidelines for Chemical Disasters – April 2007’ issued by National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Govt. of India.

17. Dow’s Fire and Explosion index hazard classification guide, seventh edition,

1994, published by AIChE.

18. ‘The Fire Below: Spontaneous Combustion in Coal’, Environment Safety and Health Bulletin, U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/EH-0320, Issue No. 93-4, May 1993.

19. Preliminary risk assessment report for Port of Botany, Australia, 2007.

20. OCIMF (1993) “Safety Guide for Terminals handling Ships carrying Liquefied

Gases in bulk” 2nd edition, ISBN: 1856090574.

21. SIGTTO (1992) “Guidelines for hazard analysis as an aid to management of safe operations”.

22. OCIMF (1987) “A Guide to Contingency Planning for the Gas Carrier Alongside

and Within Port Limits”.

23. SIGTTO (2001) “A Guide to Contingency Planning for Marine Terminals Handling Liquefied Gases in Bulk”.

24. NFPA 850 (2000) “Recommended practice for Fire Protection for Electric

Generating Plants and High Voltage Direct Current Converter Stations”.

25. Standard design criteria/Guidelines for balance of plant of 2 x (500 MW or above) Thermal power project, Central Electricity Authority, September 2010.

26. ‘Fire Protection Facilities for Petroleum Depots, Terminals, Pipeline Installations

and Lube Oil Installations’, OISD-STANDARD-117, 2nd Edition, 2010. 27. ‘Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Installations’, OISD-STANDARD-144,

Amended Edition, 2008.


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APPENDIX A: Consequence Analysis Results for LPG

1. Vapor cloud explosion from Full Bore Rupture of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 1 m/s and F stability class:

2. Jet Fire from Full Bore Rupture of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 3 m/s and D stability class:


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3. Vapor cloud explosion from Full Bore Rupture of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 3 m/s and D stability class:

4. Vapor cloud explosion from Full Bore Rupture of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 5 m/s and D stability class:


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5. Flammable area of vapor cloud from Full Bore Rupture of 12 inch pipeline during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 1 m/s and F stability class:

6. Flammable area of vapor cloud from Full Bore Rupture of 12 inch pipeline during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 3 m/s and D stability class:


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7. Dispersion area of vapor cloud from Full Bore Rupture of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 3 m/s and D stability class:

8. Flammable area of vapor cloud from Full Bore Rupture of 12 inch pipeline during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 5 m/s and D stability class:


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9. Fireball from Full Bore Rupture of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 5 m/s and D stability class:

10. Jet Fire from 100 mm hole (large Leak) of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 1 m/s and F stability class:


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11. Vapor Cloud Explosion effect from 100 mm hole (large Leak) of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 1 m/s and F stability class:

12. Jet Fire from 100 mm hole (large Leak) of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 3 m/s and D stability class:


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13. Vapor Cloud Explosion effect from 100 mm hole (large Leak) of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 3 m/s and D stability class:

14. Jet Fire from 100 mm hole (large Leak) of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 5 m/s and D stability class:


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15. Vapor Cloud Explosion effect from 100 mm hole (large Leak) of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 5 m/s and D stability class:

16. Flammable area of vapor cloud from 100 mm hole (large leak) of 12 inch line during unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 3 m/s and D stability class:


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17. Flammable area of vapor cloud from 100 mm hole (large leak) of 12 inch line during unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 5 m/s and D stability class:

18. Dispersion area of vapor cloud from 100mm hole (large leak) of 12 inch line during LPG unloading (i.e. 100 meters) wind speed 5 m/s and D stability class:


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19. Flammable area of vapor cloud from Rupture of 12 inch LPG unloading arm (i.e. 10 meters) wind speed 1 m/s and F stability class:

20. Flammable area of vapor cloud from Rupture of 12 inch LPG unloading arm (i.e. 10 meters) wind speed 5 m/s and D stability class:


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21. Pool Fire from Rupture of 12 inch LPG unloading arm (i.e. 10 meters) wind speed 5m/s and D stability class:

22. BLEVE from Catastrophic Rupture of One LPG tank having volume 2900 m3 at wind speed 5 m/s and D stability class:


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APPENDIX B: Vessel Traffic Data


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APPENDIX C: MSDS – LPG


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Product name :

SDS n° :39053-33 PRODUCT LABELS LABELLING (standard or EU):

Safety Data Sheet

LPG

Version :1.00 Concerned

Version of :2009-01-25 This sheet supersedes the one dated :2009-01-25

Symbol(s) : Symbol(s) :

Contains :

R-phrases :

S-phrases : TRANSPORT LABELLING:

EC No. 270-990-9 - PETROLEUM GAS EC No. 270-681-9 - PETROLEUM GAS F+ Extremely Flammable

Hydrocarbons, C3-4-rich, Petroleum gas Hydrocarbons, C3-4; Petroleum gas

R-12 Extremely flammable.

S-2 Keep out of reach of children. S-9 Keep container in a well-ventilated place. S-16 Keep away from sources of ignition - No Smoking.

Applicable (see section 14) 1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUBSTANCE/PREPARATION AND OF THE COMPANY UNDERTAKING Name of the product :

Product application :

Supplier : Contact :

Emergency telephones :

See local details at end of sheet : 2. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION Health effects : Physico-chemical hazards :

LPG

Raw material for industrial uses. Fuel, combustible, petrochemical intermediate.

TOTAL RAFFINAGE MARKETING 24, cours Michelet. 92800 PUTEAUX. FRANCE Tel: 01 41 35 40 00 Fax: 01 41 35 82 88

e-mail : [email protected]

ORFILA / Tel : 01.45.42.59.59 In the gaseous phase: may have a slight anaesthetic effect and/or an asphyxiating effect as it reduces the oxygen content in the air. In liquid phase: may cause cold burns.

EXTREMELY FLAMMABLE Dans certaines conditions forme avec l'air des MELANGES EXPLOSIFS OU DEFLAGRANTS. In case of a leak, this gas travels along the ground since it is HEAVIER THAN AIR, and may ACCUMULATE IN LOW AREAS IF VENTILATION IS LACKING and may ignite at a distance. Accidental intense heating of a container holding LPG/C (in case of fire, for example) can cause the container to rupture of provoke a spill of product ; if ignited, the vapours can, under certain conditions, lead to deflagration or explosion.


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Product name :

SDS n° :39053-33 Product classification :

Safety Data Sheet LPG

Version :1.00 Extremely flammable Carcinogenic Mutagen.


NOTA K : the classification as a carcinogen does not apply if it can be shown that the substance contains less than 0.1% weight/weight of 1.3-butadiene (Einecs n°203-450-8). Similar comment for the classification as a mutagen.

3. COMPOSITION/INFORMATION ON INGREDIENTS SUBSTANCE

Chemical nature : Hydrocarbons, C3-C4; Petroleum gas

Substances presenting a health hazard

EC No.

CAS No.

Content Symbol(s) R-phrases Hydrocarbons, C3-4-rich, Petroleum gas 270-990-9 68512-91-4 100 % T ,F+ R-12, 45, 46 Hydrocarbons, C3-4; Petroleum gas 270-681-9 68476-40-4 100 % T ,F+ R-12, 45, 46

See section 16 for explanations of R-phrases :

Composition comments : 4. FIRST AID MEASURES

Dienes (1,3-butadiene) : < 0,5% mol

IN CASE OF SERIOUS OR PERSISTENT CONDITIONS, CALL A DOCTOR OR EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE.

General : Inhalation : Skin contact : Eye contact :

Protective equipment for first-aiders : 5. FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES Flash point: see heading 9 - "Physical and chemical properties"

Ventilate extensively Take potential victims into the fresh air. Turn off the valves of the container or storage. Eliminate possible causes of ignition. Cut off the electric power supply if this operation causes no sparks in the area or the vapours from the product have dispersed. Treat symptomatically.

In case of exposure to heavy concentrations of vapour, transport the person into fresh air and allow to rest. If the person has breathing problems, call a doctor and apply mechanical ventilation immediately. - Symptoms : Headaches, dizziness, somnolence and fainting in case of asphyxiation.

With liquid gas : Immediately remove all stained or splashed clothing on condition that it is not adhering to the skin. Do not attempt to warm up the affected members quickly; they must be warmed up slowly. In case of major injury, take the person to a medical center for treatment.

Direct contact with the product: (liquefied gas) Wash immediately and copiously with water for at least 10 minutes. Cover the eye with a sterilized compress. Consult a specialist as quickly as possible.

In order to enter an area where gas has been accidentally released: According to risks of exposure, an insulated breathing apparatus must be worn, or a safety helmet with a face mask and neck protection, gloves and full body cover protective clothing and boots (with trousers outside the boots) as applicable. Protect all first-aiders with a "lifeline". This type of intervention should be exclusively reserved to special personnel who are trained for this.


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Product name :

SDS n° :39053-33 Extinguishing media :


Version :1.00

- suitable:


Specific fire-fighting methods : Specific hazards : Protective measures for firefighters :

6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES Personal protection : After spillage / leakage :

Spill cleanup methods :

Prevention of secondary risks : 7. HANDLING AND STORAGE

Powder, CO2, water spray in certain circumstances. - not recommended: Stream of water on containers holding propylene. The use of foam is ineffective.

It is dangerous to extinguish a burning flame if it is impossible to stop the leak rapidly. Extinction of the flame should only be carried out by closing off the valve, in situations where this is possible. Protection of storage and containers : COOL DOWN the fixed and/or semi-mobile tanks and containers exposed to the fire, by means of copious amounts of water spray. DO NOT SPRAY WATER JET on tanks holding LPG if they have been heated.

Accidental intense heating (in case of fire for example) of a container filled with this gas can lead to bursting and spreading of the product whose vapours may ignite causing deflagration or explosion. Incomplete combustion produces gases of varying toxicity such as carbon monoxide (CO). These are highly dangerous if inhaled.

Use water curtains to protect the personnel. Insulated individual breathing apparatus must be worn in premises with reduced oxygen. In case of spill in a closed area, clear this area, Ventilate thoroughly and let qualified personnel intervene. Protect all fire-fighters with a "life line". An insulated breathing apparatus or a helmet with a face mask and neck protection should be worn, as applicable, as well as gloves and protective clothing and boots (trouser legs pulled down over the boots). They must be made of flame-resistant and fire-proof material.

In case of a leak with no fire: stop the leak by closing the valve. In case of gas cloud formation: spray water to contain, direct and dissipate the gas cloud.

- Recovery: Not concerned

Shut off the gas supply. Eliminate possible causes of ignition. Stop all work that requires an open flame, stop all vehicles, stop all machines and equipment that may cause sparks or flames. Cut off the electric power supply if this operation causes no sparks in the area containing vapours from the product. VENTILATE THE PREMISES EXTENSIVELY. Remove combustible material and, if possible, all exposed LPG reservoirs. Ensure that there is no remaining risk before resuming normal operations.

This gas is produced, stored, transported and distributed UNDER PRESSURE AS A LIQUID. Under normal conditions of distribution, it is never handled directly because it is continuously confined in closed systems until its final destruction by combustion during use. FIRST PRECAUTIONS CONSIST IN ENSURING IT IS CAREFULLY CONFINED.

HANDLING :

Prevention of user exposure :

Handle in well-ventilated premises. Operations involving the inspection, cleaning and maintenance of storage containers require the application of strict procedures and must be entrusted to qualified specialist personnel only. DO NOT SMOKE. Wear safety boots and fully covering protective clothing GENERATING NO STATIC ELECTRICITY.


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Product name :

SDS n° :39053-33


Version :1.00


Prevention of fire and explosion : Precautions :

STORAGE :

Technical measures : Storage precautions : Incompatible products :

Packaging materials :

Use only in well-ventilated premises. Plan installations so as to avoid the possibility of this gas accumulating in low areas. Never heat a tank, a bottle or pipes holding gas with an open flame. All transfers, loading and unloading from vehicles must be carried out only by specifically trained personnel and in compliance with applicable procedures.

Use only soapy water or suitable products to search for leaks. NEVER USE A FLAME. IN ANY CASE: NEVER UNDERTAKE ANY OPERATION THAT MAY AFFECT THE SAFE CONTAINMENT OF THE FIXED STORAGE TANKS OR CONTAINERS. - Safe handling advice: In the installations use only materials and equipment expressly designed to use C/LPG. Do not use natural rubber, which dissolves on contact with C/LPG. Use only standardised pressure relief valves which are Butane/Propane approved under national or EC standards or covered by a specific ministerial agreement, appropriate for the control of pressure of the equipment used. For lines, restrict the use of hoses made of synthetic rubber. In case of discontinuous use close the tap after use. STORE THIS GAS IN COMPLIANCE WITH VALID REGULATIONS, AS APPROPRIATE FOR THE TYPE OF STORAGE USED AND THE QUANTITIES STORED. Use blast-proof electrical equipment in danger areas.

- Suitable: Store in well-ventilated premises and away from any source of ignition or heat. Do not expose containers holding C/LPG to temperatures exceeding 50°C. Store away from low areas where C/LPG vapours could accumulate in case of a leak or an accidental spilling. - To be avoided: Proximity of combustible material. Basement storage of this gas is prohibited.

Strong oxidising agents.

Use only bottles and tanks that comply with regulations for pressure devices intended for C/LPG.

8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS/PERSONAL PROTECTION Technical measures :

Occupational exposure limit :

Hand protection :

Eye protection :

Skin and body (other than the hands) protection :

When working in confined spaces (tanks, containers, etc.), ensure that there is a supply of air suitable for breathing and wear the recommended equipment.

- For LPG vapors, in the USA (ACGIH) TLV - TWA = 1000 ppm. In France : none.

Hydrocarbon-resistant gloves with cuffs.

Goggles and/or faceshield in case of risk of splashing.

Face mask, protective clothing and anti-static safety boots, as applicable. 9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES Appearance : Colour :

Odour :

Liquefied/pressurised. Liquefied/pressurised (at atmospheric pressure: liquid at -43°C and below, gas over -43°C).

Liquid phase: clear and colourless. Gas phase: colourless.

This product is treated to produce a characteristic odor.


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Product name :

SDS n° :39053-33 Flash point :

Température d'auto-inflammation :

Flammability limit - lower(%) :

Flammability limit - upper(%) :


Version :1.00

< -50 °C

> 400 ºC

1,9

9,5


Temperatures at phase change :

Vapour density :

Solubility :

Further information : 10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY Stability :

Conditions to avoid :

Materials to avoid :

Hazardous decomp. products : 11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION Acute toxicity / Local effect :

Inhalation, comments:

Skin contact, comments:

Eye contact, comments:

Boiling point: > - 43 ° C at 1013 mbar Critical temperature: > 97 ° C

1,4 - 1,55 / air

- in water : Slightly soluble.

Vapor pressure : ~ 4 bars at 15°C, < 15,5 bars at 40°C In liquid phase, Density : >= à 530 kg/m3 à 15°C. - Evaporation speed: - 1 litre of liquid placed under atmospheric pressure gives a volume of vapour of approximately 255 litres. - pH: not applicable The product is stable at normal storage, handling and use temperatures.

Not applicable.

Avoid contact with strong oxidizers

Not applicable. In the accidental presence of gas, a narcotic effect may be produced. Nausea, dizziness, headache, drowsiness, asphyxia, los of consciousness.

With the liquid gas: frostbites.

Risk of severe burns by the cold (if projection of liquefied gas).


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APPENDIX D: DMP updating for LPG Berth No. 12 and Collision, Grounding Accidents

D.1: LPG Fire at Berth No. 12 during unloading operation – on Ship or Ashore 1. The master of the ship.

a. Should raise ships emergency alarm and activate ship board emergency plan. b. Stop LPG transfer operation immediately and then all valves should be shut. c. Terminal should be informed of any incident on the ship without delay. d. Personnel to remain stand by to disconnect metal arms all through the period

of unloading operation. e. Also, to remain prepared to unberth the ship to the safe area during unloading.

2. The terminal personnel (Total Gas) should: a. First activate Port Emergency Control Plan by informing the port security. b. Shut off isolation valve on LPG pipeline at the berth. c. Pour foam on LPG spillage to reduce rate of vaporization. d. In the event of a fire, the tower monitors should be used for fighting. e. Surrounding equipment / installation to be kept cool by water jet from

monitors.

3. Handling LPG Emergencies Leaks from LPG pump glands, pipes flanges or pipeline ruptures or from vent emissions due to cargo tank over-pressure or relief valve failure will initially produce vapour. This vapour will not ignite immediately but, if the vapour production is large, there is a hazard of the resultant cold and dense vapour cloud as in the case of LPG spreading to a source of ignition before it is diluted below the lower explosive limit. Therefore, in case of release of large quantity of flammable vapour cloud, immediate effort should be directed to eliminate such source of ignition. In such event, eliminate all sources of ignitions i.e. open flames, welding, cutting, operation etc in the entire port premises.

4. Direct or disperse the vapour cloud away from such sources by means of fixed and/or mobile water sprays or by water fog arrangement.

5. If ignition does occur, there are chances of flash back to the source of leak. Leaks

from pipelines are likely to be under pressure and these, if ignited, will give rise to a jet flame. This phenomenon may occur even after the emergency shut down of the system due to pressure may persist in a closed pipeline until the liquid trapped within it has been expelled either as liquid or vapour through the leak. In such a case it may be safer to allow the fire to burn out while protecting surroundings by copious cooling water rather than attempting extinguishment of fire and risk a further vapour cloud which may result in explosion or flash back on availability of ignition source.


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Action group at NMPT Fire On-Board LPG Vessels at Berth No. 12

Master of LPG Tanker (Note: The Master must

intimate his working channel on the VHF during cargo work to the signal station.

Disaster Management Group Deputy Conservator

Terminal Manager LPG Import Facility

(Total Gas)

PILOT

Executive Engineer (Civil)

Executive Engineer (MECH)

Executive Engineer (ELEC)

Inspector – I CISF

Sr. Medical Officer

Fire cum Assistant Safety Officer

Signal Station VHF Ch.12 /16

Deputy Traffic Manager

Harbour Master


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Action Group for LPG berth no. 12 Duties and Responsibilities:

Designated Officer Role Duties Alternate

Officer Deputy Conservator

Site Main Controller

Will be stationed at the Emergency Control Centre to review & assess possible developments to determine the most probable course of action. He will give necessary instructions & arrange for external aid to the Site Incident Controller as necessary.

Harbour Master

Harbour Master

Site Incident Controller

During Emergency shall proceed to the scene & communicate & collect all information from the master of the tanker. He will report the situation to the Site Main Controller & the Disaster Management Group. He will extend all necessary help to the master of the ship to fight the fire. He will instruct the Executive Engineer (Mech) to keep the fixed fire fighting installation in a state of readiness & activate if required. He will instruct Marine Engineer(s) to keep tugs ready for fire fighting.

Dock Master

Fire Cum Asst Safety Officer I

Support to Master of the vessel for fire fighting operation.

Shall take orders from the Site Incident Controller. He will mobilise fire tenders, men & fire fighting equipments to the scene & extend all necessary support to the master of the vessel for fire fighting.

Fire Cum Asst Safety Officer II.


Security Officer

Controls & Directs traffic in the area. Shall supervise evacuation of personnel from the scene at the time of emergency.

Inspector –II CISF

Terminal Manager - Total Gas (LPG Import

Cargo Work Shall be responsible of shutting down of cargo operation & coordinating with NMPT and rendering necessary assistance to

Assistant Terminal Manager


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facility) the site incident controller by providing additional fire fighting & emergency equipment as required.

Executive Engineer (Mech)

In charge of Vehicles standby

Shall mobilize and dispatch sufficient number of vehicles to the site of emergency.

Assistant Executive Engineer (Mech.)

Executive Engineer (Elec.)

In charge of Electrical Installation

Shall be responsible for Electrical supply to vital equipment and systems at the berth

Asst Exe Engineer (Elec.)

Dy Chief Medical Officer

First Aid to Injured

Shall be responsible to organize and keep first aid team with ambulance & necessary medicines to attend to any injured person at the site of the accident.

Sr. Medical Officer

Master of the tanker

In Charge of fire fighting operation on board vessel

Shall be responsible for fighting the fire with ships own resources as well as from the help available from action group. He will coordinate with action group leader and will be responsible for shutting down all cargo operation on board in coordination with terminal In Charge.

Chief Officer of Tanker

Duty Pilot In Charge of Pilotage

Shall be ready on site for taking the ship out of berth.

Stand By Pilot

Stand By Pilot Signal Station In Charge (Port Control)

Shall monitor the communication on VHF & convey and relay messages on the advice from Site Main and Site Incident Controller. He will maintain LOG of events.

Signal Station Superintendent


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Action Flow Chart for LPG Tanker Fire at Berth No. 12

Signal Station

VHF CH.12 /16

Master of Tanker (Note: The Master of the Tanker must intimate his

channel on the VHF during cargo work to the

Signal Station)

Terminal IOC/Total

Gas/HPCL/IMC/IPWC/ MRPL

Informs Action Group Informs Port Fire Services on VHF – 10 Informs Disaster Management Group

Rings Ships Emergency Signal & Activate Shipboard Emergency Plan Informs signal station on VHF CH.12 /16. Stops cargo operation & informs terminal loading master. Informs port Fire Services on VHF CH.10 about the fire and start fighting fire with his own resources. On arrival of port fire services & action group coordinate with them in fighting fire mobiles ships main engines.

Rings Emergency signal & activate terminal emergency plan. Stops all cargo transfer operations. Keeps Fire fighting equipments in a state of readiness and assist ship and action group as required informs signal station.

Port Fire Services Ph: 2407488 /

2407673 VHF: Ch 10

Action Group

Disaster Management

Group

On hearing of the emergency proceed to the site with men and equipment. Assist the tanker in fire fighting. Take orders from the Site Incident Controller.

Assembles at the Site Assesses the extent of fire. Activates fire services to the location. Controls and Directs traffic in the port area. Evacuates personnel from the area. Administers first aid and carries out rescue of the injured to the hospital. Maintain continuous communication with the disaster management group.

Assemble at the Emergency control centre. Monitor, Assess the situation. Advise, instruct Site Incident Controller. Determine possible future course of action. If deemed necessary activate off – site emergency plan.


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D.2: Grounding/Collision within NMPT port limit Action Group

Grounding/collision of vessels

Master of

Ship

Disaster Management Group Deputy Conservator

PILOT

Executive Engineer (Civil)

Executive Engineer (MECH)

Executive Engineer (ELEC)


Sr. Medical Officer

Fire cum Assistant Safety Officer

Marine Engineer

Signal Station VHF Ch.12 /16

Deputy Traffic Manager

Harbour Master

Pollution Control Contractor (PresentlyYojaka India Pvt. Ltd.)

Coastguard/ District Commander


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Action Group for collision and grounding Duties and Responsibilities:

Designated Officer Role Duties Alternate

Officer Deputy Conservator

Site Main Controller

Will be stationed at the Emergency Control Centre to review & assess possible developments to determine the most probable course of action. He will give necessary instructions & arrange for external aid such as tugs/firefighters to the Site Incident Controller as necessary.

Harbor Master

Harbor Master Site Incident Controller

During Emergency shall proceed to the scene & communicate & collect all information from the master of the tanker. He will report the situation to the Site Main Controller & the Disaster Management Group. In case of fire on board the vessel after collision or contact he will extend all necessary help to the master of the ship. He will instruct Marine Engineer(s) to keep tugs ready for firefighting.

Dock Master

Pollution Control Officer

Support the SMC in case of threat of pollution

He will alert the OSRO/NMPT vessels and crew to respond with material and equipment in the event of oil pollution.

Fire Cum Asst. Safety Officer I

Support to Master of the vessel for firefighting operation.

Shall take orders from the Site Incident Controller. He will mobilise fire tenders, men & firefighting equipment’s to the scene & extend all necessary support to the master of the vessel for firefighting.

Fire Cum Asst. Safety Officer II.

Dy. Chief Medical Officer

First Aid to Injured

Shall be responsible to organize and keep first aid team with ambulance & necessary medicines to attend to any injured person.

Sr. Medical Officer

Master of the tanker

In Charge of counter

Master of the tanker shall be responsible for

Chief Officer of Tanker


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measures (as applicable) for 1. Firefighting 2. Flooding 3. Grounding

1. Fighting the fire with ships own resources as well as from the help available from action group. 2. Shutting down all cargo operations if it in progress. 3. Appropriate damage control measures in case of flooding including leak stoppage and pumping out, list correction etc. 4. Estimating the extent of under water damage, sounding of tanks and actions for the refloating of the vessel. 5. Taking decision regarding evacuation of the vessel.

Duty Pilot In Charge of Pilotage

Shall be ready for taking the instructions from site main controller and evacuate/move/shift the vessel from the area.

Stand By Pilot

Stand By Pilot Signal Station In Charge (Port Control)

Shall monitor the communication on VHF & convey and relay messages on the advice from Site Main and Site Incident Controller. He will maintain LOG of events.

Signal Station Superintendent


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EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

GROUNDING OF A VESSEL Definition This plan relates to the grounding of a vessel within NMPT Port waters including where its presence is likely to interrupt the movement of vessels into or out of the port. Aim and Objectives of the plan Site Main Controller will have control of the incident. He should confer with the Master regarding plans to refloat the vessel, precautions to be taken to preserve the safety of the vessel in the interim, and measures to be taken for the prevention of pollution. Immediate Action In the event of such an incident occurring, the following actions should be considered:

• The port control should be informed of the incident by the master of the vessel. • The port control will inform the Site Incident Controller of the incident. • To confirm appropriate pollution control measures are in place or standby and

inform State PCB and Coastguard, if necessary. The NMPT will then carry out the following actions:

• The movement of all other vessels into or out of the port should be stopped and alternative orders issued as necessary.

• The tug owner's representative should be promptly advised, and tugs requested to be placed on standby.

• Communications should be maintained and events are to be recorded, as appropriate.

• Ascertain details of the incident, including the location of the grounding, the vessel's particulars, direction of the vessel's head, height of tides, extent of damage to vessel (use of divers if required), prevailing and predicted weather conditions and damage to navigational aids.

• NMPT vessels on security duty should be directed to proceed to the location of the incident and clear the area of fishing and other traffic.

• Confer with the Master regarding plans for the refloating the vessel and the subsequent need for an alternative berth.

• Advise the District Authority, and determine the need for assistance from any functional services if necessary.

• Determine whether any form of pollution of the sea has occurred or is likely to occur. The oil pollution containment equipment should be deployed as necessary. In the event of pollution refer to the NMPT OSCP.

• The vessel's agent should be informed of the incident.


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Safety Issues The need to evacuate passengers and/or crew should be discussed with the ship’s Master. Authorities to be inform

• MMD must be notified of the incident. • Coastguard must be notified of the incident.

Post Emergency Actions

• Arrange for a preliminary inquiry into the causes of the incident to be commenced as soon as possible.

• Review the effectiveness of NMPT Ports Emergency Response Plans. • Inform alerted agencies that the incident is over.


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GROUNDING OF A VESSEL WITHIN NMPT PORT LIMIT -CHECKLIST-

Port .................................................Location ..........................................Date.................................. Vessel...........................................................................Agent............................................................ Master...........................................................................Pilot.............................................................. Time of Grounding............................................................................................................................ Cause of Grounding........................................................................................................................... NMPT Ports Emergency Co-ordinator………………………………………………............................ Agent advised.................................................................................................................................... Tug Company advised....................................................................................................................... Port Launches ordered...................................................................................................................... Vessel length.................................................Draft F.....................A.....................M ......................... Tides ................................................................................................................................................. Tide at time of grounding................................................................................................................... Direction of vessel's head.................................................................................................................. Movement of other Vessels stopped ................................................................................................ Damage to vessel ............................................................................................................................ Pollution ............................................................................................................................................ Confer with Master............................................................................................................................ Evacuation of Passengers (if any)................................................... ................................................ Plans to refloat vessel. ..................................................................................................................... Impact on Environment ……………………………………………………………………………............ Berth ................................................................................................................................................ Remarks ........................................................................................................................................... Date...................................................................................................................................................


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SINKING OR CAPSIZING OF VESSEL WITHIN PORT LIMIT Definition This plan relates to the sinking or capsize of a vessel within the NMPT Ports waters. Aim and Objectives of the plan Site Main Controller will have control of the incident. He should confer with the Master regarding plans to refloat the vessel, precautions to be taken to preserve the safety of the vessel in the interim, and measures to be taken for the prevention of pollution. Immediate Action In the event of such an incident occurring, the following actions should be considered:

• The VTMS in-charge (port control) should be informed of the incident. • The movement of all other vessels within the port should be stopped until the

circumstances of the incident have been ascertained, and alternative instructions can be issued.

• Immediately contact the emergency services (for e.g. tugs, harbor crafts, divers, pollution control measures etc.) and request the standby of all functional services that may be of assistance, particularly in regard to the rescue of survivors.

• NMPT Ports’ vessels should be directed to proceed immediately to the area and commence a rescue operation and search for survivors.

• Divers should be requisitioned to the scene to make a search for survivors if deemed necessary.

• Determine whether any form of pollution of the sea has occurred or is likely to occur. The oil pollution containment equipment should be deployed as necessary. In the event of pollution refer to the NMPT OSCP.

Safety Issues • The need to evacuate passengers and/or crew should be discussed with the

Master. Additional actions

• Arrange for NMPT Port’s vessels to recover or secure flotsam in the vicinity of the wreck.

• When clear to do so, arrange for the vessel to be buoyed, marking the position of the wreck.

• When it is safe for other vessels to navigate in the vicinity of the wreck, ensure that all Masters are properly advised of the precautions to be observed for the safety of navigation.


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• Discuss with the Master, owner or agent plans for the refloating or salvage (World Salvage Directory- http://www.marine-salvage.com/members/intro.htm) of the vessel. Action in this regard is particularly important where the wreck has obstructed the navigation channel, or approaches to the channel.

• Inform the vessel's agent of the incident/casualty. Authorities to be inform



• Arrange for a Notice to Mariners to be drafted and sent to MMD for issue. • If appropriate to do so, arrange for a preliminary inquiry into the causes of the

incident to be commenced as soon as possible.


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SINKING/CAPSIZE OF A VESSEL WITHIN NMPT PORT LIMIT -CHECKLIST-

Port .................................................Location ..........................................Date.................................. Vessel...........................................................................Agent............................................................ Master...........................................................................Pilot.............................................................. Time of Sinking/Capsize.................................................................................................................... Cause of Sinking/Capsize................................................................................................................. NMPT Ports Emergency Co-ordinator………………………………………………............................ Agent advised.................................................................................................................................... Tug Company advised....................................................................................................................... Port Launches ordered...................................................................................................................... Vessel length.................................................Draft F.....................A.....................M ......................... Tides................................................................................................................................................. Tide at time of Sinking/Capsize......................................................................................................... Direction of vessel's head.................................................................................................................. Movement of other Vessels stopped ................................................................................................ Damage to vessel ............................................................................................................................ Pollution ............................................................................................................................................ Confer with Master............................................................................................................................ Evacuation of Passengers (if any)................................................... ................................................ Plans to refloat vessel. ..................................................................................................................... Impact on Environment ……………………………………………………………………………............ Berth ................................................................................................................................................ Remarks ........................................................................................................................................... Date...................................................................................................................................................


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COLLISION BETWEEN TWO VESSELS WITHIN NMPT PORT LIMIT

Definition This plan relates to a collision between two vessels within NMPT Port limit. This includes navigation channels, areas adjacent to navigation channels, harbors, berths, anchorages and areas immediately adjacent through which vessels will navigate whilst approaching the port or in which they may anchor whilst awaiting berthing instructions. Aim and Objectives of the plan Site Main Controller will have control of the incident. Precautions to be taken to preserve the safety of the vessel(s) in the interim and measures to be taken for the prevention of environmental damage as well as safety of crews onboard vessel(s). Immediate Action In the event of a collision between two vessels within the port limits, the following action should be taken:

• MMD to be informed • The VTMS in-charge should be informed of the incident. • The movement of all other vessels in the port should be stopped and alternative

orders issued as necessary. • Immediately contact the emergency services and request the standby of all

functional services that may be of assistance. • Determine the extent and seriousness of any injuries sustained by the vessels

crews, and arrange medical assistance if necessary. • Ascertain the details of the incident, including the location of the vessels,

proximity to the navigation channel and the condition of the vessels in relation to hull damage and watertight integrity.

• If either vessel is in danger of sinking, determine action to be taken including moving it to a place where it can rest on the bottom, clear of the navigation channel.

• NMPT Port vessels should be directed to proceed to the location of the incident as necessary. Whilst on standby they should keep all nearby vessels clear of the area.

Safety Issues The need to evacuate passengers and/or crew should be conferred with the Masters.


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Additional Actions • Determine whether any form of pollution of the sea has occurred or is likely to

occur. The oil pollution containment equipment should be deployed as necessary. In the event of pollution refer to the NMPT OSCP.

• Liaison with the State should occur to ensure appropriate pollution control measures are in place or on standby in the event of a spill greater than 10 tonnes occurring.

• If the vessel(s) were under pilotage at the time, assess the need for another pilot(s) to be assigned to the vessel(s) to complete the movement, if practicable.

• The tug owner's representative should be promptly advised and requested to place the tug crews on immediate standby.

• Confer with the Master(s) on the need for the vessel(s) to be allocated alternative berth(s) taking in to account the extent of the damage and the risk of moving the vessel.

Authorities to be inform



• Review the effectiveness of NMPT Ports Emergency Response Plans. • Inform alerted agencies that the incident is over.


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COLLISION BETWEEN TWO VESSELS WITHIN NMPT PORT LIMIT

-CHECKLIST- Port .................................................Location ..........................................Date.................................. Vessel 1............................................................................................................................................. Pilot............................................................................Agent.............................................................. Vessel 2............................................................................................................................................. Pilot............................................................................Agent.............................................................. NMPT Ports Emergency Co-ordinator………………………………………………............................ Agent advised.................................................................................................................................... Tug Company advised....................................................................................................................... Port Launches ordered...................................................................................................................... Condition of vessels........................................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................................................................... Confer with Masters........................................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................................................................... Action to be taken to move Vessels.................................................................................................. ........................................................................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................................................................... Impact on Environment ……………………………………………………………………………............ Likelihood of Pollution....................................................................................................................... Type of ...........................................................Quantity..................................................................... Action taken...................................................................................................................................... Remarks ........................................................................................................................................... Date...................................................................................................................................................

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