new thinking in measuring national power slovenia univ

7/17/2019 New Thinking in Measuring National Power Slovenia Univ

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4567894:;<= 65>? @5:AB<:DE< Integrated State Power

The earl and /ostl -/erican

efforts on /easuring national power

in the last fift ears focused /ainl

on econo/ic and /ilitar factors# one

reason being the lack of data for other areas

so/eti/es considered i/portant but too fuFF to /easure0 In the last

two decades the Chinese have developed various concepts of

Co/prehensive National Power CNPH to take a /uch broader look at

/easuring power# and since $))$ the Indians have gone as far as

placing hu/an securit above national securit in co/puting their

National Securit Inde NSIH# which is the result of a general

paradig/ shift fro/ solel focusing on hard power to also including

soft power along with increasing data availabilit0

This background has served /e in developing a new power eJuation

that /easures national power b Juantifing the following factors2 KH

econo/ic perfor/ance Lno/inal G1PL# $H social develop/ent L

life epectancL# %H educational perfor/ance Linternational student

assess/ent scoresL# H govern/ent perfor/anceLcorruptionL# H

energ production# 'H /ilitar ependitures# OH ar/s production# and

*H nuclear weapons capabilit0 M paper is structured along the

following seJuence2 IH truncated background su//ar of the

paradig/ shift in power eJuations# IIH "ustifing the selection of factorsin / power eJuation# IIIH eplaining the conversion of inde nu/bers

into co/parable nu/bers Lthat therefore allows the calculation of

national shares in the global sste/L# IH presenting the results and

what the /ean0



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K0 The Quantification of Power

The quantification of national power aspires to take a less theoretical and more practical-mathematical approach in dealing

with the problem of defining and understanding national power and its perception, components and context. Measurement

increases precision and correlates data in progressively more effective ways to allow automatic feedback. The British

philosopher and mathematician Bertrand rthur !illiam "ussell stressed #that the fundamental concept in social science is

$ower, in the same sense in which %nergy is the fundamental concept in physics& '"())%**+ . Moreover power is a

holistic phenomenon, and #holistic phenomena cannot be described by linear, monocausal reasoning. "ather, whichever

element on some particular level is chosen for investigation, it must be considered in its context involving other levels, with

circularly causal relations between them& '/"0%))12/.

lmost any formula drawing on whatever factors can throw up numbers that give the impression of being reasonable for

some nations. 1n spite of this no formula has emerged with numbers that come across as equitable for all nations. 1nitialmeasurement usually starts out simple, leading to a basic model that can then be further refined until an advanced formula

results. holistic phenomenon, however, with its intrinsic complexity, may prove resistant to such a step-by-step procedure.

%ffectual quantification of holistic phenomena will almost certainly require a multidimensional basic framework with a

sophisticated configuration of factors in place before there is any chance of attaining first-round results that seem semi-

reasonable and so set in the right direction.

#Measurement& itself #is the foundation of science and its applications to technology& '30!4+ 5, it reduces uncertainty

by increasing precision, and it solidifies a basis for replication and refutation. This way concepts and dimensions of power

have a chance to gain legitimacy. rguments in words always rest in the end on arbitrary aesthetics. )o long asquantification is inadequate, so-called political science is forced to deal with notions of national power that amount to nothing

more substantial than philosophical speculations, hidden ideologies and empty talk.

6arious theorists have supplied various definitions of power. )ome compiled lists of factors 'see "02+ 78. 9owever, such

definitions and lists habitually lack the formulaic expression and quantifications indispensable for automatic feedback. The

quantification of phenomena is necessary in order to accumulate measurements and to figure out new methods to increase

precision since the formula:s automatic feedback in terms of results will be continuously redirecting the experimental

reasoning as well as the selection and application factors. 1n the absence of such automatic quantitative feedback, no

progress in reasoning is possible and no facts can be f irmly established.

$0 Power and Geopolitics

$ower resides fundamentally in the ability to kill and to protect oneself from being killed. ;oercion, exploitation and control

can be extended from this principle. The distinction between potential and actual is of prime importance, so a credible threat

to kill must not be confounded with mass, arbitrary killing. 1ntimidation suffices, as )un<i highlights in #kill one, frighten ten

thousand& '=092)T02+ >?. Machiavelli contended likewise that #disorders harm the entire citi<enry, while the executions




ordered by a prince harm only a few individuals& 'M;916%**1+ @A. urther he counsels that itCs better to be feared than

loved, even if one must avoid being outright hated, for hatred endangers, rather than secures, one:s position 'M;916%**1+

7.

The power of the nation state can at times force its citi<ens to kill by threatening to kill them if they do not comply.1ncarceration, discrimination and social pressure can be extended from this principle. The state has the monopoly of

violence, that is, the state is the potential killing machine, persecuting and de-legitimi<ing all other potential killing machines

within its territory. ourth /eneration !arfare contests exactly this state legitimacy+

In Rourth Generation war# the state loses its /onopol on war0 -ll over the world# state /ilitaries find

the/selves fighting nonstate opponents such as alQaeda# ,a/as# ,eFbollah# and the R-C0 -l/ost

everwhere# the state is losing0 !IN1H

The state understands itself as a monopolistD itCs one internally and isn:t externally. This lack of external control poses a

psychological problem for the state. )tates function in part to impose hierarchy and control. )ubsequently the anarchic and

fluid aspects of international relations constantly throw up quandaries that states cope with by delineating their shifting

national interests to maximi<e relative power on top of defensive capability.

1n AA5 the "ussian geopolitician lexander 4ugin composed Основы Геополитики E Foundations of Geopolitics avowing

#FGHIHJKLKN O PLH QKRHSHRGUKG SJNVLK, UNWN H SJNVLK K XJY SJNVLK E /eopolitics O a worldview of power, a science

about power and for power& '4(/12+ 8 E authorCs translation. The term geopolitics itself Zoins geography with the quest for

power. The key focus is to identify the strategic situation by linking any factors pertaining to politics with any factors

pertaining to location in space, which accentuates the physical constellation of countries along morphological maps as forexample in the land[water dichotomy. The problematic of geopolitics lies in its hybrid nature being situated between

academic analysis and activist politics 'compare BTT/*1+ 8@. $redominantly international military strategists seem to

appreciate geopolitics for its no-nonsense practical applicability and prescriptive tendencies.

The ability to kill facilitates control over society, which logically extends control to the natural environment depending on the

level of development. The definition of national power by the Bra<ilian Escola upe!io! de Gue!!a " upe!io! #a! $ollege can

bring this subZect to a close+

Poder Nacional a epressVo integrada dos /eios de toda orde/ de Jue a naVo dispXe no /o/entoconsiderado# para pro/over no ca/po interno e no Y/bito eterno a consecuVo dos ob"etivos nacionais# a

despeito dos antagonis/os0 M-TTZS K[OO2 K$[H

National power is the integrated epression of all capacities which a nation possesses at a considered

/o/ent for pro/oting internall and eternall the achieve/ent of national ob"ectives# in spite of whatever

challenges to it0 translated in +\!!]2 OH




%0 - !ittle ,istor

The first power equation may possibly be traced to the /erman statistician =ohann $eter )\]milch, who was a leading

pioneer in the field of population statistics. 1tCs unsurprising that the first power formula may have arisen with the systematic

development of statistics, for power was measured and is still measured in most literature by a multitude of means .^ 1n 5?

)\]milch claimed in his work %ie g&ttlic'e (!dnung E )'e %i*ine (!de!+

Wenn ein eich ebensoviele \inwohner hat als ein drei/al gr^_eres# so ist desselben \hre# Macht und

Sicherheit drei/al gr^_er oder die ,errlichkeit des letFteren drei/al kleiner0 S`_MI!C,2 K3)$H

If a countr has as /an inhabitants as one three ti/es larger# so is its reputation# power and securit three

ti/es greater# or the splendor of the latter threeti/es s/aller0 authors translationH

The assertion can be directly transformed into a power equation+

national power population population densit

or

national power population population 3 habitable land

The reasoning in support of this formula was that a high population density was thought to indicate high development

'!$$_()+ ? and sparsely populated areas were considered an enticement for conquest for encompassing surplus land

on top of being less able to withstand conquest due to the dispersion of the populace and defense resources ')`]M1*;9+

[??>, 8[75. The 5? )\]milch formula was quoted via !appus in @A by riedrich "at<el '"T%*+ 88 in

his A5 seminal work ,olitisc'e Geog!ap'ie E ,olitical Geog!ap'- , which is commonly regarded as the beginning ofgeopolitics.

1tCs sensible to assume that in the period 5?A7 more than a few individuals may have constructed power equations. 2o

work is known that has tried systematically to trace them. 0ne case in point constitutes the /erman mineralogist erdinand

riedensburg, who proposed a power equation in A87 that is made of ' self-sufficiency in natural resources, which he had

quantified, multiplied by '> population '"1%4%2)B("/+ >. 1sraeli ;olonel )hmuel /ordon traces power assessments

back to *anchesterCs laws formulated in A7 by the %nglish polymath and engineer rederick !illiam *anchester

'/0"402+ >@>7. 9owever these laws are less concerned with national power than force on the battlefield.

more systematic era commenced with ;lifford /erman:s power equation '/%"M2 A7. $ower equations became more

common. number of individuals started to quantify power with more attentiveness to past and current efforts in that

direction. s a consequence everyone familiar with this field knows the names of !ilhelm ucks '(;3) A7@, A5, =oel

4avid )inger, )tuart Bremer, =ohn )tuckey ')12/%" et alia A5>, "ay )teiner ;line ';*12% A5@, A55, A, AA? and

bramo imo 3enneth 0rganski and =acek 3ugler '0"/21)31 3(/*%" A5A. *ess known are !ayne erris '%""1)

A58, *ancelot arrar '""" A, $eter Beckman 'B%;3M2 A? and *ewis )nider, who further developed the

* In K[*K ,ar/ +lueting did his postdoctoral work about the /easure/ent of power along the develop/ent of statistics in the

K*th Centur +!U\TINGH0

† !ogical inference indicates that nonhabitable land should not count in calculating population densit as S_/ilch intended0Ror instance in atFels book we find the population densit of \gpt applied "ust to habitable land ecluding the desert-T\!2 %K'H0



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0rganski-3ugler formula ')214%" A5, A. More or less unknown are the modifications of ;line:s formula by Bra<ilian

/eneral ;arlos de Meira Mattos 'MTT0) A55, =apanese scholar 3angren ukushima '11)) and Taiwanese scholar

;hang ;hin-*ung '>?. ;line and Mattos were primarily geopolitical thinkers ';91*4, 3%**.

renaissance of geopolitical power calculations came with the ;hinese under 4eng iaoping in the As '$1**)B(".)ince that time #more than evaluation and measurement methods& '2+ have been developed. 1n A5 the

=apanese government conducted a study on 日本の総合国力 E .apan/s $o0p!e'ensi*e 1ational ,o2e! , which ()

;olonel !ort<el credits as initiating the ;hinese interest on calculating 综合国力 E ;omprehensive 2ational $ower;2$

'!0"T%* ;9%2/+ >?. The =apanese formula consisted of+

KH capabilit of contribution to international societ in conditions of international cooperation $H enforce/ent

capabilit to influence countries outside international sste/s to participate in the/ and %H capabilit of

survival to independentl ensure national survival against foreign threats0 \P-2 K$)H

The =apanese study along with ucks and ;line constitute the three key sources for subsequent ;hinese endeavors

'$1**)B(". 1n >> this ;hinese wave swept over 1ndia, where the 2ational )ecurity ;ouncil )ecretariat developed its

2ational )ecurity 1ndex2)1, which has been constantly revised and is published annually.

0 Rro/ ,ard to Soft to ,u/an Securit

The advancement of military technology has caused an unremitting erosion of the boundary between civil and military

matters. )ince !!1 persistent efforts have been made to view and pursue war in its totality, involving all national resources

and capabilities, hence the concept of )otal #a! . or instance, the new military dimension of air power amplified the

exposure of populations. 1tCs worth remembering the 1talian /eneral /iulio 4ouhet and his views on air power. 9e reckoned

that permanent bombardment would demorali<e populations. !!1 stretched to the breaking point and sometimes beyond

the psychological condition of the populations of all the maZor %uropean countries involved. 1n /ermany, in particular, the

defeat was attributed to the decline and eventual collapse of national morale at the end of !!1 and triggered the conceptual

addition of the psychological dimension of power equal to the military and economic dimensions 'see 91%"*, 1);9%".

This totali<ation went hand in hand with Third /eneration !arfare+

Third Generation warfare# like Second# was a product of World War I0 It was developed b the Ger/an

-r/# and is co//onl known as litFkrieg or /aneuver warfare0 !IN1H

The 5? )\]milch formula is demographic in character, the A87 riedensburg formula is based on natural resources and

population. The A7@ ucks formula consists of ' population, '> steel production and '8 energy production. The A5>

)inger formula consists of ' total population, '> urban population, '8 steel production, '? energy production, '@ military

expenditure and '7 military personnel. The A58 erris formula is based on ' area, '> population, '8 government

revenues, '? defense expenditures, '@ trade value, '7 armed forces and '5 defense expenditure. The A5A 0rganski-

3ugler formula is based on taxes, so is the A5 )nider formula that extends this view. The A arrar formula is based on

' manufacturing and '> population. ll these formulas can be said to be hard-power based, that is, consisting of



O


demographic, economic, military factors. The 0rganski-3ugler and )nider formulas come closest to appraising government

capacity, thereby touching on soft power as well.

The A7 /erman formula is multifaceted and consists of four factor-categories+ ' the national economy, '> land, '8

population and '? military power. Morale is a remarkable albeit minor factor modifier to working population. 1tCs the soleingredient based on arbitrary evaluation, which /erman Zustifies by observing that #certain countries, through corruption,

apathy, or poverty, do not mobili<e their human resources effectively& '/%"M2+ 8A. Morale in the /erman formula

affects [> or circa .8 of the results. The A5@ ;line formula consists of typical hard-power factors such as ' population

plus territory, '> economic resources and '8 military resources, which are multiplied by the soft-power factors '? strategic

purpose and '@ national will. 1n net effect soft power accounts for @ of the ;line formulaj The only drawback is that the

soft-power factors are again based on arbitrary evaluation. The A? Beckman formula consists of ' steel production and

'> world population, with the latter being multiplied by '8 political stability. $olitical stability possesses hard-power as well as

soft-power features. 1t accounts for >@ of the Beckman formula. $olitical stability was again based on arbitrary evaluation,

however nowadays the !orld BankCs !orldwide /overnance 1ndicators, extending back to AA7, quantify twice-yearly '

voice and accountability, '> political stability and absence of violence, '8 government effectiveness, '? regulatory quality,

'@ rule of law and '7 control of corruption. Though those indicators are perception-based, they represent a formidable

treasure of information.

The A5@ ;line formula denotes the focal point of all geopolitical power calculations. #;line:s significant contribution to the

field was not his new conclusion on components of state power, but rather his inclusion of both soft: and hard: powers as

factors rather than addends in his equation& '2+ 7. s the earlier synopsis of formulas and factors has demonstrated,

hitherto the paradigm shift towards soft power has been anything but consistent or clean-cut. The best that can be

recogni<ed is a trend. 2or has the ;hinese renaissance been consistent and homogeneous. 1ndeed lots of creativity still

exists in this field despite some fatigue about the ever decreasing ability to hit upon a consensus on the ultimate power

formula. general tendency exists to include soft power in the numerous ;2$ formulas. 9owever, lack of lucidity regarding

the concept itself has brought about some ;2$ formulas that still cling more or less to hard power. 1n those cases itCs the

broader inclusion of increasingly diversified factors that is expanding outlooks. The >> ;2$ formula by 9u ngang and

Men 9onghua places much weight on financial and technological factors 'see 9( M%2. $illsbury points out the excessive

praise that the ;hinese reserve for the annual 3nte!national $o0petiti*e ,o2e! 4epo!t by the !orld %conomic orum in

comparison to their critical approach to power formulas otherwise. 1tCs fair to infer that ;hina:s present primary strategic focus

is on market competitiveness as the dynamic engine of uninterrupted economic growth. The AA7 ;2$ formula by the;hinese cademy of )ocial )ciences;)) contains more hard power yet inclines towards soft power, for direct

perceptions surveys were made to include soft power in areas like foreign-affairs capability. *ong-time pioneer 9uang

)huofeng of the ;hinese cademy of Military )cienceM) set forth a dynamic equation for ;2$ that can be quite difficult

to comprehend. 1t upholds a balance of hard power and soft power '$1**)B(". The scholar turned media commentator

an uetong complains that #measuring methods used in assessing ;hina:s power status have become increasingly

complicated& '2+ . 9u and Men use >8 indices, ;)) draws on 7? indices and the M) makes use of >A secondary

indices and more than tertiary indices. an laments+

1ue to the lack of a co//on standard# neither increasing the nu/ber of factors /easured# nor using

co/plicated /easure/ents have led to an i/prove/ent in the accurac of /easuring Chinas current

power status0 ]-N2 [H



*


;)) includes #the level of social development& in its index, which #is connected to peopleCs quality of life, political stability,

and social benefits& '$1**)B(". rom that it isnCt a long step to 1ndia:s 2)1 that shifted the focus on human security.

9uman security conveys a broader view on national security, since it focuses on the situation of individuals rather than

states. 1tCs to be expected that a poverty-stricken democracy would establish a more integrative standpoint embracing social

aspects. The 1ndian 2ational )ecurity ;ouncil )ecretariat pieced together the 2)1 in >>. The 2)1 has been published for

>>, >8, >?, >7 and >5. The 2)1 has been reworked incessantly in terms of factors, information sources and

methodologies '3(M" >>, >8, >?, >@, >7, >5, >.

Table 1 shows the categories and weightings of the $))$ and $))O NSI

$))$ NSI $))O NSI

$) ,u/an 1evelop/ent Inde $ \cono/ic Strength

$) esearch and 1evelop/ent Inde $ 1efence Capabilit

$) G1P Perfor/ance Inde $) \nerg Securit$) 1efence \penditure Inde K Technological Strength

$) Population Inde K \ffective Population

Source2 +UM- $))%# $))*

The insertion of the 9uman 4evelopment 1ndex941 by (24$ was a ground-breaking step to adZoin and enhance the

social dimension in power formulas. 1n addition the $opulation 1ndex multiplied the 941 by population. 1n total the 941

embodied effectively ?. "egrettably the 941 was dropped in further revisions, so education and pe! capita /4$ was

eventually Zoined with population to determine %ffective $opulation. *ife expectancy was dropped altogether and the si<e of

the Zoined categories shrunk to effectively @. Technology was also trimmed down from > to @. The boon of the

1ndian 2)1 is that it remains colorful and dynamic and has been published regularly every year, apart from >@. )o despite

the trend suggesting a fallback to conventional factors, the future remains wide open.

Table 2 shows Indias ranking throughout the continuousl revised NSI

$))$ $))% $)) $)) $))' $))O

United States United States United States L United States United States

(apan China China L China China

China (apan (apan L Norwa Norwa

South +orea South +orea Sweden L India ussia

Ger/an Sweden Rinland L (apan India

Rrance ussia ussia L ussia (apan

ussia Ger/an Canada L Saudi -rabia South +orea

United +ingdo/ India South +orea L United +ingdo/ United +ingdo/

Israel Rrance India L Ger/an Ger/an

India United +ingdo/ Ger/an L South +orea Rrance

Source2 +UM- $))%# $))# $))# $))'# $))O# $))*

The 1ndian economist rvind 6irmani, the ;hinese scholar hang !enkui and the merican economist %van 9illebrand all

developed independent of each other a similar formula focused on pe! capita /4$ or pe! capita ;2$ '9(/9%) 91**%B"24+ ?, 11)), 61"M21 >@a, >@b. )ome factors in the A58 erris formula were already aggregate as well

as pe! capita. lso a resemblance to the 5? )\]milch formula is undeniable. The >@ 6irmani formula called the 6irmani



[


1ndex of $otential $ower61$> and the >7 9illebrand formula consist of ' /4$$$$ multiplied by '> pe! capita

/4$$$$. The rationali<ation is that /4$$$$ best represents economic capability and that pe! capita /$4$$$ best

represents the technological capability. ccordingly, the multiplication of both factors amounts to comprehensive technico-

economic capability. hang !enkui:s formula adds up ;2$ and pe! capita ;2$. hang, 6irmani and 9illebrand essentially

contend in the same vein that populations can be a liability when the masses lack the technological superstructure.%specially 6irmani accentuates in comparison to ;hina that high economic growth ought to be measured pe! capita. This

way 1ndian aggregate growth becomes less exciting, and in retrospect ;hina pursued the right strategy by implementing the

one-child policy to promote pe! capita economic growth.

0 Perspectives j Ideolog

The /erman quantum physicist !erner 9eisenberg clarified that #what we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed

to our method of questioning& '9%1)%2B%"/+ @. $eople can manipulate what they see. )o it could be argued that

academic obZectivity particularly in the social sciences tends to consist of deceptions legitimi<ed by the garb of theory and

methodology 'compare M0"/%2T9(. %xaggeration and generali<ation are the two key methods used to universali<e

diverse reductionisms. Theories become a substitute for religion at times mere dogma defended by hypocrites with

international relations being in no way exceptional 'compare M"T"%)+ 878. The ;hinese scholar !ang iwei describes

the three maZor merican schools of international relations theory as vulgar and regards them as ideological, the (nited

)tates being able to choose whatever theoretical outlook serves the national interest best in different contexts '!2/+ AA.

9ence, such theories themselves are soft-power factors in the propaganda war but not tools for analysis. The rench scholar=ean-*ouis Martres pushes a different thinking that may entail a partial return to historical reasoning+

Il suffit doser le sncrtis/e# blasph/e affreu# Jui bafoue chaJue thoricien dans sa gloire uniJue# /ais

en fait si/pose afin de faire apparatre le caractre convergent et co/pl/entaire des rponses fournies

par les diffrentes /thodes0 ien smr# un tel sacrilge offense la notion //e de paradig/e 0 Mais

seraitce vrai/ent cri/inel q M-T\S2 )H

Its enough to dare to propose sncretis/# a terrible blasphe/# which violates the uniJue glor of ever

theorist# but is in fact necessar in order to show the convergent and co/ple/entar answers provided b

different /ethods0 Zf course# such a sacrilege offends the ver notion of paradig/ 0 ut is it reallcri/inal q authors translationH

$ower formulas are no less guided by interests, bias or perception. ;line was an extremely dedicated anti-communist ;1

official who was later funded by Taipei. 9e set out to confirm through his calculations that the (nited )tates was falling

behind the )oviet (nion because of what he perceived to be an acute lack of strategic purpose and national cohesion after

6ietnam. ;line rewarded the fully committed anti-communist allies Taiwan and )outh 3orea with unrealistically high scores

';92/+ @, while at the same time lessening ;hina:s score to decrease its attractiveness for )ino-merican

rapprochement. 0rganski and 3ugler use taxation for the determination of national power, which would be a rather unusual

step for those with views aligned to tax-hostile () "epublicans. 1ndeed, it suggests views aligned to tax-friendly ()4emocrats. The ;hinese interest in finance and economic competitiveness reveal a ;hinese state of mind created by a high-

growth economy in which the legitimacy of one-party rule is no longer based on ideology but economic performance. The



K)


1ndian interest in human development and human security reveal that mass poverty in 1ndia is still too pervasive and visible

to be ignored by academics in ivory towers.

The formulas are not thereby discredited. 1ntersubZectivity should supplant navely dogmatic and sterile notions of obZectivity,

whereas increased precision in numbers may pave the way to facts. 2or is it meant to insinuate reductionist determinism inthe construction of formulas. The ;hinese and 1ndian interest in power equations seems to correlate to their appearance as

so-called rising powers, though ;hina has been fashionably regarded as a rising power since the A@s, and 1ndia:s claim to

such a title is dubious and caused by false analogy. 1tCs more likely that the opening of ;hina under 4eng iaoping has

inspired this surge. 1tCs all speculation, for historical coincidence is every time susceptible to rationali<ation, conspiracy

theories being Zust more radical attempts at such. Moreover itCs plain that all information here on power formulas is tainted by

a strong self-selection bias. 1solated endeavors in smaller countries to construct power formulas have much less opportunity

to get referenced and thereby become widely known.

'0 So/e Guidelines

The quantification of national power is the attempt to construct a unified, comprehensive factor. ;onsequently itCs illogical

and unnecessary work to commence with a vast set of factors when comprehensive factors are available to cover many

areas, for instance /4$. 2or do additional factors assure improved results. The escalating complexity provides ever-

increasing space for errors in weights and formulaic positions that can skew results. 1f a more comprehensive factor is

available, and this comprehensive factor covers the parts adequately, then the more comprehensive factor is preferable tothe more specific ones. 1f at an advanced stage an automatic method is found to be viable to process an unlimited set of

factors, then obviously a vast set of factors can be assimilated.

=udgments containing hidden preferences on the choices made by the state actor should be minimi<ed. or instance, the

weight of capital-intensive armies can be propped up by stressing air and naval power. The other way around the weight of

manpower intensive armies can be propped up by highlighting military personnel. 1n either case the person computing the

measurement is somehow supposing superior Zudgment on how the state should distribute its military expenditures. 1tCs much

safer to assume that all states seek to optimi<e their distribution of military expenditures according to their strategic needs. 1f

severe strategic incompetence is to be assumed, then this should be measured directly or indirectly by proxy factors like

corruption. ;onversely a case could be made that, for instance, the industrial sector of the economy or more explicitly

manufacturing has more relevance pertaining to war potential than /4$ in total. 1n this case the sector distribution within the

economy can be Zudged according to a legitimate criterion. 1tCs ultimately a matter of personal wisdom to determine what can

be Zustified and what not. The rule is to be careful and conscious of the problematic.

The ideal-type aim in constructing a preliminary power formula is to optimi<e the selection of factors and method. 1tCs to cover

as much as possible with as little as necessary, so that the ratio of the coverage divided by the number of factors is

maximi<ed. This ratio is difficult to guesstimate. ;onceptually it serves as a weak foundation for efficacious inquiry, which isa function of intelligence. %ffectiveness regardless of efficiency would lead to spending an infinite amount of time and effort

on miniscule improvements. Minimal investment in time and effort would end with the selection of one factor proving



KK


unsatisfactory. The holistic-intuitive decision process ought to be relied on for no other reason than the fact that intuition

covers and digests a huge amount of information and is accordingly a better guide to optimi<ing selections and correlations

than any methodology. s long as human intelligence is qualitatively superior to computer intelligence, intuition and

plausibility are legitimate anchors to unconscious realms of enormous capacity. )cientific method serves to externali<e these

mental processes and transfer this wisdom in tiny steps to the machine for faster and more voluminous processing. Thescholastic disZointing of emotional and rational as well as aesthetical and mathematical ends in false dichotomies 'compare

$1")1/.

O0 asic Paradig/

1n essence my basic paradigm is taking the 9ermetic principle of #as above, so below& as articulated in the )a5ula0a!agdina E E0e!ald )a5let of 9ermes Trismegistus+

Quod est inferius est sicut Juod est superius# et Juod est superius est sicut Juod est inferius# ad

perpetranda /iracula rei unius0 WI+IP\1I-H

That which is above is as that which is below# and that which is below is as that which is above# to perfor/

the /iracles of the one thing0 translated in WI+IP\1I-H

Macro-cosmos and micro-cosmos correspond to one another. 1n its radical interpretation it can be reali<ed as a principle for

magic. 1n a more restrained interpretation it connotes that many remarkable similarities can be found from the large-scalestructures of galaxy clusters to the tiny-scale structures of atoms and beyond. 1n this case it performs to produce a humble

analogy of human and state. !hen my contemplations focused on how to position the human in terms of assets, four

variables came to mind that could be defined by two dimensions+

Table 3 Jualitative Juantitative

/ental character intel ligence

phsical health wealth

1tCs more than arguable to what degree these four factors encapsulate human assets. t the same time, it would be hard to

deny that these four factors together are of maZor significance. *ater contemplations on national strength started with a huge

number of factors, subsequently reduced to four, that effectively translate those of the human to that of the state+

Table 4 Jualitative Juantitative

/ental integrity = lack of corruption educational level

phsical life expectancy economic level

These four factors constitute the socio-economic body of the state. 1nterestingly enough these factors correspond to the

factors in the 941, which are ' life expectancy, '> education and '8 /4$, plus the ;orruptions $erceptions 1ndex;$1,

even if qualitative differences exist in the actual factor selection. They are significantly correlated, likewise it can be inferred



K$


that they are all connected to, and reinforce each other, to an unknown degree. 9ere:s a $earson correlation matrix based

on original per capita values, the components are elaborated in the next section along with the data sources+

Table 5 integrit educational level life epectanc econo/ic level

integrit K0)) )0' )0O )0[

educational level )0' K0)) )0O* )0%[

life epectanc )0O )0O* K0)) )0%

econo/ic level )0[ )0%[ )0% K0))

The exclusion of smaller countries will tremendously boost correlations, and relatively high correlations tempt the usage of a

single variable. 9owever this would be seriously detrimental to all cases in which the high correlations don:t hold. )ome

countries are rich solely because of natural resources but may still suffer low educational quality and high corruption.

)ocialist and formerly socialist countries may be relatively poor but still benefit from a well-developed social system ensuring

good life-expectancy rates and good education. )ignificant examples exist for various configurations, so single-factor

reductionism is unimaginative+

The atte/pt to treat one for/ of power# sa wealth# in isolation# can onl be partiall successful# "ust as the

stud of one for/ of energ will be defective at certain points# unless other for/s are taken into account0

USS\!!2 KKH

4eveloped nations take adequate care to secure the individual from violence, so here the analogy ends and the security

aspect of national power has to be considered. 1n the preliminary model the military aspect is another dimension, accordingly

civil power and military power are balanced in terms of weight. /iven the definition of power as the ability to kill while

simultaneously protecting oneself from being killed, all power is ipso facto military power. The inclusion of the civilian state ofthe socio-economic body is Zustified by being latent military power. 1tCs power waiting for transformation when the political will

so commands. %very so often itCs argued that civil power can be so rapidly converted to military power that it suffices to

quantify civil power. This might be true to the extent one is willing to move into the past, where distance and slow

transportation provided a certain grace period for mobili<ation. Then again surprise attacks were also launched a long time

ago. The 9un and Mongol invasions demonstrated how flexibility and speed could be used decisively even under non-high-

tech warfare conditions. The use of missiles and nuclear weapons does altogether abolish the grace period+

In an allout ther/onuclear war the superior econo/ic war potential of the United States is i/portant onl to

the etent that it has been effectivel diverted to securit purposes before war starts0 ,ITC,3Mc+\-N2 KH

2uclear weapons are not adequately covered by any broad factors on military power like military expenditures, though in an

all-out conflict they would be the ultimate weapon. )imilarly energy production isnCt adequately covered by any of the broad

factors within the socio-economic body. =apan and many other high-income economies are dismally dependent on energy

imports. n all-out oil embargo like in A58 would certainly cripple numerous economies. 1f renewable resources compensate

for disappearing oil and gas resources, energy production may again match energy demand locally. )ubsequently the

importance of energy production as an extraordinary factor will be diminished. 2uclear weapons and energy production have

to be added as an extraordinary dimension standing for total military or economic escalation.

The preliminary formula to measure 1ntegrated )tate $ower consists subsequently of the following elements and weights+



K%


Table 6 Table 7

integrit education

life epectanc econo/ic level

/ilitar

ependituresar/s production

'0$ econo/ic level

'0$ life epectanc

'0$ education

'0$ integrit

energ production nuclear weapons

$0)) energ production

K$0) /ilitar ependitures

K$0) ar/s production

$0)) nuclear weapons

Table 5 may give the false impression that the socio-economic body represents only >@, however military expenditures and

arms production are calculated in relation to the whole socio-economic body, so that the socio-economic body is effectively

the base for @ of the total.

*0 Ractor Selection

The extremely difficult quantification of numerous important factors is the foremost problem. 1talian /eneral ;arlo =ean

testifies in his AA@ work Geopolitica on the problematic of factors #che talune non sono suscettibili di quantifica<ione, come

il prestigio, la credibilit, lo coesione, il consenso, la capacit di accettare perdite e priva<ioni, la qualit della leadership e

cos via E that some are not susceptible of quantification like prestige, credibility, cohesion, consensus, the ability to accept

losses and privations, the quality of leadership and so on& '=%2+ 7> E authorCs translation. *ots of theorists for a number ofmillennia stressed the decisive importance of these factors. 2ational morale and strategic leadership are perhaps the two

most important factors in the determination of power, the coefficients of which ;line estimated in accordance with his

extensive knowledge, but filtered through his ideological favoritism. Then again in this decade a number of other important

factors like governance, corruption and education have been systematically quantified. These recent developments proffer

magnificent potential for the future of geopolitical power calculations.

*ots of available data is incomplete, and these gaps constitute a tremendous obstacle to quantification purposes. 1n the

absence of rough estimates, it most often means in practice that countries have to be excluded. Most data gaps affect tiny

countries, and their self-selected omission can be Zustified due to insignificance. The more factors are used, the more likely

small-to-medium-si<e countries tend to be affected as well. %xtremely specific and peculiar factors may have only rather

limited data availability to commence with. The common tendency is that any increase in factors causes a decrease in the

coverage of countries for which national power can be calculated. 2orth 3orea is the most notorious example of statistical

inaccessibility causing exclusion from power indices. 2orth 3orea is the most militari<ed country in the world. 1t has the fourth

largest army in terms of military personnel. or that reason itCs ludicrous to omit 2orth 3orea from geopolitical power

calculations. 1tCs perhaps a matter of long-term wisdom to survey for available data rather than getting stuck on incomplete

data. ppendix B lists all recent !orld Bank data available on 2orth 3orea.

The 941 uses $$$ for pe! capita /4$. My formula uses the official exchange rate0%", for the 0%" underscores

technological capability and trade value. s a general observation it can pointed out that mericans, for instance, prefer



K


/4$$$$, whereas /ermans prefer /4$0%". 1f country background plays the leading role in economic assessment,

one is forced once more to question so-called obZectivity. 6irmani and 9illebrand use pe! capita /4$$$$ as a proxy for

technological capability and they multiply it with /4$$$$ itself. 1t can be argued that using /4$0%" directly is the

simpler adZustment of /4$ to technological capability. nother issue is that some countries are rich due to natural resources,

tourism, et cetera. urthermore some indices use raw population, and though itCs a dubious factor by itself alone, if one wereto integrate raw population figures and pe! capita values, one may end up again with the normal aggregate values as they

stand. et pe! capita is relevant to perception and ultimately should be integrated to a more limited degree in future power

formulas. *ife expectancy is taken directly like in the 941. 1t has a long tradition as a measure of social development and

progress. The net effect of wealth is for people to have longer, healthier and hopefully happier lives, so this indicator seems

better fitted than /4$$$$ to capture a comprehensive picture of net effectiveness. 1nformation on /4$0%" and life

expectancy are taken primarily from the ;1 !orld actbook ';1.

The 941 measures education by ' adult literacy and '> gross enrollment that adds together the years spent at primary,

secondary and tertiary level. The problem with adult literacy it that this measure has reached the near-maximum in most

developed countries, hence itCs useless in assessing differences here. /ross-enrollment measures education by years

enrolled in the system, not by educational quality. or instance, people in 1ndia may spend many years in class, yet still

emerge almost uneducated, whereas others in ;hina use their time much more efficiently to learn something. My formula

takes the calculated scores by the /erman psychologist 9einer "indermann, who combined the scores of three sources to

obtain cumulative score as well as a complete data set on cognitive ability, the only exception being $alestine, the score of

which "indermann for reasons of his own failed to calculate. The sources for his qualitative assessments consisted of ' the

0%;4 $rogramme for 1nternational )tudent ssessment$1) study, '> the 1nternational ssociation for the %valuation of

%ducational chievement1% Trends in 1nternational Mathematics and )cience )tudyT1M)) as well as $rogress in

1nternational "eading *iteracy )tudy$1"*) and '8 the international 1 tests standardi<ed by the British psychologist

"ichard *ynn and the innish political scientist Tatu 6anhanen '"124%"M22.

;orruption is a hideous malady and impediment for many countries in this world. 1t eradicates the trust of people and

businesses to one another as well as their trust to state institutions. ;orruption acts as an unofficial surtax on everything,

however the damaging effects of corruption are less related to the actual cost, which can be quite minor, than to slowing

business down. *ack of trust increases uncertainty and subsequently decreases the liquidity of already scarce resources by

requiring excessive tit-for-tat negotiation on countless minor issues. ;orruption demotivates people by setting up an insidious

role-model in the form of the so-called elites, who illustrate by their very existence that cheating and stealing are the path toindividual success and affluence rather than hard work and persistence. ;orruption immediately degrades the power of the

state by restricting its control over the bureaucracy. 4egrees of corruption also help illustrate how serious countries are in

terms of sustainable state-building. or instance, the (nited rab %mirates have relatively low corruption, which matches

much high quality investment in other areas, whereas )audi rabia is a prime example of high corruption levels and

corresponding incompetence. ;onsequently, )audi rabia as a state seems unlikely to survive the end of oil revenues. My

formula takes the ;$1 by Transparency 1nternational to measure integrity. The ;$1 coalesces the scores of various recent

surveys on corruption '*MB)40".

Mike 9uckabee was one of the presidential candidates in the > "epublican primaries in the (nited )tates. 1n the several

debates he emphasi<ed many times the importance of self-sufficiency in the three strategic key sectors of the economy that



K


are ' food and water, '> fuel and energy production and '8 weapons manufacturing. 9uckabee made his argument this

way+

When we start outsourcing everthing and we are in that kind of a trade deficit# then "ust re/e/ber# who

feeds us# who fuels us and who helps us to fight# thats to who/ we are enslaved0 So if we cant do those

three things# our national securit is ver /uch at risk0 ,ZRRM-NNH

9uckabee:s argument can be converted to simple logical functions+

no food no people

no fuel no econo/

no ar/s no ar/

ood spoils rapidly and is more or less evenly distributed across the globe, though the recent food crisis reaffirms the value

of local production. or these two reasons it was excluded from my power equation. 9owever, agricultural land as an

upgraded version of territory indicates demographic growth potential, hence agricultural production and land should be

integrated in future revisions. %nergy is the basis of modern economic activity. 1ts production isnCt evenly distributed across

the globe. urthermore, oil, gas and coal have taken millions of years to come into existence, so they don:t spoil if for tactical

reasons their production is suddenly reduced. 1nformation is taken from the %nergy 1nformation dministration of the ()

4epartment of %nergy '%1.

The special caveat of arms production is that it often pushes the customer into long-term dependency on the supplier for the

purposes of weapons maintenance. *arge countries with large armies are in the best position to engage in advanced

weapons manufacturing due to economies of scale as well as high costs related to "4. 9ence they are in the best position

to export weapons and exert implicit pressure by doing so. 6ene<uela:s change of allegiance from pro to anti-() has caused

it problems in obtaining spare parts for maintaining its air force. 1t will take a long time before all 6ene<uelan weapons

systems can be replaced by acquisitions in "ussia. !eapons acquisitions can bind countries strategically more enduringly

than anything else. #*a recherche de puissance Zoue un rle essentiel E the pursuit of power plays a key role& explains the

rench economist =ean-ves ;aro #que la /rande-Bretagne et la rance veulent conserver leur rang dans la production

dCarmements E that Britain and rance want to keep their rank in the production of armaments& ';"0 >>b+ 7 E authorCs

translation. The opaque character of arms trade and production severely obstructs access and completeness of quality

information. %stimates on the employment in arms production were taken from the Bonn 1nternational ;enter for ;onversion

B1;; ')1$"1 and transformed into estimates on arms production for my formula.

Taking solely military expenditures and omitting military personnel has been Zustified earlier. The only observation that needs

to be added is that the three most populous countries ;hina, 1ndia and the (nited )tates put their main weight on capital

intensity rather than manpower, because a certain threshold on maximum manpower beyond which further additions bring

little benefit seems to exist. 1nformation here was taken primarily from the ;1 !orld actbook. The inclusion of nuclear

weapons as the ultimate weapons has been Zustified earlier. The only observation that needs to be added is that nuclear

weapons power isnCt proportional to the amount of warheads. 1f for instance 1ran were to produce a few warheads, it would

be still vastly outnumbered by most nuclear armed countries including 1srael. 9owever, the possession of a single nuclear

weapon is already considered a catastrophe for international security in () propaganda warfare. ;onsequently, next to the



K'


number of nuclear warheads a dummy variable was added simply to determine if a country has nuclear weapons or not.

1nformation was taken from /lobal)ecurity.org '/*0B*)%;("1T.0"/.

[0 Mathe/atics

1ndices like the 941 and 2)1 convert the absolute numbers of numerous factors into logarithms to render them compatible for

adding up. They don:t convert the logarithms back to absolute numbers to indicate global shares. 941 and 2)1 merely

indicate rank. My approach reconverts logarithms back into absolute numbers. *ife expectancy, education and corruption

scores are treated as logarithms and converted into absolute numbers with the aim of making them compatible with absolute

/4$0%" values. This can be done by calculating the geometric mean of the /4$0%" values pe! capita with countries

weighted by population to equal the geometric mean of any set of converted values pe! capita with countries weighted bypopulation. The beauty is that values will have the same mean whether perceived on an absolute or logarithmic scale. n

equal geometric mean preserves relations. 1f in one country like =apan people live on average >.> years and in another

like 1ndia 7.@A years, it follows that the development in the former country is much higher than of the latter and that not

merely by a factor of circa .> as the direct numbers relate to. )ubsequently life expectancy has to be recalculated. >.>

years of average life expectancy can be quantified to resemble a pe! capita /4$0%" of @8@? and 7.@A years of

average life expectancy resemble a pe! capita /4$0%" of @ with the result being a factor of circa >A.The real

/4$0%" for =apan is 88 and 1ndia 58 with a factor of circa @?.

nother extremely contentious issue is whether to keep things linear or not, whether to coalesce the numerous factors by anadditive or multiplicative approach. The additive approach requires an undemanding calculation of the arithmetic mean. The

problem is that the arithmetic mean of percentages is immensely dependent on the total or unity. Two countries cannot be

compared without access to information on all the other countries to calculate percentage shares, otherwise results will get

easily skewed with limited country selections 'compare 34%" )0"0312+ >5>>. urthermore, arithmetic means are

more sensitive to large values than small values, so '> [ > @ and '> [ > 7. 1t:s hardly a difference given

that the first value was increased by a factor of ten. The geometric mean excels in relational sensitivity, accordingly the

square root of > x is circa ? and that of > x is circa ?@, which makes a whopping difference. The advantage of the

geometric mean is that the ratios of whatever two countries remain constant regardless of how many countries are selected.

The disadvantage is that the geometric mean fails in dealing with <ero values. 1f the factors include one <ero value, the total

result is always <ero as well.

2ormally in statistics, what mean is proper is usually clear. The arithmetic mean is frequently used to average quantities like

number of soldiers shot per day, whereas the geometric mean is used correctly to average growth rates like the average

annual /4$ growth rates for a decade, for instance. actors of national power reinforce one another to a certain degree. )till

they are not as completely interdependent as to Zustify using the geometric mean. This presents a problem in locating

something between arithmetic and geometric mean. My solution is to measure the concentration of values via the number of

effective components+

The *aakso-Taagepera effective number of components is



KO


2 ' Σ ) > [ Σ ' )i> [ Σ ( si

> ,

where ) is the total si<e, )i the si<e of the 1-th component, and si )i [ ) its fractional share. 'T/%$%"+ ?

;oncentration is the inverse of the effective number of components, which in economics is known as the 9erfindahl-9irschman concentration index. The percentage values across various factors are added together according to factor

weights and then divided by the comprehensive concentration value. Table A demonstrates that this intermediate

concent!ation 0ean, in comparison to the geometric mean, benefits Bra<il, /ermany and =apan, none of which possess

nuclear weapons. But, in comparison to what emerges under the arithmetic mean, the values of these countries are here

decreased because their power does not encompass all categories.

Table [ ea/ple to de/onstrate the effect of different /eans

G1P.Z\

/ilitar

ependitures inG1P.Z\

deliverable

nuclearweapons

countries

presu/ed power calculated

arith/etic/ean

concentration

meangeo/etric

/ean

['O ))) ))) ))) $ K$ ))) ))) ) raFil K0[ K0 )0)

$ O$O %') ))) ))) K)* ''K ))) ))) %$ China O0[ O0O *0O

$ K*% *% %% ')$ % ')[ [*) O'[ %) Rrance 0 0[ '0

$ *O 'O )) ))) % K$ ))) ))) ) Ger/an 0' %0% )0)

*) )) ))) ))) $) K%O )) ))) KK) India K0[ $0K $0%

**% ))) ))) ))) %[ )' ))) ))) ) (apan '0O 0) )0)

O%% ')) ))) ))) ) ))) ))) ))) % $$ ussia K$0* O0O [0%

$ %' K'' )O[ [$ ' %)' O[K [% $)) United +ingdo/ 0$ 0K 0'

K% % $K '$ [ % $[' ))) ))) ' %[) United States %0' '$0O 'O0'

%) *[' %'* O '*[ [%) %$ $O$ OK$ K) 'KO Total K))0) K))0) K))0)

The concentration of power in a few factors results in reduced power. ;onversely, if power is balanced across the various

sectors, the results will be increased. 1ntegrated )tate $ower rewards synergy by assuming that balanced countries are

stronger than unbalanced ones. 1n sum my formula looks like this+

0'$ G1P 0'$ !\ 0'$ TI 0'$ \Q 0$ \P 0%K$ M\ G1P 0%K$ M\ !\ 0%K$ M\

INT 0%K$ M\ \1U 0%K$ -P G1P 0%K$ -P !\ 0%K$ -P INT 0%K$ -P

\1U 0K$ NWC 0K$ NW H 3 0'$ G1P i$ 0'$ !\i

$ 0'$ INTi$ 0'$ \1Ui

$ 0$ \Pi$ 0%K$ M\

G1PHi$ 0%K$ M\ !\Hi$ 0%K$ M\ INTHi$ 0%K$ M\ \1UHi$ 0%K$ -P G1PHi$

0%K$ -P !\Hi$ 0%K$ -P INTHi

$ 0%K$ -P \1UHi$ 0K$ NWCi

$ 0K$ NW i$ H

G1P no/inal G1P# !\ !ife \pectanc# INT Integrit# \1U \ducation# \P \nerg Production#

M\ Militar \penditures as percentage of G1P# -P -r/s Production as percentage of G1P# NWC

Nuclear Weapons Capabilit du// variableH# NW Nu/ber of Nuclear Warheads# i percentile

Military expenditures and arms production are not measured Zust on the basis /4$0%". The formula illustrates that

military expenditures and arms production are calculated by multiplying their percentage share of /4$0%" with every

socio-economic factor. This way an integrated estimate on military capability is acquiredj Table A presents some results of

the calculation. ppendix exhibits the complete list. The numbers are adZusted to render total 1ntegrated )tate $ower equal

to total /4$0%" and thus make them directly comparable.



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Table 10 Integrated State Power

K ') %[K %$ *O United States

O $O K%' $O[ China

% O) K%[ %* $$O ussia

$ ' )O [$ K' United +ingdo/

$ $'O %$% O K%' Rrance

K '$ O) ' K% India

K K[K '[O O* O'$ (apan

K )[) ' )*' '*[ Canada

*[ $[ % '$ Ger/an

'O* [[$ O$ *$$ -ustralia

)%[ )*K % Saudi -rabia

OO %[% %[[ * raFil

%*$ )* %)O $%) South +orea

%*) $)O $O %% Indonesia

%OK * %K[ O% Meico

%) [[$ $' KO$ Israel

%%K $OO *) '' North +orea

%$[ *)' %O $$ Norwa

%K% $%' )$* *$ Ital

$O' O$* %%% KO Pakistan

$O) %)[ O[ )) Iran

$O) $K) [ O[[ Netherlands

$' $[[ *K[ '* Poland

$[ *K* $)) [O Spain

$)O %OO K Sweden

The worldwide power concentration is around 7.7, which means that power is distributed among the A5 countries as if they

were 7.7 countries of equal si<e. 4ividing the total of ?7 ?5A 55 A>8 @7A index units by 7.7 results in 5 ? 58 7A 7@

index units, which is the effective threshold for system dominating powers. The (nited )tates and ;hina are the only system-

dominating powers. 1t denotes that any increase in the power of the (nited or ;hina decreases multipolarity. ;onversely, the

increase of the power of any other country increases multipolarity. The %uropean (nion as a superstate would attain more

than 5A8 A 7 58@ index units due to synergy effects. 9ence the %( would pass an increased threshold due toincreased concentration that ;hina would fall Zust about below.

K)0 China2 sk is the li/it0 India2 dubious future

;hina was given a relatively high value and is already classified as a system-dominating power. This is due to exceptionally

high scoring in three intelligence tests. The scores were so high that *ynn and 6anhanen reduced one of them arbitrarily in



K[


their first book on the subZect of national intelligence, but stepped back from this critici<ed reduction in the second book

'*22 6292%2 >>, >7. 6alues in the diverse factors can be directly compared with the aim of determining

relative strengths and weaknesses. Table presents pe! capita values on the socio-economic body plus energy of nine

countries+

Table 11 G1P!ife

\pectanc

\ducation

IntelligenceIntegrit \nerg

raFil )*[ $% K )) K * K))

China $ )$ %*K $$ )[ K OO' *)

Rrance %% ')* %' K)) * O'* $[ '$ * ))

Ger/an % *[) $ [ O O%) KO$ ' [

India OK% K *) '[' K O** K )[

(apan %* %K* % ) KO $ % '* % $$

ussia K*[ [K) O O%) OK[ %O ''

United +ingdo/ %* 'K* $% )KK KK $ O$ K[ K )*

United States % ''O K[ %K* * O $O %$ $% )$'

Those numbers must be understood as pe! capita values of global shares. =apanese education and intelligence is excellent,

but given the weight of the ;hinese populace, the =apanese global share is less in education and intelligence than in the

other areas. (nless ;hina participates in $1) or T1M)), it remains an open issue as to what degree those three intelligence

tests can be substantiated by educational achievement. The confirmed correlations of intelligence tests and T1M)) or $1)

scores tend to be high with a $earson correlation of [email protected] '"124%"M22+ 775. /arett =ones and =oel )chneider carried

out 88 regressions to compute that #a point increase in a nation:s average 1 is associated with a persistent .

annual increase in /4$ per capita& '=02%) );92%14%"+ 5. !hether or not the ;hinese value in education should bereduced by a number of points, it remains certain that ;hina is on track to become a superpower, whereas 1ndiaCs chances of

entering this league look dubious in the long run. =apan and the sian Tigers have all proved that )ino-Mongolian

populations can translate this educational power into economic power. 2o such examples exist for 1ndo-1ranian populations.

=apan has received a relatively low value on 1ntegrated )tate $ower due to extreme energy dependency and an extremely

low militari<ation, the latter being to a large extent self-chosen castration.

1n the long run it means that instead of moving from unipolarity to multipolarity, we may move from unipolarity to unipolarity,

with the (nited )tates merely handing the crown to ;hina. ormer )ingapore $rime Minister *ee 3uan ew indicated as

much with his prophetic insight back in AA8+

The siFe of Chinas displace/ent of the world is such that the world /ust find a new balance in %) or )

ears0 Its not possible to pretend that this is "ust another big plaer0 This is the biggest plaer in the histor

of /an0 ,-N2 KH

1f the data can be substantiated, then even the most optimistic assessments of ;hina:s future may turn out to be laughable

understatements. 1t may be that a tidal wave is approaching that will sweep away our present thinking on international

relations. The sole limitation on ;hina is a lack of territory that could provide for a sustainable expansion of the population.

;onversely, its abundance of territory may allow the (nited )tates a comeback. "ussia has even more territory fordemographic expansion. 1f "ussian president 4mitry Medvedev is able to reverse the catastrophic demographic decline by

>? as intended 'see %B%")T4T /"0T9, "ussia could be holding good cards for the distant future.



$)


KK0 Rurther 1evelop/ents

$illsbury Zustified his analysis of ;hinese geopolitical power calculations by pointing out the necessity to understand the

paradigm and logic of the antagonist. 9is #study suggests that the ;hinese have their own unique perceptions, which

may be difficult to appreciate& '$1**)B(". ;2$ is nowadays one of the two or three most important strategic concepts in

;hina. ;2$ is rooted in ancient strategic concepts affirming a totality of war going far beyond the military aspect, a

paradigmatic advantage to %uropean views where such a paradigmatic development was to some degree a belated reaction

to advances in technology. )ome !estern discussions surround the absence of a so-called ;hinese school of international

relations theory, but ;hinese international relations theories do exist yet express themselves differently. 1tCs standard

!estern arrogance to understand only its own theoretical rhetoric. 1tCs quite possible that ;hinese international relationstheory will turn out to be superior once itCs sufficiently updated to modern conditions.

The ;hinese emphasis on harmony and peaceful development should be taken seriously because semiotics plays an

important role in structuring aims and means. )imultaneously, the ;hinese emphasis on the art of deception must not be

disregarded. () ;olonel !ort<el cautions+

What bothers /e about their for/ula and we all have these little for/ulas about national interest and

powerH is when ou get enough co/prehensive national power# in the view of these Chinese strategists# the

end of that algorith/ eJuals giang zhi li # the power to co/pel or the strength to co/pel other countries0

WZT\! j C,\NG2 $H

4eng iaoping:s >? ;haracter )trategy advised #冷静观察,站稳脚跟,沉着应付,韬光养晦,善于守拙,绝不当 E

observe calmlyD secure our positionD cope with affairs calmlyD hide our capacities and bide our timeD be good at maintaining a

low profileD and never claim leadership& '()404+ 7. ;2$ may signify the threshold or timeline that the strategy will be

slackened or discarded altogether.

nother issue is that power equations could play a role is in (2 )ecurity ;ouncil reform. ;hinese commentator suggests+

It /ight be /ore preferable to identif so/e universall abiding guidelines# rather than taking positions on

the inclusion of this or that particular countr in the Securit Council /e/bership0000 I t is out of the

Juestion that econo/ic strength# though b no /eans uni/portant# should be singled out as the sole

criterion for "udging a countrs eligibilit to a per/anent or nonper/anent seat in the Securit Council0

!-U\NTI2 KH

Both the great power veto in the (2 )ecurity ;ouncil and the equal vote in the (2 /eneral ssembly are extremes.

reasonable gradation scheme along criteria may increase the workability and legitimacy of the (nited 2ations. 1t may bestow

a flexible automatism towards easy and gradual transitions representing the future power of nations. (2 )ecurity ;ouncil

veto is equal to having seven votes with a qualified voting threshold of 8A out of ?@. 9ence, a plain implementation of a

gradation scheme could gradate powers from one to seven votes.



$K


The greatest challenge is to find a weighting system that isnCt arbitrary. erris must be credited for utili<ing a weighing

scheme based on the variation of the factors in relation to the first principal component extracted by principal component

analysis '%""1)+ ?8@. erris writes on the problematic of weighting in relation to his own weighting method+

Theoreticall speaking# however# this /ethod leaves so/ething to be desired# since i/plicit in the solution is

the assu/ption that all variables are eJuall i/portant as deter/inants of power capabilities0 Co//on

sense suggests that it is unlikel that the real world confor/s to such a /odel0 In a war between two states#

ar/ed forces and defense ependitures are likel to be better predictors of outco/e than area or trade

value0 Zn the other hand# neither co//on sense nor logic provides clearl defined principles for arriving at

weights which precisel represent the relative i/portance of the variables0 -re ar/ed forces twice or onl

one and a half ti/es as i/portant as areaq Zn what groundsq Merel to raise the Juestion is to appreciate

the difficult of rationall assigning eact weights to the various indicatorvariables0 The proble/ is

co/pounded b the fact that the i/portance of a particular variable /a itself var over ti/e depending

upon the /agnitude of one or /ore of the other variables0 R\IS2 &'H

1t can be argued that the weighting and selection of variables are by their intrinsic nature qualitative Zudgments that have tobe arbitrary, so a string of numbers itself doesn:t tell whether it:s relevant or not, or to what degree. This line of argument

demands instead a theoretical set to Zustify the selection and weighting of factors+

I Theor ó 1efinition of Power ó Power Indicators ó Power Calculations

The problematic is the absence of an underlying universal theory to Zustify one set of variables and methods vis--vis others.

Technically the selection and weighting of variables have been arbitrary and thus dependent on the subZective preferences of

their creators. The pu<<le remains the creation of a valid universal formula for measuring power along with obZective

Zustifications. There:s a general tendency among mathematically inclined people to avoid theory and among theoretically

inclined people to avoid mathematics. %ven if the formulas and results can be seen as failures and disappointments, the

quest itself has been an ongoing achievement in approaching power from a pragmatic level. 1f one cannot solve the problem,

one can still try to understand and learn why it has not been solved.

The selection of factors encompasses the problems of ' data availability some factors are important, but no data

available, '> data accuracy from precision to rough estimates and '8 data completeness for how many countries,

limiting country selection. The quantification of factors specifically concerns the transformation of index numbers to ensure

comparability. Three weighting schemes of mine are still work in progress to deal with an infinite set of data. The first

weighting scheme measures a sort of median in a multi-dimensional field, a matrix equation by iteration determines thelocation of least distance to all variables. The problem is that this weighting scheme reduces the number of factors

dramatically to a few. Most factors are located in between those extreme factors and are subsequently annihilated. The

second weighting scheme has the aim to maximi<e information by including the variation of all information strings or

factors that are given increased weight according to their degree of dissimilarity from the rest. The problem with this

scheme is that itCs strongly biased towards areas that contain many available factors. This might be a truism for all formulas,

yet the scheme systemi<es this tendency. )o while it:s not a fundamental problem if a formula is biased to move

automatically wherever the richest supply of information awaits it, it:s exactly the less available incongruent information that

the first scheme may notice and value. synthetic weighting scheme out of the two can be constructed.

Much work was also done to take a more empirical approach by directly measuring the perception of power. 1n A78

)himbori Michiya, 1keda 9ideo, 1shida Tsuyoshi and 3ondo Moto conducted a perception survey on measuring national



$$


prestige with =apanese high school and college students ')91MB0"1 et alia. *ikewise in A77 )imon )chwart<man and

Manuel Mora y rauZo conducted a perception survey on national prestige in *atin merica with university students in

rgentina, Bra<il, ;hile and 2orway ');9!"TM2 M0". 1n A7A llen )hinn conducted a perception survey with

merican university students ')9122. The results of a similar study in A57 by Thomas )aaty and Mohamad 3houZa were

#surprisingly close& ')T 390(=+ ?7. 1n A5 2orman lcock and lan 2ewcombe did their well-known perceptionsurvey on national power with ;anadian subZects '*;0;3 2%!;0MB%. 1n A5? ;harles 4oran, 3im uaile 9ill,

3enneth Mladenka and !akata 3yoZo conducted an extended cross-cultural replication study with students from the (nited

)tates, inland and =apan which confirmed that power perceptions correspond globally '40"2 et alia. 1n > =ean-ves

;aro conducted a perception survey with rench military officers, economists and other highly educated civilians ';"0

AAA, >a, >b, >c, >>a. The general tendency in the methodology of those perception surveys is to correlate

factors to the scores acquired in the perception surveys and subsequently distill a power formula out of this information. The

advantage is again that human intuition has processed more information that any pre-designed formula ever can. 0n the

other hand the disadvantage is that perceptions do not always fit actuality. superb example is 1raq under )addam 9ussein+

it was perceived, and perceived itself continuously, as being much more powerful than it actually proved to be in the end.

Besides the scientific perception surveys mentioned above a Zungle of perception surveys exist on national power in the form

of irregular opinion surveys that don:t utili<e the gathered data for scientific analysis. n annually published international

perception survey on national power and unquantified soft-power factors is certainly needed for further studies to increase

precision in the understanding of national power. This annually published international perception survey should be

comparable to the status of the ;$1 by Transparency 1nternational in the field of corruption. 1tCs my hope that one day an

independent institute will set itself the task of promoting systematic creativity in this exciting field.



$%


-PP\N1I - Co/plete !ist of esults

;oncentration refers to what degree 1ntegrated )tate $ower is concentrated across the various factors, <ero representing

perfect balance, and one being all power concentrated in a single point. higher score signifies a more concentrated

distribution and thus lesser 1ntegrated )tate $ower.

ank Integrated State Power Countr Concentration

K K ') %[K %$ *O United States )0%%

$ O $O K%' $O[ China )0

% % O) K%[ %* $$O ussia )0'

$ ' )O [$ K' United +ingdo/ )0K

$ $'O %$% O K%' Rrance )0)

' K '$ O) ' K% India )0[O K K[K '[O O* O'$ (apan )0'%

* K )[) ' )*' '*[ Canada )0'

[ *[ $[ % '$ Ger/an )0

K) 'O* [[$ O$ *$$ -ustralia )0

KK )%[ )*K % Saudi -rabia )0''

K$ OO %[% %[[ * raFil )0

K% %*$ )* %)O $%) South +orea )0*

K %*) $)O $O %% Indonesia )0K

K %OK * %K[ O% Meico )0O

K' %) [[$ $' KO$ Israel )0*)

KO %%K $OO *) '' North +orea )0*K

K* %$[ *)' %O $$ Norwa )0O

K[ %K% $%' )$* *$ Ital )0'

$) $O' O$* %%% KO Pakistan )0*%

$K $O) %)[ O[ )) Iran )0''

$$ $O) $K) [ O[[ Netherlands )0'$

$% $' $[[ *K[ '* Poland )0%%

$ $[ *K* $)) [O Spain )0')

$ $)O %OO K Sweden )0'

$' K*K O** KO' O% \gpt )0

$O K'* $* O*O ['O Taiwan )0$

$* K'O K$K ['% ))' Turke )0

$[ K') **K $K% $%O South -frica )0'K

%) K') O%' %$ ') -lgeria )0''

%K K K** *%% [ -rgentina )0

%$ KK % **% )* eneFuela )0'[%% K* 'K[ $[* $ Malasia )0K

% K) '*K KK) %%O Ukraine )0[



$


% K%$ $$O %[$ [[O United -rab \/irates )0O)

%' K%K [K )O O* Thailand )0%

%O K$ [O$ OK OK[ Colo/bia )0%

%* K$K $'' O$* O[% ietna/ )0K

%[ KK $% $$* '*% Nigeria )0O)

) K)O 'O* $O% $*$ SwitFerland )0''

K K)' K*) $'O $O Singapore )0O$

$ K)$ '[% $$ ' +uwait )0OK

% K)$ $O %)$ %[% 1en/ark )0'O

[* *OO $)K *[ CFech epublic )0%$

[ [O) ** %[* IraJ )0'

' *[ )$ $%% *%O Rinland )0OK

O ** [) K% [O elgiu/ )0'

* ** K$* )K *% +aFakhstan )0OK

[ O[ %K$ *K $$ o/ania )0%'

) O KK$ *[) O !iba )0'*

K O *$O *[ $)% -ustria )0'%

$ O$ **$ [*' 'O Greece )0'$

% ' )K) %) '[[ Chile )0''

'% OO K) )[ Qatar )0OK

$ [ $O )% Sria )0K

' $ K)K [) O$ Z/an )0''

O ' *K[ %O ) \cuador )0[

* ' K** )[ *% Portugal )0'$

[ '% *[$ [*' Philippines )0')

') % $$$ K' *'% -ngola )0O$

'K $ **O $* K[ ,ungar )0

'$ K $OO O *% UFbekistan )0OK

'% K K$K [) $O angladesh )0$

' ) O%[ %'$ [* Turk/enistan )0O%

' %[ K) K'$ K ulgaria )0%)

'' %* %[$ O$ $O New ealand )0OO

'O % *'O ))O %[O Peru )0%

'* %% $' *)K [) Slovakia )0%$

'[ %K * *%O '% Serbia )0

O) $% $[' ')$ K)O ]e/en )0')

OK $K O[ *O' %K Trinidad and Tobago )0O%

O$ $) K' '$' ' -Ferbai"an )0O)

O% K[ $'O $ )K Man/ar )0%

O K* O)[ $[% [%' Croatia )0$

O K* %K' [O KO Ireland )0O



$


O' KO O% ** K) Cuba )0O

OO KO $)% *% '' Sudan )0'$

O* KO )[% $[O K Tunisia )0')

O[ K' OK) *[ K Morocco )0O

*) K )*% %** %$ Paragua )0'$

*K K * %[ $K* olivia )0'%

*$ K % *) [K Slovenia )0O

*% K KK %'K %% runei )0OK

* K$ ** K[ elarus )0'O

* K$ $)O *[ O)' osnia,erFegovina )0O'

*' KK '* O[ O$ \Juatorial Guinea )0O

*O KK ' [K KO) \stonia )0')

** K) [)O )$$ $* ahrain )0'

*[ K) *[K [%O *** !ithuania )0*

[) [ K%* [)$ K[ Gabon )0O$

[K * [[) * O) Sri !anka )0*$

[$ * K*O )KO O[ (ordan )0*O

[% * K* KK$ O$' Urugua )0'*

[ O O[ %K $$ CongoraFFaville )0O$

[ O K*K )' )[O Chad )0'[

[' ' *K )$ [ Ca/eroon )0*

[O ' %$% % ) Congo+inshasa )0'$

[* ' K)* [$$ K[[ Cxte dIvoire )0*

[[ O' '%[ ''$ Costa ica )0O$

K)) 'O O[ '%$ Guate/ala )0'

K)K %O % *%% \l Salvador )0O)

K)$ K [) $% Ta"ikistan )0'

K)% [% %K% ))) +rgFstan )0O

K) ' *'% *'$ Iceland )0'O

K) %) KK' K*K -r/enia )0')

K)' )' K% %)' i/babwe )0')

K)O $ %'K *$[ +ena )0'

K)* ) '% %%' MoFa/biJue )0'$

K)[ %K [% K* !atvia )0

KK) )$ $** O$ Macedonia )0'%

KKK % *%% %' 'K' Papua New Guinea )0K

KK$ % ' $OO $[K -lbania )0O*

KK% % $ OO) * a/bia )0'

KK % $ K'$ *K Mongolia )0*

KK % )) '$O K +osovo )0'%

KK' % %%* K% K*) Georgia )0O*



$'


KKO % %$$ )O) )$ Nepal )0'

KK* % $*O O *$* 1o/inican epublic )0OO

KK[ % K*) [)[ O$ !ebanon )0OK

K$) % )$% *%% O'K \thiopia )0*%

K$K % )K ** O' Ghana )0OO

K$$ $ [[ $*% OO !ue/bourg )0O'

K$% $ *K% K) *)$ Pana/a )0O$

K$ $ *) '* [$ Ti/or!este )0O$

K$ $ K* %[' '$O Greek Cpriot epublic )0O$

K$' $ K$K $K KOK Uganda )0O*

K$O $ K)[ O$ )) -fghanistan )0OK

K$* $ K)* [ )$ Ca/bodia )0OK

K$[ $ )* [O O Madagascar )0OK

K%) K [** K* '' ,onduras )0'O

K%K K O*K $$* O) otswana )0O$

K%$ K * K)O 'O% TanFania )0*'

K%% K $[$ *'$ )[* Montenegro )0[

K% K K[[ %)[ $K$ Surina/e )0O

K% K K$' *K ** !aos )0O$

K%' K )[' *O[ '[K Moldova )0O[

K%O K )O$ *%% '' Nicaragua )0O*

K%* K )% OK' )% Na/ibia )0O%

K%[ [O* %$ O% Senegal )0*%

K) **K )K% $) (a/aica )0*)

KK *)O *K [$K Malta )0O'

K$ O[* %*K )% Mauritius )0O

K% O*K O*O K Turkish Cpriot epublic )0OK

K OO) OK[ *) Ri"i )0K

K OKK )$) *) hutan )0O*

K' '[O )* $% Malawi )0*

KO ' K% [) Mali )0*K

K* 'K* $$% $ Palestine )0*'

K[ * )K '% urkina Raso )0*

K) )K $*[ K) Guinea )0O

KK [' [O *'[ Niger )0*$

K$ O' '') %'O SwaFiland )0'O

K% %[ )$' )' enin )0*K

K %[$ K[ $$K wanda )0*'

K %O' K)' *K arbados )0O[

K' %$* KK% *K ,aiti )0*)

KO %)O [O [$ \ritrea )0*'



$O


K* $*% O%* O Togo )0OO

K[ $O% O ')) urundi )0*[

K') $'K O$$ )OO !esotho )0OO

K'K $[ $O K% Mauritania )0*$

K'$ $$' $$ O aha/as )0*

K'% KO* K% % So/alia )0*K

K' KO $' $' Guana )0'

K' K' O'% )O[ Sierra !eone )0*

K'' K* KKO K%O -ndorra )0*'

K'O K $$ KK Cape erde )0O*

K'* K )** )[ Central -frican epublic )0*)

K'[ K% [* )$ Solo/on Islands )0*

KO) K$) 'OK O$ eliFe )0O)

KOK K)O *$ O' Maldives )0O*

KO$ K)$ )% ') !iechtenstein )0*%

KO% [' K) '% Saint !ucia )0*O

KO ** K*$ $)[ Monaco )0O*

KO *% [[ *) Co/oros )0O$

KO' *% KK '$O Sa/oa )0O

KOO *K ')K *%O !iberia )0*

KO* 'O %% $) Sechelles )0O

KO[ 'O KOK )' San Marino )0*%

K*) ' [) )O Saint incent and the Grenadines )0*%

K*K $ '[* %$ 1"ibouti )0*$

K*$ %%' $$K -ntigua and arbuda )0*

K*% K$ O[[ 1o/inica )0*)

K* % )'% O Guineaissau )0*

K* %O $ Ga/bia )0*'

K*' $[ '%$ K)$ Tonga )0O

K*O $% )') *[ Micronesia )0O[

K** $) OKK 'KK anuatu )0*)

K*[ $) $'* $$ SVo To/ and Pryncipe )0OO

K[) K[ ')% [K* Saint +itts and Nevis )0*%

K[K K) [) $$* Grenada )0**

K[$ K) *O K Marshall Islands )0*K

K[% * %'* ) +iribati )0*K

K[ $ [O[ Palau )0*

K[ % '' $' Tuvalu )0'*

K[' % )% [) atican Cit )0[$

K[O K '[$ *O Nauru )0*$



$*


-PP\N1I North +orea

!ist of factors available on North +orea in the World ank database WZ!1 -N+H2

$))' -d"usted savings2 particulate e/ission da/age of GNIH K0)O

$))' -dolescent fertilit rate births per K#))) wo/en ages K&K[H K0

$))' -ge dependenc ratio dependents to workingage populationH )0*

$)) -gricultural land of land areaH $0%%

$)) -gricultural land k/$H %) ))

$))% -gricultural /achiner# tractors ' $))

$))% -gricultural /achiner# tractors per K)) k/$ of arable land $%O0O*

$))' -id per capita current USH $0%)

$))' -ir transport# freight /illion tons per k/H $0$[

$))' -ir transport# passengers carried K) %''

$))' -ir transport# registered carrier departures worldwide K *%[

$)) -rable land of land areaH $%0$

$)) -rable land hectares per personH )0K$

$)) -rable land hectaresH $ *)) )))

$)) -I treat/ent of children under taken to a health providerH [$0*)

$)) -r/s eports constant K[[) USH K% ))) )))

$))' -r/s i/ports constant K[[) USH ))) )))

$))' irth rate# crude per K#))) peopleH K%0'K

$)) irths attended b skilled health staff of totalH [O0K

$))$ roadband subscribers )

$))' Cereal ield kg per hectareH % ['0$$

$)) CZ$ e/issions ktH O[ ))0$K

$)) CZ$ e/issions /etric tons per capitaH %0%'

$)) Co/bustible renewables and waste of total energH 0*'

$)) Co/bustible renewables and waste /etric tones of oil eJuivalentH K )%$

K[[' Contraceptive prevalence of wo/en ages K&[H '$

$)) Crop production inde K[[[&$))K K))H KK)

$))' 1eath rate# crude per K#))) peopleH [0OO

$)) \lectric power consu/ption kWh per capitaH *K'0[$

$)) \lectric power consu/ption kWhH K[ %)) ))) )))

$)) \lectric power trans/ission and distribution losses of outputH K0*

$)) \lectric power trans/ission and distribution losses kWhH % '$) ))) )))

$)) \lectricit production kWhH $$ [)) ))) )))

$)) \lectricit production fro/ coal sources of totalH %[0)



$[


$)) \lectricit production fro/ coal sources kwhH * [) ))) )))

$)) \lectricit production fro/ hdroelectric sources of totalH O0%K

$)) \lectricit production fro/ hdroelectric sources kwhH K% K)) ))) )))

$)) \lectricit production fro/ natural gas sources of totalH )

$)) \lectricit production fro/ natural gas sources kwhH )

$)) \lectricit production fro/ nuclear sources of totalH )

$)) \lectricit production fro/ nuclear sources kwhH )

$)) \lectricit production fro/ oil sources of totalH %0'

$)) \lectricit production fro/ oil sources kwhH *% ))) )))

$)) \nerg i/ports# net of energ useH 0O$

$)) \nerg production kt of oil eJuivalentH $) $K$

$)) \nerg use kg of oil eJuivalent per capitaH *[*0$'

$)) \nerg use kt of oil eJuivalentH $K $K%

$)) \ternal resources for health of total ependiture on healthH %'0'

$))' Rertilit rate# total births per wo/anH K0*'

$))' Rood production inde K[[[&$))K K))H KK0['

$)) Rorest area of land areaH K0%*

$)) Rorest area k/$H 'K *O)

$)) ,ealth ependiture per capita current USH )0%

$)) ,ealth ependiture# private of G1PH )0

$)) ,ealth ependiture# public of G1PH %

$)) ,ealth ependiture# total of G1PH %0

$))$ ,ospital beds per K#))) peopleH K%0$

$))' I//uniFation# 1PT of children ages K$&$% /onthsH *[

$))' I//uniFation# /easles of children ages K$&$% /onthsH ['

$)) I/proved sanitation facilities of population with accessH [

$)) I/proved sanitation facilities# rural of rural population with accessH ')

$)) I/proved sanitation facilities# urban of urban population with accessH *

$)) I/proved water source of population with accessH K))

$)) I/proved water source# rural of rural population with accessH K))

$)) I/proved water source# urban of urban population with accessH K))

$))' Incidence of tuberculosis per K))#))) peopleH KOO0O*

$)) International /igration stock of populationH )0K'

$)) International /igration stock# total %' O'

K[[% International voice traffic /inutes per personH )0$[

K[[% International voice traffic out and in# /inutesH ' K[[ )))

$))K Internet users )



%)


$))% Irrigated land of croplandH )0%

$))' !abor force participation rate# fe/ale of fe/ale population ages K&'H [0[

$))' !abor force participation rate# /ale of /ale population ages K&'H *)0

$))' !abor force participation rate# total of total population ages K&'H '0%

$))' !abor force# fe/ale of total labor forceH %[0%$

$))' !abor force# total KK )) )))

$))' !and area k/$H K$) K)

$))' !and under cereal production hectaresH K $% )

$))' !ife epectanc at birth# fe/ale earsH '[0K'

$))' !ife epectanc at birth# /ale earsH '0**

$))' !ife epectanc at birth# total earsH ''0[O

K[** !isted do/estic co/panies# total )$

$)) !ivestock production inde K[[[&$))K K))H KK0

$))$ Malnutrition prevalence# height for age of children under H 0O

$))$ Malnutrition prevalence# weight for age of children under H KO0*

$)) Manage/ent ti/e dealing with officials of /anage/ent ti/eH %0$K

K[** Market capitaliFation of listed co/panies current USH [ $)) ))) )))

$))' Merchandise eports current USH K [*) ))) )))

$))' Merchandise i/ports current USH % )K) ))) )))

$)) Militar ependiture current !CUH ))) ))) )))

$))' Militar personnel of total labor forceH KK0%[

$))' Militar personnel# total K $[ )))

$))$ Mobile phone subscribers )

$))' Mortalit rate# adult# fe/ale per K#))) fe/ale adultsH K$*0%%

$))' Mortalit rate# adult# /ale per K#))) /ale adultsH K*$0%[

$))' Mortalit rate# infant per K#))) live birthsH $

$))' Mortalit rate# under per K#)))H

$)) Net /igration )

$))' Zfficial develop/ent assistance and official aid current USH )) )))

$)) Zutofpocket health ependiture of private ependiture on healthH K))

K[[$ Patent applications# nonresidents *

$)) Per/anent cropland of land areaH K0''

$))% Phsicians per K#))) peopleH %0$[

$)) PMK)# countr level /icrogra/s per cubic /eterH O$0OK

$))' Population ages )&K of totalH $%0'

$))' Population ages K&' of totalH 'O0

$))' Population ages ' and above of totalH *0*K



%K


$))' Population densit people per k/$H K['0*[

$))' Population growth annual H )0%[

$)) Population in largest cit % %K %*'

$)) Population in the largest cit of urban populationH $%0)

$)) Population in urban agglo/erations z K /illion % *%K

$)) Population in urban agglo/erations z K /illion of total populationH K*0*'

$))' Population# fe/ale of totalH )0'$

$))' Population# total $% O)) )))

$)) Prevalence of ,I# total of population ages K&[H )0$

$)) Prevalence of undernourish/ent of populationH %%

$))' Pri/ar education# duration earsH

$))' Proportion of seats held b wo/en in national parlia/ent H $)0K

$))$ ail lines total routek/H $K

$))' efugee population b countr or territor of origin ))

$))) oads# paved of total roadsH '0

$))) oads# total network k/H %K $))

$))' ural population [ )K* %K

$))' ural population of total populationH %*0)

$)) ural population densit rural population per k/$ of arable landH %$%0*O

$))' ural population growth annual H &)0

K[[ Scientific and technical "ournal articles )

K[[) Share of wo/en e/ploed in the nonagricultural sector of total nonagricultural e/plo/entH )0O

$))' Surface area k/$H K$) )

K[[% Telephone e/ploees# total K )))

K[[% Telephone faults per K)) /ainlinesH )

$))% Telephone /ainlines [*) )))

$))$ Telephone subscribers [K' )))

K[[% Telephone subscribers per e/ploee %%0%%

K[[$ Trade/arks# nonresidents K$

K[[$ Trade/arks# residents K $%[

$))' Tuberculosis cases detected under 1ZTS H [O0$O

$)) Tuberculosis treat/ent success rate of registered casesH *[0$

$))' Urban population K O)) )))

$))' Urban population of totalH 'K0['

$))' Urban population growth annual H )0[O



%$


eferences

*;0;3 2orman " 2%!;0MB% lan / " #The $erception of 2ational $ower& " .ou!nal of $onflict 4esolution "

6olume ? " A5 " pages 88@8?8

"02 "aymond ;laude erdinand " ,ai6 et gue!!e ent!e les nations " e dition " ;almann*vy " $aris " A7> " 5A? pages

BTT/*1 0tto orst de " #/eopolitik& " Eu!op7isc'e Gesp!7c'e+ 8a05u!ge! 9onats'efte f:! aus27!tige ,oliti; " [> "

A8> " pages >?8

B%;3M2 $eter " " #o!ld ,olitics in t'e )2entiet' $entu!- " $rentice-9all " %nglewood ;liffs " A? " 85? pages

;"0 =ean-ves " #*:approche conomique de la puissance& " </=!0e0ent " 7 " dcembre AAA " pages >8>A

;"0 =ean-ves " #*es schzmes de perception de la puissance& " <es c'a0ps de 9a!s " >e semestre " > "

pages A5>@

;"0 =ean-ves " #4e la richesse a la puissance des nations& " =!es " 6olume 6111 " ?7 " dcembre > "

pages 8A

http+[[webu>.upmf-grenoble.fr[espace-europe[publication[ares[?7[caro.pdf

;"0 =ean-ves " #)tructure de la puissance+ pour une mthodologie quantitative& " =nnuai!e f!an>ais de !elations

inte!nationales " 6olume " > " pages 5A

http+[[www.diplomatie.gouv.fr[fr[1M/[pdf[4?7.pdf

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;92/ ;hin-*ung " = 9easu!e of 1ational ,o2e! " ;onference $aper " The 2ational (niversity of Malaysia " Bangi "

75 ebruary >? " 8? pageshttp+[[?..7.8[academicweb[up[malayconference[paperscollection.files[conferefncepapers[chang.pdf

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;1;entral 1ntelligence gency " )'e #o!ld Fact5oo;

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;*12% "ay )teiner " #o!ld ,o2e! =ssess0ent+ = $alculus of t!ategic %!ift " !estview $ress " Boulder " A5@ " 58 pages

http://webu2.upmf-grenoble.fr/espace-europe/publication/ares/46/caro.pdf

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http://webu2.upmf-grenoble.fr/espace-europe/publication/ares/46/caro.pdf


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https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/



%%


;*12% "ay )teiner " #o!ld ,o2e! =ssess0ent @ABB+ = $alculus of t!ategic %!ift " !estview $ress " Boulder " A55 " >7

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Geopolitical Futu!e of 4ussia " rctogaia " Moscow " AA5 " A>? pages

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%1%nergy 1nformation dministration " #Table . !orld $rimary %nergy $roduction 'Btu, A>@& " 3nte!national

Ene!g- =nnual NO " table posted > )eptember >5

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%$%conomic $lanning gency O =apan " 日本の総合国力 + !"#日本の国力$%&'(#国)*+, "

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%""1) !ayne " )'e ,o2e! $apa5ilities of 1ationStates+ 3nte!national $onflict and #a! " *exington Books " *exington "

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)tuttgart " A87 " >7? pages

(;3) !ilhelm " Fo!0eln Vu! 9ac't+ ,!ognosen :5e! W&l;e!X #i!tsc'aftX ,otentiale " 4eutsche 6erlags-nstalt " )tuttgart "

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http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tablef1.xls



%


(;3) !ilhelm " 97c'te *on 9o!gen+ Y!aftfelde!X )endenVenX YonseZuenVen " 4eutsche 6erlags-nstalt " )tuttgart " A5 "

>55 pages

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and [uantu0 )'eo!- *ia $i!cula!l- $ausal 9odeling " >

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92 ook 3wang " #)M calls for a new security arrangement& " )'e t!aits )i0es " A May AA8 " page

9%1)%2B%"/ !erner " ,'-sics and ,'ilosop'-+ )'e 4e*olution in 9ode!n cience " 9arper "ow $ublishers " 2ew ork "

A7> " >8 pages

91%"* ;onstantin " G!undlagen eine! deutsc'en #e'!politi; " 8. uflage " 6erlag ran< %her 2achfolger " M\nchen "

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31%$ 1nternational ;onference " )eoul " A> March >? " 87 pages " ;hinese version was published in t!ateg-

\ 9anage0ent 8 >>

http+[[irchina.org[en[xueren[china[pdf[mhh8.pdf

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%


11))The 1nternational 1nstitute for )trategic )tudies - ;hina "综合国力*-./0123 E $o0p!e'ensi*e 1ational

t!engt' 3ndicato!s and 9et'ods of $alculation

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=02%) /arett " );92%14%" ! =oel " #1ntelligence, human capital, and economic growth+ Bayesian averaging of classical

estimates 'B;% approach& " .ou!nal of Econo0ic G!o2t' " 6olume " >7 " pages 5A8

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=0e!ican tudies " 6olume 7 " > " 2ovember A? " pages ?8A?7

3*(%T12/ 9arm " %ie <e'!e *on de! 9ac't de! taaten+ %as au]enpolitisc'e 9ac'tp!o5le0 in de! ^politisc'en

#issensc'aft_ und in de! p!a;tisc'en ,oliti; i0 @D .a'!'unde!t " 4uncker 9umblot " Berlin " A7 " 8@@ pages

30!4 Masashi " #oundations of Measurement '11& " Uulletin of 1ago-a 3nstitute of )ec'nolog- " 6olume @ " > "

pages 5>8

3(M" )atish " editor " 3ndia/s 1ational ecu!it-+ =nnual 4e*ie2 N@ " 6ikas $ublishing 9ouse " 2ew 4elhi " >> " 5

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%'


3(M" )atish " editor " 3ndia/s 1ational ecu!it-+ =nnual 4e*ie2 NO " 3nowledge !orld 9ouse " 2ew 4elhi " >7 " 87?

pages

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(nited 2ations ssociation of the (nited )tates of merica " 2ew ork " AA5 " >7 pages

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MTT0) ;arlos de Meira " = Geopolitica e as ,!oe>es do ,ode! " Biblioteca do %xrcito " "io de =aneiro " A55 "

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M0"/%2T9( 9ans =oachim " #1nternational "elations+ ;ommon )ense and Theories& " )!ut' and ,o2e!+ Essa-s of a

%ecadeX @ARB " $raeger $ublishers " 2ew ork !ashington *ondon " A5 " pages >?>7

0"/2)31 bramo imo 3enneth " 3(/*%" =acek " #4avids and /oliaths+ $redicting the 0utcomes of 1nternational !ars&

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http://antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702


http://www.icgg.org/downloads/CPI_2007.xls

http://www.unausa.org/atf/cf/%7B49C555AC-20C8-4B43-8483-A2D4C1808E4E%7D/reforming_security_council.pdf

http://antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702




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$1**)B(" Michael " $'ina %e5ates t'e Futu!e ecu!it- En*i!on0ent " 2ational 4efense (niversity $ress " !ashington "

=anuary >

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"())%** Bertrand rthur !illiam " ,o2e!+ = 1e2 ocial =nal-sis " /eorge llen (nwin " *ondon " A8 " 8> pages

)T Thomas * " 390(= Mohamad ! " # Measure of !orld 1nfluence& " .ou!nal of ,eace tudies " 6olume > "

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,eace 4esea!c' " 6olume 8 " A77 " pages >>@>?8

http+[[www.schwart<man.org.br[simon[pdf[images.pdf

)91MB0"1 Michiya " 13%4 9ideo " 1)914 Tsuyoshi " 30240 Moto " #Measuring a 2ationCs $restige& " =0e!ican .ou!nal

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)12/%" =oel 4avid " B"%M%" )tuart " )T(;3% =ohn " #;apability distribution, (ncertainty, and MaZor $ower !ar,>A7@& " "())%TT Bruce 'editor " ,eaceX #a! and 1u05e!s " )age $ublications " Beverly 9ills " A5> " pages A?

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6olume > " 8 " 0ctober A5 " pages 8?8@7

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http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/pills2/

http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/rindermann/materialien/PublikationsPDFs/07EJP.pdf

http://www.schwartzman.org.br/simon/pdf/images.pdf

http://sitemaker.umich.edu/jdsinger/files/capability_distribution__uncertainty_and_major_power_war__1820-1965.pdf

http://first.sipri.org/index.php




)214%" *ewis ! " #;omparing the )trength of 2ations+ The rab /ulf )tates and $olitical ;hange& " $o0pa!ati*e ,olitics "

6olume > " ? " =uly A " pages ?7??

)`]M1*;9 =ohann $eter " %ie g&ttlic'e (!dnung in den We!7nde!ungen des 0ensc'lic'en Gesc'lec'tsX aus de! Ge5u!tX

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/~ttingen ugsburg " 5? A " >>7 pages

T/%$%" "ein " <i0iting F!a0es of ,olitical Ga0es+ <ogical [uantitati*e 9odels of iVeX G!o2t' and %ist!i5ution "

$aper >:? " ;enter for the )tudy of 4emocracy " (niversity of ;alifornia " 1rvine " >> " ?7 pages

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"esearch on 1nternational %conomic "elations " 2ew 4elhi " =uly >@ " >? pages

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,o2e! W3, " !orking $aper 5@ " 1ndian ;ouncil for "esearch on 1nternational %conomic "elations " 2ew 4elhi "

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!2/ iwei " #Between )cience and rt+ uestionable 1nternational "elations Theories& " .apanese .ou!nal of ,olitical

cience " 6olume " > " A>

http+[[Zournals.cambridge.org[production[action[cZo/etulltext|fulltextid8>@>

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!131$%41 " E0e!ald )a5let

http+[[en.wikipedia.org[wiki[%merald{Tablet

!0"*4 B23 " %ata [ue!- -ste0

http+[[devdata.worldbank.org[query[default.htm

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> 2ovember >7 E > pages

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http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/dod-2007.pdf

http://www.icrier.org/pdf/VIPP4.pdf

http://www.icrier.org/pdf/WP175VIPP8.pdf

http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=1038252

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emerald_Tablet

http://devdata.worldbank.org/query/default.htm

http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/488.pdf

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