Newport Docks, Collapse of Fully Timbered Deep Excavation Canary Wharf Tower Crane Collapse Project Overview

At approximately 5.20pm, the timbers supporting the west wall of the

excavation trench collapsed, driving the timber up and together, caus-

ing the walls of the trench to collapse. 46 men were trapped in the

collapse, 39 of whom died due to the collapse or from injury in the

subsequent days. Messrs. Easton Gibb and Son, the contractor em-

ployed by the Alexandra Docks and Railway Company, had been

tasked with extending the already existing Newport dock, for the sec-

ond time in less than a decade. The contractor excavated several

trenches to create a south lock.

The structural failure of the trench occurred during a shift change,

which made it challenging to ascertain how many men were in the

trench, as the record keeping at the time was poor. The inquest car-

ried out by W. W. Squire it was noted that the Timbers were checked

daily by an Messrs. Easton Gibb and Son Engineer (Squire, 1909), .

Also, the walking ganger (The foreman in today’s terms), Ratcliff

was tasked with making sure any problems on site were addressed

and rectified to maintain safe conditions. On the day of the disaster

movement of the piles was not reported by Ratcliff to his superiors,

which shows he was confident in his abilities.

Key Project Facts

Date: 2nd of July 1909, 5.20pm

Contractor: Messrs. Easton Gibb and Son

Client: Alexandra docks and Railway company

Structure: 14” timber walled trench between

56 and 44 feet deep and 238 feet long

Function: Dock wall foundations

Fatalities: 39 men

Economic Social Environmental

The dramatic increase in Coal export re-

sulted in the expansion of the area of the

dock, the South Quay. In 1909, Newport

was a thriving merchant town. With a

brand new Transporter Bridge, designed

to allow access to sailing ships on their

way to the docks. The wealth increase in

import and trade suggested the people

were more driven to expand the docks,

arguably this lessened their attention to

detail in design and implementation. Re-

ports show this where part of the east

trench timbering drawings was increased

from 6 to 14 inch, also done in the west

trench, further stating it seemed evident

that it was necessary to take more than

In 1882, Alexandra (Newport) Dock

Company was renamed the Alexandra

(Newport and South Wales) Docks and

Railway (ANDR). Following this, the

development of railways and connec-

tions thrived, the Great Western Railway

and the Cardiff Railway in 1903 and 2

steam rail motors built by the Glasgow

Railway and Engineering Company of

Govan, opened seven halts on route in

1904. (Railscot, 2014) The connections

over land resulted in the opening of

Queen Alexandra Dock in 1907 where

the land consisted of 165 acres of docks

and 38,000 feet of quayside. Relating to

the sustainability of the environment be-

cause it provided solid links for future

During the 1900s, workers were concerned

about reporting possible dangers and com-

menting on any issues in there work as they

could have lost their jobs. This was a big

problem as the practise of health and safety

should always be a priority. In relation to

the Newport Dock collapse, it is reported

that witnesses came forward after the col-

lapse and spoke of temporary props falling

in the northern part of the trench, and the

sides of the channel falling in the southern

part of the trench. Another called attention

to the pressure on the sides caused by the

weight of the concrete mixer, crane and

wagon roads. However, unlike modern day

projects, there was no health and safety of-

ficer or much enforcement and protection

for workers, the difference in class in socie-

ty often meant the working class were ex-

ploited.

Analysis of the Project

The Newport Dock disaster occurred during the early 20th centu-

ry, a period in which the Engineering projects undertaken were

being carried out with considerably less technical information

available to them in comparison to that currently available to En-

gineers. This lack of information led to shortcomings in all areas

of the identified themes of failure. Although Easton Gibb & Son

were acknowledged experts in the type of construction underway

at the dock, their construction methods and safety measures

would not stand up to the scrutiny of the 21st century.

In the case of the Newport Dock disaster, it could be argued that

the greatest shortcoming of the Newport Dock extension was

Easton Gibb & Son’s procedures when malfunction occurred, not

the construction methods themselves. Per W. W. Squire

(p5,1909), Any movement of the piles or support timbers was re-

ported directly to the Walking Ganger, who would then make re-

inforcements and decisions at their own discretion. The lack of a

defined route of action for the walking ganger to take upon re-

ceiving reports of movement meant they were under no obliga-

tion to take any measurements or further investigate the reason

for the movement. This was a failure of both management, for

not setting out a clear and safe procedure for dealing with timber

movement, and workmanship for not securing the timbers

properly.

Ultimately "The contractors seem to have taken all reasonable

and proper steps in considering the scheme of timbering by con-

sultation with their staff of assistants and gangers, and with Mr.

Davidson, their consulting engineer." (Squire, p5, 1909). The in-

quest found that due to the large amount of possible contributing

factors no one person was at fault because nobody had all the re-

quired information to ascertain that there was a risk of failure.

This was a serviceability failure because the structure was put un-

der loads inhibiting its proper function, and deflected excessively.

Key Project Facts

Date: 21st May 2000

Contractor: Hewden Tower Cranes Ltd or

Kvaerner Cleveland Bridge (KCB)

Client: Canary Wharf Contractors Ltd

Structure: Wolff WK 320BF Tower Crane

Function: Construct HSBC skyscraper

Fatalities: 3

Project Overview

3 Hewden Tower Cranes Ltd workers were killed when a 450 foot high crane crashed to the ground.

The structural failure occurred during the phase of construction known as ‘climbing’, a routine oper-

ation. Hewden’s specialist team, consisting of 6 experienced people, were adding another section,

for the fifth time that weekend to the 25th storey, when at approximately 3.50 pm the crane began

twisting. This operation is relatively rare in the UK; usually tower cranes are assembled to their full

desired height when first taken to site.

Two members of the erection crew and the crane driver working on this tower crane were killed as a

result. Two other erectors working with them on the crane survived, as did an assistant on the

ground. Two other erectors working with them on the crane survived, as did an assistant on the

ground. The fatality of the collapse could have been considerably high had the road outside not been

temporarily closed, or it had been at a busy time of day.

Final Discussion and Conclusions

In conclusion, it is clear when looking at the attitude of employees across both disasters, that the last century has seen a massive im-

provement in how information and concerns are relayed to senior employees, with the capability to assess the situation and prevent

failure. It is paramount for all employees to work together, without fear of repercussions, to maintain safe working conditions.

Another shared factor of failure in each project was relying solely on the opinion of senior employees. Taking from this, it is evident

that clear standards need to be adhered to, and the stability of structures should be based upon measurements and known physics,

not the discretion of the supervisor.

Petroski (2006, p3) argues that successful design and failure are inherently intertwined, meaning that learning from the failures of

the past is crucial to successfully and safely carrying out Engineering projects in the current day and age.

The shortcomings of the Newport Dock Disaster of 1909 and the Canary Wharf Tower Crane Collapse of 2000 has taught us as

young Engineers that the practice of health and safety should always be considered throughout the design process through to imple-

mentation of a project.

http://www.newportpast.com/

http://quietwomansrow.com

- This shows the aftermath of the collapse of the dock

http://

par-

lipapers.proquest.com/

parlipapers/result/

pqpdocumentview?

ac-

countid=12860&group

id=99944&pgId=d7ae

ab46-f4c4-4eb6-b747-

08226ca20e07

- view of the timber

support system in the

trench

http://www.cranestodaymagazine.com/news/lessons-from-

canary-wharf/image/lessons-from-canary-wharf-131209.html

- This shows the aftermath of the collapse of the crane

Reference List:

Petroski, H (2006) Success through failure the paradox of design. Princeton University Press: Oxfordshire.

Squire, W. W. (1909) Report to The Secretary of State for the Home Department on the Disaster at the Alexandria Dock, Newport, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers

Online.

No author, http://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/result/pqpdocumentview?accountid=12860&groupid=99944&pgId=d7aeab46-f4c4-4eb6-b747-08226ca20e07 Accessed

28/02/2017

No author, http://www.railscot.co.uk/Alexandra_Docks_and_Railway/frame.htm, 2014 Accessed 28/02/2017

No author, (2002) http://www.hse.gov.uk/construction/crane/report.pdf Accessed 28/02/2017

No author, http://www.personneltoday.com/hr/no-evidence-for-action-over-triple-death-crane-collapse/ Accessed 03/03/2017

World Development, http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm Accessed 05/03/2017

This picture

shows a

climbing

frame being

used to in-

crease the

height of the

crane, it is not

a picture from

the site of the

accident, but

something

similar. http://

www.cranecr

ews.com/

crane-blog/

how-do-tower

-cranes-climb

Other contributing factors of Failure:

Large amount of rainfall prior months

Extra pressure on the northern side of the trench due to the

weight of the dam

Timber movements were secured based on the discretion of

the walking ganger

Work was left incomplete allowing movement of the piles

making subsequent efforts to secure the piles less effective

Possible lack of consistent timber – no records available

No efforts made to calculate the force the timbers would be

baring

Economic Social Environmental

Wolffkran’s pioneering innovation

in luffing crane technology can be

transported easily and economically

and erected extremely fast

considering its size.

Cranes are not often alike because

they are made to match the

requirements of the job that it will

undertake, therefore once the job is

finished there may not be a use for

the crane and this is a waste of

materials.

Cranes are used continuously in

construction, producing a large amount

of carbon emissions. Also, the materials

used to construct the crane, sometimes

coming from other parts of the world,

could already have a large carbon

footprint.

Specific high-strength steels were

partially implemented in the construction

the tower system so as to increase the

performance and to extend the

serviceable lifespan of the tower element.

The custom luffing jib crane offers

unique installation flexibility. It can be

safely parked for wind speeds up to 130

km/h with its slew brakes on.

A crane replaces the need for people to

move heavy loads themselves and

therefore this reduces the risk of injury

and over working. Cranes make

construction a lot more time effective

and a less strenuous task – overall a

more inclusive job.

The Health & Safety Executive (HSE)

has decided there is insufficient

evidence to support any action

regarding the tower crane collapse. As

a result of this, the unexplained tragedy

could have turned people off working

on cranes due to uncertainty with

regards to their safety.

An 'open verdict' was the official HSE report conclusion, as

there was no definitive cause of the crane collapse. No area

was significant enough to have caused the failure of overload-

ing and deformation of the top front guide wheels, the cumula-

tive stress increased the damage done.

The day before the accident the crane driver had never

‘climbed’ before. He followed the supervisor’s instruc-

tions but when he was in the crane cab, isolating controls and

applying the slew brake, he was concerned about the erratic

movement, and after discussing this with the supervisor, he

came then down from his cab between each climb.

On the day of the accident, a more experienced driver took

over and the 'climb' proceeded as usual. Two men were work-

ing on the upper platform of the climb rig, two on the lower

platform, the driver stayed in his cab throughout the climb and

a trainee was on the ground, slinging loads. At around 3.50pm,

they were moving the last mast section from the traverse car-

riage platform into the frame. Whilst doing this one of the erec-

tors on the lower platform noticed one of the guide

wheels moving laterally around one of the legs of the mast. The

two erectors on the lower platform jumped onto the metal lad-

der inside the mast and managed to move down, they then

could see the climbing frame tilting about the north east

leg. The mast then started to violently shake, the two erectors

on the ladder managed to cling on, but when the shaking

stopped they saw that the new mast section and the top of the

crane had overturned and fell 120 meters onto the sight be-

low, fatally injuring the crew above.

When the wreckage was examined by HSE, the sections

showed a structure typical of low carbon steel, a metal well

suited for welding. One end had completely failed through the

weld, and appeared to be a typical failure of overload, the other

end had failed through the weld connecting a small end plate to

the climbing frame. The western and upper end of the upper di-

agonal member had failed through approximately 75% weld

metal and 25% parent metal. The east end failed around ap-

proximately 75% of the member and therefore was still at-

tached to the east leg of the climbing frame, the failure mode

appearing typical of a fracture caused by ductile shear. The

west end of the lower diagonal member had failed in a similar

manner, with partial failure through the weld metal, this had re-

sulted in the crushing of the end of the member. Other members

also became detached, as the welds tore off and fractured, due

to overload. The materials weren't strong enough to cope with

the excess stress they had to support when the crane started to

fail, but they weren't designed to go wrong, and therefore sup-

port that excess load. This is only the second accident of its

kind in history.

The supervisor in charge had 15 years experience in climbing,

and his team were also well experienced, but there is no official

training for crane climbers, they learnt by instruction and work-

ing with an experienced supervisor. Because there is no official

training, there is also no official qualification and evidence. It

may be beneficial in future to ensure there is recorded training

and a qualification as proof.

The men were expected to work long hours, away from

home, each signing voluntary exemptions to the 48 hours per

week limit regulations. Hours were recorded and it was aimed

to give erectors 78 hours a week, giving them a day off if that

figure was exceeded, but this was not always possible. They

had worked 79 hours that week, yet had done 87 hours the

week before. The crew need concentration throughout the oper-

ation, relying on their experience of the climbing system and

visual clues to identify important changes in conditions. This

could be seriously compromised by the hours they were work-

ing.

The management could have done more to prepare their

staff, ensuring all their equipment was in perfect working order

and present, so that the men weren't being put in

any unnecessary danger. The climbing frame did have a slight

bow in one member, but it had been present for a few months,

and it had been adequately bolted to make allowance for the

bow. The supervisor had sought advice from his superiors, but

it had not been deemed serious. There was no anemometer fit-

ted in the crane, a device to measure wind speed, reliance was

placed on other crane drivers. On the day of the accident it is

reported there were no weather problems, HSE checked this

with the Meteorological Office.

A balance was not used when adding height to the crane, as

recommended, but doing so without a balance would not have

caused the incident. The experienced supervisor used a trial and

error method to determine the radius required to keep the crane

balance whilst extending its height, instead of calculating it.

The theoretical radius for balancing the crane without a balance

weight has been estimated at 31m. A few minutes before the ac-

cident, a site worker was taking pictures of the crane nearby,

and from these pictures the radius has been estimated at about

28m, but the frame was so damaged in the fall, an estimate was

all that could be given. A difference of a few meters would not

have caused the fall, but proper calculations for a radius would

be recommended, especially when doing one of the most dan-

gerous jobs in the construction industry.

There can be no definitive type of failure, but after analyzing

all the research, a disconnection failure because the members of

the structure did become separated.

Analysis of the Project

The Pillars of Sustainability

The main aim of structural design is to design a safe structure that will fulfil its intended purpose.

The structure should be able to resist the predicted loading for its entire design life with a sufficient

margin of safety. Structural design is an integral part of construction, even a small chance of failure

is unacceptable.

Sustainability is described as development that meets the needs of the present without

compromising ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Sustainability in engineering

is vital as we are currently using up the Earth’s future resources, we are destroying our own

environment on a global scale in the pursuit of economic gain and resources of Earth are not

sufficient to sustain even current human population of the world.

Environmental sustainability is the ability to maintain rates of renewable resource harvest,

pollution creation, and non-renewable resource depletion that can be continued indefinitely.

Economic considerations have always been an integral part of engineering design and a force for

refinement and sophistication of design methods. Social sustainability is the ability of a community

to develop processes and structures which not only meet the needs of its current members but also

support the ability of future generations to maintain a healthy community.

-Plan of the

section of the

west wall

where the

collapse oc-

curred

http://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/result/pqpdocumentview?

accountid=12860&groupid=99944&pgId=d7aeab46-f4c4-4eb6-b747-08226ca20e07

- view of timber supports in the system of the trench

W15008927, W15008100,

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