NEWSBRIEFISSN 2399 - 8296 January/February 2017 Vol 37 No 1Briefings and Analysis Behind the News

Countering ExtremismReed & Pohl

Parker & Davis

Iran’s Elections Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi

Tackling ProliferationTom Hickey

Cristina Varriale

Balkan Security Thomas Theiner

The Evolution of US Special

Forces

1February 2017, Vol. 37, No. 1 RUSI Newsbrief

Joint Special Operations Command

Contents

Cover: A US Navy SEAL during training. Courtesy of Martin L Carey/Wikimedia.

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Hassan Rouhani and the Future of Iran’sModerates 7Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi

Counter-Radicalisation at the Coalface:Lessons for Europe and Beyond 13David Parker and Jonathan Davis

Three Existential Global Challenges for theTrump Presidency 17Randolph Kent

Putting Security into Prime Minister May’sNew Industrial Strategy 20John Hemmings and Alex Manzoor

Fish and Ships – Diplomatic Theatre in theSouth China Sea 22James Kingston

Between the Bear and the Dragon:Kazakhstan at the UN Security Council 25Alex Maciag

Kosovo – Beware Russia’s Little Green Men 28Thomas Theiner

US Joint Special Operations Command andthe War On Terror – A Sharper Edge? 1Simon Anglim

A Bull in a China Shop: How Trump CouldShatter Non-Proliferation Efforts 4Tom Hickey

Disentangling the EU Foreign Fighter Threat:the Case for a Comprehensive Approach 10Alastair Reed and Johanna Pohl

Extended Nuclear Deterrence under Trump:Why Removing Weapons from Turkey Mightbe Good Policy Cristina Varriale 31

On 28 January, US armed forces suffered their first casualties of the Trump administration as Chief Petty Office William

Owens was killed and three other service members wounded raiding an Al-Qa’ida target in Bayda province, Yemen. Fourteen Al-Qa’ida members and 30 civilians were also reported killed, and material of intelligence value was apparently seized during the raid.

Units participating have not been named at the time of writing, but it is likely the lead was taken by US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). This command is responsible for counterterrorist and other classified operations by the US ‘Tier One’ Special Forces, the Army’s Delta Force, the Navy’s SEAL Team 6 (of which CPO Owens was probably a member) and covert intelligence gathering and surveillance by the Field Operations Group, which goes by the somewhat sinister nickname of ‘The Activity’.

JSOC has been carrying out a global campaign of ‘capture or kill’ strikes against Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban since the mid-2000s, marking an escalation from the traditional roles associated with Special Forces. Hitherto, Special Forces have supported their government, or other forces in theatre, in three broad ways: through intelligence gathering via reconnaissance and surveillance; through improving their government’s influence over theatre strategy and host actors by training, advising and supporting local forces; and through kinetic direct action, consisting of striking overtly at key enemy people and facilities.

US Special Forces have been busy at all three tasks, post 9/11. Operators from

JSOC’s senior HQ, US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) – which oversees operations involving special forces units from all four US services – have been deployed on the ground in Iraq, Syria and North Africa to gather intelligence and have played a major part in locating high-value targets in the Jihadi-Salafist infrastructure for strikes by Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) or US aircraft.

300–400 SOCOM operators are deployed in Syria, ‘advising’ local forces such as the Kurdish YPG

Up to 500 SOCOM personnel are reported currently to be embedded with Iraqi formations in and around Mosul, in what is described in most media as an advice and mentoring mission. At the same time, 300–400 operators are deployed in Syria, ‘advising’ local forces – such as the Kurdish YPG – fighting both Daesh (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) and the Syrian government. In September 2016, 40 accompanied Turkish forces as they began a major offensive into northern Syria.

Little of this is new: the UK and US, for instance, had specialist organisations working alongside local partisans in the Second World War. Where there is some departure from past practice is in SF deployment becoming a strategic option of first choice and the other is the growing prominence of direct action operations by JSOC since the mid-2000s.

JSOC’s role has expanded for two broad reasons. The first followed the successful deployment of SOCOM in the initial invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and confirmed the faith that the then Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, had in them. In 2004, Rumsfeld signed the Al-Qa’ida Network Execute Order (drafted partially by SOCOM), which authorised JSOC operations against jihadi targets ‘anywhere in the world’, but specifically in 20 named countries on a still-classified list.

The second reason for the expansion of JSOC’s role was a result of its tactical success on the ground in Iraq, particularly its High Value Target (HVT) programme of night raids on houses, villages or city blocks where insurgency leaders or those involved in terrorist financing or arming were thought to be holed up. This was escalated to accompany the much-hyped ‘surge’ of 2007, and duplicated in the Afghan ‘surge’ of 2009–10.

The driving force behind the HVT strategy was General Stanley McChrystal, Commanding General, JSOC during 2003–08 and ISAF in Afghanistan during 2009–10. His aim was to break up insurgent networks of command and control, their bomb-making factories and the crime networks financing them.

The night raids proved contentious, not least due to the whole ‘fighting terror with terror’ issue, the poor or non-existent cooperation with host governments and other forces in theatre, the killing of civilians and the reliance sometimes on intelligence obtained by ‘enhanced interrogation’ at Camp Nama in Baghdad and various ‘Black Sites’ in Afghanistan.

US Joint Special Operations Command and the War On Terror – A Sharper Edge?Simon Anglim

US Special Forces have always been part of military operations. But how has their role evolved since 9/11? And what might the future hold for special operations under President Donald Trump?

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Joint Special Operations Command

forces and then to join a special forces unit. These volunteers are subjected to selection processes ensuring only the most motivated get through.

Another possible factor in the centrality of JSOC has been the presence of powerful, persuasive and politically astute senior figures, most prominently McChrystal and Admiral William McRaven, a highly-experienced SEAL officer. He is the author of Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare – Theory and Practice, a well-received work on Special Forces operations. McRaven oversaw the creation of the HVT programme in Iraq before commanding JSOC from 2008 and then SOCOM from 2011 to 2014.

McRaven supervised the bin Laden raid and the beginning of SOCOM deployments to Syria, and Obama’s embrace of JSOC has been attributed popularly to his personal contacts with McRaven, particularly during the Maersk Alabama episode of April 2009 (dramatised by Hollywood as Captain Phillips). After the operation, McRaven and other senior SOCOM officers became regular visitors to the White House, with Obama apparently valuing their advice on regional and security policy.

Special Forces also offer one option that aerial strikes do not, that of capturing the target alive, the strategic value of which is best summarised by the instructions issued to 22 SAS as it carried out targeted strikes against the Provisional IRA during the ‘Troubles’ of the 1970s and 80s: the aim was to capture targets, not kill them, as dead terrorists have little to no intelligence value, but as ‘martyrs’ they offer enormous propaganda value to the enemy.

They also – in theory – hold out less risk of collateral damage due to the fact that they involve human beings armed with relatively precise weapons who operate at closer range than the alternatives. When it was ascertained that bin Laden was in Abbottabad, a UCAV strike was the first option put on the table. However, SEAL Team 6 was deployed because of the reduced risk to civilians in the area and also because they could identify the target in a way an aerial attack could not.

However, firefights with automatic weapons in built-up areas or inside buildings create collateral damage of their own, especially if they stem from strikes where the targets will not come quietly. A case in point was the recent raid in Yemen, where civilians, including at least one child, were reportedly killed, a sad outcome now being made into a major issue by President Trump’s domestic opponents.

There are other challenges with the use of JSOC, some of which arise from JSOC’s very success. Most importantly, continued tactical success does not necessarily make for successful strategy. There is no clear or understandable ‘end state’ to which these operations are supposed to be leading. No one, least of all Bush, Obama and Trump, has stated what the aims of the War on Terror actually are beyond continuously hunting down and punishing – or pre-empting – people and groups deemed to be terrorists.

US forces are often accused of mistaking operational success for strategic effect

This seems not so much a ‘war’ – something pursued to meet a concrete political aim – as a state of constant warfare against jihadi leadership and infrastructure with little regard for the politics or geography of the conflict. The very success of high-profile special operations, such as the bin Laden raid, may be contributing to this in giving an impression of progress.

US forces in particular are often accused of mistaking operational success for strategic effect, something noticeable particularly since the easy victory in the Gulf in 1991. It is telling that much US military thought since 1991 has centred on improving performance at the operational and tactical levels, with little regard for the actual global situation or what their political leaders might want from them. McRaven’s book is a case in point: it focuses almost exclusively on the tactics of direct action.

Will things change with Trump? It seems unlikely. He has stated, repeatedly, that he sees destroying the Salafist–Jihadi threat as a main priority; two UCAV strikes were carried out on Yemen 48 hours after his inauguration, and the Bayda raid came after less than two weeks. Trump’s defence team will play a major part in pursuing this aim, and JSOC has friends and contacts there.

It is likely that SOCOM and JSOC are going to stay busy for years to come

The new National Security Advisor, Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, was Director of Intelligence, JSOC from 2004 to 2007, working alongside McChrystal and McRaven, and playing a major role in implementing the HVT strategy. And as Commanding General of US Central Command from 2010 to 2013, Defense Secretary James Mattis oversaw both the main geographical regions in which the decapitation strategy was applied and US Special Forces’ deployment to support anti-Daesh forces in Iraq and Syria.

Mattis has also expressed admiration for Reading University Professor Colin Gray, the British–American strategic thinker and author who for many years was one of the few academic authors to deem special forces worthy of study.

It is likely, therefore, that SOCOM and JSOC are going to stay busy for years to come – what this achieves, long-term, depends on other choices made by the new administration.

Dr Simon Anglim Teaching Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He previously taught at Brunel University and in the Sultanate of Oman. He is the author of Orde Wingate: Unconventional Warrior and several papers on special forces and covert warfare.

Night raiding had been carried out by SOCOM and other Allied forces since the occupation of the big cities in southern and central Iraq in 2003 and was demonstrably successful. The raids helped in the hunt for the ‘deck of cards’ of senior former regime figures, including Saddam Hussein himself, as well as the senior Al-Qa’ida commander and spiritual founder of Daesh, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who was killed by a bomb dropped by an F-16 supporting a JSOC assault on his sanctuary in June 2006.

However, from 2007, McChrystal raised the tempo of direct operations to where insurgent networks in Iraq were smashed quicker than they could recover, with JSOC and Britain’s 22 SAS, with whom JSOC cooperates closely, taking the lead. It is apparently from then that certain terrorist organisations began to want to talk.

Direct action by JSOC therefore continued to feature prominently in the strategy for fighting international Jihadi-Salafist groups followed by President Barack Obama from 2008.

The pinnacle of this was Operation Neptune Spear the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, by SEAL Team 6 in 2011. Another

prominent JSOC operation included Operation Celestial Balance of 2009 – the ‘capture or kill’ strike on Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, the senior Al-Qa’ida operative behind the attack on the USS Cole nine years before. Saleh was killed resisting capture; at the time he was coordinating between Al-Qa’ida and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. There was also the 2014 capture in Tripoli of one of the commanders of the pro-Al-Qa’ida militia that had attacked the US Consulate in Benghazi the year before.

JSOC direct action has now extended to operations against Daesh

JSOC direct action has now extended to operations against Daesh, beginning with the May 2015 strike by Delta Force aimed at capturing Syria-based Abu Sayyaf, who had been engaged in the sale of oil and gas from Daesh-controlled areas. He too was killed resisting capture.

The overarching reasons for this strategy may lie in recent history. For most Western powers, since 1991 stakes

in military action have been low, as they have been engaged in ‘optional’ wars against ‘rogue’ states, punitive actions against terrorist groups and liberal interventions under various interpretations of ‘responsibility to protect’.

Moreover, the US public is traditionally averse to casualties, and they can become highly intolerant if they feel their soldiers’ lives are being gambled in a cause which doesn’t really matter to them. The past sixteen years have been dominated by two long-term interventions, one based on highly dubious premises, in which thousands of NATO soldiers and tens of thousands of civilians have been killed or maimed.

Whatever the short-term risks, special operations are cheaper and less risky than invading and occupying hostile territory and can be carried out relatively quickly, allowing politicians to show they are ‘doing something’ and responding to key constituencies’ expectations. They are also relatively risk-free in terms of soldiers’ lives. Nearly all the operations mentioned have been carried out by small numbers of highly trained people who have volunteered at least twice – first to join the armed

A US Navy SEAL during training. Since the mid-2000s, JSOC has been carrying out a global campaign of ‘capture or kill’ strikes against Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, marking an escalation from the traditional roles associated with Special Forces. Courtesy of Martin L Carey/Wikimedia.

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Trump and Non-Proliferation

The US has a central role in international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Following

Donald Trump’s surprise presidential election victory in November, this role has been thrown into question. Trump’s rhetoric on the campaign trail has indicated the possibility of abrupt, sweeping changes in how America deals with the bomb.

It is unlikely, however, that non-proliferation efforts in his administration will reflect his most controversial statements. Trump’s cabinet secretaries, the international community and the US defence and security bureaucracies are likely to have a steadying influence on nuclear policy, injecting a fair degree of even-handedness and institutional inertia into a policy area that is inherently risk-averse.

A more likely scenario is policy change by erosion and neglect. The key risk to non-proliferation efforts in a Trump presidency is that his administration will fail to pay sustained attention to difficult and delicate policy initiatives in the nuclear domain.

Three of Trump’s characteristics are particularly worrisome in this regard: his transactional outlook; his rhetorical recklessness; and his preference for an opaque and short-sighted decision-making process.

These qualities are particularly concerning with regard to two of America’s cornerstone non-proliferation efforts – the nuclear deal with Iran and extended deterrence guarantees to Washington’s allies.

The Iran DealTrump has been a vocal critic of the Iran agreement, calling it ‘the worst deal ever’ and vowing to dismantle it as president. Despite this rhetoric, however, pressure has been mounting on Trump to take a more patient approach, with GOP senators, the Israeli security establishment and key cabinet nominees all urging caution.

Trump is likely to find that the short-term, tangible costs to unilaterally walking away – in the form of opprobrium from other world leaders – outweigh the short-term, tangible benefits. As a result, a more likely outcome is that Trump and his advisers will take steps that will kill the deal in the medium term – after his first 100 days in office, but before his term is up.

If Trump wants to kill the Iran deal immediately, he can sign an executive order to impose new US sanctions against Iran

If Trump wants to kill the deal immediately, he can sign an executive order to impose new US sanctions against Iran. This would render meaningless President Barack Obama’s executive order from January 2016 that permanently revoked many of the existing non-proliferation sanctions. In response, Iran would

likely trigger the agreement’s dispute resolution process, and eventually exit the deal after what would surely be a fruitless process.

The problem with this approach is that Europe would be unlikely to join the US in re-imposing sanctions, and Russia and China would almost certainly not. Germany, in particular, will look to champion multilateralism in the wake of Trump’s victory, Brexit and other crises brewing on the continent.

If the Trump government were to scrap the deal in the coming weeks, it would face significant political censure and reputational damage from Europe at a time it can little afford either. Trump’s central national security goal of countering violent extremism will require the support of European partners.

In a worst-case scenario, Iran would respond to a US abrogation by cancelling the agreement. It would then have access to the cash windfall it received directly after the deal was implemented. Tehran could also re-instate its nuclear programme with no International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring and in the face of an international community lacking the unity or political will to mount an effective response.

An alternative path would be for Trump to try to kill the deal slowly, building or manufacturing evidence over time that Iran is violating its terms. The goal would be to leave the deal as soon as possible, but not before Washington can make a reasonable argument that

A Bull in a China Shop: How Trump Could Shatter Non-Proliferation EffortsTom Hickey

Despite Donald Trump’s presidential election campaign rhetoric, the US still has a central role to play in international nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The hope is that Trump’s defence officials and the international community will have a steadying influence on the new president.

its hand was forced by Iranian non-compliance.

A recent report from the IAEA would support this argument: Iran was found to have very slightly exceeded the agreement’s threshold for heavy water, which can be used to produce plutonium. While the Obama administration might have chosen to downplay such minor violations, Trump may seize on them to justify an exit from the agreement.

As a variation on this theme, Trump’s administration could try to leverage compliance issues to pressure Iran to reopen negotiations or submit to harsher terms. This approach would likely rely on a policy of not violating the agreement (rather than actively

maintaining it) and strengthening its terms through hawk-eyed enforcement (rather than through improved relations with Iran).

The political cost of upholding the deal in both Washington and Tehran makes a long-sighted approach somewhat unsustainable

If renegotiation is the goal, however, the struggle for leverage between cabinet Iran hawks in Washington and

hardliners in Tehran could easily descend into a counterproductive tit-for-tat of accusations and recriminations. Such an outcome would only be more likely if Iran’s Principlists defeat President Hassan Rouhani in the May 2017 elections.

Trump’s penchant to air his grievances on Twitter is likely to bring this sort of battle into the public eye, where leaders on both sides will feel pressure to talk tough. In this scenario, the smart money is not on compromise.

The other trouble with keeping the agreement alive is that Washington would have to continue to uphold its end of the deal while it builds a case or renegotiates, which may be unpalatable for Trump and his cabinet. The Secretary

Trump’s rhetoric has led to concerns that he will no longer offer nuclear guarantees to US allies, forcing them to defend themselves by building their own weapons. Courtesy of Gage Skidmore/Wikimedia.

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Trump and Non-Proliferation

of State, for example, will have to issue a signed approval of certain sanctions waivers every few months. While his cabinet currently appears willing to take a measured approach, their calculus may change if congressional Republicans find reason to attack the administration’s Iran policy from the right.

The political cost of upholding the deal in both Washington and Tehran thus makes a long-sighted approach somewhat unsustainable, indicating that the agreement may survive for one or two years before collapsing.

Extended Deterrence and Reckless RhetoricTrump’s statements on the campaign trail threw into doubt America’s extended deterrence commitments to allies in NATO and the Asia–Pacific, shaking a long-held bipartisan consensus. In a March 2016 interview with CNN’s Anderson Cooper, Trump said, ‘Now, wouldn’t you rather, in a certain sense, have Japan have nuclear weapons when North Korea has nuclear weapons?’

If allies lose confidence in the US nuclear umbrella, the consequences will be severe

This rhetoric has led to concerns that Trump will no longer offer nuclear guarantees to US allies, forcing them to defend themselves by building their own weapons. As Trump transitions into the White House, however, his cabinet secretaries and security advisers will almost certainly work to impress upon him the importance of maintaining these extended deterrence commitments, making a removal of US guarantees unlikely.

The more likely future is that Washington’s allies gradually lose faith in US promises as the Trump administration neglects the active measures designed to bolster confidence among foreign leaders.

Maintaining extended deterrence requires sustained attention from the highest levels of US leadership,

which can then be filtered down into agency priorities. During the Obama administration, this meant high-level consultations during the crafting of major policy documents such as the Nuclear Posture Review. The State Department also created new bilateral forums for extended deterrence discussions, including the US–Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogues.

Even if Trump vows to uphold all commitments on paper, his administration may fail to prioritise the legwork of extended deterrence. Trump’s transactional outlook and disinterest in mundane, long-sighted policy work do not bode well.

Another bad omen is Trump’s rhetorical recklessness. An effective nuclear guarantee requires both assuring allies that Washington would step up in a crisis and reassuring countries such as Russia and China that the US is not looking for a fight. During the Obama years, this has led to a lasting debate over whether Washington should officially admit its vulnerability to China’s nuclear deterrent.

The parsimony of arguments on both sides has attested to the importance of lexical nuance in US extended deterrence policy, where rash signalling from the executive can override years of behind-the-scenes policy work. In this regard, Trump’s tendency to lash out on social media may undermine the credibility of American commitments.

In the event that allies lose confidence in the US nuclear umbrella, the consequences would be severe. Hardliners in South Korea are already calling for an independent nuclear deterrent in the face of persistent North Korean nuclear threats, and they would only be strengthened by a removal or evident weakening of US commitments.

It is less likely that Japan would pursue nuclear weapons – Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has already had significant political challenges in re-interpreting Japan’s pacifist constitution to allow an increased conventional footprint in the Asia–Pacific.

There have also been concerns that Taiwan or NATO countries could seek nuclear weapons in the absence of a reliable US nuclear umbrella. The challenge is not just proliferation: even if no new nuclear countries emerge, a

retreating US could embolden North Korea, China and Russia, and increase the chances of a snowballing conflict in Europe or East Asia.

A Full PlateTrump will have a large non-proliferation portfolio as he enters the White House. In addition to Iran policy and extended deterrence, he will have a monumental task in addressing North Korea’s nuclear programme. Other key issues will be preventing terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon, ensuring the security of nuclear materials, and engaging with debates surrounding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

All signs point to an administration that lacks both the inclination and the artfulness to handle non-proliferation efforts with care

On some of these fronts, the Trump administration’s policies may exhibit a fair degree of continuity as a result of the significant expertise and institutional inertia of the US nuclear community. On others – including the Iran deal and relationships with allies – the Trump presidency could be a game changer. For these issues, surviving the first 100 days of the new administration should not be understood as a stamp of immunity.

The real dangers lurk in the medium-term, as all signs point to an administration that lacks both the inclination and the artfulness to handle non-proliferation efforts with care.

Tom HickeyResearch Analyst in the Nonproliferation and Nuclear Policy department at RUSI and a postgraduate student at LSE. He holds a Masters in Public Policy from the University of California, Berkeley, where he was a Fellow with the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium. Prior to starting at RUSI, Tom worked on US nuclear policy as a graduate researcher at Sandia National Laboratories.

Iran’s Presidential Elections

Iran’s presidential elections are fast approaching, and their outcome will influence not only the country’s foreign policy, but also

the internal dynamics for the coming years. And this time it is not just the presidency at stake, but also the future of Iran’s moderates.

Elections in Iran are always divisive, intense and profoundly destabilising. This is especially so for presidential elections, which take place every four years and since 1997 have always constituted a test for the legitimacy and stability of the Islamic Republic. Those on 19 May 2017 are expected to be particularly crucial and conflict ridden.

They will constitute first and foremost a test for President Hassan Rouhani, whose re-election is not guaranteed.

The population will likely judge whether Rouhani has kept his promises from four years ago before trusting him with a second mandate. When he stood for president in June 2013, Rouhani’s electoral platform focused on resolving the nuclear issue, improving the economic situation of the country and reducing the use of extraordinary means in the name of security by the state.

On the nuclear issue, the president and his administration have managed to bring home a major victory. From Day One, the nuclear issue was considered the priority and the key to resolving all other matters. Negotiations were immediately taken out of the hands of the Supreme National Security Council (a body constituted by representatives of all elected and non-elected governmental institutions) and handed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (composed of those

close to the administration) to give the like-minded negotiators more wiggle room and show the commitment of the new government on closing the nuclear dossier. The team was led by Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, and the approach towards the negotiating parties (the so-called P5+1, the US, France, Germany, the UK, China and Russia) changed swiftly.

Only five months after being in charge, the new administration reached an interim agreement with the international community on the nuclear issue, the first in more than nine years of negotiations. This paved the way for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) announced in July 2015.

Despite success on the nuclear front, Rouhani did not fix the Iranian economy as promised

Through the final agreement, Rouhani effectively managed not to cross the red line set by the Iranian leadership (enriching uranium on Iranian soil) while getting sanctions relief on all the nuclear-related measures introduced by the UN Security Council, the US and the EU in the previous nine years.

Despite success on the nuclear front, Rouhani did not fix the Iranian economy as promised, although there are some good indicators: in just over three years, his government brought inflation down from over 40% to around 9.5% for the first time in 25 years. The

economy also grew by 4.4% in 2016, from a contraction of 4.1% in 2013.

Although the country is and still feels in a deep recession, after the JCPOA was announced, Iran was able to revive its production and export of oil, bringing them back to pre-2012 levels, the year a ban on crude-oil imports was introduced by the EU. The cut in oil revenues severely hit the Iranian government, as these made up 50–60% of its income.

Since the JCPOA came into force in January 2016, Tehran has also seen an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI), which since 2010 has been limited by sanctions targeting Iran’s financial and energy sectors. However, the $4.5 billion in FDI in the few months after the nuclear agreement was far below Rouhani’s anticipated $30 –50 billion in FDI per year.

Over the past year, a large number of international companies have investigated business opportunities in Iran, but most financial institutions are still wary of conducting transactions with Iranian entities, making it difficult for businesses to operate.

Banks remain concerned about the potential risk of violating the remaining US sanctions against Iran: the fines that BNP Paribas ($8.9 billion), Credit Suisse ($536 million), ING ($619 million) and others had to pay for breaking the sanctions, and the lack of clarity on what is permitted in doing business with Iran, have so far led financial institutions to act cautiously.

This has hindered the improvement in the economy that Rouhani was expecting. The Iranian people, who elected him in 2013 hoping for a change

Hassan Rouhani and the Future of Iran’s ModeratesAniseh Bassiri Tabrizi

In Iran’s upcoming elections it is not just the presidency that is at stake, but the future of the country’s moderates.

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Iran’s Presidential Elections

in the economy, have waited patiently for a nuclear ‘dividend’, with most of them renewing their trust in Rouhani’s camp by voting for those close to him in the February 2016 parliamentary elections. However, a year on from the JCPOA, many are unlikely to back a second mandate for Rouhani without first witnessing some economic benefits.

This is even more the case in light of the fact that Rouhani did not get anywhere close to maintaining his third promise: reversing the process that has enabled the state to use extraordinary means in the name of security.

In the past four years, for instance, the administration has not introduced the blossoming culture and easing of internet censorship that was advocated. Furthermore, the number of political prisoners remains unchanged, and the leaders of the reformist movement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, are still under house arrest, contrary to Rouhani’s commitment to free them.

A failure to fulfil all the promised benefits from the JCPOA may harm Rouhani’s attempts to secure a second mandate

A large number of Iranian dual nationals (particularly Americans and British) were also arrested in the aftermath of the JCPOA. This was part of the hardliners’ plan to thwart the administration’s policy of engagement with the West through the instruments at their disposal: the judiciary and the security apparatus. However, Rouhani is, in effect, being held responsible for the worsening of the situation.

Therefore, a failure to fulfil all the promised benefits from the JCPOA may harm the administration’s attempts to secure a second mandate. While at the moment the hardliners do not seem to have a candidate who could effectively challenge Rouhani’s re-election, this

could change in the second half of April, when the candidates will be registered and vetted by the Guardian Council and the electoral campaign will officially start.

The hardliners could decide to play the ‘moderate’ card, investing in a figure positioned at the centre of the Iranian political spectrum, making it even more difficult for Rouhani to succeed.

As Rouhani is likely to once again embody and represent the moderates, however, a failure to win would be interpreted as a defeat for the whole camp. And Rouhani has not always been seen as a moderate. He gained that mantle only in June 2013, when he was supported by, among others, former Iranian presidents and key reformers Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who died in January, and Mohammad Khatami.

Despite his moderate agenda, Rouhani is the only candidate that the Iranian leadership considers ‘eligible’, due to his past as a man of the system. He served as the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (a government body focusing on Iran’s national and security interests) for more than sixteen years. He was also Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator between 2003 and 2005. In these positions, he gained the trust of the Supreme Leader and of the whole system.

The only similar figure was Rafsanjani, a founding member of the Islamic Republic, who filled a wide range of central positions within the regime, while at the same time pushing for reform, particularly after 2009. His death has raised further questions about the future of the moderate camp, and also about Rouhani’s chances of succeeding in the next election (Rafsanjani’s endorsement in 2013 proved to be crucial for his victory).

All other potential reformist and moderate candidates will be unlikely to stand for president, although for different reasons. There are no indications that Mousavi and Karroubi, who stood in the disputed 2009 presidential elections, will soon be released from house arrest. Khatami, the founder of the reformist movement, has been forced out of the

Iranian political scene since 2009. Like Mousavi and Karroubi, he is perceived as a threat to the regime’s stability, and the country’s media have been banned from publishing his name or images. Khatami was even prevented from attending Rafsanjani’s funeral. He is, in effect, a non-person.

A defeat for Rouhani would lead all moderates and reformists into a profound and enduring crisis

Mohammad Reza Aref, currently the leader of the reformists’ ‘list of hope’ (which took shape in the 2016 parliamentary elections), seems the only alternative to Rouhani, but he does not have enough power to lead the whole moderate camp. For this reason, in 2013 he decided to drop out of the race to avoid a split in the non-conservative vote, and he is likely to do the same in May to increase Rouhani’s chances.

With no realistic alternative to Rouhani and with the difficulties the current president will face for re-election, 19 May will constitute a significant test for the future of the moderate camp. In the coming months, all eyes will be on Rouhani.

A defeat would not only lead hardliners to secure the presidency, gaining greater control over Iran’s foreign and domestic agenda, but would also force all moderates and reformists into a profound and enduring crisis.

Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi Research Fellow at RUSI. Her research is concerned with security in the Middle East, with a particular focus on Iran’s foreign and domestic politics. She completed her PhD at the War Studies Department of King’s College London, focusing on the diplomatic initiative of France, Germany and the UK (E3) on the Iranian nuclear issue.

PREVIOUS PAGE: Hassan Rouhani is likely to once again embody and represent the moderates; but a failure to win the presidential election would be interpreted as a defeat for the whole moderate camp. Image courtesy of the Kremlin.

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The Foreign Fighter Threat

As the battle for Mosul in Iraq rages on, many experts and policymakers have already begun to focus on what the

inevitable defeat of Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) will mean for Europe. Across the corridors of power in Brussels there is a widespread fear that the collapse of the organisation will lead to a surge in foreign fighters returning to Europe. In October, the EU Commissioner for the Security Union, Sir Julian King, warned:

Re-taking the Islamic State stronghold in northern Iraq can lead to a scenario in which violent militants would return to Europe … This is a very serious threat and we must be prepared to face it.

Similarly, EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove cautioned that the bloc would struggle to handle the predicted 1,500–2,000 foreign fighters who may return if Daesh is driven out of its strongholds in Mosul and Raqqa, in Syria. On the other side of the pond, the new US administration has already taken steps to address, among other things, the potential danger posed by returning foreign fighters by attempting to introduce an entry ban affecting seven majority-Muslim countries.

As the events in Syria and Iraq unfold, it is clear that Europe’s foreign fighter problem is far from over and that, in fact, the worst is most likely yet to come. In this context, now more than ever, it is crucial that policymakers get to grips with the complex nature of the foreign fighter phenomenon in

order to design and implement effective countermeasures.

Even though security circles have been grappling with the foreign fighter phenomenon for a long time, the eruption of the conflict in Syria has seen the issue rise to greater prominence in the public consciousness. With an unprecedented number of foreign fighters from numerous countries attracted to the conflict, policymakers are viewing the problem with a sense of urgency. This is despite a lack of clarity about the evolving threat and its various manifestations.

The refugee crisis has been framed as providing terrorists with a free pass to enter the EU; in reality, terrorists posing as refugees remain rare exceptions

Mirroring the development of the threat, the initial focus on foreign fighters – those who left to join conflicts abroad – shifted to include those who have returned from conflict theatres and then those who did not leave their home countries. Often, this shift featured a blurring between terrorism and other issues: for instance, media coverage of recent terror attacks frequently alluded to the supposed mental health problems of the perpetrators, despite scant evidence of the presence and nature of those problems. Similarly, the refugee

crisis has been framed as providing terrorists with a free pass to enter the EU, while, in reality, terrorists posing as refugees remain rare exceptions. Both narratives, propagated chiefly by the mainstream media, further confuse the debate.

The EU still lacks an agreed definition of what a foreign fighter is; rather it uses the terms ‘Terrorist’, ‘Foreign Fighter’ and ‘Foreign Terrorist Fighter’ interchangeably. On top of this, individual member states’ own definitions vary widely. This lack of clarity has not only led to much confusion, it has also resulted in a lack of a shared perception of the foreign fighter threat.

What we have seen, as European governments seek to address the threat, are a series of piecemeal policies designed to tackle various issues perceived to be related in a wider sense to the phenomenon of foreign fighters. While many such measures are straightforward and implemented in numerous affected countries – such as legislation prohibiting the financing of terrorism – others appear vague both in terms of their aims and the ways to achieve them.

Among these vague measures that seem to target not only terrorism and extremism, but also a growing public perception of insecurity, is the UK’s proposed Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill. It was branded as ‘confusing’ by a parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights in July for using overly broad definitions of extremism and largely covering offences that fall under already existing laws.

Disentangling the EU Foreign Fighter Threat: the Case for a Comprehensive ApproachAlastair Reed and Johanna Pohl

Islamic extremists returning from fighting in Iraq and Syria pose a massive problem for European policymakers. But there are no quick fixes.

Similarly, the ongoing and costly deployment of military troops in France’s main cities under its Vigipirate national security alert system, and even the ‘burkini ban’ briefly implemented in parts of the country last year, attest to uncertainty regarding the concrete objectives of counterterrorism measures. And, not least, political expediency plays a crucial role in confronting the problem of foreign fighters.

In this environment of knee-jerk reactions, there appears to be little understanding of the threat’s multiple dimensions and, more importantly, how these are interconnected. Unless we tackle the totality of the threat using an integrated approach, we may simply displace activity. Likewise, tackling one

aspect of the threat will necessarily impact the others, and, in turn, may have unintended consequences.

How Do We Do It Better? As the previous examples illustrate, a lack of understanding is leading to quick fixes, rather than strategic solutions, to respond to arising security needs. To counteract this lack of understanding and the resulting incoherence, it is helpful to conceptualise the threat connected to foreign fighters as four distinct but interlinked aspects. These must be tackled collectively in order to be successful.

First, the travel of foreign fighters to conflict zones remains a major source

of concern, largely because of the likelihood that they will become more radicalised in the process, in addition to the training and experience they will gain in the field.

An often under-acknowledged aspect is the violence against civilians they may carry out in their host country. We have seen foreign fighters inflict the most barbarous acts of terrorism on the local civilian populations, but preventing this has, with few notable exceptions, rarely been the primary concern of Western governments.

As Daesh continues to lose ground in Syria and Iraq, we might not just see a reversal of the foreign fighter flow, but also new flows to emerging hotspots. Increasingly, Daesh is likely to direct

Floral tributes outside the Bataclan Theatre in memory of the victims of the November 2015 Paris attacks. The alleged mastermind behind the attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, fought with Daesh in Syria before returning to Europe. Courtesy of Adam Davy, PA Archive/PA Images.

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The Foreign Fighter Threat

resources to its affiliates across Africa and Asia.

Second, the return of foreign fighters to their home countries is widely seen as the greatest threat. Returnees may come back to carry out attacks themselves, or facilitate logistical, financial and recruitment activity at home. Reports of centrally dispatched terrorist units as well as returnees having been involved in large-scale attacks, such as Paris and Brussels, underline the potential threat from returning foreign fighters, even though individuals may follow different pathways upon their return.

While the overwhelming fear of policymakers and the public alike is returning foreign fighters planning acts of terror in their home countries, the reality is that this only represents a minority of cases, with many more seeking to leave behind a life of extremist violence.

Increasingly, Daesh is likely to direct resources to its affiliates across Africa and Asia

Thomas Hegghammer’s analyses of foreign fighter-related attacks, for instance, assert that merely one in nine returnees perpetrated attacks in the West between 1990–2010, with that number decreasing vastly for the Syrian conflict, to one in 360. Thus, for the majority of returning foreign fighters, assistance in returning to normal life and dealing with mental illness such as post-traumatic stress disorder is a more necessary policy response.

Third, the fear generated by the foreign fighter phenomenon has negatively impacted social cohesion across Europe and has fed into the increasing polarisation over the refugee crisis. In fact, in many tabloid headlines the two have become irresponsibly conflated.

With populism on the rise in many European countries and the US, anti-Muslim sentiment has been central to the political campaigns of the far right. For instance, The German

party Alternative für Deutschland – polling as the third-strongest party in the country – has recently confirmed its stance on the matter, adopting the phrase ‘Islam is not part of Germany’ in its manifesto.

Reassuring increasingly fearful voters, while not alienating Muslim communities, will remain a balancing act for politicians in the years to come. However, this balancing act will only become more difficult in the coming years, if we also see a rise in violence by left-wing extremists in reaction to the rise of the right.

Lastly, an increased risk is posed by lone actors and home-grown terrorists who do not travel to conflict areas abroad. These commit attacks in nominal affiliation with terrorist groups in their countries of residence. There are those who, having been prevented from travelling to Syria or Iraq, subsequently choose to carry out an attack in their home country, as was the case for one of the perpetrators of the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015. Then there are those who never intended to travel, but were inspired by the foreign fighter phenomenon to carry out lone-actor attacks in their home country. Such attacks have been on the rise in recent months: the June 2016 nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida, and two attacks in Würzburg and Ansbach, Germany the following month are believed to have been carried out by lone perpetrators.

Daesh has long encouraged such lone-actor attacks, with spokesperson Abu Mohammed Al-Adnani calling on supporters to carry out attacks in their home countries in May 2016.

Linking the Four Dimensions Tackling these four interlinked threats requires systematic consideration of the law of unintended consequences – targeting one threat may have a negative impact on the others. For example, if policy aims to prevent people travelling to Syria and Iraq, for instance by revoking their passports, there is a risk that those people will prepare terrorist attacks as lone actors in their home country.

On the other hand, there is a serious risk that if people are allowed to travel

to Syria and Iraq, they will contribute not only to violence there but also assist in the planning or preparation of terrorist attacks back home or in a third country.

And even if policymakers prioritise domestic over foreign security by allowing foreign fighters to leave, but not return, the threat may simply evolve as they move to third countries and organise themselves in places in which thorough surveillance is impossible. This issue of where Daesh fighters will go, as they are driven out of its strongholds is a growing concern.

The only way to tackle the foreign fighter phenomenon is a comprehensive approach that addresses all dimensions of the threat, while focusing on its most salient aspects. Thus, a priority on rehabilitating returned foreign fighters needs to go hand-in-hand with emphasis on security-centric measures, such as the surveillance of homegrown networks and sympathisers, to prevent both travel abroad and attacks at home. Security cooperation with third states, as well as improved border control mechanisms beyond the EU, are essential in monitoring and counteracting the displacement of foreign fighters. Lastly, and perhaps the most difficult dimension, is the potential inherent in the foreign fighter phenomenon to divide the West’s increasingly multiethnic societies.

Refraining from grand security policy gestures to appease conservative voters requires true leadership in the face of upcoming elections and populist parties on the rise. Nevertheless, sober judgment of which policy measures do, in fact, address the foreign fighter phenomenon in a comprehensive manner is the only way to be effective in countering it.

Dr Alastair Reed Acting Director of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague.

Johanna Pohl Programme Assistant at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague.

Counter-Radicalisation

As the number of planned and realised terrorist attacks against Europe continues to grow, there

are increasing concerns that terrorist actors are diversifying their tactics. The subsequent difficulties this presents to efforts to interdict and mitigate attacks make the early prevention of radicalisation increasingly important. States across Europe have recognised this fact, but, despite sharing similar challenges, approaches to addressing radicalisation vary considerably. While some effective approaches have been acknowledged, there is limited consensus on what ‘works’ in practice and a lack of standardisation of activities.

This article provides insight by two local authority practitioners delivering the Prevent Strategy (known as Prevent) in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham (LBHF) and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC). It sets out learning from five years of local radicalisation prevention activities in this part of west London (the Kensington Model) whose unique and well-developed approach could help to inform the responses of counterterrorism practitioners across Europe and beyond.

Framing the ChallengeLone-actors, terrorist cells and large terrorist groups have, over the past five years, inflicted physical and psychological damage throughout Europe. Attackers have used machine guns, knives, trucks, bombs and cars.

Targets have ranged widely from sports stadiums and Christmas markets to religious institutions. Soldiers, police officers, Muslims, Jews, and the wider public have all been specifically targeted in different attacks. Motivations have included far-right extremism, Islamism and even anarchism.

An early identification of vulnerabilities is essential to prevent radicalisation

This complex picture presents governments with a range of new and pressing challenges, both in disrupting plots and dealing with the repercussions. For example, security officials have openly recognised the difficulties in detecting and disrupting lone-actor attacks. This tactic is increasingly being promoted by Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) and Al-Qa’ida and is recognised as having the added danger of inspiring copycat attacks. Therefore, an early identification of vulnerabilities is essential to prevent radicalisation.

Responses to DateConsidering the complexity in addressing these threats, it is sensible that some degree of local, regional and national variation to radicalisation prevention exists. However, while groups such as the European Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness Network have shared some good practice across Europe,

there remains little accepted wisdom regarding the most effective activities and approaches in the long term. This has contributed to a situation where European states with similar problems are, at times, employing starkly different, even opposing, approaches.

The French government is opening twelve de-radicalisation ‘boot camps’ to house people judged to be moving towards violent extremism. In these military-style settings, participants will wear uniforms, salute the French flag and engage in highly structured educational classes, cultural lessons and exercise regimens.

Compare this with the Danish ‘Aarhus model’ of inclusion, where individuals considered vulnerable to extremism, including returnees from Syria, are supported in their inclusion in mainstream society through counselling, employment support and, potentially, accommodation.

Launched in 2012, Germany’s Advice Centre on Radicalisation helpline provides help and guidance for individuals concerned that a friend or loved one is becoming radicalised.

In the UK, the Prevent Strategy, which many countries look to as one of the most developed strategies designed to prevent violent extremism, centres on supporting individuals with tailored interventions. It does this through the multi-agency Channel Safeguarding Programme, supporting institutions and challenging terrorist ideologies. European allies are also designing new strategies, with the US Department of State and USAID releasing a Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism in May 2016.

Counter-Radicalisation at the Coalface: Lessons for Europe and BeyondDavid Parker and Jonathan Davis

Europe is on a high state of alert after several terror attacks – and more are thought to be in the pipeline. So which strategy should governments adopt to address radicalisation and prevent future attacks?

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The Kensington ModelWhile much can be learned from comparing the relative strengths of national strategies, the experiences of practitioners delivering on the front line can also be a valuable source of insight. The London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea are good examples, having worked in tandem for the past five years to deliver a large and unique local programme that has had tangible success in preventing radicalisation.

The boroughs have a history of extremist risk across the ideological spectrum. Several residents have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight with Daesh, including Aine Davis, one of the infamous four ‘ISIS Beatles’, alongside another ‘Beatle’, Mohammed Emwazi (Jihadi John), from neighbouring Westminster. The Prevent team have

also responded to non-Islamist referrals, such as those from the extreme far right.

For every individual lured by the propaganda of groups such as Daesh, there are dozens who have received tailored help and support to live safe, meaningful lives

However, for every individual that has been lured by the propaganda of groups such as Daesh, there are dozens of people who have received tailored help and support to live safe, meaningful lives. Indeed, at the time of writing, the team had received more than 150 unique referrals in the 2016/17 financial

year. While some cases were dismissed as being not directly relevant to Prevent activity, many instances resulted in support ranging from mental health interventions to parenting classes for guardians of the impacted individuals. The team’s ability to draw on local safeguarding support has been key to the success of local Prevent delivery.

During the past five years of delivery of Prevent in the two boroughs, the team has developed a robust approach and toolkit that have been adaptive to extremist trends. It has also succeeded in securing the support of local community organisations and faith institutions in the two boroughs, despite some groups having concerns about Prevent in some parts of the country. The boroughs’ ten-point delivery plan is guided by three overarching principles that reflect widening circles of activity: first, a broad range of tailored individual interventions that

Aine Davis (left), from Hammersmith, travelled to Syria in 2013 and became one of the infamous ‘ISIS Beatles’. The Prevent team in his borough and neighbouring Kensington and Chelsea have developed the Kensington Model to deal with extremist risk across the ideological spectrum. Courtesy of Metropolitan Police/PA Archive/PA Images.

Counter-Radicalisation

draw on learning from academic insight and related policy areas; second, influencing the environments in which vulnerable individuals exist; and third, working in partnership with community organisations through a transparent and accessible local action plan.

Tailored Individual InterventionsThe difference between joining a local sports team and a one-way trip to Syria can be the safeguarding support provided to a vulnerable individual. The Prevent Strategy places support to individuals at its core, through approved intervention providers commissioned by the Channel safeguarding board (for Channel cases referred to in this article, details and sources are not available due to data protection). The Prevent team in LBHF and RBKC has taken this further by providing interventions both within and outside Channel and incorporating a wider range of approaches by using the expertise of professionals in neighbouring policy areas. For instance, the boroughs employed the first Prevent social worker in the UK, as well as developing safeguarding initiatives with local voluntary and faith organisations, teachers and other local actors that

understand the individual and his or her circumstances.

This approach to safeguarding vulnerable individuals allows a flexible response to all forms of radicalisation and the wide variety of drivers behind that process. While Channel handles many of the most severe or ideologically driven cases, the Prevent team’s wider safeguarding activities, using local providers and experts from neighbouring policy areas, allows work on longer-term, more nuanced cases. These have included wardship actions for families that have attempted to travel to Daesh-held territory and an individual showing an unhealthy interest in pipe bombs and sympathy for the extreme far right. The Prevent social worker used her experience to support mental health practitioners, while also offering one-to-one support to a vulnerable adult with mental health disabilities known to be linked to Terrorism ACT 2000 (TACT) offenders and who had verbalised a desire to travel to Syria to support Daesh. Other tailored support has included parenting classes provided by local community groups for the parents of affected individuals, e-safety courses for parents of children accessing extremist propaganda, and one-to-one

mentoring between a vulnerable school student and his Religious Education teacher. In that case, the young man shifted from a position of wanting to leave school at sixteen to travel abroad on the advice of an unknown group of older men to rejecting that idea and completing his A-levels before going to university.

Parents have been offered free thirteen-week parenting classes, and over 450 have completed the programme over the past five years

These examples illustrate a more delicate and tailored style to counter-radicalisation efforts compared with more generic or military-style boot camp methods. A stark reminder of the need for a range of intervention options was provided when, in an historic case, an individual who rejected support from the Channel safeguarding process was subsequently killed fighting with Daesh in Syria. Such cases can and must be avoided, and a wider variety

Working with community partners (through community engagement and programmes like the Prevent Advisory Group)

Influencing milieus of vulnerable individuals (through training front line service providers and supporting faith programmes)

Individual interventions (through mental health support and Prevent social workers, and programmes like Channel)

Figure 1: The ‘widening circles’ Kensington Model, through which the Prevent Strategy provides support to a vulnerable individual directly, positively shapes the environments in which these individuals exist, and improves the knowledge and ability of those in wider society and communities to recognise and respond to vulnerabilities.

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Counter-Radicalisation

of interventions and intervention specialists is part of the solution.

Influencing the Environments of Vulnerable IndividualsUnderstanding the broader context and settings in which vulnerable individuals work, study, socialise and worship is also vital to any long-term strategy. Tailored interventions support vulnerable individuals, but individual support programmes can be sustained only if the organisations and individuals that surround the individual understand the risks of radicalisation and contribute to safeguarding. As such, the Prevent team has spent many hours developing relationships with spheres of influence groups such as front line services, faith organisations, schools, community groups, parents, and charities.

Preventative strategies will be far less effective without the long-term support of communities

With each of these, the Prevent team has sought to understand needs and provide support. For example, schools have been provided with training for teachers and a range of resources for use in classrooms, including lesson plans. In the 2016/17 financial year the team has trained more than 2,000 local teaching staff. Parents have been offered free thirteen-week parenting classes, and over 450 have completed the programme over the past five years. Madrasahs (Islamic supplementary schools) have been provided with a safeguarding resources toolkit, classroom management training and detailed sessions on terrorist propaganda and how to keep students safe from radicalisation.

These types of support ensure that those who interact daily with some of society’s most vulnerable individuals are aware of the risks posed by radicalisation and make sure that their institutions are ready to help them.

Working with Community Partners: Transparency and AccessibilityIt has been well documented that some community organisations and faith groups have been critical or suspicious of the Prevent Strategy, in part influenced by anti-Prevent groups. Preventative strategies will be far less effective without the long-term support of communities and so the team have employed dedicated officers whose sole responsibility is community engagement. They help groups to understand how Prevent works locally and why safeguarding local people is so important, to answer questions and support them in their work. This transparency and accessibility is vital to securing close relations with the community and pays dividends in efforts to prevent radicalisation.

The Prevent Advisory Group is now a key partner in shaping local Prevent delivery

One example is that in December 2016 the local Prevent Advisory Group (PAG), a unique network in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, celebrated its fifth year of monthly engagement meetings with a continually growing membership of community groups and faith institutions. In those five years, the Prevent team has confronted criticism and heeded advice, and the monthly meeting is now an opportunity for local groups to co-design and co-deliver safeguarding support for individuals at risk of radicalisation. This turnaround is testament to the importance of open debate, community buy-in and a cooperative approach to Prevent delivery. PAG is now a key partner in shaping local Prevent delivery and as one member (chair of a local Muslim

organisation and school governor) commented recently:

Having been a vocally critical member within the Prevent Advisory Group (PAG) from the outset, [PAG meetings] convinced me it was best for Muslim groups to engage … Prevent has evolved, learned lessons, and achieved significant strides during the last five years.

ConclusionThe work described in this article is taking place on a local level, but the lessons have wider implications. Although it is too soon to compare the success of new programmes in Europe, the Prevent approach to countering radicalisation has proven its value in supporting individuals, shaping local contexts, and securing the support of local communities. Through these three guiding principles, preventative work can make an important contribution to wider counterterrorism work across Europe, providing safeguarding to individuals and societies.

Dr David ParkerDavid Parker is a Postdoctoral Research Associate and Teaching Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. His research primarily focuses on preventing, interdicting and mitigating lone-actor extremist events, as part of the EU-funded PRIME project. He also supports the strategic local implementation of Prevent in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.

Jonathan DavisJonathan Davis works as a Prevent officer in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. Prior to this he spent two years working in the commercial security and political risk sector.

Future Crises

The Trump presidency is just beginning, and many of the challenges it faces are hotly debated in the media. But

there are other issues, which are just as complex and urgent, that are not receiving the same sort of publicity. Some of these need to be opened up to intensive scrutiny and debate now.

While they may or may not happen under Donald Trump’s watch, one cannot ignore the possibility that the new president’s approach to global engagement could exacerbate at least three potentially catastrophic crises within the decade.

Global debt levels are now more than 325% of the world’s GDP

The first has to do with an unprecedented level of international debt, the second concerns pandemics caused by molecular nanotechnology, and the third relates to the worldwide and substantial displacement of people. To avoid the full impact of each crisis, there will need to be a commitment to international collaboration and cooperation that has few precedents in the recent past and remains all too unlikely in the foreseeable future.

An increasing number of financial institutions are talking in hushed tones about the one crisis they really fear. Nuclear attacks, cyber warfare and climate change are all worrisome, but the one they see as ‘possibly shutting down the world’ – as one leading financier put

it in a conversation with the author – is the global debt crisis.

Between 2007 and 2015, global debt relative to GDP increased by $57 trillion, to approximately $200 trillion (at 2013 exchange rates). And global debt levels are now more than 325% of the world’s GDP. Global debt is a time bomb and according to the Bank for International Settlements – the central bank of central banks, as it is known – the ticking is getting louder.

If debt relative to GDP continues to increase at its present rate, it is evident that the structure of international finance will have, at best, a frail base. Economies will be prone to ever-increasing numbers of slumps, which governments and central banks will attempt to offset through expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. In other words, they will facilitate more and more borrowing, sustained by low interest rates, to promote what – generally speaking – has been sub-optimal growth.

At some stage, the global economic system may well implode, with an impact far more catastrophic than the Great Depression of 1929 or the global financial crisis of 2008. If governments are inclined – as the current US administration seems to be – to raise trade barriers, fail to offer incentives for deleveraging and resist an internationally coordinated approach to interest levels, a catastrophe looms.

The potential for catastrophe and the need for cooperation are further reflected in efforts to deal with pandemics. Uncoordinated international responses were in no small part to blame for the inadequate

prevention and poor levels of preparedness and response to previous pandemics, such as the Ebola virus in Africa and the Zika virus, which originated in South America.

Despite a growing awareness of the system’s failings and the recent launch of initiatives – such as the $500-million governmental, non-governmental and private sector Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations – these efforts are unlikely to meet the challenges posed by ever-more complex pandemic drivers. One possible such driver comes from molecular nanotechnology, which brings microbiology and nanotechnology together.

Nanotechnology has been heralded as the next scientific revolution, with the potential for changing all aspects of the ways human beings live

Nanotechnology uses processes that are able to manipulate individual atoms and molecules, and fit them together to produce structures and even machines on minute scale. It has been heralded as the next scientific revolution, with the potential for changing all aspects of the ways human beings live. The European Technology Platforms, led by industry and set up with the European Commission, believes that nanotechnology has the potential to transform the specificity

Three Existential Global Challenges for the Trump Presidency Randolph Kent

The world faces unprecedented crises, with mounting global debt, the possibility of man-made pandemics and mass migration all likely to hit soon. Is President Trump able or indeed willing to deal with the issues?

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Future Crises

and efficacy of existing drugs as well as assist in the creation of new health tools.

On the other hand, a challenge that many fear is the unfettered development of molecular nanotechnology. Oxford University professor Nick Bostrom warns that this will enable the ‘construction of bacterium-scale self-replicating mechanical robots that can feed on dirt or other organic matter. Such replicators could eat up the biosphere or destroy it by other means such as by poisoning it, burning it, or blocking out sunlight’.

Refugees in the next decade may be driven to seek some form of security in ‘no-man’s lands’, territories informally conceded by a state or states for corralling the displaced

That view may be too extreme, but there is a growing consensus that greater control over the negative consequences of such nanotechnology is required. Over the past three years, both the US and the EU have upgraded regulations intended to deal with this transformative technology. However, given that, in the future, nanotechnology may be deliberately transformed into a lethal and contagious tool that could inadvertently escape the supposedly safe confines of the laboratory, the potential global consequences of various forms of molecular nanotechnology must be controlled.

Here, the need for continuous monitoring, preventive action and capacities for immediate response must be seen as one of the highest security interests of individual nations and the global community at large. Resorting to conventional alliances, selective bilateral ‘deals’ and protective

walls between states would be to invite an unprecedented pandemic driver to wreak havoc of truly global dimensions.

A further foreseeable challenge has previously been described by this author as the ‘violent continuum of displacement’. The world is already becoming used to large flows of people seeking improved and more secure lives. The scale of the flows over the next decade, however, is likely to be far greater as a result of climate-driven resource depletion, geopolitical adjustments, urban overloads, and exponential population increase. These people may be driven to seek some form of security in ‘no-man’s lands’, territories informally conceded by a state or states for corralling the displaced. Governments will have little will, capacity or interest in controlling such areas as long as the displaced do not spill over into more valued territory. No-man’s lands may provide temporary refuge, but they will likely provide minimal living conditions and no prospect of employment. Therefore, it is quite likely that the displaced will continue to move in search of more than just minimal survival, becoming increasingly dependent on the resources of stable populations and generating conflict that may lead to even more displacement.

The exponential increase in the numbers of people on the move could well result in conflict, violence and instability

Here, again, the pattern of movement will have not only regional, but global impacts. Directly, there is a strong possibility that the exponential increase in the numbers of people on the move will result in conflict, violence and instability. States will find themselves not only resisting the flows of the displaced,

but also attempting to counter the actions of neighbouring countries that they believe are exacerbating the displacement continuum. Globally, the effects of this migration upon various regions may well flow over into broader economic and security issues, which will have more dramatic consequences.

So what will be the response of the new US administration to these challenges? The first concern is the extent to which such potentially catastrophic threats can gain the attention of the current man in the Oval Office, and the extent to which he will appreciate that, while these may not necessarily strike during his watch, they can only be mitigated if preparations are made now.

While Trump is in charge, will he be willing to configure his policies in ways that will bring together the capacities of the global community?

Second, while Trump is in charge, will he be willing to configure his policies in ways that will bring together the capacities of the global community? Will he resist creating barriers to collaboration, and will he use the weight of the US to energise international and regional organisations, governments, the private sector and others to mitigate the potential impact of catastrophic risks that will have an impact on us all?

Dr Randolph Kent Director of the Futures Project at RUSI.

PREVIOUS PAGE: The Za’atri camp in Jordan for Syrian refugees, July 2013. The scale of the flow of refugees over the next decade is likely to be far greater than it currently is because of climate-driven resource depletion, geopolitical adjustments, urban overloads and population increase. Image courtesy of the US Department of State/Wikimedia.

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Post-Brexit Industrial Strategy

The UK prime minister’s Green Paper on a new industrial strategy was written ‘to provoke debate’ and ‘start

a consultation’ as part of Theresa May’s commitment to make the UK a global leader in free trade. This is a commendable drive to build both post-Brexit prosperity and a post-EU identity for Britain. However, the dangers of developing overly mercantilist policies are ever present and a laissez-faire approach to inbound foreign investment should be avoided, particularly when it comes to foreign ownership of critical national infrastructure (CNI). A growing number of autocratic states have become global trading partners, and while this is to be warmly welcomed, it is not without risks. China is of particular note in this regard. China is predicted to surpass the US as the largest cross-border investor by 2020 and has a reputation for large-scale projects and visionary economic planning. Furthermore, the prime minister declared in a recent BBC interview that the ‘golden era’ of UK–China relations is still in place.

China is predicted to surpass the US as the largest cross-border investor by 2020

Much of China’s economic miracle has been built on leap-frogging technologies, achieved through a mixture of cyber espionage and pushing foreign firms with desirable intellectual

property into disadvantageous joint ventures with Chinese rivals. As far back as 2007, MI5 was alerting executives in Britain to the dangers of commercial espionage from Chinese state actors. The 2016 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission asserts that ‘reports of Chinese espionage against the United States have risen significantly over the past 15 years’, noting that while the emphasis has been on ‘defence industrial companies, national security decision makers, and critical national infrastructure entities’. This article reviews three types of Chinese investment into foreign firms.

1. Attempting to Dominate Technology Industries Critical to Modern War-fightingIn 2016, for security reasons the German and US governments blocked the Chinese acquisition of AIXTRON SE, a German-based technology company in the semiconductor industry, and its US subsidiary AIXTRON Inc. in California. The Chinese firm Fujian Grand Chip Investment Fund LP was a nominally private company, but had state backing in the deal.

Matthias Machnig, Minister of State for the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, stated that the decision took place after it became evident that AIXTRON ‘owns technologies which are relevant to national security’. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the US, which advises the president on foreign investment proposals, had

also recommended that the merger be prevented due to national security concerns.

2. Developing Ownership or Partial Ownership of Foreign Critical National InfrastructureChinese companies have been attempting to gain a foothold in CNI in a number of liberal democracies, including the US, Japan, Australia and the UK. In November 2014, Admiral Michael Rogers, director of the National Security Agency, told the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that China sought the capability to ‘shut down vital infrastructure like oil and gas pipelines, power transmission grids, and water distribution and filtration systems’. In 2016, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, the Chinese State Grid Corporation (SGCC) attempted to purchase a 99-year partial lease for a 50.4% stake in Ausgrid, the electricity infrastructure company owned by the Australian state of New South Wales. The Australian Treasurer Scott Morrison MP, acting on advice from Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board, decided to block the deal due to ‘national interest’ and national security.

In the UK, although Hinkley Point C is China’s most famous foray into Britain’s infrastructure, it is not its first. In 2013 the Parliamentary Security and Intelligence Committee published a report about Huawei Technologies’ success in partnering with BT, O2, TalkTalk and Everything Everywhere and embedding

Putting Security into Prime Minister May’s New Industrial StrategyJohn Hemmings and Alex Manzoor

Prime Minister Theresa May’s proposed post-Brexit industrial strategy is commendable. However, the UK must avoid the pitfalls of an overly mercantilist policy, especially when it comes to dealing with China.

itself in the UK’s CNI. Because of the report, the UK government is said to have taken steps to mitigate the threat posed by Huawei’s access to sensitive British communications.

3. Gaining Property Critical to National SecurityIn 2012, the Ralls Corporation, a subsidiary of the Chinese-owned Sany Group, purchased development interests in four small wind-farm projects in the US. It planned to sell the power generated to PacifiCorp, with the purpose of going on to introduce Sany turbines into the US. Then President Barack Obama, in an executive order, prevented the acquisition and ordered the company to divest itself of the projects, arguing that there was ‘credible evidence’ that the purchase of the turbines could ‘impair the national security of the United States’.

Although Sany Group is a private company, it has received official visits from political leaders, such as former Premier Wen Jiabao and former President Hu Jintao, and has benefited heavily from the Chinese government’s

massive investment in infrastructure projects. Moreover, its founder and chairman, Liang Wengen, has been mooted as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

In Obama’s executive order, the details of the national security issue were not specified, although the primary issue was most likely the proximity of the wind farms to the Naval Weapons Systems Training Facility, where the military tests unmanned drones.

A review process would provide transparency and actually improve relations with many Chinese firms

In looking forward to what could be an exciting period of British trade in the world, Prime Minister May cannot dismiss the geopolitical interests of some of the UK’s trade partners. China and the UK can partner in a number of exciting new ventures, and Chinese investment and partnership should

be welcomed. However, it should be welcomed with open eyes and an awareness that China is well known for attempting to use investment for security-driven reasons.

It is therefore incumbent on the UK government to consider an investment review board, staffed by the Department for International Trade, the private sector and technical experts from the security services. A simple review process would provide transparency and actually improve relations with many Chinese firms, which are currently uncertain about which areas are off limits and which are not.

John Hemmings John Hemmings is Director of the Asia Studies Centre at the Henry Jackson Society in London.

Alex ManzoorAlex Manzoor is a researcher at the Henry Jackson Society in London.

The views expressed in this article are the views of the authors and should not be taken to represent the views of the Henry Jackson Society or any other institution with which the authors may be affiliated.

Hinkley Point C nuclear power station: China’s most famous foray into Britain’s infrastructure. Courtesy of Richard Baker/CC 2.0.

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Duterte, China and the US

Colourful, controversial and crude, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte appears committed both to upending

the certitudes of a decades-old alliance with the US as well as the niceties of diplomatic language.

Having appeared to call former US President Barack Obama a ‘son of whore’, and proclaiming himself ‘no American puppet’, Duterte used his state visit to Beijing in December to announce his ‘separation’ from the US and alignment with China.

His predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, both launched the Permanent Court of International Arbitration case against Chinese claims in the South China Sea and renewed defence ties with the US. Duterte, however, branded the resulting favourable Hague ruling ‘just a piece of paper’ and announced he wanted US troops out of his country within two years.

Duterte seems to be willing to risk strategic positioning and legal norms in favour of short-term material gain

In overturning the long-held politics of his country, is this ‘Trump of the East’ astutely manipulating international forces in search of a better deal? Or is this ‘head-snapping transformation’, as Max Boot put it in Foreign Policy, the work of a ‘crude populist’ overlooking the strategic interests of his nation in favour of his idiosyncratic impulses?

Analysis of Duterte’s stated policies, including his announcement in November of a marine sanctuary in Scarborough Shoal, suggested a leader willing to risk strategic positioning and legal norms in favour of short-term material gain – a posture not without parallel to his domestic policy persona.

For the Philippines, history may turn on the minutiae of what is ostensibly a fishing dispute. For four years, Chinese ships have blocked Philippine fishermen from accessing Scarborough Shoal, infuriating both the fishermen and Philippine nationalist sentiment. At 124 nautical miles west of the Philippines province of Zambales, the shoal lies well within the 200-nautical mile limit that would under international law otherwise lead it to be considered a part of the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone.

However, according to its ‘nine-dash line’, China claims roughly 90% of the South China Sea by dint of ‘historic right’. In recent years, Beijing has become increasingly assertive in pursuit of its claims, and has initiated a policy of island building and base construction in disputed waters. Scarborough Shoal falls within the scope of China’s claims.

Backed by the US, this position was contested by countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia. As a result of this blockade, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled on 12 July 2016 that there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the seas following the ‘nine-dash line’.

It further ruled that, by interfering with fishermen and petroleum

exploration, constructing artificial islands and failing to prevent Chinese fishing in the zone, the People’s Republic of China had violated the sovereign rights of the Philippines.

The economic, strategic and diplomatic implications of this ruling could not be higher. The area is central to the trade and energy security of East Asia; 80% of China’s crude oil imports and nearly 60% of Japan and Taiwan’s energy suppliers are transported through the region.

Roughly $4.5 trillion of ship-borne trade passes through the South China Sea each year. Deep beneath the paths of the passing vessels, there is an abundance of natural resources, including oil reserves of 7 billion barrels and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Some Chinese estimates suggest a potential yield of 130 billion barrels of oil.

Roughly $4.5 trillion of ship-borne trade passes through the South China Sea each year

For Beijing, control of the South China Sea thus represents a vital element to establishing long-term security in the face of energy supply vulnerabilities as well as the strategic encirclement it sees from US bases in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. For Washington, seeking to maintain the freedom of the seas and the integrity of the ‘first island chain’ by which it secures control of the

Fish and Ships – Diplomatic Theatre in the South China SeaJames Kingston

The Philippines’ brash president, Rodrigo Duterte, is making overtures to China at the expense of a long-lasting alliance with the US. It remains to be seen whether Beijing will reciprocate given its own conflicts with Manila over fishing rights and freedom of navigation.

Pacific, it is vital that this region is not dominated by another power.

However, both see the South China Sea as a testing ground of one another’s responses to changing international order, and it is in this context that the brash figure of Duterte is making his mark.

In loudly proclaiming his independence from the US, it looks as though Duterte could either be adopting a policy of band-wagoning on perceived Chinese ascendancy or hedging the Philippines’s relationship between the

two dominant powers of the Pacific. A surface reading suggests the former.

President Duterte seems intent on siding his country with China

In his sharp criticism of Obama and the US, his open avowal of alignment with China and possibly Russia, Duterte seems intent on siding his country with

the rising power. Such an analysis leaves out the fact that for all his harsh words, Duterte has done little formally to end the strategic relationship between the Philippines and the US.

Indeed, while on 26 October he said that he wanted US troops out of the Philippines in two years, only two days earlier he had told the Japanese press that ‘there should be no worry about changes of alliances’. A policy of strategic hedging and balancing thus seems more likely to be his preferred path. However, a closer analysis suggests

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte shakes hands with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, prior to a meeting in Beijing, October 2016. Unlike his predecessor, Duterte seems to be favouring China over the US. Image courtesy of the Philippine Government/Wikimedia.

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Duterte, China and the US

Duterte risks undermining the strategic interests of the Philippines in favour of extracting short-term material benefit – especially since he appears not to have gained any real concession on the Scarborough issue. If this is hedging, it is somewhat self-defeating.

Duterte’s rhetoric has sought balance between apparently irreconcilable positions. During his bid for power and in lieu risking Philippines naval forces, Duterte promised personally to jet ski to the China-claimed Spratly Islands and plant the national flag. On 10 October and before his Beijing visit, he told residents of Basilan Island that he would build them ‘hospitals and schools from the soft-term loans we will get from China’. As for the shoal, he said:

[E]ven if we get angry, we’ll just be putting on airs. We can’t beat [China]. We’ll ask them to allow our fishermen to [return] to their traditional fishing ground in Scarborough.

Elsewhere, he was keen to assert before his visit that ‘we will insist on what is ours’, and agreed with the view of the Senior Associate of the Supreme Court, Antonio Carpio, that to give up the Philippines’s claim would be an ‘impeachable’ offence.

Duterte returned from China with $24 billion in new investment and financing agreements

In China, by contrast, Duterte seemed willing during his Beijing state visit to undermine the validity of the Hague ruling and support the basis of rejected Chinese claims. He said:

The arbitral award gives us the right. China has the historical right. And they’re insisting. In this situation, do we argue, or do we just talk? I would say, let us put it [off] to some other day.

His flexibility would initially seem to have been rewarded. Duterte

returned from China with $24 billion in new investment and financing agreements, while on 28 October, Philippines Defence Minister Delfin N Lorenzana hailed the withdrawal of Chinese ships from Scarborough Shoal. In the wake of the announcement, however, satellite imagery published by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative revealed numerous Chinese ships still anchored in the shoal. The Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs has refrained from commenting on any new arrangement.

In November, Duterte ridiculed potential ICC action against him as ‘bullshit’

Perhaps as a result of this ambiguity, Duterte announced on 21 November the formation of a nature sanctuary within the disputed Scarborough Shoal, banning fishermen from entering the lagoon. While Duterte invited China to follow his example in declaring the lagoon within the shoal off-limits to fishing, China has yet to make any official comment on this policy. It simply stated on 25 November that its position on its sovereignty and jurisdiction over the ‘Huangyan Island’ remained unchanged.

On the one hand, Duterte here maintains rhetorical space for the assertion of Philippines sovereignty, and removes the risk of confrontation between fishermen and Chinese forces. On the other, this sovereignty is near meaningless without Chinese agreement, and it remains to be seen whether the Chinese will cooperate with his unilateral action. Until then, Duterte’s announcement is diplomacy as theatre.

Duterte’s actions in undermining the ruling of the Tribunal – and with it the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – parallels the contempt he has shown for legalistic processes in the domestic sphere. Thousands of Filipinos lie dead through extrajudicial killing as a result of his violent crackdown on drugs, and he

has promised more. In November, he ridiculed potential ICC action against him as ‘bullshit’. In this light, his attitude to the Arbitration is unsurprising; Duterte appears to view himself as part of the global opposition to the crumbling liberal consensus.

In seeming to align himself with China, this domestic strongman would do well to contemplate the famed words of Thucydides: ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’. It is not for nothing that many small states have identified their interests in the maintenance of international institutions and legal norms.

Duterte may now find a Trump administration all too willing to agree with his stated views on US regional involvement and international treaties. Duterte is aiding in the unravelling of global order that guarantees rights to small states and ties the Philippines by bonds of trade, treaty and alliance with the strongest power the world has yet known. In doing so, he is failing to act in the better interests of his country.

It remains to be seen how US President Donald Trump will act in the Pacific, but with the weakening of the Philippine–US bond, China can afford to wait.

James KingstonJames is a barrister-at-law and political analyst.

Kazakhstan at the UN Security Council

On New Year’s Day, Kazakhstan became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council

(UNSC), a position it will hold for the next two years. The limitations of the UNSC are well documented, and a non-permanent place at the table provides only some real-world benefits (as illustrated by Ukraine’s ongoing membership). However, the symbolic implications for Kazakhstan are significant.

Kazakhstan won its place last summer, the culmination of a six-year campaign based on an agenda of promoting food, water, energy and nuclear security. Such areas have been of historical significance for Kazakhstan and Central Asia, most visibly in the dramatic depletion of the Aral Sea. Kazakhstan campaigned not only on the basis of bringing such matters to the fore at the UNSC, but also as a solution provider to other states facing similar challenges.

Kazakhstan is the first Central Asian state to secure a seat on the UNSC since it gained its independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It comes in recognition of Kazakhstan’s diplomatic achievements in a relatively short time, and also as a sign of the growing strategic and economic importance of the region as a whole.

Since independence, Kazakhstan has experienced limited freedom of expression, a lack of pluralistic democracy and human rights abuses. Former Communist Party chief Nursultan Nazarbayev has held the presidency from Day One, and holds the official title ‘Leader of the Nation’ – along with substantially expanded presidential powers and immunities.

Indeed, it is a criminal offence to make insulting remarks about Nazarbayev.

Nonetheless, Kazakhstan has gained a reputation for being a stable, prosperous and responsible state in what is a fragile and fragmented region. Indeed, Kazakhstan’s ascension to the UNSC represents just the latest in a concerted effort by Astana to present itself to the world through a multi-vector foreign policy approach.

Kazakhstan is an active member of the key regional economic and security organisations – the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

Kazakhstan has gained a reputation for being a stable, prosperous and responsible state in a fragile and fragmented region

In recent years, Kazakhstan has also chaired the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Astana has made clear efforts to act as a mediator in high-level discussions. It claimed a role in breaking the deadlock on Iran’s nuclear agreement in 2015, moderated between Ankara and Moscow during their rapprochement in 2016, and between Moscow and Kiev concerning the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Most

recently, Astana hosted negotiations that brought together Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Syrian government and rebel representatives in the hope of bringing the Syrian Civil War to an end.

In campaigning for its seat on the UNSC, Astana has pointed to its vocal opposition to the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. As a newly independent state in 1991, Kazakhstan inherited the world’s fourth-largest nuclear power but swiftly renounced its arsenal. This theme has since continued and led most recently in its agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to host the Low Enriched Uranium Bank.

Since 2003, Kazakh forces have also trained regularly with NATO forces in annual Steppe Eagle exercises, which focus on peacekeeping capabilities. This has enhanced Astana’s reputation for friendly relations with both the Alliance and its neighbours.

In short, Kazakhstan has been successful at projecting a positive global image and has built significant diplomatic ties with a variety of states and organisations. For Astana, a seat at the UNSC provides the opportunity to further develop its international status through diplomacy, and to have a voice in high-level security discussions.

However, this approach is not simply a vain self-enhancement project, and Astana’s desire to build multiple friendships is a reflection of its potentially vulnerable geopolitical situation and security dilemmas.

To the south, Afghanistan remains a security concern. Opium trafficking through Central Asia has been an endemic problem for the region and

Between the Bear and the Dragon: Kazakhstan at the UN Security Council Alex Maciag

Kazakhstan, the newest member of the UN Security Council, faces a difficult test. It must balance relations with its two powerful neighbours – Russia and China – while maintaining sovereignty and also engaging with several partners.

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this, together with volatility emanating from any security deterioration, could percolate through weaker Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

In comparison with its Central Asian neighbours, largely secular Kazakhstan has experienced low levels of home-grown Islamist terrorism, although official reports suggest dozens of Kazakh nationals are fighting for Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS or IS) and present a high security risk when they return to Kazakhstan. In 2016, there were several convictions of Daesh-affiliated terrorist cells and armed attacks on security services, sharpening the fears of a rise in such activity.

Kazakhstan’s own military efforts reflect this immediate challenge. The Kazakh armed forces are the most capable in Central Asia, and according to government statements investment has increased by 36% from $2 billion in 2014 to $2.7 billion in 2017. Alongside strengthening naval capabilities in the Caspian Sea, the main thrust of military reform has been to update and build counterterrorism and peacekeeping

capabilities and interoperability with other armed forces.

The potential threat from Islamist fighters is a concern shared by Kazakhstan’s close neighbours, and its forces have held a range of counterterrorism exercises and initiatives in recent years under the banner of the CSTO, the CIS and the SCO.

Russians constitute approximately 22% of Kazakhstan’s population of 16 million

On its northern and eastern borders, Kazakhstan is caught between Chinese and Russian spheres of influence. Balancing relations between these two powerful, but very different, neighbours while maintaining sovereignty is Astana’s key long-term foreign policy mission.

Russia has traditionally been culturally close to Kazakhstan as well as its largest trading partner

and security guarantor. Russians constitute approximately 22% of Kazakhstan’s population of 16 million – the second-largest Russian diaspora in the world (after Ukraine). The fear of separatist sentiment among the Russian population – and its potential exploitation by Moscow – is real, and Astana undoubtedly views Russia’s assertions of its spheres of interest in Georgia and Ukraine with a degree of trepidation.

Nazarbayev has criticised Ukraine’s ‘discrimination against minority rights’ and made generally successful efforts to appeal to Russian minorities. Calls for separatism are taken seriously and offenders are given long prison terms. In December 2016, a man was imprisoned for five-and-a-half years for advocating pro-Russian separatism.

There have been examples of Astana asserting its independence from Russia in both the security and cultural spheres. In 2015, Kazakhstan hastily organised celebrations marking 550 years of Kazakh independence and culture, a move seen by many observers as a riposte to comments by Russian

Since 2003, Kazakh forces have trained regularly with NATO forces in annual Steppe Eagle exercises, which focus on peacekeeping capabilities. Image courtesy of Tracy R Myers/US Army Central.

Kazakhstan at the UN Security Council

President Vladimir Putin that both were essentially artificial constructs created by Nazarbayev ‘on territory where no state had ever existed’.

Kazakhstan has taken control of a string of military bases previously run by the Russian military, most recently in October 2016 when its armed forces took control of the Emba training range. In 2016, Nazarbayev also ordered the end of the Soviet-era ‘goose-step’ march, a small detail on the surface, but a move made by other states that have looked to move out from Moscow’s shadow (Georgia in 2007, Estonia [2008] and Ukraine [2009]).

As Kazakhstan has asserted its independence from Russia, it has continued to deepen economic ties with China, a dynamic that reflects a challenge to the established order. It is no secret that China has invested heavily in Central Asia for several years, and the announcement of the vast One Belt, One Road initiative is set to transform the infrastructure of the region and its connectivity with the rest of the world.

New roads and railways, bridges, tunnels and pipelines are being constructed across the region, and Kazakhstan is one of the primary beneficiaries. Projects such as the Khorgos Gateway – a dry port on the China–Kazakh border – illustrate the ambition of the initiative and the importance of good relations between Astana and Beijing.

According to the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, China invested around $10 billion in Kazakhstan between 2011 and 2016 and the number of Chinese companies operating in the country grew by 35% between 2013 and 2016. Alongside Kazakhstan’s own sovereign wealth fund, worth $9 billion, joint Chinese–Kazakh projects are planned to transform Kazakhstan into a giant hub connecting China, Russia, Europe and South Asia.

In line with China’s broader foreign policy, Beijing appears content to increase its influence in Central Asia through mutual economic benefit with no security strings attached. Nonetheless, Kazakhs remain wary of China’s influence and its long-term intentions in their country. It is possible

that in time, deteriorating relations with Moscow, an increased threat of Islamist extremism or regional socio-economic volatility, could lead to a change in Beijing’s soft approach and morph into a strategy that requires it to use hard power to protect its interests.

With Kazakhstan’s growing economic links with China and its determination to pursue an independent foreign policy, there are many reasons to believe that Astana would be inclined to move decisively away from a potentially aggressive Moscow. However, the two remain culturally close and major trading partners.

Despite the heavy investment from China, Kazakhstan was one of the founding members of the EEU in 2014, with Russia and Belarus, albeit with the pledge from Nazarbayev not to cede ‘an iota’ of sovereignty to Russia.

Putin and Nazarbayev remain personally close: the two met no fewer than nine times in 2016

Moreover, from a security perspective, Kazakhstan has few clear alternatives. The country still relies largely on Russian-made military equipment and security partnerships, and while China has pledged to protect Kazakhstan’s sovereignty under the SCO, without an interventionist policy it seems unlikely that Beijing would be willing to engage in a security contest with Russia over Kazakhstan. Moreover, exercising with NATO did not prevent Kazakh forces from participating in controversial CSTO military exercises on the border of Estonia and Latvia in August 2016. Nazarbayev has also supported Moscow over its campaign in Syria, describing it as ‘work for all of humanity’.

Putin and Nazarbayev remain personally close. The two met no fewer than nine times in 2016, and it would take a dramatic change of heart from either of them for a security crisis to emerge. However, at the age of 75, Nazarbayev is the last remaining Central Asian leader from the Soviet era, and a

change in leadership is inevitable in the medium term.

Further questions surround Kazakhstan’s economic homogeneity. Since 1991, internal stability, growth and Nazarbayev’s own popularity has been based largely on high oil prices and prosperity from the energy industry, which makes up more than 60% of the economy. Recently, low prices have hit the Kazakh economy, and unless the market rises significantly, and for a sustained period, there could be political difficulties ahead for Nazarbayev.

And yet, the fragility of Central Asian regimes can be overestimated. Nazarbayev may have already weathered the worst of the oil slump as prices slowly begin to rise. The 2016 budget was based on $40 per barrel, and Astana even claims to be able to cope with prices as low as $16 per barrel.

Politically, as has been seen with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s smooth succession from the late Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, Nazarbayev’s eventual successor is likely to be of a similar mould and outlook. Despite the autocratic nature of the regime, clamour for political change remains low and stability is generally valued above democratic ideals.

Balancing relations between China and Russia while maintaining sovereignty is Astana’s primary geopolitical challenge. As long as Kazakhstan can act as a useful ally for each of its neighbours and avoid being caught in zero-sum economic or security disputes, this approach will continue to reap rewards. Nazarbayev has been adept in benefiting from what Beijing and Moscow offer without having to choose a decisive direction. It has been by engaging with a multitude of partners that Kazakhstan has gained its place on the UNSC, but the two most important members at the table are its two powerful neighbours.

Alex MaciagAlex holds a degree in Modern History and a Master’s in War Studies (distinction). He has conducted research into security issues in the post-Soviet space, including on Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

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Balkan Security

Western analysts point to the Baltic States as the place where Russian President Vladimir Putin

will try to break NATO, but they are mistaken. Invading the Baltics now, be it with Little Green Men – as in Crimea – or openly, would lead to an all-out NATO–Russia war. By now, fifteen NATO nations have forward-deployed military units to the Baltic States as part of the Alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence.

The Baltic States host heavy, multinational, combat-ready NATO forces and an attack would result in a war that Russia could win only through the use of nuclear weapons. This is a gamble that is hopefully too risky even for Putin.

On the other hand, Kosovo’s security and integrity is based solely on US goodwill, which, with Donald Trump in the White House, is for the first time not guaranteed. Trump has, in the past, shown open disdain for the EU and NATO, opening the possibility for Putin to exact revenge for the end of the Soviet Empire and other imagined slights against Russia since the end of the Cold War.

No imagined slight gnaws more at Putin than NATO’s 1999 war against Russia’s old ally Serbia, when Kosovo gained independence. NATO’s expansion into the former Soviet Empire and the westward orientation of Ukraine are the other slights Putin lists in his grievances about the Western humiliation of Russia.

Putin wants to ‘right’ all these ‘wrongs’ and if Trump does not acquiesce to a new Yalta Agreement, dividing Europe into Russian and American spheres of influence, then the key to breaking NATO is Kosovo.

If Russia’s ally Serbia were to invade Kosovo, and if NATO should fail to defend it, then how credible would NATO’s commitment be to defend its own members against nuclear-armed Russia?

Serbia considers Kosovo to be a renegade province, while 110 states recognise its independence. Kosovo’s population is predominantly Albanian, with a Serbian minority in Northern Kosovo. Over the past few weeks, Serbia’s government, cheered on by Russian propaganda, has threatened its smaller neighbour with war. The tensions began when Serbia tried to send a Russian-made train painted all over with the slogan ‘Kosovo is Serbia’ into the breakaway territory. After Kosovo announced that the train would not be allowed to enter, Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić said the two sides were on the ‘brink of war’, and threatened to send in the army ‘if Serbs are being killed’.

The recent tensions began when Serbia tried to send a train painted all over with the slogan ‘Kosovo is Serbian’ into Kosovo

But Nikolić’s veiled threat of an open invasion is bluster that certainly does not have Putin’s support. Any ensuing war would spiral out of control within hours and lead to a military confrontation between the US and Russia. Instead of an open invasion, Nikolić and Putin have another option to regain control of parts of Kosovo and to break NATO.

Why would an open invasion fail? Serbia’s military is numerically vastly superior to Kosovo’s lightly armed Kosovo Security Force (KSF). However, there are currently 4,300 NATO-led troops in Kosovo as part of the UN-mandated KFOR peacekeeping mission, which is tasked with contributing ‘towards maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo and freedom of movement for all’.

If Serbia were to openly invade Kosovo, KSF and KFOR would fight. KFOR’s two lead nations are the US and Italy, each leading a multinational brigade under overall Italian command. The main force contributors are the US (675 troops), Italy (551), Germany (550), Austria (474), Hungary (350), Turkey (313), Poland (258) and First Lady Melania Trump’s home nation of Slovenia (252).

It is important that an attack on KFOR would not lead to NATO invoking Article V, the collective defense clause, as Kosovo is not part of a NATO member’s territory as defined by Article VI. An open invasion would pit Serbia against the US and Italy, with the latter two being supported by a coalition of the willing.

Between them, KFOR and KSF can field around 10,000 lightly armed troops against Serbia’s approximately 25,000 troops, which are concentrated in three brigades to the east and north of Kosovo.

While KFOR and KSF have no heavy equipment, Serb forces can field at least 160 main battle tanks, 240 tracked infantry fighting vehicles, 54 tracked self-propelled howitzers, 72 towed howitzers and 80 multiple rocket launchers. Therefore, a Serb invasion

Kosovo – Beware Russia’s Little Green MenThomas Theiner

While the world’s gaze is focused on Ukraine and the Baltics as key locations of Russia’s challenge to the West, the real risk lies in Kosovo. It is where President Vladimir Putin imagines that the Western humiliation of Russia began.

could swiftly strike deep into Kosovo and kill KFOR troops from 22 NATO and eight NATO-allied nations.

As KFOR lead-nations, the US and Italy each keep a paratrooper battalion on standby in Italy as quickly deployable reinforcements – one battalion from the US 173rd Airborne Brigade based in Vicenza, and one battalion from Italy’s Folgore Parachute Brigade, based in Tuscany.

If needed to deploy to Kosovo, the US paratroopers would have to wait for the US Air Force’s 86th Airlift Wing to arrive from Germany; by contrast, Italy’s 46th Air Brigade would be able to fly its paratroopers to Kosovo within hours.

After dropping off the Italian paratrooper battalion, the 46th Air Brigade could shuttle further American and Italian reinforcements and heavy equipment from Italy to Kosovo. Within a day, KFOR could be reinforced by more than 1,500 Italian and US troops and by the entire Albanian Army, which would bring every man it can muster to this fight (approximately 5,000). But even with these reinforcements, KFOR

and KSF may not be able to stop a Serbian advance.

What would stop it is allied air power. In less than six hours of an invasion the air forces of Italy and the US could be on hand to attack Serbian forces. The US Air Force’s 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano Air Base in Italy would lead, followed by Italy’s 6th and 51st Wing. Serbia’s air force, with its four outdated MiG-29s as its most potent jets, would be eliminated quickly. Should this happen, Serbia’s advance might be halted even before other NATO members’ reinforcements arrived on the battlefield.

Therefore, an open advance by Serb forces into Kosovo would be madness. Even if Putin were to lend Belgrade Russian air force regiments with advanced fighter jets, Serbia would still suffer massive losses – as the US military will always use overwhelming force to save its troops under attack.

Russia, as Belgrade’s closest ally, would not want Serbia to be defeated. However, it would not be able to do much, because there is no way for Moscow to transfer troops and equipment to Serbia – the country is

surrounded on all sides by NATO and NATO allies. Of course, this could have been different had Russia succeeded in its alleged attempt to orchestrate a coup in Montenegro in November 2016.

Little Green MenSo if the open invasion route is a non-starter, Serbia and Russia may instead opt for the Crimea scenario: heavily armed but unmarked Serb troops sneaking into northern Kosovo and pretending to be ‘local self-defence forces’. Kosovo President Hashim Thaci warned in January that Serbia was preparing this exact scenario.

Such ‘Little Green Men’ could prevent the use of NATO air power by mingling with civilians and using them as human shields. Only ground forces could push such invaders out. However, if not pushed out with overwhelming force, Serbia, like Russia in Donbas, could sneak fresh batches of Little Green Men into unguarded areas of Kosovo every day; with KFOR busy ejecting them elsewhere.

If Serbia does this – which, given Russia’s previous and largely successful

Graffiti on a wall in Belgrade, Serbia, January 2017. The message, written in Russian, English and Serbian, reads ‘Kosovo is Serbia’. Courtesy of Thomas Brey DPA/PA Images.

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Balkan Security

experiences, is not unlikely – then KFOR would need to be augmented with massive numbers of ground troops to push out the Little Green Men. Italy and the US would again unilaterally dispatch reinforcements: besides paratroopers, Italy would likely send the San Marco Marine Brigade, Pinerolo Mechanised Brigade and its two anti-Little-Green-Men Carabinieri battalions; additional American reinforcements would come from the 2nd (Stryker) Cavalry Regiment, 709th Military Police Battalion, and 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group in Germany, and the mechanised 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment in Bulgaria.

Within a few days, KFOR could swell to more than 20,000 troops, but what would happen next is unpredictable. KFOR’s mission is UN-mandated, but every UN-resolution aimed at evicting Serbia’s Little Green Men would be vetoed by Russia, therefore leaving NATO and KFOR with only two bad options.

First, it could use force to evict the Little Green Men. But there is a problem here, for NATO governments would have to agree on such a campaign, and it is doubtful that they would. First, Spain, Slovakia and Greece do not even recognise Kosovo as a state, so it is unclear if they would be willing to protect it. Second, France, Spain, Belgium, Iceland, Slovakia and Latvia do not have troops in Kosovo, and so it would be difficult for them to convince their publics of the need to send troops into battle in Kosovo. Third, Kosovo is not part of a NATO member’s territory, so there is no Article V obligation on other NATO member states to protect it. Fourth, Serbia’s Little Green Men would initially avoid killing or injuring KFOR troops, to not force Italy’s or the US’s to retaliate. Finally, it may be difficult to reach an agreement because Trump appears to want to form a positive relationship with Putin, and he may not be willing to jeopardise that goal for the sake of ousting Little Green Men from Kosovo.

But if NATO did agree to a campaign to eject ‘Serb local self-defence forces’, then one result would likely be the exodus of the Serb population from Kosovo. This would

be a propaganda coup for Russia and Serbia – remember that NATO went to war in 1999 to stop Serbia from fighting ‘Kosovar self-defence forces’ and to stop the exodus of Kosovo’s Albanian population.

This refugee stream, in addition to the civilian casualties that would be likely in such a conflict, would give Serbia and Russia the pretext – based on NATO’s own 1999 Kosovo intervention – to intervene there. Putin could even dispatch Russian troops to northern Kosovo as a ‘peacekeeping force’.

Such a force would carve out a territory that would, in all likelihood, never be returned to Kosovo. Russia has followed a similar strategy in other territories: it stoked a civil war then inserted its ‘peacekeeping forces’ in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Kosovo, rather than the Baltics, is a much better place for Putin to test Trump’s commitment to NATO

The second bad option open to KFOR and NATO would be to stand down and allow the Little Green Men to carve up Kosovo. This would devastate NATO’s credibility. If Trump were to back down, suspend the fighting and withdraw NATO forces from northern Kosovo, Putin would know that he could act with impunity in Europe with no fear of an American pushback.

Still, the more likely scenario would be that Putin would bluff, threaten and bribe Trump into not even attempting to expel Serbia’s Little Green Men from Northern Kosovo. With Trump retreating in the face of Serbian aggression and Russian bullying, the global belief in US commitment to its allies would take a devastating hit. Without the US no other NATO nation, save Albania, would support Kosovo in a fight to regain control of its territory.

The Trump administration might even do Putin’s dirty work and bully Albania and Kosovo into accepting

the new reality. If the US were to do that, then not only would trust in the commitment of the US to NATO be destroyed, but also the belief that the US will not allow Europe’s borders to be redrawn by Putin. The Russian president may then be tempted to repeat the Little Green Men strategy in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

One added benefit for Putin of having Serbia dispatch Little Green Men to Kosovo and test NATO’s cohesion is that it gives him plausible deniability, which he would not have if this tactic were used in the Baltics first. So Kosovo, rather than the Baltics, is a much better place for Putin to test Trump’s commitment to NATO and, if Trump backs down, to break NATO.

What to do?The best way to stymie Putin would be to dispatch 10,000 NATO troops to Kosovo immediately and spread them out along the northern border with the order to eliminate all armed persons attempting to cross into Kosovo. The UK might need to step up its participation in KFOR – at present it intends to send only 30 troops to the force.

The only way to earn Putin’s respect and be seen as an equal is to anticipate his next moves and ruthlessly block them. Dispatching 10,000 NATO troops to Kosovo might well block any Putin gamble there and possibly earn his respect. Such a preventive move by NATO would also be a warning to the leaders of the Serbian Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who openly threaten secession.

Alas, I fear Trump’s administration has neither the foresight nor the will to act against Putin’s next move. And so, once more, the West will allow Putin to choose the field of battle, and to choose it on his terms.

Thomas Theiner Thomas Theiner served in Italy’s IV Alpine Army Corps, before studying history and politics at the University of Innsbruck. In recent years he worked for a media production group in Kiev, Ukraine.

Twitter: @noclador

Non-Proliferation

During his election campaign, President Donald Trump made many questionable and potentially damaging

claims on nuclear weapons. Now much of the world is waiting to see how his rhetoric will be reflected in policy.

The extended nuclear deterrent was one area addressed by Trump. Having been a successful tool of non-proliferation for decades, hints of changes in Washington’s nuclear alliances have been alarming policymakers both in the US and in those states under its nuclear umbrella.

Trump could change this policy in a number of ways, from downgrading specific arrangements to asking allies for increased compensation. However, if Trump insists on enacting at least some of his campaign rhetoric, the removal of US forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Turkey could be an ideal option. It is an idea that has been around for some time, and it has gained prominence once again since the attempted military coup in Turkey last summer.

When the question of withdrawing nuclear weapons from Turkey has come up before, there have been two primary justifications: first, the domestic situation in Turkey poses high risks and would not ordinarily be accepted as a safe and secure nuclear hosting state; and second, the US nuclear capability, suspected to be based at Incirlik, cannot be delivered by either American forces stationed in Turkey or by the Turkish Air Force.

Although this operational limitation goes some way to reducing the risk posed

by the domestic instability in Turkey, it does not completely override the risks posed by hosting nuclear weapons in an unstable country. Therefore, removal makes operational sense. Moreover, it has been reported that US forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons have been stationed in Turkey under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements for decades. Removing this US capability from forward deployment would allow Trump to implement campaign rhetoric while also bringing three benefits to broader nuclear policy.

The removal of this nuclear capability from Turkey could create a better footing for arms control with Russia. Second, it could open a much-needed pathway for dialogue with the advocates of a Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty. And finally, such a policy could be enacted without going against NATO or US interests. NATO’s primary objective is to provide collective security for all its members, so no one country’s security is prioritised over another’s. A way of ensuring this security is through the notion of extended nuclear deterrence. Unilaterally, the US is committed to maintaining a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent. Removing nuclear weapons from Turkish soil would not damage these provisions as the country would still be covered by the Alliance’s nuclear umbrella.

Giving Turkey What it Needs Any policy change cannot leave a void for Turkey or the southern flank of

NATO: such a void would undermine the trust that member states have in the Alliance and may embolden NATO’s adversaries. As such, before changes to the deployment of nuclear weapons in Turkey are implemented, both the US and NATO will need to address any perceptions of abandonment that arise.

Turkey’s designation as a NATO nuclear base is historically and symbolically important. It is a demonstration of Washington’s commitment both to Turkey and to the broader Alliance, a commitment that, from Ankara’s perspective, was damaged following the removal of the Jupiter missiles after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. However, Washington, acting by itself and within NATO, should be able to reassure Turkey of its commitment to security.

One option is to strengthen conventional forces in Turkey, which are appropriate for the immediate threats that Turkey faces. Nuclear weapons are not useful for dealing with non-state groups such as Kurdish rebels or Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS). By removing nuclear forces from Turkish soil, Trump can fulfil his rhetoric of reducing Alliance members’ dependency on the US nuclear arsenal in a manner that is acceptable for broader NATO postures. Indeed, by removing the costs of forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons, there would then be a better case for enhanced conventional forces that could more appropriately address the immediate security concerns for the Alliance in the region.

Extended Nuclear Deterrence under Trump: Why Removing Weapons from Turkey Might be Good PolicyCristina Varriale

Despite Donald Trump’s presidential election campaign rhetoric, the US still has a central role to play in international nuclear non-proliferation efforts. There is hope Trump’s defence officials and the international community will have a steadying influence on the new president.

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However, Turkey’s recent statements casting doubt on the continued use of Incirlik Air Base by allied forces for the mission in Syria have further complicated the management of any proposed removal process; such statements already suggest that there is a fracturing between the Alliance and Turkey. Nuclear weapons removal could be interpreted as a reaction to such statements, further entrenching Alliance divisions. However, taking decisions in consultation with Turkey could help to limit the damage to Washington’s relationship with Ankara, and the broader NATO alliance.

Finding Agreement with Russia Another benefit of removing the US nuclear capability in Turkey is that such an action may lead to a stronger prospect for arms’ control agreements with Russia.

Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in Eastern Ukraine, relations between Russia and the US and NATO have deteriorated. Moscow has suspended implementation of the Plutonium Disposition and Management Agreement, which committed Russia and the US to reducing their holdings of weapons grade plutonium. The Kremlin has also been accused of ‘nuclear sabre-rattling’ across NATO states and energetically pursuing nuclear weapons modernisation. The US also bears some responsibility for the situation – it too has programmes to modernise its nuclear triad, and has enforced sanctions against Moscow which have significantly

contributed to the deterioration of relations. Both states are seriously diminishing the future prospect of successful arms’ control negotiations.

It remains to be seen whether Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will have a fruitful relationship that bears mutual benefits, or whether their personalities will clash and lead to a deepening of the distrust between the two countries. Whatever the case, when Trump comes to engage with the complexities of nuclear weapons and arms control, the removal of nuclear forces from Turkey could be used as an olive branch. While this is unlikely to single-handedly result in a solution, it could be an important symbolic step by NATO to reduce tensions and kick-start further discussions on the issue.

Resurrecting the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament AgendaThe broader non-proliferation and disarmament agenda is also facing an impending crisis. A treaty on banning nuclear weapons will be negotiated this year at the UN. Although it is not clear what will be specifically included in the treaty, discussions will most likely occur without representation from nuclear weapons states and with only scant representation from those countries which benefit from the protection of nuclear alliances.

In this context, the divisions between the haves and have-nots are likely to increase – a division that the process has already further

entrenched. Unless efforts to engage are made, these divisions will likely spill over into the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process, due to start again this year, further stalling consensus-based progress in this area. The impetus behind the Ban Treaty process thus far has come from the frustrations of non-nuclear weapons states feeling rightly disgruntled at the dwindling progress in the area of disarmament, something the nuclear weapons states are mandated to work towards, in good faith, under the NPT.

Although the removal of nuclear forces from Turkey would not rectify the slow-moving disarmament progress, it could have symbolic value, signal efforts of good faith, as requested by the NPT, and demonstrate a concrete move to reduce the number of countries hosting nuclear weapons.

Removing forward-deployed US nuclear forces from Turkey could seem like a dramatic change to the NATO posture and raise questions over whether it is best to let sleeping dogs lie. However, given the potential retreat from the Alliance by Trump, as well as Ankara’s domestic issues and the negative trajectory of arms’ control and disarmament progress, the policy community should seriously consider the benefits of removing nuclear weapons from Turkey.

Cristina Varriale Research Analyst with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Team. She specialises in non-proliferation, deterrence policy and CBRN security.

A US F-15 fighter jet shortly after landing at Incirlik Air Base in Adana, Turkey, November 2015. Ankara’s recent statements casting doubt on the continued use of the air base by allied forces for the mission in Syria have further complicated the management of any proposed process for the removal of nuclear weapons from Turkey. Courtesy of Cory W Bush/Zuma Press/PA Images.