nfpa-apsei fire & security 2010 design solutions for water

NFPA-APSEI Fire & Security 2010

Design solutions for water mist in

tunnels fire protection

Fernando Díaz

B&C, Tunnels Manager

Marioff Hi-Fog S.A.

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Design solutions for water mist in tunnels fire protection

Marioff – NFPA-APSEI Fire & Security 2010. 20/10/2010

Tunnels Fire Protection

Fire in tunnels

FFFS in tunnels standards

Water mist systems in tunnels

Conclusions




Fires in tunnels



Conclusions



Tunnels in the world

• ¿Why?

Communications

Economic development

Environmental impact

LONGEST TUNNELS YEAR LENGTH

Lärdal – Norway 2000 25.510 m

Zhongnanshan - China 2007 18.040 m

S. Gotthard - Switzerland 1980 16.918 m

Somport –Huesca (Spain) 2003 8.608 m

Vielha – Lérida (Spain) 1948 5.240 m



Fire origin in trucks

61%14%

9%

16%

Engine, tires Driver place

Load Others

Fires in tunnels

• Catastrophic road tunnels fire

• Difficulties of fire in tunnels

Not confined + smoke = Spread

Higher temperatures & Heat Release Rates (HRR)

Egress difficulty

Human behavior

• Causes

Crashes

Technical failures

• Origin

• Involved combustibles

¿Hazardous goods? = WOOD!

GREAT FIRES YR. DEATHS DAMAGES

Fréjus – France 2005 2 10 km facilities

Flöfjell – Norway 2003 1 N/A

S. Gotthard- Switzerland 2001 11Severe in 930 m.

Closed for 2 months

Seljestad – Norway 2000 0 N/A

Tauern – Austria 1999 12 Closed for 3 months

Mont Blanc – France/Italy 1999 39Severes in 900 m.

Closed for 3 years




Fires in tunnels



Conclusions




PIARC past decade misconceptions

1. Water can cause explosion in petrol fires

2. There is a risk that the fire is extinguished but flammable

gases are still produced and may cause an explosion

3. Vaporized steam can hurt people

4. The efficiency is low for fires inside vehicles

5. Smoke layer destratification

6. Maintenance can be costly

7. Sprinklers are difficult to handle manually

8. Visibility is reduced




Further comments from WM point of view

1. Petrol isn’t a material which WM is not a suitable agent

2. WM+ventilation helping to tenable conditions vs. let it burn

3. Steam is created locally. Compensated by surroundings cooling

4. Purpose: Reduce HRR, fire spreading, radiation-shielding

5. WM may increase ventilation capacity reducing the smoke

generated

6. High quality materials (ss, brass,..) -> increase lifetime

7. Development of deluge, sprinklers and hybrid systems

8. Operating procedures




PIARC and NFPA 502 nowadays

Both permitted water-based FFFS in road tunnels recognizing them

suitable to:

Slow down fire development

Reverse the rate of fire growth

Prevent spreading

Mitigate the impact of fire:

Improving safety for occupants

Protecting structure and installations elements

Ease fire brigades intervention

Limit environmental pollution.




Fires in tunnels



Conclusions



Water mist systems fundamentals

Mechanisms

Cooling (LH2O = 2 MJ/kg)

Locally inertization

Radiant heat blocking

Theoretical dimensional analysis

“Absorbing 30 to 60% of the heat may be enough to cause burning to

stop. […] The concurrent effect of oxygen reduction could mean the fire

could be extinguished with only a fraction of the theoretical minimum

required for flame cooling”

It had better real-scale test

Objectives in tunnels (motorist, fire brigades and infrastructure

protection)

Temperature and HRR control and limit the spreading

Facilitate egress ↓T, ↓ HRR



Previous Remarks

Real flow needing

Most part of water is wasted

Accuracy (location) vs. efficacy (flow)

Sprinkler application

No generic guidance. Evaluate the fulfillment of

performance criteria in tunnels

Operation

Release mode. Automatic?

Is extinguishing the main objective? NO



Previous Remarks

E.g. Release procedure in Japanese tunnels

(MOLIT)

Detect

Select the zones to be released

Start the pump station

Check the situation with CCTV

Open zone valves



Initial design parameters

Length, cross section, max width and height

Slopes (longitudinal section)

Ventilation level

Fire load. Light traffic, HGVs

Zones length and simultaneity

Flux density (lpm/m3)

Total flow

Piping sections and layout



Performance Based Design I

GOAL

Protecting people

OBJECTIVE

Minimize casualties

Self-rescue

DESIGN OBJECTIVE

T < 65ºC

Radiation< 2,5 kW/m2

Visibility > 30m

[CO] < 1000 ppm, [CO2]< 3%



Performance Based Design II

GOAL

Protecting goods/infrastructure

OBJECTIVE

Minimize fire spreading to adjacent vehicles

Minimize structural damages

DESIGN OBJECTIVE

T < 300ºC (spalling)

T < 400ºC minimize damages in facilities



Performance Based Design III

GOAL

Mission

OBJECTIVE

Max shut down period < 24h

DESIGN OBJECTIVE

Max affected zone length < 100 m



Performance Based Design IV

GOAL

Environment

OBJECTIVE

Minimize contaminant emission

DESIGN OBJECTIVE

Water-soluble particles scrubbing

Minimize of total water amount

Black water containtment



Real scale fire scenarios

Tunnel: geometry, concrete

Fire load

Fire origin

Spill

Multiple crash

Overheating failure

Location

Ventilation

Vehicle Max HRR (MW) Energy(GJ)

Car 5-8 2-8

Bus 20 41

Truck 20-30 10-244

Tanker 30-300 1000

Runehamar 2003: 202 MW



Tentative WM designs. Deluge

enlaces/ANIMATIONS/HI-FOG spray head system for tunnels(300642668).wmv



Tentative WM designs. Hybrid

enlaces/ANIMATIONS/HI-FOG hybrid system for tunnels(300642664).wmv



WM systems tests I

PRELIMINARY SYSTEM CONCEPT

UPTUN. Pool fires

HRR < 28 MW

Flux density 0.4-0.7 lpm/m3



WM systems tests II

A86 SYSTEM DESIGN TEST

Hagerbach tunnel test. Light traffic

HRR < 24 MW

Flux density 0.4-0.5 lpm/m3

Deluge



WM systems tests III

M30 SYSTEM DESIGN TEST

San Pedro tunnel test. Light and HGVs

HRR < 100 MW

Flux density 0,7 lpm/m3

Deluge, hybrid and sprinklers




Fires in tunnels



Conclusions



Conclusions

• More and more, longer and deeper tunnels are being

constructed. There is a necessity to increase the safety

• Higher HRR than expected. Low likelihood but severe

consequences -> Considerable risk

• State clear and realistic design objectives

• Real-scale fire tests must be carried out

• Tested WM systems have an excellent performance being able

to suppress the fire, avoiding fire spreading, protecting people

involved, preventing tunnel to collapse and making fire brigade

intervention possible and easier



Otis

Ascensores y

escaleras

mecánicas

Carrier

Calefacción y aire

acondicionado

Pratt & Whitney

Motores de aviación

Sikorsky

Helicópteros

Hamilton Sundstrand

Sistemas industriales y

aeroespaciales

UTC Fire & Security

Seguridad y protección contra

incendios

UTC Power

Células de combustible y

producción de energía

Marioff Group

Part of United Technologies Corporation

USD 54.8 billion sales

225,600 Employees

Operating in 4,000 locations of 70 countries



Part of United Technologies Corporation

Part of UTC Fire & Security business unit

USD 5.74 billion sales

43,000 employees

Operating in 250 locations in 43 countries

Marioff Group

Otis

Elevators, scalators

Carrier

Heating, air -conditioning

Pratt & Whitney

Aircraft engines

Sikorsky

Helicopters

Hamilton Sundstrand

Aerospace, industrial

systems

UTC Fire & Security

Fire safety, security solutions

UTC Power

Power systems, fuel

cells



Thank you!

Marioff Hi-Fog, S.A.

Tlf: +34 91 641 84 00

[email protected]