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CONTENTS

Gagik Harutyunyan President of the Constitutional Court of Armenia .............................................. 7

Arthur Baghdasaryan Chair of the National Assembly of RA .................................................................. 11

Andras Baka Judge of the European Court of Human Rights ................................................. 12

Gianni Buquicchio Secretary of the Venecian Commission of the European Council .................... 15

Reports at the IX Yerevan International Conference*

Gagik Harutyunyan The Principle of the Rule of Law as a Guarantee for Constitutional Democracy (in Russian) ........................................................................................... 21

Valeriy Zorkin The Role of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in Guaranteeing the Rule of Law (in Russian) .......................................................... 35

Andras Baka Human Rights and Judiciary: European Dimensions (in English) .................................. 49

Pierre Joxe The principle of the Rule of Law in the Practice of the Constitutional Court of France(in French) ..................................................................................... 56

Francois Luchaire The Rule of Law in the Practice of the Constitutional Tribunal of Andorra (in French) ............................................................................................. 66

Jose de Sousa E.Brito The Rule of Law in the Practice of the Constitutional Court of Portugual (in French) .......................................................................................... 72

Nicolay Selivon Realization of the Principle the Rule of Law in the Practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (in Russian) ...................................................... 79

Evangelia Nika-Manoukian Judges v. Legislators: the Greek solution (in English) ....................................... 89

* The reports are presented in the order to the programme of the IX Yerevan InternationalConference.

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Alvina Gyulumyan The principle of the Rule of Law in the Case Laws of the European Court of Human Rights (in Russian) ................................................................................ . 97

Alina Yanuchenko Constitutional Parameters of the Principles of the Rule of Law (in Russian) .... 107

Lyubomir Dobrik Constitutional State in the Doctrine of the Constitutional Court of Slovak Republic (in Russian) ............................................................................................... 122

Khursheda Kamilova Guaranteeing the Main Actions of Norms of the Constitution in Accomplishment of the Constitutional Jurisdiction (in Russian) ...................... 129

Gabor Kozsokar, Ruxandra Sabareanu Necessary Institutional - Constitutional and Legislative Guarantees for Ensuring the Principle of the Rule of Law in Romania (in English) ............... 134

Eliska Wagnerova The Rule of Law State in the Practice of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic(in English) ..................................................................................... 139

Hranush Hakobyan Parliamentarism and the Establishment of Parliamentary Democracy in Armenia (in Russian) ........................................................................................... 148

Lazar Gruev Guaranteeing the Primacy of Law through the Practice of the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria (in Russian) ............................................................................... 161

Jerzy Stepien The Role of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in the Process of PoliticalTransformations and During the Pre-Accession Period (in English) ................ 169

Liliana Ingilitsova-Ristova The Principle of the Rule of Law in the Practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia (in English) .......................................................... 176

Armanas Abramavichus, Yonas Propiestis The Principle of Rule of the Constitution in the Practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania (in Russian) ................................................. 181

Ksenya KenikRealization of the Principles of Rule of Law in the Practice of Constitutional Court in the Republic of Belarus (in Russian) ..................................................... 192

Istvan Bagi The Principles of the Rule of Law in the Decisions of the Constitutional Court of Hungary (in French) ................................................................................ 205

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Summary of the Debates

Valeriy Zorkin The Closing Speech at the IX Yerevan International Conference ................... 214

Appendix

Statistical Data on the Submitted Applications and Considered Cases of the Constitutional Courts (Bodies of Constitutional Control) of Several Countries 1996-2003 .............................................................................. 224

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IS PUBLISHED ON RECOMMENDATION OF THECONFERENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL BODIESOF THE STATES OF NEW DEMOCRACY, BY THE CENTREOF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF RA

HEAD OF THE PROJECT

G.G. HARUTYUNYAN

PRESIDENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA,DOCTOR OF LAW, PROFESSOR

ISSN 1829-0124

- 2004

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NJAR - 2004

OPENING SPEECHES

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GAGIK HARUTYUNYANPresident of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia,Doctor of law, Professor

Dear participants of the International Conference!

Dear guests!

I welcome all the participants of the 9th Yerevan International Conferenceon the actual problems of constitutional justice. I thank you for findingtime to participate in the work of this forum.

The representatives from France, the Russian Federation, Portugal, Ukraine,Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary,Romania, Lithuania, Moldova, Belarus, Macedonia, Tajikistan and Armenia,

as well as judges of the European Court of Human Rights and members ofthe European Commission of the Council of Europe For DemocracyThrough Law are taking part in the 9th Yerevan International Conference.We are very glad that Mr. Gianni Buquicchio, Secretary General of theVenice Commission is present at this Conference; Mr. Buquicchio has madehuge contribution in the strengthening of the international co-operation ofconstitutional courts. We welcome Mr. Francois Luchaire, the president ofthe Constitutional Court of Andorra, the member of the VeniceCommission, and Mr. Jose de Sousa e Brito, the former member of theConstitutional Court of Portugal, who delightfully accepted the invitation toparticipate in the further discussions. Judge Andras Baka from the EuropeanCourt of Human Rights and our colleague Mrs. Alvina Gyulumyan, who wealso express our gratefulness, are also taking part in the Conference.

Let me, introduce you the other participants of our Conference: Mr. ValeryZorkin, President of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,Mr. Nikolai Selivon, President of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Mrs.Liljana Ingilizova-Ristova, President of the Constitutional Court ofMacedonia, Mrs. Vera Markova, and Mr. Mahmut Jusufi, Members of theConstitutional Court of Macedonia, Mrs. Eliska Wagnerov, Deputy ChiefJustice of the Constitutional Court of Czech Republic, Mr. Abramaviciusand Mr. Prapiestis, Judges of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania, Mr.Pierre Joxe, Member of the Constitutional Council of France, Mrs.Evangelia Nika-Manoukian, Judge of the Supreme Court of Greece, Mr.Abdulloev and Mrs. Khursheda Kamilova, Judge of the ConstitutionalCourt of Tajikistan, Mr. Lubomir Dobrik, Judge of the Constitutional Courtof Slovakia, Mr. Lasar Gruev, Professor, Judge of the Constitutional Courtof Bulgaria, Mrs. Alina Yanuchenko, Judge of the Constitutional Court ofMoldova. Mr. Istvan Baji from the Constitutional Court of Hungary repre-sented the report. Mr. Gabor Kozsokar from the Constitutional Court ofRomania and Mrs. Ruxandra Sabareanu, Mr. Stepien from theConstitutional Court of Portugal are present.

We also welcome the representative of the Venice Commission Mrs.Tatyana Mychelova, who has a great merit in the organization of thisConference.

Dear colleagues!

We are sure that such a representative participation in the work of theConference, the reports, messages and further discussions will bring theessential contribution into summarization of theoretical and methodologi-cal and law-implementing aspects, connected with interpretation andimplementation of the constitutional principle of supremacy of law. Theguaranty of the supremacy of the Constitution, consecutive realization offundamental principle of rule of law of state and basic constitutional val-

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ues in the social practice, first of all, suppose the presence of the consti-tutionally established and reliably realized guarantees of the human rightsprotection. As a rule, first of all, of the every decision constitutional courts,answer to the questions ase: to what extent human rights and freedoms areprotected and to what extent demands of concrete constitutional provisionsare taken into consideration. In the process development of there legalposition, constitutional courts face the necessity on defining clear positionson guaranteeing the supremacy of law. Summarization of the experience inthis field, development of common positions and approaches have pivotalsignificance, and first of all, for the countries of new democracy.

In my report I intend to present some theses, connected with the interpre-tation and implementation of the principle of supremacy of law by theorgans of constitutional justice. I would only like to underline, that we workwith initial material, with problem of system-forming, outlook significance,and I hope that all participants will actively take part in the debates.

I am confident that our discussions, the acknowledgement of the hugeexperience of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as the valu-able practical experience of many constitutional courts in the developmentof its doctrinal approaches toward the principle of supremacy of law willnot only have common cognitive significance, but also contribution essen-tial to the development of the theory and practice of constitutional justice.

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

Mr. Arthur Baghdasaryan, Doctor of law, President of the NationalAssembly of the Republic of Armenia, Mr. David Harutyunyan, Minister ofJustice, Mr. Henrik Danielyan, President of the Court of Cassation, Mr.Aghvan Hovsepyan, General prosecutor of the Republic of Armenia, Mr.Gagik Ghazinyan, President of the Armenian Bar Association, Dean of theLaw Faculty of the Yerevan State University, Members of theConstitutional Court, parliamentarians, Judges of Cassation, Appeal andArbitrage Courts, advocates, scientists, representatives of NGO-s, journal-ists will take part in the 9th International Yerevan Conference.

Let me again thank all of you for the participation in the work of theInternational Conference and to ask Mr. Baghdasaryan, President of theNational Assembly of the Republic of Armenia to take the floor.

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ARTUR BAGHDASARYANThe Chairman of the National Assembly of the Republic of ArmeniaDoctor of Law Sciences

Dear Gentlemen,

Dear Chairman of the International Conference,

I would like to greet the members of the IX International Conferencefrom the name of the National Assembly of Armenia and state the factthat as the result of the productive work of the Constitutional Court ofRA and the activities of the International and European organizations inYerevan, it has become a tradition to organize annual Conferences todiscuss the contemporary constitutional issues. I would also like to statethat such discussions, the exchange of experience, cooperation, disputesand discussions are of high importance and give a chance to understandthe main problems in the sphere of the constitutional law in the coun-tries of young democracies.

Dear participants,

Today the Republic of Armenia is facing constitutional reforms. This dis-cussion is more important for our country as next year we are planingto carry out constitutional reforms. So, from the point of view of theConstitution and for building the law ruled state, the rule of law isessential. I think that the discussions and the reports when later printedshall become real help for our later work.

I am sure that the work of the conference will be useful also for the otherconstitutional courts and judicial structures.

Dear colleagues,

Let me once again greet the participants of the international conferencefrom the name of the National Assembly and thank the VeniceCommission of the European Council for the aid in the organization ofthis international conference and wish you productive work.

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ANDRAS BAKAJudge of the European Court of Human Rights

Dear President, ladies and gentlemen, dear guests,

I am greatly honoured to take part in the 9th International Conference,organized by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia and theVenice Commission. I am pleased to have been invited and have theopportunity to represent the European Court of Human Rights and itsPresident on this occasion.

The European Court of Human Rights has always paid great attention toits relations with superior national courts and, in particular, supreme andconstitutional courts, like yours, Mr. President. The Strasbourg Court isan international judicial body which sets common legal standards, anddefines legal orders of contacting states, standards, which influence andshape domestic law and practice in areas such as criminal and constitu-tional law, the administration of justice in criminal, civil, and administra-tive matters, family law, property law, media law. Over the years andthrough the case law of the Court, the European Convention on HumanRights has become deeply cultivated in the legal and moral fabric of soci-ety of the Council of Europe states; and the same process is well under-vein in new member states.

From its earliest judgments the Court has recognized the subsidiary char-acter of the Convention system, which is preliminary for the nationalauthorities and particularly the national judicial authorities to secure therights, ensured in the Convention. This is, of course, the main burden ofthe supreme and constitutional courts, which the European Court sees asforming a partnership within the system of the protection, set up by theConvention. This is not only a practical necessity in the conventionalcommunity, which now extends to 45 contracting states and combines thepopulation of 800 millions; it is also necessary element inherent in thenature of international jurisdiction that applies to domestic states thatrespect the rule of law. The international judge allows some difference indecisions, made by the national domestic institutions in full compliancewith the rule of law and, although, the difference will never exclude theinternational review completely, it will call for some measure for judicialself-restrict in international level. I strongly believe, Mr. President, thatthe essential role has to be played at national level by the national supe-rior courts, like yours. That is why professional meetings, conferencessuch as the present one, are very important.

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The Convention is an international treaty, the vocation of which has tobe applied at national level by the national judges like you, your col-leges, Mr. President, not as a foreign instrument, introducing into thedomestic system, but as a part of the system.

Thank you very much for the invitation again and all the benefit to all ofus for very fruitful and useful conference.

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GIANNI BUQUICCHIOSecretary of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe

Mr President of the National Assembly,

Mr Minister of Justice,

Mr President of the Constitutional Court,Ladies and gentlemen,

On behalf of the Venice Commission I am pleased to welcome you to thisConference organised in co-operation with the Constitutional Court ofArmenia. This event is taking place in the framework of the agreementsigned between the Venice Commission and the Conference ofConstitutional Courts of Countries of Young Democracy (CCCOCYD),chaired by the Constitutional Court of Armenia as you are aware.

These conferences bring together Constitutional Courts from youngdemocracies and longer established courts. They are part of the objectivesof the Venice Commission to act as a facilitator for exchanges betweencourts by bringing them together to enable a constant flow of informationand ideas. The most important tools in this respect are the Bulletin onConstitutional case law, the database CODICES, exchanges between thecourts via the Venice Forum, and more recently, the amicus curiae opin-ions. These are opinions given by the Venice Commission upon requestfrom constitutional courts, in which it presents aspects of comparative con-stitutional law related to cases before the courts. There have already deliv-ered several opinions (which came from the courts of Albania and Georgia)and we are at the disposal of any other interested courts to develop thisinspiring practice.

We consider that exchanges between courts are not a one-way street. Ourgoal is cross-fertilisation meaning mutual inspiration between all courts.Since their creation new courts have built up an impressive stock of case-law, for ex. in topics such as the restitution of property, which can inspireolder European courts.

The Venice Commission has always promoted these exchanges betweencourts with the aim of building the common constitutional heritage basedon the principles of the Council of Europe, namely pluralistic democracy,respect for human rights and the rule of law, the topic of todays confer-ence.

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It is becoming increasingly apparent that in todays world these funda-mental pillars of our societies are not stable, like the pillars supporting the(beautiful) city of Venice. A few weeks ago, at the UNs General Assembly,Kofi Annan said: ...today the rule of law is at risk around the world. Againand again, we see fundamental laws shamelessly disregarded .. this showsour collective failure to uphold the rule of law, and instil respect for it inour fellow men and women. We all have a duty to do whatever we can torestore this respect. He went on: To do so, we must start from the prin-ciple that no one is above the law, and no one should be denied its pro-tection.

Respect for the rule of law - be it at home or internationally comesdown to sound laws and a full respect of them. On the one hand, it can beseen in a formal way - state action based on legal norms. This principlecan prevent arbitrariness on the part of the executive. It is important butnot sufficient. There is a need for a material concept of the rule of law -laws have to be founded on human dignity which implies the protection ofhuman rights.

Such a material concept of the rule of law ensures that the individual isnot subject to arbitrariness neither of the executive nor that of the legisla-tor. Constitutional Courts have a central position in ensuring that theseprinciples are met in practice.

An inevitable consequence of the respect for the principle of the rule oflaw is the respect for court decisions and in particular of decisions of theConstitutional Court, notably for their final and binding character. As wehave shown in the past, the Venice Commission remains prepared to sup-port courts which encounter difficulties with the execution of their judg-ments.

I am keen to learn from the participants how their courts have addressedthese issues and how they have contributed to our common goal, the pro-motion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Im convinced thatour Conference will further contribute to building this heritage.

Finally, I wish all of us a fruitful seminar. Thank you Mr President.

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SUMMARY

It is undeniable that for the establishment of constitutionalism the merepresence of a constitution is not enough. What society and people needis not a collection of well wishes but a working constitution. Some aspectsof this problem are considered in the report:

I. What does the international experience bare witness to?

The analysis of the international experience of constitutional justice showsthat when reviewing the majority of cases the constitutional courts comeinto contact with the fundamental constitutional principles, which forcesthem to express a certain legal position towards the object of the reviewconcerned. The consequences of a given position are not only conditionedby the real picture of the constitutional democracy and societys level oflegal comprehension; they are also conditioned by the fact that how thebody of constitutional review has perceived and interpreted the essence ofthe constitutional principle. Contemporaneously, the analysis of the con-tent of the decisions of constitutional courts shows that there is no uniformapproach toward the interpretation of such concepts as the Rule of Law,Supremacy of Law or a Rule of Law State as well as other conceptswhich have a fundamental meaning for the theory as well as the practiceof constitutional justice.

II. How is the principle of rule of law understood withinthe context of european legal doctrine?

It is generalized that at the beginning of the XX century the Europeandemocratic processes created and adopted, along with liberal economic rela-tions, a type of a liberal legal comprehension. The essence of the latter restsupon the recognition of human beings natural rights, as a high value, as adirectly applicable law and as a basis of positive legal norm. It was theunavoidable logic of the democratic developments that the guarantee of theRule of Law became the cornerstone of the European legal system.

Leaving aside the theoretical and methodological point of view, it is ofgreat importance, for the practice of constitutional justice, on how theRule of Law as a concept is recognized, understood and realized. Thefocus is made on four fundamental components. These are:

- The constitutional recognition of human dignity and rights as asupreme and inalienable value, as a directly applicable law,

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- The guarantee of those rights, which condition the meaning, con-tent and nature of application of the laws, as well as the nature ofactivities of the legislative and the executive,

- The definition of the constitutional criteria of the possible limita-tion of human rights, taking into consideration the principles ofcivic society,

- The insurance of the judiciary and institutional guarantees of thehuman rights and fundamental freedoms.

It is the contemporaneous systemic guarantee of the content and essenceof the Rule of Law, which, first and foremost, must be guaranteed by theconstitution.

III. What is the practical picture in post-communist reality?

Few generalizations stand out:

1) The states located in this region were unable to experience theliberal market economic relations which took Europe more thantwo hundred years to undergo. Most simply went from a feu-dal system to a socialist system.

2) A wholly different system of proprietary relations developed. Inthe process of privatization of the means of production by theState, the people were alienated from the power and were trans-formed into object of realization of power. The real owner ofproperty were neither the people nor the state but the authori-ty. The law was called to protect not the human being and thelatters property but that of authority.

3) The dogmatic positivist philosophy, constructed on the atheis-tic worldview, replaced the legal philosophy, which took cen-turies to form.

4) Within a single party reality, the source of law became theabsolute will of the political power. The partys supreme bodybecame the real norm-creating body which had unlimited andmisbalanced power.

It was only natural that centuries of positivist legal thought with its politi-cized and distorted manifestations, deep rooted itself in the whole regionof the former USSR and East Europe.

The unique feature of societies undergoing transformation is that theSoviet mentality often produces fertile ground for self re-generation.

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The shortest road to Europe is not the fruitless experience of leaping overcenturies or the reduction of specific values and principles to paper slo-gans but the recognition of the European values within the framework ofdomestic value system and transforming them into societys philosophi-cal property.

IV. What is the starting point for the practice of constitu-tional justice?

For a Rule of Law State, in my opinion, the starting point is the consistentrealization and protection of the norm-principles of the Constitutionenshrined in the bases of constitution order. Of pivotal importance is theneed to have a clear understanding and guarantee of the norm-principleRule of Law State. The primary principle of a Rule of Law State is thatpower of authority needs to be limited, that limit needs to be clearlydefined, and that authority cannot transcend that limit. That limit is mansinalienable rights.

Judging from the above-mentioned generalizations, the necessary andimperative conditions for the creation of a Rule of Law State in every post-Communist state are the following:

- The recognition and respect of human dignity, the guarantee ofmans fundamental rights and freedoms, and the guarantee of theRule of Law,

- The separation of powers, the implementation of checks and bal-ances, and the decentralization of the political, economic andadministrative power,

- The election of authority and the control over the latter,

- The presence of an independent judiciary,

- The guarantee of the supremacy and the stability of the Constitution.

These conditions are interrelated, and the absence or ignoring of one ofthese may cast a shadow on the presence of the others and may attest tolack of democratic process.

Regardless of what issue is being discussed by the Constitutional Court,the key to the constitutional democracy is the guarantee of the Rule of Lawand the restriction of the power of authority through law.

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SUMMARY

1. Contradictory role of decisions of the ConstitutionalCourt.

The normative acts because of the decisions of Constitutionals Court losetheir juridical power as they are acknowledged as non-constitutional. Theyhave the same sphere of activity in the time, space and circle of personsas the decision of normative body, and, thus, have the same commonmeaning as the normative acts which are not inherently law enforced tothe nature of acts of courts of general jurisdiction and arbitrage courts(decision of the Constitutional Court the Russian Federation, 16th June 1998on interpretation of separate points of Articles 125,126 and 127ofConstitution of RF). Thus, the decision of the Constitutional Court on thematter of checking of constituency of laws and other normative acts of

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high level, has normative character (obtain with normative power) and assuch acquires precedent meaning.

Some essential characteristics of the decisions of the Constitutional Courtwhich contain judicial positions liken them to the precedents. Creation ofprecedent decisions in proceedings of exercising of constitutional judica-ture is one of the basic mechanisms of judicial modernization. Especiallyin the frames of such approach, the judicial positions of ConstitutionalCourt (reflected in its decisions) can be correlated to ratio decidendi inEnglish Law.

Judicial position of the Constitutional Court, together with its precedentcharacter, has also prejudicial power for all courts. If the defined norm ofthe branch legislation is acknowledged as non constitutional, it loses thejuridical power and becomes invalid.

2. Significance of the principles and norms of InternationalLaw, judicial positions of European Court of HumanRights for practice of Constitutional Court of Russia.

Neither the Constitution nor Federal Constitutional Court law TheConstitutional Court of Federation of Russia bind Constitutional Courtto enforce other than Constitutional sources. Though in the practice ofthe Constitutional Court from its starting point an approach is confirmed,the generally accepted principles and norms of international law havebeen used as a standard in accordance with which the rights and free-doms of a person and a citizen, confirmed by Constitution, are realizedin the state.

Article 32 of Convention for protection of human rights and main freedomsthe European Court for human rights are entitled to solve all problems,concerning the interpretation and application of statements of Conventionand its protocols. That is why the legal position of the European Court stat-ed in its decisions when interpreting the statements of Convention and itsprotocols, and the precedents of European Court for Federation Russian,have general characteristics.

Federation Russian officially acknowledged the jurisdiction of theEuropean Court as binding in the interpretation and realization of thequestions concerning the Convention and its protocols. Thus follows thatRussian court shall consider the precedent practice of European Court forthe human rights in their activities.

According to legal position of the Constitutional Court recorded in theStatement (2nd of February, 1996 N: 4-P) accepted even before the ratifi-

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cation of Convention by Russia, the decisions of interstate bodies canrevise the concrete cases by the higher courts of Federation of Russiawhich authorizes the latter for retrial for changing the decisions madebefore, and also for the decisions made by higher interstate legal authori-ties.

3. Legal reforms as necessary terms of confirmation of theprinciple of rule of law.

I would assign three main tasks and at the same time trends of legalreforms: 1. Legal transformation of Russian society, 2. Transformation andstabilization of the law system, 3. Realization of severe and steady systemsof law enforcement and guaranty the access of citizens to judicial power.

For realization of this problem three main problems must be solved: 1.quality, up-to-datedness and succession of legislation; 2. non-stability oflegislation; 3. juridical personnel.

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIARY;EUROPEAN DIMENSIONS

ANDRAS BAKAJudge of the European Court

of Human Rights

Mr President, dear colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me first of all tell you once again how pleased I am to have beeninvited to speak at this conference devoted to a truly fascinating topic,The ensuring of the principle of rule of law in the practice of consti-tutional justice. You will hardly be surprised to see me tackle this sub-ject from a human rights perspective. I feel comfortable in doing so, notso much because I am firmly convinced that human rights are moreessential than ever to safeguard the principle of rule law of the newEurope. This is illustrated for instance by the fact that it is clear todaythat in order for any national human rights protection system to beentirely credible, it has to accept to expose itself to an external, inter-national control acting as an objective third party. This is why nearlyall European States have now joined the Strasbourg protection systemand accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights,thereby turning the European Convention on Human Rights into anessential component of modern-day European identity. For the samereason the European Union is also in the process of acceding to theConvention.

However, human rights do not only have a founding role in the waywhich I just mentioned. They also appear to be the driving force behindsome recent developments which have a lasting impact on our Europeanunderstanding of law and justice. One should recall, in this respect, thatthe Convention was one of the first mechanisms to confer legal person-ality in international law on the private individual. And despite all thedifficulties currently encountered in Strasbourg in trying to preserve theefficiency of the system against the flood of applications, the Strasbourg-style right of individual petition is still generally perceived as an achieve-ment in international law which seems to serve as an example to manyother international human rights protection mechanisms, like those oper-ating in the framework of the United Nations or of the AmericanConvention on Human Rights.

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50 Over the years, the Strasbourg case-law has contributed to increase theefficiency of the Convention protection system, one of the latest develop-ments in this respect being the one concerning the States obligation toexecute the Courts judgments, which recently occurred in the Courtsjudgment of 8 April 2004 in the case of Assanidze v. Georgia. Up until veryrecently, the Court had indeed always stressed that it could not order anymeasures to be taken by a State for the purpose of redressing a violation.In line with the subsidiary nature of the Convention, any respondent Stateremained free to choose the means by which it would discharge its legalobligation to execute the Courts judgment. Under Article 41 of theConvention the Court could, by way of just satisfaction, only awardfinancial compensation for damage suffered by applicants.

In the case of Assanidze, however, the Court took a further step towardsstrengthening the efficiency of the Strasbourg system. The applicant was aperson who, despite being acquitted by the Supreme Court of Georgia,nonetheless remained in the custody of the local Ajarian authorities. Thecentral Georgian authorities had taken all the procedural steps possibleunder domestic law to secure compliance with the judgment acquitting theapplicant, they had sought to resolve the dispute by various politicalmeans and had repeatedly urged the Ajarian authorities to release theapplicant, but to no avail. After finding that the applicant had been heldarbitrarily in breach of Article 5 1 of the Convention, the Court forthe first time in its history held in the operative part of its judgmentthat it was for the Georgian State to secure the applicants release at theearliest possible date. Actually, the applicant was released from his jail inAjaria on the very day after the delivery of the Courts judgment.

* * *

The result of these developments today is a splendid institutional and pro-cedural framework with a considerable impact on the every-day-life ofaround 800 million potential applicants and a Court having to address anever wider range of situations and issues. What is really striking in thisrespect is the capacity of the European Convention on Human Rights toprovide answers to them out of only a handful of substantive provisions.That is undoubtedly the best testimony to the Conventions dynamism andastonishing topicality, qualities that enable it to shed light on virtually allaspects of modern society. Last year too the Court had to deal with issuesas new and varied as homosexual couples, the right to give birth anony-mously and noise pollution. Even in spheres more traditionally within theConventions domain, 2003 has been marked by what could in many casesbe described as cutting edge developments, such as those concerning theA

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scope of the presumption of innocence or the extent of the States positiveobligations.

To illustrate what I am talking about, I have selected a judgment whichreflects the role played by the Court. This is the Refah Partisi (the WelfareParty) and Others v. Turkey1 case where the judgement was delivered on13 February 2003.

This is a unanimous Grand Chamber judgment and is one of a series ofjudgments over the past few years in which the Court has sought to definethe bases of the democratic system on which the Convention is founded,an endeavour which is truly relevant to the subject of our meeting today.Thus in 1998, in the Turkish Communist Party judgment, the Court hadfound that democracy appeared to be the sole political model contemplat-ed by the Convention and, consequently, the only one that was compati-ble with it. But this raised the question of what that concept means.

Paradoxically, although most people profess their commitment to democ-racy, it is in many ways an imprecise notion with an apparent weaknessthat is capable of causing it to buckle under pressure and even, as historyshows, to do away with itself. The reason for this is that, by definition,democracy seeks to satisfy the aspirations of the greatest number. Suchaspirations are, however, often changeable and even contradictory.

It is in this domain that the Court, aided by the pan-European consensusprovided by the Convention, has a role to play in identifying the con-stituent elements of democracy and in reminding everyone of the minimumessential requirements of a political system if human rights within themeaning of the Convention are to be protected. The Court has in the pastapplied itself to establishing the basic principles of the rule of law, the roleof political parties, and the limits on freedom of political expression andparliamentary immunity. In the Refah Partisi judgment, it carried out athorough examination of the relationship between the Convention, democ-racy, political parties and religion. The case concerned the dissolution, bythe Turkish Constitutional Court, of a political party, the Welfare Party,on the grounds that it wanted to introduce sharia law and a theocraticregime. A Grand Chamber of the Court found unanimously that there hadbeen no violation of Article 11 of the Convention, which protects the free-dom of association. It seems to me that the judgment provides some ele-ments of an answer to the question which we have raised today concern-ing the rule of law reuirements of the New Europe.

In its judgment, the Court first noted that freedom of thought, of religion,of expression and of association as guaranteed by the Convention could

511 Nos. 41340/98 et seq.

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not deprive the authorities of a State in which an association, through itsactivities, jeopardised that States institutions, of the right to protect thoseinstitutions. It necessarily followed that a political party whose leadersincited to violence or put forward a policy which failed to respect democ-racy or which was aimed at the destruction of democracy and the floutingof the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy, could not lay claimto the Conventions protection against penalties imposed on thosegrounds. Such penalties could even, where there was a sufficiently estab-lished and imminent danger for democracy, take the form of preventiveintervention.

Noting that the Welfare Party had pledged to set up a regime based onsharia law, the Court found that sharia was incompatible with the funda-mental principles of democracy as set forth in the Convention. It consid-ered that sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laiddown by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as pluralism inthe political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have noplace in it. According to the Court, it was difficult to declare ones respectfor democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting aregime based on sharia, which clearly diverged from Convention values,particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its ruleson the legal status of women and the way it intervened in all spheres ofprivate and public life in accordance with religious precepts.

* * *

This brings me to the question of the future, of the role of human rights,and of the European Convention in particular, in international andEuropean law in the years to come. In this field coherence and legal cer-tainty will be one of the major challenges in several respects.

Perhaps we might agree that the significance of human rights can hardlybe expected to drop in the future. What we can expect, however, is a grow-ing complexity in social and legal relations. Today, no less than three dif-ferent types of legal systems, each of them with their own set of funda-mental rights, can be identified on the European continent: the nationallegal systems, the EU law system and the Convention system. These legalsystems coexist but also overlap each other, to the effect that the same per-sons can, at the same time, be the subject of two or three of them operat-ing in parallel. Hence the risk of confusion.

I am of course not calling into question the coexistence of different legalsystems on our continent, with their own set of fundamental rights. I ameven less denying the legitimacy of such coexistence. But I think that eachlegal system should be based on a coherent set of fundamental rights.

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We should therefore, more than in the past, make efforts so as to ensurelegal certainty and avoid confusion among our citizens. We have to ensurethat when we are talking about the same rights, they are given the samecontent, that they mean the same thing in all legal systems coexisting onthe continent. This is no plea for a uniform, but for a harmonized approach,the case-law of the Strasbourg Court being the best evidence that harmo-ny does not imply uniformity.

Starting from this premise, we should be able to ensure coherence andlegal certainty between all coexisting sources of fundamental rights on thecontinent and to build up a European Constitutional Area, which wouldgive its full sense to the very notion of fundamental rights and, in fact,would represent nothing else than a modern, European form of implemen-tation of what is and what should be a pluralistic democracy.

* * *

Now let me look more specifically at the future agenda of our Court.Should we continually expand the reach of our case-law? Some wouldflatly say yes. There are always some individuals, academics, non-gov-ernmental organisations or other groups who would like us to embracetheir political, economic, social or other agenda and do a lot more. Inshort, they believe in the old American advertising slogan that more isbetter.

I would respond in five ways. Firstly, our Court has an evaluative case-law.It has branched out in various ways. And it continues to do so. But it doesso step by step, in a prudent, gradual way. Courts should not embracepolitical agendas lock, stock and barrel. It is for the people and the par-liaments to make political choices.

Secondly, it would not help us much to say that more human rights arebetter. We have for instance, the case of Princess Caroline of Monaco.She wanted our Court to say that, even if she is a public figure, she stillhas rights of privacy. Well if our Court gives the press more rights, it willgive the Princess less rights. If the Court gives the Princess more rights, itwill give the press less rights. We constantly balance various public andprivate interests against each other. In many respects, it does not helpmuch to claim that more is better. We would have to ask more ofwhat?

Thirdly, we are a Court for 45 vastly different states. Rather than trying tocater to special interest groups or persons in specific countries, we shouldthink of the whole Europe-wide context. And this context is one of sub-sidiarity, where national courts have a very important role to play.

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Fourthly, I will not dwell long on our workload problems. As I indicatedalready, they will not be entirely resolved by the 14th Additional Protocol,although the Protocol is certainly a step in the right direction. So, to putit succinctly, we cannot do everything. There is definitely a limit to newtasks that should be assigned to us as long as the system is not changedmore radically.

Fifthly, what matters in my view, perhaps even more than newly formu-lated and invented rights is to turn the existing rights into reality. Thethe-law-in-the-Convention and the law-in-action should become thesame in reality. To work on this endeavour is a rewarding task. It is aprivilege (although it is also a huge responsibility) to be sitting on ourCourt at this moment in time. I very much hope that you will all wantto contribute to this ongoing process. My Europe is not one of out-dated hegemonies and quarrels of the past. My Europe is a continentof legitimate and inspiring diversity, of 41 languages in which com-plaints can be brought to our Court, of wonderful cultural riches, of con-stant new challenges and discoveries. It is also a continent of humanrights.

Thank you.

- , .

, , , : 1998 - locus standi; ; , .

- . - , 8 2004.

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56 LE PRINCIPE DE LA PRIMAUT DU DROIT DANSLA PRATIQUE DU CONSEIL

CONSTITUTIONNEL FRANAIS:LEXEMPLE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL

PIERRE JOXEMembre du Conseil constitutionnel de France

Le 25 mars 1957, Rome, sur le Capitole, tait sign le trait crant la Communautconomique europenne (CEE). Dans deux semaines, le 29 octobre 2004, dans lamme salle, sera sign le trait tablissant une Constitution pour lEurope.

En 1958, plus exactement le 4 octobre 1958, la Constitution franaise crait le Conseilconstitutionnel. En novembre 2004, le Conseil constitutionnel sera probablementappel se prononcer sur la conformit ou non la Constitution franaise du traittablissant une Constitution pour lEurope.

Prs dun demi-sicle dexprience europenne et constitutionnelle me donne locca-sion de faire le point, de manire gnrale, sur la faon dont le Conseil constitutionnelfranais respecte le principe de la primaut du droit, pour ce qui touche au droit inter-national.

Jillustrerai ensuite cette prsentation par une jurisprudence rcente du Conseil consti-tutionnel en matire de lois transposant une directive communautaire.

Jai prfr aborder un sujet dactualit, qui concerne plusieurs cours europennes,plutt que de me livrer une analyse globale du principe de la primaut du droit dansla jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel.

I. Le principe de primaut du droit dans les relations entre leConseil constitutionnel franais et le droit international

Le Conseil constitutionnel ne dispose pas dune comptence gnrale comme lesCours suprmes anglo-saxonnes. Les domaines dans lesquels il peut intervenir sontlimitativement fixs par la Constitution. Cest ainsi, par exemple, quil ne sest estimcomptent, en 1962, que pour contrler les lois votes par le Parlement et non pointcelles qui, adoptes par le Peuple la suite dun rfrendum, constituent lexpressiondirecte de la souverainet nationale1.

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EDe plus, il ne peut tre saisi que par des instances politiques. Lorsque cest le cas:

- il consacre et fait respecter la primaut de la Constitution sur les traits (A);

- mais il refuse de mettre en cause la constitutionnalit dun trait djrgulirement ratifi (B);

- enfin, il consacre la primaut des traits sur les lois (C).

A. Lorsquil est saisi, le Conseil constitutionnel consacre et fait respecter la primaut de la Constitution sur les traits

La Constitution est la norme fondamentale qui dtermine elle-mme la valeur desautres normes juridiques. Cest pour cette raison quun trait contraire la Constitutionne peut pas tre ratifi sans rvision de la Constitution.

En ce qui concerne la procdure, le Conseil constitutionnel peut tre saisi, titre fac-ultatif, de deux faons:

- soit avant la loi autorisant la ratification du trait par diverses autorits poli-tiques (Prsident de la Rpublique, Premier Ministre, Prsident delAssemble Nationale, Prsident du Snat, soixante dputs ou soixantesnateurs): le Conseil constitutionnel doit alors dire, sur le fondement de lar-ticle 54 de la Constitution, si le trait est conforme la Constitution; sil nelest pas, il faut modifier la Constitution avant de pouvoir le ratifier; cestdans ce cadre que le Conseil constitutionnel devrait tre saisi dans quelquessemaines du trait tablissant une constitution pour lUnion europenne;

- soit entre le vote de la loi autorisant la ratification et sa promulgation, par lesmmes autorits sur le fondement de larticle 61; si le trait nest pas con-forme la Constitution, le Conseil constitutionnel censure la loi autorisant laratification;

Pour exercer son contrle, le Conseil constitutionnel suit le raisonnement suivant:

- un transfert de comptences au profit dune organisation supranationale nestpas, par lui-mme, inconstitutionnel;

- mais il peut ltre, sil porte atteinte aux conditions essentielles dexercice dela souverainet nationale.

Reste distinguer ce qui est essentiel de ce qui ne lest pas. Il est possible cet gardde tirer les enseignements des dcisions Maastricht I 2 (1992) et Amsterdam3 (1997) en

2 Dcision n 92-308 DC du 9 avril 1992, Trait sur lUnion europenne, Rec. p. 553 Dcision n 97-394 DC du 31 dcembre 1997, Trait dAmsterdam modifiant le trait sur lUnion

europenne, les traits instituant les communauts europennes et certains actes connexes, Rec. p. 344

58 dgageant les trois critres qui permettent dapprcier le degr datteinte la sou-verainet nationale:

1) transfert de comptence dans un domaine rgalien;

2) ampleur des transferts consentis en distinguant labandon de comptences de la simple ouverture dune matire lexercice de com-ptences partages;

3) procdures de dessaisissement et modalits dexercice de la comptencetransfre prvues par le trait. A cet gard, linfluence que conserve lesreprsentants de la France dans le processus dcisionnel europen estdcisive: la situation est bien sr radicalement diffrente selon que letrait prvoit le maintien du vote lunanimit du Conseil des ministreseuropen ou le passage au vote la majorit qualifie.

B. Toutefois, le Conseil constitutionnel refuse de mettre en causela constitutionnalit dun trait dj rgulirement ratifi

Lorsque le Conseil constitutionnel est saisi de la conformit la Constitution duntrait sur le fondement de larticle 54 de la Constitution, il refuse dexaminer les dis-positions de ce trait qui simposent dj la France. Pour cela, il se fonde sur le qua-torzime alina du prambule de la Constitution de 1946, auquel se rfre le prambulede la Constitution de 1958, et qui proclame que la Rpublique franaise se conformeaux rgles du droit public international. Au nombre de ces rgles, il range la rglePacta sunt servanda qui implique que tout trait en vigueur lie les parties et doit treexcut par elles de bonne foi 4. On retrouve encore ici lexigence de scuritjuridique.

Ce principe dimmunit constitutionnelle des traits ratifis nempche pas, bienentendu, dexaminer la constitutionnalit dun trait compte tenu des engagementsantrieurement souscrits, en particulier pour ce qui concerne le respect des condi-tions essentielles dexercice de la souverainet nationale. En effet, si les prc-dentes limitations de souverainet sont incontestables, une nouvelle limitation,venant sajouter aux prcdentes, pourrait se rvler contraire la Constitution. Ilsagirait en pareil cas, pour utiliser une expression familire, de la goutte deau quifait dborder le vase.

C. Enfin, le Conseil constitutionnel consacre la primaut des traits sur les lois

La hirarchie entre les traits et les lois est fixe, au bnfice des premiers, par larti-cle 55 de la Constitution qui dispose que: Les traits ou accords rgulir ement rati-4 Dcision n 92-308 DC du 9 avril 1992, Trait sur lUnion europenne, Rec. p. 55.PI

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fis ou approuvs ont, ds leur publication, une autorit suprieure celle des lois,sous rserve, pour chaque accord ou trait, de son application par lautre partie .

En se fondant sur cet article, le Conseil constitutionnel aurait pu juger que, ds lors queles traits sont suprieurs la loi, une loi qui ne respecte pas un trait ne respecte paslarticle 55 de la Constitution. Ce nest pourtant pas ce quil a fait. En 19755, il a refusde contrler la compatibilit dune loi sur linterruption volontaire de grossesse avec ledroit la vie proclam par larticle 2 de la Convention europenne des droits delhomme. Toutefois, ce refus ne crait pas un vide juridique: il invitait les juridictionsordinaires carter les dispositions lgislatives contraires aux engagements interna-tionaux.

La Cour de cassation en a tir les consquences immdiatement en acceptant dex-ercer ce contrle. Il sagit de sa dcision du 24 mai 1975 (Cafs Jacques Vabre), con-cernant des droits de douane. Le Conseil dEtat la suivra, mais presque quinze ansaprs, pour faire prvaloir un trait sur une loi mme postrieure: il sagit de larrtNicolo du 20 octobre 1989, relatif llection du parlement europen dans les terri-toires doutre-mer.

Ce partage de comptences sexplique par la nature du contrle exerc par le Conseilconstitutionnel et peut se justifier par la recherche dune plus grande scurit juridique.

Tout dabord, le Conseil exerce un contrle a priori et abstrait cest--dire aprsladoption de la loi par le Parlement et avant sa promulgation, indpendamment de toutlitige concret. De plus, ce contrle nest que facultatif ds lors que le Conseil ne peuttre saisi que par des autorits politiques. Il apparat plus efficace et plus pertinent deconfier au juge ordinaire le soin de veiller au respect au coup par coup de larti-cle 55. En effet, lorsquil doit confronter une situation de droit ou de fait avec une con-vention internationale, il le fait de faon concrte au regard dune seule convention. Sile Conseil constitutionnel devait faire ce contrle de faon abstraite et pralable, ilserait confront plusieurs milliers de conventions internationales dj ratifies par laFrance.

Ensuite, multiplier les juges et les mettre en concurrence sur un mme sujet est un fac-teur dinscurit juridique. Jy reviendrais plus loin.

On peut retenir de tout cela quen droit franais, la primaut des conventions interna-tionales sur les lois est assure, en cas de litige, par le juge de droit commun.

II. Une illustration rcente : la spcificit du dr oit commu-nautaire driv

La question des rapports entre droit interne et droit international est donc pose delongue date au Conseil constitutionnel. Pourtant, sa jurisprudence a encore volurcemment de faon notable: le 10 juin dernier, dans une dcision importante (n 2004-

5 Dcision n 74-54 DC du 15 janvier 1975, loi relative linterruption volontaire de la grossesse, Recueil, p. 19

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60 496 DC), il a considr que le droit communautaire driv devait faire lobjet duntraitement particulier, sans pour autant revenir sur le principe de la primaut de laConstitution.

A. Le Conseil constitutionnel juge que le droit communautaire driv doit faire lobjet dun traitement particulier

Cette dcision a t rendue propos dune loi pour la confiance dans lconomienumrique qui consacrait, en application dune directive communautaire du 8 juin20006, un droit spcifique pour la communication sur Internet. Les parlementaires delopposition considraient que le nouveau rgime de responsabilit auquel le lgisla-teur avait soumis les informations stockes sur les sites Internet tait incompatible avecla libert de communication, les droits de la dfense et le droit un procs quitable.

Lexistence mme de ces griefs posait un problme redoutable car le texte de loi que leConseil devait examiner tait strictement identique celui de la directive en applica-tion de laquelle il avait t adopt. Dans ces conditions, le Conseil tait conduit seposer les questions suivantes: peut-il se prononcer sur la conformit la Constitutiondune disposition lgislative qui reprend strictement les termes dune directive com-munautaire inconditionnelle et prcise? Un tel contrle ne reviendrait-il pas, indirecte-ment, se prononcer sur la conformit la Constitution de la directive elle-mme?Dans lhypothse o il censurerait une disposition lgislative tirant les consquencesncessaires dune directive, ne ferait-il pas obstacle sa transposition en temps utile?

Le Conseil aurait pu esquiver ces questions. Il ne la pas voulu: il a jug, au contraire,que, de faon gnrale, lorsquune directive fait cran entre la loi et la Constitution, ilne lui appartient pas dexaminer des griefs qui, indirectement, sont adresss au textecommunautaire. Quel a t son raisonnement?

1) Le Conseil a tout dabord consacr, en se fondant sur larticle 88-1 de laConstitution7, la reconnaissance par la France dun ordre juridique com-munautaire distinct de lordre juridique interne comme de lordrejuridique international. Dans ce cadre spcifique, il a fait de la transposi-tion dune directive une obligation non seulement conventionnelle maisgalement constitutionnelle.

2) Sur ces fondements, il a considr quun acte de droit driv ne peutavoir quun seul juge, qui est la Cour de justice des Communautseuropennes appele devenir, peut-tre, Cour des Justices de lUnionEuropenne: le consentement donn par les Etats membres linstaura-

6 Directive n 2000/31/CE, relative au commerce lectronique7 Aux termes duquel: La Rpublique participe aux Communauts europennes et lUnion europenne,

constitues dEtats qui ont choisi librement, en vertu des traits qui les ont institues, dexercer en commun cer-taines de leurs comptences.P

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tion dun ordre juridique communautaire autonome contient lacceptationdu fait que le contentieux des actes communautaires suivra des rgles pro-pres.

3) Les conditions dans lesquelles le Conseil constitutionnel exerce son con-trle ne lui permettent pas de saisir la Cour de justice de Luxembourg titre prjudiciel. Ds lors, il a estim quil ntait pas comptent pour seprononcer sur des dispositions lgislatives qui se bornent tirer les con-squences ncessaires dune directive prcise et inconditionnelle, carexaminer une telle loi reviendrait se prononcer sur la directive elle-mme.

4) Constatant que les dispositions qui lui taient soumises dcalquaientmot pour mot une directive, il a jug quil ntait pas comptent pourexaminer les griefs soulevs par les requrants 8.

B. Le Conseil constitutionnel ne revient pas pour autant sur le principe de la primaut de la Constitution

Il convient, toutefois, de complter, voire de temprer, cette prsentation en insistantsur les deux lments suivants :

1) La solution adopte le 10 juin 2004 ne sapplique quaux dispositionsinconditionnelles et prcises dune directive, cest--dire celles qui sontdirectement applicables en droit interne et qui ne laissent pas de marge demanuvre au stade de la transposition. Son champ dapplication est donccirconscrit; dans les autres cas, le Conseil conserve toute sa comptence.

2) Surtout, il serait impropre de commenter cette dcision sur le terrain de lahirarchie des normes en considrant quelle place la norme communau-taire au-dessus de la norme constitutionnelle. Certes, une telle lecture iraitdans le sens de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de Luxembourg, quidnie aux juridictions nationales, y compris constitutionnelles, le pouvoirde dclarer invalides des actes de droit driv. Mais elle ne correspondpas ce qui a t jug par le Conseil. Celui-ci a rappel, au contraire, quecest la Constitution qui donne sa force aux traits et au droit driv. LaConstitution ne peut hisser un autre droit au-dessus delle.

Par ailleurs, il a amnag une soupape de scurit: Je cite la dcision du 10 juin: sila transposition en droit interne dune directive communautaire rsulte dune exi-

61

8 Ce raisonnement a t conscutivement appliqu trois reprises dans les semaines suivantes, propos de la loirelative aux communications lectroniques et aux services de communication audiovisuelle (dcision n 2004-497 DC du 1er juillet 2004, cons. 18 et 19), de la loi relative la biothique (dcision n 2004-498 DC du29 juillet 2004, cons. 4 7) et de la loi relative la protection des personnes physiques lgard des traitementsde donnes caractre personnel (dcision n 2004-499 DC du 29 juillet 2004, cons. 7 et 8).

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gence constitutionnelle et sil nappartient quau juge communautaire de la contrler;une disposition expresse contraire de la Constitution pourrait, le cas chant, faireobstacle cette transposition. Or, la simple mention dune disposition de cette natureheurte la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice.

Cette notion de disposition expresse de la Constitution a troubl la doctrine. LeConseil a cependant prcis son contenu dans des dcisions postrieures, notammentle 29 juillet propos de la loi relative la biothique: une disposition expresse est unenorme propre la France, cest--dire sans quivalent dans le catalogue communau-taire des droits fondamentaux et principes gnraux du droit, les principes communsaux Etats membres relevant du juge communautaire. Des exemples ont t cits: la for-mule figurant larticle 6 de la Dclaration des droits de lhomme de 1789 concernantle principe dgal accs aux emplois publics, le principe de la parit homme/femme quirsulte de la modification, en 1999, de larticle 3 de la Constitution de 1958 ou bien srle principe de lacit de la Rpublique nonc son article 1er.

En toute hypothse, cette soupape montre que le Conseil sest dabord situ,comme je lavais laiss entendre dans la premire partie de mon intervention, sur le ter-rain de la scurit juridique et de la comptence juridictionnelle.

Il a affirm que, dans lordre communautaire, il ne peut y avoir quun seul juge, lesprrogatives de la Cour de justice devant tre respectes.

Mais il a aussi estim quil devait toujours y avoir un juge, ce qui justifie quilretrouve sa comptence lorsquune norme est propre lordre juridique franais.

* * *

La dcision du 10 juin 2004 soulve sans doute des questions. En particulier, certains sedemandent si elle ne pourrait pas conduire le Conseil oprer, une rupture au moins par-tielle avec sa jurisprudence de 1975 selon laquelle, comme on la vu, il ne contrle pasla conventionnalit des lois dans le cadre du contrle de constitutionnalit rupture quipourrait le conduire, terme, se prononcer sur les transpositions elles-mmes. Laquestion reste ouverte: la seule chose certaine... cest quelle nest pas tranche.

Mais ce stade, il est difficile de ne pas voquer de nouveau le trait tablissant uneConstitution pour lEurope, equi provoque dj bien des dbats dans notre pays Eneffet, son article I-6proclame, de faon dsormais crite et non plus seulement jurispru-dentielle, que: La Constitution et le droit adopt par les institutions de lUnion danslexercice des comptences qui lui sont attribues ont la primaut sur le droit des Etatsmembres. Ds lors, une disposition constitutionnelle, mme expresse et spcifique,pourra-t-elle encore faire obstacle, demain, la transposition dune loi-cadre (appel-lation nouvelle des directives)?

Il appartiendra au Conseil constitutionnel de rpondre cette question, et beaucoupdautres sagissant du trait constitutionnel lui-mme...

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66 ANDORRE ET SON TRIBUNALCONSTITUTIONNEL

FRANOIS LUCHAIREAncien Prsident

du Tribunal constitutionel dAndorre

Introduction

Andorre Etat souverain situ dans les Pyrnes avec une frontire espagnole et unefrontire franaise prsente deux particularits.

En premier lieu Andorre, membre de lONU et du Conseil de lEurope compte prs de70.000 habitants mais seulement 20.000 ont la nationalit andorrane alors quy rsidentprs de 30.000 Espagnols, 7.000 Portugais et 4.500 Franais.

En second lieu Andorre a deux chefs dEtats, deux co-princes, lun est Paris cest lePrsident de la Rpublique franaise, lautre est lEvque dUrgel, petite localitespagnole 10 km dAndorre.

Le Conseil dEtat franais a toujours considr que lorsque le Prsident de laRpublique agissait en tant que co-prince dAndorre il tait une autorit trangre; sesactes navaient pas besoin dtre contresigns par les ministres franais et ntaient passusceptibles de recours devant le Conseil dEtat.

Depuis quAndorre dispose dune Constitution et donc de sa pleine souverainet, cest dire depuis 1993, ses deux co-princes ne dirigent pas le pays qui lit un parlement lgis-lateur, cest le Conseil gnral; Andorre dispose dun chef de Gouvernement lu par leConseil gnral et responsable devant lui.

Les deux co-princes ont donc un rle honorifique et de reprsentation comparable celui de la reine dAngleterre ou du roi dEspagne.

Ils ont cependant une attribution que nont pas la reine dAngleterre ou le roidEspagne; chacun deux peut saisir le Tribunal constitutionnel.

Composition du Tribunal constitutionnel

Ce tribunal dont jai t membre pendant six ans et que jai prsid pendant deux ansest rgi par la Constitution et par une loi dite qualifie (cest le titre donn aux loisles plus importantes) du 3 septembre 1993 modifie le 22 avril 1999.

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le Conseil gnral; chacun des co-princes dsigne un autre membre. Ils peuvent ne pastre andorrans; quand jtais membre du Tribunal il y avait un Andorran dailleursnomm par le Prsident de la Rpublique franaise; maintenant il ny en a plus car toutjuriste andorran de haute qualit ne pouvant tre la fois avocat et membre duTribunal, prfrera rester avocat. Il y a donc aujourdhui deux Franais et deuxEspagnols qui sont professeurs de droit dans leur pays respectif.

Les premires nominations ont t faites pour deux, quatre, six et huit ans ce qui a per-mis par la suite un renouvellement partiel des membres qui sont ensuite nomms pourhuit ans.

Quatre juges cela peut conduire a un partage gal des voix. Qui aura alors une voixprpondrante? Ce ne peut tre le prsident car la nomination la prsidence se faittous les deux ans tour de rle entre les membres; le prsident na donc aucune autoritsur les autres membres. Une solution originale a donc t trouve : elle consiste don-ner une voix prpondrante dans chaque affaire au rapporteur car cest lui qui connatle mieux le dossier; les rapporteurs se succdent tour de rle pour chaque affaire.

Attributions du Tribunal

Il est linterprte suprme de la Constitution; il sige en tant quorgane juridictionnelet ses dcisions simposent au pouvoir public et aux personnes prives.

Trois catgories de personnes peuvent le saisir.

1) Ce sont dabord des personnes publiques: un co-prince, le chef du Gouvernement,1/5e des membres du Conseil gnral, ou encore trois communes (Andorre en possdesept); le recours peut tre form contre une loi ou un dcret pris en vertu dune dl-gation lgislative ou encore le rglement du Conseil gnral. Au lieu dun recours con-tre le texte il peut tre saisi dune demande davis pralable avant la publication dutexte.

Il peut aussi tre saisi dune demande davis sur la constitutionnalit dun trait inter-national; sil estime que ce trait est contraire la Constitution Andorre ne peut le rat-ifier que si la Constitution est rvise. Le cas ne sest jamais produit.

Enfin il peut tre saisi par lune des autorits cites en cas de conflits de comptenceentre les co-princes, le Conseil gnral, le Gouvernement, les communes et le Conseilsuprieur de la justice.

2) Cest ensuite un tribunal qui prouve un doute raisonnable sur une loi ou un dcretpris en vertu dune dlgation lgislative; il peut en effet saisir le Tribunal constitu-tionnel dune question prjudicielle pour lui demander de se prononcer sur cette con-stitutionnalit.