Nicanor NACAR vs JAPITANAJapitana filed the complaint in CivilCaseNo. 65ClaimAgainst theEstateof theLate Isabelo Nacar including an allegation"that defendant are sic! about to removeand dispose the above"named propert#sevencarabaos! $ithintent todefraudJapitanaand considering that %r.Japitanahadgivensecurit#accordingtothe&ulesof Court' JudgeNistal issuedthe order commanding the provincialsheriff toattachtheseven(! headsofcattle in the possession of petitionerNicanor Nacar. Nicanor Nacar filed a motion to dismiss' todissolve $rit of preliminar# attachment'and to order the return of the carabaosJapitana filed an opposition to this motion$hile intervenor Antonio )oloricon filed acomplaint in intervention asserting that he$astheo$nerof theattachedcarabaosandthat thecertificatesof o$nershipoflarge cattle $ere in his name.*he respondent Judge denied the motiontodismissprompting%r.Nacar togotothe +upreme CourtIn a resolution' *he respondents $ereen,oined from further enforcing the $rit ofattachment and to return the sei-edcarabaos. *he ,udge $as restrained fromfurther proceeding $ith Civil Case No. 65.The court found the petitionmeritoriousIn his motion to dismiss' petitioner raisedthe issue of lac. of ,urisdiction andabsence of a cause of action.%r.Nacar averredthat theindebtednessmentioned in the complaint $as alleged tohavebeenincurredb#thelateIsabeloNacar and not b# NicanorNacar.therefore' no cause of actionagainst him.Ratio:/nder the circumstances of this case'respondent Japitana has no cause ofaction against petitioner Nacar.A cause of action is an act or omission ofone part# in violation of the legalright ofthe other. Its essential elements are'namel#0 1! the e2istence of a legal right inthe plaintiff' 3! a correlative legal dut# inthe defendant' and 4! an act or omissionof thedefendant inviolationof plaintiff5sright $ith conse6uentialin,ur# or damageto the plaintiff for $hich he ma# maintainan action for the recover# of damages orother appropriate relief.although respondent Japitana ma# have alegal right to recover an indebtedness duehim' petitioner Nicanor Nacar has nocorrelativelegal dut#topa#thedebt forthe simple reason that there is nothing inthe complaint to sho$ that he incurred thedebt or had an#thing to do $ith thecreation of the liabilit#. As far as the debtis concerned' there is no allegation orsho$ingthat thepetitioner hadactedinviolation of %r. Japitana5s rights $ithconse6uential in,ur# or damage to thelatter as$ouldcreateacauseof actionagainst the former.*hismatter'ho$ever'isonl#ancillar#tothe main action.evenassumingthat respondent Japitanahadalegal right tothecarabaos$hich$ere in the possession of petitioner Nacar'the proper procedure $ould not be to filean action for the recover# of theoutstanding debts of the late IsabeloNacar against his stepfather' the petitionerNacar as defendantAppropriate actions for the enforcement ordefense of rights must be ta.en inaccordance $ith procedural rules andcannot be left to the $hims or caprices oflitigants. It cannot even be left to theuntrammeleddiscretionof thecourts of,ustice$ithout sacrificing uniformit# ande6ualit#intheapplicationandeffectivit#thereof.G.R. No. 4724GREGORIA MONTAANO, plaintiff-appellant,vs.SILVESTRE SUESA, defendant-appellee.Mariano Lim for appellant.Benito Gimenez-Zboli for appellee. MAPA, J.:Contrary to the claims of the appellant as argued at length in her brief, the evidence presented in this case can not be reviewed by this court. She intervened and filed a complaint alleging that shewas the owner of two parcels of land that had been attached as being the property of Catalino Montaano, by virtue of an order of execution issued in an action brought against him by the defendant herein in an action brought against him by the defendant herein, Silvestre Suesa. The appellant was defeated in the first instance, and excepted to the judgment, moving later on for a new trial on the ground that the said judgment was contrary to the weight of the evidence adduced in the case. Her motion for a new trial was presented on January 20, 1908, andon the 31st of the same month the bill of exceptions which has been submitted to this court was filed. No ruling whatever appears to have been made on said motion, consequently noprovision was made to except thereto in the event it were overruled. The motion not being overruled and duly excepted to, this court can not review the evidence in the case; it can only base its decision on the facts found to have been proven in the judgment appealed from, and admitted by the parties in their respective briefs. (Sec. 497, Code of Civil Procedure , as amended by Act No. 1596 ; Hijos de I. de la Rama vs. Robles and Robles, 8 Phil. Rep., 712.)According to the judgment the following facts have been proven:That the property described in the complaint wasowned by the late Catalino Montaano, father of the plaintiff Gregoria Montaano; that prior to this death the said Catalino Montaano executed his last will and testament, by which he declares his children Gregoria, Catalino, and Manuel Montaano, to be heirs to the property left by him in the shares or portions respectively designated in the said will; that the said will was duly authenticated on the 2d of February, 1906, and the defendant herein, Silvestre Suesa, being appointed administrator of the estate, presented an inventory of the property left by Catalino Montaano sr., deceased; that in numbers 8 and 38 of the said inventory the two parcels of land in controversy are described; that the plaintiff has endeavored to prove that the parcels of land claimed in her complaint were ceded to her as a gift by her father, Catalino Montaano, during his lifetime, and that she had never since been in possession thereof, but while these facts have notbeen fully demonstrated, on the other hand it appears by the evidence and the will executed byCatalino Montaano, sr., that the person whom he designated to inherit the parcels of land-referred to was his son Catalino, parcels of land situated in other barrios being left to the plaintiff Gregoria Montaano.Lastly, it was held in the judgment that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, both documentary and oral, does not establish her pretended ownership to the property in question.Accordingly to the foregoing considerations of the lower court not only has the plaintiff failed toprove that she is the owner of the lands in controversy, but there is positive evidence that they belong to her brother Catalino, against whom they were attached. In the opinion of the court below this evidence consists of the duly authenticated will of the late Catalino Montano, their ancestor, in which it is set forth that said lands were willed by the testator to his son Catalino, entirely different parcels being assigned to the plaintiff herein. With reference tothis point the judge below expresses himself in the following terms:As the will executed by Catalino Montaano, sr.,was duly authenticated, and the portion of the property left by the testator corresponding to each one of his heirs being stated therein, one must necessarily conclude that the latter are entitled to make their own those properties indicated in the said will in the manner provided by the testator himself. If, therefore, Catalino Montaano was instituted heir under said will of the two parcels of land describe in paragraph 1 of the complaint, it is unquestionable that no one but him can be recognized as the owner thereof, by title of inheritance from his father Catalino Montaano.The appellant maintains that the trial erred in attributing such probatory force to the testamentary provisions of the late Catalino Montaano from the mere fact that his will had been authenticated, because as she states, although it is true that it is conclusive with respect to the proper execution of the same, and as to the capacity of the testator, yet, according to the doctrine set up in the matters of Castaedavs. Alemany (3 Phil Rep., 426) and Pimentel vs. Palanca (5 Phil. Rep., 436), it is not so with regard to the validity of the provisions therein contained.The true import and meaning of this doctrine is by its own terms so clear and precise that any further explanation seems unnecessary. The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity ofthe testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity of efficiency of the provisions; these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questionsrelating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. This is not the case, however, with regard to the proper execution thereof, as in view of the fact that it constitutes the proper and special subject-matter thereof, it acquires by virtue thereof, the character of res adjudicata, and judicial question in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. Such is the reason of the doctrine invoked by the appellant, which evidently is not susceptible of the interpretation which she seems to have attributed in her brief.From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it does not follow that such provisions lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals. With respect to the partition of the inheritance, there isthe definite provision of law that when the testator makes such partition by an act inter vivos or by a last will, it shall be accepted in so far as it does not prejudice the legal portion of the heirs by force of law. (Art. 1056, Civil Code.)From this follows that, as the testator, Montaano, had by his will partitioned his property and assigned to his son Catalino, as his portion, the lands in question herein, the said testamentary provision, being binding on the heirs, constitutes prima facie evidence that the said lands were actually inherited by Catalino, and not by the plaintiff herein; other property was assigned to her in payment of her legal portion. Therefore, the trial judge committed no error of law when he considered said evidence inthe sense that he has done, inasmuch as it has notbeen proven, nor has any attempt been made to prove that the said testamentary provisions was impugned or annulled, or that it has ceased to be effective for any reason whatever.The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur.G.R. No. 1439ANTONIO CASTAEDA, plaintiff-appellee,vs.JOSE E. ALEMANY, defendant-appellant.Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos for appellant.The court erred in holding that all legal formalities had been complied with in the execution of the will of Doa Juana Moreno, as the proof shows that the said will was not writtenin the presence of under the express direction of the testratrix as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.Antonio V. Herrero for appellee.The grounds upon which a will may be disallowed are limited to those mentioned in section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure.WILLARD, J.:(1) The evidence in this case shows to our satisfaction that the will of Doa Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses, who signed it as witnesses in thepresence of the testratrix and of each other. It was therefore executed in conformity with law.There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be written by the testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under his express direction. That section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence. The English text of section 618 is very plain. The mistakes in translation found in the first Spanish edition of the code have been corrected in the second.(2) To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. It could not in this case make any decision upon the question whether the testratrix had the power to appoint by will a guardian for the property of her children by her first husband, or whether the person so appointed was or was not a suitable person to discharge such trust.All such questions must be decided in some other proceeding. The grounds on which a will may be disallowed are stated the section 634. Unless one of those grounds appears the will must be allowed. They all have to do with the personal condition of the testator at the time of its execution and the formalities connected therewith. It follows that neither this court nor the court below has any jurisdiction in his proceedings to pass upon the questions raised by the appellants by the assignment of error relatingto the appointment of a guardian for the children of the deceased.It is claimed by the appellants that there was no testimony in the court below to show that the will executed by the deceased was the same will presented to the court and concerning which this hearing was had. It is true that the evidence does not show that the document in court was presented to the witnesses and identified by them, as should have been done. But we think that we are justified in saying that it was assumed by all the parties during the trial in the court below that the will about which the witnesses were testifying was the document then in court. No suggestion of any kind was then made by the counsel for the appellants that it wasnot the same instrument. In the last question put to the witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is used by the counsel for the appellants. In their argument in that court, found on page 15 of the record, they treat the testimony of the witnesses as referring to the will probate they were then opposing.The judgment of the court below is affirmed, eliminating therefrom, however, the clause "el cual debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en todas sus partes." The costs of this instance will be charged against the appellants.HONESTO ALVAREZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs.PEDRO K. ESPIRITU, defendant-appellee.Arturo Agustines for plaintiffs-appellants.Alberto Aguilar for defendant-appellee.REGALA, J.:This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The resolution of the issues presented depends on a determination of whether Lot No. 292 of the Tala Estate was the paraphernal property of the late Consolacion Evangelista, or whether it was property of her conjugal partnership with Pedro K. Espiritu.The lot in question, with an area of 2 hectares, 76acres and 2 hectares, is located in Caloocan, Rizal (now Caloocan City). It originally formed part of the Friar Lands administered under Act No. 1120.On June 29, 1910, the Director of Lands issued Sales Certificate No. 479 in favor of ConsolacionEvangelista, by virtue of which the government agreed to sell the lot for P242.04. Under the terms of this certificate, the amount of P60.04, which had been paid as rentals, was credited in favor of Consolacion Evangelista and the balance of P182 was to be paid in 18 annual installments, the first installment of P12 to be paid on July 1, 1910 and the rest to be paid everyyear thereafter in 17 equal installments of P10 each.On June 13, 1923, Consolacion Evangelista married Pedro K. Espiritu. During their marriage, the installments on the price of the lot were paid with conjugal funds and by 1927 payment on all the installments was completed. On November 18, of that year, Consolacion Evangelista signed a deed entitled "Assignment of Sales Certificate No. 279" which recites as follows:This agreement, made in duplicate between Consolacion Evangelista, as ASSIGNOR, and Pedro K. Espiritu as ASSIGNEE.WITNESSETH: that the said ASSIGNOR, for and in consideration ofthe sum of P_______, 1 receipt $hereof is ac.no$ledged' hereb# sells' assigns' and transfers to the said A++I7NEE all right' and interest in and to lot 383 of the said Estate' ac6uired under and b# the terms of sales certificate numbered 9(8 dated June 38' 181:' together $ith all buildings and improvements on the said lot belonging to the said A++I7N;&.*he said A++I7NEE hereb# accepts the said assignment and transfer and e2pressl# agrees to be bound b# and to .eep and perform all the covenants and condition e2pressed in the said sale certificate to be .ept and performed b# the edro @. Espiritu' and b# plaintiffs Nicasio and Asuncion Evangelista her brother and sister' respectivel#!' ?onesto and Josefina Alvare- children of her deceased sister Eduviges! and Arsenio Evangelista son of her deceased brother &ufino!.>edro @. Espiritu filed +pecial >roceedings No. 5:3 in the Court of =irst Instance of Aulacan for the settlement of his $ife5s estate. *he $ill $as allo$ed and >edro @. Espiritu $as appointed e2ecutor upon the filing of a bond. Instead of filing a bond and 6ualif#ing as e2ecutor' Espiritu as.ed the court to convert the proceedings into a summar# settlement of the estate on the ground that the value of the properties did not e2ceed >4':::. *he court granted his motion' heard the case and on November 15' 1859' issued an order' the dispositive portion of $hich reads in part as follo$s0B?E&E=;&E' the Court hereb# distributes summaril# the estate left b# the deceased Consolacion Evangelista and hereb# ad,udicatesaforesaid estate in accordance $ith the $ill' E2hibit C' of said deceased in the follo$ing manner' to $it02 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 23! to >edro @. EspirituC of legal age' =ilipino' married to =lorentina Lope-' and resident of %abolo' >olo' Aulacan' the follo$ing properties02 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2b! All the one"fourth 1D9! share of the deceasedConsolacion Evangelista in the parcel of land .no$n as Lot No. 383 of the *ala Estate situatedin the Aarrio of Llano' Caloocan' &i-al' and described in Land *a2 )eclaration No. 13814 E2hibit A"3!' of said municipalit#C ... .%ean$hile' Aniceto %artin' the vendee a retro of the undivided other half of Lot No. 383' died. ?is children e2ecuted a document on )ecember 9' 185(' stating that "prior to Jul# (' 1851" >edro @. Espiritu had paid >4'::: to their father but that death prevented the latter from e2ecuting the corresponding deed of resale. =or this reason' the# $ere reconve#ing to >edro @. Espiritu "all theirrights' interest' participation and o$nership of $hatever nature in said Lot No. 383 1D3! of the *ala Estate +ubdivision described in *.C.*. No. 1953( of the &egister of)eeds of &i-al' sub,ect matter of the Pacto de Retro +ale.";n Januar# E' 1858' the plaintiffs brought this action against >edro @. Espiritu. Bhile their original claim $as that the lot $as con,ugal and' therefore' the# $ere entitled to one"half 1D3! of it' plaintiffs later amended their complaint and alleged that the lot $as the paraphernal propert# of Consolacion Evangelista $hich she brought to her marriage $ith >edro @. Espiritu. *he#' therefore' contended that' as heirs of Consolacion Espiritu' the# $ere entitled to three fourths 4D9! of the lot' onl# one"fourth 1D9!having been disposed of in the $ill. ;n the other hand' >edro @. Espiritu claimed that the lot $as their con,ugal propert#' one"half of $hich $as his share' in addition to one"fourth given to him in his $ife5s $ill. ?e subse6uentl# died and his second $ife' =lorentina Lope-' $ho is also theadministratri2 of his estate' substituted for him as defendant in this case.;n Januar# 5' 1861' the lo$er court rendered a decision declaring >edro @. Espiritu the o$ner of the entire lot. It e2plained thus0... . It is $ell settled that the propert# becomes con,ugal if the funds paid b# the husband in the later installments $ere for the purpose of the ac6uisition for the partnership the husband acting in his capacit# as administrator of the same. And there is over$helming evidence to support this conclusion. *he deceased Consolacion Evangelista had the installments paid b# the con,ugal funds and her intention to have it paid not for her e2clusive benefit but for that of the partnership is abundantl# demonstrated in the instruments she e2ecuted. *he final deed of conve#ance $as e2ecuted in the name of both spouses and the *orrens *itle issued in their names ,ointl#. In the )eed of Pacto de Retro she alluded to the land as propert# o$ned in common b# her and her husband and not as e2clusive propert#. *he real estate ta2es $ere paid out of the con,ugal funds.Again' this intention is clear and manifest $ith the subse6uent e2ecution of the )eed of Assignment purportedl# conve#ing the lot in 6uestion in favor of the spouses ,ointl#. Bithout necessaril# passing upon the validit# and effect of said deed' the same indubitabl# demonstratesthe intended change of the character of the propert# in 6uestion. =inall#' in her last $ill and testament' Consolacion e2pressl# declared said lot to be con,ugal propert#.*he Court' therefore' finds and so holds that the lot in 6uestion is con,ugal propert#' both spousesbeing entitled to an undivided half share. +o thaton =eb. (' 1896' $hen the same $as sold on pacto de retro' one"half thereof $as alienated' of$hich both spouses have an undivided e6ual share i.e.' one"fourth each!. *he remaining unsold half' consists of again an undivided e6ualshare in favor of both spouses i.e.' one"fourth each!. *his e2plains $h# in the $ill' Consolaciononl# be6ueathed 1D9 of the lot in favor of her husband' obviousl# because she believed that the other remaining one"fourth is the share of the husband in the con,ugal propert#.*he $hole one"half portion' therefore' remainingprior to the redemption of the lot in 185( belongsto the defendant >edro @. Espiritu. ;n the other hand' the Court believes that the other half portion subse6uentl# redeemed b# >edro @. Espiritu in 185( $ith his o$n e2clusive mone# also pertains to him in full o$nership. *his is the onl# ,ust and e6uitable conclusion considering that in 1898 $hen Consolacion died' the con,ugal partnership $as automaticall# dissolved' and considering further that the spouses manifestl# considered the lot in 6uestion to have been absolutel# alienated $ithout an# intention to redeem the same' and that it $as onl# in 189( $hen the redemption period had almost e2pired that the husband on second thought believed it profitable to redeem the land $ith his o$n mone# and for his o$n e2clusive benefit. ... .>laintiffs have appealed to this Court. Citing the case of Director of Lands v. Rizal' E( >hil. E:6' the# contend that o$nership of Lot No. 383 vested in Consolacion Evangelista upon the issuance to her in 181: of a sales certificate' $ith the result that the lot had become her propert# long before her marriage in 1834 to >edro @. Espiritu.*he point is $ell ta.en. Indeed' in Director of Lands v. Rizal' this Court ruled that under the =riar Lands Act No. 113:' the e6uitable and beneficial title to the land passes tothe purchaser the moment the first installment is paid and acertificate of sale is issued. *he reservation of the title in favor of the government' $hich refers to the bare' na.ed title' is made merel# for the protection of its interest so that the lot ma# not be disposed of b# the purchaser before the price is paid in full. Aut outside of this protection' the government retains no right as an o$ner.Even more in point is the case of Lorenzo v. Nicolas' 81 >hil. 6E6' in $hich this Court held that friar lands bought b# a $oman before her marriage $ere her paraphernal properties' although some of the installments on their price $ere paid for $ith con,ugal funds during their marriage. *hecon,ugal partnership $ould onl# be entitled to reimbursement for the e2penses' Civil Code Art. 191:!And $hat of the assignment of the sale certificate $hich Consolacion Evangelista made to her husband and herself and the subse6uent registration of the lot in their namesF Neither can avail the defendant an#. *he assignment of the sales certificate sho$s ver# clearl# that the lot $as Consolacion Evangelista5s e2clusive propert#' else $h# $ould she have to ma.e the assignmentF +uch an assignment is void G a patent nullit# G in vie$ of articles 1449 and 195E $hich prohibit donations and sales bet$eenspouses during the marriage. +ee e.g.' /# Co6ue v. NavasL. +ioca' 95 >hil. 94:!.*he lo$er court5s reliance on the certificate of title being issued in the names of the spouses is misplaced' because sec. (: of Land &egistration Act provides that "nothing contained in this Act shall in an# $a# be construed to relieve registered land or the o$ners thereof from an# rights incident to the relation of husband and $ife." Aecause of the feeling of trust e2isting bet$een spouses' certificates of title are often secured in the names of both' or of either' regardless of the source of the purchase mone#. It is thus but fair that on li6uidation of the partnership' the trust should be recogni-ed and enforced' so that the real o$nership of the propert# ma# be established. *he principle' that a trustee $ho ta.es a *orrens *itle in his name cannot repudiate the trust b# rel#ing on the registration' is one of the $ell".no$n limitations upon the finalit# of a decree of title. >aterna adilla v. Aibb# de >adilla' (9 >hil. 4((!.Nor do $e agree $ith the lo$er court5s reasoning that because >edro @. Espiritu redeemed one"half 1D3! of the lot $ith his o$n mone#' after the dissolution of the con,ugal partnership of gains' he thereb# became its o$ner. Lot No. 383 being the paraphernal propert# of Consolacion Evangelista before the sale' its redemption must be deemed as having revested its o$nership in the heirs of Consolacion Evangelista. +ee 7uinto v. Lim Aonfing' 9E >hil. EE9C +antos v. Aartolome' 99 >hil. (6! Bhat Espiritu had on the portion so redeemed $as merel# a lien for the amount paid b# him.It is contended' ho$ever' that the probate court5s order summaril# distributing the estate of Consolacion Evangelista is conclusive on the con,ugal character of Lot No. 383.*he argument has no merit. *he general rule is that 6uestions of title to propert# cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings. *he probate court can decide onl# provisionall# 6uestions of title to propert# for the purpose of inclusion into' or e2clusion from' the inventor#' $ithout pre,udice to a final determination of the 6uestion in a separate action. It is onl# $hen the parties interested are all heirs and the# agree to submit to the probate court the 6uestion as to title to propert# that the probate court ma# definitel# pass ,udgment thereon. 4 %oran Comments on the Rules of Court 93( H1864 ed.I! *hat is $h#' in Bernardo v. Court of Appeals' 7.&. No. L"1E19E' =ebruar# 3E' 1864' $e upheld the po$er of the probate court to ad,udicate in the testate proceedings the 6uestion as to $hether the properties therein involved belonged to the con,ugal partnership or to the deceased e2clusivel#.In this case' ho$ever' there is no such agreement among the heirs to submit for determination of the probate court the 6uestion of $hether or not Lot No. 383 $as con,ugal partnership propert#. If this point $as at all considered b# the probate court of Aulacan' it $as onl# provisionall#' for inventor# purposes' and certainl# $ithout pre,udice to the final determination of the 6uestion in a separate action such as this one.Be' therefore' hold that Lot No. 383 $as the paraphernal propert# of Consolacion Evangelista. +ince onl# one"fourth 1D9! of this lot had been given b# $ill' there still remains undisposed three"fourths 4D9! of the same./nder the rules of intestac# of the +panish Civil Code' 3 one"half 1D3! of the portion remaining belongs to the plaintiffs as collateral relatives and the other half belonged in usufruct to >edro @. Espiritu as surviving spouse. Art. 854 in relation to art. E4(! 4 Nicasio and Asuncion Evangelista $ho are the brother and sister of the deceased' respectivel#' inherit per capitaC $hile Josefina Alvare-' ?onesto Alvare- and Arsenio Evangelista' $ho areher niece and nephe$' respectivel#' inherit per stirpes. In addition' these collateral relatives are entitled to the corpus or capita of the other half held in usufruct b# >edro @. Espiritu. /pon the death of Espiritu on August 31' 1858' this usufruct terminated. +p. Civil Code art. 514H1I!*he usufruct of the husband during his life should be fi2ed conformabl# $ith article E4E $hich states0*he usufructuar# rights of the surviving spouse ma# be satisfied b# the settlement upon him or her b# the heirs of a life annuit# or the income from some specific propert#' or b# the pa#ment of mone#' as ma# be determined b# agreement bet$een the parties' or' in default of such agreement' b# ,udicial decision./ntil this has been done the usufructuar# interest of the surviving spouse shall constitute alien upon all the propert# of the estate.=or this reason' this case should be returned to the lo$er court for the purpose of determining the usufructuar# legitime of >edro @. Espiritu. In addition' the lo$er court should determine and settle the follo$ing0 1! the amount advanced b# the con,ugal partnership for the pa#ment of installments falling due during the marriage. 3! the amountpaid b# >edro @. Espiritu in redeeming Lot No. 383 after it had been sold under a deed of pacto de retroC 4! the amount of ta2es paid on the propert# b# the con,ugal partnershipC and 9! the value of the fruits received b# the husband over and above the value of his usufruct.B?E&E=;&E' the decision appealed from is reversed andthe case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in conformit# $ith this decision' $ithout pronouncement as to costs.Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Rees, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, !a"alintal, Bengzon, J.P., and #aldivar, JJ., concur.Barrera, J., is on leave.